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Concept

Impressions and assent

φαντασία καὶ συγκατάθεσιςphantasia kai synkatathesisLatin: visum et adsensio

Things appear to us in impressions; we decide whether to assent. Our assent is in our power, and that is where wisdom and error begin.

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An impression (phantasia) is the way something appears to the mind: this is a dog, that was an insult, death is terrible. Impressions arrive whether we want them or not. What is in our power is whether to give them our assent, accepting them as true, or to withhold it.

The Stoics built both their theory of knowledge and their ethics on this. Some impressions are so clear that they guarantee their own truth (katalēptikai). Passions, on the other hand, come from assenting too quickly to impressions of good and evil. Epictetus’ practical training is largely about testing impressions before assenting: stopping to ask what an impression really is, and whether it concerns something in our power (see Enchiridion 1).

A fragment of Epictetus preserved by Aulus Gellius (Attic Nights 19.1) explains that even the wise feel a first involuntary shock at a terrifying sight, but do not assent to it.

Key passages

<argument> The reply of a certain philosopher, when he was asked why he turned pale in a storm at sea.

</argument> WE were sailing from Cassiopa to Brundisium over the Ionian sea, violent, vast and storm-tossed. During almost the whole of the night which followed our first day a fierce side-wind blew, which had filled our ship with water. Then afterwards, while we were all still lamenting, and working hard at the pumps, day at last dawned. But there was no less danger and no slackening of the violence of the wind; on the contrary, more frequent whirlwinds, a black sky, masses of fog, and a kind of fearful cloud-forms, which they called typhones, or typhoons, seemed to hang over and threaten us, ready to overwhelm the ship.

In our company was an eminent philosopher of the Stoic sect, whom I had known at Athens as a man of no slight importance, holding the young men who were his pupils under very good control. In the midst of the great dangers of that time and that tumult of sea and sky I looked for him, desiring to know in what state of mind he was and whether he was unterrified and courageous. And then I beheld the man frightened and ghastly pale, not indeed uttering any lamentations, as all the rest were doing, nor any outcries of that kind, but in his loss of colour and distracted expression not differing much from the others. But when the sky cleared, the sea grew calm, and the heat of danger cooled, then the Stoic was approached by a rich Greek from Asia, a man of elegant apparel, as we saw, and with an abundance of baggage and many attendants, while he himself showed signs of a luxurious person and disposition. This man, in a bantering tone, said: What does this mean, Sir philosopher, that when we were in danger you were afraid and turned pale, while I neither feared nor changed colour? And the philosopher, after hesitating for a moment about the propriety of answering him, said: If in such a terrible storm I did show a little fear, you are not worthy to be told the reason for it. But, if you please, the famous Aristippus, the pupil of Socrates, shall answer for me, who on being asked on a similar occasion by a man much like you why he feared, though a philosopher, while his questioner on the contrary had no fear, replied that they had not the same motives, for his questioner need not be very anxious about the life of a worthless coxcomb, but he himself feared for the life of an Aristippus.

With these words then the Stoic rid himself of the rich Asiatic. But later, when we were approaching Brundisium and sea and sky were calm, I asked him what the reason for his fear was, which he had refused to reveal to the man who had improperly addressed him. And he quietly and courteously replied: Since you are desirous of knowing, hear what our forefathers, the founders of the Stoic sect, thought about that brief but inevitable and natural fear, or rather, said he, read it, for if you read it, you will be the more ready to believe it and you will remember it better. Thereupon before my eyes he drew from his little bag the fifth book of the Discourses of the philosopher Epictetus, which, as arranged by Arrian, undoubtedly agree with the writings of Zeno and Chrysippus.

In that book I read this statement, which of course was written in Greek : The mental visions, which the philosophers call fantasi/ai or 'phantasies,' by which the mind of man on the very first appearance of an object is impelled to the perception of the object, are neither voluntary nor controlled by the will, but through a certain power of their own they force their recognition upon men; but the expressions of assent, which they call sugkataqe/seis, by which these visions are recognized, are voluntary and subject to man's will. Therefore when some terrifying sound, either from heaven or from a falling building or as a sudden announcement of some danger, or anything else of that kind occurs, even the mind of a wise man must necessarily be disturbed, must shrink and feel alarm, not from a preconceived idea of any danger, but from certain swift and unexpected attacks which forestall the power of the mind and of reason. Presently, however, the wise man does not approve ' such phantasies,' that is to say, such terrifying mental visions (to quote the Greek, 'he does not consent to them nor confirm them'), but he rejects and scorns them, nor does he see in them anything that ought to excite fear. And they say that there is this difference between the mind of a foolish man and that of a wise man, that the foolish man thinks that such ' visions ' are in fact as dreadful and terrifying as they appear at the original impact of them on his mind, and by his assent he approves of such ideas as if they were rightly to be feared, and 'confirms' them; for prosepidoca/zei is the word which the Stoics use in their discourses on the subject. But the wise man, after being affected for a short time and slightly in his colour and expression, 'does not assent,' but retains the steadfastness and strength of the opinion which he has always had about visions of this kind, namely that they are in no wise to be feared but excite terror by a false appearance and vain alarms.

That these were the opinions and utterances of Epictetus the philosopher in accordance with the beliefs of the Stoics I read in that book which I have mentioned, and I thought that they ought to be recorded for this reason, that when things of the kind which I have named chance to occur, we may not think that to fear for a time and, as it were, turn white is the mark of a foolish and weak man, but in that brief but natural impulse we yield rather to human weakness than because we believe that those things are what they seem.

Aulus Gellius, Gellius, Attic Nights 19.1 · trans. J. C. Rolfe (1927)

The Stoics agree to put in the forefront the doctrine of presentation and sensation, inasmuch as the standard by which the truth of things is tested is generically a presentation, and again the theory of assent and that of apprehension and thought, which precedes all the rest, cannot be stated apart from presentation. For presentation comes first; then thought, which is capable of expressing itself, puts into the form of a proposition that which the subject receives from a presentation.

Diogenes Laërtius, Lives 7.49 · trans. R. D. Hicks (1925)

All passages

48 passages in 11 works, found by: συγκατάθεσις (Greek); assent + impression / appearance; adsensio (Latin).

Meditations · 5

Discourses · 25

  • Discourses 1.3 — If a man should be able to assent to this doctrine as he ought, that we are all sprung from God in an especial manner, and…
  • Discourses 1.5 — …one of the understanding, the other of the sense of shame, when a man is resolved not to assent to what is manifest nor to desist from contradictions. Most of us are afraid of…
  • Discourses 1.7 — …proposed in reasoning? To establish true propositions, to remove the false, to withhold assent from those which are not plain. Is it enough then to have learned only this? It is…
  • Discourses 1.14 — …by ten thousand things at the same time in your senses and in your understanding, and to assent to some, and to dissent from others, and again as to some things to suspend your…
  • Discourses 1.18 — Greek text uses συγκαταθεσθαι
Show 20 more
  • Discourses 1.21 — Greek text uses συγκαταθεσει
  • Discourses 1.28 — Greek text uses συγκαταθεσθαι
  • Discourses 2.8 — Greek text uses συγκαταθεσιν
  • Discourses 2.17 — Greek text uses συγκαταθεσεισ
  • Discourses 2.20 — Greek text uses συγκαταθεσθε
  • Discourses 2.26 — …he sees that a thing is false; but so long as this falsehood does not appear to him, he assents to it as to truth. He then is strong in argument and has the faculty of exhorting and…
  • Discourses 3.2 — Greek text uses συγκαταθεσεισ
  • Discourses 3.3 — …is to use appearances conformably to nature: and as it is the nature of every soul to assent to the truth, to dissent from the false, and to remain in suspense as to that which is…
  • Discourses 3.7 — Greek text uses συγκαταθεσθαι
  • Discourses 3.8 — …a good. If we train ourselves in this manner, we shall make progress; for we shall never assent to any thing of which there is not an appearance capable of being comprehended. Your son…
  • Discourses 3.9 — Greek text uses συγκαταθεσεισ
  • Discourses 3.12 — Greek text uses συγκαταθεσεισ
  • Discourses 3.21 — Greek text uses συγκατατιθεμαι
  • Discourses 3.22 — Greek text uses συγκαταθεσθαι
  • Discourses 3.26 — …he do than like a good general he has given me the signal to retreat? I obey, I follow, assenting to the words of the commander, praising his acts: for I came when it pleased him, and I…
  • Discourses 4.1 — Greek text uses συγκαταθεσθαι
  • Discourses 4.4 — …things now when it is the time of action? This is just as if in the topic (matter) of assent when appearances present themselves, some of which can be comprehended, and some cannot…
  • Discourses 4.6 — Greek text uses συγκατατιθεμαι
  • Discourses 4.10 — Greek text uses συγκατατιθωμαι
  • Discourses 4.11 — Greek text uses συγκατατιθεσθαι

Enchiridion · 1

Moral Letters to Lucilius · 5

Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Book VII · 4

  • Lives 7.46 — Greek text uses συγκατατιθεσθαι
  • Lives 7.51 — Greek text uses συγκαταθεσεωσ
  • Lives 7.75 — Greek text uses συγκαταθεσιν
  • Lives 7.91 — Greek text uses συγκαταθεσεισ

On Duties · 1

On Ends, Book III · 2

  • De Finibus 3.18 — Latin text uses adsensione
  • De Finibus 3.30 — …and the chief duty of a wise man is to resist appearances, and firmly to withhold his assent from them. Now people often make very lengthy replies to each of these assertions; yet…

On Stoic Self-Contradictions · 1

Against the Stoics on Common Conceptions · 1

On Benefits · 1

  • On Benefits 4.34 — …pains to weigh the value of these with all possible care, and will not hastily give my assent to them. For instance, in a battle, it may happen that my hand may be deceived by some…
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