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The Stoa

Concept

Oikeiôsis

οἰκείωσιςoikeiōsisLatin: conciliatio, commendatio

Appropriation: the process by which a living being comes to treat itself, and then others, as its own.

About this idea · editorial

Oikeiōsis is usually translated “appropriation” or “affinity”. It names the natural attachment every animal has to itself from birth: its first impulse is not towards pleasure, the Stoics argued against the Epicureans, but towards preserving its own constitution.

In human beings this attachment develops. As reason matures, a person comes to recognise virtue as what truly belongs to them, and their sense of what is “their own” widens to include family, fellow citizens and finally all humanity. The second-century Stoic Hierocles pictured this as a set of concentric circles drawn steadily inwards.

The idea grounds Stoic ethics in nature and links self-love to justice. Diogenes Laërtius (Lives 7.85) and Cato in Cicero’s De Finibus (3.16 onwards) give the classic accounts.

Key passages

An animal’s first impulse, say the Stoics, is to selfpreservation, because nature from the outset endears it to itself, as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his work On Ends: his words are, The dearest thing to every animal is its own constitution and its consciousness thereof; for it was not likely that nature should estrange the living thing from itself or that she should leave the creature she has made without either estrangement from or affection for its own constitution. We are forced then to conclude that nature in constituting the animal made it near and dear to itself; for so it comes to repel all that is injurious and give free access to all that is serviceable or akin to it.

Diogenes Laërtius, Lives 7.85 · trans. R. D. Hicks (1925)

Those philosophers, said he, whose system I approve of, consider that as soon as an animal is born, (for this is where we must begin,) he is instinctively induced and excited to preserve himself and his existing condition, and to feel attachment to those things which have a tendency to preserve that condition; and to feel an abhorrence of dissolution, and of those circumstances which appear to be pregnant with dissolution. And they prove that this is the case, because, before either pleasure or pain has affected it, even while it is very little, it seeks what is salutary, and shuns the contrary: and this would not be the case if they were not fond of their condition, and afraid of dissolution; and it would not be possible for them to seek any particular thing if they had not some sense of themselves, and if that did not influence them to love themselves and what belongs to them. From which it ought to be understood that it is from the animal itself that the principle of self-love in it is derived. But among these natural principles of self-love most of the Stoics do not admit that pleasure ought to be classed; and I entirely agree with them, to avoid the many discreditable things which must ensue if nature should appear to have placed pleasure among those things which are the first objects of desire. But it appears to be proof enough why we naturally love those things which are by nature placed in the first rank, that there is no one, who, when either alternative is equally in his power, would not prefer to have all the parts of his body in a suitable and entire condition, rather than impaired by use, or in any particular distorted or depraved.

But as for the knowledge of things—or if you do not so much approve of this word cognitio, or find it less intelligible, we will call it κατάληψις—that we think is naturally to be acquired for its own sake, because it contains something which has, as it were, embraced and seized upon truth. And this is perceptible even in infants; whom we see amused if they have succeeded in finding out anything themselves by reason, even though it may be of no service whatever to them. And moreover, we consider arts worth attending to on their own account, both because there is in them something worth acceptance, and also because they depend upon knowledge, and contain in themselves something which proceeds on system and method. But I think that we are more averse to assent on false grounds than to anything else which is contrary to nature. Now of the limbs, that is to say, of the parts of the body, some appear to have been given to us by nature because of the use which, they are of to us, as, for instance, the hands, legs, and feet, and also those internal organs of the body, of which I may leave it to the physicians to explain the exceeding usefulness; but others with no view to utility, but for ornament as it were, as the tail is given to the peacock, plumage of many colours to the dove, breasts and a beard to man. Perhaps you will say this is but a dry enumeration; for these things are, as it were, the first elements of nature, which cannot well have any richness of language employed upon them; nor indeed am I thinking of displaying any; but when one is speaking of more important matters, then the subject itself hurries on the language: and then one's discourse is at the same time more impressive and more ornate. It is as you say, said I; but still everything which is said in a lucid manner about a good subject appears to me to be said well. And to wish to speak of subjects of that kind in a florid style is childish; but to be able to explain them with clearness and perspicuity, is a token of a learned and intelligent man.

Cicero, De Finibus 3.16 · trans. C. D. Yonge (1853)

All passages

27 passages in 7 works, found by: οἰκείωσις (Greek); conciliatio (Latin); first impulse + self-preservation.

Meditations · 6

Show 1 more

Discourses · 5

Moral Letters to Lucilius · 3

Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Book VII · 3

On Ends, Book III · 5

On Stoic Self-Contradictions · 1

Against the Stoics on Common Conceptions · 2

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