Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
THE · DISCOURSES · OF · EPICTETUS. · BOOK II. · CHAPTER I. · That Courage is not inconsistent with Caution.
1hat is asserted by the Philosophers may, perhaps, appear a Paradox to some: let us, however, examine, as well as we can, whether this be true; That it is possible in all Things, to act at once with Caution and Courage. For Caution seems, in some measure, contrary to Courage: and Contraries are by no means consistent. The Appearance of a Paradox to many, in the present Case, seems to me to arise from something like this: If, indeed, we assert, that Courage and Caution are to be used, in the same Instances, we should justly be accused of uniting Contradictions: but, in the Way that we affirm it, where is the Absurdity? For, if what hath been so often said, and so often demonstrated, be certain, that the Essence of Good and Evil consists in the Use of the Appearances; and that Things independent on Choice, are not of the Nature either of Good or Evil; what Paradox do the Philosophers assert, if they say: "Where Things are not dependent on Choice, be courageous: where they are, be cautious?" For in these only, if Evil consists in a bad Choice, is Caution to be used. And if Things independent on Choice, and not in our Power, are nothing to us, in these we are to make use of Courage. Thus we shall be at once cautious and courageous: and, indeed, courageous on the Account of this very Caution; for by using Caution with regard to things really evil, we shall gain Courage, with regard to what are not so. 2But we are in the same Condition as [hunted] Deer: when these, in a Fright, fly from the Feathers, where do they turn, and to what do they retire for Safety? To the Toils And thus they are undone, by inverting the Objects of Fear and Confidence. Thus we, too, In what Instances do we make use of Fear? In Things independent on Choice. In what, on the other hand, do we behave with Courage, as if there were nothing to be dreaded? In Things dependent on Choice. To be deceived then, or to act rashly or impudently, or to indulge an ignominious Desire, is of no Importance to us, if we do but take a good Aim, in Things independent on Choice. But where Death, or Exile, or Pain, or Ignominy, are concerned, there is the Retreat, there, the Flutter and Fright. Hence, as it must be with those who err in Matters of the greatest Importance, what is naturally Courage, we render bold, desperate, rash, and impudent: and what is naturally Caution, timid and base, and full of Fears and Perturbations. For if a Person was to transfer Caution to Choice, and the Actions of Choice, by a Willingness to be cautious, he will, at the same time, have it in his Power to avoid [what he guards against:] but if he transfers it to Things not in our Power, or Choice, by fixing his Aversion on what is not in our own Power, but dependent on others, he will necessarily fear; he will be hurried; will be disturbed. For it is not Death, or Pain, that is to be feared; but the Fear of Pain, or Death. Hence we commend him who says: Death is no Ill, but shamefully to die. Courage, then, ought to be opposed to Death, and Caution to the Fear of Death: whereas we, on the contrary, oppose to Death, Flight; and to our Principle concerning it, Carelessness, and Desperateness, and Indifference. 3Socrates used, very properly, to call these Things Vizards: for, as Masks appear shocking and formidable to Children, from their Inexperience; we are affected in like manner, with regard to Things, for no other Reason, than as Children are, with regard to Vizards. For what is a Child? Ignorance. What is a Child? Want of Learning: for, so far as the Knowledge of Children extends, they are not inferior to us. What is Death? A Vizard. Turn it, and be convinced. See, it doth not bite. This little body and Spirit must be separated (as they formerly were) either now, or hereafter: why, then, are you displeased if it be now? For if not now, it will be hereafter. Why? To complete the Revolution of the World: for that hath need of some Things present, others to come, and others already completed. What is Pain? A Vizard. Turn it, and be convinced. This paultry Flesh is sometimes affected by harsh, sometimes by smooth Impressions. If suffering be not worth your while, the Door is open; if it be, bear it: for it was fit the Door should be open, against all Accidents. And thus we have no Trouble. 4What, then, is the Fruit of these Principles? What it ought to be; the most noble, and the most becoming the Truly Educated, Tranquillity, Security, Freedom. For in this Case, we are not to give Credit to the Many, who say, that none ought to be educated but the Free; but rather to the Philosophers, who say, that the Well-educated alone are free. How so? Thus: Is Freedom any thing else, than the Power of Living as we like? Nothing else. Well tell me then, do you like to live in Error? We do not. No one, sure, that lives in Error, is Free. Do you like to live in Fear? Do you like to live in Sorrow? Do you like to live in Perturbation? By no means. No one, therefore, in a State of Fear, or Sorrow, or Perturbation, is free: but whoever is delivered from Sorrow, Fear, and Perturbation, by the same means is delivered likewise from Slavery. How shall we believe you, then, good Legislators, when you say; "We allow none to be educated but the Free?" For the Philosophers say; "We allow none to be free, but the Liberally-educated:" that is, God doth not allow it. What, then, when any Person hath turned his Slave about before the Consul, hath he done nothing? Yes, he hath. What? He hath turned his Slave about, before the Consul. Nothing more? Yes. He pays a Fine for him. Well then: is not the Man, who hath gone through this Ceremony, rendered free? No more than [he is rendered] exempt from Perturbation. Pray, have you, who are able to give this Freedom to others, no Master of your own? Are not you a Slave to Money? To a Girl? To a Boy? To a Tyrant? To some Friend of a Tyrant? Else, why do you tremble when any of these is in question? Therefore, I so often repeat to you, Let this be your Study; have this always at hand; in what it is necessary to be courageous, and in what cautious: courageous, in what doth not depend on Choice; cautious, in what doth. 5But have not I read my Papers to you? Do not you know what I am doing? In what? In my Essays. Show me in what State you are, as to Desire and Aversion. Whether you do not fail of what you wish, and incur what you would avoid but, as to these common-place Essays, if you are wise, you will take them, and obliterate them. Why, did not Socrates write? Yes: who so much? But how? As he had not always one at hand, to argue against his Principles, or be argued against in his Turn, he argued with, and examined, himself; and always treated, at least, some one natural Notion, in a manner fitted for the Use of Life. These are the Things which a Philosopher writes: but for such common-place Essays as those I am speaking of, he leaves to the Insensible, or to the happy Creatures whom Idleness furnishes with Leisure; or to such as are too weak to regard Consequences. And will you, when you are gone from hence, which the Time now calls for, be fond of showing, and reading, and be ridiculously conceited, of these Things? Pray see, how I compose Dialogues. Talk not of that, Man; but rather be able to say; See, how I avoid being disappointed of my Desire: see, how I secure myself against incurring my Aversion. Set Death before me; set Pain, set a Prison, set Ignominy, set Condemnation before me; and you will know me. This is the [proper] Ostentation of a young Man come out from the Schools. Leave the rest to others. Let no one ever hear you utter a Word about them: nor suffer it, if any one commends you for them: but think that you are nobody, and that you know nothing. Appear to know only this, how you may never be disappointed of your Desire; never incur your Aversion. Let others study Causes, Problems, and Syllogisms. Do you study Death, Chains, Torture, Exile: and all these, with Courage, and Reliance upon Him, who hath called you to them, and judged you worthy a Post, in which you may show, what the rational governing Faculty can do, when set in Array, against Powers independent on the Choice. And thus, this Paradox becomes neither impossible, nor a Paradox, that we must be at once cautious and courageous: courageous, in what doth not depend upon Choice; and cautious, in what doth.
Carter’s notes (10)
- This was a Kind of Scare-crow, formed of different coloured Feathers, by which the Animal was terrified, and so driven into the Net: which was the ancient Manner of Hunting.
- Παιδεια, in Greek, means nearly the same Thing, as what we now call liberal Education. It was that Sort of Education peculiar to Gentlemen; that is, such as were free; and of which the Slaves, or lower Sort of People, were forbid to partake, according to the Systems of some Legislators. Such (as well as I can remember) was the Case among the Lacedemonians, and amongst the ancient Persians, till the Time of Cyrus.It must be observed, that the Words Educated, Free, King, and many others, were taken by the Stoics from common Life; and by them applied solely to the Character of their wise, and perfect Man.The Translator is obliged for this Note, as well as for many other valuable Hints, to Mr. Harris; so well known for many Works of Literature and Genius.
- And ye shall know the Truth, and the Truth shall make you free. John viii. 32. This is one, among many other Passages to the same Purpose, in that perfect Law of Liberty, the New Testament.
- When a Slave was to be presented with his Freedom, he was brought before the Consul; and his Master, taking him by the Hand, pronounced a certain Form of Words, and then turned the Slave about, who was thus rendered free. The Fine which the Master was to pay on this Occasion, was applied to the public Use. Upton.
- This seems to be spoken by one of the Scholars.
- No other ancient Author mentions Socrates, as having written any Thing, except a Hymn to Apollo, and a Translation of some Fables of Æsop into Verse. Many Authors of Credit affirm, that he wrote nothing. Therefore Wolfius doubts, whether some other Name should not be put here, instead of Socrates. Yet the Description most properly belongs to him. And, perhaps, Epictetus doth not mean to intimate here, that Socrates had published any thing: but that he wrote, when he had no Opportunity of discoursing, for his own Improvement. But still, living constantly at Athens, the Seat of philosophical Disputation, he cannot be supposed, often to have had that Reason for Writing.
- The Original here seems corrupt, or inaccurate. I hope the Translation is not far from the true Sense.
- The Greek is Αταραξία, Tranquillity: but it seems to be false Reading for Απραξία. Αταραξία is the very Thing which Epictetus had been recommending through the whole Chapter, and which makes the Subject of the next; and, therefore, cannot be well supposed to be the true Reading in a Place, where it is mentioned with Contempt.
- For επελθων, perhaps, the Reading should be απελθων and it is so translated. The Person to whom Epictetus speaks, was a young Man just leaving the philosophical School.
- Some English Readers, too happy to comprehend how Chains, Torture, Exile, and sudden Executions, can be ranked among the common Accidents of Life, may be surprized to find Epictetus so frequently endeavouring to prepare his Hearers for them. But it must be recollected, that he addressed himself to Persons, who lived under the Roman Emperors; from whose Tyranny, the very best of Men were perpetually liable to such Kind of Dangers.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
That courage is not inconsistent with caution.
There is an assertion of the philosophers which may perhaps appear a paradox to many; yet let us fairly examine whether it be true,—that it is possible, in all things, to act at once with caution and courage. For caution seems, in some measure, contrary to courage; and contraries are by no means consistent. The appearance of a paradox in the present case seems to me to arise as follows. If indeed we assert that courage and caution are to be used in the same instances, we might justly be accused of uniting contradictions; but in the way that we affirm it, where is the absurdity? For if what has been so often said, and so often demonstrated, be certain, that the essence of good and evil consists in the use of things as they appear, and that things inevitable are not to be classed either as good or evil, what paradox do the philosophers assert, if they say, Where events are inevitable, meet them with courage, but otherwise with caution? For in these last cases only, if evil lies in a perverted will, is caution to be used; and if things inevitable and uncontrollable are nothing to us, in these we are to make use of courage. Thus we shall be at once cautious and courageous, and, indeed, courageous on account of this very caution; for by using caution with regard to things really evil, we shall gain courage with regard to what are not so.
But we are in the same condition with deer; when these in a fright fly from the plumes [which hunters wave], whither do they turn, and to what do they retire for safety? To the nets. And thus they are undone, by inverting the objects of fear and confidence. Thus we, too. When do we yield to fear? About things inevitable. When, on the other hand, do we behave with courage, as if there were nothing to be dreaded? About things that might be controlled by will. To be deceived, then, or to act rashly or imprudently, or to indulge a scandalous desire, we treat as of no importance, in our effort to bring about things which we cannot, after all, control. But where death, or exile, or pain, or ignominy, is concerned, then comes the retreat, the flutter, and the fright. Hence, as it must be with those who err in matters of the greatest importance, we turn what should be courage into rashness, desperation, recklessness, effrontery; and what should be caution becomes timid, base, and full of fears and perturbations. Let one apply his spirit of caution to things within the reach of his own will, then he will have the subject of avoidance within his own control; but if he transfers it to that which is inevitable, trying to shun that which he cannot control and others can, then he must needs fear, be harassed, and be disturbed. For it is not death or pain that is to be dreaded, but the fear of pain or death. Hence we commend him who says: Death is no ill, but shamefully to die.
Courage, then, ought to be opposed to death, and caution to the fear of death; whereas we, on the contrary, oppose to death, flight; and to these our false convictions concerning it, recklessness, and desperation, and assumed indifference.
Socrates used, very properly, to call these things masks; for as masks appear shocking and formidable to children from their inexperience, so we are thus affected with regard to things for no other reason. For what constitutes a child? Ignorance. What constitutes a child? Want of instruction; for they are our equals, so far as their degree of knowledge permits. What is death? A mask. Turn it on the other side and be convinced. See, it doth not bite. This little body and spirit must be again, as once, separated, either now or hereafter; why, then, are you displeased if it be now? For if not now it will be hereafter. Why? To fulfil the course of the universe; for that hath need of some things present, others to come, and others already completed.
What is pain? A mask. Turn it and be convinced.
This weak flesh is sometimes affected by harsh, sometimes by smooth impressions. If suffering be beyond endurance, the door is open; till then, bear it. It is fit that the final door should be open against all accidents, since thus we escape all trouble.
What, then, is the fruit of these principles? What it ought to be; the most noble, and the most suitable to the wise,—tranquillity, security, freedom. For in this case we are not to give credit to the many, who say that none ought to be educated but the free; but rather to the philosophers, who say that the wise alone are free.
How so?
Thus: is freedom anything else than the power of living as we like?
Nothing else. Well; tell me then, do you like to live in error? We do not. No one who lives in error is free.
Do you like to live in fear? Do you like to live in sorrow? Do you like to live in perturbation?
By no means.
No one, therefore, in a state of fear, or sorrow, or perturbation, is free; but whoever is delivered from sorrow, fear, and perturbation, by the same means is delivered likewise from slavery. How shall we believe you, then, good legislators, when you say, We allow none to be educated but the free? For the philosophers say, We allow none to be free but the wise; that is, God doth not allow it.
What, then; when any person hath turned his slave about before the consul, has he done nothing?
Yes, he has.
What?
He has turned his slave about before the consul.
Nothing more?
Yes. He pays a fine for him.
Well, then; is not the man who has gone through this ceremony rendered free?
Only so far as he is emancipated from perturbation. Pray, have you, who are able to give this freedom to others, no master of your own? Are you not a slave to money; to a girl; to a boy; to a tyrant; to some friend of a tyrant? Else why do you tremble when any one of these is in question? Therefore, I so often repeat to you, let this be your study and constant pursuit, to learn in what it is necessary to be courageous, and in what cautious; courageous against the inevitable, cautious so far as your will can control.
But have I not read my essay to you? Do not you know what I am doing?
In what?
In my essays.
Show me in what state you are as to desires and aversions; whether you do not fail of what you wish, and incur what you would avoid; but, as to these commonplace essays, if you are wise, you will take them, and destroy them.
Why? Did not Socrates write?
Yes; who so much? But how? As he had not always one at hand to argue against his principles, or be argued against in his turn, he argued with and examined himself, and always made practical application of some one great principle at least. These are the things which a philosopher writes; but such commonplaces as those of which I speak he leaves to the foolish, or to the happy creatures whom idleness furnishes with leisure, or to such as are too weak to regard consequences. And yet will you, when opportunity offers, come forward to exhibit and read aloud such things, and take a pride in them?
Pray, see how I compose dialogues.
Talk not of that, man, but rather be able to say, See how I accomplish my purposes; see how I avert what I wish to shun. Set death before me; set pain, a prison, disgrace, doom, and you will know me? This should be the pride of a young man come out from the schools. Leave the rest to others. Let no one ever hear you waste a word upon them, nor suffer it, if any one commends you for them; but admit that you are nobody, and that you know nothing. Appear to know only this, never to fail nor fall. Let others study cases, problems, and syllogisms. Do you rather contemplate death, change, torture, exile; and all these with courage, and reliance upon Him who hath called you to them, and judged you worthy a post in which you may show what reason can do when it encounters the inevitable. And thus this paradox ceases to be a paradox, that we must be at once cautious and courageous; courageous against the inevitable, and cautious when events are within our own control.
Higginson’s notes (2)
- Quotation source: Euripides, Fragments.—H.
- The prescribed form of manumission.—H.
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
That confidence (courage) is not inconsistent with caution.
The opinion of the philosophers perhaps seems to some to be a paradox; but still let us examine as well as we can, if it is true that it is possible to do every thing both with caution and with confidence. For caution seems to be in a manner contrary to confidence, and contraries are in no way consistent. That which seems to many to be a paradox in the matter under consideration in my opinion is of this kind: if we asserted that we ought to employ caution and confidence in the same things, men might justly accuse us of bringing together things which cannot be united. But now where is the difficulty in what is said? for if these things are true, which have been often said and often proved, that the nature of good is in the use of appearances, and the nature of evil likewise, and that things independent of our will do not admit either the nature of evil nor of good, what paradox do the philosophers assert if they say that where things are not dependent on the will, there you should employ confidence, but where they are dependent on the will, there you should employ caution? For if the bad consists in a bad exercise of the will, caution ought only to be used where things are dependent on the will. But if things independent of the will and not in our power are nothing to us, with respect to these we must employ confidence; and thus we shall both be cautious and confident, and indeed confident because of our caution. For by employing caution towards things which are really bad, it will result that we shall have confidence with respect to things which are not so.
We are then in the condition of deer; when they flee from the huntsmen’s feathers in fright, whither do they turn and in what do they seek refuge as safe? They turn to the nets, and thus they perish by confounding things which are objects of fear with things that they ought not to fear. Thus we also act: in what cases do we fear? In things which are independent of the will. In what cases on the contrary do we behave with confidence, as if there were no danger? In things dependent on the will. To be deceived then, or to act rashly, or shamelessly or with base desire to seek something, does not concern us at all, if we only hit the mark in things which are independent of our will. But where there is death, or exile or pain or infamy, there we attempt to run away, there we are struck with terror. Therefore as we may expect it to happen with those who err in the greatest matters, we convert natural confidence (that is, according to nature) into audacity, desperation, rashness, shamelessness; and we convert natural caution and modesty into cowardice and meanness, which are full of fear and confusion. For if a man should transfer caution to those things in which the will may be exercised and the acts of the will, he will immediately by willing to be cautious have also the power of avoiding what he chooses: but if he transfer it to the things which are not in his power and will, and attempt to avoid the things which are in the power of others, he will of necessity fear, he will be unstable, he will be disturbed. For death or pain is not formidable, but the fear of pain or death. For this reason we commend the poet who said Not death is evil, but a shameful death.
Confidence (courage) then ought to be employed against death, and caution against the fear of death. But now we do the contrary, and employ against death the attempt to escape; and to our opinion about it we employ carelessness, rashness and indifference. These things Socrates properly used to call tragic masks; for as to children masks appear terrible and fearful from inexperience, we also are affected in like manner by events (the things which happen in life) for no other reason than children are by masks. For what is a child? Ignorance. What is a child? Want of knowledge. For when a child knows these things, he is in no way inferior to us. What is death? A tragic mask. Turn it and examine it. See, it does not bite. The poor body must be separated from the spirit either now or later as it was separated from it before. Why then are you troubled, if it be separated now? for if it is not separated now, it will he separated afterwards. Why? That the period of the universe may be completed, for it has need of the present, and of the future, and of the past. What is pain? A mask. Turn it and examine it. The poor flesh is moved roughly, then on the contrary smoothly. If this does not satisfy (please) you, the door is open: if it does, bear (with things). For the door ought to be open for all occasions; and so we have no trouble.
What then is the fruit of these opinions? It is that which ought to be the most noble and the most becoming to those who are really educated, release from perturbation, release from fear, freedom. For in these matters we must not believe the many, who say that free persons only ought to be educated, but we should rather believe the philosophers who say that the educated only are free. How is this? In this manner. Is freedom any thing else than the power of living as we choose? Nothing else. Tell me then, ye men, do you wish to live in error? We do not. No one then who lives in error is free. Do you wish to live in fear? Do you wish to live in sorrow? Do you wish to live in perturbation? By no means. No one then who is in a state of fear or sorrow or perturbation is free; but whoever is delivered from sorrows and fears and perturbations, he is at the same time also delivered from servitude. How then can we continue to believe you, most dear legislators, when you say, We only allow free persons to be educated? For philosophers say we allow none to be free except the educated; that is, God does not allow it. When then a man has turned round before the praetor his own slave, has he done nothing? He has done something. What? He has turned round his own slave before the praetor. Has he done nothing more? Yes: he is also bound to pay for him the tax called the twentieth. Well then, is not the man who has gone through this ceremony become free? No more than he is become free from perturbations. Have you who are able to turn round (free) others no master? is not money your master, or a girl or a boy, or some tyrant, or some friend of the tyrant? why do you tremble then when you are going off to any trial (danger) of this kind? It is for this reason that I often say, study and hold in readiness these principles by which you may determine what those things are with reference to which you ought to have confidence (courage), and those things with reference to which you ought to be cautious: courageous in that which does not depend on your will; cautious in that which does depend on it.
Well have I not read to you, and do you not know what I was doing? In what? In my little dissertations. —Show me how you are with respect to desire and aversion (ἔκκλισιν); and show me if you do not fail in getting what you wish, and if you do not fall into the things which you would avoid: but as to these long and labored sentences you will take them and blot them out.
What then did not Socrates write? And who wrote so much?—But how? As he could not always have at hand one to argue against his principles or to be argued against in turn, he used to argue with and examine himself, and he was always treating at least some one subject in a practical way. These are the things which a philosopher writes. But little dissertations and that method, which I speak of, he leaves to others, to the stupid, or to those happy men who being free from perturbations have leisure, or to such as are too foolish to reckon con. sequences.
And will you now, when the opportunity invites, go and display those things which you possess, and recite them, and make an idle show, and say, See how I make dialogues? Do not so, my man; but rather say; See how I am not disappointed of that which I desire: See how I do not fall into that which I would avoid. Set death before me, and you will see. Set before me pain, prison, disgrace and condemnation. This is the proper display of a young man who is come out of the schools. But leave the rest to others, and let no one ever hear you say a word about these things; and if any man commends you for them, do not allow it; but think that you are nobody and know nothing. Only show that you know this, how never to be disappointed in your desire and how never to fall into that which you would avoid. Let others labour at forensic causes, problems and syllogisms: do you labour at thinking about death, chains, the rack, exile; and do all this with confidence and reliance on him who has called you to these sufferings, who has judged you worthy of the place in which being stationed you will show what things the rational governing power can do when it takes its stand against the forces which are not within the power of our will. And thus this paradox will no longer appear either impossible or a paradox, that a man ought to be at the same time cautious and courageous: courageous towards the things which do not depend on the will, and cautious in things which are within the power of the will.
Long’s notes (14)
- It was the fashion of hunters to frighten deer by displaying fathers of various colours on ropes or strings and thus frightening them towards the nets. Virgil, Georg. iii. 372— Puniceaeve agitant pavidos formidine pennae,
- Euripides, fragments.
- In the Phaedon, c. 24, or p. 78.
- It was the opinion of some philosophers that the soul was a portion of the divinity sent down into human bodies.
- This was a doctrine of Heraclitus and of Zeno. Zeno (Diog. Laert. vii. 137) speaks of God as in certain periods or revolutions of time exhausting into himself the universal substance ( οὐσία ) and again generating it out of himself. Antoninus (xi. 1) speaks of the periodical renovation of all things. For man, whose existence is so short, the doctrine of all existing things perishing in the course of time and then being renewed, is of no practical value. The present is enough for most men. But for the few who are able to embrace in thought the past, the present and the future, the contemplation of the perishable nature, of all existing things may have a certain value by elevating their minds above the paltry things which others prize above their worth.
- Sec. i. 9, note 7. Schweighaeuser says that he does not quite see what is the meaning of ought to be open ; and he suggests that Epictetus intended to say we ought to consider that the door is open for all occasions ; but the occasions, he says, ought to be when things are such that a man can in no way bear them or cannot honourably endure them, and such occasions the wise man considers to be the voice of God giving to him the sign to retire.
- This is an allusion to one of the Roman modes of manumitting a slave before the praetor. Compare, Persius, Sat. V. 75— —Heu steriles veri, qulbus una Quiritem Vertigo facit; and again Verterit hunc dominus, momento turbinis exit Marcus Dama. The sum paid on manumission was a tax of five per cent., established In B. C. 356 (Livy, vii. 16), and paid by the slave. Epictetus here speaks of the tax being paid by the master; but in iii. 26, he speaks of it as paid by the enfranchised slave. See Dureau de la Malle, Economie Politique des Romains i. 290, ii 169.
- These are the words of some pupil who is boasting of what he has written.
- The word is περιόδια . I am not sure about the exact meaning of περιόδια : see the notes of Wolf and Schweig.
- No other author speaks of Socrates having written any thing. It is therefore very difficult to explain this passage in which Arrian, who took down the words of Epictetus, represents him as saying that Socrates wrote so much. Socrates talked much, and Epictetus may have spoken of talking as if it were writing; for he must have known that Socrates was not a writer. See Schweig.’s note.
- The word is ὑπὸ ἀταραξίας . Mrs. Carter thinks that the true reading is ὑπὸ ἀπραξίας , through idleness or having nothing to do ; and she remarks that freedom from perturbations is the very thing that Epictetus had been recommending through the whole chapter and is the subject of the next chapter, and therefore cannot be well supposed to be the true reading in a place where it is mentioned with contempt. It is probable that Mrs. Carter is right. Upton thinks that Epictetus is alluding to the Sophists, and that we should understand him as speaking ironically: and this may also be right. Schweighaeuser attempts to explain the passage by taking free from perturbations in the ordinary simple sense; but I doubt if he has succeeded.
- ἐμπερπερεύσῃ . Epictetus (iii. 2. 14) uses the adjective πέρπερος to signify a vain man. Antoninus (v. 5) uses the verb περπέρευεσθαι : and Paul (Corinthians i. c. 13, 4), where our version is, charity (love) vaunteth not itself. Cicero ( ad Attic. i. 14, 4 ) uses ἐνεπερπερευσάμην , to express a rhetorical display.
- The whole life of philosophers, says Cicero (Tusc. i. 30), following Plato, is a reflection upon death .
- Some English readers, too happy to comprehend how chains, torture, exile and sudden executions, can be ranked among the common accidents of life, may be surprised to find Epictetus so frequently endeavouring to prepare his hearers for them. But it must be recollected that he addressed himself to persons who lived under the Roman emperors, from whose tyranny the very best of men were perpetually liable to such kind of dangers. —Mrs. Carter. All men even now are exposed to accidents and misfortunes against which there is no security, and even the most fortunate of men must die at last. The lessons of Epictetus may be as useful now as they were in his time. See i. 30.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1παράδοξον μὲν τυχὸν φαίνεταί τισιν τὸ ἀξιούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσόφων, ὅμως δὲ σκεψώμεθα κατὰ δύναμιν, εἰ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ δεῖν ἅμα μὲν εὐλαβῶς ἅμα δὲ θαρρούντως πάντα ποιεῖν. 2ἐναντίον γάρ πως δοκεῖ τῷ θαρραλέῳ τὸ εὐλαβές, τὰ δʼ ἐναντία οὐδαμῶς συνυπάρχει. 3τὸ δὲ φαινόμενον πολλοῖς ἐν τῷ τόπῳ παράδοξον δοκεῖ μοι τοιούτου τινὸς ἔχεσθαι· εἰ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ταὐτὰ ἠξιοῦμεν χρῆσθαι τῇ τʼ εὐλαβείᾳ καὶ τῷ θάρσει, δικαίως ἂν ἡμᾶς ᾐτιῶντο ὡς τὰ ἀσύνακτα συνάγοντας. 4νῦν δὲ τί δεινὸν ἔχει τὸ λεγόμενον; εἰ γὰρ ὑγιῆ ταῦτʼ ἐστι τὰ πολλάκις μὲν εἰρημένα, πολλάκις δʼ ἀποδεδειγμένα, ὅτι ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔστιν ἐν χρήσει φαντασιῶν καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ ὡσαύτως, τὰ δʼ ἀπροαίρετα οὔτε τὴν τοῦ κακοῦ δέχεται φύσιν οὔτε τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, 5τί παράδοξον ἀξιοῦσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι, εἰ λέγουσιν ὅπου μὲν τὰ ἀπροαίρετα, ἐκεῖ τὸ θάρσος ἔστω σοι, ὅπου δὲ τὰ προαιρετικά, ἐκεῖ ἡ εὐλάβεια; 6εἰ γὰρ ἐν κακῇ προαιρέσει τὸ κακόν, πρὸς μόνα ταῦτα χρῆσθαι ἄξιον εὐλαβείᾳ· εἰ δὲ τὰ ἀπροαίρετα καὶ μὴ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, πρὸς ταῦτα τῷ θάρσει χρηστέον. 7καὶ οὕτως ἅμα μὲν εὐλαβεῖς ἅμα δὲ θαρραλέοι ἐσόμεθα καὶ νὴ Δία διὰ τὴν εὐλάβειαν θαρραλέοι. διὰ γὰρ τὸ εὐλαβεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντως κακὰ συμβήσεται θαρρεῖν ἡμῖν πρὸς τὰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντα. 8λοιπὸν ἡμεῖς τὸ τῶν ἐλάφων πάσχομεν· ὅτε φοβοῦνται καὶ φεύγουσιν αἱ ἔλαφοι τὰ πτερά, ποῦ τρέπονται καὶ πρὸς τίνα ἀναχωροῦσιν ὡς ἀσφαλῆ; πρὸς τὰ δίκτυα· καὶ οὕτως ἀπόλλυνται ἐναλλάξασαι τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. 9οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς ποῦ χρώμεθα τῷ φόβῳ; πρὸς τὰ ἀπροαίρετα. ἐν τίσιν πάλιν θαρροῦντες ἀναστρεφόμεθα ὡς οὐδενὸς ὄντος δεινοῦ; ἐν τοῖς προαιρετικοῖς. 10ἐξαπατηθῆναι ἢ προπεσεῖν ἢ ἀναίσχυντόν τι ποιῆσαι ἢ μετʼ ἐπιθυμίας αἰσχρᾶς ὀρεχθῆναί τινος οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἡμῖν, ἂν μόνον ἐν τοῖς ἀπροαιρέτ[ικ]οις εὐστοχῶμεν. ὅπου δὲ θάνατος ἢ φυγὴ ἢ πόνος ἢ ἀδοξία, ἐκεῖ τὸ ἀναχωρητικόν, ἐκεῖ τὸ σεσοβημένον. 11τοιγαροῦν ὥσπερ εἰκὸς τοὺς περὶ τὰ μέγιστα διαμαρτάνοντας τὸ μὲν φύσει θαρραλέον θρασὺ κατασκευάζομεν, ἀπονενοημένον, ἰταμόν, ἀναίσχυντον, τὸ δʼ εὐλαβὲς φύσει καὶ αἰδῆμον δειλὸν καὶ ταπεινόν, φόβων καὶ ταραχῶν μεστόν. 12ἂν γάρ τις ἐκεῖ μεταθῇ τὸ εὐλαβές, ὅπου προαίρεσις καὶ ἔργα προαιρέσεως, εὐθὺς ἅμα τῷ θέλειν εὐλαβεῖσθαι καὶ ἐπʼ αὐτῷ κειμένην ἕξει τὴν ἔκκλισιν· ἂν δʼ ὅπου τὰ μὴ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ἐστι καὶ ἀπροαίρετα, πρὸς τὰ ἐπʼ ἄλλοις ὄντα τὴν ἔκκλισιν ἔχων ἀναγκαίως φοβήσεται, ἀκαταστατήσει, ταραχθήσεται. 13οὐ γὰρ θάνατος ἢ πόνος φοβερόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι πόνον ἢ θάνατον. διὰ τοῦτο ἐπαινοῦμεν τὸν εἰπόντα ὅτι οὐ κατθανεῖν γὰρ δεινόν, ἀλλʼ αἰσχρῶς θανεῖν. 14ἔδει οὖν πρὸς μὲν τὸν θάνατον τὸ θάρσος ἐστράφθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὸν φόβον τοῦ θανάτου τὴν εὐλάβειαν· νῦν δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον πρὸς μὲν τὸν θάνατον τὴν φυγήν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ περὶ αὐτοῦ δόγμα τὴν ἀνεπιστρεψίαν καὶ τὸ ἀφειδὲς καὶ τὸ ἀδιαφορητικόν. 15ταῦτα δʼ ὁ Σωκράτης καλῶς ποιῶν μορμολύκεια ἐκάλει. ὡς γὰρ τοῖς παιδίοις τὰ προσωπεῖα φαίνεται δεινὰ καὶ φοβερὰ διʼ ἀπειρίαν, τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἡμεῖς πάσχομεν πρὸς τὰ πράγματα διʼ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ παιδία πρὸς τὰς μορμολυκείας. 16τί γάρ ἐστι παιδίον; ἄγνοια. τί ἐστι παιδίον; ἀμαθία. ἐπεὶ ὅπου οἶδεν, κἀκεῖνα οὐδὲν ἡμῶν ἔλαττον ἔχει. 17θάνατος τί ἐστιν; μορμολύκειον. στρέψας αὐτὸ κατάμαθε· ἰδοῦ, πῶς οὐ δάκνει. τὸ σωμάτιον δεῖ χωρισθῆναι τοῦ πνευματίου, ὡς πρότερον ἐκεχώριστο, ἢ νῦν ἢ ὕστερον. τί οὖν ἀγανακτεῖς, εἰ νῦν; εἰ γὰρ μὴ νῦν, ὕστερον. 18διὰ τί; ἵνα ἡ περίοδος ἀνύηται τοῦ κόσμου· χρείαν γὰρ ἔχει τῶν μὲν ἐνισταμένων, τῶν δὲ μελλόντων, τῶν δʼ ἠνυσμένων. 19πόνος τί ἐστιν; μορμολύκειον. στρέψον αὐτὸ καὶ κατάμαθε. τραχέως κινεῖται τὸ σαρκίδιον, εἶτα πάλιν λείως. ἄν σοι μὴ λυσιτελῇ, ἡ θύρα ἤνοικται· ἂν λυσιτελῇ, φέρε. 20πρὸς πάντα γὰρ ἠνοῖχθαι δεῖ τὴν θύραν· καὶ πρᾶγμα οὐκ ἔχομεν. 21τίς οὖν τούτων τῶν δογμάτων καρπός; ὅνπερ δεῖ κάλλιστόν τʼ εἶναι καὶ πρεπωδέστατον τοῖς τῷ ὄντι παιδευομένοις, ἀταραξία ἀφοβία ἐλευθερία. 22οὐ γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ τούτων πιστευτέον, οἳ λέγουσιν μόνοις ἐξεῖναι παιδεύεσθαι τοῖς ἐλευθέροις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις μᾶλλον, οἳ λέγουσι μόνους τοὺς παιδευθέντας ἐλευθέρους εἶναι. 23— πῶς τοῦτο; — οὕτως· νῦν ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐλευθερία ἢ τὸ ἐξεῖναι ὡς βουλόμεθα διεξάγειν; οὐδέν. λέγετε δή μοι, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, βούλεσθε ζῆν ἁμαρτάνοντες; οὐ βουλόμεθα. οὐδεὶς τοίνυν ἁμαρτάνων ἐλεύθερός ἐστιν. 24βούλεσθε ζῆν φοβούμενοι, βούλεσθε λυπούμενοι, βούλεσθε ταρασσόμενοι; οὐδαμῶς. οὐδεὶς ἄρα οὔτε φοβούμενος οὔτε λυπούμενος οὔτε ταρασσόμενος ἐλεύθερός ἐστιν, ὅστις δʼ ἀπήλλακται λυπῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ ταραχῶν, οὗτος τῇ αὐτῇ ὁδῷ καὶ τοῦ δουλεύειν ἀπήλλακται. 25πῶς οὖν ἔτι ὑμῖν πιστεύσομεν, ὦ φίλτατοι νομοθέται; οὐκ ἐπιτρέπομεν παιδεύεσθαι, εἰ μὴ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις; οἱ φιλόσοφοι γὰρ λέγουσιν ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιτρέπομεν ἐλευθέροις εἶναι εἰ μὴ τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις, τοῦτό ἐστιν ὁ θεὸς οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει. 26— ὅταν οὖν στρέψῃ τις ἐπὶ στρατηγοῦ τὸν αὑτοῦ δοῦλον, οὐδὲν ἐποίησεν; — ἐποίησεν. — τί; — ἔστρεψεν τὸν αὑτοῦ δοῦλον ἐπὶ στρατηγοῦ. — ἄλλο οὐδέν; — ναί· καὶ εἰκοστὴν αὐτοῦ δοῦναι ὀφείλει. 27— τί οὖν; ὁ ταῦτα παθὼν οὐ γέγονεν ἐλεύθερος; — οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀτάραχος. 28ἐπεὶ σὺ ὁ ἄλλους στρέφειν δυνάμενος οὐδένα ἔχεις κύριον; οὐκ ἀργύριον, οὐ κοράσιον, οὐ παιδάριον, οὐ τὸν τύραννον, οὐ φίλον τινὰ τοῦ τυράννου; τί οὖν τρέμεις ἐπί τινα τοιαύτην ἀπιὼν περίστασιν; 29διὰ τοῦτο λέγω πολλάκις· ταῦτα μελετᾶτε καὶ ταῦτα πρόχειρα ἔχετε, πρὸς τίνα δεῖ τεθαρρηκέναι καὶ πρὸς τίνα εὐλαβῶς διακεῖσθαι, ὅτι πρὸς τὰ ἀπροαίρετα θαρρεῖν, εὐλαβεῖσθαι τὰ προαιρετικά. 30— ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀνέγνων σοι οὐδʼ ἔγνως τί ποιῶ. 31— ἐν τίνι; ἐν λεξειδίοις. ἔχε σου τὰ λεξείδια· δεῖξον, πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς ὄρεξιν καὶ ἔκκλισιν, εἰ μὴ ἀποτυγχάνεις ὧν θέλεις, εἰ μὴ περιπίπτεις οἷς οὐ θέλεις. ἐκεῖνα δὲ τὰ περιόδια, ἂν νοῦν ἔχῃς, ἄρας πού ποτε ἀπαλείψεις. 32— τί οὖν; Σωκράτης οὐκ ἔγραφεν; — καὶ τίς τοσαῦτα; ἀλλὰ πῶς; ἐπεὶ μὴ ἐδύνατο ἔχειν ἀεὶ τὸν ἐλέγχοντα αὐτοῦ τὰ δόγματα ἢ ἐλεγχθησόμενον ἐν τῷ μέρει, αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἤλεγχεν καὶ ἐξήταζεν καὶ ἀεὶ μίαν γέ τινα πρόληψιν ἐγύμναζεν χρηστικῶς. 33ταῦτα γράφει φιλόσοφος· λεξείδια δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁδός, ἣν λέγω, ἄλλοις ἀφίησι, τοῖς ἀναισθήτοις ἢ τοῖς μακαρίοις, τοῖς σχολὴν ἄγουσιν ὑπὸ ἀταραξίας ἢ τοῖς μηδὲν τῶν ἑξῆς ὑπολογιζομένοις διὰ μωρίαν. 34καὶ νῦν καιροῦ καλοῦντος ἐκεῖνα δείξεις ἀπελθὼν καὶ ἀναγνώσῃ καὶ ἐμπερπερεύσῃ; ἰδοῦ, πῶς διαλόγους συντίθημι. 35μή, ἄνθρωπε, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνα μᾶλλον ἰδοῦ, πῶς ὀρεγόμενος οὐκ ἀποτυγχάνω. ἰδοῦ, πῶς ἐκκλίνων οὐ περιπίπτω. φέρε θάνατον καὶ γνώσῃ· φέρε πόνους, φέρε δεσμωτήριον, φέρε ἀδοξίαν, φέρε καταδίκην. 36αὕτη ἐπίδειξις νέου ἐκ σχολῆς ἐληλυθότος. τἆλλα δʼ ἄλλοις ἄφες, μηδὲ φωνήν τις ἀκούσῃ σου περὶ αὐτῶν ποτε μηδʼ, ἂν ἐπαινέσῃ τις ἐπʼ αὐτοῖς, ἀνέχου, δόξον δὲ μηδεὶς εἶναι καὶ εἰδέναι μηδέν. 37μόνον τοῦτο εἰδὼς φαίνου, πῶς μήτʼ ἀποτύχῃς ποτὲ μήτε περιπέσῃς. 38ἄλλοι μελετάτωσαν δίκας, ἄλλοι προβλήματα, ἄλλοι συλλογισμούς· σὺ ἀποθνῄσκειν, σὺ δεδέσθαι, σὺ στρεβλοῦσθαι, σὺ ἐξορίζεσθαι. 39πάντα ταῦτα θαρρούντως, πεποιθότως τῷ κεκληκότι σε ἐπʼ αὐτά, τῷ ἄξιον τῆς χώρας ταύτης κεκρικότι, ἐν ᾗ καταταχθεὶς ἐπιδείξεις, τίνα δύναται λογικὸν ἡγεμονικὸν πρὸς τὰς ἀπροαιρέτους δυνάμεις ἀντιταξάμενον. 40καὶ οὕτως τὸ παράδοξον ἐκεῖνο οὐκέτι οὔτʼ ἀδύνατον φανεῖται οὔτε παράδοξον, ὅτι ἅμα μὲν εὐλαβεῖσθαι δεῖ ἅμα δὲ θαρρεῖν, πρὸς μὲν τὰ ἀπροαίρετα θαρρεῖν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς προαιρετικοῖς εὐλαβεῖσθαι.