Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER IX. · How from the Doctrine of our Kindred to God, we are to proceed to its Consequences.
1If what Philosophers say of the Kindred between God and Man be true; what has any one to do, but, like Socrates, when he is asked what Countryman he is, never to say that he is a Citizen of Athens, or of Corinth; but of the World? For why do you say that you are of Athens: and not of that Corner only, where that paultry Body of yours was laid at its Birth? Is it not, evidently, from what is principal, and comprehends not only that Corner, and your whole House; but the general Extent of the Country, from which your Pedigree is derived down to you, that you call yourself an Athenian, or a Corinthian? Why may not he then, who understands the Administration of the World; and has learned that the greatest, and most principal, and comprehensive, of all Things, is this System, composed of Men and God: and that from Him the Seeds of Being are descended, not only to my Father or Grandfather, but to all Things that are produced and born on Earth; and especially to rational Natures, as they alone are qualified to partake of a Communication with the Deity, being connected with him by Reason: Why may not [such a one] call himself a Citizen of the World? Why not a Son of God? And, why shall he fear any thing that happens among Men? Shall Kindred to Cæsar, or any other of the Great at Rome, enable a Man to live secure, above Contempt, and void of all Fear whatever: and shall not the having God for our Maker, and Father, and Guardian, free us from Griefs and Terrors? 2"But how shall I subsist? For I have nothing." Why, how do Slaves, how do Fugitives? To what do they trust, when they run away from their Masters? Is it to their Estates? Their Servants? Their Plate? To nothing but themselves. Yet they do not fail to get Necessaries. And must a Philosopher, think you, when he leaves his own Abode, rest and rely upon others; and not take care of himself? Must he be more helpless and anxious than the brute Beasts; each of which is self-sufficient, and wants neither proper Food, nor any able and natural Provision? One would think, there should be no Need for an old Fellow to sit here contriving, that you may not think meanly, nor entertain low and abject Notions of yourselves but that his Business would be, to take care, that there may not happen to be [among you] young Men of such a Spirit, that, knowing their Affinity to the Gods; and that we are as it were fettered by the Body and its Possessions, and by so many other Things as are necessary, upon these Accounts, for the Oeconomy and Commerce of Life; they should resolve to throw them off, as both troublesome and useless, and depart to their Kindred. 3This is the Work, if any, that ought to employ your Master and Preceptor, if you had one that you should come to him, and say; "Epictetus, we can no longer bear being tied down to this paultry Body: feeding and resting, and cleaning it, and hurried about with so many low Cares on its Account. Are not these Things indifferent, and nothing to us: and Death no Evil? Are not we Relations of God: and did we not come from him? Suffer us to go back thither from whence we came: suffer us, at length, to be delivered from these Fetters, that chain and weigh us down. Here, Thieves and Robbers, and Courts of Judicature, and those who are called Tyrants, seem to have some Power over us, on account of the Body and its Possessions. Suffer us to show them, that they have no Power." 4And in this Case it would be my Part to answer: "My Friends, wait for God, till he shall give the Signal, and dismiss you from this Service: then return to him. For the present, be content to remain in this Post, where he has placed you. The Time of your Abode here is short, and easy to such as are disposed like you: For what Tyrant, what Robber, what Thief, or what Courts of Judicature are formidable to those, who thus account the Body, and its Possessions, as nothing? Stay. Depart not inconsiderately." 5Thus ought the Case to stand between a Preceptor and ingenuous young Men. But how stands it now? The Preceptor has no Life in him: you have none neither. When you have had enough To-day, you sit weeping about To-morrow, how you shall get Food. Why, if you have it, Wretch, you will have it: if not you will go out of Life. The Door is open: why do you lament? What room doth there remain for Tears? What Occasion for Flattery? Why should any one Person envy another? Why should he be struck with awful Admiration of those who have great Possessions, or are placed in high Rank, [as is common,]? Especially, if they are powerful and passionate? For what will they do to us? The Things which they can do, we do not regard: the Things which we are concerned about, they cannot do. Who then, after all, shall command a Person thus disposed? How was Socrates affected by these Things? As it became one persuaded of his being a Relation of the Gods. "If you should tell me (says he to his Judges), we will acquit you, upon Condition that you shall no longer discourse in the Manner you have hitherto done, nor make any Disturbance either among our young or our old People;" I would answer; "You are ridiculous in thinking, that if your General had placed me in any Post, I ought to maintain and defend it, and chuse to die a thousand times, rather than desert it: but if God hath assigned me any Station or Method of Life, that I ought to desert that for you." 6This it is, for a Man to be truly a Relation of God. But we consider ourselves as a mere Assemblage of Stomach and Entrails, and bodily Parts. Because we fear, because we desire; we flatter those who can help us in these Matters; we dread the very same Persons. 7A Person desired me once to write for him to Rome. He was one vulgarly esteemed unfortunate, as he had been formerly illustrious and rich, and afterwards stript of all his Possessions, and reduced to live here. I wrote for him in a submissive Stile: but, after reading my Letter, he returned it to me, and said; "I wanted your Assistance, not your Pity; for no Evil hath befallen me." §. 8 Thus Rufus, to try me, used to say, this or that you will have from your Master. When I answered him, these are [uncertain] human Affairs: Why then, says he, should I intercede with him, when you can receive these Things from yourself? For what one hath of his own, it is superfluous and vain to receive from another. Shall I then, who can receive Greatness of Soul and a manly Spirit from myself, receive an Estate, or a Sum of Money, or a Place, from you? Heaven forbid! I will not be so insensible of my own Possessions. But, if a Person is fearful and abject, what else is necessary, but to write Letters for him as if he was dead. "Pray oblige us with the Corpse and Blood of such a one." For, in fact, such a one is Corpse and Blood; and nothing more. For, if he was any thing more, he would be sensible, that one Man is not rendered unfortunate by another.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (3)
- Δει ημας should probably be δι ὐμας, and is so translated.
- This Passage has great Difficulties, which I know not how to solve, any otherwise than by supposing something after ανθρωπινα to be lost.
- The Translator follows Mr. Upton's Conjecture in this Place, and the French Version agrees with it.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
How from the doctrine of our relationship to god we are to deduce its consequences.
If what philosophers say of the kinship between God and men be true, what has any one to do but, like Socrates, when he is Asked what countryman he is, never to say that he is a citizen of Athens, or of Corinth, but of the universe? For why, if you limit yourself to Athens, do you not farther limit yourself to that mere corner of Athens where your body was brought forth? Is it not, evidently, from some larger local tie, which comprehends, not only that comer and your whole house, but the whole country of your fathers, that you call yourself an Athenian, or a Corinthian? He, then, who understands the administration of the universe, and has learned that the principal and greatest and most comprehensive of all things is this vast system, extending from men to God: and that from Him the seeds of being are descended not only to one’s father or grandfather, but to all things that are produced and born on earth; and especially to rational natures, since they alone are qualified to partake of a communication with the Deity, being connected with him by reason,—why may not such a one call himself a citizen of the universe! Why not a son of God? And why shall he fear any thing that happens among men? Shall kinship to Caesar, or any other of the great at Rome, enable a man to live secure, above contempt, and void of all fear whatever; and shall not the having God for our maker, and father, and guardian, free us from griefs and alarms?
But wherewithal shall I be fed? For I have nothing.
To what do fugitive slaves trust when they run away from their masters? Is it to their estates,—their servants,—their plate? To nothing but themselves. Yet they do not fail to obtain the necessaries of life. And must a philosopher, think you, leave his own abode to rest and rely upon others, and not take care of himself? Must he be more helpless and anxious than the brute beasts?—each of which is self-sufficient, and wants neither proper food nor any suitable and natural provision. One would think that you would need an instructor, not to guard you from thinking too meanly or ignobly of yourselves, but that his business would be to rear up young men of such a spirit that, knowing their affinity to the gods, and that we are as it were fettered by the body and its possessions, and by so many other things as are thus made needful for the daily pursuits of life, they should resolve to throw them all off, as both troublesome and useless, and depart to their divine kindred.
This is the work, if any, that ought to employ your master and preceptor if you had one, that you should come to him and say: Epictetus, we can no longer bear being tied down to this poor body,—feeding, and resting, and cleaning it, and vexed with so many low cares on its account. Are not these things indifferent, and nothing to us, and death no evil? Are we not of kindred to God; and did we not come from him? Suffer us to go back thither from whence we came. Suffer us at length to be delivered from these fetters that bind and weigh us down. Here thieves and robbers, courts and tyrants, claim power over us, through the body and its possessions. Suffer us to show them that they have no power.
And in this case it would be my part to answer: My friends, wait for God, till he shall give the signal and dismiss you from this service; then return to him. For the present, be content to remain at this post where he has placed you. The time of your abode here is short and easy to such as are disposed like you; for what tyrant, what robber, what thief, or what court can be formidable to those who thus count for nothing the body and its possessions. Stay, nor foolishly depart.
Thus ought the case to stand between a preceptor and ingenuous young men. But how stands it now? The preceptor has no life in him, and you have none. When you have had enough to-day, you sit weeping about to-morrow, in regard to how you shall get food. Why, if you have it, slave, you will have it; if not, you will go out of life. The door is open, why do you lament; what room remains for tears; what occasion for flattery? Why should any one person envy another? Why should he be impressed with awe by those who have great possessions, or are placed in high rank,—especially, if they are powerful and passionate? For what can they do to us? The things which they can do, we do not regard; the things about which we are concerned, they cannot reach. Who, then, after all, shall hold sway over a person thus disposed? How behaved Socrates in regard to these things? As it became one conscious of kinship with the gods. He said to his judges:—
If you should tell me, We will acquit you upon condition that you shall no longer discourse in the manner you have hitherto done, nor make any disturbance among either our young or our old people, I would answer: You are ridiculous in thinking that if your general had placed me in any post I ought to maintain and defend it, and choose to die a thousand times, rather than desert it, but that if God has assigned me any station or method of life, I ought to desert that for you.
This it is for a man to truly recognize his relationship with God, But we habitually think of ourselves as [made up of] mere stomach and intestines and bodily parts. Because we fear, because we desire, we flatter those who can help us in these matters; we dread them too.
A person desired me once to write for him to Rome. He was one vulgarly esteemed unfortunate, as he had been formerly illustrious and rich, and was afterwards stripped of all his possessions, and reduced to live here. I wrote for him in a submissive style; but after reading my letter he returned it to me and said: wanted your assistance, not your pity; for no evil has befallen me.
Thus Rufus, to try me, used to say, This or that you will have from your master. When I answered him, These are mere human affairs, Why, then, says he, should I intercede with him, when you can receive from yourself things more important? For what one has of his own, it is superfluous and vain to receive from another. Shall I, then, who can receive nobleness and a manly spirit from myself, receive an estate, or a sum of money, or a place, from you? Heaven forbid! I will not be so insensible of my own possessions. But if a person is fearful and abject, what else is necessary but to apply for permission to bury him as if he were dead? Please forward to us the corpse of such a one. For, in fact, such a one is that, and nothing more. If he were anything more, he would be sensible that man is not to be made miserable at the will of his fellow-man.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Higginson’s notes (1)
- This is a disputed passage, and something is probably lost.—H.
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
How from the fact that we are akin to God a man may proceed to the consequences.
If the things are true which are said by the philosophers about the kinship between God and man, what else remains for men to do than what Socrates did? Never in reply to the question, to what country you belong, say that you are an Athenian or a Corinthian, but that you are a citizen of the world (κόσμιος). For why do you say that you are an Athenian, and why do you not say that you belong to the small nook only into which your poor body was cast at birth? Is it not plain that you call yourself an Athenian or Corinthian from the place which has a greater authority and comprises not only that small nook itself and all your family, but even the whole country from which the stock of your progenitors is derived down to you? He then who has observed with intelligence the administration of the world, and has learned that the greatest and supreme and the most comprehensive community is that which is composed of men and God, and that from God have descended the seeds not only to my father and grandfather, but to all beings which are generated on the earth and are produced, and particularly to rational beings—for these only are by their nature formed to have communion with God, being by means of reason conjoined with him—why should not such a man call himself a citizen of the world, why not a son of God, and why should he be afraid of anything which happens among men? Is kinship with Caesar (the emperor) or with any other of the powerful in Rome sufficient to enable us to live in safety, and above ( contempt and without any fear at all? and to have God for your maker (ποιητήν), and father and guardian, shall not this release us from sorrows and fears?
But a man may say, Whence shall I get bread to eat when I have nothing?
And how do slaves, and runaways, on what do they rely when they leave their masters? Do they rely on their lands or slaves, or their vessels of silver? They rely on nothing but themselves; and food does not fail them. And shall it be necessary for one among us who is a philosopher to travel into foreign parts, and trust to and rely on others, and not to take care of himself, and shall he be inferior to irrational animals and more cowardly, each of which being self-sufficient, neither fails to get its proper food, nor to find a suitable way of living, and one conformable to nature?
I indeed think that the old man ought to be sitting here, not to contrive how you may have no mean thoughts nor mean and ignoble talk about yourselves, but to take care that there be not among us any young men of such a mind, that when they have recognised their kinship to God, and that we are fettered by these bonds, the body, I mean, and its possessions, and whatever else on account of them is necessary to us for the economy and commerce of life, they should intend to throw off these things as if they were burdens painful and intolerable, and to depart to their kinsmen. But this is the labour that your teacher and instructor ought to be employed upon, if he really were what he should be. You should come to him and say, Epictetus, we can no longer endure being bound to this poor body, and feeding it and giving it drink, and rest, and cleaning it, and for the sake of the body complying with the wishes of these and of those. Are not these things indifferent and nothing to us; and is not death no evil? And are we not in a manner kinsmen of God, and did we not come from him? Allow us to depart to the place from which we came; allow us to be released at last from these bonds by which we are bound and weighed down. Here there are robbers and thieves and courts of justice, and those who are named tyrants, and think that they have some power over us by means of the body and its possessions. Permit us to show them that they have no power over any man. And I on my part would say, Friends, wait for God: when He shall give the signal and release you from this service, then go to Him; but for the present endure to dwell in this place where He has put you: short indeed is this time of your dwelling here, and easy to bear for those who are so disposed: for what tyrant or what thief, or what courts of justice, are formidable to those who have thus considered as things of no value the body and the possessions of the body? Wait then, do not depart without a reason.
Something like this ought to be said by the teacher to ingenuous youths. But now what happens? The teacher is a lifeless body, and you are lifeless bodies. When you have been well filled to-day, you sit down and lament about the morrow, how you shall get something to eat. Wretch, if you have it, you will have it; if you have it not, you will depart from life. The door is open. Why do you grieve? where does there remain any room for tears? and where is there occasion for flattery? why shall one man envy another? why should a man admire the rich or the powerful, even if they be both very strong and of violent temper? for what will they do to us? We shall not care for that which they can do; and what we do care for, that they cannot do. How did Socrates behave with respect to these matters? Why, in what other way than a man ought to do who was convinced that he was a kinsman of the gods? If you say to me now, said Socrates to his judges, we will acquit you on the condition that you no longer discourse in the way in which you have hitherto discoursed, nor trouble either our young or our old men, I shall answer, you make yourselves ridiculous by thinking that, if one of our commanders has appointed me to a certain post, it is my duty to keep and maintain it, and to resolve to die a thousand times rather than desert it; but if God has put us in any place and way of life, we ought to desert it. Socrates speaks like a mar who is really a kinsman of the gods. But we think about ourselves, as if we were only stomachs, and intestines, and shameful parts; we fear, we desire; we flatter those who are able to help us in these matters, and we fear them also.
A man asked me to write to Rome about him, a man who, as most people thought, had been unfortunate, for formerly he was a man of rank and rich, but had been stripped of all, and was living here. I wrote on his behalf in a submissive manner; but when he had read the letter, he gave it back to me and said, I wished for your help, not your pity: no evil has happened to me.
Thus also Musonius Rufus, in order to try me, used to say: This and this will befall you from your master; and when I replied that these were things which happen in the ordinary course of human affairs. Why then, said he, should I ask him for anything when I can obtain it from you? For, in fact, what a man has from himself, it is superfluous and foolish to receive from another?s Shall I then, who am able to receive from myself greatness of soul and a generous spirit, receive from you land and money or a magisterial office? I hope not: I will not be so ignorant about my own possessions. But when a man is cowardly and mean, what else must be done for him than to write letters as you would about a corpse. Please to grant us the body of a certain person and a sextarius of poor blood. For such a person is, in fact, a carcase and a sextarius (a certain quantity) of blood, and nothing more. But if he were anything more, lie would know that one man is not miserable through the means of another.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (11)
- Cicero, Tuscul. v. 37, has the same: Socrates cum rogaretur, cujatem se esse diceret, Mundanum, inquit. Totius enim mundi se incolam et civem arbitrabatur. (Upton.)
- It is the possession of reason, he says, by which man has communion with God; it is not by any external means, or religious ceremonial. A modern expositor of Epictetus says, Through reason our souls are as closely connected and mixed up with the deity as though they were part of him (Epictet. i. 14, 6; ii. 8, 11, 17, 33). In the Epistle named from Peter (ii. 1, 4) it is written: Whereby are given to us exceeding great and precious promises that by these (see v. 3) ye might be partakers of the divine nature ( γένησθε θείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως ), having escaped the corruption that is in the world through lust. Mrs. Carter, Introduction, § 31, has some remarks on this Stoic doctrine, which are not a true explanation of the principles of Epictetus and Antoninus.
- So Jesus said, Our Father which art in heaven. Cleanthes, in his hymn to Zeus, writes, ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμέν . Compare Acts of the Apostles, xvii. 28, where Paul quotes these words. It is not true then that the conception of a parental deity, as it has been asserted, was unknown before the teaching of Jesus, and, after the time of Jesus, unknown to those Greeks who were unacquainted with His teaching.
- In our present society there are thousands who rise in the morning and know not how they shall find something to eat. Some find their food by fraud and theft, some receive it as a gift from others, and some look out for any work that they can find and get their pittance by honest labour. You may see such men everywhere, if you will keep your eyes open. Such men, who live by daily labour, live an heroic life, which puts to shame the well-fed philosopher and the wealthy Christian. Epictetus has made a great misstatement about irrational animals. Millions die annually for want of sufficient food; and many human beings perish in the same way. We can hardly suppose that he did not know these facts. Compare the passage in Matthew (vi. 25–34). It is said, v. 26: Behold the fowls of the air: for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns; yet your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are ye not much better than they? The expositors of this passage may be consulted.
- The old man is Epictetus.
- He means, as Wolf says, on account of the necessities of the body seeking the favour of the more powerful by disagreeable compliances.
- Upton refers to Cicero, Tuscul. i. 30, Cato Major, c. 20; Somnium Scipionis, c. 3 (De Republica, iv. 15); the purport of which passage is that we must not depart from life without the command of God. See Marcus Antoninus, ii. 17; iii. 5; v. 33. But how shall a man know the signal for departure, of which Epictetus speaks?
- Upton has referred to the passages of Epictetus in which this expression is used, i. 24, 20; i. 25, 18; ii. 1, 19, and others; to Seneca, De Provid. c. 6, Ep. 91; to Cicero, De Fin. iii. 18, where there is this conclusion: e quo apparet et sapientis esse aliquando officium excedere e vita, quum beatus sit; et stulti manere in vita quum sit miser. Compare Matthew vi. 31: Therefore take no thought, saying, What shall we eat? or, What shall we drink? or, Wherewithal shall we be clothed? (For after all these things do the Gentiles seek:) for your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things, etc.
- This passage is founded on and is in substance the same as that in Plato’s Apology, c. 17.
- Schweighaeuser has a long note on this passage, to receive from another. I think that there is no difficulty about the meaning; and the careful reader will find none. Epictetus was once a slave.
- The meaning is obscure. Schweighaeuser thinks that the allusion is to a defeated enemy asking permission from the conqueror to bury the dead. Epictetus considers a man as a mere carcase who places his happiness in externals and in the favour of others.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1εἰ ταῦτά ἐστιν ἀληθῆ τὰ περὶ τῆς συγγενείας τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων λεγόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσόφων, τί ἄλλο ἀπολείπεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους, μηδέποτε πρὸς τὸν πυθόμενον ποδαπός ἐστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι Ἀθηναῖος ἢ Κορίνθιος, ἀλλʼ ὅτι κόσμιος; 2διὰ τί γὰρ λέγεις Ἀθηναῖον εἶναι σεαυτόν, οὐχὶ δʼ ἐξ ἐκείνης μόνον τῆς γωνίας, εἰς ἣν ἐρρίφη γεννηθέν σου τὸ σωμάτιον; 3ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ κυριωτέρου καὶ περιέχοντος οὐ μόνον αὐτὴν ἐκείνην τὴν γωνίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλην σου τὴν οἰκίαν καὶ ἁπλῶς ὅθεν σου τὸ γένος τῶν προγόνων εἰς σὲ κατελήλυθεν ἐντεῦθέν ποθεν καλεῖς σεαυτὸν Ἀθηναῖον καὶ Κορίνθιον; 4ὁ τοίνυν τῇ διοικήσει τοῦ κόσμου παρηκολουθηκὼς καὶ μεμαθηκώς, ὅτι τὸ μέγιστον καὶ κυριώτατον καὶ περιεκτικώτατον πάντων τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ σύστημα τὸ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεοῦ, ἀπʼ ἐκείνου δὲ τὰ σπέρματα καταπέπτωκεν οὐκ εἰς τὸν πατέρα τὸν ἐμὸν μόνον οὐδʼ εἰς τὸν πάππον, ἀλλʼ εἰς ἅπαντα μὲν τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς γεννώμενά τε καὶ φυόμενα, προηγουμένως δʼ εἰς τὰ λογικά, 5ὅτι κοινωνεῖν μόνον ταῦτα πέφυκεν τῷ θεῷ τῆς συναναστροφῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἐπι πεπλεγμένα, 6διὰ τί μὴ εἴπῃ [τις] αὑτὸν κόσμιον; διὰ τί μὴ υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ; διὰ τί δὲ φοβηθήσεταί τι τῶν γιγνομένων ἐν ἀνθρώποις; 7ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν τὸν Καίσαρα ἡ συγγένεια ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν μέγα δυναμένων ἐν Ῥώμῃ ἱκανὴ παρέχειν ἐν ἀσφαλείᾳ διάγοντας καὶ ἀκαταφρονήτους καὶ δεδοικότας μηδʼ ὁτιοῦν, τὸ δὲ τὸν θεὸν ποιητὴν ἔχειν καὶ πατέρα καὶ κηδεμόνα οὐκέτι ἡμᾶς ἐξαιρήσεται λυπῶν καὶ φόβων; 8— καὶ πόθεν φάγω, φησίν, μηδὲν ἔχων; — καὶ πῶς οἱ δοῦλοι, πῶς οἱ δραπέται, τίνι πεποιθότες ἐκεῖνοι ἀπαλλάττονται τῶν δεσποτῶν; τοῖς ἀγροῖς. ἢ τοῖς οἰκέταις ἢ τοῖς ἀργυρώμασιν; οὐδενί, ἀλλʼ ἑαυτοῖς· καὶ ὅμως οὐκ ἐπιλείπουσιν αὐτοὺς τροφαί. 9τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον ἡμῖν δεήσει ἄλλοις θαρροῦντα καὶ ἐπαναπαυόμενον ἀποδημεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν θηρίων τῶν ἀλόγων εἶναι χείρονα καὶ δειλότερον, ὧν ἕκαστον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ἀρκούμενον οὔτε τροφῆς ἀπορεῖ τῆς οἰκείας οὔτε διεξαγωγῆς τῆς καταλλήλου[ς] καὶ κατὰ φύσιν; 10ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ὅτι ἔδει καθῆσθαι τὸν πρεσβύτερον ἐνταῦθα οὐ τοῦτο μηχανώμενον, ὅπως μὴ ταπεινοφρονήσητε μηδὲ ταπεινοὺς μηδʼ ἀγεννεῖς τινας διαλογισμοὺς διαλογιεῖσθε αὐτοὶ περὶ ἑαυτῶν, 11ἀλλὰ μή τινες ἐμπίπτωσιν τοιοῦτοι νέοι, οἳ ἐπιγνόντες τὴν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς συγγένειαν καὶ ὅτι δεσμά τινα ταῦτα προσηρτήμεθα τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν κτῆσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἕνεκα ἀναγκαῖα ἡμῖν γίνεται εἰς οἰκονομίαν καὶ ἀναστροφὴν τὴν ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ὡς βάρη τινὰ καὶ ἀνιαρὰ καὶ ἄχρηστα ἀπορρῖψαι θέλωσιν καὶ ἀπελθεῖν πρὸς τοὺς συγγενεῖς. 12καὶ τοῦτον ἔδει τὸν ἀγῶνα ἀγωνίζεσθαι τὸν διδάσκαλον ὑμῶν καὶ παιδευτήν, εἴ τις ἄρα ἦν· ὑμᾶς μὲν ἔρχεσθαι λέγοντας Ἐπίκτητε, οὐκέτι ἀνεχόμεθα μετὰ τοῦ σωματίου τούτου δεδεμένοι καὶ τοῦτο τρέφοντες καὶ ποτίζοντες καὶ ἀναπαύοντες καὶ καθαίροντες, εἶτα διʼ αὐτὸ συμπεριφερόμενοι τοῖσδε καὶ τοῖσδε. 13οὐκ ἀδιάφορα ταῦτα καὶ οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς καὶ ὁ θάνατος οὐ κακόν; καὶ συγγενεῖς τινες τοῦ θεοῦ ἐσμεν κἀκεῖθεν ἐληλύθαμεν; 14ἄφες ἡμᾶς ἀπελθεῖν ὅθεν ἐληλύθαμεν, ἄφες λυθῆναί ποτε τῶν δεσμῶν τούτων τῶν ἐξηρτημένων καὶ βαρούντων. 15ἐνταῦθα λῃσταὶ καὶ κλέπται καὶ δικαστήρια καὶ οἱ καλούμενοι τύραννοι δοκοῦντες ἔχειν τινὰ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ἐξουσίαν διὰ τὸ σωμάτιον καὶ τὰ τούτου κτήματα. ἄφες δείξωμεν αὐτοῖς, ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἔχουσιν ἐξουσίαν· 16ἐμὲ δʼ ἐν τῷδε λέγειν ὅτι ἄνθρωποι, ἐκδέξασθε τὸν θεόν. ὅταν ἐκεῖνος σημήνῃ καὶ ἀπολύσῃ ὑμᾶς ταύτης τῆς ὑπηρεσίας, τότʼ ἀπολύεσθε πρὸς αὐτόν· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ παρόντος ἀνάσχεσθε ἐνοικοῦντες ταύτην τὴν χώραν, εἰς ἣν ἐκεῖνος ὑμᾶς ἔταξεν. 17ὀλίγος ἄρα χρόνος οὗτος ὁ τῆς οἰκήσεως καὶ ῥᾴδιος τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις. ποῖος γὰρ ἔτι τύραννος ἢ ποῖος κλέπτης ἢ ποῖα δικαστήρια φοβερὰ τοῖς οὕτως παρʼ οὐδὲν πεποιημένοις τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὰ τούτου κτήματα; μείνατε, μὴ ἀλογίστως ἀπέλθητε. 18τοιοῦτόν τι ἔδει γίνεσθαι παρὰ τοῦ παιδευτοῦ πρὸς τοὺς εὐφυεῖς τῶν νέων. 19νῦν δὲ τί γίνεται; νεκρὸς μὲν ὁ παιδευτής, νεκροὶ δʼ ὑμεῖς. ὅταν χορτασθῆτε σήμερον, κάθησθε κλάοντες περὶ τῆς αὔριον, πόθεν φάγητε. 20ἀνδράποδον, ἂν σχῇς, ἕξεις· ἂν μὴ σχῇς, ἐξελεύσῃ· ἤνοικται ἡ θύρα. τί πενθεῖς; ποῦ ἔτι τόπος δακρύοις; τίς ἔτι κολακείας ἀφορμή; διὰ τί ἄλλος ἄλλῳ φθονήσει; διὰ τί πολλὰ κεκτημένους θαυμάσει ἢ τοὺς ἐν δυνάμει τεταγμένους, μάλιστʼ ἂν καὶ ἰσχυροὶ ὦσιν καὶ ὀργίλοι; 21τί γὰρ ἡμῖν ποιήσουσιν; ἃ δύνανται ποιῆσαι, τούτων οὐκ ἐπιστρεψόμεθα· ὧν ἡμῖν μέλει, ταῦτα οὐ δύνανται. τίς οὖν ἔτι ἄρξει τοῦ οὕτως διακειμένου; 22πῶς Σωκράτης εἶχεν πρὸς ταῦτα; πῶς γὰρ ἄλλως ἢ ὡς ἔδει τὸν πεπεισμένον ὅτι ἐστὶ τῶν θεῶν συγγενής; 23ἄν μοι λέγητε, φησίν, νῦν ὅτι ἀφίεμέν σε ἐπὶ τούτοις, ὅπως μηκέτι διαλέξῃ τούτους τοὺς λόγους οὓς μέχρι νῦν διελέγου μηδὲ παρενοχλήσεις ἡμῶν τοῖς νέοις μηδὲ τοῖς γέρουσιν, 24ἀποκρινοῦμαι ὅτι γελοῖοί ἐστε, οἵτινες ἀξιοῦτε, εἰ μέν με ὁ στρατηγὸς ὁ ὑμέτερος ἔταξεν εἴς τινα τάξιν, ὅτι ἔδει με τηρεῖν αὐτὴν καὶ φυλάττειν καὶ μυριάκις πρότερον αἱρεῖσθαι ἀποθνῄσκειν ἢ ἐγκαταλιπεῖν αὐτήν, εἰ δʼ ὁ θεὸς ἔν τινι χώρᾳ καὶ ἀναστροφῇ κατατέταχεν, ταύτην δʼ ἐγκαταλιπεῖν δεῖ ἡμᾶς. 25τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος ταῖς ἀληθείαις συγγενὴς τῶν θεῶν. 26ἡμεῖς οὖν ὡς κοιλίαι, ὡς ἔντερα, ὡς αἰδοῖα, οὕτω περὶ αὑτῶν διανοούμεθα, ὅτι φοβούμεθα, ὅτι ἐπιθυμοῦμεν· τοὺς εἰς ταῦτα συνεργεῖν δυναμένους κολακεύομεν, τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους δεδοίκαμεν. 27ἐμέ τις ἠξίωκεν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ γράψαι εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην ὡς ἐδόκει τοῖς πολλοῖς ἠτυχηκὼς καὶ πρότερον μὲν ἐπιφανὴς ὢν καὶ πλούσιος, ὕστερον δʼ ἐκπεπτωκὼς ἁπάντων καὶ διάγων ἐνταῦθα. 28κἀγὼ ἔγραψα ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ταπεινῶς. ὁ δʼ ἀναγνοὺς τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἀπέδωκέν μοι αὐτὴν καὶ ἔφη ὅτι ἐγὼ βοηθηθῆναί τι ὑπὸ σοῦ ἤθελον, οὐχὶ ἐλεηθῆναι· κακὸν δέ μοι οὐθέν ἐστιν. 29οὕτως καὶ Ῥοῦφος πειράζων μʼ εἰώθει λέγειν συμβήσεταί σοι τοῦτο καὶ τοῦτο ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου. 30κἀμοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀποκριναμένου ὅτι ἀνθρώπινα τί οὖν ἔτι ἐκεῖνον παρακαλῶ παρὰ σοῦ αὐτὰ λαβεῖν δυνάμενος; 31τῷ γὰρ ὄντι, ὃ ἐξ αὑτοῦ τις ἔχει, περισσὸς καὶ μάταιος παρʼ ἄλλου λαμβάνων. 32ἐγὼ οὖν ἔχων ἐξ ἐμαυτοῦ λαβεῖν τὸ μεγαλόψυχον καὶ γενναῖον, ἀγρὸν παρὰ σοῦ λάβω καὶ ἀργύριον ἢ ἀρχήν τινα; μὴ γένοιτο. οὐχ οὕτως ἀναίσθητος ἔσομαι τῶν ἐμῶν κτημάτων. 33ἀλλʼ ὅταν τις ᾖ δειλὸς καὶ ταπεινός, ὑπὲρ τούτου τί ἄλλο ἢ ἀνάγκη γράφειν ἐπιστολὰς ὡς ὑπὲρ νεκροῦ τὸ πτῶμα ἡμῖν χάρισαι τοῦ δεῖνος καὶ ξέστην αἱματίου; 34τῷ γὰρ ὄντι πτῶμα ὁ τοιοῦτός ἐστι καὶ ξέστης αἱματίου, πλέον δʼ οὐδέν. εἰ δʼ ἦν πλέον τι, ᾐσθάνετʼ ἄν, ὅτι ἄλλος διʼ ἄλλον οὐ δυστυχεῖ.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA