Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER XXII. · Of Friendship.
1To whatever Objects a Person devotes his Attention, these Objects he, probably, loves. Do Men ever devote their Attention then, to Evils?——By no means.——Or even to what doth not concern them?——No: nor this.——It remains then, that Good must be the sole Object of their Attention; and, if of their Attention, of their Love too. Whoever, therefore, understands Good, is capable likewise of Love: and he who cannot distinguish Good from Evil, and Things indifferent from both, how is it possible, that he can love? The prudent Person alone then, is capable of loving. How so? I am not this prudent person, yet I love my Child. I protest it surprizes me, that you should, in the first place, confess yourself imprudent. For in what are you deficient? Have not you the Use of your Senses? Do not you distinguish the Appearances of Things? Do not you provide such Food, and Cloathing, and Habitation, as are suitable to you? Why then do you confess, that you want Prudence? In truth, because you are often struck, and disconcerted by Appearances, and their Speciousness gets the better of you; and hence you sometimes suppose the very same Things to be good, then evil, and, lastly, neither: and, in a word, you grieve, you fear, you envy, you are disconcerted, you change. Is it from hence, that you confess yourself imprudent? And are you not changeable too in Love? Riches, Pleasure, in short, the very same Things, you at some times esteem good, and at others, evil: and do not you esteem the same Persons too, alternately good and bad? And, at one time, treat them with Kindness, at another, with Enmity? One time, commend, and at another, censure them? Yes. This too is the Case, with me. Well then, can he who is deceived in another, be his Friend, think you? No, surely. Or doth he, who loves him with a changeable Affection, bear him genuine Good-will? Nor he, neither. Or he, who now vilifies, then admires him? Nor he. Do you not often see little Dogs caressing, and playing with each other, that you would say, nothing could be more friendly: but, to learn what this Friendship is, throw a Bit of Meat between them, and you will see. Do you too throw a Bit of an Estate, betwixt you and your Son, and you will see, that he will quickly wish you under Ground, and you him: and then you, no doubt, on the other hand, will exclaim; What a Son have I brought up! He would bury me alive! Throw in a pretty Girl, and the old Fellow and the young one will, both, fall in Love with her: or let Fame or Danger intervene, the Words of the Father of Admetus will be yours: You hold Life dear: Doth not your Father too? Do you suppose, that he did not love his own Child, when he was a little one? That he was not in Agonies, when he had a Fever; and often wished to undergo that Fever in his stead? But, after all, when the Trial comes home, you see what Expressions he uses. Were not Eteocles and Polynices born of the same Mother, and of the same Father? Were they not brought up, and did they not live, and eat, and sleep, together? Did not they kiss and fondle each other? So that any one, who saw them, would have laughed at all the Paradoxes, which Philosophers utter about Love. And yet, when a Kingdom, like a Bit of Meat, was thrown betwixt them, see what they say, and how eagerly they wish to kill each other. For universally, be not deceived, no Animal is attached to any thing so strongly, as to its own Interest. Whatever therefore, appears a Hindrance to that, be it Brother, or Father, or Child, or Mistress, or Friend, is hated, abhorred, execrated; for, by Nature, it loves nothing like its own Interest. This is Father, and Brother, and Family, and Country, and God. Whenever therefore, the Gods seem to hinder this, we vilify even them, and throw down their Statues, and burn their Temples; as Alexander ordered the Temple of Esculapius to be burnt, because he had lost the Man he loved. 2Whenever therefore, any one makes his Interest to consist in the same thing with Sanctity, Virtue, his Country, Parents, and Friends, all these are secured: but, where-ever they are made to interfere, Friends, and Country, and Family, and Justice itself, all give way, borne down by the Weight of Self-interest. For wherever I and mine are placed, thither must every Animal gravitate. If in Body, that will sway us; if in Choice, that; if in Externals, these. If therefore, I be placed in a right Choice, then only, I shall be a Friend, a Son, or a Father, such as I ought. For, in that Case, it will be for my Interest to preserve the faithful, the modest, the patient, the abstinent, the beneficent, Character; to keep the Relations of Life inviolate. But, if I place my self in one Thing, and Virtue in another, the Doctrine of Epicurus will stand its Ground, That Virtue is nothing, or mere
Opinion. 3From this Ignorance it was, that the Athenians and Lacedemonians quarrelled with each other; and the Thebans with both: the Persian King, with Greece; and the Macedonians, with both: and now the Romans, with the Getes. And, in still remoter Times, the Trojan War arose from the same Cause. Paris was the Guest of Menelaus; and whoever had seen the mutual Proofs of Good-will, that passed between them, would never have believed, that they were not Friends. But a tempting Bit, a pretty Woman, was thrown in between them; and for this they went to War. At present, therefore, when you see dear Brothers have, in Appearance, but one Soul, do not immediately pronounce upon their Friendship; not though they should swear it, and affirm it was impossible to live asunder. (For the governing Faculty of a bad Man is faithless, unsettled, injudicious; successively vanquished by different Appearances). But inquire, not as others do, whether they were born of the same Parents, and brought up together, and under the same Preceptor; but this Thing only, in what they place their Interest; in Externals, or in Choice. If in Externals, no more call them Friends, than faithful, or constant, or brave, or free; nay, nor even Men, if you are wise. For it is no Principle of Humanity, that makes them bite and vilify each other; and take Possession of public Assemblies, as wild Beasts do of Solitudes and Mountains and convert Courts of Justice into Dens of Robbers: nor that prompts them to be intemperate, Adulterers, Seducers; or leads them into other Offences, that Men commit against each other, from the one single Principle, by which they place themselves, and their own Concerns, in Things independent on Choice. 4But, if you hear, that these Men, in reality suppose Good to be placed only in Choice, and in a right Use of the Appearances of Things; no longer take the trouble of inquiring, if they are Father and Son, or old Companions and Acquaintance; but as boldly pronounce, that they are Friends, as that they are faithful and just. For where else can Friendship be met, but with Fidelity and Modesty, and a Communication of Virtue; and of no other Thing? Well: but such a one paid me the utmost Regard, for so long a Time; and did not he love me? How can you tell, Wretch, if that Regard be any other than he pays to his Shoes, or his Horse, when he cleans them? And, how do you know, but when you cease to be a necessary Utensil, he may throw you away, like a broken Stool? Well: but it is my Wife; and we have lived together many Years. And how many did Eriphyle live with Amphiaraus; and was the Mother of Children, and not a few? But a Bracelet fell in between them. What was this Bracelet? The Principle [she had formed] concerning such Things. This turned her into a savage Animal: this cut asunder all Love; and suffered neither the Wife, nor the Mother, to continue such. 5Whoever therefore, among you, studies to be, or to gain a Friend, let him cut up all these Principles by the Root; hate them; drive them utterly out of his Soul. Thus, in the first place, he will be secure from inward Reproaches, and Contests; from Change of Mind, and Self-torment. Then, with respect to others; to every one, like himself, he will be unreserved. To such as are unlike, he will be patient, mild, gentle, and ready to forgive them, as failing in Points of the greatest Importance: but severe to none; being fully convinced of Plato's Doctrine, that the Soul is never willingly deprived of Truth. Without all this, you may, in many Respects, live as Friends do; and drink, and lodge, and travel together, and be born of the same Parents; and so may Serpents too: but neither they, nor you, can ever be Friends, while you have these brutal and execrable Principles.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (7)
- Admetus, King of Thessaly, being destined to die, Apollo obtained a Reversal of his Sentence from the Fates, on Condition, that some Person could be found to die in his stead. Admetus tried all his Friends, and, among the rest, his Father, Pheres; but no one chose to be his Representative, but his Wife, Alcestis. After her Death, Pheres is introduced preparing Honours for her Funeral, and condoling with his Son, on her Loss. Admetus rejects his Presents, with great Indignation; and makes him the severest Reproaches, on his Cowardice and Mean-spiritedness, in not parting with a few remaining Years of Life, to save his Son from an untimely Death; and in suffering Alcestis to descend to the Grave for him, in the Bloom of Youth. The Quotation made by Epictetus, is Part of the Answer of Pheres, to the Reproaches of his Son.Some of the finest and most touching Parts of the Dialogue, in Edward and Eleonora, are taken from the Alcestis; but Mr. Thomson is much happier, in the Conduct of his Story, than Euripides. Eleonora exposes herself to Death, against the Consent, and without the Knowledge, of her Husband; which by no means appears to have been the Case of Alcestis. This Circumstance renders Admetus, a most despicable Character, throughout the Play; and the Reproaches which he throws upon Pheres appear absurd, and shocking. It is a little remarkable, that Epictetus should treat the Father with so much Contempt, and bestow none on the Son, to whom it was, at least equally, due. See B. III. c. 20. §. 1.
- The Original quotes some Verses from Euripides, of a Dialogue between Eteocles and Polynices, before the Walls of Thebes; of which the Translation gives the general Sense.
- See Matt. xii. 50.
- By self is here meant the proper Good, or, as Solomon expresses it, Eccl. xii. 13. The Whole of Man. The Stoic proves excellently, the Inconvenience of placing this, in any thing but a right Choice (a right Disposition and Behaviour): but how it is the Interest of each Individual, in every Case, to make that Choice, in Preference to present Pleasure, and in Defiance of present Sufferings, appears only from the Doctrine of a future Recompence.
- Perhaps δοσις in the Greek, should be διαδοσις.
- Amphiaraus married Eriphyle, the Sister of Adrastus, King of Argos. He was an excellent Soothsayer; and, by his Skill, foresaw, that it would prove fatal to him, if he engaged himself in the Theban War. Wherefore, to avoid inevitable Destruction, he hid himself: but was discovered by his Wife Eriphyle, whom Polynices had corrupted, with a Present of a golden Chain. Statius's Thebais, L. VI.
- Mr. Upton's Copy.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Of friendship.
To whatever objects a person devotes his attention, these objects he probably loves. Do men ever devote their attention, then, to [what they think] evils? By no means. Or even to things indifferent? No, nor this. It remains, then, that good must be the sole object of their attention; and if of their attention, of their love too. Whoever, therefore, understands good, is capable likewise of love; and he who cannot distinguish good from evil, and things indifferent from both, how is it possible that he can love? The wise person alone, then, is capable of loving.
How so? I am not this wise person, yet I love my child.
I protest it surprises me that you should, in the first place, confess yourself unwise. For in what are you deficient? Have not you the use of your senses? Do you not distinguish the semblances of things? Do you not provide such food and clothing and habitation as are suitable to you? Why then do you confess that you want wisdom? In truth, because you are often struck and disconcerted by semblances, and their speciousness gets the better of you; and hence you sometimes suppose the very same things to be good, then evil, and lastly, neither; and, in a word, you grieve, you fear, you envy, you are disconcerted, you change. Is it from this that you confess yourself unwise? And are you not changeable too in love? Riches, pleasure, in short, the very same things, you sometimes esteem good, and at other times evil. And do you not esteem the same persons too alternately as good and bad, at one time treating them with kindness, at another with enmity; at one time commending, and at another censuring them?
Yes. This too is the case with me.
Well, then; can he who is deceived in another be his friend, think you?
No, surely.
Or does he who loves him with a changeable affection bear him genuine good-will?
Nor he, neither. Or he who now vilifies, then admires him?
Nor he.
Do you not often see little dogs caressing and playing with each other, so that you would say nothing could be more friendly? But to learn what this friendship is, throw a bit of meat between them, and you will see. Do you too throw a bit of an estate betwixt you and your son, and you will see that he will quickly wish you under ground, and you him; and then you, no doubt, on the other hand will exclaim, What a son have I brought up! He would bury me alive! Throw in a pretty girl, and the old fellow and the young one will both fall in love with her; or let fame or danger intervene, the words of the father of Admetus will be yours:— You love to see the light. Doth not your father?
You fain would still behold it. Would not he?
The second line, as quoted by Epictetus, is not found in the received editions. Pheres, the father of Admetus, is defending himself for not consenting to die in place of his son.
Do you suppose that he did not love his own child when it was little; that he was not in agonies when it had a fever, and often wished to undergo that fever in its stead? But, after all, when the trial comes home, you see what expressions he uses. Were not Eteocles and Polynices born of the same mother and of the same father? Were they not brought up, and did they not live and eat and sleep, together? Did not they kiss and fondle each other? So that any one, who saw them, would have laughed at all the paradoxes which philosophers utter about love. And yet when a kingdom, like a bit of meat, was thrown betwixt them, see what they say,— Polynices Where wilt thou stand before the towers?
Eteocles Why askest thou this of me?
Pol. I will oppose myself to thee, to slay thee.
Et. Me too the desire of this seizes.
Such are the prayers they offer. Be not therefore deceived. No living being is held by anything so strongly as by its own needs. Whatever therefore appears a hindrance to these, be it brother or father or child or mistress or friend, is hated, abhorred, execrated; for by nature it loves nothing like its own needs. This motive is father and brother and family and country and God. Whenever, therefore, the gods seem to hinder this, we vilify even them, and throw down their statues, and burn their temples; as Alexander ordered the temple of Esculapius to be burnt, because he had lost the man he loved.
When, therefore, any one identifies his interest with those of sanctity, virtue, country, parents, and friends, all these are secured; but whenever he places his interest in anything else than friends, country, family, and justice, then these all give way, borne down by the weight of self-interest. For wherever I and mine are placed, thither must every living being gravitate. If in body, that will sway us; if in our own will, that; if in externals, these. If, therefore, I rest my personality in the will, then only shall I be a friend, a son, or a father, such as I ought. For in that case it will be for my interest to preserve the faithful, the modest, the patient, the abstinent, the beneficent character; to keep the relations of life inviolate. But if I place my personality in one thing, and virtue in another, the doctrine of Epicurus will stand its ground, that virtue is nothing, or mere opinion.
From this ignorance it was that the Athenians and Lacedemonians quarrelled with each other, and the Thebans with both; the Persian king with Greece, and the Macedonians with both; and now the Romans with the Getes. And in still remoter times the Trojan war arose from the same cause. Alexander [Paris] was the guest of Menelaus; and whoever had seen the mutual proofs of good-will that passed between them would never have believed that they were not friends. But a tempting bait, a pretty woman, was thrown in between them; and thence came war. At present, therefore, when you see that dear brothers have, in appearance, but one soul do not immediately pronounce upon their love; not though they should swear it, and affirm it was impossible to live asunder. For the governing faculty of a bad man is faithless, unsettled, undiscriminating, successively vanquished by different semblances. But inquire, not as others do, whether they were born of the same parents, and brought up together, and under the same preceptor; but this thing only, in what they place their interest,—in externals or in their own wills. If in externals, you can no more pronounce them friends, than you can call them faithful, or constant, or brave, or free; nay, nor even truly men, if you are wise. For it is no principle of humanity that makes them bite and vilify each other, and take possession of public assemblies, as wild beasts do of solitudes and mountains; and convert courts of justice into dens of robbers; that prompts them to be intemperate, adulterers, seducers; or leads them into other offences that men commit against each other,—all from that one single error, by which they risk themselves and their own concerns on things uncontrollable by will.
But if you hear that these men in reality suppose good to be placed only in the will, and in a right use of things as they appear, no longer take the trouble of inquiring if they are father and son, or old companions and acquaintances; but boldly pronounce that they are friends, and also that they are faithful and just. For where else can friendship be met, but joined with fidelity and modesty, and the intercommunication of virtue alone?
Well; but such a one paid me the utmost regard for so long a time, and did he not love me?
How can you tell, foolish man, if that regard be any other than he pays to his shoes, or his horse, when he cleans them? And how do you know but that when you cease to be a necessary utensil, he may throw you away, like a broken stool?
Well; but it is my wife, and we have lived together many years.
And how many did Eriphyle live with Amphiaraus, and was the mother of children not a few? But a bauble came between them. What was this bauble? A false conviction concerning certain things. This turned her into a savage animal; this cut asunder all love, and suffered neither the wife nor the mother to continue such.
Whoever, therefore, among you studies either to be or to gain a friend, let him cut up all false convictions by the root, hate them, drive them utterly out of his soul. Thus, in the first place, he will be secure from inward reproaches and contests, from vacillation and self-torment. Then, with respect to others, to every like-minded person he will be without disguise; to such as are unlike he will be patient, mild, gentle, and ready to forgive them, as failing in points of the greatest importance; but severe to none, being fully convinced of Plato’s doctrine, that the soul is never willingly deprived of truth. Without all this, you may, in many respects, live as friends do; and drink and lodge and travel together, and even be born of the same parents; and so may serpents too; but neither they nor you can ever be really friends, while your accustomed principles remain brutal and execrable.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Higginson’s notes (3)
- Quotation source: Euripides, Alcestis, v. [691] 701.
- Quotation source: Euripides, Phoenissae 630-631.
- Amphiaraus married Eriphyle, the sister of Adrastus, king of Argos , and was betrayed by her for a golden chain.—C.
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
On friendship.
What a man applies himself to earnestly, that he naturally loves. Do men then apply themselves earnestly to the things which are bad? By no means. Well, do they apply themselves to things which in no way concern themselves? not to these either. It remains then that they employ themselves earnestly only about things which are good; and if they are earnestly employed about things, they love such things also. Whoever then understands what is good, can also know how to love: but he who cannot distinguish good from bad, and things which are neither good nor bad from both, how can he possess the power of loving? To love then is only in the power of the wise.
How is this? a man may say; I am foolish, and yet I love my child.—I am surprised indeed that you have begun by making the admission that you are foolish. For what are you deficient in? Can you not make use of your senses? do you not distinguish appearances? do you not use food which is suitable for your body, and clothing and habitation? Why then do you admit that you are foolish? It is in truth because you are often disturbed by appearances and perplexed, and their power of persuasion often conquers you; and sometimes you think these things to be good, and then the same things to be bad, and lastly neither good nor bad; and in short you grieve, fear, envy, are disturbed, you are changed. This is the reason why you confess that you are foolish. And are you not changeable in love? But wealth, and pleasure and in a word things themselves, do you sometimes think them to be good, and sometimes bad? and do you not think the same men at one time to be good, at another time bad? and have you not at one time a friendly feeling towards them, and at another time the feeling of an enemy? and do you not at one time praise them, and at another time blame them? Yes; I have these feelings also. Well then, do you think that he who has been deceived about a man is his friend? Certainly not. And he who has selected a man as his friend and is of a changeable disposition, has he good will towards him? He has not. And he who now abuses a man, and afterwards admires him? This man also has no good will to the other. Well then, did you never see little dogs caressing and playing with one another, so that you might say, there is nothing more friendly? but that you may know what friendship is, throw a bit of flesh among them, and you will learn. Throw between yourself and your son a little estate, and you will know how soon he will wish to bury you and how soon you wish your son to die. Then you will change your tone and say, what a son I have brought up! He has long been wishing to bury me. Throw a smart girl between you; and do you the old man love her, and the young one will love her too. If a little fame intervene or dangers, it will be just the same. You will utter the words of the father of Admetus! Life gives you pleasure: and why not your father?
Do you think that Admetus did not love his own child when he was little? that he was not in agony when the child had a fever? that he did not often say, I wish I had the fever instead of the child? then when the test (the thing) came and was near, see what words they utter. Were not Eteocles and Polynices from the same mother and from the same father? Were they not brought up together, had they not lived together, drunk together, slept together, and often kissed one another? So that, if any man, I think, had seen them, he would have ridiculed the philosophers for the paradoxes which they utter about friendship. But when a quarrel rose between them about the royal power, as between dogs about a bit of meat, see what they say Polynices. Where will you take your station before the towers?
Eteocles. Why do you ask me this?
Pol. I will place myself opposite and try to kill you.
Et. I also wish to do the same.
Such are the wishes that they utter.
For universally, be not deceived, every animal is attached to nothing so much as to its own interest. Whatever then appears to it an impediment to this interest, whether this be a brother, or a father, or a child, or beloved, or lover, it hates, spurns, curses: for its nature is to love nothing so much as its own interest; this is father, and brother and kinsman, and country, and God. When then the gods appear to us to be an impediment to this, we abuse them and throw down their statues and burn their temples, as Alexander ordered the temples of Aesculapius to be burned when his dear friend died. For this reason if a man put in the same place his interest, sanctity, goodness, and country, and parents, and friends, all these are secured: but if he puts in one place his interest, in another his friends, and his country and his kinsmen and justice itself, all these give way being borne down by the weight of interest. For where the I and the Mine are placed, to that place of necessity the animal inclines: if in the flesh, there is the ruling power: if in the will, it is there: and if it is in externals, it is there. If then I am there where my will is, then only shall I be a friend such as I ought to be, and son, and father; for this will be my interest, to maintain the character of fidelity, of modesty, of patience, of abstinence, of active co—operation, of observing my relations (towards all). But if I put myself in one place, and honesty in another, then the doctrine of Epicurus becomes strong, which asserts either that there is no honesty or it is that which opinion holds to be honest (virtuous).
It was through this ignorance that the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians quarrelled, and the Thebans with both; and the great king quarrelled with Hellas, and the Macedonians with both; and the Romans with the Getae. And still earlier the Trojan war happened for these reasons. Alexander was the guest of Menelaus; and if any man had seen their friendly disposition, he would not have believed any one who said that they were not friends. But there was cast between them (as between dogs) a bit of meat, a handsome woman, and about her war arose. And now when you see brothers to be friends appearing to have one mind, do not conclude from this any thing about their friendship, not even if they swear it and say that it is impossible for them to be separated from one another. For the ruling principle of a bad man cannot be trusted, it is insecure, has no certain rule by which it is directed, and is overpowered at different times by different appearances. But examine, not what other men examine, if they are born of the same parents and brought up together, and under the same paedagogue; but examine this only, wherein they place their interest, whether in externals or in the will. If in externals, do not name them friends, no more than name them trustworthy or constant, or brave or free: do not name them even men, if you have any judgment. For that is not a principle of human nature which makes them bite one another, and abuse one another, and occupy deserted places or public places, as if they were mountains, and in the courts of justice display the acts of robbers; nor yet that which makes them intemperate and adulterers and corrupters, nor that which makes them do whatever else men do against one another through this one opinion only, that of placing themselves and their interests in the things which are not within the power of their will. But if you hear that in truth these men think the good to be only there, where will is, and where there is a right use of appearances, no longer trouble yourself whether they are father or son, or brothers, or have associated a long time and are companions, but when you have ascertained this only, confidently declare that they are friends, as you declare that they are faithful, that they are just. For where else is friendship than where there is fidelity, and modesty, where there is a communion of honest things and of nothing else?
But you may say, such a one treated me with regard so lung; and did he not love me? How do you know, slave, if he did not regard you in the same way as he wipes his shoes with a sponge, or as he takes care of his beast? How do you know, when you have ceased to be useful as a vessel, he will not throw you away like a broken platter? But this woman is my wife, and we have lived together so long. And how long did Eriphyle live with Amphiaraus, and was the mother of children and of many? But a necklace came between them: and what is a necklace? It is the opinion about such things. That was the bestial principle, that was the thing which broke asunder the friendship between husband and wife, that which did not allow the woman to be a wife nor the mother to be a mother. And let every man among you who has seriously resolved either to be a friend himself or to have another for his friend, cut out these opinions, hate them, drive them from his soul. And thus first of all he will not reproach himself, he will not be at variance with himself, he will not change his mind, he will not torture himself. In the next place, to another also, who is like himself, he will be altogether and completely a friend. But he will bear with the man who is unlike himself, he will be kind to him, gentle, ready to pardon on account of his ignorance, on account of his being mistaken in things of the greatest importance; but he will be harsh to no man, being well convinced of Plato’s doctrine that every mind is deprived of truth unwillingly. If you cannot do this, yet you can do in all other respects as friends do, drink together, and lodge together, and sail together, and you may be born of the same parents; for snakes also are: but neither will they be friends nor you, so long as you retain these bestial and cursed opinions.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (13)
- In this dissertation is expounded the Stoic principle that friendship is only possible between the good. Schweig. He also says that there was another discourse by Epictetus on this subject, in which he expressed some of the opinions of Musonius Rufus (i. 1. note 12). Schweig draws this conclusion from certain words of Stobaeus; and he supposes that this dissertation of Epictetus was in one of the last four books of Epictetus’ discourses by Arrian, which have been lost. Cicero (de Amicit. c. 5) says nisi in bonis amicitiam ease non posse, and c. 18.
- The first verse is from the Alcestis of Euripides, v. 691. The second in Epictetus is not in Euripides. Schweighaeuser thinks that it has been intruded into the text from a trivial scholium.
- From the Phoenissae of Euripides, v. 723, etc.
- Compare Euripides, Hecuba, v. 846, etc.:— δεινόν γε θνητοῖς ὡς ἅπαντα συμπίτνει καὶ τὰς ἀνάγκας ὡς νόμοι διώρισαν, φίλους τιφέντες τούς γε πολεμιωτάτους ἐχθρούς τε τοὺς πρὶν εὐμενεῖς ποιούμενοι.
- Alexander did this when Hephaestion died. Arrian. Expedition of Alexander, vii. 14.
- Matthew vi. 21, for where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.
- By self is here meant the proper Good, or, as Solomon expresses it, Eccl. xii. 13, the whole of man. The Stoic proves excellently the inconvenience of placing this in any thing but a right choice (a right disposition and behaviour): but how it is the interest of each individual in every case to make that choice in preference to present pleasure and in defiance of present sufferings, appears only from the doctrine of a future recompense. Mrs. Carter. Compare Cicero, De Fin. ii. 15, where he is speaking of Epicurus, and translates the words ἀποφαίνειν ἢ μηδὲν εἶναι τὸ καλὸν ἢ ἄρα τὸ ἔνδοξον , ut enim consuetudo loquitur, id solum dicitur Honestum quod est populari fama gloriosum ( ἔνδοξον ). See Schweig.’s note.
- The quarrels of the Athenians with the Lacedaemonians appear chiefly in the history of the Peloponnesian war. (Thucydides, i. 1). The quarrel of the great king, the king of Persia , is the subject of the history of Herodotus (i. 1). The great quarrel of the Macedonians with the Persians is the subject of Arrian’s expedition of Alexander. The Romans were at war with the Getae or Daci in the time of Trajan, and we may assume that Epictetus was still living then.
- Aristotle, Eth. viii. c. 8. Mrs. Carter.
- Schweig. thinks that this is the plain meaning: as wild beasts in the mountains lie in wait for men, so men lie in wait for men, not only in deserted places, but even in the forum.
- ὅπου δόσις τοῦ καλοῦ . Lord Shaftesbury suggested δόσις καὶ λῆψις τοῦ καλοῦ : which Upton approved, and he refers to ii. 9. 12, αἱ ἀκατάλληλοι λήψεις καὶ δόσεις . Schweighaeuser suggests διαδόσις which I have followed in the version. Schweig. refers to i. 12. 6 i. 14. 9. The MSS. give no help.
- The old story about Eriphyle who betrayed her husband for a necklace.
- See Schweig.’s note
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1περὶ ἅ τις ἐσπούδακεν, φιλεῖ ταῦτα εἰκότως. μή τι οὖν περὶ τὰ κακὰ ἐσπουδάκασιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι; οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλὰ μή τι περὶ τὰ μηδὲν πρὸς αὐτούς; οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα. 2ὑπολείπεται τοίνυν περὶ μόνα τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἐσπουδακέναι αὐτούς· εἰ δʼ ἐσπουδακέναι, καὶ φιλεῖν ταῦτα. 3ὅστις οὖν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν, οὗτος ἂν καὶ φιλεῖν εἰδείη· ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος διακρῖναι τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἀπὸ τῶν κακῶν καὶ τὰ οὐδέτερα ἀπʼ ἀμφοτέρων πῶς ἂν ἔτι οὗτος φιλεῖν δύναιτο; τοῦ φρονίμου τοίνυν ἐστὶ μόνου τὸ φιλεῖν. 4καὶ πῶς; φησίν· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἄφρων ὢν ὅμως φιλῶ μου τὸ παιδίον. 5— θαυμάζω μὲν νὴ τοὺς θεούς, πῶς καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὡμολόγηκας ἄφρονα εἶναι σεαυτόν. τί γάρ σοι λείπει; οὐ χρῇ αἰσθήσει, οὐ φαντασίας διακρίνεις, οὐ τροφὰς προσφέρῃ τὰς ἐπιτηδείους τῷ σώματι, οὐ σκέπην, οὐκ οἴκησιν; 6πόθεν οὖν ὁμολογεῖς ἄφρων εἶναι; ὅτι νὴ Δία πολλάκις ἐξίστασαι ὑπὸ τῶν φαντασιῶν καὶ ταράττῃ καὶ ἡττῶσίν σε αἱ πιθανότητες αὐτῶν· καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ὑπολαμβάνεις, εἶτα ἐκεῖνα αὐτὰ κακά, ὕστερον δʼ οὐδέτερα· καὶ ὅλως λυπῇ, φοβῇ, φθονεῖς, ταράσσῃ, μεταβάλλῃ· διὰ ταῦτα ὁμολογεῖς ἄφρων εἶναι. 7ἐν δὲ τῷ φιλεῖν οὐ μεταβάλλῃ; ἀλλὰ πλοῦτον μὲν καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ ἁπλῶς αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα ποτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὰ ὑπολαμβάνεις εἶναι, ποτὲ δὲ κακά· ἀνθρώπους δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς οὐχὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἀγαθούς, ποτὲ δὲ κακοὺς καὶ ποτὲ μὲν οἰκείως ἔχεις, ποτὲ δʼ ἐχθρῶς αὐτοῖς καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἐπαινεῖς, ποτὲ δὲ ψέγεις; — ναὶ καὶ ταῦτα πάσχω. 8— τί οὖν; ὁ ἐξηπατημένος περί τινος δοκεῖ σοι φίλος εἶναι αὐτοῦ; — οὐ πάνυ. — οὐδʼ ὁ μεταπτώτως ἑλόμενος αὐτὸν εἶναι εὔνους αὐτῷ; — οὐδʼ οὗτος. — ὁ δὲ νῦν λοιδορῶν μέν τινα, ὕστερον δὲ θαυμάζων; 9— οὐδʼ οὗτος. — τί οὖν; κυνάρια οὐδέποτʼ εἶδες σαίνοντα καὶ προσπαίζοντα ἀλλήλοις, ἵνʼ εἴπῃς οὐδὲν φιλικώτερον; ἀλλʼ ὅπως ἴδῃς, τί ἐστι φιλία, βάλε κρέας εἰς μέσον καὶ γνώσῃ. 10βάλε καὶ σοῦ καὶ τοῦ παιδίου μέσον ἀγρίδιον καὶ γνώσῃ, πῶς σὲ τὸ παιδίον ταχέως κατορύξαι θέλει καὶ σὺ τὸ παιδίον εὔχῃ ἀποθανεῖν. εἶτα σὺ πάλιν οἷον ἐξέθρεψα τεκνίον· πάλαι ἐκφέρει. 11βάλε κορασίδιον κομψὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ὁ γέρων φίλει κἀκεῖνος ὁ νέος· ἂν δέ, δοξάριον. ἂν δὲ κινδυνεῦσαι δέῃ, ἐρεῖς τὰς φωνὰς τὰς τοῦ Ἀδμήτου πατρός· [χαίρεις ὁρῶν φῶς, πατέρα δʼ οὐ χαίρειν δοκεῖς;] θέλεις βλέπειν φῶς, πατέρα δʼ οὐ θέλειν δοκεῖς; 12οἴει ὅτι ἐκεῖνος οὐκ ἐφίλει τὸ ἴδιον παιδίον, ὅτε μικρὸν ἦν, οὐδὲ πυρέσσοντος αὐτοῦ ἠγωνία οὐδʼ ἔλεγεν πολλάκις ὅτι ὤφελον ἐγὼ μᾶλλον ἐπύρεσσον; εἶτα ἐλθόντος τοῦ πράγματος καὶ ἐγγίσαντος ὅρα οἵας φωνὰς ἀφιᾶσιν. 13ὁ Ἐτεοκλῆς καὶ ὁ Πολυνείκης οὐκ ἦσαν ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς μητρὸς καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πατρός; οὐκ ἦσαν συντεθραμμένοι, συμβεβιωκότες, συμπεπωκότες, συγκεκοιμημένοι, πολλάκις ἀλλήλους καταπεφιληκότες; ὥστʼ εἴ τις οἶμαι εἶδεν αὐτούς, κατεγέλασεν ἂν τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐφʼ οἷς περὶ φιλίας παραδοξολογοῦσιν. 14ἀλλʼ ἐμπεσούσης εἰς τὸ μέσον ὥσπερ κρέως τῆς τυραννίδος ὅρα οἷα λέγουσι· ποῦ ποτε στήσῃ πρὸ πύργων; — ὡς τί μʼ ἐρωτᾷς τῷδʼ; — ἀντιτάξομαι κτενῶν σε. — κἀμὲ τοῦδʼ ἔρως ἔχει. καὶ εὔχονται εὐχὰς τοιάσδε. 15καθόλου γὰρ — μὴ ἐξαπατᾶσθε — πᾶν ζῷον οὐδενὶ οὕτως ᾠκείωται ὡς τῷ ἰδίῳ συμφέροντι. ὅ τι ἂν οὖν πρὸς τοῦτο φαίνηται αὐτῷ ἐμποδίζειν, ἄν τʼ ἀδελφὸς ᾖ τοῦτο ἄν τε πατὴρ ἄν τε τέκνον ἄν τʼ ἐρώμενος ἄν τʼ ἐραστής, μισεῖ, προβάλλεται, καταρᾶται. 16οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως φιλεῖν πέφυκεν ὡς τὸ αὑτοῦ συμφέρον· τοῦτο πατὴρ καὶ ἀδελφὸς καὶ συγγενεῖς καὶ πατρὶς καὶ θεός. 17ὅταν γοῦν εἰς τοῦτο ἐμποδίζειν ἡμῖν οἱ θεοὶ δοκῶσιν, κἀκείνους λοιδοροῦμεν καὶ τὰ ἱδρύματα αὐτῶν καταστρέφομεν καὶ τοὺς ναοὺς ἐμπιπρῶμεν, ὥσπερ Ἀλέξανδρος ἐκέλευσεν ἐμπρησθῆναι τὰ Ἀσκλήπεια ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἐρωμένου. 18διὰ τοῦτο ἂν μὲν ἐν ταὐτῷ τις θῇ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ πατρίδα καὶ γονεῖς καὶ φίλους, σῴζεται ταῦτα πάντα· ἂν δʼ ἀλλαχοῦ μὲν τὸ συμφέρον, ἀλλαχοῦ δὲ τοὺς φίλους καὶ τὴν πατρίδα καὶ τοὺς συγγενεῖς καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ δίκαιον, οἴχεται πάντα ταῦτα καταβαρούμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ συμφέροντος. 19ὅπου γὰρ ἂν τὸ ἐγὼ καὶ τὸ ἐμόν, ἐκεῖ ἀνάγκη ῥέπειν τὸ ζῷον· εἰ ἐν σαρκί, ἐκεῖ τὸ κυριεῦον εἶναι· εἰ ἐν προαιρέσει, ἐκεῖ[νο] εἶναι· εἰ ἐν τοῖς ἐκτός, ἐκεῖ[νο]. 20εἰ τοίνυν ἐκεῖ εἰμι ἐγώ, ὅπου ἡ προαίρεσις, οὕτως μόνως καὶ φίλος ἔσομαι οἷος δεῖ καὶ υἱὸς καὶ πατήρ. τοῦτο γάρ μοι συνοίσει τηρεῖν τὸν πιστόν, τὸν αἰδήμονα, τὸν ἀνεκτικόν, τὸν ἀφεκτικὸν καὶ συνεργητικόν, φυλάσσειν τὰς σχέσεις. 21ἂν δʼ ἀλλαχοῦ μὲν ἐμαυτὸν θῶ, ἀλλαχοῦ δὲ τὸ καλόν, οὕτως ἰσχυρὸς γίνεται ὁ Ἐπικούρου λόγος, ἀποφαίνων ἢ μηδὲν εἶναι τὸ καλὸν ἢ εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἔνδοξον. 22διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἄγνοιαν καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι διεφέροντο καὶ Θηβαῖοι πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους καὶ μέγας βασιλεὺς πρὸς τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ Μακεδόνες πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους καὶ νῦν Ῥωμαῖοι πρὸς Γέτας καὶ ἔτι πρότερον τὰ ἐν Ἰλίῳ διὰ ταῦτα ἐγένετο. 23ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος τοῦ Μενελάου ξένος ἦν, καὶ εἴ τις αὐτοὺς εἶδεν φιλοφρονουμένους ἀλλήλους, ἠπίστησεν ἂν τῷ λέγοντι οὐκ εἶναι φίλους αὐτούς. ἀλλʼ ἐβλήθη εἰς τὸ μέσον μερίδιον, κομψὸν γυναικάριον, καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ πόλεμος. 24καὶ νῦν ὅταν ἴδῃς φίλους, ἀδελφοὺς ὁμονοεῖν δοκοῦντας, μὴ αὐτόθεν ἀποφήνῃ περὶ τῆς φιλίας τι αὐτῶν μηδʼ ἂν ὀμνύωσιν μηδʼ ἂν ἀδυνάτως ἔχειν λέγωσιν ἀπηλλάχθαι ἀλλήλων. 25οὐκ ἔστι πιστὸν τὸ τοῦ φαύλου ἡγεμονικόν· ἀβέβαιόν ἐστιν, ἄκριτον, ἄλλοθʼ ὑπʼ ἄλλης φαντασίας νικώμενον. 26ἀλλʼ ἐξέτασον μὴ ταῦθʼ ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι, εἰ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γονέων καὶ ὁμοῦ ἀνατεθραμμένοι καὶ ὑπὸ τῷ αὐτῷ παιδαγωγῷ, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο μόνον, ποῦ τὸ συμφέρον αὐτοῖς τίθενται, πότερον ἐκτὸς ἢ ἐν προαιρέσει. 27ἂν ἐκτός, μὴ εἴπῃς φίλους οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ πιστοὺς ἢ βεβαίους ἢ θαρραλέους ἢ ἐλευθέρους, ἀλλὰ μηδʼ ἀνθρώπους, εἰ νοῦν ἔχεις. 28οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπικὸν δόγμα ἐστὶ τὸ ποιοῦν δάκνειν ἀλλήλους καὶ λοιδορεῖσθαι καὶ τὰς ἐρημίας καταλαμβάνειν ἢ τὰς ἀγορὰς ὡς τὰ ὄρη καὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἀποδείκνυσθαι τὰ λῃστῶν· οὐδὲ τὸ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ μοιχοὺς καὶ φθορεῖς ἀπεργαζόμενον οὐδʼ ὅσʼ ἄλλα πλημμελοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι κατʼ ἀλλήλων διʼ ἓν καὶ μόνον τοῦτο δόγμα, τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀπροαιρέτοις τίθεσθαι αὑτοὺς καὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν. 29ἂν δʼ ἀκούσῃς, ὅτι ταῖς ἀληθείαις οὗτοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἐκεῖ μόνον οἴονται τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὅπου προαίρεσις, ὅπου χρῆσις ὀρθὴ φαντασιῶν, μηκέτι πολυπραγμονήσῃς μήτʼ εἰ υἱὸς καὶ πατήρ ἐστι μήτʼ εἰ ἀδελφοὶ μήτʼ εἰ πολὺν χρόνον συμπεφοιτηκότες καὶ ἑταῖροι, ἀλλὰ μόνον αὐτὸ τοῦτο γνοὺς θαρρῶν ἀποφαίνου, ὅτι φίλοι, ὥσπερ ὅτι πιστοί, ὅτι δίκαιοι. 30ποῦ γὰρ ἀλλαχοῦ φιλία ἢ ὅπου πίστις, ὅπου αἰδώς, ὅπου δόσις τοῦ καλοῦ, τῶν δʼ ἄλλων οὐδενός; 31ἀλλὰ τεθεράπευκέ με τοσούτῳ χρόνῳ· καὶ οὐκ ἐφίλει με; πόθεν οἶδας, ἀνδράποδον, εἰ οὕτως τεθεράπευκεν ὡς τὰ ὑποδήματα σπογγίζει τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, ὡς τὸ κτῆνος; πόθεν οἶδας, εἰ τὴν χρείαν σʼ ἀποβαλόντα τὴν τοῦ σκευαρίου ῥίψει ὡς κατεαγὸς πινάκιον; 32ἀλλὰ γυνή μου ἐστὶ καὶ τοσούτῳ χρόνῳ συμβεβιώκαμεν. πόσῳ δʼ ἡ Ἐριφύλη μετὰ τοῦ Ἀμφιαράου καὶ τέκνων μήτηρ καὶ πολλῶν; 33ἀλλʼ ὅρμος ἦλθεν εἰς τὸ μέσον. τί δʼ ἐστὶν ὅρμος; τὸ δόγμα τὸ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων. ἐκεῖνο ἦν τὸ θηριῶδες, ἐκεῖνο τὸ διακόπτον τὴν φιλίαν, τὸ οὐκ ἐῶν εἶναι γυναῖκα γαμετήν, [τὴν] μητέρα μητέρα. 34καὶ ὑμῶν ὅστις ἐσπούδακεν ἢ αὐτός τινι εἶναι φίλος ἢ ἄλλον κτήσασθαι φίλον, ταῦτα τὰ δόγματα ἐκκοπτέτω, ταῦτα μισησάτω, ταῦτα ἐξελασάτω ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἑαυτοῦ. 35καὶ οὕτως ἔσται πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ μὴ λοιδορούμενος, μὴ μαχόμενος, μὴ μετανοῶν, μὴ βασανίζων ἑαυτόν· 36ἔπειτα καὶ ἑτέρῳ, τῷ μὲν ὁμοίῳ παντὶ ἁπλῶς, τοῦ δʼ ἀνομοίου ἀνεκτικός, πρᾷος πρὸς αὐτόν, ἥμερος, συγγνωμονικὸς ὡς πρὸς ἀγνοοῦντα, ὡς πρὸς διαπίπτοντα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων· οὐδενὶ χαλεπός, ἅτʼ εἰδὼς ἀκριβῶς τὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, ὅτι πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἄκουσα στέρεται τῆς ἀληθείας. 37εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πράξετε πάντα ὅσα οἱ φίλοι καὶ συμπιεῖσθε καὶ συσκηνήσετε καὶ συμπλεύσετε καὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γεγενημένοι ἔσεσθε· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ὄφεις· φίλοι δʼ οὔτʼ ἐκεῖνοι οὔθʼ ὑμεῖς, μέχρις ἂν ἔχητε τὰ θηριώδη ταῦτα καὶ μιαρὰ δόγματα.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA