Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER XXVIII. · That we are not to be angry with Mankind. What Things are little, what great, among Men.
1What is the Cause of Assent to any thing? Its appearing to be true. It is not possible, therefore, to assent to what appears to be not true. Why? Because it is the very Nature of the Understanding to agree to Truth; to be dissatisfied with Falshood; and to suspend its Belief, in doubtful Cases. What is the Proof of this? Persuade yourself, if you can, that it is now Night. Impossible. Unpersuade yourself that it is Day. Impossible. Persuade yourself, that the Stars are, or are not, even. Impossible. 2When any one, then, assents to what is false, be assured, that he doth not wilfully assent to it, as false (for, as Plato affirms, the Soul is never voluntarily deprived of Truth): but what is false, appears to him to be true. Well, then: Have we, in Actions, any thing correspondent to True and False, in Propositions? Duty, and contrary to Duty: Advantageous, and Disadvantageous: Suitable and Unable; and the like. A Person then, cannot think a Thing advantageous to him, and not chuse it. He cannot. But how says Medea? "I know what Evils wait my dreadful Purpose;
But vanquish'd Reason yields to powerful Rage." Because she thought, that very Indulgence of her Rage, and the punishing her Husband, more advantageous than the Preservation of her Children. Yes: but she is deceived. Shew clearly to her, that she is deceived, and she will forbear: but, till you have shewn it, what is the to follow, but what appears to herself? Nothing. Why, then, are you angry with her, that the unhappy Woman is deceived, in the most important Points; and instead of a human Creature, becomes a Viper? Why do not you rather, as we pity the Blind and Lame, so likewise pity those who are blinded and lamed, in their superior Faculties? Whoever, therefore, duly remembers, that the Appearance of Things to the Mind is the Standard of every Action to Man: that this is either right or wrong: and, if right, he is without Fault; if wrong, he himself bears the Punishment: for that one Man cannot be the Person deceived, and another the Sufferer: will not be outrageous and angry at any one; will not revile, or reproach, or hate, quarrel with, any one. 3So then, Have all the great and dreadful Deeds, that have been done in the World, no other Original than Appearance? Absolutely, no other. The Iliad consists of nothing but the Appearances [of Things to the Mind]; and the Use of those Appearances. It appeared [right] to Paris, to carry off the Wife of Menelaus. It appeared [right] to Helen, to follow him. If, then, it had appeared [right] to Menelaus, to persuade himself, that it was an Advantage to be robbed of such a Wife, what would have happened? Not only the Iliad had been loft, but the Odyssey too. Do these great Events then, depend on so small a Cause? What are these Events, which you call great? Wars, and Seditions; the Destruction of Numbers of Men; and the Overthrow of Cities. And what great Matter is there in all this? Nothing. What great Matter is there in the Death of Numbers of Oxen, Numbers of Sheep, or in the burning or pulling down Numbers of Nests of Storks or Swallows? Are these like Cases, then? Perfectly like. The Bodies of Men are destroyed, and the Bodies of Sheep and Oxen. The Houses of Men are burnt, and the Nests of Storks. What is there great or dreadful in all this? Pray, shew me what Difference there is between the House of a Man, and the Nest of a Stork, so far as it is a Habitation, excepting that Houses are built with Beams, and Tiles, and Bricks; and Nests, with Sticks and Clay? What, then, is a Stork and a Man a like Thing? What do you mean? With regard to Body, extremely like. Is there no Difference, then, between a Man and a Stork? Yes, surely: but not in these Things. In what then? Enquire; and you will find, that the Difference consists in something else. See whether it be not, in acting with Discernment: whether it be not, in a social Disposition; in Fidelity, Honour, Steadiness, Judgment. § 4. Where then, is the great Good or Evil of Man? Where his Difference is. If this is preserved, and remains well fortified, and neither Honour, Fidelity, or Judgment, is destroyed, then he himself is preserved likewise: but, when any of these is lost and demolished, he himself is lost also. In this do all great Events consist. Paris, they say, was undone, because the Greeks invaded Troy, and laid it waste; and his Family were slain in Battle. By no means: for no one is undone by an Action, not his own. All that was only laying waste the Nests of Storks. But his true Undoing was, when he lost the modest, the faithful, the hospitable, and the decent Character. When was Achilles undone? When Patroclus died? By no means. But when he gave himself up to Rage; when he wept over a Girl; when he forgot, that he came there, not to get Mistresses, but to fight. This is human Undoing; this is the Siege; this the Overthrow; when right Principles are ruined; when these are destroyed. But, when Wives and Children are led away Captives, and the Men themselves killed, are not these, Evils? Whence do you conclude them such? Pray inform me, in my Turn. Nay: but whence do you affirm, that they are not Evils? 5Let us recur to the Rules. Produce the Preconceptions. One cannot sufficiently wonder at what happens, in this Respect. When we would judge of Light and Heavy, we do not judge by Guess: when of Strait and Crooked, not by Guess: and, in general, when it concerns us to know the Truth of any Particular, no one of us will do any thing, by Guess, But, where the first and principal Cause is concerned, of acting either right or wrong; of being prosperous or unprosperous, happy or unhappy; there only do we act rashly, and by Guess. No-where any thing like a Balance; no-where any thing like a Rule: but some Fancy strikes me, and I instantly act conformably to it. For am I better than Agamemnon or Achilles; that they, by following their Fancies, should do and suffer so many Things, and Fancy not suffice me? And what Tragedy hath any other Original? The Atreus of Euripides, what is it? Fancy. The Oedipus of Sophocles? Fancy. The Phœnix? The Hippolytus? All Fancy. To what Character, then, doth it belong, think you, to take no care of this Point? What are they called who follow every Fancy? Madmen. Do we, then, behave any otherwise?
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (2)
- See Note a, c. 18. §. 1.
- The Order of the following Words is disturbed in the Original. The Translation follows Mr. Upton's Correction.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
That we ought not to be angry with mankind. What things are little, what great, among men.
What is the basis of assent to anything? Its appearing to be true. It is not possible, therefore, to assent to what appears to be not true. Why? Because it is the very nature of the understanding to agree to truth, to be dissatisfied with falsehood, and to suspend its belief in doubtful cases.
What is the proof of this?
Persuade yourself, if you can, that it is now night. Impossible. Dissuade yourself from the belief that it
1 This seems to be said by one of the hearers, who wanted to have the absurdities of the sceptics confuted and guarded against by regular argument. Epictetus allows this to be right, for such as have abilities and leisure; but recommends in others the more necessary task of curing their own moral disorders, and insinuates that the mere common occurences of life are sufficient to overthrow the notions of the Pyrrhonists.—C. is day. Impossible. Persuade yourself that the number of the stars is even or odd. Impossible.
When any one, then, assents to what is false, be assured that he does not wilfully assent to it as false,—for, as Plato affirms, the soul is unwillingly deprived of truth,—but what is false appears to him to be true. Well, then; have we, in actions, anything correspondent to this distinction between true and false? There are right and wrong; advantageous and disadvantageous; desirable and undesirable, and the like.
A person, then, cannot think a thing truly advantageous to him, and not choose it?
He cannot. But how says Medea?— I know what evils wait upon my purpose;
But wrath is stronger than this will of mine.
Was it that she thought the very indulgence of her rage, and the punishing her husband, more advantageous than the preservation of her children? Yes; but she is deceived. Show clearly to her that she is deceived, and she will forbear; but, till you have shown it, what has she to follow but what appears to herself? Nothing.
Why, then, are you angry with her, that the unhappy woman is deceived in the most important points, and instead of a human creature, becomes a viper? Why do you not rather, as we pity the blind and lame, so likewise pity those who are blinded .and lamed in their superior faculties? Whoever, therefore, duly remembers, that the appearance of things to the mind is the standard of every action to man,—that this is either right or wrong, and if right, he is without fault; if wrong, he himself suffers punishment; for that one man cannot be the person deceived, and another the only sufferer,—such a person will not be outrageous and angry at any one; will not revile, or reproach, or hate, or quarrel with any one.
So, then, have all the great and dreadful deeds that have been done in the world no other origin than semblances?
Absolutely no other. The Iliad consists of nothing but such semblances and their results. It seemed to Paris that he should carry off the wife of Menelaus. It seemed to Helen that she should follow him. If, then, it had seemed to Menelaus that it was an advantage to be robbed of such a wife, what could have happened? Not only the Iliad had been lost, but the Odyssey too.
Do such great events, then, depend on so small a cause?
What events, then, call you great?
Wars and seditions, the destruction of numbers of men, and the overthrow of cities.
And what in all this is great? Nothing. What is great in the death of numbers of oxen, numbers of sheep, or in the burning or pulling down numbers of nests of storks or swallows?
Are these things then similar?
They are. The bodies of men are destroyed, and the bodies of sheep and oxen. The houses of men are burnt, and the nests of storks. What is there so great or fearful in all this? Pray, show me what difference there is between the house of a man and the nest of a stork, considered as a habitation, except that houses are built with beams and tiles and bricks, and nests with sticks and clay?
What, then; are a stork and a man similar? What do you mean?
Similar in body.
Is there no difference, then, between a man and a stork?
Yes, surely; but not in these things. In what, then?
Inquire; and you will find, that the difference lies in something else. See whether it be not in rationality of action, in social instincts, fidelity, honor, providence, judgment.
Where, then, is the real good or evil of man?
Just where this difference lies. If this distinguishing trait is preserved, and remains well fortified, and neither honor, fidelity, nor judgment is destroyed, then he himself is likewise saved; but when any one of these is lost or demolished, he himself is lost also. In this do all great events consist. Paris, they say, was undone, because the Greeks invaded Troy, and laid it waste, and his family were slain in battle. By no means; for no one is undone by an action not his own. All that was only like laying waste the nests of storks. But his true undoing was when he lost modesty, faith, honor, virtue. When was Achilles undone,—when Patroclus died? By no means. But when he gave himself up to rage; when he wept over a girl; when he forgot that he came there, not to win mistresses, but to fight. This is human undoing; this is the siege, this the overthrow, when right principles are ruined and destroyed.
But when wives and children are led away captives, and the men themselves killed, are not these evils?
Whence do you conclude them such? Pray inform me, in my turn.
Nay; but whence do you affirm that they are not evils?
Recur to the rules. Apply your principles. One cannot sufficiently wonder at what happens among men. When we would judge of light and heavy, we do not judge by guess, nor when we judge of straight and crooked; and, in general, when it concerns us to know the truth on any special point, no one of us will do anything by guess. But where the first and principal source of right or wrong action is concerned, of being prosperous or unprosperous, happy or unhappy,—there only do we act rashly, and by guess. Nowhere anything like a balance; nowhere anything like a rule; but something seems thus or so to me, and I at once act accordingly. For am I better than Agamemnon or Achilles; that they, by following what seemed best to them, should do and suffer so many things, and yet that seeming should not suffice me? And what tragedy hath any other origin? The Atreus of Euripides, what is it? Seeming. The Oedipus of Sophocles? Seeming. The Phoenix? The Hippolytus? All seeming. Who then, think you, can escape this influence? What are they called who follow every seeming? Madmen. Yet do we, then, behave otherwise?
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Higginson’s notes (2)
- This is not a literal quotation from Plato, but similar passages are to be found in his Laws, 9. 5; Sophist, 29; Protagoras, 87, etc.—H.
- Quotation source: Euripides, Medea, 1087.—H.
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
That we ought not to be angry with men; and what are the small and the great things among men.
What is the cause of assenting to any thing? The fact that it appears to be true. It is not possible then to assent to that which appears not to be true. Why? Because this is the nature of the understanding, to incline to the true, to be dissatisfied with the false, and in matters uncertain to withhold assent. What is the proof of this? Imagine (persuade yourself), if you can, that it is now night. It is not possible. Take away your persuasion that it is day. It is not possible. Persuade yourself or take away your persuasion that the stars are even in number. It is impossible. When then any man assents to that which is false, be assured that he did not intend to assent to it as false, for every soul is unwillingly deprived of the truth, as Plato says; but the falsity seemed to him to be true. Well, in acts what have we of the like kind as we have here truth or falsehood? We have the fit and the not fit (duty and not duty), the profitable and the unprofitable, that which is suitable to a person and that which is not, and whatever is like these. Can then a man think that a thing is useful to him and not choose it? He cannot. How says Medea?— Tis true I know what evil I shall do,
But passion overpowers the better counsel.
She thought that to indulge her passion and take vengeance on her husband was more profitable than to spare her children. It was so; but she was deceived. Show her plainly that she is deceived, and she will not do it; but so long as you do not show it, what can she follow except that which appears to herself (her opinion)? Nothing else. Why then are you angry with the unhappy woman that she has been bewildered about the most important things, and is become a viper instead of human creature? And why not, if it is possible, rather pity, as we pity the blind and the lame, so those who are blinded and maimed in the faculties which are supreme?
Whoever then clearly remembers this, that to man the measure of every act is the appearance (the opinion),— whether the thing appears good or bad: if good, he is free from blame; if bad, himself suffers the penalty, for it is impossible that he who is deceived can be one person, and he who suffers another person—whoever remembers this will not be angry with any man, will not be vexed at any man, will not revile or blame any man, nor hate nor quarrel with any man.
So then all these great and dreadful deeds have this origin, in the appearance (opinion)? Yes, this origin and no other. The Iliad is nothing else than appearance and the use of appearances. It appeared to Alexander to carry off the wife of Menelaus: it appeared to Helene to follow him. If then it had appeared to Menelaus to feel that it was a gain to be deprived of such a wife, what would have happened? Not only would the Iliad have been lost, but the Odyssey also. On so small a matter then did such great things depend? But what do you mean by such great things? Wars and civil commotions, and the destruction of many men and cities. And what great matter is this? Is it nothing?—But what great matter is the death of many oxen, and many sheep, and many nests of swallows or storks being burnt or destroyed? Are these things then like those? Very like. Bodies of men are destroyed, and the bodies of oxen and sheep; the dwellings of men are burnt, and the nests of storks. What is there in this great or dreadful? Or show me what is the difference between a man’s house and a stork’s nest, as far as each is a dwelling; except that man builds his little houses of beams and tiles and bricks, and the stork builds them of sticks and mud. Are a stork and a man then like things? What say you?—In body they are very much alike.
Does a man then differ in no respect from a stork? Don’t suppose that I say so; but there is no difference in these matters (which I have mentioned). In what then is the difference? Seek and you will find that there is a difference in another matter. See whether it is not in a man the understanding of what he does, see if it is not in social community, in fidelity, in modesty, in steadfastness, in intelligence. Where then is the great good and evil in men? It is where the difference is. If the difference is preserved and remains fenced round, and neither modesty is destroyed, nor fidelity, nor intelligence, then the man also is preserved; but if any of these things is destroyed and stormed like a city, then the man too perishes; and in this consist the great things. Alexander, you say, sustained great damage then when the Hellenes invaded and when they ravaged Troy, and when his brothers perished. By no means; for no man is damaged by an action which is not his own; but what happened at that time was only the destruction of storks’ nests: now the ruin of Alexander was when he lost the character of modesty, fidelity, regard to hospitality, and to decency. When was Achilles ruined? Was it when Patroclus died? Not so. But it happened when he began to be angry, when he wept for a girl, when he forgot that he was at Troy not to get mistresses, but to fight. These things are the ruin of men, this is being besieged, this is the destruction of cities, when right opinions are destroyed, when they are corrupted.
When then women are carried off, when children are made captives, and when the men are killed, are these not evils? How is it then that you add to the facts these opinions? Explain this to me also.—I shall not do that; but how is it that you say that these are not evils?—Let us come to the rules: produce the praecognitions (προλήψεις): for it is because this is neglected that we can not sufficiently wonder at what men do. When we intend to judge of weights, we do not judge by guess: where we intend to judge of straight and crooked, we do not judge by guess. In all cases where it is our interest to know what is true in any matter, never will any man among us do anything by guess. But in things which depend on the first and on the only cause of doing right or wrong, of happiness or unhappiness, of being unfortunate or fortunate, there only we are inconsiderate and rash. There is then nothing like scales (balance), nothing like a rule: but some appearance is presented, and straightway I act according to it. Must I then suppose that I am superior to Achilles or Agamemnon, so that they by following appearances do and suffer so many evils: and shall not the appearance be sufficient for me?—And what tragedy has any other beginning? The Atreus of Euripides, what is it? An appearance. The Oedipus of Sophocles, what is it? An appearance. The Phoenix? An appearance. The Hippolytus? An appearance. What kind of a man then do you suppose him to be who pays no regard to this matter? And what is the name of those who follow every appearance? They are called madmen. Do we then act at all differently?
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (6)
- See c. 18 of this book.
- We cannot conceive that the number of stars is either even or odd. The construction of the word ἀποπάσχειν is uncertain, for, says Schweighaeuser, the word is found only here.
- The Medea of Euripides, 1079 , where, instead of δρᾶν μέλλω of Epictetus, the reading is τολμήσω (Upton). τολμήσω (Kirchoff), with the best MSS., for δρᾶν μέλλω , which, however is the reading sited by several antient authors. Paley’s Euripides, note.
- This is the literal version. It does not mean that it appeared right, as Mrs. Carter translates it. Alexander never thought whether it was right or wrong. All that appeared to him was the possessing of Helene, and he used the means for getting possession of her, as a dog who spies and pursues some wild animal.
- Schweighaeuser proposes to erase μὴ from the text, but it is, I suppose, in all the MSS.: and it is easy to explain the passage without erasing the, μὴ .
- The expression τὸ φαινόμενον often occurs in this chapter, and it is sometimes translated by the Latin sententia or opinio : and so it may be, and I have translated it by opinion. But Epictetus says (s. 30) ἀλλὰ τί ἐφάνη, καὶ εἰθὺς ποιῶ τὸ φανέν : which means that there was an appearance, which was followed by the act. The word generally used by Epictetus is φαντασία , which occurs very often. In the Encheiridion (i. 5) there is some difference between φαντασία and τὸ φαινόμενον , for they are contrasted: τὸ φαινόμενον is the phenomenon, the bare appearance: φαντασία in this passage maybe the mental state consequent on the φαινόμενον : or as Diogenes Laertius says, Παντασία ἐστι τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ .
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1τί ἐστιν αἴτιον τοῦ συγκατατίθεσθαί τινι; τὸ φαίνεσθαι ὅτι ὑπάρχει. 2τῷ οὖν φαινομένῳ ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει συγκατατίθεσθαι οὐχ οἷόν τε. διὰ τί; ὅτι ἡ φύσις αὕτη ἐστὶ τῆς διανοίας τοῖς μὲν ἀληθέσιν ἐπινεύειν, τοῖς δὲ ψευδέσι δυσαρεστεῖν, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἄδηλα ἐπέχειν. 3τίς τούτου πίστις; πάθε, εἰ δύνασαι, νῦν ὅτι νύξ ἐστιν. οὐχ οἷόν τε. ἀπόπαθε ὅτι ἡμέρα ἐστίν. οὐχ οἷόν τε. πάθε ἢ ἀπόπαθε ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀρτίους εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας. οὐχ οἷόν τε. 4ὅταν οὖν τις συγκατατίθηται τῷ ψεύδει, ἴσθι ὅτι οὐκ ἤθελεν ψεύδει συγκαταθέσθαι· πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχὴ ἄκουσα στέρεται τῆς ἀληθείας, ὡς λέγει Πλάτων· ἀλλὰ ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ τὸ ψεῦδος ἀληθές. 5ἄγε ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πράξεων τί ἔχομεν τοιοῦτον οἷον ἐνθάδε τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ τὸ ψεῦδος; τὸ καθῆκον καὶ παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον, τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ ἀσύμφορον, τὸ κατʼ ἐμὲ καὶ οὐ κατʼ ἐμὲ καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ὅμοια. 6οὐ δύναται οὖν τις δοκεῖν μέν, ὅτι συμφέρει αὐτῷ, μὴ αἱρεῖσθαι δʼ αὐτό; οὐ δύναται. 7πῶς ἡ λέγουσα καὶ μανθάνω μὲν οἷα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά, θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων; ὅτι αὐτὸ τοῦτο, τῷ θυμῷ χαρίσασθαι καὶ τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν ἄνδρα, συμφορώτερον ἡγεῖται τοῦ σῶσαι τὰ τέκνα. 8ναί· ἀλλʼ ἐξηπάτηται. δεῖξον αὐτῇ ἐναργῶς ὅτι ἐξηπάτηται καὶ οὐ ποιήσει· μέχρι δʼ ἂν οὗ μὴ δεικνύῃς, τίνι ἔχει ἀκολουθῆσαι ἢ τῷ φαινομένῳ; 9οὐδενί. τί οὖν χαλεπαίνεις αὐτῇ, ὅτι πεπλάνηται ἡ ταλαίπωρος περὶ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ ἔχις ἀντὶ ἀνθρώπου γέγονεν; οὐχὶ δʼ, εἴπερ ἄρα, μᾶλλον ἐλεεῖς, ὡς τοὺς τυφλοὺς ἐλεοῦμεν, ὡς τοὺς χωλούς, οὕτως τοὺς τὰ κυριώτατα τετυφλωμένους καὶ ἀποκεχωλωμένους; 10ὅστις οὖν τούτου μέμνηται καθαρῶς ὅτι ἀνθρώπῳ μέτρον πάσης πράξεως τὸ φαινόμενον (λοιπὸν ἢ καλῶς φαίνεται ἢ κακῶς· εἰ καλῶς, ἀνέγκλητός ἐστιν· εἰ κακῶς, αὐτὸς ἐζημίωται· οὐ δύναται γὰρ ἄλλος μὲν εἶναι ὁ πεπλανημένος, ἄλλος δʼ ὁ βλαπτόμενος), οὐδενὶ ὀργισθήσεται, οὐδενὶ χαλεπανεῖ, οὐδένα λοιδορήσει, οὐδένα μέμψεται, οὐ μισήσει, οὐ προσκόψει οὐδενί. 11ὥστε καὶ τὰ οὕτω μεγάλα καὶ δεινὰ ἔργα ταύτην ἔχει τὴν ἀρχήν, τὸ φαινόμενον; ταύτην οὐδʼ ἄλλην. 12ἡ Ἰλιὰς οὐδέν ἐστιν ἢ φαντασία καὶ χρῆσις φαντασιῶν. ἐφάνη τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἀπάγειν τοῦ Μενελάου τὴν γυναῖκα, ἐφάνη τῇ Ἑλένῃ ἀκολουθῆσαι αὐτῷ. 13εἰ οὖν ἐφάνη τῷ Μενελάῳ παθεῖν ὅτι κέρδος ἐστὶ τοιαύτης γυναικὸς στερηθῆναι, τί ἂν ἐγένετο; ἀπολώλει ἡ Ἰλιὰς οὐ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια. — 14ἐκ τοιούτου οὖν μικροῦ πράγματος ἤρτηται τὰ τηλικαῦτα; — τίνα δὲ καὶ λέγεις τὰ τηλικαῦτα; πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ ἀπωλείας πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κατασκαφὰς πόλεων; καὶ τί μέγα ἔχει ταῦτα; — οὐδέν; — 15τί δʼ ἔχει μέγα πολλοὺς βοῦς ἀποθανεῖν καὶ πολλὰ πρόβατα καὶ πολλὰς καλιὰς χελιδόνων ἢ πελαργῶν ἐμπρησθῆναι καὶ κατασκαφῆναι; 16— ὅμοια οὖν ἐστι ταῦτα ἐκείνοις; — ὁμοιότατα. σώματα ἀπώλετο ἀνθρώπων· καὶ βοῶν καὶ προβάτων. οἰκημάτια ἐνεπρήσθη ἀνθρώπων· καὶ πελαργῶν νεοσσιαί. 17τί μέγα ἢ δεινόν; ἢ δεῖξόν μοι τί διαφέρει οἰκία ἀνθρώπου καὶ νεοσσιὰ πελαργοῦ ὡς οἴκησις. 18— ὅμοιον οὖν ἐστι πελαργὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος; — τί λέγεις; κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ὁμοιότατον. [πλὴν ὅτι μὲν ἐκ δοκῶν καὶ κεραμίδων καὶ πλίνθων οἰκοδομεῖται τὰ οἰκίδια, ἡ δʼ ἐκ ῥάβδων καὶ πηλοῦ.] 19οὐδενὶ οὖν διαφέρει ἄνθρωπος πελαργοῦ;— μὴ γένοιτο· ἀλλὰ τούτοις οὐ διαφέρει. — τίνι οὖν διαφέρει; 20— ζήτει καὶ εὑρήσεις, ὅτι ἄλλῳ διαφέρει. ὅρα μὴ τῷ παρακολουθεῖν οἷς ποιεῖ, ὅρα μὴ τῷ κοινωνικῷ, μὴ τῷ πιστῷ, τῷ αἰδήμονι, τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ, τῷ συνετῷ. 21ποῦ οὖν τὸ μέγα ἐν ἀνθρώποις κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν; ὅπου ἡ διαφορά. ἂν σῴζηται τοῦτο καὶ περιτετειχισμένον μένῃ καὶ μὴ διαφθείρηται τὸ αἰδῆμον μηδὲ τὸ πιστὸν μηδὲ τὸ συνετόν, τότε σῴζεται καὶ αὐτός· ἂν δʼ ἀπολλύηταί τι τούτων καὶ ἐκπολιορκῆται, τότε καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπόλλυται. καὶ τὰ μεγάλα πράγματα ἐν τούτῳ ἐστίν. 22ἔπταισεν μεγάλα ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος, ὅτʼ ἐπῆλθον φασιν οἱ Ἕλληνες καὶ ὅτε ἐπόρθουν τὴν Τροίαν καὶ ὅτε οἱ ἀδελφοὶ αὐτοῦ ἀπώλλυντο; 23οὐδαμῶς· διʼ ἀλλότριον γὰρ ἔργον πταίει οὐδείς· ἀλλὰ τότε πελαργῶν νεοσσιαὶ ἐπορθοῦντο. πταῖσμα δʼ ἦν, ὅτε ἀπώλεσε τὸν αἰδήμονα, τὸν πιστόν, τὸν φιλόξενον, τὸν κόσμιον. 24πότʼ ἔπταισεν ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς; ὅτε ἀπέθανεν ὁ Πάτροκλος; μὴ γένοιτο· ἀλλʼ ὅτε ὠργίζετο, ὅτε κορασίδιον ἔκλαεν, ὅτʼ ἐπελάθετο ὅτι πάρεστιν οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐρωμένας κτᾶσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τὸ πολεμεῖν. 25ταῦτʼ ἐστὶ τὰ ἀνθρωπικὰ πταίσματα, τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡ πολιορκία, τοῦτό ἐστι κατασκαφή, ὅταν τὰ δόγματα τὰ ὀρθὰ καθαιρῆται, ὅταν ἐκεῖνα διαφθείρηται. 26— ὅταν οὖν γυναῖκες ἄγωνται καὶ παιδία αἰχμαλωτίζηται καὶ ὅταν αὐτοὶ κατασφάζωνται, ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστι κακά; 27— πόθεν τοῦτο προσδοξάζεις; κἀμὲ δίδαξον. — οὔ· ἀλλὰ πόθεν σὺ λέγεις ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι κακά; 28— ἔλθωμεν ἐπὶ τοὺς κανόνας, φέρε τὰς προλήψεις. διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἱκανῶς θαυμάσαι τὸ γινόμενον. ὅπου βάρη κρῖναι θέλομεν, οὐκ εἰκῇ κρίνομεν· ὅπου τὰ εὐθέα καὶ στρεβλά, οὐκ εἰκῇ· 29ἁπλῶς ὅπου διαφέρει ἡμῖν γνῶναι τὸ κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἀληθές, οὐδέποθʼ ἡμῶν οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν εἰκῇ ποιήσει. 30ὅπου δὲ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ μόνον αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ κατορθοῦν ἢ ἁμαρτάνειν, τοῦ εὐροεῖν ἢ δυσροεῖν, τοῦ ἀτυχεῖν ἢ εὐτυχεῖν, ἐνθάδε μόνον εἰκαῖοι καὶ προπετεῖς. οὐδαμοῦ ὅμοιόν τι ζυγῷ, οὐδαμοῦ ὅμοιόν τι κανόνι, ἀλλά τι ἐφάνη καὶ εὐθὺς ποιῶ τὸ φανέν. 31κρείσσων γάρ εἰμι τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος ἢ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως, ἵνʼ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθῆσαι τοῖς φαινομένοις τοιαῦτα κακὰ ποιήσωσι καὶ πάθωσιν, ἐμοὶ δὲ μὴ ἀρκῇ τὸ φαινόμενον; 32καὶ ποία τραγῳδία ἄλλην ἀρχὴν ἔχει; Ἀτρεὺς Εὐριπίδου τί ἐστιν; τὸ φαινόμενον. Οἰδίπους Σοφοκλέους τί ἐστιν; τὸ φαινόμενον. Φοῖνιξ; 33τὸ φαινόμενον. Ἱππόλυτος; τὸ φαινόμενον. τούτου οὖν μηδεμίαν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι τίνος ὑμῖν δοκεῖ; τίνες δὲ λέγονται οἱ παντὶ τῷ φαινομένῳ ἀκολουθοῦντες; — μαινόμενοι. — ἡμεῖς οὖν ἄλλο τι ποιοῦμεν;
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA