Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER XXIV. · That we ought not to be affected, by Things not in our own Power.
1Let not what is contrary to Nature in another, be an Evil to you: for you were not born to be depressed, and unhappy, along with others; but to be happy, along with them. And, if any one is unhappy, remember, that he is so for himself: for God made all Men to enjoy Felicity, and a settled good Condition. He hath furnished all with Means for this Purpose; having given them some Things for their own; others, not for their own. Whatever is subject to Restraint, Compulsion, or Deprivation, not their own: whatever is not subject to Restraint, their own. And the Essence of Good and Evil, he hath placed in Things which are our own; as it became Him, who provides for, and protects us, with paternal Care. But I have parted with such a one, and he is in Grief. And why did he esteem what belonged to another, his own? Why did he not consider, while he was pleased with seeing you, that you are mortal, that you are subject to change your Abode? Therefore he bears the Punishment of his own Folly. But to what Purpose, or for what Cause do you too break your Spirits? Have not you neither studied these Things? But, like trifling, silly Women, considered the Things you delighted in; the Places, the Persons, the Conversations, as if they were to last for ever; and now sit crying, because you do not see the same People, nor live in the same
Place? Indeed you deserve to be so affected, and
thus to become more wretched than Ravens or
Crows; which, without groaning, or longing for
their former State, can fly where they will, build
their Nests in another Place, and cross the Seas. Ay: but this happens from their Want of Reason. Was Reason then given to us by the Gods, for
the Purpose of Unhappiness and Misery, to make
us live wretched and lamenting? O, by all means,
let every one be immortal! Let nobody go from
home! Let us never go from home ourselves, but
remain rooted to a Spot, like Plants! And, if any
of our Acquaintance should quit his Abode, let us
sit and cry; and when he comes back, let us dance,
and clap our Hands, like Children. Shall we never wean ourselves, and remember what we have
heard from the Philosophers, (unless we have heard
them only as juggling Enchanters;) That the
World is one great City, and the Substance one,
out of which it is formed: that there must necessarily be a certain Rotation of Things: that some
must give way to others; some be dissolved, and
others rise in their stead: some remain in the same
Situation, and others be moved: but that all is full
of Friendship: first of the Gods, and then of Men,
by Nature endeared to each other: that some must
be separated; others live together, rejoicing in the
Present, and not grieving for the Absent: and that
Man, besides a natural Greatness of Mind, and
Contempt of Things independent on Choice, is
likewise formed not to be rooted to the Earth: but
to go at different Times to different Places; sometimes on urgent Occasions, and sometimes merely
for the sake of Observation. Such was the Case of Ulysses, who, Wand'ring from Clime to Clime observant stray'd,
Their Manners noted, and their States survey'd. Pope's Odyss. I. And yet, before him, of Hercules, to travel over the World, Just and unjust recording in his Mind,
And, with sure Eyes, inspecting all Mankind. Pope's Odyss. XVII. v. 580. To expel and clear away the one, and, in its stead, to introduce the other. Yet how many Friends do you think he must have at Thebes? How many at Argos? How many at Athens? And how many did he acquire in his Travels? He married too, when he thought it a proper Time, and became a Father, and then quitted his Children; not lamenting and longing for them, nor as if he had left them Orphans: for he knew, that no human Creature is an Orphan; but that there is a Father, who always and without Intermission, takes care of all. For he had not merely heard it, as Matter of Talk, that Jupiter was the Father of Mankind; but he esteemed and called him his own Father, and performed all that he did, with a View to Him. Hence, he was, in every Place, able to live happy. But it is never possible to make Happiness consistent with a Desire of what is not present. For what is happy must have all it wishes for; must resemble a Person satisfied with Food: there must be no Thirst, no Hunger. But Ulysses longed for his Wife, and sat crying on a Rock. Why: do you mind Homer, and his Fables, in every thing? Or, if Ulysses really did cry, what was he, but a wretched Man? But what wise and good Man is wretched? The Universe is surely but ill governed, unless Jupiter takes care, that his Subjects may be happy like himself. But these are unlawful and profane Thoughts; and Ulysses, if he did indeed cry and bewail himself, was not a good Man. For who can be a good Man, who doth not know what he is? And who knows this, and forgets, that all Things made are perishable; and that it is not possible for Man and Man always to live together? What then? To desire Impossibilities is base and foolish: it is the Behaviour of a Stranger [to the World]; of one who fights against God, the only way he can, by his Principles. But my Mother grieves, when she doth not see me. And why hath not she learnt these Doctrines? I do not say, that Care ought not to be taken that she may not lament; but that we are not to wish absolutely, what is not in our own Power. Now, the Grief of another is not in our Power; but my own Grief is. I will therefore absolutely suppress my own, for that is in my Power; and I will endeavour to suppress another's Grief, as far as I am able: but I will not endeavour it absolutely, otherwise I shall fight against God; I shall resist Jupiter, and oppose him, in the Administration of the Universe. And not only my Children's Children will bear the Punishment of this Disobedience, and Fighting against God, but I myself too; starting, and full of Perturbation, both in the Day time, and in my Dreams by Night; trembling at every Message, and having my Enjoyment dependent on the Intelligence of others. "Somebody is come from Rome." "No Harm, I hope." Why, what Harm can happen to you, where you are not?——"From Greece." "No Harm, I hope." Why, at this Rate, every Place may be the Cause of Misfortune to you. Is it not enough for you to be unfortunate where you are, but it must be beyond Sea too, and by Letters? Such is the Security of your Condition! But what if my Friends there should be dead? What indeed, but that those are dead, who were born to die. Do you at once wish to live to be old, and yet not to see the Death of any one you love? Do not you know, that, in a long Course of Time, many and various Events must necessarily happen? That a Fever must get the better of one; a Highwayman, of another; a Tyrant, of a third? For such is the World we live in; such they who live in it with us. Heats and Colds, improper Diet, Journies, Voyages, Winds, and various Accidents destroy some, banish others; destine one to an Embassy, another to a Camp. And now, pray, sit in a Flutter about all these Thingt; lamenting, disappointed, wretched, dependent on another; and that not one or two, but ten thousand times ten thousand. 2Is this what you have heard from the Philosophers? This what you have learnt? Do not you know what sort of a Thing a Warfare is? One must keep Guard; another go out for a Spy; another, to Battle too. It is neither possible, that all should be in the same Place, nor indeed better: but you, neglecting to perform the Orders of your General, complain, whenever any thing a little hard is commanded; and do not consider what you make the Army become, as far as lies in your Power. For, if all should imitate you, nobody will dig a Trench, or throw up a Rampart, or watch, or expose himself to Danger; but every one will appear useless to the Expedition. Again: if you were a Sailor in a Voyage, fix upon one Place, and there remain. If it should be necessary to climb the Mast, refuse to do it; if to run to the Head of the Ship, refuse to do it. And what Captain will bear you? Would not he throw you over board, as a useless Piece of Goods, and mere Luggage, and a bad Example to the other Sailors? Thus also, in the present Case: every one's Life is a Warfare, and that long and various. You must observe the Duty of a Soldier, and perform every thing, at the Nod of your General; and even, if possible, divine what he would have done. For there is no Comparison between the above-mentioned General and This, either in Power, or Excellence of Character. You are placed in an extensive Command, and not in a mean Post; but you are a Senator: Do not you know, that such a one must spend but little Time on his Affairs at home; but be much abroad, either commanding or obeying; attending on the Duties either of a Magistrate, a Soldier, or a Judge. And now pray, would you be fixed and rooted to the same Spot, like a Plant? Why: it is pleasant. Who denies it? And so is a Ragout pleasant; and a fine Woman is pleasant. Is not this just what They say who make Pleasure their End? Do not you perceive whose Language you have spoken? That of Epicureans and Catamites. And while you follow their Practices, and hold their Principles, do you talk to us of the Doctrines of Zeno and Socrates? Why do not you throw away, to as great a Distance as possible, those Ornaments which belong to others, and which you have nothing to do with? What else do the Epicureans desire, than to sleep without Hindrance, and rise without Compulsion; and, when they are got up, to yawn at their leisure, and wash their Face; then write and read what they please; then prate about some Trifle or other, and be applauded by their Friends, whatever they say: then go out for a Walk; and, after they have taken a Turn, bathe, and then eat; and then to Bed: in what manner they spent their Time there, why should one say? For it is easily guessed. Come: now do you also tell me, what Course of Life you desire to lead, who are a Zealot for Truth, and Diogenes, and Socrates? What would you do at Athens? These very same Things? Why then do you call yourself a Stoic? They who falsely pretend to the Roman Citizenship, are punished severely: and must those be dismissed with Impunity, who falsely claim so great a Thing, and so venerable a Title, as you do? Or is this impossible; and is there not a divine, and powerful, and inevitable Law, which exacts the greatest Punishments from those, who are guilty of the greatest Offences? For what says this Law? Let him who claims what doth not belong to him, be arrogant, be vain-glorious, be base, be a Slave: let him grieve, let him envy, let him pity, and, in a ward, let him be unhappy, let him lament. 3What then! would you have me pay my Court to such a one? Would you have me frequent his Door? If Reason requires it, for your Country, for your Relations, for Mankind, why should you not go? You are not ashamed to go to the Door of a Shoemaker, when you want Shoes; nor of a Gardener, when you want Lettuce. Why then of the Rich, when you have some similar Want? Ay: but I am not struck with Awe of a Shoemaker. Nor of a rich Man neither. I need not flatter a Gardener. Nor a rich Man neither. How then shall I get what I want? Why, do I bid you go, in Expectation of getting it? No: only that you may do what becomes yourself. Why then, after all, should I go? That you may have gone; that you may have discharged the Duties of a Citizen, of a Brother, of a Friend. And, after all, remember, that you are going to a Shoemaker, to a Gardener, who hath not the Power of any thing great or respectable, though he should sell it ever so dear. You are going to buy Lettuces. They are sold for a Penny, not for a Talent. So here too, the Matter is worth going to his Door about. Well: I will go. It is worth talking with him about. Well: I will talk with him. Ay: but one must kiss his Hand too, and cajole him with Praise. Away with you. That is worth a Talent. It is not expedient for myself, nor my Country, nor my fellow Citizens, nor my Friends, to destroy the good Citizen, and the Friend [in my own Character.] But one shall appear not to have set heartily about the Business, if one fails. What, have you forgot again, why you went? Do not you know, that a wise and good Man doth nothing for Appearance; but for the sake of having acted well? What Advantage then is it to him, to have acted well? What Advantage is it to one, who writes the Name of Dion as he ought? The having writ it. Is there no Reward then? Why do you seek any greater Reward, for a good Man, than the doing what is fair and just? And yet, at Olympia, you desire nothing else; but think it enough, to be crowned Victor. Doth it appear to you so small and worthless a Thing, to be fair, good and happy? Besides: being introduced by God into this great City, [the World,] and bound to discharge, at this time, the Duties of a Man, do you still want Nurses and a Mamma; and are you moved and effeminated by the Tears of poor foolish Women? Are you thus determined never to cease being an Infant? Do not you know, that he who acts like a Child, the older he is, so much is he the more ridiculous? 4Did you never visit any one at Athens, at his own House? Yes: whomsoever I pleased. Why: now you are here, be willing to visit this Person, and you will still see whom you please; only let it be without Meanness, without Desire, or Aversion, and your Affairs will go well: but their going well, or not, doth not consist in going to the House, and standing at the Door, or not; but lies within, in your own Principles; when you have acquired a Contempt of Things independent on Choice, and esteem none of them your own; but that what belongs to you is only to judge, to think, to exert your Pursuits, your Desires, and Aversions, right. What further Room is there, after this, for Flattery, for Meanness? Why do you still long for the Quiet you enjoyed there; for Places familiar to you? Stay a little, and these will become familiar to you, in their Turn; and then, if you are so mean-spirited, weep and lament again at leaving these. How then am I to preserve an affectionate Temper? As becomes a noble-spirited and happy Person. For Reason will never tell you to be dejected, and broken-hearted; or to depend on another; or to reproach either God, or Man. Be affectionate in such a manner as to observe all this. But if, from Affection, as you call it, you are to be a Slave, and a Wretch, it is not worth your while to be affectionate. And what restrains you from loving any one as a Mortal, as a Person who may be obliged to quit you? Pray did not Socrates love his own Children? But it was as became one, who was free, and mindful that his first Duty was, to gain the Love of the Gods. Hence he violated no Part of the Character of a good Man, either in his Defence, or in fixing a Penalty on himself. Nor
yet before, when he was a Senator, or a Soldier. But we make use of every Pretence to be mean-spirited; some, on Account of a Child; some, of a Mother; and some, of a Brother. But it is not fit to be unhappy, on the Account of any one; but happy, on the Account of All; and chiefly of God, who hath constituted us for this Purpose. What! did Diogenes love nobody; who was so gentle, and benevolent, as chearfully to undergo so many Pains and Miseries of Body, for the common Good of Mankind? Yes: he did love them: but how? As became a Minister of Jove; at once taking care of Men, and obedient to God. Hence the whole Earth, not any particular Place, was his Country. And, when he was taken Captive, he did not long for Athens, and his Friends and Acquaintance there; but made himself acquainted with the Pirates, and endeavoured to reform them: and, when he was at last sold, he lived at Corinth, just as before at Athens: and, if he had gone to the Perrhœbeans, he would have been exactly the same. Thus is Freedom acquired. Hence he used to say, "Ever since Antisthenes made me free, I have ceased to be a Slave," How did he make him free? Hear what he says. "He taught me what was my own, and what not. An Estate is not my own. Kindred, Domestics, Friends, Reputation, familiar Places, Manner of Life, all belong to another." "What is your own then?" "The Use of the Appearances of Things. He showed me, that I have this, not subject to Restraint, or Compulsion: no one can hinder or force me to use them, any otherwise than I please. Who then, after this, hath any Power over me? Philip, or Alexander, or Perdiccas, or the Persian King? Whence should they have it? For he that is to be subdued by Man, must, long before, be subdued by Things. He therefore, of whom neither Pleasure, nor Pain, nor Fame, nor Riches, can get the better; and who is able, whenever he thinks fit, to throw away his whole Body, with Contempt, and depart, whose Slave can he ever be? To whom is he subject?" But if Diogenes had taken Pleasure in living at Athens, and had been subdued by that Manner of Life, his Affairs would have been at every one's Disposal; and whoever was stronger, would have had the Power of grieving him. How would he have flattered the Pirates, think you, to make them sell him to some Athenian, that he might see again the fine Piræum, the long Walls, and the Citadel? How would you see them, you Wretch? As a dispirited Slave. And what Good would that do you?——"No: but free."——Show in what manner, free. See, somebody lays hold on you; whoever takes you away from your usual Manner of Life, and says, "You are my Slave: for it is in my Power to restrain you from living as you like. It is in my Power to afflict and humble you Whenever I please, you may be chearful again; and set out, elated, for Athens." What do you say to him who thus enslaves you? What Method will you find of getting free? Or dare you not so much as look up at him; but, without making many Words, supplicate to be dismissed? You ought to go to Prison, Man, with Alacrity, with Speed, and to precede your Conductors. Instead of this, do you regret living at Rome, and long for Greece? And, when you must die, will you then too come crying to us, that you shall no more see Athens, nor walk in the Lyceum? Have you travelled for this? Is it for this, that you have been seeking for somebody to do you Good? What Good? That you may the more easily solve Syllogisms, and manage hypothetical Arguments? And is it for this Reason, you left your Brother, your Country, your Friends, your Family, that you might carry back such Improvements as these? So that you did not travel for Constancy, nor for Tranquillity; nor that, secured from Harm, you might complain of no one, accuse no one: that no one might injure you; and that thus you might preserve your relative Duties, without Impediment. You have made a fine Traffic of it, to carry home hypothetical Arguments, and convertible Propositions! If you please too, sit in the Market, and cry them for Sale, as Mountebanks do their Medicines. Why will you not rather deny, that you know even what you have learned; for fear of bringing a Scandal upon Theorems as useless? What Harm hath Philosophy done you? In what hath Chrysippus injured you, that you should give a Proof, by your Actions, that Philosophy is of no Value? Had you not Evils enough at home? How many Causes for Grief and Lamentation had you there, even if you had not travelled? But you have added more; and, if you ever get any new Acquaintance and Friends, you will find fresh Causes for groaning; and, in like manner, if you attach yourself to any other Country. To what Purpose therefore do you live? To heap Sorrow upon Sorrow, to make you wretched? And then you tell me this is Affection. What Affection, Man? If it be good, it is not the Cause of any Ill: if ill, I will have nothing to do with it. I was born for my own Good; not Ill. 5What then is the proper Exercise in this Case? First, the highest, and principal, and obvious, as it were at your Door, is, that when you attach yourself to any thing, it may not be as to what cannot be taken away. But as to what? As to something of the same kind with an earthen Pot, or a glass Cup; that, when it happens to be broken, you may remember not to be troubled. So here too: when you kiss your Child, or your Brother, or your Friend, never intirely give way to the Appearance, nor suffer the Pleasure to diffuse itself as far as it will; but curb it, restrain it, like those who stand behind triumphant Victors, and remind them, that they are men. Do you likewise remind yourself, that you love what is mortal; that you love what is not your own. It is allowed you for the present, not irrevocably, nor for ever; but as a Fig, or a Bunch of Grapes, in the appointed Season. If you long for these in Winter, you are a Fool. So, if you long for your Son, or your Friend, when he is not allowed you, know, you wish for Figs in Winter. For as Winter is to a Fig, so is every Acccident in the Universe, to those Things which are taken away by it. In the next place, represent to yourself Appearances contrary to whatever Objects give you Pleasure. What Harm is there, while you are kissing your Child, to say softly, "To-morrow you will die:" and so to your Friend, "To-morrow either you or I shall go away, and we shall see each other no more." But these Sayings are ominous. And so are some Incantations: but, because they are useful, I do not mind it; only let them be useful. But do you call any thing ominous, except what is the Signification of some Ill? Cowardice is ominous; Mean-spiritedness is ominous; Lamentation, Grief, Want of Shame. These are Words of bad Omen; and yet we ought not to be scrupulous of using them, as a Guard against the Things they mean. But do you tell me, that a Word is ominous which is significant of any thing natural? Say too, that it is ominous, for Ears of Corn to be reaped; for this signifies the Destruction of the Corn; but not of the World. Say too, that the Fall of the Leaf is ominous; and that a candied Mass should be produced from Figs; and Raisins, from Grapes. For all these are changes from a former, into another State; not a Destruction, but a certain appointed Oeconomy and Administration. Such is Absence, a small Change: such is Death, a greater Change: not from what now is nothing, but to what now is not. What then, shall I be no more? You will be: but [you will be] some thing else, of which, at present, the World hath no Need: for even you were not produced when you pleased, but when the World had Need [of you.] Hence a wise and good Man, mindful who he is, and whence he came, and by whom he was produced, is attentive only how he may fill his Post regularly, and dutifully to God. "Is it thy Pleasure I should any longer continue in being? I will continue, free, spirited, agreeably to thy Pleasure: for Thou hast made me incapable of Restraint, in what is my own. But hast Thou no farther Use for me? Fare thou well! I have staid thus long for thy Sake alone, and no other; and now I depart in Obedience to Thee."——"How do you depart?"——"Again: agreeably to thy Pleasure; as free, as thy Servant, as one sensible of thy Commands, and thy Prohibitions. But, while I am employed in thy Service, what wouldst Thou have me be? A Prince, or a private Man; a Senator, or a Plebeian; a Soldier, or a General; a Preceptor, or the Master of a Family? Whatever Post or Rank Thou shalt assign me, like Socrates, I will die a thousand times rather than desert it. Where wouldst thou have me be? At Rome, or at Athens; at Thebes, or at Gyaros? Only remember me there. If Thou shalt send me, where Men cannot live conformably to Nature, I do not depart from thence, in Disobedience to thy Will; but as receiving my Signal of Retreat from Thee. I do not desert Thee: Heaven forbid! but I perceive Thou hast no Use for me. If a Life conformable to Nature be granted, I will seek no other Place, but that in which I am; nor any other Company, but those with whom I am," 6Let these Things be ready at hand, Night and Day. These Things write; these Things read; of these Things talk both to yourself and others. [Ask them,] "Have you any Assistance to give me for this Purpose?" And again, go and ask another, and another. Then, if any of those Things should happen that are said to be against our Will, immediately this will be a Relief to you; in the first place, that it was not unexpected. For it is a great Matter, upon all Occasions, to [be able to] say, "I knew that I begot one born to die." Thus do you say too; "I knew that I was liable to die, to remove, to be exiled, to be imprisoned." if afterwards you turn to yourself, and seek from what Quarter the Event proceeds, you will presently recollect: "It is from Things independent on Choice; not from what is my own. What then is it to me?" Then, farther (which is the chief): Who sent it? The Commander, the General, the City, the Law of the City? Give it me then; for I must always obey the Law in all Things. Farther yet: when any Appearance molests you (for [to prevent] that, is not in your Power,) strive against it; and, by Reason, conquer it. Do not suffer it to gain Strength, nor to lead you on to Consequences; and represent what, and how, it pleases. If you are at Gyaros, do not represent to yourself the Manner of Living at Rome; how many Pleasures you used to find there, and how many would attend your Return; but be intent on this Point; How he, who lives at Gyaros, may live with Spirit and Comfort, at Gyaros. And, if you are at Rome, do not represent to yourself the Manner of Living at Athens: but consider only, how you ought to live where you are. Lastly: to all other Pleasures oppose that of being conscious, that you are obeying God; and performing, not in Word, but in Deed, the Duty of a wise and good Man. How great a Thing is it to be able to say to yourself, "What others are now solemnly arguing in the Schools, and seem to carry beyond Probability, this I am [actually] performing. They are sitting and expatiating upon my Virtues, and disputing about me, and celebrating me. Jupiter hath been pleased to let me receive a Demonstration of this from myself; and indeed that He may know, whether he hath a Soldier, a Citizen, such as he should be, and to produce me as a Witness to other Men, concerning Things independent on Choice. See that your Fears were vain, your Appetites vain. Seek not Good from without: seek it in yourselves, or you will never find it. For this Reason, he now brings me hither, now sends me thither; shows me to Mankind, poor, without Authority, sick; sends me to Gyaros; leads me to Prison: not that he hates me: Heaven forbid! For who hates the best of his Servants? Nor that he neglects me: for he doth not neglect any one of the smallest Things: but to exercise me, and make use of me as a Witness to others. Appointed to such a Service, do I still care where I am, or with whom, or what is said of me, instead of being wholly attentive to God, and to his Orders and Commands?" 7Having these Things always at hand, and practising them by yourself, and making them ready for Use, you will never want any one to comfort and strengthen you. For Shame doth not consist in not having any thing to eat, but in not having Reason enough to exempt you from Fear and Sorrow. But, if you once acquire that Exemption, will a Tyrant, or his Guards, or Courtiers, be any thing to you? Will any Destination of Offices, or they who offer Sacrifices in the Capitol, on being admitted into the Emperor's Train, give you Uneasiness, who have received so great a Command from Jupiter? Only, do not make a Parade of it, nor grow insolent upon it. But show it by your Actions: and, though no one should perceive it, be content, that you are well, and happy.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (24)
- There is no need of Salmasius's Change of αντι τινος, &c. to αντιτεινεις, &c. if, for επι τι κλας, one reads επικλᾶς. The τι might arise from a Mistake in writing πι twice over. Επεκλασεν is used in the same Sense, in L. 3. c. 26. p. 527. of Mr. Upton's Edition. If κλαω hath it, the present Reading may stand.
- Το γαρ ευδαιμονουν απεχειν δει παντα ἁ θελει, πεπληρωμενω τινι εοικεναι. This bears a strong Resemblance to απεχω δε παντα και περισσευω, πεπληρωμαι, &c. Phil. iv. 18.
- The Greek should be pointed, ξενου, θεομαχουντος.
- An Allusion to Homer.
- The Translation here follows a Conjecture of Wolfius; who reads, for ευπειθειαν, ευπαθειαν. The same Word occurs in B. IV. c. 3. p. 582. of Mr. Upton's Edition; and is there translated in the same manner.
- The Translation here follows Mr. Upton's Conjecture, in his Addenda.
- This Figure is frequently used both by sacred and profane Authors. See Job vii. 1. Eph. vi. 12. 1 Pet. ii. 11, &c. Vivere militare est. Life is a State of War. Sen. Epist. 96, &c.
- Instead of Αλλ, αει Βουλευτης, the true Reading, perhaps, is, Αλλα ει Βουλευτης; and it is translated accordingly.
- The Conjecture of Wolfius (αναστηναι) is a good one; and the Translation hath followed it.
- What follows hath no Connexion with what immediately preceded; but belongs to the general Subject of the Chapter.
- The Change of the Persons in these Discourses is often so sudden, that it is difficult to discover the Speaker; and one can judge only from the general Sense. The Translator hath endeavoured to give this Passage the Turn which seems most agreeable to the Context, without adhering very literally to the several Words in the Greek. Epictetus, in this Paragraph, personates the Scholar, whom he is exhorting to visit a great Man.
- This refers to a former Part of the Chapter.
- Here, what was said before, about going to a great Man, is again resumed
- At Athens.
- It was the Custom at Athens, in Cases where no fixed Punishment was appointed by the Law, before the Judges gave Sentence, to ask the Criminal himself, what Penalty he thought he deserved. Socrates refused either to comply with this Form himself, or suffer any of his Friends to do it for him; alleging, that the naming a Penalty, was a Confession of Guilt. When the Judges therefore asked him, what Penalty he thought he deserved, he answered, "The highest Honours, and Re- wards; and to be maintained in the Prytaneum, at the public Expence." An Answer which so extremely irritated his Judges, that they immediately condemned him to Death. Plato. Cicero.
- A People towards the Extremity of Greece.
- Diogenes was the Disciple of Antisthenes. Compare what Diogenes says of Antisthenes making him free, with John viii. 32—36.
- Instead of ανειναι, the Sense seems to require ανιᾶν; and it is so translated.
- See Enchiridion, c. iii.
- The Translation here follows Mr. Upton's Conjecture. Εν αυτοις οιστισι, &c.
- The Translation follows Mr. Upton's Transposition of ουκ. The Meaning of the Passage is, that, though the personal Existence is dissolved, and destroyed by Death, the Substance, out of which it was produced, remains, under some other Form; which was the Stoic Doctrine.
- Απειθων. Wolfius.
- This was said by Xenophon, when News was brought him, that his Son Gryllus was killed in a Battle.
- Compare this with the Description of the universal Care of Providence, Matth. x. 29, 30. and the Occasion on which it was introduced.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
That we ought not to be affected by things not in our own power.
Let not another’s disobedience to Nature become an ill to you; for you were not born to be depressed and unhappy with others, but to be happy with them. And if any is unhappy, remember that he is so for himself; for God made all men to enjoy felicity and peace. He hath furnished all with means for this purpose; having given them some things for their own, others not for their own. Whatever is subject to restraint, compulsion, or deprivation is not their own; whatever is not subject to restraint is their own. And the essence of good and evil he has placed in things which are our own, as it became him who provides for, and protects us, with paternal care.
But I have parted with such a one, and he is therefore in grief.
And why did he esteem what belonged to another his own? Why did he not consider, while he was happy in seeing you, that you are mortal, that you are liable to change your abode? Therefore he bears the punishment of his own folly. But to what purpose, or for what cause, do you too suffer depression of spirits? Have you not studied these things? Like trifling, silly women, have you regarded the things you took delight in, the places, the persons, the conversations, as if they were to last for ever; and do you now sit crying, because you do not see the same people, nor live in the same place? Indeed, you deserve to be so overcome, and thus to become more wretched than ravens or crows, which, without groaning or longing for their former state, can fly where they will, build their nests in another place, and cross the seas.
Ay, but this happens from their want of reason.
Was reason then given to us by the gods for the purpose of unhappiness and misery, to make us live wretched and lamenting? Oh, by all means, let every one be deathless! Let nobody go from home! Let us never go from home ourselves, but remain rooted to a spot, like plants! And if any of our acquaintance should quit his abode, let us sit and cry; and when he comes back, let us dance and clap our hands like children. Shall we never wean ourselves, and remember what we have heard from the philosophers,—unless we have heard them only as juggling enchanters,—that the universe is one great city, and the substance one of which it is formed; that there must necessarily be a certain rotation of things; that some must give way to others, some be dissolved, and others rise in their stead; some remain in the same situation, and others be moved; but that all is full of beloved ones, first of the gods, and then of men, by nature endeared to each other; that some must be separated, others live together, rejoicing in the present, and not grieving for the absent; and that man, besides a natural greatness of mind and contempt of things independent on his own will, is likewise formed not to be rooted to the earth, but to go at different times to different places; sometimes on urgent occasions, and sometimes merely for the sake of observation. Such was the case of Odysseus, who Saw the cities and watched the habits of various men; and, even before him, of Hercules, to travel over the habitable world, Observing manners, good or ill, of men;
to expel and clear away the one, and, in its stead, to introduce the other. Yet how many friends do you not think he must have at Thebes; how many at Argos; how many at Athens; and how many did he acquire in his travels? He married, too, when he thought it a proper time, and became a father, and then quitted his children; not lamenting and longing for them, nor as if he had left them orphans; for he knew that no human creature is an orphan, but that there is a father who always, and without intermission, takes care of all. For he had not merely heard it as matter of talk, that Zeus was the Father of Mankind; but he esteemed and called him his own Father, and performed all that he did with a view to him. Hence he was, in every place, able to live happy. But it is never possible to make happiness consistent with a longing after what is not present. For true happiness implies the possession of all which is desired, as in case of satiety with food; there must be no thirst, no hunger.
But Odysseus longed for his wife, and sat weeping on a rock.
Why do you regard Homer and his fables in everything? Or, if Odysseus really did weep, what was he but a wretched man? But what wise and good man is wretched? The universe is surely but ill governed, if Zeus does not take care that his subjects may be happy like himself. But these are unlawful and profane thoughts; and Odysseus, if he did indeed cry and bewail himself, was not a good man. For who can be a good man who does not know what he is? And who knows this, and yet forgets that all things made are perishable; and that it is not possible for man and man always to live together? What then? To desire impossibilities is base and foolish; it is the behavior of a stranger [to the world]; of one who fights against God in the only way he can, by holding false principles.
But my mother grieves when she does not see me.
And why has she not learned these doctrines? I do not say that care ought not to be taken that she may not lament; but that we are not to insist absolutely upon what is not in our own power. Now, the grief of another is not in my power; but my own grief is. I will therefore absolutely suppress my own, for that is in my power; and I will endeavor to suppress another’s grief so far as I am able; but I will not insist upon it absolutely, otherwise I shall fight against God; I shall resist Zeus, and oppose him in the administration of the universe; and not only my children’s children will bear the punishment of this disobedience and fighting against God, but I myself too,—starting, and full of perturbation, both in the day-time and in my nightly dreams; trembling at every message, and having my peace dependent on intelligence from others. Somebody is come from Rome. trust no harm has happened. Why, what harm can happen to you where you are not? From Greece. No harm, I hope. Why, at this rate, every place may be the cause of misfortune to you. Is it not enough for you to be unfortunate where you are, but it must happen beyond sea, too, and by letters? Such is the security of your condition!
But what if my friends there should be dead?
What, indeed, but that those are dead who were born to die? Do you at once wish to grow old, and yet not to see the death of any one you love? Do you not know that, in a long course of time, many and various events must necessarily happen; that a fever must get the better of one, a highwayman of another, a tyrant of a third? For such is the world we live in; such they who live in it with us. Heats and colds, improper diet, journeys, voyages, winds, and various accidents destroy some, banish others; destine one to an embassy, another to a camp. And now, pray, will you sit in consternation about all these things, lamenting, disappointed, wretched, dependent on another; and not on one or two only, but ten thousand times ten thousand?
Is this what you have heard from the philosophers; this what you have learned? Do you not know what sort of a thing warfare is? One must keep guard, another go out for a spy, another even to battle. It is neither possible, nor indeed desirable, that all should be in the same place; but you, neglecting to perform the orders of your General, complain whenever anything a little hard is commanded; and do not consider what influence you have on the army, so far as lies in your power. For, if all should imitate you, nobody will dig a trench, or throw up a rampart, or stand guard, or expose himself to danger; but every one will appear useless to the expedition. Again, if you were a sailor in a voyage, suppose you were to fix upon one place, and there remain,—if it should be necessary to climb the mast, refuse to do it; if to run to the bow of the ship, refuse to do it! And what captain would tolerate you? Would he not throw you overboard as a useless piece of goods and mere luggage,.and a bad example to the other sailors? Thus, also, in the present case; every one’s life is a warfare, and that long and various. You must observe the duty of a soldier, and perform everything at the nod of your General, and even, if possible, divine what he would have done. For there is no comparison between the above-mentioned General and this whom you now obey, either in power or excellence of character. You are placed in an extensive command, and not in a mean post; your life is a perpetual magistracy? Do you not know that such a one must spend but little time on his affairs at home, but be much abroad, either commanding or obeying; attending on the duties either of a magistrate, a soldier, or a judge? And now, pray, would you be fixed and rooted on the same spot, like a plant?
Why; it is pleasant.
Who denies it? And so is a ragout pleasant, and a fine woman is pleasant. Is not this just what they say who make pleasure their end? Do you not perceive whose language you have spoken? That of Epicureans and debauchees. And while you follow their practices and hold their principles, do you talk to us of the doctrines of Zeno and Socrates? Why do you not throw away as far as possible those assumed traits which belong to others, and with which you have nothing to do? What else do the Epicureans desire than to sleep without hindrance, and rise without compulsion; and when they have risen, to yawn at their leisure and wash their faces; then write and read what they please; then prate about some trifle or other, and be applauded by their friends, whatever they say; then go out for a walk, and, after they have taken a turn, bathe, and then eat, and then to bed? In what manner they spend their time there, why should one say? For it is easily guessed. Come now; do you also tell me what course of life you desire to lead, who are a zealot for truth, and Diogenes, and Socrates? What would you do at Athens,—these very same things? Why then do you call yourself a Stoic? They who falsely pretend to the Roman citizenship are punished severely; and must those be dismissed with impunity who falsely claim so great a thing, and so venerable a title, as you? Or is not this impossible; and is there not a divine and powerful and inevitable law, which exacts the greatest punishments from those who are guilty of the greatest offences? For what says this law?—Let him who claims what belongs not to him be arrogant, be vainglorious, be base, be a slave; let him grieve, let him envy, let him pity; and, in a word, let him lament and be miserable.
What then! would you have me pay my court to such a one? Would you have me frequent his door?
If reason requires it for your country, for your relations, for mankind, why should you not go? You are not ashamed to go to the door of a shoemaker when you want shoes, nor of a gardener when you want lettuce. Why, then, in regard to the rich, when you have some similar want?
Ay; but I need not be awed before a shoemaker. Nor before a rich man. I need not flatter a gardener. Nor a rich man. How, then, shall I get what I want?
Why, do I bid you go in expectation of getting it? No; only that you may do your duty.
Why, then, after all, should I go?
That you may have gone; that you may have discharged the duties of a citizen, of a brother, of a friend. And, after all, remember that you are going as if to a shoemaker, to a gardener, who has no monopoly of anything great or respectable, though he should sell it ever so dear. You are going as if to buy lettuces worth an obolus, but by no means worth a talent. So here, too, if the matter is worth going to his door about, I will go; if it is worth talking with him about, I will talk with him. But if one must kiss his hand, too, and cajole him with praise, that is paying too dear. It is not expedient for myself, nor my country, nor my fellow-citizens, nor my friends, to destroy what constitutes the good citizen and the friend.
But one will appear not to have set heartily about the business, if one thus fails.
What, have you again forgotten why you went? Do you not know that a wise and good man does nothing for appearance, but everything for the sake of having acted well?
What advantage is it, then, to him, to have acted well?
What advantage is it to one who writes down the name of Dion without a blunder? The having written it.
Is there no reward, then?
Why, do you seek any greater reward for a good man than the doing what is fair and just? And yet, at Olympia, you desire nothing else, but think it enough to be crowned victor. Does it appear to you so small and worthless a thing to be just, good, and happy? Besides, being introduced by God into this Great City [the world], and bound to discharge at this time the duties of a man, do you still want nurses and a mamma; and are you conquered and effeminated by the tears of poor weak women? Are you thus determined never to cease being an infant? Do not you know that, if one acts like a child, the older he is, so much the more he is ridiculous?
Did you never visit any one at Athens at his own house?
Yes; whomsoever I pleased. Why, now you are here, be willing to visit this person, and you will still see whom you please; only let it be without meanness, without undue desire or aversion, and your affairs will go well; but their going well, or not, does not consist in going to the house and standing at the door, or the contrary; but lies within, in your own principles, when you have acquired a contempt for things uncontrollable by Will, and esteem none of them your own, but hold that what belongs to you is only to judge and think, to exert rightly your aims, your desires, and aversions. What further room is there after this for flattery, for meanness? Why do you still long for the quiet you elsewhere enjoyed; for places familiar to you? Stay a little, and these will become familiar to you in their turn; and then, if you are so mean-spirited, you may weep and lament again on leaving these.
How, then, am I to preserve an affectionate disposition?
As becomes a noble-spirited and happy person. For reason will never tell you to be dejected and broken-hearted, or to depend on another, or to reproach either God or man. Be affectionate in such a manner as to observe all this. But if, from affection, as you call it, you are to be a slave and miserable, it is not worth your while to be affectionate. And what restrains you from loving any one as a mortal,—as a person who may be obliged to quit you? Pray did not Socrates love his own children? But it was as became one who was free, and mindful that his first duty was to gain the love of the gods. Hence he violated no part of the character of a good man, either in his defence or in fixing a penalty on himself. Nor yet before, when he was a senator or a soldier. But we make use of every pretence to be mean-spirited; some on account of a child; some, of a mother; and some, of a brother. But it is not fit to be unhappy on account of any one, but happy on account of all; and chiefly of God, who has constituted us for this purpose. What! did Diogenes love nobody, who was so gentle and benevolent as cheerfully to undergo so many pains and miseries of body for the common good of mankind? Yes, he did love them; but how? As became a minister of Zeus; at once caring for men, and obedient to God. Hence the whole earth, not any particular place, was his country. And when he was taken captive he did not long for Athens and his friends and acquaintance there, but made himself acquainted with the pirates, and endeavored to reform them; and when he was at last sold into captivity, he lived at Corinth just as before at Athens; and if he had gone to the Perrhaebeans, he would have been exactly the same. Thus is freedom acquired. Hence he used to say, Ever since Antisthenes made me free I have ceased to be a slave. How did he make him free? Hear what he says: He taught me what was my own and what not. An estate is not my own. Kindred, domestics friends, reputation, familiar places, manner of life, all belong to another. What is your own, then? The right use of the phenomena of existence. He showed me that I have this, not subject to restraint or compulsion; no one can hinder or force me in this, any otherwise than as I please. Who, then, after this, has any power over me,—Philip, or Alexander, or Perdiccas, or the Persian king? Whence should they have it? For he that is to be subdued by man must first be subdued by things. He, therefore, of whom neither pleasure, nor pain, nor fame, nor riches can get the better; and he who is able, whenever he thinks fit, to abandon his whole body with contempt and depart, whose slave can he ever be? To whom is he subject? But if Diogenes had taken pleasure in living at Athens, and had been subdued by that manner of life, his affairs would have been at every one’s disposal; and whoever was stronger would have had the power of grieving him. How would he have flattered the pirates, think you, to make them sell him to some Athenian, that he might see again the fine Piraus, the Long Walls, and the Citadel? How would you see them,—as a slave and a miserable wretch? And what good would that do you? No; but as free. How free? See, somebody lays hold on you, takes you away from your usual manner of life, and says: You are my slave; for it is in my power to restrain you from living as you like. It is in my power to afflict and humble you. Whenever I please you may be cheerful once more, and set out elated for Athens. What do you say to him who thus enslaves you? What rescuer can you find? Or dare you not so much as look up at him; but, without making many words, do you supplicate to be dismissed? Why, you ought even to go to prison, man, with alacrity, with speed, outstripping your conductors. Instead of this do you regret living at Rome and long for Greece? And when you must die, will you then, too, come crying to us that you shall no more see Athens, nor walk in the Lyceum? Is it for this that you have travelled? Is it for this that you have been seeking for somebody to do you good? What good,—that you may the more easily solve syllogisms and manage hypothetical arguments? And is it for this reason you left your brother, your country, your friends, your family, that you might carry back such acquirements as these? So that you did not travel to learn constancy nor tranquillity; not that. secured from harm, you might complain of no one, accuse no one; that no one might injure you; and that thus you might preserve your human relations, without impediment. You have made a fine traffic of it, to carry home hypothetical arguments and convertible propositions! If you please, too, sit in the market, and cry them for sale, as mountebanks do their medicines. Why will you not rather deny that you know even what you have learned, for fear of bringing a scandal upon such theorems as useless? What harm has philosophy done you,—in what has Chrysippus injured you,—that you should demonstrate by your actions that such studies are of no value? Had you not evils enough at home? How many causes for grief and lamentation had you there, even if you had not travelled? But you have added more; and if you ever get any new acquaintance and friends, you will find fresh causes for groaning; and, in like manner, if you attach yourself to any other country. To what purpose, therefore, do you live,—to heap sorrow upon sorrow, to make you wretched? And then you tell me this is affection. What affection, man? If it be good, it cannot be the cause of any ill; if ill, I will have nothing to do with it. I was born for my own good, not ill.
What, then, is the proper training for these cases?
First, the highest and principal means, and as obvious as if at your very door, is this,—that when you attach yourself to anything, it may not be as to a secure possession.
How, then?
As to something brittle as glass or earthenware; that when it happens to be broken, you may not lose your self-command. So here, too, when you embrace your child, or your brother, or your friend, never yield yourself wholly to the fair semblance, nor let the passion pass into excess; but curb it, restrain it,—like those who stand behind triumphant victors, and remind them that they are men. Do you likewise remind yourself that you love what is mortal; that you love what is not your own. It is allowed you for the present, not irrevocably, nor forever; but as a fig, or a bunch of grapes, in the appointed season. If you long for these in winter, you are foolish. So, if you long for your son, or your friend, when you cannot have him, remember that you are wishing for figs in winter. For as winter is to a fig, so is every accident in the universe to those things with which it interferes. In the next place, whatever objects give you pleasure, call before yourself the opposite images. What harm is there, while you kiss your child, in saying softly, To-morrow you may die; and so to your friend, To-morrow either you or I may go away, and we may see each other no more?
But these sayings are ominous.
And so are some incantations; but because they are useful, I do not mind it; only let them be useful. But do you call anything ominous except what implies some ill? Cowardice is ominous; baseness is ominous; lamentation, grief, shamelessness. These are words of bad omen; and yet we ought not to shrink from using them, as a guard against the things they mean. But do you tell me that a word is ominous which is significant of anything natural? Say, too, that it is ominous for ears of corn to be reaped; for this signifies the destruction of the corn, but not of the world. Say, too, that the fall of the leaf is ominous; and that confectionery should be produced from figs, and raisins from grapes. For all these are changes from a former state into another,—not a destruction, but a certain appointed economy and administration. Such is absence, a slight change; such is death, a greater change,—not from what now is nothing, but to what now is not.
What, then; shall I be no more?
True; but you will be something else, of which at present the world has no need; for even you were not produced when you pleased, but when the world had need of you. Hence a wise and good man, mindful who he is and whence he came, and by whom he was produced, is attentive only how he may fill his post regularly and dutifully before God. Dost thou wish me still to live? Let me live free and noble, as thou desirest; for thou hast made me incapable of restraint in what is my own. But hast thou no further use for me? Farewell! I have stayed thus long through thee alone, and no other; and now I depart in obedience to thee. How do you depart? Still as thou wilt; as one free, as thy servant, as one sensible of thy commands and thy prohibitions. But, while I am employed in thy service, what wouldst thou have me to be,—a prince, or a private man; a senator, or a plebeian; a soldier, or a general; a preceptor, or a master of a family? Whatever post or rank thou shalt assign me, like Socrates, I will die a thousand times rather than desert it. Where wouldst thou have me to be,—at Rome, or at Athens; at Thebes, or at Gyaros? Only remember me there. If thou shalt send me where men cannot live conformably to nature, I will not depart unbidden, but upon a recall as it were sounded by thee. Even then I do not desert thee; Heaven forbid! but I perceive that thou hast no use for me. If a life conformable to nature be granted, I will seek no other place but that in which I am, nor any other company but those with whom I dwell.
Let these things be ready at hand, night and day. These things write; these things read; of these things talk both to yourself and others. [Ask them,] Have you any assistance to give me for this purpose? And, again, go and ask another and another. Then, if any of those things should happen that are called disagreeable, this will surely be a relief to you, in the first place, that it was not unexpected. For it is much to be able always to say, knew that I begot one born to die. Thus do you say too, knew that I was liable to die, to travel, to be exiled, to be imprisoned. If afterwards you turn to yourself, and seek from what quarter the event proceeds, you will presently recollect: It is from things uncontrollable by will, not from what is my own. What then is it to me? Then, further, which is the chief point: Who sent this,—the commander, the general, the city, the public law? Give it to me, then, for I must always obey the law in all things.
Further yet, when any delusive appearance molests you (for this may not depend on you), strive against it, and conquer it through reason. Do not suffer it to gain strength, nor to lead you indefinitely on, beguiling you at its own will. If you are at Gyaros, do not represent to yourself the manner of living at Rome,—how many pleasures you used to find there, and how many would attend your return; but dwell rather on this point,—how he who must live at Gyaros may live there nobly. And if you are at Rome, do not represent to yourself the manner of living at Athens; but consider only how you ought to live where you are.
Lastly, for all other pleasures substitute the consciousness that you are obeying God, and performing not in word, but in deed, the duty of a wise and good man. How great a thing is it to be able to say to yourself: What others are now solemnly arguing in the schools, and can state in paradoxes, this I put in practice. Those qualities which are there discoursed, disputed, celebrated, I have made mine own. Zeus hath been pleased to let me recognize this within myself, and himself to discern whether he hath in me one fit for a soldier and a citizen, and to employ me as a witness to other men, concerning things uncontrollable by will. See that your fears were vain, your appetites vain. Seek not good from without; seek it within yourselves, or you will never find it. For this reason he now brings me hither, now sends me thither; sets me before mankind, poor, powerless, sick; banishes me to Gyaros; leads me to prison; not that he hates me,—Heaven forbid! for who hates the most faithful of his servants?—nor that he neglects me, for he neglects not one of the smallest things; but to exercise me, and make use of me as a witness to others. Appointed to such a service, do I still care where I am, or with whom, or what is said of me,—instead of being wholly attentive to God and to his orders and commands?
Having these principles always at hand, and practising them by yourself, and making them ready for use, you will never want any one to comfort and strengthen you. For shame does not consist in having nothing to eat, but in not having wisdom enough to exempt you from fear and sorrow. But if you once acquire that exemption, will a tyrant or his guards or courtiers be anything to you? Will offices or office-seekers disturb you, who have received so great a command from Zeus? Only do not make a parade over it, nor grow insolent upon it; but show it by your actions; and though no one else should notice it, be content that you are well and blessed.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Higginson’s notes (6)
- Quotation source: Homer, Odyssey, 1.3.
- Quotation source: Hom. Od. 15.487.—H.
- It was the custom at Athens , in cases where no fixed punishment was appointed by the law, before the judges gave sentence, to ask the criminal himself what penalty he thought he deserved. Socrates refused either to comply with this form himself, or suffer any of his friends to do it for him; alleging that the naming a penalty was a confession of guilt. When the judges therefore asked him what penalty he thought he deserved, he answered, The highest honors and rewards, and to be maintained in the Prytaneum at the public expense, an answer which so extremely irritated his judges, that they immediately condemned him to death.—C.
- A people towards the extremity of Greece .—C.
- Diogenes was the disciple of Antisthenes.—C.
- This was said by Xenophon, when news was brought him that his son Gryllus was killed in a battle.—C.
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
That we ought not to be moved by a desire of those things which are not in our power.
Let not that which in another is contrary to nature be an evil to you: for you are not formed by nature to be depressed with others nor to be unhappy with others, but to be happy with them. If a man is unhappy, remember that his unhappiness is his own fault: for God has made all men to be happy, to be free from perturbations. For this purpose he has given means to them, some things to each person as his own, and other things not as his own: some things subject to hindrance and compulsion and deprivation; and these things are not a man’s own: but the things which are not subject to hindrances, are his own; and the nature of good and evil, as it was fit to be done by him who takes care of us and protects us like a father, he has made our own.—But you say, I have parted from a certain person, and he is grieved.—Why did he consider as his own that which belongs to another? why, when he looked on you and was rejoiced, did he not also reckon that you are mortal, that it is natural for you to part from him for a foreign country? Therefore he suffers the consequences of his own folly. But why do you or for what purpose bewail yourself? Is it that you also have not thought of these things? but like poor women who are good for nothing, you have enjoyed all things in which you took pleasure, as if you would always enjoy them, both places and men and conversation; and now you sit and weep because you do not see the same persons and do not live in the same places.—Indeed you deserve this, to be more wretched than crows and ravens who have the power of flying where they please and changing their nests for others, and crossing the seas without lamenting or regretting their former condition.— Yes, but this happens to them because they are irrational creatures.—Was reason then given to us by the gods for the purpose of unhappiness and misery, that we may pass our lives in wretchedness and lamentation? Must all persons be immortal and must no man go abroad, and must we ourselves not go abroad, but remain rooted like plants; and if any of our familiar friends goes abroad, must we sit and weep; and on the contrary, when he returns, must we dance and clap our hands like children?
Shall we not now wean ourselves and remember what we have heard from the philosophers? if we did not listen to them as if they were jugglers: they tell us that this world is one city, and the substance out of which it has been formed is one, and that there must be a certain period, and that some things must give way to others, that some must be dissolved, and others come in their place; some to remain in the same place, and others to be moved; and that all things are full of friendship, first of the gods, and then of men who by nature are made to be of one family; and some must be with one another, and others must be separated, rejoicing in those who are with them, and not grieving for those who are removed from them; and man in addition to being by nature of a noble temper and having a contempt of all things which are not in the power of his will, also possesses this property not to be rooted nor to be naturally fixed to the earth, but to go at different times to different places, sometimes from the urgency of certain occasions, and at others merely for the sake of seeing. So it was with Ulysses, who saw Of many men the states, and learned their ways. And still earlier it was the fortune of Hercules to visit all the inhabited world Seeing men’s lawless deeds and their good rules of law casting out and clearing away their lawlessness and introducing in their place good rules of law. And yet how many friends do you think that he had in Thebes, bow many in Argos, how many in Athens? and how many do you think that he gained by going about? And he married also, when it seemed to him a proper occasion, and begot children, and left them without lamenting or regretting or leaving them as orphans; for he knew that no man is an orphan; but it is the father who takes care of all men always and continuously. For it was not as mere report that he had heard that Zeus is the father of men, for he thought that Zeus was his own father, and he called him so, and to him he looked when he was doing what he did. Therefore he was enabled to live happily in all places. And it is never possible for happiness and desire of what is not present to come together. For that which is happy must have all that it desires, must resemble a person who is filled with food, and must have neither thirst nor hunger.—But Ulysses felt a desire for his wife and wept as he sat on a rock.—Do you attend to Homer and his stories in every thing? Or if Ulysses really wept, what was he else than an unhappy man? and what good man is unhappy? In truth the whole is badly administered, if Zeus does not take care of his own citizens that they may be happy like himself. But these things are not lawful nor right to think of: and if Ulysses did weep and lament, he was not a good man. For who is good if he knows not who he is? and who knows what he is, if he forgets that things which have been made are perishable, and that it is not possible for one human being to be with another always? To desire then things which are impossible is to have a slavish character, and is foolish: it is the part of a stranger, of a man who fights against God in the only way that he can, by his opinions.
But my mother laments when she does not see me.— Why has she not learned these principles? and I do not say this, that we should not take care that she may not lament, but I say that we ought not to desire in every way what is not our own. And the sorrow of another is another’s sorrow: but my sorrow is my own. I then will stop my own sorrow by every means, for it is in my power: and the sorrow of another I will endeavour to stop as far as I can; but I will not attempt to do it by every means; for if I do, I shall be fighting against God, I shall be opposing Zeus and shall be placing myself against him in the administration of the universe; and the reward (the punishment) of this fighting against God and of this disobedience not only will the children of my children pay, but I also shall myself, both by day and by night, startled by dreams, perturbed, trembling at every piece of news, and having my tranquillity depending on the letters of others.—Some person has arrived from Rome. I only hope that there is no harm. But what harm can happen to you, where you are not?—From Hellas (Greece) some one is come: I hope that there is no harm.—In this way every place may be the cause of misfortune to you. Is it not enough for you to be unfortunate there where you are, and must you be so even beyond sea, and by the report of letters? Is this the way in which your affairs are in a state of security?—Well then suppose that my friends have died in the places which are far from me.—What else have they suffered than that which is the condition of mortals? Or how are you desirous at the same time to live to old age, and at the same time not to see the death of any person whom you love? Know you not that in the course of a long time many and various kinds of things must happen; that a fever shall overpower one, a robber another, and a third a tyrant? Such is the condition of things around us, such are those who live with us in the world: cold and heat, and unsuitable ways of living, and journeys by land, and voyages by sea, and winds, and various circumstances which surround us, destroy one man, and banish another, and throw one upon an embassy and another into an army. Sit down then in a flutter at all these things, lamenting, unhappy, unfortunate, dependent on another, and dependent not on one or two, but on ten thousands upon ten thousands.
Did you hear this when you were with the philosophers? did you learn this? do you not know that human life is a warfare? that one mail must keep watch, another must go out as a spy, and a third must fight? and it is not possible that all should be in one place, nor is it better that it should be so. But you neglecting to do the commands of the general complain when any thing more hard than usual is imposed on you, and you do not observe what you make the army become as far as it is in your power; that if all imitate you, no man will dig a trench, no man will put a rampart round, nor keep watch, nor expose himself to danger, but will appear to be useless for the purposes of an army. Again, in a vessel if you go as a sailor, keep to one place and stick to it. And if you are ordered to climb the mast, refuse; if to run to the head of the ship, refuse; and what master of a ship will endure you? and will he not pitch you overboard as a useless thing, an impediment only and bad example to the other sailors? And so it is here also: every man’s life is a kind of warfare, and it is long and diversified. You must observe the duty of a soldier and do every thing at the nod of the general; if it is possible, divining what his wishes are: for there is no resemblance between that general and this, neither in strength nor in superiority of character. You are placed in a great office of command and not in any mean place; but you are always a senator. Do you not know that such a man must give little time to the affairs of his household, but be often away from home, either as a governor or one who is governed, or discharging some office, or serving in war or acting as a judge? Then do you tell me that you wish, as a plant, to be fixed to the same places and to be rooted?—Yes, for it is pleasant.—Who says that it is not? but a soup is pleasant, and a handsome woman is pleasant. What else do those say who make pleasure their end? Do you not see of what men you have uttered the language? that it is the language of Epicureans and catamites? Next while you are doing what they do and holding their opinions, do you speak to us the words of Zeno and of Socrates? Will you not throw away as far as you can the things belonging to others with which you decorate yourself, though they do not fit you at all? For what else do they desire than to sleep without hindrance and free from compulsion, and when they have risen to yawn at their leisure, and to wash the face, then write and read what they choose, and then talk about some trifling matter being praised by their friends whatever they may say, then to go forth for a walk, and having walked about a little to bathe, and then eat and sleep, such sleep as is the fashion of such men? why need we say how? for one can easily conjecture. Come, do you also tell your own way of passing the time which you desire, you who are an admirer of truth and of Socrates and Diogenes. What do you wish to do in Athens? the same (that others do), or something else? Why then do you call yourself a Stoic? Well, but they who falsely call themselves Roman citizens, are severely punished; and should those, who falsely claim so great and reverend a thing and name, get off unpunished? or is this not possible, but the law divine and strong and inevitable is this, which exacts the severest punishments from those who commit the greatest crimes? For what does this law say? Let him who pretends to things which do not belong to him be a boaster, a vain-glorious man: let him who disobeys the divine administration be base, and a slave; let him suffer grief, let him be envious, let him pity; and in a word let him be unhappy and lament.
Well then; do you wish me to pay court to a certain person? to go to his doors?—If reason requires this to be done for the sake of country, for the sake of kinsmen, for the sake of mankind, why should you not go? You are not ashamed to go to the doors of a shoemaker, when you are in want of shoes, nor to the door of a gardener, when you want lettuces; and are you ashamed to go to the doors of the rich when you want any thing?—Yes, for I have no awe of a shoemaker—Don’t feel any awe of the rich—Nor will I flatter the gardener—And do not flatter the rich— How then shall I get what I want?—Do I say to you, go as if you were certain to get what you want? And do not I only tell you, that you may do what is becoming to yourself? Why then should I still go? That you may have gone, that you may have discharged the duty of a citizen, of a brother, of a friend. And further remember that you have gone to the shoemaker, to the seller of vegetables, who have no power in any thing great or noble, though he may sell dear. You go to buy lettuces: they cost an obolus (penny), but not a talent. So it is here also. The matter is worth going for to the rich man’s door—Well, I will go —It is worth talking about—Let it be so; I will talk with him—But you must also kiss his hand and flatter him with praise—Away with that, it is a talent’s worth: it is not profitable to me, nor to the state nor to my friends, to have done that which spoils a good citizen and a friend.—But you will seem not to have been eager about the matter, if you do not succeed. Have you again forgotten why you went? Know you not that a good man does nothing for the sake of appearance, but for the sake of doing right?— What advantage is it then to him to have done right?—And what advantage is it to a man who writes the name of Dion to write it as he ought?—The advantage is to have written it.—Is there no reward then?—Do you seek a reward for a good man greater than doing what is good and just? At Olympia you wish for nothing more, but it seems to you enough to be crowned at the games. Does it seem to you so small and worthless a thing to be good and happy? For these purposes being introduced by the gods into this city (the world), and it being now your duty to undertake the work of a man, do you still want nurses also and a mamma, and do foolish women by their weeping move you and make you effeminate? Will you thus never cease to be a foolish child? know you not that he who does the acts of a child, the older he is, the more ridiculous he is?
In Athens did you see no one by going to his house?— I visited any man that I pleased—Here also be ready to see, and you will see whom you please: only let it be without meanness, neither with desire nor with aversion, and your affairs will be well managed. But this result does not depend on going nor on standing at the doors, but it depends on what is within, on your opinions. When you have learned not to value things which are external and not dependent on the will, and to consider that not one of them is your own, but that these things only are your own, to exercise the judgment well, to form opinions, to move towards an object, to desire, to turn from a thing, where is there any longer room for flattery, where for meanness? why do you still long for the quiet there (at Athens), and for the places to which you are accustomed? Wait a little and you will again find these places familiar: then, if you are of so ignoble a nature, again if you leave these also, weep and lament.
How then shall I become of an affectionate temper? By being of a noble disposition, and happy. For it is not reasonable to be mean-spirited nor to lament yourself, nor to depend on another, nor ever to blame God or man. I entreat you, become an affectionate person in this way, by observing these rules. But if through this affection, as you name it, you are going to be a slave and wretched, there is no profit in being affectionate. And what prevents you from loving another as a person subject to mortality, as one who may go away from you. Did not Socrates love his own children? He did; but it was as a free man, as one who remembered that he must first be a friend to the gods. For this reason he violated nothing which was becoming to a good man, neither in making his defence nor by fixing a penalty on himself, nor even in the former part of his life when he was a senator or when he was a soldier. But we are fully supplied with every pretext for being of ignoble temper, some for the sake of a child, some for a mother, and others for brethren’s sake. But it is not fit for us to be unhappy on account of any person, but to be happy on account of all, but chiefly on account of God who has made us for this end. Well, did Diogenes love nobody, who was so kind and so much a lover of all that for mankind in general he willingly undertook so much labour and bodily sufferings? He did love mankind, but how? As became a minister of God, at the same time caring for men, and being also subject to God. For this reason all the earth was his country, and no particular place; and when he was taken prisoner he did not regret Athens nor his associates and friends there, but even he became familiar with the pirates and tried to improve them; and being sold afterwards he lived in Corinth as before at Athens; and he would have behaved the same, if he had gone to the country of the Perrhaebi. Thus is freedom acquired. For this reason he used to say, Ever since Antisthenes made me free, I have not been a slave. How did Antisthenes make him free? Hear what he says: Antisthenes taught me what is my own, and what is not my own; possessions are not my own, nor kinsmen, domestics, friends, nor reputation, nor places familiar, nor mode of life; all these belong to others. What then is your own? The use of appearances. This he showed to me, that I possess it free from hindrance, and from compulsion, no person can put an obstacle in my way, no person can force me to use appearances otherwise than I wish. Who then has any power over me? Philip or Alexander, or Perdiccas or the great king? How have they this power? For if a man is going to be overpowered by a man, he must long before be overpowered by things. If then pleasure is not able to subdue a man, nor pain, nor fame, nor wealth, but he is able, when he chooses, to spit out all his poor body in a man’s face and depart from life, whose slave can he still be? But if he dwelt with pleasure in Athens, and was overpowered by this manner of life, his affairs would have been at every man’s command; the stronger would have had the power of grieving him. How do you think that Diogenes would have flattered the pirates that they might sell him to some Athenian, that some time he might see that beautiful Piraeus, and the Long Walls and the Acropolis? In what condition would you see them? As a captive, a slave and mean: and what would be the use of it for you?—Not so: but I should see them as a free man—Show me, how you would be free. Observe, some person has caught you, who leads you away from your accustomed place of abode and says, You are my slave, for it is in my power to hinder you from living as you please, it is in my power to treat you gently, and to humble you: when I choose, on the contrary you are cheerful and go elated to Athens. What do you say to him who treats you as a slave? What means have you of finding one who will rescue you from slavery? Or cannot you even look him in the face, but without saying more do you intreat to be set free? Man, you ought to go gladly to prison, hastening, going before those who lead you there. Then, I ask you, are you unwilling to live in Rome and desire to live in Hellas (Greece)? And when you must die, will you then also fill us with your lamentations, because you will not see Athens nor walk about in the Lyceion? Have you gone abroad for this? was it for this reason you have sought to find some person from whom you might receive benefit? What benefit? That you may solve syllogisms more readily, or handle hypothotical arguments? and for this reason did you leave brother, country, friends, your family, that you might return when you had learned these things? So you did not go abroad to obtain constancy of mind, nor freedom from perturbation, nor in order that being secure from harm you may never complain of any person, accuse no person, and no man may wrong you, and thus you may maintain your relative position without impediment? This is a fine traffic that you have gone abroad for in syllogisms and sophistical arguments and hypothetical: if you like, take your place in the agora (market or public place) and proclaim them for sale like dealers in physic. Will you not deny even all that you have learned that you may not bring a bad name on your theorems as useless? What harm has philosophy done you? Wherein has Chrysippus injured you that you should prove by your acts that his labours are useless? Were the evils that you had there (at home) not enough, those which were the cause of your pain and lamentation, even if you had not gone abroad? Have you added more to the list? And if you again have other acquaintances and friends, you will have more causes for lamentation; and the same also if you take an affection for another country. Why then do you live to surround yourself with other sorrows upon sorrows through which you are unhappy? Then, I ask you, do you call this affection? What affection, man! If it is a good thing, it is the cause of no evil: if it is bad, I have nothing to do with it. I am formed by nature for my own good: I am. not formed for my own evil.
What then is the discipline for this purpose? First of all the highest and the principal, and that which stands as it were at the entrance, is this; when you are delighted with anything, be delighted as with a thing which is not one of those which cannot be taken away, but as with something of such a kind, as an earthen pot is, or a glass cup, that when it has been broken, you may remember what it was, and may not be troubled. So in this matter also: if you kiss your own child, or your brother or friend, never give full license to the appearance (φαντασίαν), and allow not your pleasure to go as far as it chooses; but check it, and curb it as those who stand behind men in their triumphs and remind them that they are mortal. Do you also remind yourself in like manner, that he whom you love is mortal, and that what you love is nothing of your own: it has been given to you for the present, not that it should not be taken from you, nor has it been given to you for all time, but as a fig is given to you or a bunch of grapes at the appointed season of the year. But if you wish for these things in winter, you are a fool. So if you wish for your son or friend when it is not allowed to you, you must know that you are wishing for a fig in winter. For such as winter is to a fig, such is every event which happens from the universe to the things which are taken away according to its nature. And further, at the times when you are delighted with a thing, place before yourself the contrary appearances. What harm is it while you are kissing your child to say with a lisping voice, To-morrow you will die; and to a friend also, To-morrow you will go away or I shall, and never shall we see one another again?—But these are words of bad omen—And some incantations also are of bad omen; but because they are useful, I don’t care for this; only let them be useful. But do you call things to be of bad omen except those which are significant of some evil? Cowardice is a word of bad omen, and meanness of spirit, and sorrow, and grief and shamelessness. These words are of bad omen: and yet we ought not to hesitate to utter them in order to protect ourselves against the things. Do you tell me that a name which is significant of any natural thing is of evil omen? say that even for the ears of corn to be reaped is of bad omen, for it signifies the destruction of the ears, but not of the world. Say that the falling of the leaves also is of bad omen, and for the dried fig to take the place of the green fig, and for raisins to be made from the grapes. For all these things are changes from a former state into other states; not a destruction, but a certain fixed economy and administration. Such is going away from home and a small change: such is death, a greater change, not from the state which now is to that which is not, but to that which is not now.—Shall I then no longer exist?—You will not exist, but you will be something else, of which the world now has need: for you also came into existence not when you chose, but when the world had need of you.
Wherefore the wise and good man, remembering who he is and whence he came, and by whom he was produced, is attentive only to this, how he may fill his place with due regularity, and obediently to God. Dost thou still wish me to exist (live)? I will continue to exist as free, as noble in nature, as thou hast wished me to exist: for thou hast made me free from hindrance in that which is my own. But hast thou no further need of me? I thank thee; and so far I have remained for thy sake, and for the sake of no other person, and now in obedience to thee I depart. How dost thou depart? Again, I say, as thou hast pleased, as free, as thy servant, as one who has known thy commands and thy prohibitions. And so long as I shall stay in thy service, whom dost thou will me to be? A prince or a private man, a senator or a common person, a soldier or a general, a teacher or a master of a family? whatever place and position thou mayest assign to me, as Socrates says, I will die ten thousand times rather than desert them. And where dost thou will me to be? in Rome or Athens, or Thebes or Gyara. Only remember me there where I am. If thou sendest me to a place where there are no means for men living according to nature, I shall not depart (from life) in disobedience to thee, but as if thou wast giving me the signal to retreat: I do not leave thee, let this be far from my intention, but I perceive that thou hast no need of me. If means of living according to nature be allowed to me, I will seek no other place than that in which I am, or other men than those among whom I am.
Let these thoughts be ready to hand by night and by day: these you should write, these you should read: about these you should talk to yourself, and to others. Ask a man, Can you help me at all for this purpose? and further, go to another and to another. Then if any thing that is said be contrary to your wish, this reflection first will immediately relieve you, that it is not unexpected. For it is a great thing in all cases to say, I knew that I begot a son who is mortal. For so you also will say, I knew that I am mortal, I knew that I may leave my home, I knew that I may be ejected from it, I knew that I may be led to prison. Then if you turn round and look to yourself, and seek the place from which comes that which has happened, you will forthwith recollect that it comes from the place of things which are out of the power of the will, and of things which are not my own. What then is it to me? Then, you will ask, and this is the chief thing: And who is it that sent it? The leader, or the general, the state, the law of the state. Give it me then, for I must always obey the law in every thing. Then, when the appearance (of things) pains you, for it is not in your power to prevent this, contend against it by the aid of reason, conquer it: do not allow it to gain strength nor to lead you to the consequences by raising images such as it pleases and as it pleases. If you be in Gyara, do not imagine the mode of living at Rome, and how many pleasures there were for him who lived there and how many there would be for him who returned to Rome: but fix your mind on this matter, how a man who lives in Gyara ought to live in Gyara like a man of courage. And if you be in Rome, do not imagine what the life in Athens is, but think only of the life in Rome.
Then in the place of all other delights substitute this, that of being conscious that you are obeying God, that not in word, but in deed you are performing the acts of a wise and good man. For what a thing it is for a man to be able to say to himself, Now whatever the rest may say in solemn manner in the schools and may be judged to be saying in a way contrary to common opinion (or in a strange way), this I am doing; and they are sitting and are discoursing of my virtues and inquiring about me and praising me; and of this Zeus has willed that I shall receive from myself a demonstration, and shall myself know if he has a soldier such as he ought to have, a citizen such as he ought to have, and if he has chosen to produce me to the rest of mankind as a witness of the things which are independent of the will: See that you fear without reason, that you foolishly desire what you do desire: seek not the good in things external; seek it in yourselves: if you do not, you will not find it. For this purpose he leads me at one time hither, at another time sends me thither, shows me to men as poor, without authority, and sick; sends me to Gyara, leads me into prison, not because he hates me, far from him be such a meaning, for who hates the best of his servants? nor yet because he cares not for me, for he does not neglect any even of the smallest things; but he does this for the purpose of exercising me and making use of me as a witness to others. Being appointed to such a service, do I still care about the place in which I am, or with whom I am, or what men say about me? and do 1 not entirely direct my thoughts to God and to his instructions and commands?
Having these things (or thoughts) always in hand, and exercising them by yourself, and keeping them in readiness, you will never be in want of one to comfort you and strengthen you. For it is not shameful to be without something to eat, but not to have reason sufficient for keeping away fear and sorrow. But if once you have gained exemption from sorrow and fear, will there any longer be a tyrant for you, or a tyrant’s guard, or attendants on Caesar? Or shall any appointment to offices at court cause you pain, or shall those who sacrifice in the Capitol on the occasion of being named to certain functions, cause pain to you who have received so great authority from Zeus? Only do not make a proud display of it, nor boast of it; but shew it by your acts; and if no man perceives it, be satisfied that you are yourself in a healthy state and happy.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (26)
- See Schweig.’s note.
- See ii. 5, 26.
- See iii. 13. 15.
- Homer, Odyssey i. 3.
- Odyssey, xvii. 487.
- ἀπέχειν . See iii. 2, 13. Paul to the Philippians, iv. 18.
- Suetonius ( Claudius, 25 ) says: Peregrinae conditionis homines vetuit usurpare Romana nomina, duntaxat gentilia. Civitatem Romanam usurpantes in campo Esquilino securi percussit. Upton.
- This is a denunciation of the hypocrite.
- Pity perhaps means that he will suffer the perturbation of pity, when he ought not to feel it. I am not sure about the exact meaning.
- What follows hath no connection with what immediately preceded; but belongs to the general subject of the chapter. Mrs. Carter. The person with whom Epictetus chiefly held this discourse, seems to have been instructed by his friends to pay his respects to some great man at Nicopolis (perhaps the procurator, iii. 4. 1) and to visit his house. Schweig.
- The reward of virtue is in the acts of virtue. The Stoics taught that virtue is its own reward. When I was a boy I have written this in copies, but I did not know what it meant. I know now that few people believe it; and like the man here, they inquire what reward they shall have for doing as they ought to do. A man of common sense would give no other answer than what Epictetus gives. But that will not satisfy all. The heathens must give the answer: For what more dost thou want when thou hast done a man a service? Art thou not content that thou hast done something conformable to thy nature, and dost thou seek to be paid for it? just as if the eye demanded a recompense for seeing or the feet for walking. M. Antoninus. ix. 42. Compare Seneca, de Vita Beata, c. 9.
- It was the custom at Athens when the court (the dicasts) had determined to convict an accused person, in some cases at least, to ask him what penalty he proposed to be inflicted on himself; but Socrates refused to do this or to allow his friends to do it, for he said that to name the penalty was the same as admitting his guilt (Xenophon, Apologia, 23 ). Socrates said that if he did name a proper penalty for himself, it would be that he should daily be allowed to dine in the Prytaneium (Plato, Apology, c. 26; Cicero, De Oratore, i. 54 ).
- The character of Diogenes is described very differently by Epictetus from that which we read in common books.
- A people in Thessaly between the river Peneius and Mount Olympus. It is the same as if Epictetus had said to any remote country.
- On the word καρπιστήν see the notes in Schweig.’s edition. The word is supposed to be formed from καρπίς, καρφίς , festuca.
- Μεταπίπτοντας . See i. 7.
- This is an old practice, to go about and sell physic to people. Cicero ( Pro Cluentio, c. 14 ) speaks of such a quack (pharmacopola), who would do a poisoning job for a proper sum of money. I have seen. a travelling doctor in France who went about in a cart, and rang a bell, at the sound of which people came round him. Some who were deaf had stuff poured into their ears, paid their money, and made way for others who had other complaints.
- It was the custom in Roman triumphs for a slave to stand behind the triumphant general in his chariot and to remind him that he was still mortal. Juvenal, x. 41.
- Compare Antoninus xi. 33 and 34.
- Marcus Antoninus, xi. 35. Compare Epict., iii. 13, 14, and iv. 7. 75.
- Upton altered the text οὐκέτι οὖν ἔσομαι; Οὐκ ἔσῃ ἀλλ’ ἄλλο τι, οὗ νῦν ὁ κόσμος χρείαν ἔχει, into οὔκετι οὖν ἔσομαι; Ἔσῃ ἀλλ’ ἄλλο τι, οὗ νῦν ὁ κόσμος χρείαν οὐκ ἔχει . He says that he made the alteration without MS. authority, but that the sense requires the change. Schweighaeuser does not accept the alteration, nor do L Schweig. remarks that there may be some difficulty in the words οὗ νῦν ὁ κόσμος χρείαν ἔχει . He first supposes that the word now ( νῦν ) means after a man’s death; but next he suggests that ἄλλο τι οὗ means something different from that of which the world has now need. A reader might not discover that there is any difficulty. He might also suggest that νῦν ought to be omitted, for if it were omitted, the sense would be still plainer. See iii. 13. 15, and iv. 7. 15.
- I am not sure if Epictetus ever uses κόσμος in the sense of Universe, the universum of philosophers. I think he sometimes uses it in the common sense of the world, the earth and all that is on it. Epictetus appears to teach that when a man dies, his existence is terminated. The body is resolved into the elements of which it is formed, and these elements are employed for other purposes. Consistently with this doctrine he may have supposed that the powers, which we call rational and intellectual, exist in man by virtue only of the organisation of his brain which is superior to that of all other animals; and that what we name the soul has no existence independent of the body. It was an old Greek hypothesis that at death the body returned to earth from which it came, and the soul ( πνεῦμα ) returned to the regions above, from which it came. I cannot discover any passage in Epictetus in which the doctrine is taught that the soul has an existence independent of the body. The opinions of Marcus Antoninus on this matter are contained in his book, iv. 14, 21, and perhaps elsewhere: but they are rather obscure. A recent writer has attempted to settle the question of the existence of departed souls by affirming that we can find no place for them either in heaven or in hell; for the modern scientific notion, as I suppose that it must be named, does not admit the conception of a place heaven or a place hell (Strauss, Der Alte und der Neue Glaube, p. 129). We may name Paul a contemporary of Epictetus, for though Epictetus may have been the younger, he was living at Rome during Nero’s reign (A. D. 54–68); and it is affirmed, whether correctly or not, I do not undertake to say, that Paul wrote from Ephesus his first epistle to the Corinthians (Cor. i. 16, 8) in the beginning of A. D. 56 . Epictetus, it is said, lived in Rome till the time of the expulsion of the philosophers by Domitian, when he retired to Nicopolis an old man, and taught there. Paul’s first epistle to the Corinthians (c. 15) contains his doctrine of the resurrection, which is accepted, I believe, by all, or nearly all, if there are any exceptions, who profess the Christian faith: but it is not understood by all in the same way. Paul teaches that Christ died for our sins, that he was buried and rose again on the third day; and that after his resurrection he was seen by many persons. Then he asks, if Christ rose from the dead, how can some say that there is no resurrection of the dead? But if there be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen (v. 13); and (v. 19), if in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable. But he affirms again (v. 20) that Christ is risen and become the first fruits of them that slept. In v. 32, he asks what advantages he has from his struggles in Ephesus, if the dead rise not: let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die. He seems not to admit the value of life, if there is no resurrection of the dead; and he seems to say that we shall seek or ought to seek only the pleasures of sense, because life is short, if we do not believe in a resurrection of the dead. It may be added that there is not any direct assertion in this chapter that Christ ascended to heaven in a bodily form, or that he ascended to heaven in any way. He then says (v. 35), But some man will say, How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come. He answers this question (v. 36), Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened except it die : and he adds that God giveth it (the seed) a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed his own body. We all know that the body, which is produced from the seed, is not the body that shall be. and we also know that the seed which is sown does not die, and that if the seed died, no body would be produced from such seed. His conclusion is that the dead is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body ( σῶμα πνευματικόν ). I believe that the commentators do not agree about this spiritual body : but it seems plain that Paul did not teach that the body which will rise will be the same as the body which is buried. He says (v. 50) that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God. Yet in the Apostles’ Creed we pronounce our belief in the resurrection of the body : but in the Nicene Creed it is said we look for the resurrection of the dead, which is a different thing or may have a different meaning from the resurrection of the body. In the ministration of baptism to such as are of riper years, the person to be baptized is asked Dost thou believe in God the Father Almighty, etc. in the terms of the Church Creeds, but in place of the resurrection of the body or of the dead, he is asked if he believes in the resurrection of the flesh. The various opinions of divines of the English church on the resurrection of the body are stated by A. Clissold in the Practical Nature of the Theological Writings of E. Swedenborg in a letter to Whately, Archbishop of Dublin, 1859 , 2nd ed.
- Seneca de Consol. ad Pol. c. 30; Cicero, Tuscul. Disp. iii. 13.
- Compare i. 12. 2, ii. 14. 11, iii. 26. 28. Compare this with the description of the universal care of Providence, Matthew, x. 29, 30, and the occasion on which it was produced. Mrs. Carter.
- See i. 19. 19.
- On the strange words ὀρδινατίων and ὀπτικίοις , which occur in this sentence, see the notes in Schweighaeuser’s edition.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1τὸ ἄλλου παρὰ φύσιν σοὶ κακὸν μὴ γινέσθω· οὐ γὰρ συνταπεινοῦσθαι πέφυκας οὐδὲ συνατυχεῖν, ἀλλὰ συνευτυχεῖν. 2ἂν δέ τις ἀτυχῇ, μέμνησο, ὅτι παρʼ αὑτὸν ἀτυχεῖ. ὁ γὰρ θεὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἐπὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἐπὶ τὸ εὐσταθεῖν ἐποίησεν. 3πρὸς τοῦτο ἀφορμὰς ἔδωκεν, τὰ μὲν ἴδια δοὺς ἑκάστῳ, τὰ δʼ ἀλλότρια· τὰ μὲν κωλυτὰ καὶ ἀφαιρετὰ καὶ ἀναγκαστὰ οὐκ ἴδια, τὰ δʼ ἀκώλυτα ἴδια· τὴν δʼ οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, ὥσπερ ἦν ἄξιον τὸν κηδόμενον ἡμῶν καὶ πατρικῶς προιστάμενον, ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις. 4ἀλλʼ ἀποκεχώρηκα τοῦ δεῖνος καὶ ὀδυνᾶται. διὰ τί γὰρ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἴδια ἡγήσατο; διὰ τί, ὅτε σε βλέπων ἔχαιρεν, οὐκ ἐπελογίζετο, ὅτι θνητὸς εἶ, ἀποδημητικὸς εἶ; τοιγαροῦν τίνει δίκας τῆς αὑτοῦ μωρίας. 5σὺ δʼ ἀντὶ τίνος; ἐπὶ τί κλάεις σεαυτόν; ἢ οὐδὲ σὺ ταῦτα ἐμελέτησας, ἀλλʼ ὡς τὰ γύναια τὰ οὐδενὸς ἄξια πᾶσιν οἷς ἔχαιρες ὡς ἀ[ι]εὶ συνεσόμενος συνῆς, τοῖς τόποις, τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ταῖς διατριβαῖς; καὶ νῦν κλαίων ἐκάθισας, ὅτι μὴ τοὺς αὐτοὺς βλέπεις καὶ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τόποις διατρίβεις. 6τούτου γὰρ ἄξιος εἶ, ἵνα καὶ τῶν κοράκων καὶ κορωνῶν ἀθλιώτερος ᾖς, οἷς ἔξεστιν ἵπτασθαι, ὅπου θέλουσιν, καὶ μετοικοδομεῖν τὰς νεοσσιὰς καὶ τὰ πελάγη διαπερᾶν μὴ στένουσιν μηδὲ ποθοῦσι τὰ πρῶτα. 7— ναί· ἀλλʼ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἄλογα εἶναι πάσχει αὐτά. — ἡμῖν οὖν λόγος ἐπὶ ἀτυχίᾳ καὶ κακοδαιμονίᾳ δέδοται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἵνʼ ἄθλιοι, ἵνα πενθοῦντες διατελῶμεν; 8ἢ πάντες ἔστωσαν ἀθάνατοι καὶ μηδεὶς ἀποδημείτω, μηδʼ ἡμεῖς ποῦ ἀποδημῶμεν, ἀλλὰ μένωμεν ὡς τὰ φυτὰ προσερριζωμένοι· ἂν δέ τις ἀποδημήσῃ τῶν συνήθων, καθήμενοι κλαίωμεν καὶ πάλιν, ἂν ἔλθῃ, ὀρχώμεθα καὶ κροτῶμεν ὡς τὰ παιδία; 9οὐκ ἀπογαλακτίσομεν ἤδη ποθʼ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ μεμνησόμεθα ὧν ἠκούσαμεν παρὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων; 10εἴ γε μὴ ὡς ἐπαοιδῶν αὐτῶν ἠκούομεν, ὅτι ὁ κόσμος οὗτος μία πόλις ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ οὐσία, ἐξ ἧς δεδημιούργηται, μία καὶ ἀνάγκη περίοδόν τινα εἶναι καὶ παραχώρησιν ἄλλων ἄλλοις καὶ τὰ μὲν διαλύεσθαι, τὰ δʼ ἐπιγίνεσθαι, τὰ μὲν μένειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, τὰ δὲ κινεῖσθαι. 11πάντα δὲ φίλων μεστά, πρῶτα μὲν θεῶν, εἶτα καὶ ἀνθρώπων φύσει πρὸς ἀλλήλους ᾠκειωμένων· καὶ δεῖ τοὺς μὲν παρεῖναι ἀλλήλοις, τοὺς δʼ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, τοῖς μὲν συνοῦσι χαίροντας, τοῖς δʼ ἀπαλλαττομένοις μὴ ἀχθομένους. 12ὁ δʼ ἄνθρωπος πρὸς τῷ φύσει μεγαλόφρων εἶναι καὶ πάντων τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων καταφρονητικὸς ἔτι κἀκεῖνο ἔσχηκε τὸ μὴ ἐρριζῶσθαι μηδὲ προσπεφυκέναι τῇ γῇ, ἀλλὰ ἄλλοτʼ ἐπʼ ἄλλους ἵεσθαι τόπους ποτὲ μὲν χρειῶν τινων ἐπειγουσῶν, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς θέας ἕνεκα. 13καὶ τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ τὸ συμβὰν τοιοῦτόν τι ἦν· πολλῶν δʼ ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα καὶ νόον ἔγνω· καὶ ἔτι πρόσθεν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ περιελθεῖν τὴν οἰκουμένην ὅλην ἀνθρώπων ὕβριν τε καὶ εὐνομίην ἐφορῶντα καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐκβάλλοντα καὶ καθαίροντα, τὴν δʼ ἀντεισάγοντα. 14καίτοι πόσους οἴει φίλους ἔσχεν ἐν Θήβαις, πόσους ἐν Ἄργει, πόσους ἐν Ἀθήναις, πόσους δὲ περιερχόμενος ἐκτήσατο, ὅς γε καὶ ἐγάμει, ὅπου καιρὸς ἐφάνη αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐπαιδοποιεῖτο καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ἀπέλειπεν οὐ στένων οὐδὲ ποθῶν οὐδʼ ὡς ὀρφανοὺς ἀφιείς; 15ᾔδει γάρ, ὅτι οὐδείς ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ὀρφανός, ἀλλὰ πάντων ἀ[ι]εὶ καὶ διηνεκῶς ὁ πατήρ ἐστιν ὁ κηδόμενος. 16οὐ γὰρ μέχρι λόγου ἠκηκόει, ὅτι πατήρ ἐστιν ὁ Ζεὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅς γε καὶ αὑτοῦ πατέρα ᾤετο αὐτὸν καὶ ἐκάλει καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἀφορῶν ἔπραττεν ἃ ἔπραττεν. τοιγάρτοι πανταχοῦ ἐξῆν αὐτῷ διάγειν εὐδαιμόνως. 17οὐδέποτε δʼ ἐστὶν οἷόν τʼ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἐλθεῖν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ πόθον τῶν οὐ παρόντων τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονοῦν ἀπέχειν δεῖ πάντα ἃ θέλει, πεπληρωμένῳ τινὶ ἐοικέναι· οὐ δίψος δεῖ προσεῖναι αὐτῷ, οὐ λιμόν. 18— ἀλλʼ ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐπεπόνθει πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ ἔκλαιεν ἐπὶ πέτρα[ι]ς καθεζόμενος. — σὺ δʼ Ὁμήρῳ πάντα προσέχεις καὶ τοῖς μύθοις αὐτοῦ; ἢ εἰ ταῖς ἀληθείαις ἔκλαεν, τί ἄλλο ἢ ἐδυστύχει; τίς δὲ καλός τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς δυστυχεῖ; 19τῷ ὄντι κακῶς διοικεῖται τὰ ὅλα, εἰ μὴ ἐπιμελεῖται ὁ Ζεὺς τῶν ἑαυτοῦ πολιτῶν, ἵνʼ ὦσιν ὅμοιοι αὐτῷ, εὐδαίμονες. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὐ θεμιτὰ οὐδʼ ὅσια ἐνθυμηθῆναι, 20ἀλλʼ ὁ Ὀδυσσεύς, εἰ μὲν ἔκλαεν καὶ ὠδύρετο, οὐκ ἦν ἀγαθός. τίς γὰρ ἀγαθός ἐστιν ὁ οὐκ εἰδώς, ὅς ἐστιν; τίς δʼ οἶδεν ταῦτα ἐπιλελησμένος, ὅτι φθαρτὰ τὰ γενόμενα καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἀνθρώπῳ συνεῖναι οὐ δυνατὸν ἀεί; 21τί οὖν; τῶν μὴ δυνατῶν ἐφίεσθαι ἀνδραποδῶδες, ἠλίθιον, ξένου θεομαχοῦντος, ὡς μόνον οἷόν τε, τοῖς δόγμασι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ. 22ἀλλʼ ἡ μήτηρ μου στένει μὴ ὁρῶσά με.— διὰ τί γὰρ οὐκ ἔμαθεν τούτους τοὺς λόγους; καὶ οὐ τοῦτό φημι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελητέον τοῦ μὴ οἰμώζειν αὐτήν, ἀλλʼ ὅτι οὐ δεῖ θέλειν τὰ ἀλλότρια ἐξ ἅπαντος. 23λύπη δʼ ἡ ἄλλου ἀλλότριόν ἐστιν, ἡ δʼ ἐμὴ ἐμόν. ἐγὼ οὖν τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν παύσω ἐξ ἅπαντος, ἐπʼ ἐμοὶ γάρ ἐστιν· τὸ δʼ ἀλλότριον πειράσομαι κατὰ δύναμιν, ἐξ ἅπαντος δʼ οὐ πειράσομαι. 24εἰ δὲ μή, θεομαχήσω, ἀντιθήσω πρὸς τὸν Δία, ἀντιδιατάξομαι αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰ ὅλα. καὶ τἀπίχειρα τῆς θεομαχίας ταύτης καὶ ἀπειθείας οὐ παῖδες παίδων ἐκτίσουσιν, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸς ἐγὼ μεθʼ ἡμέραν, νυκτὸς διὰ τῶν ἐνυπνίων ἐκπηδῶν, ταρασσόμενος, πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀπαγγελίαν τρέμων, ἐξ ἐπιστολῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἠρτημένην ἔχων τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπάθειαν. 25ἀπὸ Ῥώμης τις ἥκει. μόνον μή τι κακόν. τί δὲ κακὸν ἐκεῖ σοι συμβῆναι δύναται, ὅπου μὴ εἶ; ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος. μόνον μή τι κακόν. οὕτως σοι πᾶς τόπος δύναται δυστυχίας εἶναι αἴτιος. 26οὐχ ἱκανὸν ἐκεῖ σε ἀτυχεῖν, ὅπου αὐτὸς εἶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ πέραν θαλάσσης καὶ διὰ γραμμάτων; οὕτως ἀσφαλῶς σοι τὰ πράγματα ἔχει; 27— τί οὖν, ἂν ἀποθάνωσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ φίλοι; — τί γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο ἢ οἱ θνητοὶ ἀπέθανον; ἢ πῶς ἅμα μὲν γηρᾶσαι θέλεις, ἅμα δὲ μηδενὸς τῶν στεργομένων μὴ [ε]ἰδεῖν θάνατον; 28οὐκ οἶσθʼ, ὅτι ἐν τῷ μακρῷ χρόνῳ πολλὰ καὶ ποικίλα ἀποβαίνειν ἀνάγκη, τοῦ μὲν πυρετὸν γενέσθαι κρείττονα, τοῦ δὲ λῃστήν, τοῦ δὲ τύραννον; 29τοιοῦτο γὰρ τὸ περιέχον, τοιοῦτον οἱ συνόντες, ψύχη καὶ καύματα καὶ τροφαὶ ἀσύμμετροι καὶ ὁδοιπορίαι καὶ πλοῦς καὶ ἄνεμοι καὶ περιστάσεις ποικίλαι· τὸν μὲν ἀπώλεσαν, τὸν δʼ ἐξώρισαν, τὸν δʼ εἰς πρεσβείαν, ἄλλον δʼ εἰς στρατείαν ἐνέβαλον. 30κάθησο τοίνυν πρὸς πάντα ταῦτα ἐπτοημένος, πενθῶν, ἀτυχῶν, δυστυχῶν, ἐξ ἄλλου ἠρτημένος καὶ τούτου οὐχ ἑνός, οὐ δυεῖν, ἀλλὰ μυρίων ἐπὶ μυρίοις. 31ταῦτα ἤκουες παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, ταῦτʼ ἐμάνθανες; οὐκ οἶσθʼ, ὅτι στρατεία τὸ χρῆμά ἐστιν; τὸν μὲν δεῖ φυλάττειν, τὸν δὲ κατασκοπήσοντα ἐξιέναι, τὸν δὲ καὶ πολεμήσοντα· οὐχ οἷόν τʼ εἶναι πάντας ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οὐδʼ ἄμεινον. 32σὺ δʼ ἀφεὶς ἐκτελεῖν τὰ προστάγματα τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅταν τί σοι προσταχθῇ τραχύτερον, καὶ οὐ παρακολουθεῖς, οἷον ἀποφαίνεις, ὅσον ἐπὶ σοί, τὸ στράτευμα, ὅτι ἄν σε πάντες μιμήσωνται, οὐ τάφρον σκάψει τις, οὐ χάρακα περιβαλεῖ, οὐκ ἀγρυπνήσει, οὐ κινδυνεύσει, ἀλλὰ ἄχρηστος δόξει στρατεύεσθαι. 33πάλιν ἐν πλοίῳ ναύτης ἂν πλέῃς, μίαν χώραν κάτεχε καὶ ταύτην προσλιπάρει· ἂν δʼ ἐπὶ τὸν ἱστὸν ἀναβῆναι δέῃ, μὴ θέλε, ἂν εἰς τὴν πρῴραν διαδραμεῖν, μὴ θέλε· καὶ τίς ἀνέξεταί σου κυβερνήτης; οὐχὶ δʼ ὡς σκεῦος ἄχρηστον ἐκβαλεῖ, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἐμπόδιον καὶ κακὸν παράδειγμα τῶν ἄλλων ναυτῶν; 34οὕτως δὲ καὶ ἐνθάδε· στρατεία τίς ἐστιν ὁ βίος ἑκάστου καὶ αὕτη μακρὰ καὶ ποικίλη. τηρεῖν σε δεῖ τὸ τοῦ στρατιώτου καὶ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ πρὸς νεῦμα πράσσειν ἕκαστα· 35εἰ οἷόν τε, μαντευόμενον ἃ θέλει. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὅμοιος ἐκεῖνος ὁ στρατηγὸς καὶ οὗτος οὔτε κατὰ τὴν ἰσχὺν οὔτε κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἤθους ὑπεροχήν. 36τέταξαι ἐν πόλει ἡγεμονίᾳ καὶ οὐκ ἐν ταπεινῇ τινι χώρᾳ, ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ βουλευτής. οὐκ οἶσθʼ, ὅτι τὸν τοιοῦτον ὀλίγα μὲν δεῖ οἰκονομεῖν, τὰ πολλὰ δʼ ἀποδημεῖν ἄρχοντα ἢ ἀρχόμενον ἢ ὑπηρετοῦντά τινι ἀρχῇ ἢ στρατευόμενον ἢ δικάζοντα; εἶτά μοι θέλεις ὡς φυτὸν προσηρτῆσθαι τοῖς αὐτοῖς τόποις καὶ προσερριζῶσθαι; 37— ἡδὺ γάρ ἐστιν. — τίς οὔ φησιν; ἀλλὰ καὶ ζωμὸς ἡδύς ἐστι καὶ γυνὴ καλὴ ἡδύ ἐστιν. τί ἄλλο λέγουσιν οἱ τέλος ποιούμενοι τὴν ἡδονήν; 38οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ, τίνων ἀνθρώπων φωνὴν ἀφῆκας; ὅτι Ἐπικουρείων καὶ κιναίδων; εἶτα τὰ ἐκείνων ἔργα πράσσων καὶ τὰ δόγματα ἔχων τοὺς λόγους ἡμῖν λέγεις τοὺς Ζήνωνος καὶ Σωκράτους; οὐκ ἀπορρίψεις ὡς μακροτάτω τἀλλότρια, οἷς κοσμῇ μηδέν σοι προσήκουσιν; 39ἢ τί ἄλλο θέλουσιν ἐκεῖνοι ἢ καθεύδειν ἀπαραποδίστως καὶ ἀναναγκάστως καὶ ἀναστάντες ἐφʼ ἡσυχίας χασμήσασθαι καὶ τὸ πρόσωπον ἀποπλῦναι, εἶτα γράψαι καὶ ἀναγνῶναι ἃ θέλουσιν, εἶτα φλυαρῆσαί τί ποτʼ ἐπαινούμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων, ὅ τι ἂν λέγωσιν, εἶτα εἰς περίπατον προελθόντες καὶ ὀλίγα περιπατήσαντες λούσασθαι, εἶτα φαγεῖν, εἶτα κοιμηθῆναι, οἵαν δὴ κοίτην καθεύδειν τοὺς τοιούτους εἰκός — τί ἄν τις λέγοι; ἔξεστιν γὰρ τεκμαίρεσθαι. 40ἄγε, φέρε μοι καὶ σὺ τὴν σαυτοῦ διατριβήν, ἣν ποθεῖς, ζηλωτὰ τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Διογένους. τί θέλεις ἐν Ἀθήναις ποιεῖν; ταῦτα αὐτά; 41μή τι ἕτερα; τί οὖν Στωικὸν σαυτὸν εἶναι λέγεις; εἶτα οἱ μὲν τῆς Ῥωμαίων πολιτείας καταψευδόμενοι κολάζονται πικρῶς, τοὺς δʼ οὕτως μεγάλου καὶ σεμνοῦ καταψευδομένους πράγματος καὶ ὀνόματος ἀθῴους ἀπαλλάττεσθαι δεῖ; 42ἢ τοῦτό γε οὐ δυνατόν, ἀλλʼ ὁ νόμος θεῖος καὶ ἰσχυρὸς καὶ ἀναπόδραστος οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τὰς μεγίστας εἰσπρασσόμενος κολάσεις παρὰ τῶν τὰ μέγιστα ἁμαρτανόντων; 43τί γὰρ λέγει; ὁ προσποιούμενος τὰ μηδὲν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔστω ἀλαζών, ἔστω κενόδοξος· ὁ ἀπειθῶν τῇ θείᾳ διοικήσει ἔστω ταπεινός, ἔστω δοῦλος, λυπείσθω, φθονείτω, ἐλεείτω, τὸ κεφάλαιον πάντων, δυστυχείτω, θρηνείτω. 44τί οὖν; θέλεις με τὸν δεῖνα θεραπεύειν; ἐπὶ θύρα[ι]ς αὐτοῦ πορεύεσθαι; — εἰ[ς] τοῦτο αἱρεῖ λόγος, ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος, ὑπὲρ τῶν συγγενῶν, ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων, διὰ τί μὴ ἀπέλθῃς; ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ μὲν τὰς τοῦ σκυτέως οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ πορευόμενος, ὅταν δέῃ ὑποδημάτων, οὐδʼ ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ κηπουροῦ, ὅταν θιδράκων, ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς τῶν πλουσίων, ὅταν τινὸς ὁμοίου δέῃ; 45— ναί· τὸν σκυτέα γὰρ οὐ θαυμάζω. — μηδὲ τὸν πλούσιον. — οὐδὲ τὸν κηπουρὸν κολακεύσω. — μηδὲ τὸν πλούσιον. πῶς οὖν τύχω οὗ δέομαι; 46— ἐγὼ δέ σοι λέγω ὅτι ὡς τευξόμενος ἀπέρχου; οὐχὶ δὲ μόνον, ἵνα πράξῃς τὸ σαυτῷ πρέπον; 47— τί οὖν ἔτι πορεύομαι; — ἵνʼ ἀπέλθῃς, ἵνα ἀποδεδωκὼς ᾖς τὰ τοῦ πολίτου ἔργα, τὰ ἀδελφοῦ, τὰ φίλου. 48καὶ λοιπὸν μέμνησο, ὅτι πρὸς σκυτέα ἀφῖξαι, πρὸς λαχανοπώλην, οὐδενὸς μεγάλου ἢ σεμνοῦ ἔχοντα τὴν ἐξουσίαν, κἂν αὐτὸ πολλοῦ πωλῇ. ὡς ἐπὶ τὰς θίδρακας ἀπέρχῃ· ὀβολοῦ γάρ εἰσιν, ταλάντου δʼ οὐκ εἰσίν. 49οὕτως κἀνταῦθα. τοῦ ἐπὶ θύρας ἐλθεῖν ἄξιον τὸ πρᾶγμα· ἔστω, ἀφίξομαι. τοῦ διαλεχθῆναι οὕτως· ἔστω, διαλεχθήσομαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν χεῖρα δεῖ καταφιλῆσαι καὶ θωπεῦσαι διʼ ἐπαίνου. ἄπαγε, ταλάντου ἐστίν· οὐ λυσιτελεῖ μοι οὐδὲ τῇ πόλει οὐδὲ τοῖς φίλοις ἀπολέσαι καὶ πολίτην ἀγαθὸν καὶ φίλον. 50ἀλλὰ δόξεις μὴ προτεθυμῆσθαι μὴ ἀνύσας. πάλιν ἐπελάθου, τίνος ἕνεκα ἐλήλυθας; οὐκ οἶσθʼ, ὅτι ἀνὴρ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς οὐδὲν ποιεῖ τοῦ δόξαι ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πεπρᾶχθαι καλῶς; 51— τί οὖν ὄφελος αὐτῷ τοῦ πρᾶξαι καλῶς; — τί δʼ ὄφελος τῷ γράφοντι τὸ Δίωνος ὄνομα, ὡς χρὴ γράφειν; αὐτὸ τὸ γράψαι. — ἔπαθλον οὖν οὐδέν; — σὺ δὲ ζητεῖς ἔπαθλον ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ μεῖζον τοῦ τὰ καλὰ καὶ δίκαια πράττειν; 52ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ δʼ οὐδεὶς ἄλλο οὐδέν, ἀλλʼ ἀρκεῖν σοι δοκεῖ τὸ ἐστεφανῶσθαι Ὀλύμπια. οὕτως σοι μικρὸν καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξιον εἶναι φαίνεται τὸ εἶναι καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐδαίμονα; 53πρὸς ταῦτα ὑπὸ θεῶν εἰς τὴν πόλιν ταύτην εἰσηγμένος καὶ ἤδη τῶν ἀνδρὸς ἔργων ὀφείλων ἅπτεσθαι τιτθὰς ἐπιποθεῖς καὶ μάμμην καὶ κάμπτει σε καὶ ἀποθηλύνει κλαίοντα γύναια μωρά; οὕτως οὐδέποτε παύσει παιδίον· ὢν νήπιον; οὐκ οἶσθʼ, ὅτι ὁ τὰ παιδίου ποιῶν ὅσῳ πρεσβύτερος τοσούτῳ γελοιότερος; 54ἐν Ἀθήναις δʼ οὐδένα ἑώρας εἰς οἶκον αὐτοῦ φοιτῶν; — ὃν ἐβουλόμην. — καὶ ἐνθάδε τοῦτον θέλε ὁρᾶν καὶ ὃν βούλει ὄψει· μόνον μὴ ταπεινῶς, μὴ μετʼ ὀρέξεως ἢ ἐκκλίσεως καὶ ἔσται τὰ σὰ καλῶς. 55τοῦτο δʼ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἐλθεῖν ἐστιν οὐδʼ ἐν τῷ ἐπὶ θύραις στῆναι, ἀλλʼ ἔνδον ἐν τοῖς δόγμασιν. 56ὅταν τὰ ἐκτὸς καὶ ἀπροαίρετα ἠτιμακὼς ᾖς καὶ μηδὲν αὐτῶν σὸν ἡγημένος, μόνα δʼ ἐκεῖνα σά, τὸ κρῖναι καλῶς, τὸ ὑπολαβεῖν, τὸ ὁρμῆσαι, τὸ ὀρεχθῆναι, τὸ ἐκκλῖναι, ποῦ ἔτι κολακείας τόπος, ποῦ ταπεινοφροσύνης; τί ἔτι ποθεῖς τὴν ἡσυχίαν τὴν ἐκεῖ, τί τοὺς συνήθεις τόπους; 57ἔκδεξαι βραχὺ καὶ τούτους πάλιν ἕξεις συνήθεις. εἶτα ἂν οὕτως ἀγεννῶς ἔχῃς, πάλιν καὶ τούτων ἀπαλλαττόμενος κλαῖε καὶ στένε. 58πῶς οὖν γένωμαι φιλόστοργος;— ὡς γενναῖος, ὡς εὐτυχής· οὐδέποτε γὰρ αἱρεῖ ὁ λόγος ταπεινὸν εἶναι οὐδὲ κατακλᾶσθαι οὐδʼ ἐξ ἄλλου κρέμασθαι οὐδὲ μέμψασθαί ποτε θεὸν ἢ ἄνθρωπον. 59οὕτως μοι γίνου φιλόστοργος ὡς ταῦτα τηρήσων· εἰ δὲ διὰ τὴν φιλοστοργίαν ταύτην, [τ]ἥντινά ποτε καὶ καλεῖς φιλοστοργίαν, δοῦλος μέλλεις εἶναι καὶ ἄθλιος, οὐ λυσιτελεῖ φιλόστοργον εἶναι. 60καὶ τί κωλύει φιλεῖν τινα ὡς θνητόν, ὡς ἀποδημητικόν; ἢ Σωκράτης οὐκ ἐφίλει τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ; ἀλλʼ ὡς ἐλεύθερος, ὡς μεμνημένος, ὅτι πρῶτον δεῖ θεοῖς εἶναι φίλον. 61διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲν παρέβη τῶν πρεπόντων ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ οὔτʼ ἀπολογούμενος οὐθʼ ὑποτιμώμενος οὔτʼ ἔτι πρόσθεν βουλεύων ἢ στρατευόμενος. 62ἡμεῖς δὲ πάσης προφάσεως πρὸς τὸ ἀ[γ]γεννεῖς εἶναι εὐποροῦμεν, οἱ μὲν διὰ παῖδα, οἱ δὲ διὰ μητέρα, ἄλλοι δὲ διʼ ἀδελφούς. 63διʼ οὐδένα δὲ προσήκει δυστυχεῖν, ἀλλὰ εὐτυχεῖν διὰ πάντας, μάλιστα δὲ διὰ τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἡμᾶς κατασκευάσαντα. 64ἄγε, Διογένης δʼ οὐκ ἐφίλει οὐδένα, ὃς οὕτως ἥμερος ἦν καὶ φιλάνθρωπος, ὥστε ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοσούτους πόνους καὶ ταλαιπωρίας τοῦ σώματος ἄσμενος ἀναδέχεσθαι; 65ἀλλʼ ἐφίλει πῶς; ὡς τοῦ Διὸς διάκονον ἔδει, ἅμα μὲν κηδόμενος, ἅμα δʼ ὡς τῷ θεῷ ὑποτεταγμένος. 66διὰ τοῦτο πᾶσα γῆ πατρὶς ἦν ἐκείνῳ μόνῳ, ἐξαίρετος δʼ οὐδεμία· καὶ ἁλοὺς οὐκ ἐπόθει τὰς Ἀθήνας οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐκεῖ συνήθεις καὶ φίλους, ἀλλʼ αὐτοῖς τοῖς πειραταῖς συνήθης ἐγίνετο καὶ ἐπανορθοῦν ἐπειρᾶτο. καὶ πραθεὶς ὕστερον ἐν Κορίνθῳ διῆγεν οὕτως ὡς πρόσθεν ἐν Ἀθήναις καὶ εἰς Περραιβοὺς δʼ ἂν ἀπελθὼν ὡσαύτως εἶχεν. 67οὕτως ἐλευθερία γίνεται. διὰ τοῦτο ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἐξ οὗ μʼ Ἀντισθένης ἠλευθέρωσεν, οὐκέτι ἐδούλευσα. 68πῶς ἠλευθέρωσεν; ἄκουε, τί λέγει· ἐδίδαξέν με τὰ ἐμὰ καὶ τὰ οὐκ ἐμά. κτῆσις οὐκ ἐμή· συγγενεῖς, οἰκεῖοι, φίλοι, φήμη, συνήθεις τόποι, διατριβή, πάντα ταῦτα ὅτι ἀλλότρια. 69σὸν οὖν τί; χρῆσις φαντασιῶν. ταύτην ἔδειξέν μοι ὅτι ἀκώλυτον ἔχω, ἀνανάγκαστον· οὐδεὶς ἐμποδίσαι δύναται, οὐδεὶς βιάσασθαι ἄλλως χρήσασθαι ἢ ὡς θέλω. 70τίς οὖν ἔτι ἔχει μου ἐξουσίαν; Φίλιππος ἢ Ἀλέξανδρος ἢ Περδίκκας ἢ ὁ μέγας βασιλεύς; πόθεν αὐτοῖς; τὸν γὰρ ὑπʼ ἀνθρώπου μέλλοντα ἡττᾶσθαι πολὺ πρότερον ὑπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων δεῖ ἡττᾶσθαι. 71οὗτινος οὖν οὐχ ἡδονὴ κρείττων ἐστίν, οὐ πόνος, οὐ δόξα, οὐ πλοῦτος, δύναται δʼ, ὅταν αὐτῷ δόξῃ, τὸ σωμάτιον ὅλον προσπτύσας τινὶ ἀπελθεῖν, τίνος ἔτι οὗτος δοῦλός ἐστιν, τίνι ὑποτέτακται; 72εἰ δʼ ἡδέως ἐν Ἀθήναις διῆγεν καὶ ἥττητο ταύτης τῆς διατριβῆς, ἐπὶ παντὶ ἂν ἦν τὰ ἐκείνου πράγματα, ὁ ἰσχυρότερος κύριος ἂν ἦν λυπῆσαι αὐτόν. 73πῶς ἂν δοκεῖς τοὺς πειρατὰς ἐκολάκευεν, ἵνʼ αὐτὸν Ἀθηναίων τινὶ πωλήσωσιν, ἵνʼ ἴδῃ ποτὲ τὸν Πειραιᾶ τὸν καλὸν καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη καὶ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν; 74τίς ὢν [ε]ἴδῃς, ἀνδράποδον; 75δοῦλος καὶ ταπεινός· καὶ τί σοι ὄφελος; — οὔ· ἀλλʼ ἐλεύθερος. — δεῖξον, πῶς ἐλεύθερος. ἰδοὺ ἐπείληπταί σου τίς ποτε οὗτος ὁ ἐξάγων σε ἀπὸ τῆς συνήθους σοι διατριβῆς καὶ λέγει δοῦλος ἐμὸς εἶ· ἐπʼ ἐμοὶ γάρ ἐστι κωλῦσαί σε διάγειν ὡς θέλεις, ἐπʼ ἐμοὶ τὸ ἀνεῖναί σε, τὸ ταπεινοῦν· ὅταν θέλω, πάλιν εὐφραίνῃ καὶ μετέωρος πορεύῃ εἰς Ἀθήνας. 76τί λέγεις πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν δουλαγωγοῦντά σε; ποῖον αὐτῷ καρπιστὴν δίδως; ἢ οὐδʼ ὅλως ἀντιβλέπεις, ἀλλʼ ἀφεὶς τοὺς πολλοὺς λόγους ἱκετεύεις, ἵνα ἀφεθῇς; 77ἄνθρωπε, εἰς φυλακήν σε δεῖ χαίροντα ἀπιέναι, σπεύδοντα, φθάνοντα τοὺς ἀπάγοντας. εἶτά μοι σὺ μὲν ἐν Ῥώμῃ διάγειν ὀκνεῖς, τὴν Ἑλλάδα ποθεῖς; ὅταν δʼ ἀποθνῄσκειν δέῃ, καὶ τότε μέλλεις ἡμῶν κατακλαίειν, ὅτι τὰς Ἀθήνας οὐ μέλλεις βλέπειν καὶ ἐν Λυκείῳ οὐ περιπατήσεις; 78ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἀπεδήμησας; τούτου ἕνεκα ἐζήτησάς τινι συμβαλεῖν, ἵνʼ ὠφεληθῇς ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ; ποίαν ὠφέλειαν; συλλογισμοὺς ἵνʼ ἀναλύσῃς ἑκτικώτερον ἢ ἐφοδεύσης ὑποθετικούς; καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ἀδελφὸν ἀπέλιπες, πατρίδα, φίλους, οἰκείους, ἵνα ταῦτα μαθὼν ἐπανέλθῃς; 79ὥστʼ οὐχ ὑπὲρ εὐσταθείας ἀπεδήμεις, οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἀταραξίας, οὐχ ἵνʼ ἀβλαβὴς γενόμενος μηκέτι μηδένα μέμφῃ, μηδενὶ ἐγκαλῇς, μηδείς σε ἀδικῇ καὶ οὕτως τὰς σχέσεις ἀποσῴζῃς ἀπαραποδίστως; 80καλὴν ἐστείλω ταύτην τὴν ἐμπορίαν, συλλογισμοὺς καὶ μεταπίπτοντας καὶ ὑποθετικούς· κἄν σοι φανῇ, ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ καθίσας πρόγραψον ὡς οἱ φαρμακοπῶλαι. 81οὐκ ἀρνήσῃ καὶ ὅσα ἔμαθες εἰδέναι, ἵνα μὴ διαβάλῃς τὰ θεωρήματα ὡς ἄχρηστα; τί σοι κακὸν ἐποίησεν φιλοσοφία; τί σε ἠδίκησε Χρύσιππος, ἵνʼ αὐτοῦ τοὺς πόνους ἔργῳ αὐτὸς ἀχρήστους ἐξελέγχῃς; οὐκ ἤρκει σοι τὰ ἐκεῖ κακά, ὅσα εἶχες αἴτια τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ πενθεῖν, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀπεδήμησας, ἀλλὰ πλείω προσέλαβες; 82κἂν ἄλλους πάλιν ἔχῃς συνήθεις καὶ φίλους, ἕξεις πλείονα τοῦ οἰμώζειν αἴτια, κἂν πρὸς ἄλλην χώραν προσπαθῇς. τί οὖν ζῇς; ἵνα λύπας ἄλλας ἐπʼ ἄλλαις περιβάλῃ, διʼ ἃς ἀτυχεῖς; 83εἶτά μοι καλεῖς τοῦτο φιλοστοργίαν; ποίαν, ἄνθρωπε, φιλοστοργίαν; εἰ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οὐδενὸς κακοῦ αἴτιον γίνεται· εἰ κακόν ἐστιν, οὐδέν μοι καὶ αὐτῇ ἐγὼ πρὸς τὰ ἀγαθὰ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πέφυκα, πρὸς κακὰ οὐ πέφυκα. 84τίς οὖν ἡ πρὸς τοῦτο ἄσκησις; πρῶτον μὲν ἡ ἀνωτάτω καὶ κυριωτάτη καὶ εὐθὺς ὥσπερ ἐν πύλαις, ὅταν τινὶ προσπάσχῃς, οὐδενὶ τῶν ἀναφαιρέτων, ἀλλά τινι τοιούτῳ γένει, οἷόν ἐστι χύτρα, οἷον ὑάλινον ποτήριον, ἵνʼ ὅταν καταγῇ, μεμνημένος [μὴν] μὴ ταραχθῇς. 85οὕτως καὶ ἐνθάδʼ, ἐὰν παιδίον σαυτοῦ καταφιλῇς, ἐὰν ἀδελφόν, ἐὰν φίλον, μηδέποτε ἐπιδῷς τὴν φαντασίαν εἰς ἅπαν μηδὲ τὴν διάχυσιν ἐάσῃς προελθεῖν ἐφʼ ὅσον αὐτὴ θέλει, ἀλλʼ ἀντίσπασον, κώλυσον, οἷον οἱ τοῖς θριαμβεύουσιν ἐφεστῶτες ὄπισθεν καὶ ὑπομιμνῄσκοντες, ὅτι ἄνθρωποί εἰσιν. 86τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ σὺ ὑπομίμνῃσκε σεαυτόν, ὅτι θνητὸν φιλεῖς, οὐδὲν τῶν σεαυτοῦ φιλεῖς· ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος σοι δέδοται, οὐκ ἀναφαίρετον οὐδʼ εἰς ἅπαν, ἀλλʼ ὡς σῦκον, ὡς σταφυλή, τῇ τεταγμένῃ ὥρᾳ τοῦ ἔτους· ἂν δὲ χειμῶνος ἐπιποθῇς, μωρὸς εἶ. 87οὕτως κἂν τὸν υἱὸν ἢ τὸν φίλον τότε ποθῇς, ὅτε οὐ δέδοταί σοι, ἴσθι, ὅτι χειμῶνος σῦκον ἐπιποθεῖς. οἷον γάρ ἐστι χειμὼν πρὸς σῦκον, τοιοῦτόν ἐστι πᾶσα ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ὅλων περίστασις πρὸς τὰ κατʼ αὐτὴν ἀναιρούμενα. 88καὶ λοιπὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷς χαίρεις τινί, τὰς ἐναντίας φαντασίας σαυτῷ πρό[σ]βαλε. τί κακόν ἐστι μεταξὺ καταφιλοῦντα τὸ παιδίον ἐπιψελλίζοντα λέγειν αὔριον ἀποθανῇ, τῷ φίλῳ ὡσαύτως αὔριον ἀποδημήσεις ἢ σὺ ἢ ἐγὼ καὶ οὐκέτι ὀψόμεθα ἀλλήλους; 89— ἀλλὰ δύσφημά ἐστι ταῦτα. — καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἐπαοιδῶν ἔνιαι, ἀλλʼ ὅτι ὠφελοῦσιν, οὐκ ἐπιστρέφομαι, μόνον ὠφελείτω. σὺ δὲ δύσφημα καλεῖς ἄλλα ἢ τὰ κακοῦ τινος σημαντικά; 90δύσφημόν ἐστι δειλία, δύσφημον ἀγέννεια, πένθος, λύπη, ἀναισχυντία· ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα δύσφημά ἐστιν. καίτοι γε οὐδὲ ταῦτα ὀκνεῖν δεῖ φθέγγεσθαι ὑπὲρ φυλακῆς τῶν πραγμάτων. 91δύσφημον δέ μοι λέγεις ὄνομα φυσικοῦ τινὸς πράγματος σημαντικόν; λέγε δύσφημον εἶναι καὶ τὸ θερισθῆναι τοὺς στάχυας· ἀπώλειαν γὰρ σημαίνει τῶν σταχύων· ἀλλʼ οὐχὶ τοῦ κόσμου. λέγε δύσφημον καὶ τὸ φυλλορροεῖν καὶ τὸ ἰσχάδα γίνεσθαι ἀντὶ σύκου καὶ ἀσταφίδας ἐκ σταφυλῆς. 92πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν προτέρων εἰσὶν εἰς ἕτερα μεταβολαί· οὐκ ἀπώλεια, ἀλλὰ τεταγμένη τις οἰκονομία καὶ διοίκησις. τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἀποδημία, [καὶ] μεταβολὴ μικρά· 93τοῦτο θάνατος, μεταβολὴ μείζων ἐκ τοῦ νῦν ὄντος οὐκ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἀλλʼ εἰς τὸ νῦν μὴ ὄν. 94— οὐκέτι οὖν ἔσομαι; — οὐκ ἔσει· ἀλλʼ ἄλλο τι, οὗ νῦν ὁ κόσμος χρείαν ἔχει. καὶ γὰρ σὺ ἐγένου οὐχ ὅτε σὺ ἠθέλησας, ἀλλʼ ὅτε ὁ κόσμος χρείαν ἔσχεν. 95διὰ τοῦτο ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς μεμνημένος, τίς τʼ ἐστὶ καὶ πόθεν ἐλήλυθεν καὶ ὑπὸ τίνος γέγονεν, πρὸς μόνῳ τούτῳ ἐστίν, πῶς τὴν αὑτοῦ χώραν ἐκπληρώσῃ εὐτάκτως καὶ εὐπειθῶς τῷ θεῷ. 96ἔτι μʼ εἶναι θέλεις; ὡς ἐλεύθερος, ὡς γενναῖος, ὡς σὺ ἠθέλησας· σὺ γάρ με ἀκώλυτον ἐποίησας ἐν τοῖς ἐμοῖς. 97ἀλλʼ οὐκέτι μου χρείαν ἔχεις; καλῶς σοι γένοιτο· καὶ μέχρι νῦν διὰ σὲ ἔμενον, διʼ ἄλλον οὐδένα, καὶ νῦν σοι πειθόμενος ἀπέρχομαι. 98πῶς ἀπέρχῃ; πάλιν ὡς σὺ ἠθέλησας, ὡς ἐλεύθερος, ὡς ὑπηρέτης σός, ὡς ᾐσθημένος σου τῶν προσταγμάτων καὶ ἀπαγορευμάτων. 99μέχρι δʼ ἂν οὗ διατρίβω ἐν τοῖς σοῖς, τίνα με θέλεις εἶναι; ἄρχοντα ἢ ἰδιώτην, βουλευτὴν ἢ δημότην, στρατιώτην ἢ στρατηγόν, παιδευτὴν ἢ οἰκοδεσπότην; ἣν ἂν χώραν καὶ τάξιν ἐγχειρίσῃς, ὡς λέγει ὁ Σωκράτης, μυριάκις ἀποθανοῦμαι πρότερον ἢ ταύτην ἐγκαταλείψω. 100ποῦ δέ μʼ εἶναι θέλεις; ἐν Ῥώμῃ ἢ ἐν Ἀθήναις ἢ ἐν Θήβαις ἢ ἐν Γυάροις; μόνον ἐκεῖ μου μέμνησο. 101ἄν μʼ ἐκεῖ πέμπῃς, ὅπου κατὰ φύσιν διεξαγωγὴ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνθρώπων, οὐ σοὶ ἀπειθῶν ἔξειμι, ἀλλʼ ὡς σοῦ μοι σημαίνοντος τὸ ἀνακλητικόν· οὐκ ἀπολείπω σε· μὴ γένοιτο· ἀλλʼ αἰσθάνομαι, ὅτι μου χρείαν οὐκ ἔχεις. 102ἂν δὲ διδῶται κατὰ φύσιν διεξαγωγή, οὐ ζητήσω ἄλλον τόπον ἢ ἐν ᾧ εἰμὶ ἢ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ἢ μεθʼ ὧν εἰμί. 103ταῦτα νυκτός, ταῦτα ἡμέρας πρόχειρα ἔστω· ταῦτα γράφειν, ταῦτα ἀναγιγνώσκειν· περὶ τούτων τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, αὐτὸν πρὸς αὑτόν, πρὸς ἕτερον μή τι ἔχεις μοι πρὸς τοῦτο βοηθῆσαι; καὶ πάλιν ἄλλῳ προσελθεῖν καὶ ἄλλῳ. 104εἶτα ἄν τι γένηται τῶν λεγομένων ἀβουλήτων, εὐθὺς ἐκεῖνο πρῶτον ἐπικουφίσει σε, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπροσδόκητον. 105μέγα γὰρ ἐπὶ πάντων τὸ ᾔδειν θνητὸν γεγεννηκώς. οὕτως γὰρ ἐρεῖς καὶ ὅτι ᾔδειν θνητὸς ὤν, ᾔδειν ἀποδημητικὸς ὤν, ᾔδειν ἔκβλητος ὤν, 106ᾔδειν εἰς φυλακὴν ἀπότακτος ὤν. εἶτʼ ἂν ἐπιστρέφῃς κατὰ σαυτὸν καὶ ζητήσῃς τὴν χώραν, ἐξ ἧς ἐστι τὸ συμβεβηκός, εὐθὺς ἀναμνησθήσῃ, ὅτι ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων, τῶν οὐκ ἐμῶν· τί οὖν πρὸς [σ]ἐμέ; εἶτα τὸ κυριώτατον τίς δʼ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπιπέπομφεν; 107ὁ ἡγεμὼν ἢ ὁ στρατηγός, ἡ πόλις, ὁ τῆς πόλεως νόμος. δὸς οὖν αὐτό· δεῖ γάρ με ἀ[ι]εὶ τῷ νόμῳ πείθεσθαι ἐν παντί. 108εἶθʼ ὅταν σε ἡ φαντασία δάκνῃ (τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ ἐπὶ σοί), ἀναμάχου τῷ λόγῳ, καταγωνίζου αὐτήν, μὴ ἐάσῃς ἐνισχύειν μηδὲ προάγειν ἐπὶ τὰ ἑξῆς ἀναπλάσσουσαν ὅσα θέλει καὶ ὡς θέλει. 109ἂν ἐν Γυάροις ᾖς, μὴ ἀνάπλασσε τὴν ἐν Ῥώμῃ διατριβὴν καὶ ὅσαι διαχύσεις ἦσαν ἐκεῖ διάγοντι, ὅσαι γένοιντʼ ἂν ἐπανελθόντι· ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖ τέτασο, ὅπως δεῖ τὸν ἐν Γυάροις διάγοντα, ἐν Γυάροις ἐρρωμένως διάγειν. κἂν ἐν Ῥώμῃ ᾖς, μὴ ἀνάπλασσε τὴν ἐν Ἀθήναις διατριβήν, ἀλλὰ περὶ μόνης τῆς ἐκεῖ μελέτα. 110εἶτʼ ἀντὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπασῶν διαχύσεων ἐκείνην ἀντείσαγε, τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ παρακολουθεῖν, ὅτι πείθῃ τῷ θεῷ, ὅτι οὐ λόγῳ, ἀλλʼ ἔργῳ τὰ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἐκτελεῖς. 111οἷον γάρ ἐστιν αὐτὸν αὑτῷ δύνασθαι εἰπεῖν νῦν ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς σεμνολογοῦσιν καὶ παραδοξολογεῖν δοκοῦσι, ταῦτα ἐγὼ ἐπιτελῶ· κἀκεῖνοι καθήμενοι τὰς ἐμὰς ἀρετὰς ἐξηγοῦνται καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ ζητοῦσιν καὶ ἐμὲ ὑμνοῦσιν· 112καὶ τούτου με ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸν παρʼ ἐμαυτοῦ λαβεῖν ἀπόδειξιν ἠθέλησεν καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ γνῶναι, εἰ ἔχει στρατιώτην οἷον δεῖ, πολίτην οἷον δεῖ, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις προάγειν με μάρτυρα τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων. ἴδετε, ὅτι εἰκῇ φοβεῖσθε, μάτην ἐπιθυμεῖτε ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖτε. τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἔξω μὴ ζητεῖτε, ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ζητεῖτε· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐχ εὑρήσετε. 113ἐπὶ τούτοις με νῦν μὲν ἐνταῦθα ἄγει, νῦν δʼ ἐκεῖ πέμπει, πένητα δείκνυσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, δίχα ἀρχῆς, νοσοῦντα· εἰς Γύαρα ἀποστέλλει, εἰς δεσμωτήριον εἰσάγει. οὐ μισῶν· μὴ γένοιτο· τίς δὲ μισεῖ τὸν ἄριστον τῶν ὑπηρετῶν τῶν ἑαυτοῦ; οὐδʼ ἀμελῶν, ὅς γε οὐδὲ τῶν μικροτάτων τινὸς ἀμελεῖ, ἀλλὰ γυμνάζων καὶ μάρτυρι πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους χρώμενος. 114εἰς τοιαύτην ὑπηρεσίαν κατατεταγμένος ἔτι φροντίζω, ποῦ εἰμι ἢ μετὰ τίνων ἢ τί περὶ ἐμοῦ λέγουσιν; οὐχὶ δʼ ὅλος πρὸς τὸν θεὸν τέταμαι καὶ τὰς ἐκείνου ἐντολὰς καὶ τὰ προστάγματα; 115ταῦτα ἔχων ἀεὶ ἐν χερσὶ καὶ τρίβων αὐτὸς παρὰ σαυτῷ καὶ πρόχειρα ποιῶν οὐδέποτε δεήσῃ τοῦ παραμυθουμένου, τοῦ ἐπιρρωννύντος. 116καὶ γὰρ αἰσχρὸν οὐ τὸ φαγεῖν μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ λόγον μὴ ἔχειν ἀρκοῦντα πρὸς ἀφοβίαν, πρὸς ἀλυπίαν. 117ἂν δʼ ἅπαξ περιποιήσῃ τὸ ἄλυπον καὶ ἄφοβον, ἔτι σοι τύραννος ἔσται τις ἢ δορυφόρος ἢ Καισαριανοὶ ἢ ὀρδινατίων δήξεταί σε ἢ οἱ ἐπιθύοντες ἐν τῷ Καπιτωλίῳ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀπτικίοις τὸν τηλικαύτην ἀρχὴν παρὰ τοῦ Διὸς εἰληφότα; 118μόνον μὴ πόμπευε αὐτὴν μηδʼ ἀλαζονεύου ἐπʼ αὐτῇ, ἀλλʼ ἔργῳ δείκνυε· κἂν μηδεὶς αἰσθάνηται, ἀρκοῦ αὐτὸς ὑγιαίνων καὶ εὐδαιμονῶν.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA