Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER III. · How, from the Doctrine that God is the Father of Mankind, we may proceed to its Consequences.
1IF a Person could be persuaded of this Principle as he ought, that we are all originally descended from God, and that he is the Father of Gods and Men; I conceive he never would think meanly or degenerately concerning himself. Suppose Cæsar were to adopt you, there would be no bearing your haughty Looks: And will you not be elated on knowing yourself to be the Son of Jupiter? Yet, in Fact, we are not elated. But having two Things in our composition, intimately united, a Body in Common with the Brutes, and Reason and Sentiment in common with the Gods; many incline to this unhappy and mortal Kindred, and only some few to the divine and happy one. And, as of Necessity every one must treat each particular Thing, according to the Notions he forms about it; so those few, who think they are made for Fidelity, Decency, and a well-grounded Use of the Appearances of Things, never think meanly or degenerately concerning themselves. But with the Multitude the Case is contrary: "For what am I? A poor contemptible Man, with this miserable Flesh of mine!" Miserable indeed. But you have likewise something better than this paultry Flesh. Why then, overlooking that, do you pine away in Attention to this? 2By means of this [animal] Kindred, some of us, deviating towards it, become like Wolves, faithless, and insidious, and mischievous: others, like Lions, wild, and savage, and untamed: but most of us Foxes, and Wretches even among Brutes. For what else is a slanderous and ill-natured Man, than a Fox, or something yet more wretched and mean? See then, and take heed, that you do not become such Wretches.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
How, from the doctrine that god is the father of mankind, we may proceed to its consequences.
If a person could be persuaded of this principle as he ought, that we are all originally descended from God, and that he is the father of men and gods, I conceive he never would think of himself meanly or ignobly. Suppose Caesar were to adopt you, there would be no bearing your haughty looks; and will you not feel ennobled on knowing yourself to be the son of God? Yet, in fact, we are not ennobled. But having two things united in our composition, a body in common with the brutes, and reason in common with the gods, many incline to this unhappy and mortal kindred, and only some few to that which is happy and divine. And, as of necessity every one must treat each particular thing according to the notions he forms about it, so those few who suppose that they are made for faith and honor and a wise use of things will never think meanly or ignobly concerning themselves. But with the multitude the case is contrary. For what am I? A poor contemptible man, with this miserable flesh of mine? Miserable indeed; but you have likewise something better than this poor flesh. Why, then, overlooking that, do you pine away in attention to this?
By means of this [animal] kindred some of us, deviating towards it, become like wolves, faithless, and crafty, and mischievous; others, like lions, wild and savage and untamed; but most of us foxes, and disgraceful even among brutes. For what else is a slanderous and ill-natured man but a fox, or something yet more wretched and mean? Watch and take heed, then, that you do not sink thus low.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
How a man should proceed from the principle of god being the father of all men to the rest.
If a man should be able to assent to this doctrine as he ought, that we are all sprung from God in an especial manner, and that God is the father both of men and of gods, I suppose that he would never have any ignoble or mean thoughts about himself. But if Caesar (the emperor) should adopt you, no one could endure your arrogance; and if you know that you are the son of Zeus, will you not be elated? Yet we do not so; but since these two things are mingled in the generation of man, body in common with the animals, and reason and intelligence in common with the gods, many incline to this kinship, which is miserable and mortal; and some few to that which is divine and happy. Since then it is of necessity that every man uses everything according to the opinion which he has about it, those, the few, who think that they are formed for fidelity and modesty and a sure use of appearances have no mean or ignoble thoughts about themselves; but with the many it is quite the contrary. For they say, What am I? A poor, miserable man, with my wretched bit of flesh. Wretched, indeed; but you possess something better than your bit of flesh. Why then do you neglect that which is better, and why do you attach yourself to this?
Through this kinship with the flesh, some of us inclining to it become like wolves, faithless and treacherous and mischievous: some become like lions, savage and bestial and untamed; but the greater part of us become foxes, and other worse animals. For what else is a slanderer and a malignant man than a fox, or some other more wretched and meaner animal? See then and take care that you do not become some one of these miserable things.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (2)
- Epictetus speaks of God ὁ θεός and the gods. Also conformably to the practice of the people, he speaks of God under the name of Zeus. The gods of the people were many, but his God was perhaps one. Father of men and gods, says Homer of Zeus; and Virgil says of Jupiter, Father of gods and king of men. Salmasius proposed ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ . See Schweig.’s note.
- ὁρᾶτε καὶ προσέχετε μή τι τούτων ἀποβῆτε τῶν ἀτυχημάτων . Upton compares Matthew xvi. 6: ὁρᾶτε καὶ προσέχετε ἀπὸ τῆς ζύμης , Upton remarks that many expressions in Epictetus are not unlike the style of the Gospels, which were written in the same period in which Epictetus was teaching. Schweighaeuser also refers to Wetstein’s New Testament.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1εἴ τις τῷ δόγματι τούτῳ συμπαθῆσαι κατʼ ἀξίαν δύναιτο, ὅτι γεγόναμεν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πάντες προηγουμένως καὶ ὁ θεὸς πατήρ ἐστι τῶν τʼ ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν θεῶν, οἶμαι ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀγεννὲς οὐδὲ ταπεινὸν ἐνθυμηθήσεται περὶ ἑαυτοῦ. 2ἀλλʼ ἂν μὲν Καῖσαρ εἰσποιήσηταί σε, οὐδείς σου τὴν ὀφρῦν βαστάσει· ἂν δὲ γνῷς, ὅτι τοῦ Διὸς υἱὸς εἶ, οὐκ ἐπαρθήσῃ; 3νῦν δʼ οὐ ποιοῦμεν, ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ δύο ταῦτα ἐν τῇ γενέσει ἡμῶν ἐγκαταμέμικται, τὸ σῶμα μὲν κοινὸν πρὸς τὰ ζῷα, ὁ λόγος δὲ καὶ ἡ γνώμη κοινὸν πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, ἄλλοι μὲν ἐπὶ ταύτην ἀποκλίνουσιν τὴν συγγένειαν τὴν ἀτυχῆ καὶ νεκράν, ὀλίγοι δέ τινες ἐπὶ τὴν θείαν καὶ μακαρίαν. 4ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἀνάγκη πάνθʼ ὁντινοῦν οὕτως ἑκάστῳ χρῆσθαι ὡς ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ ὑπολάβῃ, ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οἱ ὀλίγοι, ὅσοι πρὸς πίστιν οἴονται γεγονέναι καὶ πρὸς αἰδῶ καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν τῆς χρήσεως τῶν φαντασιῶν, οὐδὲν ταπεινὸν οὐδʼ ἀγε⟨ν⟩νὲς ἐνθυμοῦνται περὶ αὑτῶν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τἀναντία. 5τί γὰρ εἰμί; ταλαίπωρον ἀνθρωπάριον καὶ τὰ δύστηνά μου σαρκίδια. 6τῷ μὲν ὄντι δύστηνα, ἀλλὰ ἔχεις τι καὶ κρεῖσσον τῶν σαρκιδίων. τί οὖν ἀφεὶς ἐκεῖνο τούτοις προστέτηκας; 7διὰ ταύτην τὴν συγγένειαν οἱ μὲν ἀποκλίναντες λύκοις ὅμοιοι γινόμεθα, ἄπιστοι καὶ ἐπίβουλοι καὶ βλαβεροί, οἱ δὲ λέουσιν, ἄγριοι καὶ θηριώδεις καὶ ἀνήμεροι, οἱ πλείους δʼ ἡμῶν ἀλώπεκες καὶ ὡς ἐν ζῴοις ἀτυχήματα. 8τί γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλο λοίδορος καὶ κακοήθης ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἀλώπηξ ἢ τί ἄλλο ἀτυχέστερον καὶ ταπεινότερον; 9ὁρᾶτε οὖν καὶ προσέχετε, μή τι τούτων ἀποβῆτε τῶν ἀτυχημάτων.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA