Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER V. · How Magnanimity may be consistent with Care.
1The Materials of Action are indifferent: but the Use of them is not indifferent. How, then, shall one preserve Intrepidity and Tranquillity; and at the same time be careful, and neither rash, nor indolent. By imitating those who play at Tables. The Dice are indifferent; the Pieces are indifferent. How do I know what will fall out? But it is my Business, to manage carefully and dextrously whatever doth fall out. Thus in Life too, this is the chief Business: distinguish, and separate Things; and say, "Externals are not in my Power; Choice is. Where shall I seek Good and Evil? Within; in what is my own." But in what belongs to others, call nothing Good, or Evil, or Profit, or Hurt, or any thing of that Sort. § 2. What then, are we to treat these, in a careless Way? By no means: for this, on the other hand, is an evil Exercise of the Faculty of Choice; and on that account, against Nature. But we are to act with Care, because the Use of the Materials [of Action] is not indifferent; and at the same time with Intrepidity and Tranquillity, because the Materials themselves are indifferent. For where a Thing is not indifferent, there no one can restrain or compell me. Where I am capable of being restrained, or compelled, the Acquisition doth not depend upon me; nor is either good or evil. The Use of it, indeed, is either good or evil; but that doth depend upon me. It is difficult, I own, to blend and unite [in one Character] the Carefulness of one who is affected by the Materials of Action, and the Intrepidity of one who disregards them; but it is not impossible: if it be, it is impossible to be happy. How do we act in a Voyage? What is in my Power? To chuse the Pilot, the Sailors, the Day, the Time of Day. Afterwards comes a Storm. What have I to care for? My Part is performed. The Subject belongs to another, to the Pilot. But the Ship is sinking: What then have I to do? That which alone I can do; I am drowned, without Fear, without Clamour, or accusing God; but as one who knows, that what is born, must likewise die. For I am not Eternity, but a Man; a Part of the Whole, as an Hour is of the Day. I must come like an Hour, and like an Hour must pass away. What signifies it whether by Drowning, or by a Fever? For, in some Way or other, pass I must. 3This you may see to be the Practice of those, who play skilfully at Ball. No one contends for the Ball [itself], as either a Good or an Evil; but how he may throw, and catch it again. Here lies the Address, here the Art, the Nimbleness, the Sagacity that I may not be able to catch it, even if I hold up my Lap for it; another may catch it, whenever I throw it. But if we catch or throw it, with Fear or Perturbation, what Kind of Play will this be? How shall we keep ourselves steady; or how see the Order of the Game? One will say, Throw: another, Do not throw: a Third, You have thrown once already. This is a mere Quarrel; not a Play. Therefore Socrates well understood playing at Ball. What do you mean? Using Pleasantry at his Trial. "Tell me, says he, Anytus, how can you say, that I do not believe a God? What do you think Demons are? Are they not either the Offspring of the Gods, or compounded of Gods and Men?"——"Yes."——Do you think, then, that one can believe there are Mules, and not believe, that there are Asses?" This was just as if he had been playing at Ball. And what was the Ball he had to play with? Life, Chains, Exile, a Draught of Poison, Separation from a Wife, and the Desertion of Orphan Children. These were what he had to play with; and yet, nevertheless, he did play, and threw the Ball with Address. Thus we should be careful how we play; but indifferent, as to the Ball itself. We are by all means to manage external Materials with Art; not taking them for ourselves; but showing our Art about them, whatever they may happen to be. Thus a Weaver doth not make the Wool: but employs his Art upon what is given him. It is another who gives you Food, and a Property: and may take them away, and your paultry Body too. Do you, however, work upon the Materials you have received; and then, if you come off unhurt, others, no doubt, who meet you, will congratulate you on your Escape. But he who hath a clearer Insight into such Things, if he sees [indeed] you have behaved in a becoming Manner, will praise and congratulate you: but, if you owe your Escape to any unbecoming Action, the contrary. For where there is a reasonable Cause of Rejoicing, there is likewise [a reasonable Cause] of Congratulation. 4How, then, are some external Things said to be according to Nature; others contrary to it? When we are considered as unconnected Individuals. I will allow it is natural for the Foot, [for Instance,] to be clean. But if you take it as a Foot, and not as an unconnected individual Thing, it will be fit that it should walk in the Dirt, and tread upon Thorns; and sometimes that it should even be cut off, for the Good of the Whole: otherwise it is no longer a Foot. We should reason in some such manner concerning ourselves. What are you? A Man. If then, indeed, you consider yourself, as an unconnected Individual, it is natural that you should live to old Age; be rich, and healthy: but if you consider yourself as a Man, and as a Part of the Whole, it will be fit, on the Account of that Whole, that you should at one time be sick; at another, take a Voyage, and be exposed to Danger: sometimes be in Want; and possibly it may happen, die before your Time. Why, then, are you displeased? Do not you know, that else, as the other is no longer a Foot, so you are no longer a Man? For what is a Man? A Part of a Commonwealth; principally of that which consists of Gods and Men; and next, of that to which you immediately belong, which is a Miniature of the universal City. 5What then, must I, at one Time, be called to a Trial; must another, at another Time, be scorched by a Fever; another be exposed to the Sea; another die; and another be condemned? Yes: for it is impossible, in such a Body, in such a World, and among such Companions, but that some or other of us must fall into such Circumstances. Your Business, when you come into them, is, to say what you ought, to order Things as you can. Then says one, "I decide that you have acted unjustly." Much Good may it do you; I have done my Part. You are to look to it, whether you have done yours: for there is some Danger of that too, let me tell you.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (3)
- The Translation follows Mr. Upton's Conjecture.
- Socrates professed himself to have a good Demon; and argues here jocularly from thence, that he must believe the Existence of a Deity as he who believes there are Mules, must believe there are Asses; because that Species enters into the Composition of the other. But there is a Play upon the Words in the Original, which cannot be preserved in the Translation. One cannot, I think, help regretting, that Plato should relate, and Epictetus approve, a Witticism unworthy of the Attic Genius; and an Instance of Levity, on so awful a Subject, unbecoming the Character of the wise and pious Socrates. It may, however, be some Excuse, that he thought neither his Accuser, nor his Judges deserved, or were likely to be influenced by, a more serious Answer.
- See p. 3. Note c.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
How nobleness of mind may be consistent with prudence.
The materials of action are variable, but the use we make of them should be constant.
How, then, shall one combine composure and tranquillity with energy; doing nothing rashly, nothing carelessly?
By imitating those who play at games. The dice are variable; the pieces are variable. How do I know what will fall out? But it is my business to manage carefully and dexterously, whatever happens. Thus in life too, this is the chief business, to consider and discriminate things, and say, Externals are not in my power; choice is. Where shall I seek good and evil? Within; in what is my own. But in what is controlled by others, count nothing good or evil, profitable or hurtful, or any such thing.
What, then; are we to treat these in a careless way?
By no means; for this, on the other hand, would be a perversion of the will, and so contrary to nature. But we are to act with care, because the use of our materials is not indifferent; and at the same time with calmness and tranquillity, because the materials themselves are uncertain. For where a thing is not uncertain, there no one can restrain or compel me. Where I am capable of being restrained or compelled, the acquisition does not depend upon me; nor is it either good or evil. The use of it, indeed, is either good or evil; but that does depend upon me. It is difficult, I own, to blend and unite tranquillity in accepting, and energy in using, the facts of life; but it is not impossible; if it be, it is impossible to be happy. How do we act in a voyage? What is in my power? To choose the pilot, the sailors, the day, the hour. Afterwards comes a storm. What have I to care for? My part is performed. This matter belongs to another, to the pilot. But the ship is sinking; what then have I to do? That which alone I can do; I submit to being drowned, without fear, without clamor, or accusing God; but as one who knows that what is born must likewise die. For I am not eternity, but a man,—a part of the whole, as an hour is of the day. I must come like an hour, and like an hour must pass away. What signifies it whether by drowning or by a fever? For, in some way or other, pass I must.
This you may see to be the practice of those who play skilfully at ball. No one strives for the ball itself, as either a good or an evil; but how he may throw and catch it again. Here lies the address, here the art, the nimbleness, the skill; lest I fail to catch it, even when I open my breast for it, while another catches it whenever I throw it. But if we catch or throw it in fear and trembling, what kind of play will this be? How shall we keep ourselves steady, or how see the order of the game? One will say, throw; another, do not throw; a third, you have thrown once already. This is a mere quarrel, not a play. Therefore Socrates well understood playing at ball.
What do you mean?
When he joked at his trial. Tell me, said he, Anytus, how can you say that I do not believe in a God? What do you think demons are? Are they not either the offspring of the gods, or compounded of gods and men? Yes. Do you think, then, that one can believe there are mules, and not believe that there are asses? This was just as if he had been playing at ball. And what was the ball he had to play with? Life, chains, exile, a draught of poison, separation from a wife, and leaving his children orphans. These were what he had to play with; and yet he did play, and threw the ball with address. Thus we should be careful as to the play, but indifferent as to the ball. We are by all means to manage our materials with art,—not taking them for the best, but showing our art about them, whatever they may happen to be. Thus a weaver does not make the wool, but employs his art upon what is given him. It is another who gives you food and property, and may take them away, and your paltry body too. Do you, however, work upon the materials you have received; and then, if you come off unhurt, others, no doubt, who meet you, will congratulate you on your escape. But he who has a clearer insight into such things will praise and congratulate you if he sees you to have done well; but if you owe your escape to any unbecoming action, he will do the contrary. For where there is a reasonable cause for rejoicing, there is cause likewise for congratulation.
How, then, are some external circumstances said to be according to nature; others contrary to it?
Only when we are viewed as isolated individuals. I will allow that it is natural for the foot (for instance) to be clean. But if you take it as a foot, and not as a mere isolated thing, it will be fit that it should walk in the dirt, and tread upon thorns; and sometimes that it should even be cut off, for the good of the whole; otherwise it is no longer a foot. We should reason in some such manner concerning ourselves. Who are you? A man. If then, indeed, you consider yourself isolatedly, it is natural that you should live to old age, should be prosperous and healthy; but if you consider yourself as a man, and as a part of the whole, it will be fit, in view of that whole, that you should at one time be sick; at another, take a voyage, and be exposed to danger; sometimes be in want; and possibly die before your time. Why, then, are you displeased? Do not you know that otherwise, just as the other ceases to be a foot, so you are no longer a man? For what is a man? A part of a commonwealth; first and chiefly of that which includes both gods and men; and next, of that to which you immediately belong, which is a miniature of the universal city.
What, then; must I, at one time, go before a tribunal; must another, at another time, be scorched by a fever; another be exposed to the sea; another die; another be condemned?
Yes; for it is impossible, in such a body, in such a world, and among such companions, but that some one or other of us must meet with such circumstances. Your business, then, is simply to say what you ought, to order things as the case requires. After this comes some one and says, pronounce that you have acted unjustly. Much good may it do you; I have done my part. You are to look to it, whether you have done yours; for you may as well understand that there is some danger in that quarter also.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
How magnanimity is consistent with care.
Things themselves (materials) are indifferent; but the use of them is not indifferent. How then shall a man preserve firmness and tranquillity, and at the same time be careful and neither rash nor negligent? If he imitates those who play at dice. The counters are indifferent; the dice are indifferent. How do I know what the cast will be? But to use carefully and dexterously the cast of the dice, this is my business. Thus then in life also the chief business is this: distinguish and separate things, and say, Externals are not in my power: will is in my power. Where shall I seek the good and the bad? Within, in the things which are my own. But in what does not belong to you call nothing either good or bad, or profit or damage or any thing of the kind.
What then? Should we use such things carelessly? In no way: for this on the other hand is bad for the faculty of the will, and consequently against nature; but we should act carefully because the use is not indifferent, and we should also act with firmness and freedom from perturbations because the material is indifferent. For where the material is not indifferent, there no man can hinder me nor compel me. Where I can be hindered and compelled, the obtaining of those things is not in my power, nor is it good or bad; but the use is either bad or good, and the use is in my power. But it is difficult to mingle and to bring together these two things, the carefulness of him who is affected by the matter (or things about him) and the firmness of him who has no regard for it; but it is not impossible: and if it is, happiness is impossible. But we should act as we do in the case of a voyage. What can I do? I can choose the master of the ship, the sailors, the day, the opportunity. Then comes a storm. What more have I to care for? for my part is done. The business belongs to another, the master.—But the ship is sinking—what then have I to do? I do the only thing that I can, not to be drowned fill of fear, nor screaming nor blaming God, but knowing that what has been produced must also perish: for I am not an immortal being, but a man, a part of the whole, as an hour is a part of the day; I must be present like the hour, and past like the hour. What difference then does it make to me, how I pass away, whether by being suffocated or by a fever, for I must pass through some such means?
This is just what you will see those doing who play at ball skilfully. No one cares about the ball as being good or bad, but about throwing and catching it. In this therefore is the skill, in this the art, the quickness, the judgment, so that even if I spread out my lap I may not be able to catch it, and another, if I throw, may catch the ball. But if with perturbation and fear we receive or throw the ball, what kind of play is it then, and wherein shall a man be steady, and how shall a man see the order in the game? But one will say, Throw; or Do not throw; and another will say, You have thrown once. This is quarrelling, not play.
Socrates then knew how to play at ball. How? By using pleasantry in the court where he was tried. Tell me, he says, Anytus, how do you say that I do not believe in God. The Daemons (δαίμονες), who are they, think you? Are they not sons of Gods, or compounded of gods and men? When Anytus admitted this, Socrates said, Who then, think you, can believe that there are mules (half asses), but not asses; and this he said as if he were playing at ball. And what was the ball in that case? Life, chains, banishment, a draught of poison, separation from wife and leaving children orphans. These were the things with which he was playing; but still he did play and threw the ball skilfully. So we should do: we must employ all the care of the players, but show the same indifference about the ball. For we ought by all means to apply our art to some external material, not as valuing the material, but, whatever it may be, showing our art in it. Thus too the weaver does not make wool, but exercises his art upon such as he receives. Another gives you food and property and is able to take them away and your poor body also. When then you have received the material, work on it. If then you come out (of the trial) without having suffered any thing, all who meet you will congratulate you on your escape; but he who knows how to look at such things, if he shall see that you have behaved properly in the matter, will commend you and be pleased with you; and if he shall find that you owe your escape to any want of proper behaviour, he will do the contrary. For where rejoicing is reasonable, there also is congratulation reasonable.
How then is it said that some external things are according to nature and others contrary to nature? It is said as it might be said if we were separated from union (or society). for to the foot I shall say that it is according to nature for it to be clean; but if you take it as a foot and as a thing not detached (independent), it will befit it both to step into the mud and tread on thorns, and sometimes to be cut off for the good of the whole body; otherwise it is no longer a foot. We should think in some such way about ourselves alsc. What are you? A man. If you consider yourself as detached from other men, it is according to nature to live to old age, to be rich, to be healthy. But if you consider yourself as a man and a part of a certain whole, it is for the sake of that whole that at one time you should be sick, at another time take a voyage and run into danger, and at another time be in want, and in some cases die prematurely. Why then are you troubled? Do you not know, that as a foot is no longer a foot if it is detached from the body, so you are no longer a man if you are separated from other men. For what is a man? A part of a state, of that first which consists of Gods and of men; then of that which is called next to it, which is a small image of the universal state. What then must I be brought to trial; must another have a fever, another sail on the sea, another die, and another be condemned? Yes, for it is impossible in such a body, in such a universe of things, among so many living together, that such things should not happen, some to one and others to others. It is your duty then since you are come here, to say what you ought, to arrange these things as it is fit. Then some one says, I shall charge you with doing me wrong. Much good may it do you: I have done my part; but whether you also have done yours, you must look to that; for there is some danger of this too, that it may escape your notice.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (7)
- The materials ( ὕλαι ) on which man works are neither good nor bad, and so they are, as Epictetus names them, indifferent. But the use of things, or of material, is not indifferent. They may be used well or ill, conformably to nature or not.
- Terence says (Adelphi, iv. 7)— Si illud, quod est maxime opus, jactu non cadit, Illud quod cecidit forte, id arte ut corrigas. Dexterously is arte, τεχνικῶς in Epictetus. —Upton.
- The word is ἁρπαστόν , which was also used by the Romans. One threw the ball and the other caught it. Chrysippus used this simile of a ball in speaking of giving and receiving (Seneca, De Beneficiis, ii. 17). Martial has the word (Epig. iv. 19) ’sive harpasta manu pulverulenta rapis’; and elsewhere.
- In Plato’s Apology c. 15, Socrates addresses Meletus; and he says, it would be equally absurd if a man should believe that there are foals of horses and asses, and should not believe that there are horses and asses. But Socrates says nothing of mules, for the word mules in sore? texts of the Apology is manifestly wrong
- Compare Antoninus, ii. 16, iii. 11, vi. 44, xii. 36; and Seneca, de Otio Sap. c. 31; and Cicero, De Fin. iii. 19.
- ἀπόλυτοι . Compare Antoninus, x. 24, viii. 34.
- He tells some imaginary person, who hears him, that since he is come into the world, he must do his duty in it.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1αἱ ὗλαι ἀδιάφοροι, ἡ δὲ χρῆσις αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀδιάφορος. 2πῶς οὖν τηρήσῃ τις ἅμα μὲν τὸ εὐσταθὲς καὶ ἀτάραχον, ἅμα δὲ τὸ ἐπιμελὲς καὶ μὴ εἰκαῖον μηδʼ ἐπισεσυρμένον; 3ἂν μιμῆται τοὺς κυβεύοντας. αἱ ψῆφοι ἀδιάφοροι, οἱ κύβοι ἀδιάφοροι· πόθεν οἶδα, τί μέλλει πίπτειν; τῷ πεσόντι δʼ ἐπιμελῶς καὶ τεχνικῶς χρῆσθαι, τοῦτο ἤδη ἐμὸν ἔργον ἐστίν. 4οὕτως τοίνυν τὸ μὲν προηγούμενον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ βίου ἔργον ἐκεῖνο· δίελε τὰ πράγματα καὶ διάστησον καὶ εἰπὲ τὰ ἔξω οὐκ ἐπʼ ἐμοί· προαίρεσις ἐπʼ ἐμοί. 5ποῦ ζητήσω τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν; ἔσω ἐν τοῖς ἐμοῖς. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις μηδέποτε μήτʼ ἀγαθὸν ὀνομάσῃς μήτε κακὸν μήτʼ ὠφέλειαν μήτε βλάβην μήτʼ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων. 6τί οὖν; ἀμελῶς τούτοις χρηστέον; οὐδαμῶς. τοῦτο γὰρ πάλιν τῇ προαιρέσει κακόν ἐστι καὶ ταύτῃ [τὴν] παρὰ φύσιν. 7ἀλλʼ ἅμα μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ὅτι ἡ χρῆσις οὐκ ἀδιάφορον, ἅμα δʼ εὐσταθῶς καὶ ἀταράχως, ὅτι ἡ ὕλη οὐ διαφέρουσα. 8ὅπου γὰρ τὸ διαφέρον, ἐκεῖ οὔτε κωλῦσαί μέ τις δύναται οὔτʼ ἀναγκάσαι. ὅπου κωλυτὸς καὶ ἀναγκαστός εἰμι, ἐκείνων ἡ μὲν τεῦξις οὐκ ἐπʼ ἐμοὶ οὐδʼ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ἡ χρῆσις δʼ ἢ κακὸν ἢ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλʼ ἐπʼ ἐμοί. 9δύσκολον δὲ μῖξαι καὶ συναγαγεῖν ταῦτα, ἐπιμέλειαν τοῦ προσπεπονθότος ταῖς ὕλαις καὶ εὐστάθειαν τοῦ ἀνεπιστρεπτοῦντος, πλὴν οὐκ ἀδύνατον. εἰ δὲ μή, ἀδύνατον τὸ εὐδαιμονῆσαι. 10ἀλλʼ οἷόν τι ἐπὶ τοῦ πλοῦ ποιοῦμεν. τί μοι δύναται; τὸ ἐκλέξασθαι τὸν κυβερνήτην, τοὺς ναύτας, τὴν ἡμέραν, τὸν καιρόν. 11εἶτα χειμὼν ἐμπέπτωκεν. τί οὖν ἔτι μοι μέλει; τὰ γὰρ ἐμὰ ἐκπεπλήρωται. ἄλλου ἐστὶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, τοῦ κυβερνήτου. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ναῦς καταδύεται. 12τί οὖν ἔχω ποιῆσαι; ὃ δύναμαι, τοῦτο μόνον ποιῶ· μὴ φοβούμενος ἀποπνίγομαι οὐδὲ κεκραγὼς οὐδʼ ἐγκαλῶν τῷ θεῷ, ἀλλʼ εἰδώς, ὅτι τὸ γενόμενον καὶ φθαρῆναι δεῖ. 13οὐ γάρ εἰμι αἰών, ἀλλʼ ἄνθρωπος, μέρος τῶν πάντων ὡς ὥρα ἡμέρας. ἐνστῆναί με δεῖ ὡς τὴν ὥραν καὶ παρελθεῖν ὡς ὥραν. 14τί οὖν μοι διαφέρει πῶς παρέλθω, πότερον πνιγεὶς ἢ πυρέξας; διὰ γὰρ τοιούτου τινὸς δεῖ παρελθεῖν με. 15τοῦτο ὄψει ποιοῦντας καὶ τοὺς σφαιρίζοντας ἐμπείρως. οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν διαφέρεται περὶ τοῦ ἁρπαστοῦ ὡς περὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ, περὶ δὲ τοῦ βάλλειν καὶ δέχεσθαι. 16λοιπὸν ἐν τούτῳ ἡ εὐρυθμία, ἐν τούτῳ ἡ τέχνη, τὸ τάχος, ἡ εὐγνωμοσύνη, ἵνʼ ἐγώ, μηδʼ ἂν τὸν κόλπον ἐκτείνω, δύναμαι λαβεῖν αὐτό, ὁ δέ, ἂν βάλω, λαμβάνει. 17ἂν δὲ μετὰ ταραχῆς καὶ φόβου δεχώμεθα ἢ βάλλωμεν αὐτό, ποία ἔτι παιδιά, ποῦ δέ τις εὐσταθήσει, ποῦ δέ τις τὸ ἑξῆς ὄψεται ἐν αὐτῇ; ἀλλʼ ὁ μὲν ἐρεῖ βάλε, ὁ δὲ μὴ βάλῃς, ὁ δὲ μὴ ἀνέβαλες. τοῦτο δὴ μάχη ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ παιδιά. 18τοιγαροῦν Σωκράτης ᾔδει σφαιρίζειν. πῶς; παίζειν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ. λέγε μοι, φησίν, Ἄνυτε, πῶς με φῂς θεὸν οὐ νομίζειν; οἱ δαίμονές σοι τίνες εἶναι δοκοῦσιν; οὐχὶ ἤτοι θεῶν παῖδές εἰσιν ἢ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν μεμιγμένοι τινές; 19ὁμολογήσαντος δὲ τίς οὖν σοι δοκεῖ δύνασθαι ἡμιόνους μὲν ἡγεῖσθαι εἶναι, ὄνους δὲ μή; ὡς ἁρπαστίῳ παίζων. καὶ τί ἐκεῖ ἐν μέσῳ ἁρπάστιον τότʼ ἦν; τὸ δεδέσθαι, τὸ φυγαδευθῆναι, τὸ πιεῖν φάρμακον, τὸ γυναικὸς ἀφαιρεθῆναι, τὸ τέκνα ὀρφανὰ καταλιπεῖν. 20ταῦτα ἦν ἐν μέσῳ οἷς ἔπαιζεν, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἔπαιζεν καὶ ἐσφαίριζεν εὐρύθμως. οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς τὴν μὲν ἐπιμέλειαν σφαιριστικωτάτην, τὴν δʼ ἀδιαφορίαν ὡς ὑπὲρ ἁρπαστίου. 21δεῖ γὰρ πάντως περί τινα τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑλῶν φιλοτεχνεῖν, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐκείνην ἀποδεχόμενον, ἀλλʼ οἵα ἂν ᾖ ἐκείνη, τὴν περὶ αὐτὴν φιλοτεχνίαν ἐπιδεικνύοντα. οὕτως καὶ ὁ ὑφάντης οὐκ ἔρια ποιεῖ, ἀλλʼ οἷα ἂν παραλάβῃ περὶ αὐτὰ φιλοτεχνεῖ. 22ἄλλος σοι δίδωσι τροφὰς καὶ κτῆσιν καὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα δύναται ἀφελέσθαι καὶ τὸ σωμάτιον αὐτό. σὺ λοιπὸν παραλαβὼν τὴν ὕλην ἐργάζου. εἶτα ἂν ἐξέλθῃς μηδὲν παθών, 23οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι ἀπαντῶντές σοι συγχαρήσονται ὅτι ἐσώθης, ὁ δʼ εἰδὼς βλέπειν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἂν μὲν ἴδῃ ὅτι εὐσχημόνως ἀνεστράφης ἐν τούτῳ, ἐπαινέσει καὶ συνησθήσεται· ἂν δὲ διʼ ἀσχημοσύνην τινὰ διασεσωσμένον, τὰ ἐναντία. ὅπου γὰρ τὸ χαίρειν εὐλόγως, ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ συγχαίρειν. 24πῶς οὖν λέγεται τῶν ἐκτός τινα κατὰ φύσιν καὶ παρὰ φύσιν; ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἀπόλυτοι ἦμεν. τῷ γὰρ ποδὶ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι ἐρῶ τὸ καθαρῷ εἶναι, ἀλλʼ, ἂν αὐτὸν ὡς πόδα λάβῃς καὶ ὡς μὴ ἀπόλυτον, καθήξει αὐτὸν καὶ εἰς πηλὸν ἐμβαίνειν καὶ ἀκάνθας πατῆσαι καὶ ἔστιν ὅτε ἀποκοπῆναι ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὅλου· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκέτι ἔσται πούς. τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐφʼ ἡμῶν ὑπολαβεῖν δεῖ. 25τί εἶ; ἄνθρωπος. εἰ μὲν ὡς ἀπόλυτον σκοπεῖς, κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ ζῆσαι μέχρι γήρως, πλουτεῖν, ὑγιαίνειν. εἰ δʼ ὡς ἄνθρωπον σκοπεῖς καὶ μέρος ὅλου τινός, διʼ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ὅλον νῦν μέν σοι νοσῆσαι καθήκει, νῦν δὲ πλεῦσαι καὶ κινδυνεῦσαι, νῦν δʼ ἀπορηθῆναι, πρὸ ὥρας δʼ ἔστιν ὅτʼ ἀποθανεῖν. 26τί οὖν ἀγανακτεῖς; οὐκ οἶδας ὅτι ὡς ἐκεῖνος οὐκέτι ἔσται πούς, οὕτως οὐδὲ σὺ ἄνθρωπος; τί γάρ ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος; μέρος πόλεως, πρώτης μὲν τῆς ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων, μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ τῆς ὡς ἔγγιστα λεγομένης, ἥ τί ἐστι μικρὸν τῆς ὅλης μίμημα. 27νῦν οὖν ἐμὲ κρίνεσθαι; νῦν οὖν ἄλλον πυρέσσειν, ἄλλον πλεῖν, ἄλλον ἀποθνῄσκειν, ἄλλον κατακεκρίσθαι; ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἐν τοιούτῳ σώματι, ἐν τούτῳ τῷ περιέχοντι, τούτοις τοῖς συζῶσιν μὴ συμπίπτειν ἄλλοις ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. 28σὸν οὖν ἔργον ἐλθόντα εἰπεῖν ἃ δεῖ, διαθέσθαι ταῦτα ὡς ἐπιβάλλει. 29εἶτα ἐκεῖνος λέγει κρίνω σε ἀδικεῖν. εὖ σοι γένοιτο. ἐποίησα ἐγὼ τὸ ἐμόν, εἰ δὲ καὶ σὺ τὸ σὸν ἐποίησας, ὄψει αὐτός. ἔστι γάρ τις κἀκείνου κίνδυνος, μή σε λανθανέτω.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA