Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER VII. · Concerning a Governor of the Free States, who was an Epicurean.
1When the Governor, who was an Epicurean, came to him; It is fit, says he, that we ignorant People should enquire of you Philosophers, what is the most valuable Thing, in the World; as those who come into a strange City do of the Citizens, and such as are acquainted with it; that, after this Enquiry, we may go and take a View of it, as they do in Cities. Now, scarcely any one denies, but that there are three Things belonging to Man; Soul, Body, and Externals. It remains for you to answer which is the best. What shall we tell Mankind? Is it Flesh? And was it for this, that Maximus took a Voyage in Winter as far as Cassiope, to accompany his Son? Was it to gratify the Flesh? No, surely. Is it not fit then, to employ our chief Study on what is best? Yes, beyond all other Things. What have we, then, better than Flesh? The Soul. Are we to prefer the Good of the Better, or of the Worse? Of the Better. Doth the Good of the Soul consist in what is dependent, or independent, on Choice? In what is dependent on it. Doth the Pleasure of the Soul then, depend on Choice? It doth. And whence doth this Pleasure arise? From itself? This is unintelligible. For there must subsist some principal Essence of Good, in the Attainment of which, we shall enjoy this Pleasure of the Soul. This too is granted. In what then consists this Pleasure of the Soul? For if it be in mental Objects, the Essence of Good is found. For it is impossible, that we should be reasonably elated with Pleasure, unless by Good; or that, if the leading Cause is not good, the Effect should be good. For, to make the Effect reasonable, the Cause must be good. But this, if you are in your Senses, you will not allow; for it would be to contradict both Epicurus, and the rest of your Principles. It remains then, that the Pleasures of the Soul must consist in bodily Objects; and that there must be the leading Cause, and the Essence of Good. Maximus therefore did foolishly, if he took a Voyage for the Sake of any thing but Body; that is, for the Sake of what is best. He doth foolishly too, if he refrains from what is another's, when he is a Judge, and able to take it. But let us consider only this, if you please, how it may be done secretly, and safely, and so that no one may know it. For Epicurus himself doth not pronounce Stealing to be evil, only the being found out in it: and says, "Do not steal;" for no other Reason, but because it is impossible to insure ourselves against a Discovery. But I say to you, That, if it be done dexterously and cautiously, we shall not be discovered. Besides: we have powerful. Friends, of both Sexes, at Rome; and the Greeks are weak; and nobody will dare to go up to Rome, on such an Affair. Why do you refrain from your own proper Good? It is Madness; it is Folly. But if you were to tell me, that you do refrain, I would not believe you. For, as it is impossible to assent to an apparent Falshood, or to deny an apparent Truth, so it is impossible to abstain from an apparent Good. Now, Riches are a Good; and, indeed, the chief Instrument of Pleasures. Why do not you acquire them? And why do not we corrupt the Wife of our Neighbour, if it can be done secretly? And, if the Husband should happen to be impertinent, why not cut his Throat too? if you have a mind to be such a Philosopher as you ought to be, a complete one, to be consistent with your own Principles. Otherwise you will not differ from us, who are called Stoics. For we too say one Thing, and do another: we talk well, and act ill: but you will be perverse in a contrary Way; teach bad Principles, and act well. 2For Heaven's sake represent to yourself a City of Epicureans. "I do not marry." "Nor I. For we are not to marry, nor have Children; nor to engage in public Affairs." What will be the Consequence of this? Whence are the Citizens to come? Who will educate them? Who will be the Governor of the Youth? Who, the Master of their Exercises? What then, will he teach them? Will it be what used to be taught at Athens, or Lacedemon? Take a young Man; bring him up, according to your Principles. These Principles are wicked; subversive of a State; pernicious to Families; nor becoming, even to Women. Give them up, Sir. You live in a capital City. You are to govern, and judge uprightly, and to refrain from what belongs to others. No one's Wife, or Child, or Silver or Gold Plate, is to have any Charms for you; but your own. Provide yourself with Principles, consonant to these Truths; and, setting out from thence, you will with Pleasure refrain from Things so persuasive to mislead, and get the better. But, if to their own persuasive Force, we add such a Philosophy, as hurries us upon them, and confirms us in them, what will be the Consequence? 3In a sculptured Vase, which is the best; the Silver, or the Workmanship? In the Hand, the Substance is Flesh: but its Operations are the principal Thing. Accordingly, the Duties, relative to it, are likewise threefold; some have respect to mere Existence; others, to the manner of Existence; and a third Sort are the leading Operations themselves. Thus likewise, do not set a Value on the Materials of Man, mere paultry Flesh; but on the principal Operations belonging to him. What are these? Engaging in public Business; Marrying; the Production of Children; the Worship of God; the Care of our Parents; and, in general, the having our Desires and Aversions, our Pursuits and Avoidances, such as each of them ought to be, conformable to our Nature. What is our Nature? To be free, noble spirited, modest. (For what other Animal blushes? What other hath the Idea of Shame?) But Pleasure must be subjected to these, as an Attendant and Handmaid, to call forth our Activity, and to keep us constant in natural Operations. But I am rich, and want nothing. Then why do you pretend to philosophize? Your Gold and Silver Plate is enough for you. What need have you of Principles? Besides, I am Judge of the Greeks. Do you know how to judge? Who hath imparted this Knowledge to you? Cæsar hath given me a Commission. Let him give you a Commission to judge of Music; and what Good will it do you? But how were you made a Judge? Whose Hand have you kissed? That of Symphorus, or Numenius? Before whose Bed-chamber have you slept? To whom have you sent Presents? After all, do you perceive, that the Office of Judge is of the same Value as Numenius? But I can throw whom I please into Prison. As you may a Stone. But I can beat whom I will too. As you may an Ass. This is not a Government over Men. Govern us like reasonable Creatures. Show us what is for our Interest, and we will pursue it: show us what is against our Interest, and we will avoid it. Like Socrates, make us Imitators of yourself. He was properly a Governor of Men, who subjected their Desires and Aversions, their Pursuits, their Avoidances, to himself. "Do this; do not do that, or I will throw you into Prison." Going thus far only, is not governing Men, like reasonable Creatures. But——"Do as Jupiter hath commanded, or you will be punished. You will be a Loser." What shall I lose? Nothing more, than the not doing what you ought. You will lose your Fidelity, Honour, Decency. Look for no greater Losses, than these.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (3)
- The Translation follows Lord Shaftesbury's Correction of ψυχικοις, for αγαθοις; which seems absolutely necessary to the Sense of the Passage.
- The Translation follows the Reading of Wolfius. Επινοει
- Of Symphorus and Numenius there is no Account; and their Names serve only to how, that Persons once of such Power are now totally forgot.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Concerning a certain governor who was an epicurean.
When the Governor, who was an Epicurean, came to him, It is fit, said he, that we ignorant people should inquire of you philosophers what is the most valuable thing in the world; as those who come into a strange city do of the citizens and such as are acquainted with it; that after this inquiry we may go and take a view of it, as they do in cities. Now, almost every one admits that there are three things belonging to man,—soul, body, and externals. It belongs to such as you to answer which is the best. What shall we tell mankind? Is it the flesh?
And was it for this that Maximus took a voyage in winter as far as Cassiope to accompany his son? Was it to gratify the flesh?
No, surely. Is it not fit, then, to study what is best? Yes, beyond all other things. What have we, then, better than flesh? The soul.
Are we to prefer the good of the better, or of the worse?
Of the better.
Does the good of the soul consist in things controllable by Will or uncontrollable?
In things controllable.
Does the pleasure of the soul, then, depend on the Will?
It does.
And whence does this pleasure arise,—from itself? This is unintelligible. For there must exist some principal essence of good, in the attainment of which we shall enjoy this pleasure of the soul.
This too is granted.
In what, then, consists this pleasure of the soul? If it be in mental objects, the essence of good is found. For it is impossible that good should lie in one thing, and rational enjoyment in another; or that, if the cause is not good, the effect should be good. For, to make the effect reasonable, the cause must be good. But this you cannot reasonably allow; for it would be to contradict both Epicurus and the rest of your principles. It remains, then, that the pleasures of the soul must consist in bodily objects; and that there must be the cause and the essence of good. Maximus, therefore, did foolishly, if he took a voyage for the sake of anything but his body; that is, for the sake of what is best. A man does foolishly too, if he refrains from what is another’s, when he is a judge and able to take it. We should consider only this, if you please, how it may be done secretly and safely, and so that no one may know it. For Epicurus himself does not pronounce stealing to be evil, only the being found out in it; and prohibits it for no other reason, but because it is impossible to insure ourselves against discovery. But I say to you that, if it be done dexterously and cautiously, we shall not be discovered. Besides, we have powerful friends of both sexes at Rome; and the Greeks are weak; and nobody will dare to go up to Rome on such an affair. Why do you refrain from your own proper good? It is madness; it is folly. But if you were to tell me that you do refrain, I would not believe you. For, as it is impossible to assent to an apparent falsehood, or to deny an apparent truth, so it is impossible to abstain from an apparent good. Now, riches are a good, and, indeed, the chief instrument of pleasures. Why do not you acquire them? And why do not we corrupt the wife of our neighbor, if it can be done secretly? And if the husband should happen to be impertinent, why not cut his throat too, if you have a mind to be such a philosopher as you ought to be,—a complete one,—to be consistent with your own principles. Otherwise you will not differ from us who are called Stoics. For we, too, say one thing and do another; we talk well and act ill; but you will be perverse in a contrary way, teaching bad principles, and acting well.
For Heaven’s sake represent to yourself a city of Epicureans. I do not marry. Nor I; for we are not to marry nor have children, nor to engage in public affairs. What will be the consequence of this? Whence are the citizens to come? Who will educate them? Who will be the governor of the youth? Who the master of their exercises? What then will he teach them? Will it be what used to be taught at Athens, or Lacedemon? Take a young man; bring him up according to your principles. These principles are wicked, subversive of a state, pernicious to families, not becoming even to women. Give them up, sir. You live in a capital city. You are to govern and judge uprightly, and to refrain from what belongs to others. No one’s wife or child, or silver or gold plate, is to have any charms for you, except your own. Provide yourself with principles consonant to these truths; and setting out thence, you will with pleasure refrain from things so persuasive to mislead and conquer. But if to their own persuasive force we can add such a philosophy as hurries us upon them and confirms us in them, what will be the consequence?
In a sculptured vase, which is the best,—the silver, or the workmanship? In the hand the substance is flesh; but its operations are the principal thing. Accordingly, its functions are threefold,—relating to its existence, to the manner of its existence, and to its principal operations. Thus, likewise, do not set a value on the mere materials of man, the flesh; but on the principal operations which belong to him.
What are these?
Engaging in public business, marrying, the production of children, the worship of God, the care of parents, and, in general, the regulation of our desires and aversions, our pursuits and avoidances, in accordance with our nature.
What is our nature?
To be free, noble-spirited, modest. For what other animal blushes? What other has the idea of shame? But pleasure must be subjected to these, as an attendant and handmaid, to call forth our activity, and to keep us constant in natural operations.
But I am rich and want nothing.
Then why do you pretend to philosophize? Your gold and silver plate is enough for you. What need have you of principles?
Besides, I am Judge of the Greeks.
Do you know how to judge? Who has imparted this knowledge to you?
Caesar has given me a commission.
Let him give you a commission to judge of music; what good will it do you? But how were you made a Judge? Whose hand have you kissed,—that of Symphorus, or Numenius? Before whose door have you slept? To whom have you sent presents? After all, do you not perceive that the office of Judge puts you in the same rank with Numenius?
But I can throw whom I please into a prison. So you may a stone.
But I can beat whom I will too.
So you may an ass. This is not a government over men. Govern us like reasonable creatures. Show us what is best for us, and we will pursue it; show us what is otherwise, and we will avoid it. Like Socrates, make us imitators of yourself. He was properly a governor of men, who controlled their desires and aversions, their pursuits, their avoidances. Do this; do not that, or I will throw you into prison. This is not a government for reasonable creatures. But Do as Zeus has commanded, or you will be punished, and be a loser.
What shall I lose?
Simply your own right action, your fidelity, honor, decency. You can find no losses greater than these.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
To the administrator of the free cities who was an Epicurean.
When the administrator came to visit him, and the man was an Epicurean, Epictetus said, It is proper for us who are not philosophers to inquire of you who are philosophers, as those who come to a strange city inquire of the citizens and those who are acquainted with it, what is the best thing in the world, in order that we also after inquiry may go in quest of that which is best and look at it, as strangers do with the things in cities. For that there are three things which relate to man, soul, body, and things external, scarcely any man denies. It remains for you philosophers to answer what is the best. What shall we say to men? Is the flesh the best? and was it for this that Maximus sailed as far as Cassiope in winter (or bad weather) with his son, and accompanied him that he might be gratified in the flesh? When the man said that it was not, and added, Far be that from him.—Is it not fit then, Epictetus said, to be actively employed about the best? It is certainly of all things the most fit. What then do we possess which is better than the flesh? The soul, he replied. And the good things of the best, are they better, or the good things of the worse? The good things of the best. And are the good things of the best within the power of the will or not within the power of the will? They are within the power of the will. Is then the pleasure of the soul a thing within the power of the will? It is, he replied. And on what shall this pleasure depend? On itself? But that can not be conceived: for there must first exist a certain substance or nature (οὐσία) of good, by obtaining which we shall have pleasure in the soul. He assented to this also. On what then shall we depend for this pleasure of the soul? for if it shall depend on things of the soul, the substance (nature) of the good is discovered; for good can not be one thing, and that at which we are rationally delighted another thing; nor if that which precedes is not good, can that which comes after be good, for in order that the thing which comes after may be good, that which precedes must be good. But you would not affirm this. if you are in your right mind, for you would then say what is inconsistent both with Epicurus and the rest of your doctrines. It remains then that the pleasure of the soul is in the pleasure from things of the body: and again that those bodily things must be the things which precede and the substance (nature) of the good.
For this reason Maximus acted foolishly if he made the voyage for any other reason than for the sake of the flesh, that is, for the sake of the best. And also a man acts foolishly if he abstains from that which belongs to others, when he is a judge (δικαστής) and able to take it. But, if you please, let us consider this only, how this thing may be done secretly, and safely, and so that no man will know it. For not even does Epicurus himself declare stealing to be bad, but he admits that detection is; and because it is impossible to have security against detection, for this reason he says, Do not steal. But I say to you that if stealing is done cleverly and cautiously, we shall not be detected: further also we have powerful friends in Rome both men and women, and the Hellenes (Greeks) are weak, and no man will venture to go up to Rome for the purpose (of complaining). Why do you refrain from your own good? This is senseless, foolish. But even if you tell me that you do refrain, I will not believe you. For as it is impossible to assent to that which appears false, and to turn away from that which is true, so it is impossible to abstain from that which appears good. But wealth is a good thing, and certainly most efficient in producing pleasure. Why will you not acquire wealth? And why should we not corrupt our neighbor’s wife, if we can do it without detection? and if the husband foolishly prates about the matter, why not pitch him out of the house? If you would be a philosopher such as you ought to be, if a perfect philosopher, if consistent with your own doctrines, [you must act thus]. If you would not, you will not differ at all from us who are called Stoics; for we also say one thing, but we do another: we talk of the things which are beautiful (good), but we do what is base. But you will be perverse in the contrary way, teaching what is bad, practising what is good.
In the name of God, are you thinking of a city of Epicureans? [One man says], I do not marry. —Nor I, for a man ought not to marry; nor ought we to beget children, nor engage in public matters. What then will happen? whence will the citizens come? who will bring them up? who will be governor of the youth, who preside over gymnastic exercises? and in what also will the teacher instruct them? will he teach them what the Lacedaemonians were taught, or what the Athenians were taught? Come take a young man, bring him up according to your doctrines. The doctrines are bad, subversive of a state, pernicious to families, and not becoming to women. Dismiss them, man. You live in a chief city: it is your duty to be a magistrate, to judge justly, to abstain from that which belongs to others; no woman ought to seem beautiful to you except your own wife, and no youth, no vessel of silver, no vessel of gold (except your own). Seek for doctrines which are consistent with what I say, and by making them your guide you will with pleasure abstain from things which have such persuasive power to lead us and overpower us. But if to the persuasive power of these things, we also devise such a philosophy as this which helps to push us on towards them and strengthens us to this end, what will be the conesquence? In a piece of toreutic art which is the best part? the silver or the workmanship? The substance of the hand is the flesh; but the work of the hand is the principal part (that which precedes and leads the rest). The duties then are also three: those which are directed towards the existence of a thing; those which are directed towards its existence in a particular kind; and third, the chief or leading things themselves. So also in man we ought not to value the material, the poor flesh, but the principal (leading things, τὰ προηγούμενα). What are these? Engaging in public business, marrying, begetting children, venerating God, taking care of parents, and generally, having desires, aversions (ἐκκλίνειν), pursuits of things and avoidances, in the way in which we ought to do these things, and according to our nature. And how are we constituted by nature? Free, noble, modest: for what other animal blushes? what other is capable of receiving the appearance (the impression) of shame? and we are so constituted by nature as to subject pleasure to these things, as a minister, a servant, in order that it may call forth our activity, in order that it may keep us constant in acts which are conformable to nature.
But I am rich and I want nothing.—Why then do you pretend to be a philosopher? Your golden and your silver vessels are enough for you. What need have you of principles (opinions)? But I am also a judge (κριτής) of the Greeks.—Do you know how to judge? Who taught you to know? Caesar wrote to me a codicil. Let him write and give you a commission to judge of music; and what will be the use of it to you? Still how did you become a judge? whose hand did you kiss? the hand of Symphorus or Numenius? Before whose bed-chamber have you slept? To whom have you sent gifts? Then do you not see that to be a judge is just of the same value as Numenius is? But I can throw into prison any man whom I please.— So you can do with a stone.—But I can beat with sticks whom I please.—So you may an ass. This is not a governing of men. Govern us as rational animals: show us what is profitable to us, and we will follow it: show us what is unprofitable, and we will turn away from it. Make us imitators of yourself, as Socrates made men imitators of himself. For he was like a governor of men, who made them subject to him their desires, their aversion, their movements towards an object and their turning away from it.—Do this: do not do this: if you do not obey, I will throw you into prison.—This is not governing men like rational animals. But I (say): As Zeus has ordained, so act: if you do not act so, you will feel the penalty, you will be punished.—What will be the punishment? Nothing else than not having done your duty: you will lose the character of fidelity, modesty, propriety. Do not look for greater penalties than these.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (12)
- The Greek is διορθωτής . The Latin word is Corrector, which occurs in inscriptions, and elsewhere.
- The Epicureans are ironically named Philosophers, for most of them were arrogant men. See what is said of them in Cicero’s De Natura Deorum, i. 8. Schweig.
- Maximus was appointed by Trajan to conduct a campaign against the Parthians, in which he lost his life. Dion Cassius, ii. 1108 , 1126 , Beimarus. Cassiope or Cassope is a city in Epirus , near the sea, and between Pandosia and Nicopolis , where Epictetus lived.
- ψυχικοῖς is Lord Shaftesbury’s emendation in place of ἀγαθοῖς , and it is accepted by Schweighaeuser.
- Diogenes Laertius (x. 151), quoted by Upton. Injustice, says Epicurus, is not an evil in itself, but the evil is in the fear which there is on account of suspicion.
- The MSS., with one exception, have δογματίζων τὰ καλὰ, ποιῶν τὰ αἴσχρα , but it was properly corrected by Wolf, as Upton remarks, who shows from Cicero, de Fin., ii. 25 and 31, that the MSS. are wrong. In the second passage Cicero says, nihil in hae praeclara epistola so, iptum ab Epicuro congruens et conveniens decretis ejus reperietis. Ita redarguitur ipse a sese, vincunturque scripta ejus probitate ipsius ac moribus. See Epictetus, ii. 18.
- Upton compares the passage (v. 333) in the Cyclops of Euripides, who speaks like an Epicurean. Not to marry and not to engage public affairs were Epicurean doctrines. See Epictetus, i. 23, 3 and 6
- The toreutic art is the art of working in metal, stone, or wood, and of making figures on them in relief or by cutting into the material.
- See Schweig.’s note.
- See Schweig.’s note.
- A codicillus is a small codex and the original sense of codex is a strong stem or stump. Lastly it was used for a book, and even for a will. Codicilli were small writing-tablets, covered with wax, on which men wrote with a stylus or pointed metal. Lastly, codicillus is a book or writing generally; and a writing or letter by which the emperor conferred any office. Our word codicil has only one sense, which is a small writing added or subjoined to a will or testament; but this sense is also derived from the Roman use of the word. (Dig. 29, tit. 7, de jure codicillorum.)
- Upton supposes this to mean, whose bedchamber man are you? and he compares i. 19. But Schweig. says that this is not the meaning here, and that the meaning is this: He who before daybreak is waiting at the door of a rich man, whose favour he seeks, is said in a derisive way to be passing the night before a man’s chamber.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1τοῦ δὲ διορθωτοῦ εἰσελθόντος πρὸς αὐτὸν (ἦν δʼ οὗτος Ἐπικούρειος) ἄξιον, ἔφη, τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἡμᾶς παρʼ ὑμῶν τῶν φιλοσόφων πυνθάνεσθαι, καθάπερ τοὺς εἰς ξένην πόλιν ἐλθόντας παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ εἰδότων, τί κράτιστόν ἐστιν ἐν κόσμῳ, ἵνα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἱστορήσαντες μετίωμεν, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι τὰ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ θεώμεθα. 2ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τρία ἐστὶ περὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα καὶ τὰ ἐκτός, σχεδὸν οὐδεὶς ἀντιλέγει· λοιπὸν ὑμέτερόν ἐστιν ἀποκρίνασθαι, τί ἐστι τὸ κράτιστον. τί ἐροῦμεν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; 3τὴν σάρκα; καὶ διὰ ταύτην Μάξιμος ἔπλευσεν μέχρι Κασσιόπης χειμῶνος μετὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ προπέμπων, ἵνʼ ἡσθῇ τῇ σαρκί; 4ἀρνησαμένου δʼ ἐκείνου καὶ εἰπόντος Μὴ γένοιτο· οὐ προσήκει περὶ τὸ κράτιστον ἐσπουδακέναι; — πάντων μάλιστα προσήκει. — τί οὖν κρεῖσσον ἔχομεν τῆς σαρκός; — τὴν ψυχήν, ἔφη. — ἀγαθὰ δὲ τὰ τοῦ κρατίστου κρείττονά ἐστιν ἢ τὰ τοῦ φαυλοτέρου; 5— τὰ τοῦ κρατίστου. — ψυχῆς δὲ ἀγαθὰ πότερον προαιρετικά ἐστιν ἢ ἀπροαίρετα; — προαιρετικά. — προαιρετικὸν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἡδονὴ ἡ ψυχική; 6— ἔφη. — αὕτη δʼ ἐπὶ τίσιν γίνεται; πότερον ἐφʼ αὑτῇ; ἀλλʼ ἀδιανόητόν ἐστιν· προηγουμένην γάρ τινα ὑφεστάναι δεῖ οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἧς τυγχάνοντες ἡσθησόμεθα κατὰ ψυχήν. — ὡμολόγει καὶ τοῦτο. — ἐπὶ τίνι οὖν ἡσθησόμεθα ταύτην τὴν ψυχικὴν ἡδονήν; 7εἰ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς ψυχικοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, εὕρηται ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. οὐ γὰρ δύναται ἄλλο μὲν εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ἄλλο δʼ ἐφʼ ᾧ εὐλόγως ἐπαιρόμεθα, οὐδὲ τοῦ προηγουμένου μὴ ὄντος ἀγαθοῦ τὸ ἐπιγέννημα ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. ἵνα γὰρ εὔλογον ᾖ τὸ ἐπιγέννημα, τὸ προηγούμενον δεῖ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. 8ἀλλʼ οὐ μὴ εἴπητε φρένας ἔχοντες· ἀνακόλουθα γὰρ ἐρεῖτε καὶ Ἐπικούρῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑμῶν δόγμασιν. 9ὑπολείπεται λοιπὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς σωματικοῖς ἥδεσθαι τὴν κατὰ ψυχὴν ἡδονήν· πάλιν ἐκεῖνα γίνεται προηγούμενα καὶ οὐσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. 10διὰ τοῦτο ἀφρόνως ἐποίησε Μάξιμος, εἰ διʼ ἄλλο τι ἔπλευσεν ἢ διὰ τὴν σάρκα, τοῦτʼ ἔστι διὰ τὸ κράτιστον. 11ἀφρόνως δὲ ποιεῖ καὶ εἰ ἀπέχεται τῶν ἀλλοτρίων δικαστὴς ὢν καὶ δυνάμενος λαμβάνειν. ἀλλʼ ἄν σοι δόξῃ, ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκεπτώμεθα, ἵνα κεκρυμμένως, ἵνʼ ἀσφαλῶς, ἵνα μή τις γνῷ. 12τὸ γὰρ κλέψαι οὐδʼ αὐτὸς Ἐπίκουρος ἀποφαίνει κακόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐμπεσεῖν· καὶ ὅτι πίστιν περὶ τοῦ λαθεῖν λαβεῖν ἀδύνατον, διὰ τοῦτο λέγει μὴ κλέπτετε. 13ἀλλʼ ἐγώ σοι λέγω, ὅτι ἐὰν κομψῶς καὶ περιεσταλμένως γίνηται, λησόμεθα· εἶτα καὶ φίλους ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ ἔχομεν δυνατοὺς καὶ φίλ[ι]ας καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες ἀδρανεῖς εἰσιν· οὐδεὶς τολμήσει ἀναβῆναι τούτου ἕνεκα. 14τί ἀπέχῃ τοῦ ἰδίου ἀγαθοῦ; ἄφρον ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ἠλίθιόν ἐστιν. ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ἂν λέγῃς μοι, ὅτι ἀπέχῃ, πιστεύσω σοι. 15ὡς γὰρ ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τῷ ψευδεῖ φαινομένῳ συγκαταθέσθαι καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀπονεῦσαι, οὕτως ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ ἀποστῆναι. ὁ πλοῦτος δʼ ἀγαθὸν καὶ οἱονανεὶ τὸ ποιητικώτατόν γε τῶν ἡδονῶν. 16διὰ τί μὴ περιποιήσῃ αὐτόν; διὰ τί δὲ μὴ τὴν τοῦ γείτονος γυναῖκα διαφθείρωμεν, ἂν δυνώμεθα λαθεῖν, ἂν δὲ φλυαρῇ ὁ ἀνήρ, καὶ αὐτὸν προσεκτραχηλίσωμεν; 17εἰ θέλεις εἶναι φιλόσοφος οἷος δεῖ, εἴ γε τέλειος, εἰ ἀκολουθῶν σου τοῖς δόγμασιν· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐδὲν διοίσεις ἡμῶν τῶν λεγομένων Στωικῶν· καὶ αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἄλλα λέγομεν, ἄλλα δὲ ποιοῦμεν. 18ἡμεῖς λέγομεν τὰ καλά, ποιοῦμεν τὰ αἰσχρά· σὺ τὴν ἐναντίαν διαστροφὴν ἔσῃ διεστραμμένος δογματίζων τὰ αἰσχρά, ποιῶν τὰ καλά. 19τὸν θεόν σοι, ἐπινοεῖς Ἐπικουρείων πόλιν; ἐγὼ οὐ γαμῶ. οὐδʼ ἐγώ· οὐ γὰρ γαμητέον. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ παιδοποιητέον, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ πολιτευτέον. τί οὖν γένηται; πόθεν οἱ πολῖται; τίς αὐτοὺς παιδεύσει; τίς ἐφήβαρχος, τίς γυμνασίαρχος; τί δὲ καὶ παιδεύσει αὐτούς; ἃ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐπαιδεύοντο ἢ Ἀθηναῖοι; 20λάβε μοι νέον, ἄγαγε κατὰ τὰ δόγματά σου. πονηρά ἐστι τὰ δόγματα, ἀνατρεπτικὰ πόλεως, λυμαντικὰ οἴκων, οὐδὲ γυναιξὶ πρέποντα. ἄφες ταῦτʼ, ἄνθρωπε. 21ζῇς ἐν ἡγεμονούσῃ πόλει· ἄρχειν σε δεῖ, κρίνειν δικαίως, ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, σοὶ καλὴν γυναῖκα φαίνεσθαι μηδεμίαν ἢ τὴν σήν, καλὸν παῖδα μηδένα, καλὸν ἀργύρωμα μηδέν, χρύσωμα μηδέν. 22τούτοις σύμφωνα δόγματα ζήτησον, ἀφʼ ὧν ὁρμώμενος ἡδέως ἀφέξῃ πραγμάτων οὕτως πιθανῶν πρὸς τὸ ἀγαγεῖν καὶ νικῆσαι. 23ἂν δὲ πρὸς τῇ πιθανότητι τῇ ἐκείνων καὶ φιλοσοφίαν τινά ποτε ταύτην ἐξευρηκότες ὦμεν συνεπωθοῦσαν ἡμᾶς ἐπʼ αὐτὰ καὶ ἐπιρρωννύουσαν, τί γένηται; 24ἐν τορεύματι τί κράτιστόν ἐστιν, ὁ ἄργυρος ἢ ἡ τέχνη; χειρὸς οὐσία μὲν ἡ σάρξ, προηγούμενα δὲ τὰ χειρὸς ἔργα. 25οὐκοῦν καὶ καθήκοντα τρισσά· τὰ μὲν πρὸς τὸ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸ ποιὰ εἶναι, τὰ δʼ αὐτὰ τὰ προηγούμενα. οὕτως καὶ ἀνθρώπου οὐ τὴν ὕλην δεῖ τιμᾶν, τὰ σαρκίδια, ἀλλὰ τὰ προηγούμενα. 26τίνα ἐστὶ ταῦτα; πολιτεύεσθαι, γαμεῖν, παιδοποιεῖσθαι, θεὸν σέβειν, γονέων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καθόλου ὀρέγεσθαι, ἐκκλίνειν, ὁρμᾶν, ἀφορμᾶν, ὡς ἕκαστον τούτων δεῖ ποιεῖν, ὡς πεφύκαμεν. πεφύκαμεν δὲ πῶς; 27ὡς ἐλεύθεροι, ὡς γενναῖοι, ὡς αἰδήμονες. ποῖον γὰρ ἄλλο ζῷον ἐρυθριᾷ, ποῖον αἰσχροῦ φαντασίαν λαμβάνει; 28τὴν ἡδονὴν δʼ ὑπόταξαι τούτοις ὡς διάκονον, ὡς ὑπηρέτιν, ἵνα προθυμίας ἐκκαλέσηται, ἵνʼ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔργοις παρακρατῇ. 29ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ πλούσιός εἰμι καὶ οὐδενὸς χρεία μοί ἐστιν. — τί οὖν ἔτι προσποιῇ φιλοσοφεῖν; ἀρκεῖ τὰ χρυσώματα καὶ τὰ ἀργυρώματα· τί σοι χρεία δογμάτων; 30— ἀλλὰ καὶ κριτής εἰμι τῶν Ἑλλήνων. — οἶδας κρίνειν; τί σε ἐποίησεν εἰδέναι; — Καῖσάρ μοι κωδίκελλον ἔγραψεν. — Γραψάτω σοι, ἵνα κρίνῃς περὶ τῶν μουσικῶν· καὶ τί σοι ὄφελος; 31ὅμως δὲ πῶς κριτὴς ἐγένου; τὴν τίνος χεῖρα καταφιλήσας, τὴν Συμφόρου ἢ τὴν Νουμηνίου; τίνος πρὸ τοῦ κοιτῶνος κοιμηθείς; τίνι πέμψας δῶρα; εἶτα οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ, ὅτι τοσούτου ἄξιόν ἐστι κριτὴν εἶναι ὅσου Νουμήνιος; — ἀλλὰ δύναμαι ὃν θέλω εἰς φυλακὴν βαλεῖν. 32— ὡς λίθον. — ἀλλὰ δύναμαι ξυλοκοπῆσαι ὃν θέλω. — ὡς ὄνον. οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτο ἀνθρώπων ἀρχή. 33ὡς λογικῶν ἡμῶν ἄρξον δεικνὺς ἡμῖν τὰ συμφέροντα καὶ ἀκολουθήσομεν· δείκνυε τὰ ἀσύμφορα καὶ ἀποστραφησόμεθα. 34ζηλωτὰς ἡμᾶς κατασκεύασον σεαυτοῦ ὡς Σωκράτης ἑαυτοῦ. ἐκεῖνος ἦν ὁ ὡς ἀνθρώπων ἄρχων, ὁ κατεσκευακὼς ὑποτεταχότας αὐτῷ τὴν ὄρεξιν τὴν αὑτῶν, τὴν ἔκκλισιν, τὴν ὁρμήν, τὴν ἀφορμήν. 35τοῦτο ποίησον, τοῦτο μὴ ποιήσῃς· εἰ δὲ μή, εἰς φυλακήν σε βαλῶ. οὐκέτι ὡς λογικῶν ἡ ἀρχὴ γίνεται. 36ἀλλʼ ὡς ὁ Ζεὺς διέταξεν, τοῦτο ποίησον· ἂν δὲ μὴ ποιήσῃς, ζημιωθήσῃ, βλαβήσῃ. ποίαν βλάβην; ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ποιῆσαι ἃ δεῖ· ἀπολέσεις τὸν πιστόν, τὸν αἰδήμονα, τὸν κόσμιον. τούτων ἄλλας βλάβας μείζονας μὴ ζήτει.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA