Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER XXIV. · Concerning a Person whom be treated with Disregard.
1When a certain Person said to him; "I have often come to you, with a Desire of hearing you; and you have never given me any Answer; but now, if possible, I intreat you to say something to me:" Do you think, replied Epictetus, that, as in other Things, so in Speaking, there is an Art, by which he, who understands it, speaks skilfully, and he, who doth not, unskilfully? I do think so. He then, who, by speaking, both benefits himself, and is able to benefit others, must speak, skilfully; but he who rather hurts, and is hurt, must be unskilful in this Art of speaking. For you may find some Speakers hurt, and others benefited. And are all Hearers benefited by what they hear? Or will you find some benefited, and some hurt? Both. Then those who hear skilfully are benefited, and those who hear unskilfully, hurt. Granted. Is there an Art of Hearing, then, as well as of Speaking? It seems so. If you please, consider it thus too. To whom, do you think, the Practice of Music belongs? To a Musician. To whom the proper Formation of a Statue? To a Statuary. And do not you imagine some Art necessary, to view a Statue skilfully? I do. If, therefore, to speak properly belongs to one who is skilful, do not you see, that to hear with Benefit belongs likewise to one who is skilful? For the present, however, if you please, let us say no more of doing Things perfectly, and with Benefit, since we are both far enough, from any thing of that Kind: but this seems to be universally confessed, that he, who would hear Philosophers, needs some Kind of Exercise in Hearing. Is it not so? Tell me then, on what I shall speak to you? On what Subject are you able to hear me? On Good and Evil. The Good and Evil of what? Of a Horse? No. Of an Ox. No. What then, of a Man? Yes. Do we know, then, what Man is? What is his Nature; what our Idea of him is; and how far our Ears are open in respect to this Matter. Nay, do you understand what Nature is; or are you able, and in what Degree, to comprehend me, when I come to say; "But I must use Demonstration to you?" "How should you? Do you comprehend what Demonstration is; or, how a Thing is demonstrated; or by what Methods; or, what resembles a Demonstration, and yet is not a Demonstration? Do you know what True, or False is? What is consequent to a Thing, and what contradictory? Or unsuitable, or dissonant? But I must excite you to Philosophy. How shall I show you that Contradiction, among the Generality of Mankind, by which they differ, concerning Good and Evil, Profitable and Unprofitable, when you know not what Contradiction means? Show me then, what I shall gain, by discoursing with you? Excite an Inclination in me, as a proper Pasture excites an Inclination to eating, in a Sheep: for if you offer him a Stone, or a Piece of Bread, he will not be excited. Thus we too have certain natural Inclinations to speaking, when the Hearer appears to be somebody; when he gives us Encouragement: but if he sits by, like a Stone, or a Tuft of Grass, how can he excite any Desire in a Man? Doth a Vine say to an Husbandman, "Take care of me?" No: but invites him to take care of it, by showing him, that, if he doth, it will reward him for his Care. Who is there, whom engaging sprightly Children do not invite to play, and creep, and prattle, with them? But who was ever taken with an Inclination to divert himself, or bray, with an Ass? for, be the Creature ever so little, it is still a little Ass. 2Why do you say nothing to me, then? I have only this to say to you: That, whoever is ignorant what he is, and wherefore he was born, and in what kind of a World, and in what Society; what Things are good, and what evil; what fair, and what base: who understands neither Discourse, nor Demonstration; nor what is true, nor what is false; nor is able to disginguish between them: such a one will neither exert his Desires, nor Aversions, nor Pursuits, conformably to Nature: he will neither intend, nor assent, nor deny, nor suspend, his Judgment, conformably to Nature: but will wander up and down, intirely deaf and blind, supposing himself to be somebody; while he is in reality, nobody. Is there any thing new, in all this? Is not this Ignorance the Cause of all the Errors that have happened, from the very Original of Mankind? Why did Agamemnon and Achilles differ? Was it not for want of knowing what is advantageous, what disadvantageous? Doth not one of them say, It is advantageous to restore Chryseis to her Father; the other, That it is not? Doth not one say, That he ought to take away the Prize of the other; the other, that he ought not? Did they not, by these means, forget who they were, and for what Purpose they had come there? Why, what did you come for, Man: to gain a Mistress, or to fight?——"To fight."——With whom? With the Trojans, or Greeks?——"With the Trojans."——Leaving Hector, then, do you draw your Sword upon your own King? And do you, good Sir, forgetting the Duties of a King, Intrusted with a Nation, and its Cares, go to squabbling, about a Girl, with the bravest of your Allies; whom you ought, by every Method, to conciliate and preserve? And will you be inferior to a subtle Priest, who pays his Court, with the utmost Care, to you fine Gladiators?——You see the Effects, which Ignorance of what is advantageous, produces.——"But I am rich [you may say], as well as other People."——What, richer than Agamemnon?——"But I am handsome too."——What, handsomer than Achilles?——"But I have fine Hair too."——Had not Achilles finer and brighter? Yet he neither combed it nicely, nor curled it.——"But I am strong too."——Can you lift such a Stone then, as Hector, or Ajax?——"But I am of a noble Family too."——Is your Mother a Goddess, or your Father descended from Jupiter? And what Good did all this do Achilles, when he sat crying for a Girl?——"But I am an Orator."——And was not he? Do not you see how he treated the most eloquent of the Greeks, Phœnix and Ulysses? How he struck them dumb? This is all I have to say to you; and even this, against my Inclination. Why so? Because you have given me no Encouragement. For what can I see in you, to encourage me, as spirited Horses do their Riders? Your Person? That you disfigure. Your Dress? That is effeminate. Your Behaviour? Your Look? Absolutely nothing. When you would hear a Philosopher, do not say to him, "You tell me nothing;" but only show yourself worthy, or fit, to hear; and you will find, how you will move him to speak.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (4)
- 2 Cor. ii. 16.
- See John viii. 43.
- Κατα ποσον, περι του, should be κατα ποσον περι τουτου. here is no Need of altering τα ωτα τετρημενα. Opening the ear, is a Phrase of Scripture. Job xxxiii. 16. xxxvi. 10. Is. xlii. 20. Mark vii. 34, 35. And even digging open the Ear. Ps. xl. 6. in the Hebrew.
- Δοκων μεν τις ειναι, ων δ' ουδεις, is very near to δοκει ειναι τι, μηδεν ων, Gal. vi. 3. There is a similar Expression of Plato, at the End of the Apology of Socrates.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Concerning a person whom he treated with disregard.
When a certain person said to him, I have often come to you with a desire of hearing you, and you have never given me any answer; but now, if possible, I entreat you to say something to me,—Do you think, replied Epictetus, that as in other things, so in speaking, there is an art by which he who understands it speaks skilfully, and he who does not unskilfully?
I do think so.
He, then, who by speaking both benefits himself, and is able to benefit others, must speak skilfully; but he who injures and is injured, must be unskilful in this art. For you may find some speakers injured, and others benefited. And are all hearers benefited by what they hear? Or will you find some benefited, and some hurt?
Both.
Then those who hear skilfully are benefited, and those who hear unskilfully, hurt.
Granted.
Is there any art of hearing, then, as well as of speaking?
It seems so.
If you please, consider it thus. To whom think you that the practice of music belongs?
To a musician.
To whom the proper formation of a statue?
To a sculptor.
And do you not imagine some art necessary even to view a statue skilfully?
I do.
If, therefore, to speak properly belongs to one who is skilful, do you not see that to hear profitably belongs likewise to one who is skilful? For the present, however, if you please, let us say no more of doing things perfectly and profitably, since we are both far enough from anything of that kind; but this seems to be universally confessed, that he who would hear philosophers needs some kind of exercise in hearing. Is it not so? Tell me, then, on what I shall speak to you. On what subject are you able to hear me?
On good and evil.
The good and evil of what,—of a horse?
No.
Of an ox?
No.
What, then; of a man?
Yes.
Do we know, then, what man is; what is his nature, what our idea of him, and how far our ears are open in this respect to him? Nay, do you understand what Nature is; or are you able in any degree to comprehend me when I come to say, But I must use demonstration to you? How should you? Do you comprehend what demonstration is, or how a thing is demonstrated, or by what methods; or what resembles a demonstration, and yet is not a demonstration? Do you know what true or false is; what is consequent upon anything, and what contradictory; suitable, or dissonant? But I must excite you to study philosophy. How shall I show you that contradiction among the generality of mankind, by which they differ concerning good and evil, profitable and unprofitable, when you know not what contradiction means? Show me, then, what I shall gain by discoursing with you? Excite an inclination in me, as a proper pasture excites an inclination to eating, in a sheep; for if you offer him a stone or a piece of bread, he will not be excited. Thus we too have certain natural inclinations to speaking, when the hearer appears to be somebody, when he gives us encouragement; but if he sits by like a stone or a tuft of grass, how can he excite any desire in a man? Does a vine say to an husbandman, Take care of me? No; but invites him to take care of it, by showing him that, if he does, it will reward him for his care. Who is there, whom bright and agreeable children do not attract to play, and creep, and prattle with them? But who was ever taken with an inclination to divert himself or bray with an ass; for be the creature ever so little, it is still a little ass.
Why then do you say nothing to me?
I have only this to say to you; that whoever is utterly ignorant what he is and wherefore he was born, and in what kind of a universe and in what society; what things are good and what evil, what fair and what base; who understands neither discourse nor demonstration, nor what is true nor what is false, nor is able to distinguish between them; such a one will neither exert his desires, nor aversions, nor pursuits conformably to Nature; he will neither aim, nor assent, nor deny, nor suspend his judgment conformably to Nature; but will wander up and down, entirely deaf and blind, supposing himself to be somebody, while he is nobody. Is there anything new in all this? Is not this ignorance the cause of all the errors that have happened, from the very origin of mankind? Why did Agamemnon and Achilles differ? Was it not for want of knowing what is advantageous, what disadvantageous? Does not one of them say it is advantageous to restore Chryseis to her father; the other, that it is not? Does not one say that he ought to take away the prize of the other; the other, that he ought not? Did they not by these means forget who they were, and for what purpose they had come there? Why, what did you come for, man,—to win mistresses, or to fight? To fight. With whom,—Trojans or Greeks? With the Trojans. Leaving Hector, then, do you draw your sword upon your own king? And do you, good sir, forgetting the duties of a king,— Intrusted with a nation and its cares,
go to squabbling about a girl with the bravest of your allies, whom you ought by every method to conciliate and preserve? And will you be inferior to a subtle priest who pays his court anxiously to you fine gladiators? You see the effects produced by ignorance of what is truly advantageous.
But I am rich, as well as other people. What, richer than Agamemnon? But I am handsome too. What, handsomer than Achilles? But I have fine hair too. Had not Achilles finer and brighter? Yet he never combed it exquisitely, nor curled it. But I am strong too. Can you lift such a stone, then, as Hector or Ajax? But I am of a noble family too. Is your mother a goddess, or your father descended from Zeus? And what good did all this do Achilles, when he sat crying for a girl? But I am an orator. And was not he? Do you not see how he treated the most eloquent of the Greeks,—Odysseus and Phoenix,—how he struck them dumb? This is all I have to say to you; and even this against my inclination.
Why so? Because you have not excited me to it. For what can I see in you to excite me, as spirited horses their riders? Your person? That you disfigure. Your dress? That is effeminate. Your behavior. Your look? Absolutely nothing. When you would hear a philosopher, do not say to him, You tell me nothing; but only show yourself fit and worthy to hear; and you will find how you will move him to speak.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Higginson’s notes (1)
- Quotation source: Homer, Iliad, 2.25.
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
To (or against) a person who was one of those who were not valued (esteemed) by him.
A CERTAIN person said to him (Epictetus): Frequently I desired to hear you and came to you, and you never gave me any answer: and now, if it is possible, I intreat you to say something to me. Do you think, said Epictetus, that as there is an art in any thing else, so there is also an art in speaking, and that he who has the art, will speak skilfully, and he who has not, will speak unskilfully?— I do think so.—He then who by speaking receives benefit himself, and is able to benefit others, will speak skilfully: but he who is rather damaged by speaking and does damage to others, will he be unskilled in this art of speaking? And you may find that some are damaged and others benefited by speaking. And are all who hear benefited by what they hear? Or will you find that among them also some are benefited and some damaged?—There are both among these also, he said.—In this case also then those who hear skilfully are benefited, and those who hear unskilfully are damaged? He admitted this. Is there then a skill in hearing also, as there is in speaking?— It seems so.—If you choose, consider the matter in this way also. The practice of music, to whom does it belong? To a musician. And the proper making of a statue, to whom do you think that it belongs? To a statuary. And the looking at a statue skilfully, does this appear to you to require the aid of no art?—This also requires the aid of art.—Then if speaking properly is the business of the skilful man, do you see that to hear also with benefit is the business of the skilful man.? Now as to speaking and hearing perfectly, and usefully, let us for the present, if you please, say no more, for both of us are a long way from every thing of the kind. But I think that every man will allow this, that he who is going to hear philosophers requires some amount of practice in hearing. Is it not so?
Tell me then about what I should talk to you: about what matter are you able to listen?—About good and evil. —Good and evil in what? In a horse? No. Well, in an ox? No. What then? In a man? Yes. Do we know then what a man is, what the notion is which we have of him, or have we our ears in any degree practised about this matter? But do you understand what nature is? or can you even in any degree understand me when I say, I shall use demonstration to you? How? Do you understand his very thing, what demonstration is, or how any thing i, demonstrated, or by what means; or what things are like demonstration, but are not demonstration? Do you know what is true or what is false? What is consequent on a thing, what is repugnant to a thing, or not consistent, or inconsistent? But must I excite you to philosophy, and how? Shall I show to you the repugnance in the opinions of most men, through which they differ about things good and evil, and about things which are profitable and unprofitable, when you know not this very thing, what repugnance (contradiction) is? Show me then what I shall accomplish by discoursing with you: excite my inclination to do this. As the grass which is suitable, when it is presented to a sheep, moves its inclination to eat, but if you present to it a stone or bread, it will not be moved to eat; so there are in us certain natural inclinations also to speak, when the hearer shall appear to be somebody, when he himself shall excite us: but when he shall sit by us like a stone or like grass, how can he excite a man’s desire (to speak)? Does the vine say to the husbandman, Take care of me? No, but the vine by showing in itself that it will be profitable to the husbandman, if he does take care of it, invites him to exercise care. When children are attractive and lively, whom do they not invite to play with them, and crawl with them, and lisp with them? But who is eager to play with an ass or to bray with it? for though it is small, it is still a little ass.
Why then do you say nothing to me? I can only say this to you, that he who knows not who he is, and for what purpose he exists, and what is this world, and with whom he is associated, and what things are the good and the bad, and the beautiful and the ugly, and who neither understands discourse nor demonstration, nor what is true nor what is false, and who is not able to distinguish them, will neither desire according to nature nor turn away nor move towards, nor intend (to act), nor assent, nor dissent nor suspend his judgment: to say all in a few words, he will go about dumb and blind, thinking that he is somebody, but being nobody. Is this so now for the first time? Is it not the fact that ever since the human race existed, all errors and misfortunes have arisen through this ignorance? Why did Agamemnon and Achilles quarrel with one another? Was it not through not knowing what things are profitable and not profitable? Does not the one say it is profitable to restore Chryseis to her father, and does not the other say that it is not profitable? does not the one say that he ought to take the prize of another, and does not the other say that he ought not? Did they not for these reasons forget, both who they were and for what purpose they had come there? Oh, man, for what purpose did you come? to gain mistresses or to fight? To fight. With whom? the Trojans or the Hellenes? With the Trojans. Do you then leave Hector alone and draw your sword against your own king? And do you, most excellent Sir, neglect the duties of the king, you who are the people’s guardian and have such cares; and are you quarrelling about a little girl with the most warlike of your allies, whom you ought by every means to take care of and protect? and do you become worse than (inferior to) a well behaved priest who treats you these fine gladiators with all respect? Do you see what kind of things ignorance of what is profitable does?
But I also am rich. Are you then richer than Agamemnon? But I am also handsome. Are you then more handsome than Achilles? But I have also beautiful hair. But had not Achilles more beautiful hair and gold coloured? and he did not comb it elegantly nor dress it. But I am also strong. Can you then lift so great a stone as Hector or Ajax? But I am also of noble birth. Are you the son of a goddess mother? are you the son of a father sprung from Zeus? What good then do these things do to him, when he sits and weeps for a girl? But I am an orator. And was he not? Do you not see how he handled the most skilful of the Hellenes in oratory, Odysseus and Phoenix? how he stopped their mouths?
This is all that I have to say to you; and I say even this not willingly. Why? Because you have not roused me. For what must I look to in order to be roused, as men who are expert in riding are roused by generous horses? Must I look to your body? You treat it disgracefully. To your dress? That is luxurious. To your behaviour, to your look? That is the same as nothing. When you would listen to a philosopher, do not say to him, You tell me nothing; but only show yourself worthy of hearing or fit for hearing; and you will see how you will move the speaker.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (3)
- That is, let us not now consider whether I am perfect in the art of speaking, and you have a mind well prepared to derive real advantage from philosophical talk. Let us consider this only, whether your ears are sufficiently prepared for listening, whether you can understand a philosophical discussion. Schweig.
- See Schweig.’s note.
- In the ninth book of the Iliad, where Achilles answers the messengers sent to him by Agamemnon. The reply of Achilles is a wonderful example of eloquence.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1εἰπόντος αὐτῷ τινος ὅτι Πολλάκις ἐπιθυμῶν σου ἀκοῦσαι ἦλθον πρὸς σὲ καὶ οὐδέποτέ μοι ἀπεκρίνω· 2καὶ νῦν, εἰ δυνατόν, παρακαλῶ σε εἰπεῖν τί μοι, Δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, καθάπερ ἄλλου τινὸς εἶναι τέχνη οὕτως δὲ καὶ τοῦ λέγειν, ἣν ὁ μὲν ἔχων ἐμπείρως ἐρεῖ, ὁ δὲ μὴ ἔχων ἀπείρως; 3— δοκεῖ. — οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν διὰ τοῦ λέγειν αὐτός τε ὠφελούμενος καὶ ἄλλους οἷός τε ὢν ὠφελεῖν οὗτος ἐμπείρως ἂν λέγοι, ὁ δὲ βλαπτόμενος μᾶλλον καὶ βλάπτων οὗτος ἄπειρος ἂν εἴη τῆς τέχνης ταύτης τῆς τοῦ λέγειν; εὕροις ἂν τοὺς μὲν βλαπτομένους τοὺς δʼ ὠφελουμένους. 4οἱ δʼ ἀκούοντες πάντες ὠφελοῦνται ἀφʼ ὧν ἀκούουσιν ἢ καὶ τούτων εὕροις ἂν τοὺς μὲν ὠφελουμένους τοὺς δὲ βλαπτομένους; — καὶ τούτων, ἔφη. — οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὅσοι μὲν ἐμπείρως ἀκούουσιν ὠφελοῦνται, ὅσοι δʼ ἀπείρως βλάπτονται; 5— ὡμολόγει. — ἔστιν ἄρα τις ἐμπειρία καθάπερ τοῦ λέγειν οὕτως καὶ τοῦ ἀκούειν; — ἔοικεν. 6— εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ οὕτως σκέψαι αὐτό. τὸ μουσικῶς ἅψασθαι τίνος σοι δοκεῖ; — μουσικοῦ. — τί δέ; 7τὸν ἀνδριάντα ὡς δεῖ κατασκευάσαι τίνος σοι φαίνεται; — ἀνδριαντοποιοῦ. — τὸ ἰδεῖν ἐμπείρως οὐδεμιᾶς σοι προσδεῖσθαι φαίνεται τέχνης; — προσδεῖται καὶ τοῦτο. 8— οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ τοῦ ἐμπείρου ἐστίν, ὁρᾷς ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν ὠφελίμως τοῦ ἐμπείρου ἐστίν; 9καὶ τὸ μὲν τελείως καὶ ὠφελίμως, εἰ βούλει, πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀφῶμεν, ἐπεὶ καὶ μακράν ἐσμεν ἀμφότεροι παντὸς τοῦ τοιούτου· 10ἐκεῖνο δὲ πᾶς ἄν τις ὁμολογῆσαί μοι δοκεῖ, ὅτι ποσῆς γέ τινος τριβῆς περὶ τὸ ἀκούειν προσδεῖται ὁ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἀκουσόμενος. ἢ γὰρ οὔ; 11περὶ τίνος οὖν λέγω πρὸς σέ; δεῖξόν μοι. περὶ τίνος ἀκοῦσαι δύνασαι; περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν; τίνος; ἆρά γε ἵππου; — οὔ. — ἀλλὰ βοός; — οὔ. — τί οὖν; 12ἀνθρώπου; — ναί. — οἴδαμεν οὖν, τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, τίς ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ, τίς ἡ ἔννοια; ἔχομεν καὶ κατὰ ποσὸν περὶ τοῦτο τὰ ὦτα τετρημένα; ἀλλὰ φύσις τί ἐστιν ἐννοεῖς ἢ δύνασαι καὶ κατὰ ποσὸν ἀκολουθῆσαί μοι λέγοντι; 13ἀλλʼ ἀποδείξει χρήσομαι πρὸς σέ; πῶς; παρακολουθεῖς γὰρ αὐτῷ τούτῳ, τί ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις ἢ πῶς τι ἀποδείκνυται ἢ διὰ τίνων; ἢ τίνα ὅμοια μὲν ἀποδείξει ἐστίν, ἀπόδειξις δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν; 14τί γάρ ἐστιν ἀληθὲς οἶδας ἢ τί ἐστι ψεῦδος; τί τίνι ἀκολουθεῖ, τί τίνι μάχεται ἢ ἀνομολογούμενόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀσύμφωνον; 15ἀλλὰ κινῶ σε πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν; πῶς παραδεικνύω σοι τὴν μάχην τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καθʼ ἣν διαφέρονται περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ συμφερόντων καὶ ἀσυμφόρων, αὐτὸ τοῦτο τί ἐστι μάχη οὐκ εἰδότι; δεῖξον οὖν μοι, τί περανῶ διαλεγόμενός σοι. κίνησόν μοι προθυμίαν. 16ὡς ἡ κατάλληλος πόα τῷ προβάτῳ φανεῖσα προθυμίαν αὐτῷ κινεῖ πρὸς τὸ φαγεῖν, ἂν δὲ λίθον ἢ ἄρτον παραθῇς, οὐ κινηθήσεται, οὕτως εἰσί τινες ἡμῖν φυσικαὶ προθυμίαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ λέγειν, ὅταν ὁ ἀκουσόμενος φανῇ τις, ὅταν αὐτὸς ἐρεθίσῃ. ἂν δʼ ὡς λίθος ἢ χόρτος ᾖ παρακείμενος, πῶς δύναται ἀνθρώπῳ ὄρεξιν κινῆσαι; 17ἡ ἄμπελος μή τι λέγει τῷ γεωργῷ ἐπιμελοῦ μου; ἀλλʼ αὐτὴ διʼ αὑτῆς ἐμφαίνουσα, ὅτι ἐπιμεληθέντι λυσιτελήσει αὐτῷ, ἐκκαλεῖται πρὸς τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν. 18τὰ παιδία τὰ πιθανὰ καὶ δριμέα τίνα οὐκ ἐκκαλεῖται πρὸς τὸ συμπαίζειν αὐτοῖς καὶ συνέρπειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμψελλίζειν; ὄνῳ δὲ τίς προθυμεῖται συμπαίζειν ἢ συνογκᾶσθαι; καὶ γὰρ εἰ μικρόν, ὅμως ὀνάριόν ἐστιν. 19τί οὖν μοι οὐδὲν λέγεις;— ἐκεῖνο μόνον ἔχω σοι εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ὁ ἀγνοῶν, τίς ἐστι καὶ ἐπὶ τί γέγονεν καὶ ἐν τίνι τούτῳ τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ μετὰ τίνων κοινωνῶν καὶ τίνα τὰ ἀγαθά ἐστι καὶ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά, καὶ μήτε λόγῳ παρακολουθῶν μήτʼ ἀποδείξει, μήτε τί ἐστιν ἀληθὲς ἢ τί ψεῦδος, μήτε διακρῖναι ταῦτα δυνάμενος οὔτʼ ὀρέξεται κατὰ φύσιν οὔτʼ ἐκκλινεῖ οὔθʼ ὁρμήσει οὔτʼ ἐπιβαλεῖται, οὐ συγκαταθήσεται, οὐκ ἀνανεύσει, οὐκ ἐφέξει, τὸ σύνολον. κωφ[λ]ὸς καὶ τυφλὸς περιελεύσεται δοκῶν μέν τις εἶναι, ὢν δʼ οὐδείς. 20νῦν γὰρ πρῶτον τοῦθʼ οὕτως ἔχει; οὐχὶ ἐξ οὗ γένος ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν, ἐξ ἐκείνου πάντα τὰ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ ἀτυχήματα παρὰ ταύτην τὴν ἄγνοιαν γεγένηται; 21Ἀγαμέμνων καὶ Ἀχιλλεὺς διὰ τί ἀλλήλοις διεφέροντο; οὐχὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι, τίνα ἐστὶ συμφέροντα καὶ ἀσύμφορα; οὐχὶ ὁ μὲν λέγει, ὅτι συμφέρει ἀποδοῦναι τῷ πατρὶ τὴν Χρυσηίδα, ὁ δὲ λέγει, ὅτι οὐ συμφέρει; οὐχὶ ὁ μὲν λέγει, ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὸν λαβεῖν τὸ ἄλλου γέρας, ὁ δέ, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ; οὐχὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἐπελάθοντο καὶ τίνες ἦσαν καὶ ἐπὶ τί ἐληλύθεσαν; 22ἔα, ἄνθρωπε, ἐπὶ τί ἐλήλυθας; ἐρωμένας κτησόμενος ἢ πολεμήσων; πολεμήσων. τίσι; τοῖς Τρωσὶν ἢ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν; τοῖς Τρωσίν. ἀφεὶς οὖν τὸν Ἕκτορα ἐπὶ τὸν βασιλέα τὸν σαυτοῦ σπᾷς τὸ ξίφος; 23σὺ δʼ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀφεὶς τὰ τοῦ βασιλέως ἔργα, ᾧ λαοί τʼ ἐπιτετράφαται καὶ τόσσα μέμηλεν, περὶ κορασιδίου διαπυκτεύεις τῷ πολεμικωτάτῳ τῶν συμμάχων, ὃν δεῖ παντὶ τρόπῳ περιέπειν καὶ φυλάττειν; καὶ χείρων γίνῃ κομψοῦ ἀρχιερέως, ὃς τοὺς καλοὺς μονομάχους διὰ πάσης ἐπιμελείας ἔχει; ὁρᾷς, οἷα ποιεῖ ἄγνοια περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων; 24ἀλλὰ κἀγὼ πλούσιός εἰμι. μή τι οὖν τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος πλουσιώτερος; ἀλλὰ καὶ καλός εἰμι. μή τι οὖν τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως καλλίων; ἀλλὰ καὶ κόμιον κομψὸν ἔχω. ὁ δʼ Ἀχιλλεὺς οὐ κάλλιον καὶ ξανθόν; καὶ οὐκ ἐκτένιζεν αὐτὸ κομψῶς οὐδʼ ἔπλασσεν. 25ἀλλὰ καὶ ἰσχυρός εἰμι. μή τι οὖν δύνασαι λίθον ἆραι ἡλίκον ὁ Ἕκτωρ ἢ ὁ Αἴας; ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐγενής. μή τι ἐκ θεᾶς μητρός, μή τι πατρὸς ἐγγόνου Διός; τί οὖν ἐκεῖνον ὠφελεῖ ταῦτα, ὅταν καθήμενος κλαίῃ διὰ τὸ κορασίδιον; ἀλλὰ ῥήτωρ εἰμί. 26ἐκεῖνος δʼ οὐκ ἦν; οὐ βλέπεις πῶς κέχρηται τοῖς δεινοτάτοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων περὶ λόγους Ὀδυσσεῖ καὶ Φοίνικι, πῶς αὐτοὺς ἀστόμους πεποίηκε; 27ταῦτά σοι μόνα ἔχω εἰπεῖν καὶ οὐδὲ ταῦτα προθύμως. — διὰ τί; — ὅτι με οὐκ ἠρέθισας.uncertain about the break here but it is clearly after διὰ τί; somewhere 28εἰς τί γὰρ ἀπιδὼν ἐρεθισθῶ ὡς οἱ ἱππικοὶ περὶ τοὺς ἵππους τοὺς εὐφυεῖς; εἰς τὸ σωμάτιον; αἰσχρῶς αὐτὸ πλάσσεις. εἰς τὴν ἐσθῆτα; καὶ ταύτην τρυφερὰν ἔχεις. εἰς σχῆμα, εἰς βλέμμα; 29εἰς οὐδέν. ὅταν ἀκοῦσαι θέλῃς φιλοσόφου, μὴ λέγε αὐτῷ ὅτι οὐδέν μοι λέγεις, ἀλλὰ μόνον δείκνυε σαυτὸν τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ ὄψει, πῶς κινήσεις τὸν λέγοντα.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA