Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER XII. · Of Disputation.
1What Things are to be learn'd, in order to the right Use of Reason, the Philosophers of our Sect have accurately taught: but we are altogether unpracticed in the due Application of them. Only give any of us, that you please, some illiterate Person, for an Antagonist, and he will not find out, how to treat him. But when he hath a little moved the Man, if he happens to answer beside the Purpose, he knows not how to deal with him any further; but either reviles, or laughs at him; and says, "He is an illiterate Fellow: there is no making any thing of him." Yet a Guide, when he perceives his Charge going out of the Way, doth not revile, and ridicule, and then leave him; but leads him into the right Path. Do you also show your Antagonist the Truth, and you will see, that he will follow. But till you do show it, do not ridicule him; but rather be sensible of your own Incapacity. 2How then, did Socrates use to act? He obliged his Antagonist himself to bear Testimony to him; and wanted no other Witness. Hence he might well say, "I give up all the rest; and am always satisfied with the Testimony of my Opponent: and I call in no one to vote, but my Antagonist alone." For he rendered the Arguments drawn from natural Notions so clear, that every one saw, and avoided the Contradiction.——"Doth an envious Man rejoice?"——"By no means. He rather grieves." (This he moved him to say, by proposing the contrary.)——"Well: and do you think Envy to be a Grief, for Misery?"——And who ever envied Misery?——"(Therefore he makes the other say, that Envy is a Grief, for Happiness.)——Doth any one envy those who are nothing to him?"——"No, surely." Having thus drawn [from his Opponent] a full and distinct Idea, he then left that Point; and doth not say, "Define to me what Envy is:" and after he had defined it; "You have defined it wrong; for the Definition doth not reciprocate to the Thing defined." Technical Terms, and therefore grievous, and scarcely to be made intelligible to the illiterate, which yet We, it seems, cannot part with. But we have no Capacity at all to move them, by such Arguments, as might induce them, in following the Track of the Appearances in their own Minds, to allow, or disprove, any Point And, from a Consciousness of this Incapacity, those among us, who have any Modesty, give the Matter intirely up: but the greater Part, rashly entering upon these Debates, mutually confound, and are confounded; and, at last, reviling, and reviled, walk off. Whereas it was the principal and most peculiar Characteristic of Socrates, never to be provoked, in a Dispute; nor to throw out any reviling or injurious Expression: but to bear patiently with those who reviled him; and to put an End to the Controversy. If you would know, how great Abilities he had in this particular, read Xenophon's Banquet, and you will see, how many Controversies he ended. Hence, even among the Poets, that Person is justly mentioned with the highest Commendation, Whose lenient Art attentive Crowds await,
To fill the furious Clamours of Debate.
Hesiod. But what then? This is no very safe Affair now, and especially at Rome. For he who doth it, must not do it in a Corner; but go to some rich Consular Senator, for Instance, and question him. "Pray, Sir, can you tell me to whom you intrust your Horses?"——"Yes, certainly."——"Is it then, to any one indifferently, though he be ignorant of Horsemanship?"——"By no means."——"To whom do you intrust your Gold, or your Silver, or your Clothes?"——"Not to any one indifferently."——"And did you ever consider, to whom you committed the Care of your Body?"——"Yes, surely."——"To one skilled in Exercise, or Medicine, I suppose."——"Without doubt."——"Are these Things your chief Good; or are you possess'd of some thing better than all of them?"——"What do you mean?"——"Something which makes use of these; and proves, and deliberates about each of them?"——"What then, do you mean the Soul?"——"You have guess'd right; for indeed I do mean that."——"I do really think it a much better Possession than all the rest."——"Can you show us, then, in what manner you have taken care of this Soul? For it is not probable, that a Person of your Wisdom, and approved Character in the State, should carelesly suffer the most excellent Thing that belongs to you, to be neglected, and lost."——"no certainly."——"But do you take care of it yourself? And is it by the Instructions of another, or by your own Discovery [how it ought to be done?]"——Here, now, comes the Danger, that he may first say, Pray, good Sir, what Business is that of yours? What are you to me? Then, if you persist to trouble him, he may lift up his Hand, and give you a Box on the Ear. I myself was once a great Admirer of this Method of Instruction, till I fell into such kind of Adventures.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Of disputation.
What things are to be learned, in order to the right use of reason; the philosophers of our sect have accurately taught; but we are altogether unpractised in the due application of them. Only give to any one of us whom you will some illiterate person for an antagonist, and he will not find out how to treat him. But when he has a little moved the man, if he happens to answer at cross purposes, the questioner knows not how to deal with him any further, but either reviles or laughs at him, and says: He is an illiterate fellow; there is no making anything of him. Yet a guide, when he perceives his charge going out of the way, does not revile and ridicule and then leave him, but leads him into the right path. Do you also show your antagonist the truth, and you will see that he will follow. But till you show it, do not ridicule him; but rather be sensible of your own incapacity.
How, then, did Socrates use to act? He obliged his antagonist himself to bear testimony to him; and wanted no other witness. Hence he might well say, I give up all the rest, and am always satisfied with the testimony of my opponent; and I call in no one to vote, but my antagonist alone. For he rendered the arguments drawn from natural impressions so clear, that every one saw and avoided the contradiction. Does an envious man rejoice? By no means; he rather grieves. (This he moves him to say by proposing the contrary.) Well, and do you think envy to be a grief caused by evils? And who ever envied evils? (Therefore he makes the other say, that envy is a grief caused by things good.) Does any one envy those things which are nothing to him? No, surely. Having thus fully drawn out his idea, he then leaves that point, not saying, Define to me what envy is; and after he has defined it, You have defined it wrong; for the definition does not correspond to the thing defined.
There are phrases repulsive and obscure to the illiterate, which yet we cannot dispense with. But we have no capacity at all to move them, by such arguments as might lead them, in following the methods of their own minds, to admit or abandon any position. And from a consciousness of this incapacity, those among us who have any modesty give the matter entirely up; but the greater part, rashly entering upon these debates, mutually confound and are confounded, and at last, reviling and reviled, walk off. Whereas it was the principal and most peculiar characteristic of Socrates, never to be provoked in a dispute, nor to throw out any reviling or injurious expression; but to bear patiently with those who reviled him, and thus put an end to the controversy. If you would know how great abilities he had in this particular, read Xenophon’s Banquet, and you will see how many controversies he ended. Hence, even among the poets, this is justly mentioned with the highest commendation,— Wisely at once the greatest strife to still.
But what then? This is no very safe affair now, and especially at Rome. For he who does it must not do it in a corer, but go to some rich consular senator, for instance, and question him. Pray, sir. can you tell me to whom you intrust your horses? Yes, certainly. Is it then to any one indifferently, though he be ignorant of horsemanship? By no means. To whom do you intrust your gold or your silver or your clothes? Not to any one indifferently; And did you ever consider to whom you committed the care of your body? Yes, surely. To one skilled in exercise or medicine, I suppose? Without doubt. Are these things your chief good, or are you possessed of something better than all of them? What do you mean? Something which makes use of these, and deliberates and counsels about each of them. What, then; do you mean the soul? You have guessed rightly; for indeed I do mean that. I do really think it a much better possession than all the rest. Can you show us, then, in what manner you have taken care of this soul? For it is not probable that a person of your wisdom and approved character in the state would carelessly suffer the most excellent thing that belongs to you to be neglected and lost. No, certainly. But do you take care of it yourself; and is it done by the instructions of another, or by your own ability?—Here, now, comes the danger that he may first say, Pray, good sir, what business is that of yours? What are you to me? Then if you persist in troubling him, he may lift up his hand and give you a box on the ear. I myself was once a great admirer of this method of instruction, till I fell into this kind of adventures.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Higginson’s notes (2)
- Plato, Gorgias, 69 , and elsewhere.—H.
- Quotation source: Hesiod, Theogony, 87.—H.
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
Of disputation or discussion.
What things a man must learn in order to be able to apply the art of disputation, has been accurately shown by our philosophers (the Stoics); but with respect to the proper use of the things, we are entirely without practice. Only give to any of us, whom you please, an illiterate man to discuss with, and he can not discover how to deal with the man. But when he has moved the man a little, if he answers beside the purpose, he does not know how to treat him, but he then either abuses or ridicules him, and says, He is an illiterate man; it is not possible to do any thing with him. Now a guide, when he has found a man out of the road leads him into the right way: he does not ridieule or abuse him and then leave him. Do you also show the illiterate man the truth, and you will see that he fellows. But so long as you do not show him the truth, do not ridicule him, but rather feel your own incapacity.
How then did Socrates act? He used to compel his adversary in disputation to bear testimony to him, and he wanted no other witness. Therefore he could say, I care not for other witnesses, but I am always satisfied with the evidence (testimony) of my adversary, and I do not ask the opinion of others, but only the opinion of him who is disputing with me. For he used to make the conclusions drawn from natural notions so plain that every man saw the contradiction (if it existed) and withdrew from it (thus): Does the envious man rejoice? By no means, but he is rather pained. Well, Do you think that envy is pain over evils? and what envy is there of evils? Therefore he made his adversary say that envy is pain over good things. Well then, would any man envy those who are nothing to him? By no means. Thus having completed the notion and distinctly fixed it he would go away without saying to his adversary, Define to me envy; and if the adversary had defined envy, he did not say, You have defined it badly, for the terms of the definition do not correspond to the thing defined—These are technical terms, and for this reason disagreeable and hardly intelligible to illiterate men, which terms we (philosophers) cannot lay aside. But that the illiterate man himself, who follows the appearances presented to him, should be able to concede any thing or reject it, we can never by the use of these terms move him to do. Accordingly being conscious of our own inability, we do not attempt the thing; at least such of us as have any caution do not. But the greater part and the rash, when they enter into such disputations, confuse themselves and confuse others; and finally abusing their adversaries and abused by them, they walk away. Now this was the first and chief peculiarity of Socrates, never to be irritated in argument, never to utter any thing abusive, any thing insulting, but to bear with abusive persons and to put an end to the quarrel. If you would know what great power he had in this way, read the Symposium of Xenophon, and you will see how many quarrels he put an end to. Hence with good reason in the poets also this power is most highly praised, Quickly with skill he settles great disputes. Well then; the matter is not now very safe, and particularly at Rome; for he who attempts to do it, must not do it in a corner, you may be sure, but must go to a man of consular rank, if it so happen, or to a rich man, and ask him, Can you tell me, Sir, to whose care you have entrusted your horses? I can tell you. Have you entrusted them to any person indifferently and to one who has no experience of horses?—By no means.—Well then; can you tell me to whom you entrust your gold or silver things or your vestments? I don’t entrust even these to any one indifferently. Well; your own body, have you already considered about entrusting the care of it to any person?—Certainly.—To a man of experience, I suppose, and one acquainted with the aliptic, or with the healing art?—Without doubt.—Are these the best things that you have, or do you also possess something else which is better than all these?—What kind of a thing do you mean?— That I mean which makes use of these things, and tests each of them, and deliberates.—Is it the soul that you mean?—You think right, for it is the soul that I mean.— In truth I do think that the soul is a much better thing than all the others which I possess.—Can you then show us in what way you have taken care of the soul? for it is not likely that you, who are so wise a man and have a reputation in the city, inconsiderately and carelessly allow the most valuable thing that you possess to be neglected and to perish.—Certainly not.—But have you taken care of the soul yourself; and have you learned from another to do this, or have you discovered the means yourself?— Here comes the danger that in the first place he may say, What is this to you, my good man, who are you? Next, if you persist in troubling him, there is danger that he may raise his hands and give you blows. I was once myself also an admirer of this mode of instruction until I fell into these dangers.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (9)
- This is what is said in the Gorgias of Plato, p. 472, 474 .
- The word is ἔννοιαι , which Cicero explains to be the name as προλήψεις . Acad. Pr. ii. 10.
- Socrates’ notion of envy is stated by Xenophon ( Mem. iii. 9, 8 ), to be this: it is the pain or vexation which men have at the prosperity of their friends, and that such are the only envious persons. Bishop Butler gives a better definition; at least a more complete description of the thing. Emulation is merely the desire and hope of equality with or superiority over others, with whom we may compare ourselves. There does not appear to be any other grief in the natural passion, but only that want which is implied in desire. However this may be so strong as to be the occasion of great grief. To desire the attainment of this equality or superiority, by the particular means of others being brought down to our level, or below it, is, I think, the distinct notion of envy. From whence it is easy to see, that the real end which the natural passion, emulation, and which the unlawful one, envy, aims at is the same; namely, that equality or superiority: and consequently that to do mischief is not the end of envy, but merely the means it makes use of to attain its end. —Sermons upon Human Nature, I.
- I have omitted the words ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἐκίνησε τὸν πλησιον I see no sense in them; and the text is plain without them.
- I am not sure that I have understood rightly it ἐξ ὧν δὲ αὐτός at the beginning of this sentence.
- The Symposium or Banquet of Xenophon is extant. Compare Epietetus, iii. 16, 5, and iv. o. 5, the beginning.
- Quotation source: Hesiod, Theogony, v. 87.
- The aliptic art is the art of anointing and rubbing, one of the best means of maintaining a body in health. The iatric or healing art is the art of restoring to health a diseased body. The aliptic art is also equivalent to the gymnastic art, or the art of preparing for gymnastic exercises, which are also a means of preserving the body’s health, when the exercises are good and moderate.
- Epictetus in speaking of himself and of his experience at Rome .
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1ἃ μὲν δεῖ μαθόντα εἰδέναι χρῆσθαι λόγῳ, ἠκρίβωται ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων. περὶ δὲ τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῶν τὴν προσήκουσαν τελέως ἀγύμναστοί ἐσμεν. 2δὸς γοῦν ᾧ θέλεις ἡμῶν ἰδιώτην τινὰ τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον· καὶ οὐχ εὑρίσκει χρήσασθαι αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ μικρὰ κινήσας τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἂν παρὰ σκέλος ἀπαντᾷ ἐκεῖνος, οὐκέτι δύναται μεταχειρίσασθαι, ἀλλʼ ἢ λοιδορεῖ λοιπὸν ἢ καταγελᾷ καὶ λέγει ἰδιώτης ἐστίν· οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ χρήσασθαι. 3ὁ δʼ ὁδηγός, ὅταν λάβῃ τινὰ πλανώμενον, ἤγαγεν ἐπὶ τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν δέουσαν, οὐχὶ καταγελάσας ἢ λοιδορησάμενος ἀπῆλθεν. 4καὶ σὺ δεῖξον αὐτῷ τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ ὄψει ὅτι ἀκολουθεῖ. μέχρι δʼ ἂν οὗ μὴ δεικνύῃς, μὴ ἐκείνου καταγέλα, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον αἰσθάνου τῆς ἀδυναμίας τῆς αὑτοῦ. 5πῶς οὖν ἐποίει Σωκράτης; αὐτὸν ἠνάγκαζεν τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον αὐτῷ μαρτυρεῖν, ἄλλου δʼ οὐδενὸς ἐδεῖτο μάρτυρος. τοιγαροῦν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ λέγειν ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐῶ χαίρειν, ἀεὶ δὲ τῷ ἀντιλέγοντι ἀρκοῦμαι μάρτυρι· καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους οὐκ ἐπιψηφίζω, τὸν δὲ προσδιαλεγόμενον μόνον. 6οὕτω γὰρ ἐναργῆ ἐτίθει τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐννοιῶν, ὥστε πάνθʼ ὁντιναοῦν συναισθανόμενον τῆς μάχης ἀναχωρεῖν ἀπʼ αὐτῆς. 7ἆρά γε ὁ φθονῶν χαίρει; — οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λυπεῖται. ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἐκίνησε τὸν πλησίον. τί δʼ; ἐπὶ κακοῖς δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι λύπη ὁ φθόνος; καὶ τί ὁ φθόνος ἐστὶ κακῶν; 8οὐκοῦν ἐκεῖνον ἐποίησεν εἰπεῖν ὅτι λύπη ἐστὶν ἐπʼ ἀγαθοῖς ὁ φθόνος. τί δέ; φθονοίη ἄν τις τοῖς οὐδὲν πρὸς αὐτόν; 9— οὐδαμῶς. καὶ οὕτως ἐκπεπληρωκὼς τὴν ἔννοιαν καὶ διηρθρωκὼς ἀπηλλάσσετο, οὐ λέγων ὅτι ὅρισαί μοι τὸν φθόνον, εἶτα ὁρισαμένου κακῶς ὡρίσω· οὐ γὰρ ἀντακολουθεῖ τῷ κεφαλαιώδει τὸ ὁρικόν· 10ῥήματα τεχνικὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῖς ἰδιώταις φορτικὰ καὶ δυσπαρακολούθητα, ὧν ἡμεῖς ἀποστῆναι οὐ δυνάμεθα. 11ἐξ ὧν δʼ αὐτὸς ὁ ἰδιώτης ἐπακολουθῶν ταῖς αὑτοῦ φαντασίαις παραχωρῆσαι δύναιτʼ ἄν τι ἢ ἀθετῆσαι, οὐδαμῶς διὰ τούτων αὐτὸν κινῆσαι δυνάμεθα. 12καὶ λοιπὸν εἰκότως συναισθανόμενοι ταύτης ἡμῶν τῆς ἀδυναμίας ἀπεχόμεθα τοῦ πράγματος, ὅσοις γʼ ἐστί τι εὐλαβείας. 13οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ εἰκαῖοι συγκαθέντες εἴς τι τοιοῦτον φύρονται καὶ φύρουσι καὶ τὰ τελευταῖα λοιδορήσαντες καὶ λοιδορηθέντες ἀπέρχονται. 14τὸ πρῶτον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ μάλιστα ἴδιον Σωκράτους μηδέποτε παροξυνθῆναι ἐν λόγῳ, μηδέποτε λοίδορον προενέγκασθαι μηδέν, μηδέποθʼ ὑβριστικόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν λοιδορούντων ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ παύειν μάχην. 15εἰ θέλετε γνῶναι, πόσην ἐν τούτῳ δύναμιν εἶχεν, ἀνάγνωτε τὸ Ξενοφῶντος Συμπόσιον καὶ ὄψεσθε πόσας μάχας διαλέλυκεν. 16διὰ τοῦτο εἰκότως καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ποιηταῖς ἐν μεγίστῳ ἐπαίνῳ λέλεκται τὸ αἶψά τε καὶ μέγα νεῖκος ἐπισταμένως κατέπαυσεν. 17τί οὖν; οὐ λίαν ἐστὶ νῦν ἀσφαλὲς τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ μάλιστα ἐν Ῥώμῃ. τὸν γὰρ ποιοῦντα αὐτὸ οὐκ ἐν γωνίᾳ δηλονότι δεήσει ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ προσελθόντα ὑπατικῷ τινι, ἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, πλουσίῳ πυθέσθαι αὐτοῦ 18ἔχεις μοι εἰπεῖν, ὦ οὗτος, ᾧ τινι τοὺς ἵππους τοὺς σεαυτοῦ παρέδωκας; ἔγωγε. ἆρα τῷ τυχόντι καὶ ἀπείρῳ ἱππικῆς; οὐδαμῶς. τί δʼ; ᾧ τινι τὸ χρυσίον ἢ τὸ ἀργύριον ἢ τὴν ἐσθῆτα; οὐδὲ ταῦτα τῷ τυχόντι. 19τὸ σῶμα δὲ τὸ σαυτοῦ ἤδη τινὶ ἔσκεψαι ἐπιτρέψαι εἰς ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτοῦ; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ἐμπείρῳ δηλονότι καὶ τούτῳ ἀλειπτικῆς ἢ ἰατρικῆς; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 20πότερον ταῦτά σοι τὰ κράτιστά ἐστιν ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι ἐκτήσω πάντων ἄμεινον; ποῖον καὶ λέγεις; τὸ αὐτοῖς νὴ Δία τούτοις χρώμενον καὶ δοκιμάζον ἕκαστον καὶ βουλευόμενον. 21ἆρά γε τὴν ψυχὴν λέγεις; ὀρθῶς ὑπέλαβες· ταύτην γάρ τοι καὶ λέγω. πολὺ νὴ Δία τῶν ἄλλων τοῦτο ἄμεινον δοκῶ μοι κεκτῆσθαι. 22ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν, ὅτῳ τρόπῳ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμεμέλησαι; οὐ γὰρ εἰκῇ χὠς ἔτυχεν εἰκός σε οὕτως σοφὸν ὄντα καὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει δόκιμον τὸ κράτιστον τῶν σεαυτοῦ περιορᾶν ἀμελούμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον. 23οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλʼ αὐτὸς ἐπιμεμέλησαι αὐτοῦ; πότερον μαθὼν παρά του ἢ εὑρὼν αὐτός; ὧδε λοιπὸν ὁ κίνδυνος, μὴ πρῶτον μὲν εἴπῃ 24τί δέ σοι μέλει, βέλτιστε; κύριός μου εἶ; εἶτʼ ἂν ἐπιμείνῃς πράγματα παρέχων, διαράμενος κονδύλους σοι δῷ. 25τούτου τοῦ πράγματος ἤμην ποτὲ ζηλωτὴς καὶ αὐτός, πρὶν εἰς ταῦτα ἐμπεσεῖν.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA