Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER XVII. · That the Art of Reasoning is necessary.
1Since it is Reason which sets in order and finishes all other Things, it ought not itself to be left in Disorder. But by what shall it be set in Order? Evidently, either by itself, or by something else. Well: either that too is Reason, or there is something else superior to Reason (which is impossible): and, if it be Reason, what, again, shall set that in Order? For, if Reason can set itself in Order in one Case, it can in another and, if we will still require any thing further, it will be infinite, and without End. But, the more urgent Necessity is to cure [our Opinions, Passions], and the like. Would you hear about these, therefore? Well: hear. But then, if you should say to me, "I cannot tell whether your Arguments are true or false;" and if I should happen to express myself doubtfully, and you should say, "distinguish [which Sense you mean]," I will bear with you no longer; but will retort your own Words upon you; the more urgent Necessity is, &c. Therefore, I suppose, the Art of Reasoning is first settled: just as, before the Measuring of Corn, we settle the Measure. For, unless we first determine what a Bushel, and what a Balance, is, how shall we be able to measure or weigh? Thus, in the present Case: unless we have first learnt, and accurately examined, that which is the Criterion of other Things, and by which other Things are learnt, how shall we be able accurately to learn any thing else? And how is it possible? Well: a Bushel, however, is only Wood, a Thing of no Value [in itself]: but it measures Corn. And Logic [you say] is of no Value in itself. That we will consider hereafter. Let us, for the present, then, make the Concession. It is enough that it distinguishes and examines, and, as one may say, measures and weighs all other Things. Who says this? Is it only Chrysippus, and Zeno, and Cleanthes? And doth not Antisthenes say it? And who is it, then, who has written, That the Beginning of a right Education is the Examination of Words? Doth not Socrates say it? Of whom, then, doth Xenophon write, That he began by the Examination of Words; what each signified. § 2. Is this, then, the great and admirable Thing, to understand or interpret Chrysippus? Who says that it is? But what, then, is the admirable Thing? To understand the Will of Nature. Well then: do you apprehend it of yourself? In that Case, what Need have you for any one else? For, if it be true, that Men never err but involuntarily; and you have learnt the Truth, you must necessarily act right. But, indeed, I do not apprehend the Will of Nature. Who, then, shall interpret that? They say, Chrysippus. I go and inquire what this Interpreter of Nature says. I begin not to understand his Meaning. I seek one to interpret that. Here explain how this is expressed, and as if it were put into Latin. How, then, doth a supercilious Self-opinion belong to the Interpreter! Indeed, it doth not justly belong to Chrysippus himself, if he only interprets the Will of Nature, and doth not follow it: and much less to his Interpreter. For we have no need of Chrysippus, on his own Account; but that, by his Means, we may apprehend the Will of Nature: nor do we need a Diviner on his own Account; but that, by his Assistance, we hope to understand future Events, and what is signified by the Gods: nor the Entrails of the Victims, on their own Account; but, on the Account of what is signified by them: neither is it the Raven, or the Crow, that we admire; but the God, who delivers his Significations by their Means. I come, therefore, to the Diviner and Interpreter of these Things; and say, "Inspect the Entrails for me: what is signified to me?" Having taken, and laid them open, he thus interprets them. You have a Choice, Man, incapable of being restrained or compelled. 'This is written here in the Entrails. I will show you this first, in the Faculty of Assent. Can any one restrain you from assenting to Truth?——"No one."——Can any one compel you to admit a Falshood?——"No one."——You see, then, that you have in this Topic a Choice incapable of being restrained, or compelled, or hindered. Well: is it any otherwise with regard to Pursuit and Desire? What can conquer one Pursuit?——"Another Pursuit."——"What, Desire and Aversion? "Another Desire and another Aversion." If you set Death before me (say you) you compel me. No: not what is set before you doth it: but your Principle, that it is better to do such or such a thing, than to die. Here, again, you see it is your own Principle which compels you: that is, Choice compels Choice. For, if God hath constituted that Portion which he hath separated from his own Essence, and given to us, capable of being restrained or compelled, either by himself, or by any other, he would not have been God; nor have taken care of us, in a due manner. 3These Things, says the Diviner, I find in the Victims. These Things are signified to you. If you please, you are free. If you please, you will have no one to complain of; no one to accuse. All will be equally according to your own Mind, and to the Mind of God. 4For the Sake of this Oracle, I go to the Diviner and the Philosopher: admiring not him merely on the Account of his Interpretation, but the Things which he interprets.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (3)
- The Sense here is supplied from a Conjecture of Wolfius.
- The Stoics were remarkably exact in tracing the Etymology of Words: a Study, certainly, of very great Use: but, by too great Subtlety and Refinement, they were often led by it into much Trifling and Absurdity
- See the Enchiridion, ch. xlix.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
That the art of reasoning is necessary.
Since it is Reason which shapes and regulates all other things, it ought not itself to be left in disorder; but by what shall it be regulated? Evidently, either by itself, or by something else. Well, either that too is Reason, or something else superior to Reason, which is impossible; and if it be Reason, what again shall regulate that? For if this Reason can regulate itself, so can the former; and if we still require any further agent, the series will be infinite and without end.
But, say you, the essential thing is to prescribe for qualities of character.
Would you hear about these, therefore? Well, hear. But then, if you say to me that you cannot tell whether my arguments are true or false, and if I happen to express myself ambiguously, and you bid me make it clearer, I will then at once show you that this is the first essential. Therefore, I suppose, they first establish the art of reasoning,—just as before the measuring of corn, we settle the measure; for, unless we first determine the measure and the weight, how shall we be able to measure or weigh? Thus, in the present case, unless we have first learned and fixed that which is the criterion of other things, and by which other things are learned, how shall we be able accurately to learn anything else? How is it possible? Well, a bushel-measure is only wood, a thing of no value, but it measures corn; and logic is of no value in itself. That we will consider hereafter, but grant it now; it is enough that it distinguishes and examines, and, as one may say, measures and weighs all other things. Who says this? Is it only Chrysippus, and Zeno, and Cleanthes? Does not Antisthenes say it? And who is it, then, who has written that the beginning of a right education is the examination of words? Does not Socrates say it? Of whom, then, does Xenophon write, that he began by the examination of words, what each signified?
Is this, then, the great and admirable thing, to understand or interpret Chrysippus?
Who says that it is? But what, then, is the admirable thing?
To understand the will of nature.
Well, then; do you conform to it yourself? In that case, what need have you for any one else? For if it be true that men err but unwillingly, and if you have learnt the truth, you must needs act rightly.
But, indeed, I do not conform to the will of nature.
Who, then, shall interpret that?
They say, Chrysippus. I go and inquire what this interpreter of nature says. Soon I cannot understand his meaning; I seek one to interpret that. I call on him to explain everything as clearly as if it were in Latin. Yet what right has this last interpreter to boast? Nor has Chrysippus himself, so long as he only interprets the will of nature, and does not follow it; and much less has his interpreter. For we have no need of Chrysippus on his own account; but that, by his means, we may apprehend the will of nature; just as no one values a diviner on his own account, but that, by his assistance, men hope to understand future events and heavenly indications; nor the auguries, on their own account, but on account of what is signified by them; neither is it the raven, or the crow, that is admired, but the divine purposes displayed through their means. Thus I come to the diviner and interpreter of these higher things, and say, Inspect the auguries for me: what is signified for me? Having taken, and inspected them, he thus interprets them: You have a free will, O man! incapable of being restrained or compelled. This is written here in the auguries. I will show you this, first, in the faculty of assent. Can any one restrain you from assenting to truth? No one. Can any one compel you to admit a falsehood? No one. You see, then, that you have here a free will, incapable of being restrained, or compelled, or hindered. Well, is it otherwise with regard to pursuit and desire? What can displace one pursuit. Another pursuit. What [can displace] desire and aversion? Another desire and another aversion. If you offer death as an alternative, say you, you compel me. No, not the alternative does it, but your conviction that it is better to do such a thing than to die. Here, again, you see that it is your own conviction which compels you,—that is, choice compels choice; for if God had constituted that portion which he has separated from his own essence, and given to us, capable of being restrained or compelled, either by himself, or by any other, he would not have been God, nor have fitly cared for us.
These things, says the diviner, I find in the auguries. These things are announced to you. If you please, you are free. If you please, you will have no one to complain of, no one to accuse. All will be equally according to your own mind, and to the mind of God.
For the sake of this oracle, I go to this diviner and philosopher; admiring not alone him for his interpretation, but also the things which he interprets.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
That the logical art is necessary.
Since reason is the faculty which analyses and perfects the rest, and it ought itself not to be unanalysed, by what should it be analysed? for it is plain that this should be done either by itself or by another thing. Either then this other thing also is reason, or something else superior to reason; which is impossible. But if it is reason, again who shall analyse that reason? For if that reason does this for itself, our reason also can do it. But if we shall require something else, the thing will go on to infinity and have no end. Reason therefore is analysed by itself. Yes: but it is more urgent to cure (our opinions) and the like. Will you then hear about those things? Hear. But if you should say, I know not whether you are arguing truly or falsely, and if I should express myself in any way ambiguously, and you should say to me, Distinguish, I will bear with you no longer, and I shall say to you, It is more urgent. This is the reason, I suppose, why they (the Stoic teachers) place the logical art first, as in the measuring of corn we place first the examination of the measure. But if we do not determine first what is a modius, and what is a balance, how shall we be able to measure or weigh anything?
In this case then if we have not fully learned and accurately examined the criterion of all other things, by which the other things are learned, shall we be able to examine accurately and to learn fully any thing else? How is this possible? Yes; but the modius is only wood, and a thing which produces no fruit.—But it is a thing which can measure corn.—Logic also produces no fruit.—As to this indeed we shall see: but then even if a man should grant this, it is enough that logic has the power of distinguishing and examining other things, and, as we may say, of measuring and weighing them. Who says this? Is it only Chrysippus, and Zeno, and Cleanthes? And does not Antisthenes say so? And who is it that has written that the examination of names is the beginning of education? And does not Socrates say so? And of whom does Xenophon write, that he began with the examination of names, what each name signified? Is this then the great and wondrous thing to understand or interpret Chrysippus? Who says this?—What then is the wondrous thing?—To understand the will of nature. Well then do you apprehend it yourself by your own power? and what more have you need of? For if it is true that all men err involuntarily, and you have learned the truth, of necessity you must act right.—But in truth I do not apprehend the will of nature. Who then tells us what it is?—They say that it is Chrysippus.—I proceed, and I inquire what this interpreter of nature says. I begin not to understand what he says: I seek an interpreter of Chrysippus.—Well, consider how this is said, just as if it were said in the Roman tongue.—What then is this superciliousness of the interpreter? There is no superciliousness which can justly be charged even to Chrysippus, if he only interprets the will of nature, but does not follow it himself; and much more is this so with his interpreter. For we have no need of Chrysippus for his own sake, but in order that we may understand nature. Nor do we need a diviner (sacrificer) on his own account, but because we think that through him we shall know the future and understand the signs given by the gods; nor do we need the viscera of animals for their own sake, but because through them signs are given; nor do we look with wonder on the crow or raven, but on God, who through them gives signs?
I go then to the interpreter of these things and the sacrificer, and I say, Inspect the viscera for me, and tell me what signs they give. The man takes the viscera, opens them, and interprets: Man, he says, you have a will free by nature from hindrance and compulsion; this is written here in the viscera. I will show you this first in the matter of assent. Can any man hinder you from assenting to the truth? No man can. Can any man compel you to receive what is false? No man can. You see that in this matter you have the faculty of the will free from hindrance, free from compulsion, unimpeded. Well then, in the matter of desire and pursuit of an object, is it otherwise? And what can overcome pursuit except another pursuit? And what can overcome desire and aversion (ἔκκλισιν) except another desire and aversion? But, you object: If you place before me the fear of death, you do compel me. No, it is not what is placed before you that compels, but your opinion that it is better to do so and so than to die. In this matter then it is your opinion that compelled you: that is, will compelled will. For if God had made that part of himself, which he took from himself and gave to us, of such a nature as to be hindered or compelled either by himself or by another, he would not then be God nor would he be taking care of us as he ought. This, says the diviner, I find in the victims: these are the things which are signified to you. If you choose, you are free; if you choose, you will blame no one: you will charge no one. All will be at the same time according to your mind and the mind of God. For the sake of this divination I go to this diviner and to the philosopher, not admiring him for this interpretation, but admiring the things which he interprets.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (10)
- Λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ διαρθρῶν . Διαρθροῦν means to divide a thing into its parts or members. The word analyse seems to be the nearest equivalent. See Schweig.’s note on ὑπὸ τίνος διαρθρωθῆ ;
- This is obscure. The conclusion, Reason therefore is analysed by itself is not in Epictetus; but it is implied, as Schweighaeuser says (p. 197, notes). So Antoninus, xi. 1, writes: These are the properties of the rational soul; it sees itself, analyses itself. If reason, our reason, requires another reason to analyse it, that other reason will require another reason to analyse that other reason; and so on to infinity. If reason then, our reason, can be analysed, it must be analysed by itself. The notes on the first part of this chapter in the edition of Schweighaeuser may be read by those who are inclined.
- Our opinions. There is some defect in the text, as Wolf remarks. The opponent, he says, disparages Logic (Dialectic) as a thing which is not necessary to make men good, and he prefers moral teaching to Logic: but Epictetus informs him, that a man who is not a Dialectician will not have a sufficient perception of moral teaching.
- He repeats the words of the supposed opponent; and he means that his adversary’s difficulty shows the necessity of Dialectic.
- Antisthenes who professed the Cynic philosophy, rejected Logic and Physic (Schweig. note p. 201).
- Xenophon, Mem. iv. 5, 12 , and iv. 6, 7 . Epictetus knew what education ought to be. We learn language, and we ought to learn what it means. When children learn words, they should learn what the thing is which is signified by the word. In the case of children this can only be done imperfectly as to some words, but it may be done even then in some degree; and it must be done, or the word signifies nothing, or, what is equally bad, the word is misunderstood. All of us pass our lives in ignorance of many words which we use; some of us in greater ignorance than others, but all of us in ignorance to some degree.
- The supposed interpreter says this. When Epictetus says the Roman tongue, perhaps he means that the supposed opponent is a Roman and does not know Greek well.
- Encheiridion, c. 49. When a man gives himself great airs because he can understand and expound Chrysippus, say to yourself, If Chrysippus had not written obscurely, this man would have had nothing to be proud of. See the rest.
- Compare Xenophon, Mem. i. 1, 3 .
- This is true. If you place before a man the fear of death, you threaten him with the fear of death. The man may yield to the threat and do what it is the object of the threat to make him do; or he may make resistance to him who attempts to enforce the threat; or he may refuse to yield, and so take the consequence of his refusal. If a man yields to the threat, he does so for the reason which Epictetus gives, and freedom of choice, and consequently freedom of will really exists in this case. The Roman law did not allow contracts or agreements made under the influence of threats to be valid; and the reason for declaring them invalid was not the want of free will in him who yielded to the threat, but the fact that threats are directly contrary to the purpose of all law, which purpose is to secure the independent action of every person in all things allowed by law. This matter is discussed by Savigny, Das heut. Römische Recht, iii. § 114. See the title Quod metus causa, in the Digest, 4, 2. Compare also Epictetus, iv. 1, 68, etc.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1ἐπειδὴ λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ διαρθρῶν καὶ ἐξεργαζόμενος τὰ λοιπά, ἔδει δʼ αὐτὸν μὴ ἀδιάρθρωτον εἶναι, ὑπὸ τίνος διαρθρωθῇ; 2δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἢ ὑφʼ αὑτοῦ ἢ ὑπʼ ἄλλου. ἤ τοι λόγος ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνος ἢ ἄλλο τι κρεῖσσον ἔσται τοῦ λόγου, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. 3εἰ λόγος, ἐκεῖνον πάλιν τίς διαρθρώσει; εἰ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν, δύναται καὶ οὗτος. εἰ ἄλλου δεησόμεθα, ἄπειρον ἔσται τοῦτο καὶ ἀκατάληκτον. 4[εἰ]ναί, ἀλλʼ ἐπείγει μᾶλλον θεραπεύειν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. θέλεις οὖν περὶ ἐκείνων ἀκούειν; ἄκουε. 5ἀλλʼ ἄν μοι λέγῃς ὅτι οὐκ οἶδα πότερον ἀληθῶς ἢ ψευδῶς διαλέγῃ, κἄν τι κατʼ ἀμφίβολον φωνὴν εἴπω καὶ λέγῃς μοι διάστιξον, οὐκ ἔτι ἀνέξομαί σου, ἀλλʼ ἐρῶ σοι· 6ἀλλʼ ἐπείγει μᾶλλον. διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ οἶμαι προ[σ]τάσσουσιν τὰ λογικά, καθάπερ τῆς μετρήσεως τοῦ σίτου προτάσσομεν τὴν τοῦ μέτρου ἐπίσκεψιν. 7ἂν δὲ μὴ διαλάβωμεν πρῶτον τί ἐστι μόδιος μηδὲ διαλάβωμεν πρῶτον τί ἐστι ζυγός, πῶς ἔτι μετρῆσαί τι ἢ στῆσαι δυνησόμεθα; 8ἐνταῦθα οὖν τὸ τῶν ἄλλων κριτήριον καὶ διʼ οὗ τἆλλα καταμανθάνεται μὴ καταμεμαθηκότες μηδʼ ἠκριβωκότες δυνησόμεθά τι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκριβῶσαι καὶ καταμαθεῖν; 9καὶ πῶς οἷόν τε; ναί· ἀλλʼ ὁ μόδιος ξύλον ἐστὶ καὶ ἄκαρπον. 10ἀλλὰ μετρητικὸν σίτου. καὶ τὰ λογικὰ ἄκαρπά ἐστι. καὶ περὶ τούτου μὲν ὀψόμεθα. εἰ δʼ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο δοίη τις, ἐκεῖνο ἀπαρκεῖ ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶ διακριτικὰ καὶ ἐπισκεπτικὰ καὶ ὡς ἄν τις εἴποι μετρητικὰ καὶ στατικά. 11τίς λέγει ταῦτα; μόνος Χρύσιππος καὶ Ζήνων καὶ Κλεάνθης; 12Ἀντισθένης δʼ οὐ λέγει; καὶ τίς ἐστιν ὁ γεγραφὼς ὅτι ἀρχὴ παιδεύσεως ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπίσκεψις; Σωκράτης δʼ οὐ λέγει; καὶ περὶ τίνος γράφει Ξενοφῶν, ὅτι ἤρχετο ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπισκέψεως, τί σημαίνει ἕκαστον; 13ἆρʼ οὖν τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ θαυμαστὸν νοῆσαι Χρύσιππον ἢ ἐξηγήσασθαι; καὶ τίς λέγει τοῦτο; τί οὖν τὸ θαυμαστόν ἐστιν; 14νοῆσαι τὸ βούλημα τῆς φύσεως. τί οὖν; αὐτὸς διὰ σεαυτοῦ παρακολουθεῖς; καὶ τίνος ἔτι χρείαν ἔχεις; εἰ γὰρ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ πάντας ἄκοντας ἁμαρτάνειν, σὺ δὲ καταμεμάθηκας τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀνάγκη σε ἤδη κατορθοῦν. 15ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία οὐ παρακολουθῶ τῷ βουλήματι τῆς φύσεως. τίς οὖν ἐξηγεῖται αὐτό; λέγουσιν ὅτι Χρύσιππος. 16ἔρχομαι καὶ ἐπιζητῶ τί λέγει οὗτος ὁ ἐξηγητὴς τῆς φύσεως. ἄρχομαι μὴ νοεῖν τί λέγει, ζητῶ τὸν ἐξηγούμενον. ἴδε ἐπίσκεψαι, πῶς τοῦτο λέγεται, καθάπερ εἰ Ῥωμαϊστί. 17ποία οὖν ἐνθάδʼ ὀφρὺς τοῦ ἐξηγουμένου; οὐδʼ αὐτοῦ Χρυσίππου δικαίως, εἰ μόνον ἐξηγεῖται τὸ βούλημα τῆς φύσεως, αὐτὸς δʼ οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ· πόσῳ πλέον τοῦ ἐκεῖνον ἐξηγουμένου; 18οὐδὲ γὰρ Χρυσίππου χρείαν ἔχομεν διʼ αὐτόν, ἀλλʼ ἵνα παρακολουθήσωμεν τῇ φύσει. οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦ θύτου διʼ αὐτόν, ἀλλʼ ὅτι διʼ ἐκείνου κατανοήσειν οἰόμεθα τὰ μέλλοντα καὶ σημαινόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, οὐδὲ τῶν σπλάγχνων διʼ αὐτά, 19ἀλλʼ ὅτι διʼ ἐκείνων σημαίνεται, οὐδὲ τὸν κόρακα θαυμάζομεν ἢ τὴν κορώνην, ἀλλὰ τὸν θεὸν σημαίνοντα διὰ τούτων. 20ἔρχομαι τοίνυν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐξηγητὴν τοῦτον καὶ θύτην καὶ λέγω ὅτι ἐπίσκεψαί μοι τὰ σπλάγχνα, τί μοι σημαίνεται. 21λαβὼν καὶ ἀναπτύξας ἐκεῖνος ἐξηγεῖται ὅτι ἄνθρωπε, προαίρεσιν ἔχεις ἀκώλυτον φύσει καὶ ἀνανάγκαστον. τοῦτο ἐνταῦθα ἐν τοῖς σπλάγχνοις γέγραπται. 22δείξω σοι αὐτὸ πρῶτον ἐπὶ τοῦ συγκαταθετικοῦ τόπου. μή τίς σε κωλῦσαι δύναται ἐπινεῦσαι ἀληθεῖ; οὐδὲ εἷς. μή τίς σε ἀναγκάσαι δύναται παραδέξασθαι τὸ ψεῦδος; 23οὐδὲ εἷς. ὁρᾷς ὅτι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ τὸ προαιρετικὸν ἔχεις ἀκώλυτον ἀνανάγκαστον ἀπαραπόδιστον; 24ἄγε ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ὀρεκτικοῦ καὶ ὁρμητικοῦ ἄλλως ἔχει; καὶ τίς ὁρμὴν νικῆσαι δύναται ἢ ἄλλη ὁρμή; τίς δʼ ὄρεξιν καὶ ἔκκλισιν ἢ ἄλλη ὄρεξις καὶ ἔκκλισις; 25ἄν μοι, φησί, προσάγῃ θανάτου φόβον, ἀναγκάζει με. οὐ τὸ προσαγόμενον, ἀλλʼ ὅτι δοκεῖ σοι κρεῖττον εἶναι ποιῆσαί τι τούτων ἢ ἀποθανεῖν. 26πάλιν οὖν τὸ σὸν δόγμα σε ἠνάγκασεν, τοῦτʼ ἔστι προαίρεσιν προαίρεσις. 27εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἴδιον μέρος, ὃ ἡμῖν ἔδωκεν ἀποσπάσας ὁ θεός, ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ ἢ ὑπʼ ἄλλου τινὸς κωλυτὸν ἢ ἀναγκαστὸν κατεσκευάκει, οὐκέτι ἂν ἦν θεὸς οὐδʼ ἐπεμελεῖτο ἡμῶν ὃν δεῖ τρόπον. 28ταῦτα εὑρίσκω, φησίν, ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς. ταῦτά σοι σημαίνεται. ἐὰν θέλῃς, ἐλεύθερος εἶ· ἐὰν θέλῃς, μέμψῃ οὐδένα, ἐγκαλέσεις οὐδενί, πάντα κατὰ γνώμην ἔσται ἅμα τὴν σὴν καὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ. 29διὰ ταύτην τὴν μαντείαν ἔρχομαι ἐπὶ τὸν θύτην τοῦτον καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον, οὐκ αὐτὸν θαυμάσας ἕνεκά γε τῆς ἐξηγήσεως, ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖνα ἃ ἐξηγεῖται.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA