Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
THE · DISCOURSES · OF · EPICTETUS. · BOOK IV. · CHAPTER I. · Of Freedom.
1e is free, who lives as he likes; who is not subject either to Compulsion, to Restraint, or to Violence whose Pursuits are unhindered, his Desires successful, his Aversions unincurred. Who then would wish to lead a wrong Course of Life?——"No one."——Who would live deceived, prone to mistake, unjust, dissolute, discontented, dejected?——"No one."——No wicked Man then lives as he likes; therefore neither is he free. And who would live in Sorrow, Fear, Envy, Pity; with disappointed Desires, and incurred Aversions?——"No one."——Do we then find any of the Wicked exempt from Sorrow, Fear, disappointed Desires, incurred Aversions?——"Not one."——Consequently then, not free. 2If a Person who hath been twice Consul should hear this, provided you add, "but you are a wise Man; this is nothing to you;" he will forgive you. But if you tell him the Truth; that, in point of Slavery, he doth not differ from those who have been thrice sold, what must you expect, but to be beaten? "For how, says he, am I a Slave? My Father was free, my Mother free. Besides, I am a Senator too, and the Friend of Cæsar; and have been twice Consul; and have myself many Slaves."——In the first place, most worthy Sir, perhaps your Father too was a Slave of the same kind; and your Mother, and your Grandfather, and all your Ancestors successively. But even if they were ever so free, what is that to you? For what, if they were of a generous, you of a mean Spirit: they, brave; and you, a Coward: they, sober; and you, dissolute? 3And, "What, says he, is this towards being a Slave?"——Do you think it nothing towards being a Slave, to act against your Will? Compelled, and lamenting?——"Be it so. But who can compel me, but the Master of All, Cæsar?"——By your own Confession then, you have one Master: and let not his being, as you say, Master of All, give you any Comfort; but know, that you are a Slave in a great Family. Thus the Nicopolitans too, frequently cry out, "By the Life of Cæsar, we are free!" 4For the present, however, if you please, we will let Cæsar alone. But tell me this. Have you never been in Love with any one, either of a servile or liberal Condition?——"Why, what is that to the being either a Slave, or free?"——Was you never commanded any thing by your Mistress, that you did not chuse? Have you never flattered your Slave? Have you never kissed her Feet? And yet, if you were commanded to kiss Cæsar's Feet, you would think it an Outrage, and an Excess of Tyranny. Have you never gone out by Night, where you did not chuse? Have you never spent more than you chose? Have not you sometimes uttered your Words with Sighs and Groans? Born to be reviled, and shut out of Doors? But, if you are ashamed to confess your own Follies, see what Thrasonides says, and doth; who, after having fought more Battles perhaps than you, went out by Night, when Geta would not dare to go: Nay, had he been compelled to it by him, would have gone roaring, and lamenting his bitter Servitude. And what doth [this Master of his] say afterwards, "A sorry Girl hath enslaved me, whom no Enemy ever enslaved."——(Wretch! to be the Slave of a Girl, and a sorry Girl too! Why then do you still call yourself free? Why do you boast your military Expeditions?)——Then he calls for a Sword, and is angry with the Person who, out of Kindness, denies it; and sends Presents to her who hates him and begs, and weeps, and then again is elated on every little Success. But how is he elated even then? Is it so, as neither passionately to desire or fear. 5Consider, in Animals, what is our Idea of Freedom. Some keep tame Lions, and feed, and even carry them about with them: and who will say, that any such Lion is free? Nay, doth he not live the more slavishly, the more he lives at ease? And who, that had Sense and Reason, would wish to be one of those Lions? Again: How much do Birds, which are taken and kept in a Cage, suffer, by trying to fly away? Nay, some of them starve with Hunger, rather than undergo such a Life: then, as many of them as are saved, it is scarcely, and with Difficulty, and in a pining Condition; and the Moment they find any Hole, out they hop. Such a Desire have they of natural Freedom, and to be at their own Disposal, and unrestrained.——"And what Harm doth this Confinement do you?"——"What say you? I was born to fly where I please, to live in the open Air, to sing when I please. You deprive me of all this, and say, What Harm doth it do you?" 6Hence we will allow those only to be free, who do not endure Captivity; but, as soon as they are taken, die, and escape. Thus Diogenes somewhere says, That the only way to Freedom is to die with Ease. And he writes to the Persian King; "You can no more enslave the Athenians, than you can Fish."——"How? What, shall not I take them?"——"If you do take them, says he, they will leave you, and be gone, like Fish. For take a Fish, and it dies. And, if the Athenians too die, as soon as you have taken them, of what Use are your warlike Preparations?"——This is the Voice of a free Man, who had examined the Matter in earnest; and, as it might be expected, found it out. But, if you seek it where it is not, what Wonder, if you never find it? 7A Slave wishes to be immediately set free. Think you it is because he is desirous to pay his Fine to the Officer? No: but because he fancies, that, for want of acquiring his Freedom, he hath hitherto lived under Restraint, and unprosperously. "If I am once set free, says he, it is all Prosperity: I care for no one; I speak to All, as their Equal, and on a Level with them. I go where I will, I come when, and how I will." He is at last made free; and presently, having nowhere to eat, he seeks whom he may flatter, with whom he may sup. He then either submits to the basest and most infamous Prostitution; and, if he can obtain Admission to some great Man's Table, falls into a Slavery much worse than the former; or, if the Creature, void of Sense and right Taste, happens to acquire an affluent Fortune, he doats upon some Girl, laments, and is unhappy, and wishes for Slavery again. "For what Harm did it do me? Another clothed me, another shod me, another fed me, another took care of me when I was sick. It was but in a few Things, by way of Return, I used to serve him. But now, miserable Wretch! what do I suffer, in being a Slave to many, instead of one! Yet, if I can obtain the Equestrian Rings, I shall live with the utmost Prosperity and Happiness." In order to obtain them, he first suffers what he deserves; and, as soon as he hath obtained them, it is all the same again. "But then, says he, if I do but get a military Command, I shall be delivered from all my Troubles." He gets a military Command. He suffers as much as the vilest Rogue of a Slave: and, nevertheless, he asks for a second Command, and a third: and when he hath put the finishing Hand, and is made a Senator, then he is a Slave indeed. When he comes into the Assembly, it is then that he undergoes his finest and most splendid Slavery. 8———. Not to be a Fool; but to learn what Socrates taught; the Nature of Things: and not to adapt Pre-conceptions rashly to particular Subjects. For the Cause of all human Evils is, the not being able to adapt general Pre-conceptions to particular Cases. But different People have different Opinions. One thinks the Cause of his Evils to be, that he is sick. By no means: but that he doth not adapt his Pre-conceptions right. Another, that he is poor: another, that he hath a harsh Father and Mother: another, that he is not in the good Graces of Cæsar. This is nothing else, but not understanding how to adapt our Pre-conceptions. For, who hath not a Pre-conception of Evil, that it is hurtful? That it is to be avoided? That it is by all means to be prudently guarded against? One Pre-conception doth not contradict another, except when it comes to be adapted. What then is this Evil, thus hurtful, and to be avoided? "Not to be the Friend of Cæsar," saith one. He is gone; he fails in the adapting; he is embarrassed; he seeks what is nothing to the purpose. For, if he gets to be Cæsar's Friend, he is never the less distant from what he sought. For what is it that every Man seeks? To be secure, to be happy, to do what he pleases without Restraint, and without Compulsion. When he becomes the Friend of Cæsar then, doth he cease to be restrained? To be compelled? Is he secure? Is he happy? Whom shall he ask? Whom can we better credit than this very Man, who hath been his Friend? Come forth and tell us, whether you sleep more quietly now, or before you were the Friend of Cæsar? You presently hear him cry, "Leave off, for Heaven's sake, and do not insult me. You know not the Miseries I suffer: there is no Sleep for me; but one comes, and saith, that Cæsar is already awake; another, that he is just going out. Then follow Perturbations, then Cares." Well: and when did you use to sup more pleasantly; formerly, or now? Hear what he says about this too. When he is not invited, he is distracted: and if he is, he sups like a Slave with his Master, solicitous all the while, not to say or do any thing foolish. And what think you? Is he afraid of being whipped, like a Slave? How can he hope to escape so well? No: but as becomes so great a Man, Cæsar's Friend, of losing his Head.——And when did you bathe more quietly; when did you perform your Exercises more at your leisure, in short, which Life would you rather wish to live, your present, or the former? I could swear, there is no one so stupid and insensible, as not to deplore his Miseries, in proportion as he is more the Friend of Cæsar. 9Since then, neither they who are called Kings, nor the Friends of Kings, live as they like; who, after all, are free? Seek, and you will find for you are furnished by Nature with Means for discovering the Truth. But, if you are not able by these alone to find the Consequence, hear them who have sought it. What do they say? Do you think Freedom a Good?——"The greatest."——Can any one then, who attains the greatest Good be unhappy, or unsuccessful in his Affairs?——"No."——As many, therefore, as you see unhappy, lamenting, unprosperous, confidently pronounce them not free.——"I do."——Henceforth then we have done with buying and selling, and such like stated Conditions of becoming Slaves. For, if you have made these Concessions properly, whether a great or a little King, a Consular, or one twice a Consul, be unhappy, he is not free.——"Agreed." 10Further then, answer me this: Do you think Freedom to be something great, and noble, and valuable?——"How should I not?"——Is it possible then, that he who acquires any thing so great, and valuable, and noble, should be of an abject Spirit?——"It is not."——Whenever then you see any one subject to another, and flattering him, contrary to his own Opinion, confidently say, that He too is not free: and not only if he doth it for a Supper, but even if it be for a Government; nay, a Consulship: but call those indeed little Slaves, who act thus for the sake of little Things; and the others, as they deserve, great Slaves.——"Be this too agreed."——Well: do you think Freedom to be something independent and self-determined?——"How can it be otherwise?"——Him then, whom it is in the Power of another to restrain or to compell, affirm confidently, to be not free. And do not mind his Grandfathers, or Great Grandfathers; or inquire, whether he hath been bought or sold: but, if you hear him say, from his Heart, and with Emotion, my Master, though twelve Lictors should march before him, call him a Slave. And, if you should hear him say, Wretch, that I am! what do I suffer! call him a Slave. In short, if you see him wailing, complaining, unprosperous, call him a Slave in Purple.——"Suppose then he doth nothing of all this?"——Do not yet say, he is free; but learn whether his Principles are liable to Compulsion, to Restraint, or Disappointment; and, if you find this to be the Case, call him a Slave, keeping Holiday during the Saturnalia. Say, that his Master is abroad: he will come presently; and you will know what he suffers.——"Who will come?"——Whoever hath the Power either of bestowing, or taking away, any of the Things, he wishes for.——"Have we so many Masters then?"——We have. For, prior to all such, we have the Things themselves for our Masters; now they are many: and it is through these, that it becomes necessary that such as have the Disposal of them, should be our Masters too. For no one fears Cæsar himself; but Death, Banishment, Loss of Goods, Prison, Disgrace. Nor doth any one love Cæsar, unless he be a Person of great Worth: but we love Riches, the Tribunate, the Prætorship, the Consulship. When we love, and hate, and fear these Things, they who have the Disposal of them must necessarily be our Masters. Hence we even worship them as Gods. For we consider, that whoever hath the Disposal of the greatest Advantages, is a Deity: and then we subjoin falsely, but such a one hath the Power of the greatest Advantages; therefore he is a Deity. For, if we subjoin falsely, the Inference arising from thence must be false likewise. 11"What is it then that makes a Man free and independent? For neither Riches, nor Consulship, nor Command of Provinces, or Kingdoms, make him so; but something else must be found"——What is it that preserves any one from being hindered and restrained in Writing?——"The Science of Writing"——In Music?——"The Science of Music."——Therefore, in Life too, the Science of Living. As you have heard it in general then, consider it likewise in Particulars. Is it possible for Him to be unrestrained, who desires any of those Things, that are in the Power of others?——"No."——Can he avoid being hindered?——"No."——Therefore neither can he be free. Consider then, whether we have nothing, or all, in our own Power alone, or whether some Things are in our own Power and some in that of others.——"What do you mean?"——When you would have your Body perfect, is it in your own Power, or is it not?—"It is not."——When you would be healthy?——"Nor this."——When you would be handsome?——"Nor this."——Live or die?——"Nor this."——Body then is not our own; but subject to every thing stronger than itself.——"Agreed."——Well: is it in your own Power to have an Estate when you please, and as long as you please, and such a one as you please?——"No."——Slaves?——"No."——Clothes?——"No."——A House?——"No"——Horses? "Indeed none of these."——Well: if you would ever so fain have your Children live, or your Wife, or your Brother, or your Friends, is it in your own Power?——"No, nor this."——Will you say then, that there is nothing independent, which is in your own Power alone, and unalienable? See then, if you have any thing of this sort.——"I do not know."——But, consider it thus: Can any one make you assent to a Falshood?"——No one."——In the Topic of Assent then, you are unrestrained and unhindered.——"Agreed:"——Well: and can any one compell you to exert your Pursuits, towards what you do not like?——"He can. For when he threatens me with Death, or Fetters, he compells me to exert them."——If then you were to despise dying, or being fettered, would you any longer regard him?——"No."——Is despising Death then an Action in our Power, or is it not?——"It is."——Is it therefore in your Power also, to exert your Pursuits towards any thing, or is it not?——"Agreed, that it is. But in whose Power is my avoiding any thing?"——This too is in your own.——"What then, if, when I am exerting myself to walk, any one should restrain me?"——What Part of you can he restrain? Can he restrain your Assent?——"No: but my Body."——Ay, as he may a Stone.——"Be it so. But still I walk no more."——And who told you, that Walking was an Action of your own, that cannot be restrained? For I only said, that your exerting yourself towards it could not be restrained. But where there is need of Body, and its Assistance, you have already heard, that nothing is in your Power.——"Be this too agreed.'!——And can any one compell you to desire against your Will?——"No one."——Or to propose, or intend, or, in short, not to make use of the Appearances which present themselves to you?——"Nor this. But when I desire any thing, he will restrain me from obtaining what I desire."——If you desire any thing that is your own, and that cannot be restrained, how can He restrain you?——"By no means."——And pray who tells you, that he who desires what depends on another, cannot be restrained?——"May not I desire Health then?"——By no means: nor any thing else that depends on another: for what is not in your own Power, either to procure, or to preserve, when you will, that belongs to another. Keep off not only your Hands from it, but, far prior to these, your Desires. Otherwise you have given yourself up a Slave: you have put your Neck under the Yoke, if you admire any of the Things not your own, but subject and mortal, to which soever of them you are attached.——"Is not my Hand my own?"——It is a Part of you; but it is, by Nature, Clay; liable to Restraint, to Compulsion; a Slave to every thing stronger than itself. And why do I say your Hand? You ought to possess your whole Body as a paultry Ass, with a Pack-saddle on, as long as may be, as long as it is allowed you. But, if there should come a Press, and a Soldier should lay hold on it, let it go. Do not resist, or murmur: otherwise you will be first beat, and lose the Ass after all. And, since you are to consider the Body [itself] in this manner, think what remains to do, concerning those Things which are provided for the Sake of the Body. If that be an Ass, the rest are Bridles, Pack-saddles, Shoes, Oats, Hay, for the Ass. Let these go too. Quit them more easily and expeditiously, than the Ass. And when you are thus prepared, and thus exercised, to distinguish what belongs to others from your own; what is liable to Restraint, from what is not; to esteem the one your own Property, the other not; to keep your Desire, to keep your Aversion, carefully turned to this Point; whom have you any longer to fear?——"No one."——For about what should you be afraid? About what is your own, in which consists the Essence of Good and Evil? And who hath any Power over this? Who can take it away? Who can hinder you? No more than God [can be hindered]. But are you afraid for Body, for Possessions, for what belongs to others, for what is nothing to you? And what have you been studying all this while, but to distinguish between your own, and not your own; what is in your Power, and what is not in your Power; what is liable to Restraint, and what is not? And for what Purpose have you applied to the Philosophers? That you might be never the less disappointed and unfortunate? No doubt you will be exempt from Fear and Perturbation! And what is Grief to you? For [nothing but] what we fear, when expected, affects us with Grief, when present. And what will you any longer passionately wish for? For you have a temperate and steady Desire of Things. dependent on Choice, as they are good, and present: and you have no Desire of Things independent on Choice, so as to leave room for that irrational and impetuous, and immoderately hasty Passion. 12Since then you are thus affected with regard to Things, what Man can any longer be formidable to you? What hath Man formidable to Man, either in Appearance, or Speech, or mutual Intercourse? No more than Horse to Horse, or Dog to Dog, or Bee to Bee. But Things are formidable to every one, and when-ever any Person can either confer or take away these from another, He becomes formidable too.——"How then is the Citadel" [the Seat of Tyranny] "to be destroyed?"——Not by Sword or Fire, but by Principle. For if we should demolish that which is in the Town, shall we have demolished also that of a Fever, of pretty Girls, in short, the Citadel within ourselves; and turned out the Tyrants, to whom we are subject upon all Occasions, every Day; sometimes the same, sometimes others? From hence we must begin; from hence demolish the Citadel; turn out the Tyrants: give up Body, its Parts, Riches, Power, Fame, Magistracies, Honours, Children, Brothers, Friends: esteem all these as belonging to others. And, if the Tyrants be turned out from hence, why should I besides demolish the [external] Citadel; at least, on my own account? For what doth it do to me by standing? Why should I turn out the Guards? For in what Point do they affect me? It is against others they direct their Fasces, their Staves, and their Swords. Have I ever been restrained from what I willed; or compelled against my Will? Indeed how is this possible? I have ranged my Pursuits under the Direction of God. Is it His Will, that I should have a Fever? It is my Will too. Is it His Will, that I should pursue any Thing? It is my Will too. Is it His Will that I should desire? It is my Will too. Is it His Will, that I should obtain any Thing? It is mine too. Is it not His Will? It is not mine. Is it his Will, that I should be tortured? Then it is my Will to be tortured. Is it his Will, that I should die? Then it is my Will to die. Who can any longer restrain or compell me, contrary to my own Opinion? No more than Jupiter [can be restrained]. It is thus that cautious Travellers act. Doth any one hear, that the Road is beset by Robbers? He doth not set out alone; but waits for the Retinue of an Embassador, or Quæstor, or a Proconsul: and, when he hath joined himself to their Company, goes along in Safety. Thus doth the prudent Man act in the World. There are many Robberies, Tyrants, Storms, Distresses, Losses of Things the most dear. Where is there any Refuge? How can he go along unattacked? What Retinue can he wait for, to go safely through his Journey? To what Company join himself? To some rich Man? To some Consular Senator? And what Good will that do me? He is [often] stript himself; groans and laments. And what if my Fellow-Traveller himself should turn against me, and rob me? What shall I do? I will be the Friend of Cæsar. While I am his Companion, no one will injure me. Yet, before I can become illustrious enough for this, what must I bear and suffer! How often, and by how many, must I be robbed! And then, if I do become the Friend of Cæsar, he too is mortal: and if, by any Accident, he should become my Enemy, where can I best retreat? To a Desart? Well: and doth not a Fever come there? What can be done then? Is it not possible to find a Fellow-Traveller, safe, faithful, brave, incapable of being surprised? A Person, who reasons thus, understands and considers, that, if he joins himself to God, he shall go safely through his Journey.——"How do you mean, join himself?"——That whatever is the Will of God, may be his Will too: whatever is not the Will of God, may not be his.——"How then can this be done?"——Why, how otherwise than by considering the Exertions of God's Power, and his Administration? What hath he given me, my own, and independent? What hath he reserved to himself? He hath given me whatever depends upon Choice. The Things in my Power he hath made incapable of Hindrance or Restraint. But how could he make a Body of Clay incapable of Hindrance? Therefore he hath subjected [that, and] Possessions, Furniture, House, Children, Wife, to the Revolution of the Universe. Why then do I fight against God? Why do I will to retain what depends not on Will? What is not granted absolutely; but how? In such a Manner, and for such a Time, as was thought proper. But he who gave, takes away. Why then do I resist? Not to say, that I shall be a Fool in contending with a stronger than myself; what is a prior Consideration, I shall be unjust. For whence had I these Things, when I came into the World? My Father gave them to me. And who gave them to him? And who made the Sun? Who, the Fruits? Who, the Seasons? Who, their Connexion and Relation to each other? And, after you have received all, and even your very Self from another, are you angry with the Giver; and complain, if He takes any thing away from you? Who are you; and for what Purpose did you come? Was it not He who brought you here? Was it not He who showed you the Light? Hath not He given you Assistants? Hath not He given you Senses? Hath not He given you Reason? And as whom did He bring you here? Was it not as a Mortal? Was it not as one to live, with a little Portion of Flesh upon Earth, and to see his Administration; to behold the Spectacle with him, and partake of the Festival for a short Time? After having beheld the Spectacle, and the Solemnity, then, as long as it is permitted you, will you not depart, when He leads you out, adoring and thankful for what you have heard and seen?——"No: but I would enjoy the Feast still longer."——So would the Initiated too be longer in their Initiation; so, perhaps, would the Spectators at Olympia see more Combatants. But the Solemnity is over. Go away. Depart, like a grateful and modest Person: make room for others. Others too must be born, as you were; and, when they are born, must have a Place, and Habitations, and Necessaries. But, if the first do not give way, what [Room] is there left? Why are you insatiable? Why are you unconscionable? Why do you crowd the World?——"Ay: but I would have my Wife and Children with me too."——Why, are they your's? Are they not the Giver's? Are they not His who made you also? Will you not quit what belongs to another then? Will you not yield to your Superior?——"Why then did he bring me into the World upon these Conditions?"——Well: if it is not worth your while, depart. He hath no Need of a discontented Spectator. He wants such as may share the Festival; make Part of the Chorus: who may rather extoll, applaud, celebrate the Solemnity: He will not be displeased to see the Wretched and Fearful dismissed from it. For, when they were present, they did not behave as at a Festival, nor fill a proper Place; but lamented, found fault with the Deity, Fortune, their Companions: insensible both of their Advantages, and their Powers, which they received for contrary Purposes; the Powers of Magnanimity, Nobleness of Spirit, Fortitude, and the Subject of present Enquiry, Freedom.——"For what Purpose then have I received these Things?"——To use them.——"How long?"——As long as He, who lent them, pleases. If then they are not necessary, do not attach yourself to them, and they will not be so: do not tell yourself, that they are necessary, and they are not. 13This should be our Study from Morning till Night, beginning from the least and frailest Things, from an earthen Vessel, from a Glass. Afterwards, proceed to a Suit of Clothes, a Dog a Horse, an Estate: from thence to your Self, Body, Parts of the Body, Children, Wife, Brothers. Look every-where around you, and throw them from yourself. Correct your Principles. See that nothing cleave to you, which is not your own; nothing grow to you, that may give you Pain, when it is torn away. And say, when you are daily exercising yourself as you do here, not that you act the Philosopher (admit this to be an insolent Title), but that you are asserting your Freedom. For this is true Freedom. This is the Freedom, that Diogenes gained from Antisthenes; and declared, it was impossible, that he should ever after be a Slave, to any one. Hence, when he was taken Prisoner, how did he treat the Pirates? Did he call any of them Master? (I do not mean the Name, for I am not afraid of a Word, but the Disposition from whence the Word proceeds.) How did he reprove them for feeding their Prisoners ill? How was he sold? Did he seek a Master? No: but a Slave. And when he was sold, how did he converse with his Lord? He immediately disputed with him, that he ought not to be dressed nor shaved in the männer he was; how he ought to bring up his Children. And where is the Wonder? For if the same Master had bought an Instructor for his Children, in the Exercises of the Palæstra, would he in those Exercises have treated him as a Servant, or as a Master? And, so if he had bought a Physician or an Architect? In every Subject, the Skilful must necessarily be superior to the Unskilful. What else then can he be but Master, who possesses the universal Knowledge of Life? For who is Master in a Ship? The Pilot. Why? Because whoever disobeys him is a Loser.——"But a Master can put me in Chains."——Can he do it then without being a Loser?——"So I, among others, used to think."——But, because he must be a Loser, for that very Reason it is not in his Power: for no one acts unjustly, without being a Loser.——"And what Loss doth he suffer, who puts his own Slave in Chains?"——What think you? The very putting him in Chains. This you yourself must grant, if you would preserve the Doctrine, that Man is not a wild, but a gentle Animal. For when is it, that a Vine is in a bad Condition?——"When it is in a Condition contrary to its Nature."——When a Cock?——"The same."——Therefore a Man too. What then is his Nature? To bite, and kick, and throw into Prison, and cut off Heads? No: but to do good, to assist, to indulge the Wishes of others. Whether you will, or not then, he is in a bad Condition, when-ever he acts unreasonably.——"And so, was not Socrates in a bad Condition?"——No: but his Judges and Accusers.——"Nor Helvidius, at Rome?"——No: but his Murderer.——"How do you talk?"—— Why, just as you do. You do not call that Cock in a bad Condition, which is victorious, and wounded; but that which is conquered, and comes off unhurt. Nor do you call a Dog happy, which neither hunts nor toils; but when you see him sweating, and in pain, and panting, with the Chace. In what do we talk Paradoxes? If we say, that the Evil of every thing consists in what is contrary to its Nature, is this a Paradox? Do not you say it with regard to all other Things? Why therefore, in the Case of Man alone, do you take a different Turn? But farther: it is no Paradox to say, that by Nature Man is gentle, and social, and faithful.——"This is none neither."——How then [is it a Paradox to say,] that, when he is whipped, or imprisoned, or beheaded, he is not hurt? If he suffers nobly, doth not he come off even the better, and a Gainer? But he is the Person hurt, who suffers the most miserable and shameful Evils: who, instead of a Man, becomes a Wolf, or Viper, or a Hornet. 14Come then: let us recapitulate what hath been granted. The Man who is unrestrained, who hath all Things in his Power as he wills, is free: but he who may be restrained, or compelled, or hindered, or thrown into any Condition against his Will, is a Slave.——"And who is unrestrained?"——He that desires none of those Thing, that belong to others.——"And what are those Things, which belong to others?"——Those which are not in our own Power, either to have, or not to have; or to have them of such a Sort, or in such a State. Body, therefore, belongs to another; its Parts, to another; Possessions, to another. If then you attach yourself to any of these as your own, you will be punished, as he deserves, who desires what belongs to others. This is the Way, that leads to Freedom; this the only Deliverance from Slavery; to be able at length to say, from the Bottom of one's Soul, Conduct me, Jove, and thou, O Destiny,
Where-ever Your Decrees have fix'd my Lot. 15But what say you, Philosopher? A Tyrant summons you to speak something unbecoming you. Will you say it, or will you not?——"Stay, let me consider."——Would you consider now? And what did you use to consider, when you were in the Schools? Did not you Study what Things are good, and evil, and what indifferent?——"I did."——Well: and what were the Opinions which pleased us?——"That just and fair Actions were good; unjust and base ones, evil."——Is living a Good?——"No."——Dying, an Evil?——"No."——A Prison?——"No."——And what did a mean and dishonest Speech, the betraying a Friend, or the flattering a Tyrant, appear to us?——"Evils."——Why then are you still considering, and have not already considered, and come to a Resolution? For what Sort of a Consideration is this? Whether I ought, when it is in my Power, to procure myself the greatest Good, instead of procuring myself the greatest Evil. A fine and necessary Consideration, truly, and deserving mighty Deliberation! Why do you trifle with us, Man? There never was any such Point considered: nor, if you really imagined what was fair and honest to be good, what base and dishonest, evil, and all other Things indifferent, would you ever be at such a Stand as this, or near it: but you would presently be able to distinguish, by your Understanding, as you do by your Sight. For do you ever consider, whether black is white: or light, heavy? Do not you follow the plain Evidence of your Senses? Why then do you say, that you are now considering, whether Things indifferent are to be avoided, rather than Evils? The Truth is, you have no Principles: for neither doth the one Sort of Things appear to you indifferent, but the greatest Evils; nor the other Evils, but Matters of no Concern to you. For thus you have accustomed yourself from the first. "Where am I? In the School? And is there an Audience? I talk as the Philosophers do. But am I got out from the School? Away with this Stuff, that belongs only to Scholars and Fools. This Man is accused by the Testimony of a Philosopher, his Friend: this Philosopher turns Parasite; that hires himself out for Money; a third doth it in the very Senate. Who doth not wish what appears [to himself to be right]? His Principles exclaim from within."——You are a poor cold Lump of Opinion, consisting of mere Words; on which you hang, as by a Hair. But preserve yourself firm, and make a due Use of the Appearances; remembering, that you are to be exercised in Things. In what manner do you hear, I do not say, that your Child is dead, (for how should you bear that?) but that your Oil is spilled, your Wine drank out? That any one, while you are bawling, might only say this; "Philosopher, you talk otherwise in the Schools. Why do you deceive us? Why, when you are a Worm, do you call yourself a Man?" I should be glad to be near one of these Philosophers, while he is revelling in Debauchery, that I might see how he exerts himself, and what Sayings he utters; whether he remembers his Title, and the Discourses which he hears, or speaks, or reads. 16"And what is all this to Freedom?"——Truly nothing else is, but this, whether you rich People will or not.——"And who is your Evidence of this?"——Who, but yourselves? Who have a powerful Master, and live by his Motion and Nod, and faint away, if he doth but look sternly upon you: who pay your Court to old Men, and old Women, and say, "I cannot do this, it is not in my Power." Why is it not in your Power? Did not you just now contradict me, and say, you were free?——"But Aprylla hath forbid me."——Speak the Truth then, Slave, and do not run away from your Masters; nor deny them, nor dare to assert your Freedom, when you have so many Proofs of your Slavery. One might indeed find some Excuse for a Person, compelled by Love to do something contrary to his Opinion, even when at the same time he sees what is best, and yet hath not Resolution enough to follow it; since he is with-held by something violent, and in some measure, divine. But who can bear you, who are in Love with old Men and old Women; and wipe their Noses, and wash them, and bribe them with Presents, and wait upon them when they are sick, like a Slave; at the same time wishing they may die, and enquiring of the Physician, whether their Distemper be yet mortal? And again, when for these great and venerable Magistracies and Honours, you kiss the Hands of the Slaves of others; so that you are the Slave of those who are not free themselves! And then you walk about in State, a Prætor, or a Consul. Do not I know how you came to be Prætor; whence you received the Consulship; who gave it you? For my own Part, I would not even live, if I must live by Felicio's Means, and bear his Pride, and slavish Insolence. For I know what a Slave is, blinded by what he thinks good Fortune. 17Are you free yourself then? (It will be said.) By Heaven I wish and pray for it. But I cannot yet face my Masters. I still pay a Regard to my Body, and set a great Value on keeping it whole; though at the same time it is not whole. But I can show you one who was free, that you may no longer seek an Example. Diogenes was free.——"How so?"——Not because he was of free Parents, for he was not; but because he was so himself; because he had cast away all the Handles of Slavery; nor was there any Way of getting at him, nor any-where to lay hold on him, to enslave him. Every thing sat loose upon him, every thing only just hung on. If you took hold on his Possessions, he would rather let them go, than follow you for them: if on his Leg, he let go his Leg: if his Body, he let go his Body: Acquaintance, Friends, Country, just the same. For he knew whence he had them, and from whom, and upon what Conditions he received them. But he would never have forsaken his true Parents the Gods, and his real Country; nor have suffered any one to be more dutiful and obedient to them than he: nor would any one have died more readily for his Country than he. For he never sought when it would be proper for him to act for the sake of any thing else, [except his real Country the Universe;] but he remembered, that every thing that exists is from thence, and carried on by it, and commanded by its Ruler. Accordingly, see what he himself says and writes. "Upon this Account, says he, O Diogenes, it is in your Power to converse as you will with the Persian Monarch, and with Archidamus, King of the Lacedemonians."——Was it because he was born of free Parents? Or was it because they were descended from Slaves, that all the Athenians, and all the Lacedemonians, and Corinthians, could not converse with them as they pleased; but feared and paid Court to them? Why then is it in your Power, Diogenes? "Because I do not esteem this sorry Body as my own. Because I want nothing. Because these [Principles,] and nothing else, are a Law to me." These were the Things that suffered him to be free. § 18. And that you may not think, that I show you the Example of a Man clear of Incumbrances; without a Wife or Children, or Country or Friends, or Relations, to bend and draw him aside: take Socrates, and consider him, who had a Wife and Children, but not as his own; a Country, Friends, Relations; but only as long as it was proper, and in the manner that was proper; and all these he submitted to the Law, and to the Obedience due to it. Hence, when it was proper to fight, he was the first to go out, and exposed himself to Danger, without the least Reserve. But when he was sent by the Thirty Tyrants to apprehend Leo; because he esteemed it a base Action, he did not deliberate about it; though he knew, that, perhaps, he might die for it. But what did that signify to him? For it was something else that he wanted to preserve, not his paultry Flesh: but his Fidelity, his Honour, free from Attack, or Subjection. And afterwards, when he was to make a Defence for his Life, doth he behave like one who had Children? Or a Wife? No: but like a single Man. And how doth he behave, when he was to drink the Poison? When he might have escaped, and Crito persuaded him to get out of Prison, for the Sake of his Children, what doth he say? Doth he esteem it a fortunate Opportunity? How should he? But he considers what is becoming, and neither sees nor regards any thing else. "For I am not desirous, says he, to preserve this pitiful Body; but that [Part of me] which is improved and preserved by Justice, and impaired and destroyed by Injustice." Socrates is not to be basely preserved. He, who refused to vote for what the Athenians commanded: he, who contemned the Thirty Tyrants: he, who held such Discourses on Virtue, and moral Beauty: such a Man is not to be preserved by a base Action; but is preserved by dying, not by running away. For even a good Actor is preserved by leaving off when he ought; not by going on to act beyond his Time. "What then will become of your Children?" "If I had gone away into Thessaly, you would have taken care of them; and will there be no one to take care of them, when I am departed to Hades?" You see how he ridicules, and plays with Death. But, if it had been you or I, we should presently have proved, by philosophical Arguments, that those, who act unjustly, are to be repaid in their own Way; and should have added, "If I escape, I shall be of Use to many; if I die, to none." Nay, if it had been necessary, we should have crept through a Mouse-hole to get away. But how should we have been of Use to any? For where must they have dwelt? If we were useful alive, should we not be of still more Use to Mankind, by dying when we ought, and as we ought? And now the Remembrance of the Death of Socrates is not less, but even more useful to the World, than that of the Things which he did and said when alive. 19Study these Points, these Principles, these Discourses; contemplate these Examples, if you would be free, if you desire the Thing in Proportion to its Value. And where is the Wonder, that you should purchase so great a Thing at the Price of others, so many, and so great? Some hang themselves, others break their Necks, and sometimes even whole Cities have been destroyed, for that which is reputed Freedom: and will not you, for the Sake of the true, and secure, and inviolable Freedom, repay God what he hath given, when he demands it? Will you not study, not only as Plato says, to die, but to be tortured, and banished, and scourged; and, in short, to give up all that belongs to others. If not, you will be a Slave among Slaves, though you were ten thousand Times a Consul: and, even though you should rise to the Palace, you will be never the less so. And you will feel, that though Philosophers (as Cleanthes says) do, perhaps, talk contrary to common Opinion, yet not contrary to Reason. For you will find it true in fact, that the Things that are eagerly followed and admired, are of no Use to those, who have gained them: while they who have not yet gained them, imagine, that, if they are acquired, every Good will come along with them: and then, when they are acquired, there is the same Feverishness, the same Agitation, the same Nauseating, and the same Desire of what is absent. For Freedom is not procured by a full Enjoyment of what is desired, but by proving the Desire to be a wrong one. And, in order to know that this is true, take the same Pains about these, which you have taken about other Things. Lie awake to acquire a Set of Principles, that will make you free. Instead of a rich old Man, pay your Court to a Philosopher. Be seen about his Doors. You will not get any Disgrace by being seen there. You will not return empty, or unprofited, if you go as you ought. However, try at least. The Trial is not dishonourable.
Carter’s notes (30)
- Whosoever committeth Sin, is the Servant of Sin. John viii. 34
- They answered him, We be Abraham's Seed, and were never in Bondage to any Man: how sayest thou, Ye shall be made free? John vi 33.
- Mr. Upton's Copy transposes many Pages of this Chapter to their right Place; which, in others, were joined to the last Chapter of the Third Book.
- A Character in one of the Comedies of Menander, called The Hated Lover.
- The Name of a Slave.
- Wolfius, very rightly, for καλον reads κακον.
- See p. 99. Note (d).
- It seems necessary, that οθεν and οπου should be οταν and οπως; and they are so translated.
- A Gold Ring was the peculiar Ornament of the Roman Knights, by which they were distinguished from the Plebeians. Upton.
- Something is here wanting in the Original.
- Αναλγητος for αναληθης. Upton.
- The Stoics held the wise Man to be the only real King. Upton.
- The Feast of Saturn, in which the Slaves had a Liberty of sitting at Table with their Masters; in Memory of the Equality of Conditions under his Reign.
- Beasts of Burthen and Carriages are pressed, for the Use of Armies, when Need requires.
- Epictetus here personates one desirous of recovering the Liberty of the City, in which he lives. There were Citadels, erected from time to time in Greek Cities, to support Tyrants: and they and the Citadels were destroyed together, whenever it could be done.
- The Translation here is agreeable to Mr. Upton's Copy.
- See B. I. c. 1. §. 3.
- The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away. Job i. 21.
- And is this all the Comfort, every serious Reader will be apt to say, which one of the best Philosophers, in one of his noblest Discourses, can give to the good Man under severe Distress? "Either tell yourself, that present Suffering, void of future Hope, is no Evil; or give up your Existence, and mingle with the Elements of the Universe!" Unspeakably more rational, and more worthy of infinite Goodness, is our blessed Master's Exhortation to the persecuted Christian: "Rejoice, and be exceeding glad, for great is your Reward in Heaven."
- Mr. Upton's Conjecture.
- See p. 137. Note (c).
- The Translation here follows a different Pointing from Μr. Upton, Πως λεγεις; ως και συ Αλεκτρυονα, &c.
- This Answer implies a silent Concession, that it is no Paradox to affirm, the Evil of every thing to consist, in what is contrary to its Nature.
- The Translation here follows Mr. Upton's Conjecture.
- There is much Obscurity, and some Variety of Reading, in several Lines of the Original, in this Place; and I am not certain, whether the Translation hath given the true Sense; but it is the best I could make of it.
- Probably some rich old Woman, from whom the Speaker had Expectations.
- Epictetus here alludes to his own Lameness. See p. 28 and 50.
- This Passage hath great Difficulties in the Original. I have given it what appeared to me the best Sense. But I am still doubtful.
- Socrates, with Four other Persons, was commanded by the Thirty Tyrants of Athens to fetch Leo from the Isle of Salamis, in order to be put to Death. His Companions executed their Commission; but Socrates remained at home, and chose rather to expose his Life to the Fury of the Tyrants, than be accessary to the Death of an innocent Person. He would most probably have fallen a Sacrifice to their Vengeance, if the Oligarchy had not shortly after been dissolved. See Plato's Apology.
- Mr. Upton's Copy.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Of freedom.
He is free who lives as he likes; who is not subject to compulsion, to restraint, or to violence; whose pursuits are unhindered, his desires successful, his aversions unincurred. Who, then, would wish to lead a wrong course of life? No one. Who would live deceived, erring, unjust, dissolute, discontented, dejected? No one. No wicked man, then, lives as he likes; therefore no such man is free. And who would live in sorrow, fear, envy, pity, with disappointed desires and unavailing aversions? No one. Do we then find any of the wicked exempt from these evils? Not one. Consequently, then, they are not free.
If some person who has been twice consul should hear this, he will forgive you, provided you add, but you are wise, and this has no reference to you. But if you tell him the truth, that, in point of slavery, he does not necessarily differ from those who have been thrice sold, what but chastisement can you expect? For how, he says, am I a slave? My father was free, my mother free. Besides, I am a senator, too, and the friend of Caesar, and have been twice consul, and have myself many slaves. In the first place, most worthy sir, perhaps your father too was a slave of the same kind; and your mother, and your grandfather, and all your series of ancestors. But even were they ever so free, what is that to you? For what if they were of a generous, you of a mean spirit; they brave, and you a coward; they sober, and you dissolute?
But what, he says, has this to do with my being a slave? Is it no part of slavery to act against your will, under compulsion, and lamenting? Be it so. But who can compel me but the master of all, Caesar? By your own confession, then, you have one master; and let not his being, as you say, master of all, give you any comfort; for then you are merely a slave in a large family. Thus the Nicopolitans, too, frequently cry out, By the genius of Caesar we are free!
For the present, however, if you please, we will let Caesar alone. But tell me this. Have you never been in love with any one, either of a servile or liberal condition? Why, what has that to do with being slave or free? Were you never commanded anything by your mistress that you did not choose? Have you never flattered your fair slave? Have you never kissed her feet? And yet if you were commanded to kiss Caesar’s feet, you would think it an outrage and an excess of tyranny. What else is this than slavery? Have you never gone out by night where you did not desire? Have you never spent more than you chose? Have you not sometimes uttered your words with sighs and groans? Have you never borne to be reviled and shut out of doors? But if you are ashamed to confess your own follies, see what Thrasonides says and does; who, after having fought more battles perhaps than you, went out by night, when [his slaves Geta would not dare to go; nay, had he been compelled to do it, would have gone bewailing and lamenting the bitterness of servitude. And what says he afterwards? contemptible girl has enslaved me, whom no enemy ever enslaved. Wretch! to be the slave of a girl and a contemptible girl too! Why, then, do you still call yourself free? Why do you boast your military expeditions? Then he calls for a sword, and is angry with the person who, out of kindness, denies it; and sends presents to her who hates him; and begs, and weeps, and then again is elated on every little success. But what elation? Is he raised above desire or fear?
Consider what is our idea of freedom in animals. Some keep tame lions, and feed them and even lead them about; and who will say that any such lion is free? Nay, does he not live the more slavishly the more he lives at ease? And who that had sense and reason would wish to be one of those lions? Again, how much will caged birds suffer in trying to escape? Nay, some of them starve themselves rather than undergo such a life; others are saved only with difficulty and in a pining condition; and the moment they find any opening, out they go. Such a desire have they for their natural freedom, and to be at their own disposal, and unrestrained. And what harm can this confinement do you? What say you? I was born to fly where I please, to live in the open air, to sing when I please. You deprive me of all this, and then ask what harm I suffer?
Hence we will allow those only to be free who will not endure captivity, but, so soon as they are taken, die and so escape. Thus Diogenes somewhere says that the only way to freedom is to die with ease. And he writes to the Persian king, You can no more enslave the Athenians than you can fish. How? Can I not get possession of them? If you do, said he, they will leave you, and be gone like fish. For catch a fish, and it dies. And if the Athenians, too, die as soon as you have caught them, of what use are your warlike preparations? This is the voice of a free man who had examined the matter in earnest, and, as it might be expected, found it all out. But if you seek it where it is not, what wonder if you never find it?
A slave wishes to be immediately set free. Think you it is because he is desirous to pay his fee [of manumission] to the officer? No, but because he fancies that, for want of acquiring his freedom, he has hitherto lived under restraint and unprosperously. If I am once set free, he says, it is all prosperity; I care for no one; I can speak to all as being their equal and on a level with them. I go where I will, I come when and how I will. He is at last made free, and presently having nowhere to eat he seeks whom he may flatter, with whom he may sup. He then either submits to the basest and most infamous degradation, and if he can obtain admission to some great man’s table, falls into a slavery much worse than the former; or perhaps, if the ignorant fellow should grow rich, he doats upon some girl, laments, and is unhappy, and wishes for slavery again. For what harm did it do me? Another clothed me, another shod me, another fed me, another took care of me when I was sick. It was but in a few things, by way of return, I used to serve him. But now, miserable wretch! what do I suffer, in being a slave to many, instead of one! Yet, if I can be promoted to equestrian rank, I shall live in the utmost prosperity and happiness. In order to obtain this, he first deservedly suffers; and as soon as he has obtained it, it is all the same again. But then, he says, if I do but get a military command, I shall be delivered from all my troubles. He gets a military command. He suffers as much as the vilest rogue of a slave; and, nevertheless, he asks for a second command and a third; and when he has put the finishing touch, and is made a senator, then he is a slave indeed. When he comes into the public assembly, it is then that he undergoes his finest and most splendid slavery.
[It is needful] not to be foolish, but to learn what Socrates taught, the nature of things; and not rashly to apply general principles to particulars. For the cause of all human evils is the not being able to apply general principles to special cases. But different people have different grounds of complaint; one, for instance, that he is sick. That is not the trouble; it is in his principles. Another, that he is poor; another, that he has a harsh father and mother; another, that he is not in the good graces of Caesar. This is nothing else but not understanding how to apply our principles. For who has not an idea of evil, that it is hurtful; that it is to be avoided; that it is by all means to be prudently guarded against? One principle does not contradict another, except when it comes to be applied. What, then, is this evil,—-thus hurtful and to be avoided? Not to be the friend of Caesar, says some one. He is gone; he has failed in applying his principles; he is embarrassed; he seeks what is nothing to the purpose. For if he comes to be Caesar’s friend, he is still no nearer to what he sought. For what is it that every man seeks? To be secure, to be happy, to do what he pleases without restraint and without compulsion. When he becomes the friend of Caesar, then does he cease to be restrained; to be compelled? Is he secure? Is he happy? Whom shall we ask? Whom can we better credit than this very man who has been his friend? Come forth and tell us whether you sleep more quietly now than before you were the friend of Caesar. You presently hear him cry, Leave off, for Heaven’s sake! and do not insult me. You know not the miseries I suffer; there is no sleep for me; but one comes and says that Caesar is already awake; another, that he is just going out. Then follow perturbations, then cares. Well, and when did you use to sup the more pleasantly,—formerly, or now? Hear what he says about this too. When he is not invited, he is distracted; and if he is, he sups like a slave with his master, solicitous all the while not to say or do anything foolish. And what think you? Is he afraid of being whipped like a slave? No such easy penalty. No; but rather, as becomes so great a man, Caesar’s friend, of losing his head. And when did you bathe the more quietly; when did you perform your exercises the more at your leisure; in short, which life would you rather wish to live,—your present, or the former? I could swear there is no one so stupid and insensible as not to deplore his miseries, in proportion as he is the more the friend of Caesar.
Since, then, neither they who are called kings nor the friends of kings live as they like, who, then, after all, is free? Seek, and you will find; for you are furnished by nature with means for discovering the truth. But if you are not able by these alone to find the consequence, hear them who have sought it. What do they say? Do you think freedom a good? The greatest. Can any one, then, who attains the greatest good be unhappy or unsuccessful in his affairs? No. As many, therefore, as you see unhappy, lamenting, unprosperous,—confidently pronounce them not free. I do. Henceforth, then, we have done with buying and selling, and such like stated conditions of becoming slaves. For if these concessions hold, then, whether the unhappy man be a great or a little king,—of consular or bi-consular dignity,—he is not free. Agreed.
Further, then, answer me this: do you think freedom to be something great and noble and valuable? How should I not? Is it possible, then, that he who acquires anything so great and valuable and noble should be of an abject spirit? It is not. Whenever, then, you see any one subject to another, and flattering him contrary to his own opinion, confidently say that he too is not free; and not only when he does this for a supper, but even if it be for a government, nay, a consulship. Call those indeed little slaves who act thus for the sake of little things; and call the others, as they deserve, great slaves. Be this, too, agreed. Well, do you think freedom to be something independent and self-determined? How can it be otherwise? Him, then, whom it is in the power of another to restrain or to compel, affirm confidently to be by no means free. And do not heed his grandfathers or great-grandfathers, or inquire whether he has been bought or sold; but if you hear him say from his heart and with emotion, my master, though twelve Lictors should march before him, call him a slave. And if you should hear him say, Wretch that I am! what do I suffer! call him a slave. In short, if you see him wailing, complaining, unprosperous, call him a slave, even in purple.
Suppose, then, that he does nothing of all this. Do not yet say that he is free; but learn whether his principles are in any event liable to compulsion, to restraint, or disappointment; and if you find this to be the case, call him a slave, keeping holiday during the Saturnalia. Say that his master is abroad; that he will come presently; and you will know what he suffers. Who will come? Whoever has the power either of bestowing or of taking away any of the things he desires.
Have we so many masters, then? We have. For, prior to all such, we have the things themselves for our masters. Now they are many; and it is through these that the men who control the things inevitably become our masters too. For no one fears Caesar himself; but death, banishment, confiscation, prison, disgrace. Nor does any one love Caesar unless he be a person of great worth; but we love riches, the tribunate, the praetorship, the consulship. When we love or hate or fear such things, they who have the disposal of them must necessarily be our masters. Hence we even worship them as gods. For we consider that whoever has the disposal of the greatest advantages is a deity; and then further reason falsely, But such a one has the control of the greatest advantages; therefore he is a deity. For if we reason falsely, the final inference must be also false.
What is it, then, that makes a man free and independent? For neither riches, nor consulship, nor the command of provinces nor of kingdoms, can make him so; but something else must be found. What is it that keeps any one from being hindered and restrained in penmanship, for instance? The science of penmanship. In music? The science of music. Therefore in life too, it must be the science of living. As you have heard it in general, then, consider it likewise in particulars. Is it possible for him to be unrestrained who desires any of those things that are within the power of others? No. Can he avoid being hindered? No. Therefore neither can he be free. Consider, then, whether we have nothing or everything in our own sole power,—or whether some things are in our own power and some in that of others. What do you mean? When you would have your body perfect, is it in your own power, or is it not? It is not. When you would be healthy? It is not. When you would be handsome? It is not. When you would live or die? It is not. Body then is not our own; but is subject to everything that proves stronger than itself. Agreed. Well; is it in your own power to have an estate when you please, and such a one as you please? No. Slaves? No. Clothes? No. A house? No. Horses? Indeed, none of these. Well, if you desire ever so earnestly to have your children live, or your wife, or your brother, or your friends, is it in your own power? No, it is not.
Will you then say that there is nothing independent, which is in your own power alone, and unalienable? See if you have anything of this sort. I do not know. But consider it thus: can any one make you assent to a falsehood? No one. In the matter of assent, then, you are unrestrained and unhindered. Agreed. Well, and can any one compel you to exert your aims towards what you do not like? He can. For when he threatens me with death, or fetters, he thus compels me. If, then, you were to despise dying or being fettered, would you any longer regard him? No. Is despising death, then, an action in our power, or is it not? It is. Is it therefore in your power also to exert your aims towards anything, or is it not? Agreed that it is. But in whose power is my avoiding anything? This, too, is in your own. What then if, when I am exerting myself to walk, any one should restrain me? What part of you can he restrain? Can he restrain your assent? No, but my body. Ay, as he may a stone. Be it so. But still I cease to walk. And who claimed that walking was one of the actions that cannot be restrained? For I only said that your exerting yourself towards it could not be restrained. But wherever the body and its assistance are essential, you have already heard that nothing is in your power. Be this, too, agreed. And can any one compel you to desire against your Will? No one. Or to propose, or intend, or, in short, not to be beguiled by the appearances of things? Nor this. But when I desire anything, he can restrain me from obtaining what I desire. If you desire anything that is truly within your reach, and that cannot be restrained, how can he restrain you? By no means. And pray who claims that he who longs for what depends on another will be free from restraint?
May I not long for health, then? By no means; nor for anything else that depends on another; for what is not in your own power, either to procure or to preserve when you will, that belongs to another. Keep off not only your hands from it, but even more than these, your desires. Otherwise you have given yourself up as a slave; you have put your neck under the yoke, if you admire any of the things which are not your own, but which are subject and mortal, to which of them soever you are attached. Is not my hand my own? It is a part of you, but it is by nature clay, liable to restraint, to compulsion; a slave to everything stronger than itself. And why do I say, your hand? You ought to hold your whole body but as a useful ass, with a pack-saddle on, so long as may be, so long as it is allowed you. But if there should come a military conscription, and a soldier should lay hold on it, let it go. Do not resist, or murmur; otherwise you will be first beaten and lose the ass after all. And since you are thus to regard even the body itself, think what remains to do concerning things to be provided for the sake of the body. If that be an ass, the rest are but bridles, pack-saddles, shoes, oats, hay for him. Let these go too. Quit them yet more easily and expeditiously. And when you are thus prepared and trained to distinguish what belongs to others from your own; what is liable to restraint from what is not; to esteem the one your own property, but not the other; to keep your desire, to keep your aversion, carefully regulated by this point,—whom have you any longer to fear? No one. For about what should you be afraid,—about what is your own, in which consists the essence of good and evil? And who has any power over this? Who can take it away? Who can hinder you, any more than God can be hindered? But are you afraid for body, for possessions, for what belongs to others, for what is nothing to you? And what have you been studying all this while, but to distinguish between your own and that which is not your own; what is in your power and what is not in your power; what is liable to restraint and what is not? And for what purpose have you applied to the philosophers,—that you might nevertheless be disappointed and unfortunate? No doubt you will be exempt from fear and perturbation! And what is grief to you? For whatsoever we anticipate with fear, we endure with grief. And for what will you any longer passionately wish? For you have acquired a temperate and steady desire of things dependent on will, since they are accessible and desirable; and you have no desire of things uncontrollable by will. so as to leave room for that irrational, and impetuous, and precipitate passion.
Since then you are thus affected with regard to things, what man can any longer be formidable to you? What has man that he can be formidable to man, either in appearance, or speech, or mutual intercourse? No more than horse to horse, or dog to dog, or bee to bee. But things are formidable to every one, and whenever any person can either give these to another, or take them away, he becomes formidable too. How, then, is this citadel to be destroyed? Not by sword or fire, but by principle. For if we should demolish the visible citadel, shall we have demolished also that of some fever, of some fair woman,—in short, the citadel [of temptation] within ourselves; and have turned out the tyrants to whom we are subject upon all occasions and every day, sometimes the same, sometimes others? From hence we must begin; hence demolish the citadel, and turn out the tyrants,—give up body, members, riches, power, fame, magistracies, honors, children, brothers, friends; esteem all these as belonging to others. And if the tyrants be turned out from hence, why should I also demolish the external citadel, at least on my own account? For what harm to me from its standing? Why should I turn out the guards? For in what point do they affect me? It is against others that they direct their fasces, their staves, and their swords. Have I ever been restrained from what I willed, or compelled against my will? Indeed, how is this possible? I have placed my pursuits under the direction of God. Is it his will that I should have a fever? It is my will too. Is it his will that I should pursue anything? It is my will too. Is it his will that I should desire? It is my will too. Is it his will that I should obtain anything? It is mine too. Is it not his will? It is not mine. Is it his will that I should be tortured? Then it is my will to be tortured. Is it his will that I should die? Then it is my will to die. Who can any longer restrain or compel me, contrary to my own opinion? No more than Zeus.
It is thus that cautious travellers act. Does some one hear that the road is beset by robbers? He does not set out alone, but waits for the retinue of an ambassador or quaestor or proconsul, and when he has joined himself to their company, goes along in safety. Thus does the prudent man act in the world. There are many robberies, tyrants, storms, distresses, losses of things most dear. Where is there any refuge? How can he go alone unattacked? What retinue can he wait for, to go safely through his journey? To what company shall he join himself,—to some rich man; to some consular senator? And what good will that do me? He may be robbed himself, groaning and lamenting. And what if my fellow-traveller himself should turn against me and rob me? What shall I do? I say I will be the friend of Caesar. While I am his companion, no one will injure me, Yet before I can become illustrious enough for this, what must I bear and suffer! How often, and by how many, must I be robbed! And then, if I do become the friend of Caesar, he too is mortal; and if, by any accident, he should become my enemy, where can I best retreat,—to a desert? Well, and may not a fever come there? What can be done, then? Is it not possible to find a fellow-traveller safe, faithful, brave, incapable of being surprised? A person who reasons thus, understands and considers that if he joins himself to God, he shall go safely through his journey.
How do you mean, join himself? That whatever is the will of God may be his will too; that whatever is not the will of God may not be his. How, then, can this be done? Why, how otherwise than by considering the workings of God’s power and his administration? What has he given me to be my own, and independent? What has he reserved to himself? He has given me whatever depends on will. The things within my power he has made incapable of hindrance or restraint. Bat how could he make a body of clay incapable of hindrance? Therefore he has subjected possessions, furniture, house, children, wife, to the revolutions of the universe. Why, then, do I fight against God? Why do I will to retain that which depends not on will; that which is not granted absolutely, but how,—in such a manner and for such a time as was thought proper? But he who gave takes away. Why, then, do I resist? Besides being a fool, in contending with a stronger than my self, I shall be unjust, which is a more important consideration. For whence had I these things, when I came into the world? My father gave them to me. And who gave them to him? And who made the sun; who the fruits; who the seasons; who their connection and relations with each other? And after you have received all, and even your very self, from another, are you angry with the giver, and do you complain, if he takes anything away from you? Who are you; and for what purpose did you come? Was it not he who brought you here? Was it not he who showed you the light? Hath not he given you companions? Hath not he given you senses? Hath not he given you reason? And as whom did he bring you here? Was it not as a mortal? Was it not as one to live with a little portion of flesh upon earth, and to see his administration; to behold the spectacle with him, and partake of the festival for a short time? After having beheld the spectacle and the solemnity, then, as long as it is permitted you, will you not depart when he leads you out, adoring and thankful for what you have heard and seen? No; but I would enjoy the feast still longer. So would the initiated [in the mysteries], too, be longer in their initiation; so, perhaps, would the spectators at Olympia see more combatants. But the solemnity is over. Go away. Depart like a grateful and modest person; make room for others. Others, too, must be born as you were; and when they are born must have a place, and habitations, and necessaries. But if the first do not give way, what room is there left? Why are you insatiable, unconscionable? Why do you crowd the world?
Ay, but I would have my wife and children with me too. Why, are they yours? Are they not the Giver’s? Are they not his who made you also? Will you not then quit what belongs to another? Will you not yield to your Superior? Why, then, did he bring me into the world upon these conditions? Well, if it is not worth your while, depart. He has no need of a discontented spectator. He wants such as will share the festival; make part of the chorus; who will extol, applaud, celebrate the solemnity. He will not be displeased to see the wretched and fearful dismissed from it. For when they were present they did not behave as at a festival, nor fill a proper place, but lamented, found fault with the Deity, with their fortune, with their companions. They were insensible both of their advantages and of the powers which they received for far different purposes,—the powers of magnanimity, nobleness of spirit, fortitude, and that which now concerns us, freedom. For what purpose, then, have I received these things? To use them. How long? As long as he who lent them pleases. If, then, they are not necessary, do not make an idol of them, and they will not be so; do not tell yourself that they are necessary, when they are not.
This should be our study from morning till night beginning with the least and frailest things, as with earthenware, with glassware. Afterwards proceed to a suit of clothes, a dog, a horse, an estate; thence to yourself, body, members, children, wife, brothers. Look everywhere around you, and be able to detach yourself from these things. Correct your principles. Permit nothing to cleave to you that is not your own; nothing to grow to you that may give you agony when it is torn away. And say, when you are daily training yourself as you do here, not that you act the philosopher, which may be a presumptuous claim, but that you are asserting your freedom. For this is true freedom. This is the freedom that Diogenes gained from Antisthenes, and declared it was impossible that he should ever after be a slave to any one. Hence, when he was taken prisoner, how did he treat the pirates? Did he call any of them master? I do not mean the name, for I am not afraid of a word, but of the disposition from whence the word proceeds. How did he reprove them for feeding their prisoners ill? How was he sold? Did he seek a master? No, but a slave. And when he was sold, how did he converse with his lord? He immediately disputed with him whether he ought to be dressed or shaved in the manner he was; and how he ought to bring up his children. And where is the wonder? For if the same master had bought some one to instruct his children in gymnastic exercises, would he in those exercises have treated him as a servant or as a master? And so if he had bought a physician or an architect. In every department the skilful must necessarily be superior to the unskilful. What else, then, can he be but master, who possesses the universal knowledge of life? For who is master in a ship? The pilot. Why? Because whoever disobeys him is a loser. But a master can put me in chains. Can he do it, then, without being a loser? I think not, indeed. But because he must be a loser, he evidently must not do it; for no one acts unjustly without being a loser. And how does he suffer, who puts his own slave in chains? What think you? From the very fact of chaining him. This you yourself must grant, if you would hold to the doctrine that man is not naturally a wild, but a gentle, animal. For when is it that a vine is in a bad condition? When it is in a condition contrary to its nature. How is it with a cock? The same. It is therefore the same with a man also. What is his nature,—to bite and kick and throw into prison and cut off heads? No, but to do good, to assist, to indulge the wishes of others. Whether you will or not, then, he is in a bad condition whenever he acts unreasonably. And so was not Socrates in a bad condition? No, but his judges and accusers. Nor Helvidius, at Rome? No, but his murderer. How do you talk? Why, just as you do. You do not call that cock in a bad condition which is victorious, and yet wounded; but that which is conquered and comes off unhurt. Nor do you call a dog happy which neither hunts nor toils; but when you see him perspiring, and distressed, and panting with the chase. In what do we talk paradoxes? If we say that the evil of everything consists in what is contrary to its nature, is this a paradox? Do you not say it with regard to other things? Why, therefore, in the case of man alone, do you take a different view? But further, it is no paradox to say that by nature man is gentle and social and faithful. This is none. How then [is it a paradox to say] that, when he is whipped, or imprisoned, or beheaded, he is not hurt? If he suffers nobly, does he not come off even the better and a gainer? But he is the person hurt who suffers the most miserable and shameful evils; who, instead of a man, becomes a wolf, a viper, or a hornet.
Come, then; let us recapitulate what has been granted. The man who is unrestrained, who has all things in his power as he wills, is free; but he who may be restrained or compelled or hindered, or thrown into any condition against his will, is a slave. And who is unrestrained? He who desires none of those things that belong to others. And what are those things which belong to others? Those which are not in our own power, either to have or not to have; or to have them thus or so. Body, therefore, belongs to another; its parts to another; property to another. If, then, you attach yourself to any of these as your own, you will be punished as he deserves who desires what belongs to others. This is the way that leads to freedom, this the only deliverance from slavery, to be able at length to say, from the bottom of one’s soul,— Conduct me, Zeus, and thou, O Destiny,
Wherever your decrees have fixed my lot.
But what say you, philosopher? A tyrant calls upon you to speak something unbecoming you. Will you say it, or will you not? Stay, let me consider. Would you consider now? And what did you use to consider when you were in the schools? Did you not study what things were good and evil, and what indifferent? did. Well, and what were the opinions which pleased us? That just and fair actions were good; unjust and base ones, evil. Is living a good? No. Dying, an evil? No. A prison? No. And what did a mean and dishonest speech, the betraying a friend, or the flattering a tyrant, appear to us? Evils. Why, then, are you still considering, and have not already considered and come to a resolution? For what sort of a consideration is this: Whether I ought, when it is in my power, to procure myself the greatest good, instead of procuring myself the greatest evil. A fine and necessary consideration, truly, and deserving mighty deliberation! Why do you trifle with us, man? No one ever needed to consider any such point; nor, if you really imagined things fair and honest to be good, things base and dishonest to be evil, and all other things indifferent, would you ever be in such a perplexity as this, or near it; but you would presently be able to distinguish by your understanding as you do by your sight. For do you ever have to consider whether black is white, or whether light is heavy? Do you not follow the plain evidence of your senses? Why, then, do you say that you are now considering whether things indifferent are to be avoided, rather than evils? The truth is, you have no principles; for things indifferent do not impress you as such, but as the greatest evils; and these last, on the other hand, as things of no importance.
For thus has been your practice from the first. Where am I? If I am in the school and there is an audience, I talk as the philosophers do; but if I am out of the school, then away with this stuff that belongs only to scholars and fools. This man is accused by the testimony of a philosopher, his friend; this philosopher turns parasite; another hires himself out for money; a third does that in the very senate. When one is not governed by appearances, then his principles speak for themselves. You are a poor cold lump of prejudice, consisting of mere phrases, on which you hang as by a hair. You should preserve yourself firm and practical, remembering that you are to deal with real things. In what manner do you hear,—I will not say that your child is dead, for how could you possibly bear that?—but that your oil is spilled, your wine consumed? Would that some one, while you are bawling, would only say this: Philosopher, you talk quite otherwise when in the schools. Why do you deceive us? Why, when you are a worm, do you call yourself a man? I should be glad to be near one of these philosophers while he is revelling in debauchery, that I might see how he demeans himself, and what sayings he utters; whether he remembers the title he bears and the discourses which he hears, or speaks, or reads.
And what is all this to freedom? It lies in nothing else than this,—whether you rich people approve or not. And who affords evidence of this? Who but yourselves? You who have a powerful master, and live by his motion and nod, and faint away if he does but look sternly upon you, who pay your court to old men and old women, and say, cannot do this or that, it is not in my power. Why is it not in your power? Did you not just now contradict me, and say you were free? But Aprylla has forbidden me. Speak the truth, then, slave, and do not run away from your masters nor deny them, nor dare to assert your freedom, when you have so many proofs of your slavery. One might indeed find some excuse for a person compelled by love to do something contrary to his opinion, even when at the same time he sees what is best without having resolution enough to follow it, since he is withheld by something overpowering, and in some measure divine. But who can bear with you, who are in love with old men and old women, and perform menial offices for them, and bribe them with presents, and wait upon them like a slave when they are sick; at the same time wishing they may die, and inquiring of the physician whether their distemper be yet mortal? And again, when for these great and venerable magistracies and honors you kiss the hands of the slaves of others; so that you are the slave of those who are not free themselves! And then you walk about in state, a praetor or a consul. Do I not know how you came to be praetor; whence you received the consulship; who gave it to you? For my own part, I would not even live, if I must live by Felicio’s means, and bear his pride and slavish insolence. For I know what a slave is, blinded by what he thinks good fortune.
Are you free yourself, then? you may ask. By Heaven, I wish and pray for it. But I own I cannot yet face my masters. I still pay a regard to my body, and set a great value on keeping it whole; though, for that matter, it is not whole. But I can show you one who was free, that you may no longer seek an example. Diogenes was free. How so? Not because he was of free parents, for he was not; but because he was so in himself; because he had cast away all which gives a handle to slavery; nor was there any way of getting at him, nor anywhere to lay hold on him, to enslave him. Everything sat loose upon him; everything only just hung on. If you took hold on his possessions, he would rather let them go than follow you for them; if on his leg, he let go his leg; if his body, he let go his body; acquaintance, friends, country, just the same. For he knew whence he had them, and from whom, and upon what conditions he received them. But he would never have forsaken his true parents, the gods, and his real country [the universe]; nor have suffered any one to be more dutiful and obedient to them than he; nor would any one have died more readily for his country than he. He never had to inquire whether he should act for the good of the whole universe; for he remembered that everything that exists belongs to that administration, and is commanded by its ruler. Accordingly, see what he himself says and writes. Upon this account, said he, Diogenes, it is in your power to converse as you will with the Persian monarch and with Archidamus, king of the Lacedemonians. Was it because he was born of free parents? Or was it because they were descended from slaves, that all the Athenians, and all the Lacedemonians, and Corinthians, could not converse with them as they pleased; but feared and paid court to them? Why then is it in your power, Diogenes? Because I do not esteem this poor body as my own. Because I want nothing. Because this and nothing else is a law to me. These were the things that enabled him to be free.
And that you may not urge that I show you the example of a man clear of incumbrances, without a wife or children or country or friends or relations, to bend and draw him aside, take Socrates, and consider him, who had a wife and children, but held them not as his own; had a country, friends, relations, but held them only so long as it was proper, and in the manner that was proper; submitting all these to the law and to the obedience due to it. Hence, when it was proper to fight, he was the first to go out, and exposed himself to danger without the least reserve. But when he was sent by the thirty tyrants to apprehend Leon, because he esteemed it a base action, he did not even deliberate about it; though he knew that, perhaps, he might die for it. But what did that signify to him? For it was something else that he wanted to preserve, not his mere flesh; but his fidelity, his honor, free from attack or subjection. And afterwards, when he was to make a defence for his life, does he behave like one having children, or a wife? No, but like a single man. And how does he behave, when required to drink the poison? When he might escape, and Crito would have him escape from prison for the sake of his children, what says he? Does he esteem it a fortunate opportunity? How should he? But he considers what is becoming, and neither sees nor regards anything else. For I am not desirous, he says, to preserve this pitiful body; but that part which is improved and preserved by justice, and impaired and destroyed by injustice. Socrates is not to be basely preserved. He who refused to vote for what the Athenians commanded; he who contemned the thirty tyrants; he who held such discourses on virtue and moral beauty,—such a man is not to be preserved by a base action, but is preserved by dying, instead of running away. For even a good actor is preserved as such by leaving off when he ought; not by going on to act beyond his time. What then will become of your children? If I had gone away into Thessaly, you would have taken care of them; and will there be no one to take care of them when I am departed to Hades? You see how he ridicules and plays with death. But if it had been you or I, we should presently have proved by philosophical arguments that those who act unjustly are to be repaid in their own way; and should have added, If I escape I shall be of use to many; if I die, to none. Nay, if it had been necessary, we should have crept through a mouse-hole to get away. But how should we have been of use to any? Where must they have dwelt? If we were useful alive, should we not be of still more use to mankind by dying when we ought and as we ought? And now the remembrance of the death of Socrates is not less, but even more useful to the world than that of the things which he did and said when alive.
Study these points, these principles, these discourses; contemplate these examples if you would be free, if you desire the thing in proportion to its value. And where is the wonder that you should purchase so good a thing at the price of other things, be they never so many and so great? Some hang themselves, others break their necks, and sometimes even whole cities have been destroyed for that which is reputed freedom; and will not you for the sake of the true and secure and inviolable freedom, repay God what he hath given when he demands it? Will you not study not only, as Plato says, how to die, but how to be tortured and banished and scourged; and, in short, how to give up all that belongs to others? If not, you will be a slave among slaves, though you were ten thousand times a consul; and even though you should rise to the palace, you will never be the less so. And you will feel that, though philosophers (as Cleanthes says) do, perhaps, talk contrary to common opinion, yet it is not contrary to reason. For you will find it true, in fact, that the things that are eagerly followed and admired are of no use to those who have gained them; while they who have not yet gained them imagine that, if they are acquired, every good will come along with them; and then, when they are acquired, there is the same feverishness, the same agitation, the same nausea, and the same desire for what is absent. For freedom is not procured by a full enjoyment of what is desired, but by controlling the desire. And in order to know that this is true, take the same pains about these which you have taken about other things. Hold vigils to acquire a set of principles that will make you free. Instead of a rich old man, pay your court to a philosopher. Be seen about his doors. You will not get any disgrace by being seen there. You will not return empty or unprofited if you go as you ought. However, try at least. The trial is not dishonorable.
Higginson’s notes (4)
- A character in one of the Comedies of Menander, called The Hated Lover .—C.
- Quotation source: A Fragment of Cleanthes, before quoted; and given in full in Enchiridion, c. 52.
- Socrates, with four other persons, was commanded by the thirty tyrants of Athens to fetch Leon from the isle of Salamis , in order to be put to death. His companions executed their commission; but Socrates remained at home, and chose rather to expose his life to the fury of the tyrants, than be accessory to the death of an innocent person. He would most probably have fallen a sacrifice to their vengeance, if the Oligarchy had not shortly after been dissolved. See Plato’s Apology . —C.
- Quotation source: Plato, Crito, i. 5.
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
About freedom.
He is free who lives as he wishes to live; who is neither subject to compulsion nor to hindrance, nor to force; whose movements to action (ὁρμαί) are not impeded, whose desires attain their purpose, and who does not fall into that which he would avoid (ἐκκλίσεις ἀπερίπτωτοι). Who then chooses to live in error? No man. Who chooses to live deceived, liable to mistake, unjust, unrestrained, discontented, mean? No man. Not one then of the bad lives as he wishes; nor is he then free. And who chooses to live in sorrow, fear, envy, pity, desiring and failing in his desires, attempting to avoid something and falling into it? Not one. Do we then find any of the bad free from sorrow, free from fear, who does not fall into that which he would avoid, and does not obtain that which he wishes? Not one; nor then do we find any bad man free.
If then a man who has been twice consul should hear this, if you add, But you are a wise man; this is nothing to you: he will pardon you. But if you tell him the truth, and say, You differ not at all from those who have been thrice sold as to being yourself not a slave, what else ought you to expect than blows? For he says, What, I a slave, I whose father was free, whose mother was free I whom no man can purchase: I am also of senatorial rank, and a friend of Caesar, and I have been a consul, and I own many slaves.—In the first place, most excellent senatorial man, perhaps your father also was a slave in the same kind of servitude, and your mother, and your grandfather and all your ancestors in an ascending series. But even if they were as free as it is possible, what is this to you? What if they were of a noble nature, and you of a mean nature; if they were fearless, and you a coward; if they had the power of self-restraint, and you are not able to exercise it.
And what, you may say, has this to do with being a slave? Does it seem to you to be nothing to do a thing unwillingly, with compulsion, with groans, has this nothing to do with being a slave? It is something, you say: but who is able to compel me, except the lord of all, Caesar? Then even you yourself have admitted that you have one master. But that he is the common master of all, as you say, let not this console you at all: but know that you are a slave in a great family. So also the people of Nicopolis are used to exclaim, By the fortune of Caesar, we are free.
However, if you please, let us not speak of Caesar at present. But tell me this: did you never love any person, a young girl, or slave, or free? What then is this with respect to being a slave or free? Were you never commanded by the person beloved to do something which you did not wish to do? have you never flattered your little slave? have you never kissed her feet? And yet if any man compelled you to kiss Caesar’s feet, you would think it an insult and excessive tyranny. What else then is slavery? Did you never go oat by night to some place whither you did not wish to go, did you not expend that you did not wish to expend, did you not utter words with sighs and groans, did you not submit to abuse and to be excluded? But if you are ashamed to confess your own acts, see what Thrasonides says and does, who having seen so much military service as perhaps not even you have, first of all went out by night, when Geta (a slave) does not venture out, but if he were compelled by his master, would have cried out much and would have gone out lamenting his bitter slavery. Next, what does Thrasonides say? A worthless girl has enslaved me, me whom no enemy ever did. Unhappy man, who are the slave even of a girl, and a worthless girl. Why then do you still call yourself free? and why do you talk of your service in the army? Then he calls for a sword and is angry with him who out of kindness refuses it; and he sends presents to her who hates him, and intreats and weeps, and on the other hand having had a little success he is elated. But even then how? was he free enough neither to desire nor to fear?
Now consider in the case of animals, how we employ the notion of liberty. Men keep tame lions shut up, and feed them, and some take them about; and who will say that this lion is free? Is it not the fact that the more he lives at his ease, so much the more he is in a slavish condition? and who if he had perception and reason would wish to be one of these lions? Well, these birds when they are caught and are kept shut up, how much do they suffer in their attempts to escape? and some of them die of hunger rather than submit to such a kind of life. And as many of them as live, hardly live and with suffering pine away; and if they ever find any opening, they make their escape. So much do they desire their natural liberty, and to be independent and free from hindrance. And what harm is there to you in this? What do you say? I am formed by nature to fly where I choose, to live in the open air, to sing when I choose: you deprive me of all this, and say, what harm is it to you? For this reason we shall say that those animals only are free, which cannot endure capture, but as soon as they are caught. escape from captivity by death. So Diogenes also somewhere says that there is only one way to freedom, and that is to die content: and he writes to the Persian king. You cannot enslave the Athenian state any more than you can enslave fishes. How is that? cannot I catch them? If you catch them, says Diogenes, they will immediately leave you, as fishes do; for if you catch a fish, it dies; and if these men that are caught shall die, of what use to you is the preparation for war? These are the words of a free man who had carefully examined the thing, and, as was natural, had discovered it. But if you look for it in a different place from where it is, what wonder if you never find it?
The slave wishes to be set free immediately. Why? Do you think that he wishes to pay money to the collectors of twentieths? No; but because he imagines that hitherto through not having obtained this, he is hindered and unfortunate. If I shall be set free, immediately it is all happiness, I care for no man, I speak to all as an equal and like to them, I go where I choose, I come from any place I choose, and go where I choose. Then he is set free; and forthwith having no place where he can eat, he looks for some man to flatter, some one with whom he shall sup: then he either works with his body and endures the most dreadful things; and if he can obtain a manger, he falls into a slavery much worse than his former slavery; or even if he is become rich, being a man without any knowledge of what is good, he loves some little girl, and in his unhappiness laments and desires to be a slave again. He says, what evil did I suffer in my state of slavery? Another clothed me, another supplied me with shoes, another fed me, another looked after me in sickness; and I did only a few services for him. But now a wretched man, what things I suffer, being a slave to many instead of to one. But however, he says, if I shall acquire rings then I shall live most prosperously and happily. First, in order to acquire these rings, he submits to that which he is worthy of; then when he has acquired them, it is again all the same. Then he says, If I shall be engaged in military service, I am free from all evils. He obtains military service. He suffers as much as a flogged slave, and nevertheless he asks for a second service and a third. After this, when he has put the finishing stroke (the colophon) to his career, and is become a senator, then he becomes a slave by entering into the assembly, then he serves the finer and most splendid slavery—not to be a fool, but to learn what Socrates taught, what is the nature of each thing that exists, and that a man should not rashly adapt preconceptions ( προλήψεις) to the several things which are. For this is the cause to men of all their evils, the not being able to adapt the general preconceptions to the several things. But we have different opinions (about the cause of our evils). One man thinks that he is sick: not so however, but the fact is that he does not adapt his preconceptions right. Another thinks that he is poor; another that he has a severe father or mother; and another again that Caesar is not favourable to him. But all this is one and only one thing, the not knowing how to adapt the preconceptions. For who has not a preconception of that which is bad, that it is hurtful, that it ought to be avoided, that it ought in every way to be guarded against? One preconception is not repugnant to another, only where it comes to the matter of adaptation. What then is this evil, which is both hurtful, and a thing to be avoided? He answers not to be Caesar’s friend.—He is gone far from the mark, he has missed the adaptation, he is embarrassed, he seeks the things which are not at all pertinent to the matter; for when he has succeeded in being Caesar’s friend, never the less he has failed in finding what he sought. For what is that which every man seeks? To live secure, to be happy, to do every thing as he wishes, not to be hindered, nor compelled. When then he is become the friend of Caesar, is he free from hindrance? free from compulsion, is he tranquil, is he happy? Of whom shall we inquire? What more trustworthy witness have we than this very man who is become Caesar’s friend? Come forward and tell us when did you sleep more quietly, now or before you became Caesar’s friend? Immediately you hear the answer, Stop, I intreat you, and do not mock me: you know not what miseries I suffer, and sleep does not come to me; but one comes and says, Caesar is already awake, he is now going forth: then come troubles and cares—Well, when did you sup with more pleasure, now or before? Hear what he says about this also. He says that if he is not invited, he is pained: and if he is invited, he sups like a slave with his master, all the while being anxious that he does not say or do any thing foolish. And what do you suppose that he is afraid of; lest he should be lashed like a slave? How can he expect any thing so good? No, but as befits so great a man, Caesar’s friend, he is afraid that he may lose his head. And when did you bathe more free from trouble, and take your gymnastic exercise more quietly? In fine, which kind of life did you prefer? your present or your former life? I can swear that no man is so stupid or so ignorant of truth as not to bewail his own misfortunes the nearer he is in friendship to Caesar. Since then neither those who are called kings live as they choose, nor the friends of kings, who finally are those who are free? Seek, and you will find; for you have aids from nature for the discovery of truth. But if you are not able yourself by going along these ways only to discover that which follows, listen to those who have made the inquiry. What do they say? Does freedom seem to you a good thing? The greatest good. Is it possible then that he who obtains the greatest good can be unhappy or fare badly? No. Whomsoever then you shall see unhappy, unfortunate, lamenting, confidently declare that they are not free. I do declare it. We have now then got away from buying and selling and from such arrangements about matters of property: for if you have rightly assented to these matters, if the great king (the Persian king) is unhappy, he cannot be free, nor can a little king, nor a man of consular rank, nor one who has been twice consul.—Be it so.
Further then answer me this question also, does freedom seem to you to be something great and noble and valuable?—How should it not seem so? Is it possible then when a man obtains anything so great and valuable and noble to be mean?—It is not possible—When then you see any man subject to another or flattering him contrary to his own opinion, confidently affirm that this man also is not free; and not only if he do this for a bit of supper, but also if he does it for a government (province) or a consulship: and call these men little slaves who for the sake of little matters do these things, and those who do so for the sake of great things call great slaves, as they deserve to be.—This is admitted also—Do you think that freedom is a thing independent and self governing?— Certainly—Whomsoever then it is in the power of another to hinder and compel, declare that he is not free. And do not look, I intreat you, after his grandfathers and great grandfathers, or inquire about his being bought or sold; but if you hear him saying from his heart and with feeling, Master, even if the twelve fasces precede him (as consul), call him a slave. And if you hear him say, Wretch that I am, how much I suffer, call him a slave. If finally you see him lamenting, complaining, unhappy, call him a slave though he wears a praetexta. If then he is doing nothing of this kind, do not yet say that he is free, but learn his opinions, whether they are subject to compulsion, or may produce hindrance, or to bad fortune; and if you find him such, call him a slave who has a holiday in the Saturnalia: say that his master is from home: he will return soon, and you will know what he suffers. Who will return? Whoever has in himself the power over anything which is desired by the man, either to give it to him or to take it away? Thus then have we many masters? We have: for we have circumstances as masters prior to our present masters; and these circumstances are many. Therefore it must of necessity be that those who have the power over any of these circumstances must be our masters. For no man fears Caesar himself, but he fears death, banishment, deprivation of his property, prison, and disgrace. Nor does any man love Caesar, unless Caesar is a person of great merit, but he loves wealth, the office of tribune, praetor or consul. When we love, and hate and fear these things, it must be that those who have the power over them must be our masters. Therefore we adore them even as gods; for we think that what possesses the power of conferring the greatest advantage on us is divine. Then we wrongly assume (ὑποτάσσομεν) that a certain person has the power of conferring the greatest advantages; therefore he is something divine. For if we wrongly assume that a certain person has the power of conferring the greatest advantages, it is a necessary consequence that the conclusion from these premises must be false.
What then is that which makes a man free from hindrance and makes him his own master? For wealth does not do it, nor consulship, nor provincial government, nor royal power; but something else must be discovered. What then is that which when we write makes us free from hindrance and unimpeded? The knowledge of the art of writing. What then is it in playing the lute? The science of playing the lute. Therefore in life also it is the science of life. You have then heard in a general way: but examine the thing also in the several parts. Is it possible that he who desires any of the things which depend on others can be free from hindrance? No—Is it possible for him to be unimpeded? No—Therefore he cannot be free. Consider then: whether we have nothing which is in our own power only, or whether we have all things, or whether some things are in our own power, and others in the power of others.—What do you mean?— When you wish the body to be entire (sound), is it in your power or not?—It is not in my power—When you wish it to be healthy?—Neither is this in my power.— When you wish it to be handsome?—Nor is this—Life or death?—Neither is this in my power.—Your body then is another’s, subject to every man who is stronger than yourself—It is—But your estate, is it in your power to have it when you please, and as long as you please, and such as you please?—No—And your slaves?—No—And your clothes?—No—And your house?—No—And your horses?—Not one of these things—And if you wish by all means your children to live, or your wife, or your brother, or your friends, is it in your power?—This also is not in my power.
Whether then have you nothing which is in your own power, which depends on yourself only and cannot be taken from you, or have you any thing of the kind?—I know not—Look at the thing then thus, and examine it. Is any man able to make you assent to that which is false—No man—In the matter of assent then you are free from hindrance and obstruction.—Granted—Well; and can a man force you to desire to move towards that to which you do not choose?—He can, for when he threatens me with death or bonds, he compels me to desire to move towards it. If then, you despise death and bonds, do you still pay any regard to him?—No—Is then the despising of death an act of your own or is it not yours?—It is my act—It is your own act then also to desire to move towards a thing: or is it not so?—It is my own act—But to desire to move away from a thing, whose act is that? This also is your act—What then if I have attempted to walk, suppose another should hinder me—What part of you does he hinder? does he hinder the faculty of assent?—No: but my poor body—Yes, as he would do with a stone— Granted; but I no longer walk—And who told you that walking is your own act free from hindrance? for I said that this only was free from hindrance, to desire to move: but where there is need of body and its co-operation, you have heard long ago that nothing is your own.—Granted this also—And who can compel you to desire what you do not wish?—No man—And to propose or intend, or in short to make use of the appearances which present themselves, can any man compel you?—He cannot do this: but he will hinder me when I desire from obtaining what I desire.—If you desire any thing which is your own, and one of the things which cannot be hindered, how will he hinder you?—He cannot in any way—Who then tells you that he who desires the things that belong to another is free from hindrance?
Must I then not desire health? By no means, nor any thing else that belongs to another: for what is not in your power to acquire or to keep when you please, this belongs to another. Keep then far from it not only your hands, but more than that, even your desires. If you do not, you have surrendered yourself as a slave; you have subjected your neck, if you admire any thing not your own, to every thing that is dependent on the power of others and perishable, to which you have conceived a liking.—Is not my hand my own?—It is a part of your own body; but it is by nature earth, subject to hindrance, compulsion, and the slave of every thing which is stronger. And why do I say your hand? You ought to possess your whole body as a poor ass loaded, as long as it is possible, as long as you are allowed. But if there be a press, and a soldier should lay hold of it, let it go, do not resist, nor murmur; if you do, you will receive blows, and never the less you will also lose the ass. But when you ought to feel thus with respect to the body, consider what remains to be done about all the rest, which is provided for the sake of the body. When the body is an ass, all the other things are bits belonging to the ass, pack-saddles, shoes, barley, fodder. Let these also go: get rid of them quicker and more readily than of the ass.
When you have made this preparation, and have practised this discipline, to distinguish that which belongs to another from that which is your own, the things which are subject to hindrance from those which are not, to consider the things free from hindrance to concern yourself, and those which are not free not to concern yourself, to keep your desire steadily fixed to the things which do concern yourself, and turned from the things which do not concern yourself; do you still fear any man? No one. For about what will you be afraid? about the things which are your own, in which consists the nature of good and evil? and who has power over these things? who can take them away? who can impede them? No man can, no more than he can impede God. But will you be afraid about your body and your possessions, about things which are not yours, about things which in no way concern you? and what else have you been studying from the beginning than to distinguish between your own and not your own, the things which are in your power and not in your power, the things subject to hindrance and not subject? and why have you come to the philosophers? was it that you may never the less be unfortunate and unhappy? You will then in this way, as I have supposed you to have done, be without fear and disturbance. And what is grief to you? for fear comes from what you expect, but grief from that which is present. But what further will you desire? For of the things which are within the power of the will, as being good and present, you have a proper and regulated desire: but of the things which are not in the power of the will you do not desire any one, and so you do not allow any place to that which is irrational, and impatient, and above measure hasty.
When then you are thus affected towards things, what man can any longer be formidable to you? For what has a man which is formidable to another, either when you see him or speak to him or finally are conversant with him? Not more than one horse has with respect to another, or one dog to another, or one bee to another bee. Things indeed are formidable to every man; and when any man is able to confer these things on another or to take them away, then he too becomes formidable. How then is an acropolis (a stronghold or fortress, the seat of tyranny) demolished? Not by the sword, not by fire, but by opinion. For if we abolish the acropolis which is in the city, can we abolish also that of fever, and that of beautiful women? Can we in a word abolish the acropolis which is in us and cast out the tyrants within us, whom we have daily over us, sometimes the same tyrants, at other times different tyrants? But with this we must begin, and with this we must demolish the acropolis and eject the tyrants, by giving up the body, the parts of it, the faculties of it, the possessions, the reputation, magisterial offices, honours, children, brothers, friends, by considering all these things as belonging to others. And if tyrants have been ejected from us, why do I still shut in the acropolis by a wall of circumvallation, at least on my account; for if it still stands, what does it do to me? why do I still eject (the tyrant’s) guards? For where do I perceive them? against others they have their fasces, and their spears and their swords. But I have never been hindered in my will, nor compelled when I did not will. And how is this possible? I have placed my movements towards action (ὁρμήν) in obedience to God. Is it his will that I shall have fever? It is my will also. Is it his will that I should move towards any thing? It is my will also. Is it his will that I should obtain any thing? It is my wish also. Does he not will? I do not wish. Is it his will that I die, is it his will that I be put to the rack? It is my will then to die: it is my will then to be put to the rack. Who then is still able to hinder me contrary to my own judgment, or to compel me? No more than he can hinder or compel Zeus.
Thus the more cautious of travellers also act. A traveller has heard that the road is infested by robbers; he does not venture to enter on it alone, but he waits for the companionship on the road either of an ambassador, or of a quaestor, or of a proconsul, and when he has attached himself to such persons he goes along the road safely. So in the world the wise man acts. There are many companies of robbers, tyrants, storms, difficulties, losses of that which is dearest. Where is there any place of refuge? how shall he pass along without being attacked by robbers? what company shall he wait for that he may pass along in safety? to whom shall he attach himself? To what person generally? to the rich man, to the man of consular rank? and what is the use of that to me? Such a man is stripped himself, groans and laments. But what if the fellow companion himself turns against me and becomes my robber, what shall I do? I will be a friend of Caesar: when I am Caesar’s companion no man will wrong me. In the first place, that I may become illustrious, what things must I endure and suffer? how often and by how many must I be robbed? Then, if I become Caesar’s friend, he also is mortal. And if Caesar from any circumstance becomes my enemy, where is it best for me to retire? Into a desert? Well, does fever not come there? What shall be done then? Is it not possible to find a safe fellow traveller, a faithful one, strong, secure against all surprises? Thus he considers and perceives that if he attaches himself to God, he will make his journey in safety.
How do you understand attaching yourself to God? In this sense, that whatever God wills, a man also shall will; and what God does not will, a man also shall not will. How then shall this be done? In what other way than by examining the movements (ὁρμάς, the acts) of God and his administration? What has he given to me as my own and in my own power? what has he reserved to himself? He has given to me the things which are in the power of the will (τὰ προαιρετικὰ): he has put them in my power free from impediment and hindrance. How was he able to make the earthy body free from hindrance? [He could not], and accordingly he has subjected to the revolution of the whole (τῇ τῶν ὅλων περιόδῳ ) possessions, household things, house, children, wife. Why then do I fight against God? why do I will what does not depend on the will? why do I will to have absolutely what is not granted to me? But how ought I to will to have things? In the way in which they are given and as long as they are given. But he who has given takes away. Why then do I resist? I do not say that I shall be a fool if I use force to one who is stronger, but I shall first be unjust. For whence had I things when I came into the world?— My father gave them to me—And who gave them to him? and who made the sun? and who made the fruits of the earth? and who the seasons? and who made the connection of men with one another and their fellowship?
Then after receiving everything from another and even yourself, are you angry and do you blame the giver if he takes any thing from you? Who are you, and for what purpose did you come into the world? Did not he (God) introduce you here, did he not show you the light, did he not give you fellow workers, and perceptions and reason? and as whom did he introduce you here? did he not introduce you as subject to death, and as one to live on the earth with a little flesh, and to observe his administration, and to join with him in the spectacle and the festival for a short time? Will you not then, as long as you have been permitted, after seeing the spectacle and the solemnity, when he leads you out, go with adoration of him and thanks for what you have heard and seen?—No; but I would still enjoy the feast.—The initiated too would wish to be longer in the initiation: and perhaps also those at Olympia to see other athletes; but the solemnity is ended: go away like a grateful and modest man; make room for others: others also must be born, as you were, and being born they must have a place, and houses and necessary things. And if the first do not retire, what remains? Why are you insatiable? Why are you not content? why do you contract the world?—Yes, but I would have my little children with me and my wife—What, are they yours? do they not belong to the giver, and to him who made you? then will you not give up what belongs to others? will you not give way to him who is superior?—Why then did he introduce me into the world on these conditions?—And if the conditions do not suit you, depart. He has no need of a spectator who is not satisfied. He wants those who join in the festival, those who take part in the chorus, that they may rather applaud, admire, and celebrate with hymns the solemnity. But those who can bear no trouble, and the cowardly he will not unwillingly see absent from the great assembly (πανήγυρις); for they did not when they were present behave as they ought to do at a festival nor fill up their place properly, but they lamented, found fault with the deity, fortune, their companions; not seeing both what they had, and their own powers, which they received for contrary purposes, the powers of magnanimity, of a generous mind, manly spirit, and what we are now inquiring about, freedom.—For what purpose then have I received these things? —To use them—How long?—So long as he who has lent them chooses.—What if they are necessary to me?—Do not attach yourself to them and they will not be necessary: do not say to yourself that they are necessary, and then they are not necessary.
This study you ought to practise from morning to evening, beginning with the smallest things and those most liable to damage, with an earthen pot, with a cup. Then proceed in this way to a tunic, to a little dog, to a horse, to a small estate in land: then to yourself, to your body, to the parts of your body, to your children, to your wife, to your brothers. Look all round and throw these things from you (which are not yours). Purge your opinions, so that nothing cleave to you of the things which are not your own, that nothing grow to you, that nothing give you pain when it is torn from you; and say, while you are daily exercising yourself as you do there (in the school), not that you are philosophizing, for this is an arrogant (offensive) expression, but that you are presenting an asserter of freedom: for this is really freedom. To this freedom Diogenes was called by Antisthenes, and he said that he could no longer be enslaved by any man. For this reason when he was taken prisoner, how did he behave to the pirates? Did he call any of them master? and I do not speak of the name, for I am not afraid of the word, but of the state of mind, by which the word is produced. How did he reprove them for feeding badly their captives? How was he sold? Did he seek a master? no; but a slave. And when he was sold how did he behave to his master? Immediately he disputed with him and said to his master that he ought not to be dressed as he was, nor shaved in such a manner; and about the children he told them how he ought to bring them up. And what was strange in this? for if his master had bought an exercise master, would he have employed him in the exercises of the palaestra as a servant or as a master? and sc if he had bought a physician or an architect. And so in every matter, it is absolutely necessary that he who has skill must be the superior of him who has not. Whoever then generally possesses the science of life, what else must he be than master? For who is master in a ship? The man who governs the helm? Why? Because he who will not obey him suffers for it. But a master can give me stripes. Can he do it then without suffering for it? So I also used to think. But because he cannot do it without suffering for it, for this reason it is not in his power: and no man can do what is unjust without suffering for it. And what is the penalty for him who puts his own slave in chains? what do you think that is? The fact of putting the slave in chains:—and you also will admit this, if you choose to maintain the truth, that man is not a wild beast, but a tame animal. For when is a vine doing badly? When it is in a condition contrary to its nature. When is a cock? Just the same. Therefore a man also is so. What then is a man’s nature? To bite, to kick, and to throw into prison and to behead? No; but to do good, to co-operate with others, to wish them well. At that time then he is in a bad condition, whether you chose to admit it or not, when he is acting foolishly.
Socrates then did not fare badly?—No; but his judges and his accusers did.—Nor did Helvidius at Rome fare badly?—No; but his murderer did. How do you mean?— The same as you do when you say that a cock has not fared badly when he has gained the victory and been severely wounded; but that the cock has fared badly when he has been defeated and is unhurt: nor do you call a dog fortunate, who neither pursues game nor labours, but when you see him sweating, when you see him in pain and panting violently after running. What paradox (unusual thing) do we utter if we say that the evil in every thing is that which is contrary to the nature of the thing? Is this a paradox? for do you not say this in the case of all other things? Why then in the case of man only do you think differently? But because we say that the nature of man is tame (gentle) and social and faithful, you will not say that this is a paradox? It is not—What then is it a paradox to say that a man is not hurt when he is whipped, or put in chains, or beheaded? does he not, if he suffers nobly, come off even with increased advantage and profit? But is he not hurt, who suffers in a most pitiful and disgraceful way, who in place of a man becomes a wolf, or viper or wasp?
Well then let us recapitulate the things which have been agreed on. The man who is not under restraint is free, to whom things are exactly in that state in which he wishes them to be; but he who can be restrained or compelled or hindered, or thrown into any circumstances against his will, is a slave. But who is free from restraint? He who desires nothing that belongs to (is in the power of) others. And what are the things which belong to others? Those which are not in our power either to have or not to have, or to have of a certain kind or in a certain manner. Therefore the body belongs to another, the parts of the body belong to another, possession (property) belongs to another. If then you are attached to any of these things as your own, you will pay the penalty which it is proper for him to pay who desires what belongs to another. This road leads to freedom, this is the only way of escaping from slavery, to be able to say at last with all your soul Lead me, O Zeus, and thou 0 destiny,
The way that I am bid by you to go.
But what do you say, philosopher? The tyrant summons you to say something which does not become you. Do you say it or do you not? Answer me—Let me consider—Will you consider now? But when you were in the school, what was it which you used to consider? Did you not study what are the things that are good and what are bad, and what things are neither one nor the other?—I did.—What then was our opinion?—That just and honourable acts were good; and that unjust and disgraceful (foul) acts were bad.—Is life a good thing?—No.—Is death a bad thing?—No.—Is prison?—No.—But what did we think about mean and faithless words and betrayal of a friend and flattery of a tyrant?—That they are bad.—Well then, you are not considering, nor have you considered nor deliberated. For what is the matter for consideration, is it whether it is becoming for me, when I have it in my power, to secure for myself the greatest of good things, and not to secure for myself (that is, not to avoid) the greatest evils? A fine inquiry indeed, and necessary, and one that demands much deliberation. Man, why do you mock us? Such an inquiry is never made. If you really imagined that base things were bad and honourable things were good, and that all other things were neither good nor bad, you would not even have approached this enquiry, nor have come near it; but immediately you would have been able to distinguish them by the understanding as you would do (in other cases) by the vision. For when do you inquire if black things are white, if heavy things are light, and do not comprehend the manifest evidence of the senses? How then do you now say that you are considering whether things which are neither good nor bad ought to be avoided more than things which are bad? But you do not possess these opinions; and neither do these things seem to you to be neither good nor bad, but you think that they are the greatest evils; nor do you think those other things (mean and faithless words, etc.) to be evils, but matters which do not concern us at all. For thus from the beginning you have accustomed yourself. Where am I? In the schools: and are any listening to me? I am discoursing among philosophers. But I have gone out of the school. Away with this talk of scholars and fools. Thus a friend is overpowered by the testimony of a philosopher: thus a philosopher becomes a parasite; thus he lets himself for hire for money: thus in the senate a man does not say what he thinks; in private (in the school) he proclaims his opinions. You are a cold and miserable little opinion, suspended from idle words as from a hair. But keep yourself strong and fit for the uses of life and initiated by being exercised in action. How do you hear (the report)?—I do not say, that your child is dead—for how could you bear that?—but that your oil is spilled, your wine drunk up. Do you act in such a way that one standing by you while you are making a great noise, may say this only, Philosopher, you say something different in the school. Why do you deceive us? Why, when you are only a worm, do you say that you are a man? I should like to be present when some of the philosophers is lying with a woman, that I might see how he is exerting himself, and what words he is uttering, and whether he remembers his title of philosopher, and the words which he hears or says or reads.
And what is this to liberty? Nothing else than this, whether you who are rich choose or not.—And who is your evidence for this?—who else than yourselves? who have a powerful master (Caesar), and who live in obedience to his nod and motion, and who faint if he only looks at you with a scowling countenance; you who court old women and old men, and say, I cannot do this: it is not in my power. Why is it not in your power? Did you not lately contend with me and say that you are free? But Aprulla has hindered me? Tell the truth then, slave, and do not run away from your masters, nor deny, nor venture to produce any one to assert your freedom (καρπιοτήν), when you have so many evidences of your slavery. And indeed when a man is compelled by love to do something contrary to his opinion (judgment), and at the same time sees the better, but has not the strength to follow it, one might consider him still more worthy of excuse as being held by a certain violent and in a manner a divine power. But who could endure you who are in love with old women and old men, and wipe the old women’s noses, and wash them and give them presents, and also wait on them like a slave when they are sick, and at the same time wish them dead, and question the physicians whether they are sick unto death? And again, when in order to obtain these great and much admired magistracies and honours, you kiss the hands of these slaves of others, and so you are not the slave even of free men. Then you walk about before me in stately fashion a praetor or a consul. Do I not know how you became a praetor, by what means you got your consulship, who gave it to you? I would not even choose to live, if I must live by help of Felicion and endure his arrogance and servile insolence: for I know what a slave is, who is fortunate, as he thinks, and puffed up by pride.
You then, a man may say, are you free? I wish, by the Gods, and pray to be free; but I am not yet able to face my masters, I still value my poor body, I value greatly the preservation of it entire, though I do not possess it entire. But I can point out to you a free man, that you may no longer seek an example. Diogenes was free. How was he free?—not because he was born of free parents, but because he was himself free, because he had cast off all the handles of slavery, and it was not possible for any man to approach him, nor had any man the means of laying hold of him to enslave him. He had everything easily loosed, everything only hanging to him. If you laid hold of his property, he would have rather let it go and be yours, than he would have followed you for it: if you had laid hold of his leg, he would have let go his leg; if of all his body, all his poor body; his intimates, friends, country, just the same. For he knew from whence he had them, and from whom, and on what conditions. His true parents indeed, the Gods, and his real country he would never have deserted, nor would he have yielded to any man in obedience to them and to their orders, nor would any man have died for his country more readily. For he was not used to inquire when he should be considered to have done anything on behalf of the whole of things (the universe, or all the world), but he remembered that every thing which is done comes from thence and is done on behalf of that country and is commanded by him who administers it. Therefore see what Diogenes himself says and writes:—For this reason, he says, Diogenes, it is in your power to speak both with the King of the Persians and with Archidamus the king of the Lacedaemonians, as you please. Was it because he was born of free parents? I suppose all the Athenians and all the Lacedaemonians because they were born of slaves, could not talk with them (these kings) as they wished, but feared and paid court to them. Why then does he say that it is in his power? Because I do not consider the poor body to be my own, because I want nothing, because law is every thing to me, and nothing else is. These were the things which permitted him to be free.
And that you may not think that I show you the example of a man who is a solitary person, who has neither wife nor children, nor country, nor friends nor kinsmen, by whom he could be bent and drawn in various directions, take Socrates and observe that he had a wife and children, but he did not consider them as his own; that he had a country, so long as it was fit to have one, and in such a manner as was fit; friends and kinsmen also, but he held all in subjection to law and to the obedience due to it. For this reason he was the first to go out as a soldier, when it was necessary, and in war he exposed himself to danger most unsparingly; and when he was sent by the tyrants to seize Leon, he did not even deliberate about the matter, because he thought that it was a base action, and he knew that he must die (for his refusal), if it so happened. And what difference did that make to him? for he intended to preserve something else, not his poor flesh, but his fidelity, his honourable character. These are things which could not be assailed nor brought into subjection. Then when he was obliged to speak in defence of his life, did he behave like a man who had children, who had a wife? No, but he behaved like a man who has neither. And what did he do when he was (ordered) to drink the poison, and when he had the power of escaping from prison, and when Crito said to him, Escape for the sake of your children, what did Socrates say? did he consider the power of escape as an unexpected gain? By no means: he considered what was fit and proper; but the rest he did not even look at or take into the reckoning. For he did not choose, he said, to save his poor body, but to save that which is increased and saved by doing what is just, and is impaired and destroyed by doing what is unjust. Socrates will not save his life by a base act; he who would not put the Athenians to the vote when they clamoured that he should do so, he who refused to obey the tyrants, he who discoursed in such a manner about virtue and right behaviour. It is not possible to save such a man’s life by base acts, but he is saved by dying, not by running away. For the good actor also preserves his character by stopping when he ought to stop, better than when he goes on acting beyond the proper time. What then shall the children of Socrates do? If, said Socrates, I had gone off to Thessaly, would you have taken care of them; and if I depart to the world below, will there be no man to take care of them? See how he gives to death a gentle name and mocks it. But if you and I had been in his place, we should have immediately answered as philosophers that those who act unjustly must be repaid in the same way, and we should have added, I shall be useful to many, if my life is saved, and if I die, I shall be useful to no man. For, if it had been necessary, we should have made our escape by slipping through a small hole. And how in that case should we have been useful to any man? for where would they have been then staying? or if we were useful to men while we were alive, should we not have been much more useful to them by dying when we ought to die, and as we ought? And now Socrates being dead, no less useful to men, and even more useful, is the remembrance of that which he did or said when he was alive.
Think of these things, these opinions, these words: look to these examples, if you would be free, if you desire the thing according to its worth. And what is the wonder if you buy so great a thing at the price of things so many and so great? For the sake of this which is called liberty, some hang themselves, others throw themselves down precipices, and sometimes even whole cities have perished: and will you not for the sake of the true and unassailable and secure liberty give back to God when he demands them the things which he has given? Will you not, as Plato says, study not to die only, but also to endure torture, and exile, and scourging and in a word to give up all which is not your own? If you will not, you will be a slave among slaves, even if you be ten thousand times a consul; and if you make your way up to the Palace (Caesar’s residence), you will no less be a slave; and you will feel, that perhaps philosophers utter words which are contrary to common opinion (paradoxes), as Cleanthes also said, but not words contrary to reason. For you will know by experience that the words are true, and that there is no profit from the things which are valued and eagerly sought to those who have obtained them; and to those who have not yet obtained them there is an imagination ( φαντασία), that when these things are come, all that is good will come with them; then, when they are come, the feverish feeling is the same, the tossing to and fro is the same, the satiety, the desire of things which are not present; for freedom is acquired not by the full possession of the things which are desired, but by removing the desire. And that you may know that this is true, as you have laboured for those things, so transfer your labour to these; be vigilant for the purpose of acquiring an opinion which will make you free; pay court to a philosopher instead of to a rich old man: be seen about a philosopher’s doors: you will not disgrace yourself by being seen; you will not go away empty nor without profit, if you go to the philosopher as you ought, and if not (if you do not succeed), try at least: the trial (attempt) is not disgraceful.
Long’s notes (63)
- Cicero, Paradox. v. Quid est enim libertas? Potestas vivendi ut velis. Quis igitur vivit ut vult, nisi qui recta sequitur, etc.
- προπίπτων . Comp. ii. 1. 10: ἐξαπατηθῆναι οὖν ἢ προπεσεῖν .
- Whoever Whosoever committeth sin, is the servant of sin John viii. 31. Mrs. Carter.
- A usual form of oath. See ii. 20. 29. Upton compares the Roman expression Per Genium, as in Horace Epp. i 7. 94— Quod te per Genium, dextramque, Deosque Penates Obsecro et obtestor.
- A lover’s exclusion by his mistress was a common topic, and a serious cause of complaint (Lucretius, iv. 1172 ): At lacrimans exclusus amator limina saepe Floribus et sertis operit. See also Horace, Odes, i. 25 .
- Thrasonides was a character in one of Menander’s plays, intitled Μισούμενος or the Hated.
- It must have been rather difficult to manage a tame lion; but we read of such things among the Romans. Seneca, Epp. 41.
- The keeping of birds in cages, parrots and others, was also common among the Romans. Ovid ( Amor. ii. 6 ) has written a beautiful elegy on the death of a favourite parrot.
- See ii. 1. 26. The εἰκοστώναι were the Publicani, men who farmed this and other taxes. A tax of a twentieth of the value of a slave when manumitted was established at an early time (Livy vii. 16). It appears from this passage that the manumitted slave paid the tax out of his savings (peculium). See ii. 1. note 7.
- The reader may guess the meaning.
- A gold ring was worn by the Equites; and accordingly to desire the gold ring is the same as to desire to be raised to the Equestrian class.
- The colophon. See ii. 14. note 5. After the words most splendid slavery it is probable that some words have accidentally been omitted in the MSS.
- Compare i 2. 6.
- Compare i. 22
- Sic praetextatos referunt Artaxata mores.—Juv. ii. 170. See Epict. i. 2, note 4.
- Saturnalia. See i. 25, note 3. At this season the slaves had liberty to enjoy themselves and to talk freely with their masters. Hence Horace says, Sat. ii. 74— Age. libertate Decembri, Quando ita majores voluerunt, utere.
- Insigne hoc exemplum est τοῦ εἰκῆ τὰς προλήψεις ἐφαρμόζειν ταῖς ἐπι μέρους οὐσίαις . De quo, vide i. 22, 9, ii. 11, 3, ii. 17, 7. Upton.
- Schweighaeuser observes that death is in our power, as the Stoics taught; and Epictetus often tells us that the door is open. He suggests that the true reading may be καὶ οὐκ ἀποθανεῖν . I think that the text is right. Epictetus asks is Life or death in our power. He means no more than if he had said Life only.
- He means that which seems to you to be false. See iii. 22, 42. In the matter of assent then : this is the third τόρος or locus or division in philosophy (iii. 2, 1–5). As to the Will, compare i. 17, note 10. Epictetus affirms that a man cannot be compelled to assent, that is to admit, to allow, or, to use another word, to believe in that which seems to him to be false, or, to use the same word again, to believe in that in which he does not believe. When the Christian uses the two creeds, which begin with the words, I believe etc., he knows or he ought to know, that he cannot compel an unbeliever to accept the same belief. He may by pains and penalties of various kinds compel some persons to profess or to express the same belief: but as no pains or penalties could compel some Christians to deny their belief, so I suppose that perhaps there are men who could not be compelled to express this belief when they have it not. The case of the believer and the unbeliever however are not the same. The believer may be strengthened in his belief by the belief that he will in some way be punished by God, if he denies that which he believes. The unbeliever will not have the same motive or reason for not expressing his assent to that which he does not believe. He believes that it is and will be all the same to him with respect to God, whether he gives his assent to that which he does not believe or refuses his assent. There remains nothing then to trouble him if he expresses his assent to that which he does not believe, except the opinion of those who know that he does not believe, or his own reflections on expressing his assent to that which he does not believe; or in other words his publication of a lie, which may probably do no harm to any man or in any way. I believe that some men are strong enough, under some circumstances at least, to refuse their assent to any thing which they do not believe; but I do not affirm that they would do this under all circumstances. To return to the matter under consideration, a man cannot be compelled by any power to accept voluntarily a thing as true, when lie believes that it is not true; and this act of his is quite independent of the matter whether his unbelief is well founded or not. He does not believe because he cannot believe. Yet it is said (Mark xvi. 11,) in the received text, as it now stands, He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not, shall be damned (condemned). The cause, as it is called, of this unbelief is explained by some theologians; but all men do not admit the explanation to be sufficient: and it does not concern the present subject.
- The word admire is θαυμάσῃς in the original. The word is often used by Epictetus, and Horace uses admirari in this Stoical sense. See i. 29. 2, note.
- See Schweig.’s note on μέρος .
- The word is ἀγγαρεία , a word of Persian origin (Herodotus, viii. 98). It means here the seizure of animals for military purposes when it is necessary. Upton refers to Matthew 5, v 41, Mark 15, c. 21 for similar uses of the verb ἀγγαρεύω
- Here he speaks of asses being shod. The Latin translation of the word ( ὑποδημάτια ) in Epictetus is ferreas calces . I suppose they could use nothing but iron.
- See Schweig.’s note.
- See Schweig.’s note.
- Schweig. suggests καταβεβλήκαμεν instead of ἀποβεβλήκαμεν , though all his MSS. have the word in the text. I do not think that his proposed alteration is an improvement.
- The word is ἀποτειχίζω , which means what I have translated. The purpose of circumvallation was to take and sometimes also to destroy a fortress. Schweig. translates the word by destruam, and that is perhaps not contrary to the meaning of the text; but it is not the exact meaning of the word.
- In this passage and in what follows we find the emphatic affirmation of the duty of conformity and of the subjection of man’s will to the will of God. The words are conclusive evidence of the doctrine of Epictetus that a man ought to subject himself in all things to the will of God or to that which he believes to be the will of God. No Christian martyr ever proclaimed a more solemn obedience to God’s will. The Christian martyr indeed has given perfect proof of his sincerity by enduring torments and death: the heathen philosopher was not put to the same test, and we cannot therefore say that he would have been able to bear it.
- In this passage the distinction must be observed between θέλω and βουλομαι , which the Latin translators have not observed, nor Mrs. Carter. See Schweig.’s note on s. 90.
- ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ : he means on earth.
- Schweig. expresses his surprise that Epictetus has applied this word ( ὁρμάς ) to God. He says that Wolf has translated it Dei appetitionem, and Upton impetum. He says that he has translated it consilium. It is not unusual for men to speak of God in the same words in which they speak of man.
- See ii. 1. 18. Schweig. expected that Epictetus would have said body and possessions etc. I assume that Epictetus did say body and possessions etc., and that his pupil or some copyist of MSS. has omitted the word body.
- The Lord gave and the Lord hath taken away. Job i. 21. Mrs. Carter.
- The initiated ( μύσται ) are those who were introduced with solemn ceremonies into some great religious body. These ceremonies are described by Dion Prus. Orat. xii., quoted by Upton.
- And is this all the comfort, every serious reader will be apt to say, which one of the best philosophers, in one of his noblest discourses, can give to the good man under severe distress? Either tell yourself that present suffering void of future hope, is no evil, or give up your existence and mingle with the elements of the Universe ! Unspeakably more rational and more worthy of infinite goodness is our blessed Master’s exhortation to the persecuted Christian: Rejoice and be exceedingly glad, for great is your reward in heaven. Mrs. Carter. I do not think that Mrs. Carter has represented correctly the teaching of Epictetus. He is addressing men who were not Christians, but were, as he assumes, believers in God or in the Gods, and his argument is that a man ought to be contented with things as they are, because they are from God. If he cannot be contented with things as they are, and make the best of them, the philosopher can say no more to the man. He tells him to depart. What else could he say to a grumbler, who is also a believer in God? If he is not a believer, Epictetus might say the same to him also. The case is past help or advice. The Christian doctrine, of which probably Epictetus knew nothing, is very different. It promises future happiness on certain conditions to Christians, but to Christians only, if I understand it right.
- See the note of Schweig. on this passage.
- The word is καρπίστην δίδως . See iii. 24.76 and the note 15: also Upton’s note on this passage. Schweig. says that he does not quite understand why Epictetus here says διδόναι καρπίστην , dare vindicem or adsertorem, instead of saying vindicate sese in libertatem.
- See iii. 24. 66, ii. 13. 24.
- See the same story in Aulus Gellius ( ii. c. 18 ), who says that Xeniades, a Corinthian, bought Diogenes, manumitted him and made him the master of his children.
- See Schweig.’s note 15.
- See i. 2, note 5.
- I do not know if dogs sweat; at least in a state of health I have never seen it. But this is a question for the learned in dog science.
- See Schweig.’s note.
- As Upton remarks, Epictetus is referring to the four categories of the Stoics.
- Epictetus, Encheiridion c. 52. M. Antoninus, Gatak. 2d. ed. 1697 , Annot. p. 96.
- Stoicus occidit Baream, delator amicum, Discipulumque senex. Juvenal, iii. 116. Epictetus is supposed to allude to the crime of Egnatius Celer who accused Barea Soranus at Rome in the reign of Nero ( Tacit. Ann. xvi. 32 ).
- Mrs. Carter says that there is much obscurity and some variety of reading in several lines of the original. But see Schweig.’s notes. Epictetus is showing that talk about philosophy is useless: philosophy should be practical.
- Horace Sat. ii. 5 .
- Aprulla is a Roman woman’s name. It means some old woman who is courted for her money.
- Compare Plato (Symposium, p. 206): All men conceive both as to the body and as to the soul, and when they have arrived at a certain age, our nature desires to procreate. But it cannot procreate in that which is ugly, but in that which is beautiful. For the conjunction of man and woman is generation; but this act is divine, and this in the animal which is mortal is divine, conceiving and begetting. See what is said in ii. 23, note 10 on marrying. In a certain sense the procreation of children is a duty, and consequently the providing for them is also a duty. It is the fulfilling of the will and purpose of the Deity to people the earth; and therefore the act of procreation is divine. So a man’s duty is to labour in some way, and if necessary, to earn his living and sustain the life which he has received; and this is also a divine act. Paul’s opinion of marriage is contained in Cor. i. 7. Some of his teaching on this matter has been justly condemned. He has no conception of the true nature of marriage; at least he does not show that he has in this chapter. His teaching is impracticable, contrary to that of Epictetus, and to the nature and constitution of man; and it is rejected by the good sense of Christians who affect to receive his teaching; except, I suppose, by the superstitious body of Christians, who recommend and commend the so-called religious, and unmarried life.
- Felicion. See i. 19, p. 62.
- Epictetus alludes to his lameness: compare i. 8. 14, i. 16. 20, and other passages. Upton.
- Schweig. doubts if the words οὐ γὰρ ἡν , which I have omitted, are genuine, and give his reasons for the doubt.
- Schweig. has a note on this difficult passage, which is rather obscure.
- The sense of law ( ὁ νόμος ) can be collected from what follows. Compare the discourse of Socrates on obedience to the law. (Criton, c. 11, etc.)
- See Schweig.’s note on ἀπεριστάτου .
- Socrates fought at Potidaea, Amphipolis and Delium. He is said to have gained the prize for courage at Delium. He was a brave soldier as well as a philosopher, a union of qualities not common. (Plato’s Apology.)
- Socrates with others was ordered by the Thirty tyrants, who at that time governed Athens, to arrest Leon in the island of Salamis and to bring him to be put to death. But Socrates refused to obey the order. Few men would have done what he did under the circumstances. (Plato’s Apology; M. Antoninus, vii. 66.)
- Cicero, Tuscul. Disp. i. 29.
- The Dialogue of Plato, named Criton, contains the arguments which were used by his friends to persuade Socrates to escape from prison, and the reply of Socrates.
- This alludes to the behaviour of Socrates when he refused to put to the vote the matter of the Athenian generals and this behaviour after the naval battle of Arginusae. The violence of the weather prevented the commanders from collecting and honorably burying those who fell in the battle; and the Athenians after their hasty fashion, wished all the commanders to be put to death. But Socrates, who was in office at this time, resisted the unjust clamour of the people. Xenophon Hellenica, i. c. 7, 15 ; Plato, Apologia; Xenophon, Memorab. i. 1, 18
- The original is ποῦ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι ἔμενον ἐκεῖνοι ; this seems to mean, if we had escaped and left the country, where would those have been to whom we might have been useful? They would have been left behind, and we could have done nothing for them.
- This is the conclusion about Socrates, whom Epictetus highly valued: the remembrance of what Socrates did and said is even more useful than his life. The life of the dead, says Cicero of Servius Sulpicius, the great Roman jurist and Cicero’s friend, rests in the remembrance of the living. Epictetus has told us of some of the acts of Socrates, which prove him to have been a brave and honest man. He does not tell us here what Socrates said, which means what he taught; but he knew what it was. Modern writers have expounded the matter at length, and in a form which Epictetus would not or could not have used.—Socrates left to others the questions which relate to the material world, and he first taught, as we are told, the things which concern man’s daily life and his intercourse with other men: in other words he taught Ethic (the principles of morality). Fields and trees, he said, will teach me nothing, but man in his social state will; and man then is the proper subject of the philosophy of Socrates. The beginning of this knowledge was as he said, to know himself according to the precept of the Delphic oracle, Know thyself ( γνῶθι σεαυτόν ): and the object of his philosophy was to comprehend the nature of man as a moral being in all relations; and among these the relation of man to God as the father of all, creator and ruler of all, as Plato expresses it. Socrates taught that what we call death is not the end of man; death is only the road to another life. The death of Socrates was conformable to his life and teaching. Socrates died not only with the noblest courage and tranquillity, but he also refused, as we are told, to escape from death, which the laws of the state permitted, by going into exile or paying a fine, because as he said, if he had himself consented to a fine or allowed others to propose it, (Xenophon, Apol. § 22 ), such an act would have been an admission of his guilt. Both (Socrates and Jesus) offered themselves with the firmest resolution for a holy cause, which was so far from being lost through their death that it only served rather to make it the general cause of mankind. (Das Christliche des Platonismus oder Socrates und Christus, by F. C. Baur.) This essay by Baur is very ingenious. Perhaps there are some readers who will disagree with him on many points in the comparison of Socrates and Christus. However the essay is well worth the trouble of reading. The opinion of Rousseau in his comparison of Jesus and Socrates is in some respects more just than that of Baur, though the learning of the Frenchman is very small when compared with that of the German. What prejudices, what blindness must a man have, says Rousseau, when he dares to compare the son of Sophroniscus with the son of Mary!—The death of Socrates philosophising tranquilly with his friends is the most gentle that a man could desire; that of Jesus expiring in torments, insulted, jeered, cursed by a whole people, is the most horrible that: man could dread. Socrates taking the poisoned cup blesses him who presents it and weeps; Jesus in his horrible punishment prays for his savage executioners. Yes, if the life and the death of Socrates are those of a sage, the life and the death of Jesus are those of a God. (Rousseau, Emile, vol. iii. p. 166. Amsterdam, 1765 .)
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1ἐλεύθερός ἐστιν ὁ ζῶν ὡς βούλεται, ὃν οὔτʼ ἀναγκάσαι ἔστιν οὔτε κωλῦσαι οὔτε βιάσασθαι, οὗ αἱ ὁρμαὶ ἀνεμπόδιστοι, αἱ ὀρέξεις ἐπιτευκτικαί, αἱ ἐκκλίσεις ἀπερίπτωτοι. 2τίς οὖν θέλει ζῆν ἁμαρτάνων; — οὐδείς. — τίς θέλει ζῆν ἐξαπατώμενος, προπίπτων, ἄδικος ὤν, ἀκόλαστος, μεμψίμοιρος, ταπεινός; 3— οὐδείς. — οὐδεὶς ἄρα τῶν φαύλων ζῇ ὡς βούλεται· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδʼ ἐλεύθερός ἐστιν. 4τίς δὲ θέλει λυπούμενος ζῆν, φοβούμενος, φθονῶν, ἐλεῶν, ὀρεγόμενος καὶ ἀποτυγχάνων, ἐκκλίνων καὶ περιπίπτων; 5— οὐδὲ εἷς. — ἔχομεν οὖν τινα τῶν φαύλων ἄλυπον, ἄφοβον, ἀπερίπτωτον, ἀναπότευκτον; — οὐδένα. — οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ ἐλεύθερον. 6ταῦτα ἄν τις ἀκούσῃ δισύπατος, ἂν μὲν προσθῇς ὅτι ἀλλὰ σύ γε σοφὸς εἶ, οὐδὲν πρὸς σὲ ταῦτα, συγγνώσεταί σοι. 7ἂν δʼ αὐτῷ τὰς ἀληθείας εἴπῃς ὅτι τῶν τρὶς πεπραμένων οὐδὲν διαφέρεις πρὸς τὸ μὴ καὶ αὐτὸς δοῦλος εἶναι, τί ἄλλο ἢ πληγάς σε δεῖ προσδοκᾶν; 8πῶς γάρ, φησίν, ἐγὼ δοῦλός εἰμι; ὁ πατὴρ ἐλεύθερος, ἡ μήτηρ ἐλευθέρα, οὗ ὠνὴν οὐδεὶς ἔχει· ἀλλὰ καὶ συγκλητικός εἰμι καὶ Καίσαρος φίλος καὶ ὑπάτευκα καὶ δούλους πολλοὺς ἔχω. 9πρῶτον μέν, ὦ βέλτιστε συγκλητικέ, τάχα σου καὶ ὁ πατὴρ τὴν αὐτὴν δουλείαν δοῦλος ἦν καὶ ἡ μήτηρ καὶ ὁ πάππος καὶ ἐφεξῆς πάντες οἱ πρόγονοι. 10εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα ἦσαν ἐλεύθεροι, τί τοῦτο πρὸς σέ; τί γάρ, εἰ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γενναῖοι ἦσαν, σὺ δʼ ἀγεννής; ἐκεῖνοι μὲν ἄφοβοι, σὺ δὲ δειλός; ἐκεῖνοι μὲν ἐγκρατεῖς, σὺ δʼ ἀκόλαστος; 11καὶ τί, φησί, τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ δοῦλον εἶναι;— οὐδέν σοι φαίνεται εἶναι τὸ ἄκοντά τι ποιεῖν, τὸ ἀναγκαζόμενον, τὸ στένοντα πρὸς τὸ δοῦλον εἶναι; 12— τοῦτο μὲν ἔστω, φησίν. ἀλλὰ τίς με δύναται ἀναγκάσαι, εἰ μὴ ὁ πάντων κύριος Καῖσαρ; 13— οὐκοῦν ἕνα μὲν δεσπότην σαυτοῦ καὶ σὺ αὐτὸς ὡμολόγησας. ὅτι δὲ πάντων, ὡς λέγεις, κοινός ἐστιν, μηδέν σε τοῦτο παραμυθείσθω, ἀλλὰ γίγνωσκε, ὅτι ἐκ μεγάλης οἰκίας δοῦλος εἶ. 14οὕτως καὶ Νικοπολῖται ἐπιβοᾶν εἰώθασι νὴ τὴν Καίσαρος τύχην, ἐλεύθεροί ἐσμεν. 15ὅμως δʼ, ἐάν σοι δοκῇ, τὸν μὲν Καίσαρα πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀφῶμεν, ἐκεῖνο δέ μοι εἰπέ· οὐδέποτʼ ἠράσθης τινός; οὐ παιδισκαρίου, οὐ παιδαρίου, οὐ δούλου, οὐκ ἐλευθέρου; 16— τί οὖν τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ δοῦλον εἶναι ἢ ἐλεύθερον; 17— οὐδέποθʼ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐρωμένης ἐπετάγης οὐδὲν ὧν οὐκ ἤθελες; οὐδέποτέ σου τὸ δουλάριον ἐκολάκευσας; οὐδέποτʼ αὐτοῦ τοὺς πόδας κατεφίλησας; καίτοι τοῦ Καίσαρος ἄν σέ τις ἀναγκάσῃ, ὕβριν αὐτὸ ἡγῇ καὶ ὑπερβολὴν τυραννίδος. 18τί οὖν ἄλλο ἐστὶ δουλεία; νυκτὸς οὐδέποτʼ ἀπῆλθες, ὅπου οὐκ ἤθελες; ἀνάλωσας, ὅσα οὐκ ἤθελες; εἶπάς τινα οἰμώζων καὶ στένων, ἠνέσχου λοιδορούμενος, ἀποκλειόμενος; 19ἀλλʼ εἰ σὺ αἰσχύνῃ τὰ σαυτοῦ ὁμολογεῖν, ὅρα ἃ λέγει καὶ ποιεῖ ὁ Θρασωνίδης, ὃς τοσαῦτα στρατευσάμενος, ὅσα τάχα οὐδὲ σύ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐξελήλυθε νυκτός, ὅτε ὁ Γέτας οὐ τολμᾷ ἐξελθεῖν, ἀλλʼ εἰ προσηναγκάζετο ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ, πόλλʼ ἂν ἐπικραυγάσας καὶ τὴν πικρὰν δουλείαν ἀπολοφυράμενος ἐξῆλθεν. 20εἶτα, τί λέγει; παιδισκάριόν με, φησίν, καταδεδούλωκʼ εὐτελές, ὃν οὐδὲ εἷς τῶν πολεμίων οὐπώποτε. 21τάλας, ὅς γε καὶ παιδισκαρίου δοῦλος εἶ καὶ παιδισκαρίου εὐτελοῦς. τί οὖν ἔτι σαυτὸν ἐλεύθερον λέγεις; τί δὲ προφέρεις σου τὰς στρατείας; 22εἶτα ξίφος αἰτεῖ καὶ πρὸς τὸν ὑπʼ εὐνοίας μὴ διδόντα χαλεπαίνει[ν] καὶ δῶρα τῇ μισούσῃ πέμπει καὶ δεῖται καὶ κλαίει, πάλιν δὲ μικρὰ εὐημερήσας ἐπαίρεται· πλὴν καὶ τότε πῶς; 23μηδʼ ἐπιθυμεῖν ἢ φοβεῖσθαι οὔτʼ ἐλευθερίαν. 24σκέψαι δʼ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων, πῶς χρώμεθα τῇ ἐννοίᾳ τῆς ἐλευθερίας. 25λέοντας τρέφουσιν ἡμέρους ἐγκλείσαντες καὶ σιτίζουσι καὶ κομίζουσιν ἔνιοι μεθʼ αὑτῶν. καὶ τίς ἐρεῖ τοῦτον τὸν λέοντα ἐλεύθερον; οὐχὶ δʼ ὅσῳ μαλακώτερον διεξάγει, τοσούτῳ δουλικώτερον; τίς δʼ ἂν λέων αἴσθησιν καὶ λογισμὸν λαβὼν βούλοιτο τούτων τις εἶναι τῶν λεόντων; 26ἄγε, τὰ δὲ πτηνὰ ταῦτα ὅταν ληφθῇ καὶ ἐγκεκλειμένα τρέφηται, οἷα πάσχει ζητοῦντα ἐκφυγεῖν; καὶ ἔνιά γε αὐτῶν λιμῷ διαφθείρεται μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπομένει τὴν τοιαύτην διεξαγωγήν, 27ὅσα δʼ οὖν διασῴζεται, μόγις καὶ χαλεπῶς καὶ φθίνοντα, κἂν ὅλως εὕρῃ τι παρεῳγμένον, ἐξεπήδησεν. οὕτως ὀρέγεται τῆς φυσικῆς ἐλευθερίας καὶ τοῦ αὐτόνομα καὶ ἀκώλυτα εἶναι. 28καὶ τί σοι κακόν ἐστιν ἐνταῦθα; οἷα λέγεις; πέτεσθαι πέφυκα ὅπου θέλω, ὕπαιθρον διάγειν, ᾁδειν ὅταν θέλω· σύ με πάντων τούτων ἀφαιρῇ καὶ λέγεις τί σοι κακόν ἐστιν; 29διὰ τοῦτο ἐκεῖνα μόνα ἐροῦμεν ἐλεύθερα, ὅσα τὴν ἅλωσιν οὐ φέρει, ἀλλʼ ἅμα τε ἑάλω καὶ ἀποθανόντα διέφυγεν. 30οὕτως καὶ Διογένης που λέγει μίαν εἶναι μηχανὴν πρὸς ἐλευθερίαν τὸ εὐκόλως ἀποθνῄσκειν, καὶ τῷ Περσῶν βασιλεῖ γράφει ὅτι τὴν Ἀθηναίων πόλιν καταδουλώσασθαι οὐ δύνασαι· οὐ μᾶλλον, φησίν, ἢ τοὺς ἰχθύας. 31πῶς; οὐ γὰρ λήψομαι αὐτούς; ἂν λάβῃς, φησίν, εὐθὺς ἀπολιπόντες σε οἰχήσονται, καθάπερ οἱ ἰχθύες. καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων ὃν ἂν λάβῃς, ἀπέθανεν· καὶ οὗτοι ληφθέντες ἐὰν ἀποθνῄσκωσιν, τί σοί ἐστι τῆς παρασκευῆς ὄφελος; 32τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἐλευθέρου ἀνδρὸς φωνὴ σπουδῇ ἐξητακότος τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ὥσπερ εἰκὸς εὑρηκότος. ἂν δʼ ἀλλαχοῦ ζητῇς ἢ ὅπου ἐστίν, τί θαυμαστόν, εἰ οὐδέποτε αὐτὸ εὑρίσκεις; 33ὁ δοῦλος εὐθὺς εὔχεται ἀφεθῆναι ἐλεύθερος. διὰ τί; δοκεῖτε, ὅτι τοῖς εἰκοστώναις ἐπιθυμεῖ δοῦναι ἀργύριον; οὔ· ἀλλʼ ὅτι φαντάζεται μέχρι νῦν διὰ τὸ μὴ τετυχηκέναι τούτου ἐμποδίζεσθαι καὶ δυσροεῖν. 34ἂν ἀφεθῶ, φησίν, εὐθὺς πᾶσα εὔροια, οὐδενὸς ἐπιστρέφομαι, πᾶσιν ὡς ἴσος καὶ ὅμοιος λαλῶ, πορεύομαι ὅπου θέλω, ἔρχομαι ὅθεν θέλω καὶ ὅπου θέλω. 35εἶτα ἀπηλευθέρωται καὶ εὐθὺς μὲν οὐκ ἔχων, ποῖ φάγῃ, ζητεῖ, τίνα κολακεύσῃ, παρὰ τίνι δειπνήσῃ· εἶτα ἢ ἐργάζεται τῷ σώματι καὶ πάσχει τὰ δεινότατα κἂν σχῇ τινα φάτνην, ἐμπέπτωκεν εἰς δουλείαν πολὺ τῆς προτέρας χαλεπω 36τέραν ἢ καὶ εὐπορήσας ἄνθρωπος ἀπειρόκαλος πεφίληκε παιδισκάριον καὶ δυστυχῶν ἀνακλαίεται καὶ τὴν δουλείαν ποθεῖ. 37τί γάρ μοι κακὸν ἦν; ἄλλος μʼ ἐνέδυεν, ἄλλος μʼ ὑπέδει, ἄλλος ἔτρεφεν, ἄλλος ἐνοσοκόμει, ὀλίγα αὐτῷ ὑπηρέτουν. νῦν δὲ τάλας οἷα πάσχω πλείοσι δουλεύων ἀνθʼ ἑνός; 38ὅμως δʼ ἐὰν δακτυλίους, φησίν, λάβω, τότε γʼ εὐρούστατα διάξω καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατα. πρῶτον μὲν ἵνα λάβῃ, πάσχει ὧν ἐστιν ἄξιος· εἶτα λαβὼν πάλιν ταὐτά. 39εἶτά φησιν ἂν μὲν στρατεύσωμαι, ἀπηλλάγην πάντων τῶν κακῶν. στρατεύεται, πάσχει ὅσα μαστιγίας καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον δευτέραν αἰτεῖ στρατείαν καὶ τρίτην. 40εἶθʼ ὅταν αὐτὸν τὸν κολοφῶνα ἐπιθῇ καὶ γένηται συγκλητικός, τότε γίνεται δοῦλος εἰς σύλλογον ἐρχόμενος, τότε τὴν καλλίστην καὶ λιπαρωτάτην δουλείαν δουλεύει. 41ἵνα μὴ μωρὸς ᾖ, ἀλλʼ ἵνα μάθῃ, ἃ ἔλεγεν ὁ Σωκράτης, τί ἐστι τῶν ὄντων ἕκαστον, καὶ μὴ εἰκῇ τὰς προλήψεις ἐφαρμόζῃ ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους οὐσίαις. 42τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάντων τῶν κακῶν, τὸ τὰς προλήψεις τὰς κοινὰς μὴ δύνασθαι ἐφαρμόζειν. τοῖς ἐπὶ μέρους. 43ἡμεῖς δʼ ἄλλοι ἄλλο οἰόμεθα. ὁ μὲν ὅτι νοσεῖ. οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλʼ ὅτι τὰς προλήψεις οὐκ ἐφαρμόζει. ὁ δʼ ὅτι πτωχός ἐστιν, ὁ δʼ ὅτι πατέρα χαλεπὸν ἔχει ἢ μητέρα, τῷ δʼ ὅτι ὁ Καῖσαρ οὐχ ἵλεώς ἐστιν. τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ἓν καὶ μόνον τὸ τὰς προλήψεις ἐφαρμόζειν μὴ εἰδέναι. 44ἐπεὶ τίς οὐκ ἔχει κακοῦ πρόληψιν, ὅτι βλαβερόν ἐστιν, ὅτι φευκτόν ἐστιν, ὅτι παντὶ τρόπῳ ἀποικονόμητόν ἐστιν; πρόληψις προλήψει οὐ μάχεται, ἀλλʼ ὅταν ἔλθῃ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐφαρμόζειν. 45τί οὖν τὸ κακόν ἐστι τοῦτο καὶ βλαβερὸν καὶ φευκτόν; λέγει τὸ Καίσαρος μὴ εἶναι φίλον· ἀπῆλθεν, ἀπέ[σ]πεσεν τῆς ἐφαρμογῆς, θλίβεται, ζητεῖ τὰ μηδὲν πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον· ὅτι τυχὼν τοῦ φίλος εἶναι Καίσαρος οὐδὲν ἧττον τοῦ ζητουμένου οὐ τέτευχεν. 46τί γάρ ἐστιν, ὃ ζητεῖ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος; εὐσταθῆσαι, εὐδαιμονῆσαι, πάντα ὡς θέλει ποιεῖν, μὴ κωλύεσθαι, μὴ ἀναγκάζεσθαι. ὅταν οὖν γένηται Καίσαρος φίλος, πέπαυται κωλυόμενος, πέπαυται ἀναγκαζόμενος, εὐσταθεῖ, εὐροεῖ; τίνος πυθώμεθα; τίνα ἔχομεν ἀξιοπιστότερον ἢ αὐτὸν τοῦτον τὸν γεγονότα φίλον; 47ἐλθὲ εἰς τὸ μέσον καὶ εἰπὲ ἡμῖν, πότε ἀταραχώτερον ἐκάθευδες, νῦν ἢ πρὶν γενέσθαι φίλος τοῦ Καίσαρος; εὐθὺς ἀκούεις ὅτι παῦσαι, τοὺς θεούς σοι, ἐμπαίζων μου τῇ τύχῃ· οὐκ οἶδας, οἷα πάσχω τάλας· οὐδʼ ὕπνος ἐπέρχεταί μοι, ἀλλʼ ἄλλος ἐλθὼν λέγει, ὅτι ἤδη ἐγρηγορεῖ, ἤδη πρόεισιν· εἶτα ταραχαί, εἶτα φροντίδες. 48ἄγε, ἐδείπνεις δὲ πότε εὐαρεστότερον, νῦν ἢ πρότερον; ἄκουσον αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ τούτων τί λέγει· ὅτι, ἂν μὲν μὴ κληθῇ, ὀδυνᾶται, ἂν δὲ κληθῇ, ὡς δοῦλος παρὰ κυρίῳ δειπνεῖ μεταξὺ προσέχων, μή τι μωρὸν εἴπῃ ἢ ποιήσῃ. καὶ τί δοκεῖς φοβεῖται; μὴ μαστιγωθῇ ὡς δοῦλος; πόθεν αὐτῷ οὕτως καλῶς; ἀλλʼ ὡς πρέπει τηλικοῦτον ἄνδρα, Καίσαρος φίλον, μὴ ἀπολέσῃ τὸν τράχηλον. 49ἐλούου δὲ πότʼ ἀταραχώτερον; ἐγυμνάζου δὲ πότε σχολαίτερον; τὸ σύνολον ποῖον μᾶλλον ἤθελες βίον βιοῦν, τὸν νῦν ἢ τὸν τότε; 50ὀμόσαι δύναμαι, ὅτι οὐδεὶς οὕτως ἐστὶν ἀναίσθητος ἢ ἀναλήθης, μὴ ἀποδύρασθαι τὰς αὑτοῦ συμφοράς, ὅσῳ ἂν ᾖ φίλτερος. 51ὅταν οὖν μήτε οἱ βασιλεῖς λεγόμενοι ζῶσιν ὡς θέλουσι μήθʼ οἱ φίλοι τῶν βασιλέων, τίνες ἔτι εἰσὶν ἐλεύθεροι; — ζήτει καὶ εὑρήσεις. ἔχεις γὰρ ἀφορμὰς παρὰ τῆς φύσεως πρὸς εὕρεσιν τῆς ἀληθείας. εἰ δʼ αὐτὸς οὐχ οἷός τε εἶ κατὰ ταύτας ψιλὰς πορευόμενος εὑρεῖν τὸ ἑξῆς, ἄκουσον παρὰ τῶν ἐζητηκότων. 52τί λέγουσιν; ἀγαθόν σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ἐλευθερία; — τὸ μέγιστον. — δύναται οὖν τις τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ τυγχάνων κακοδαιμονεῖν ἢ κακῶς πράσσειν; — οὔ. — ὅσους οὖν ἂν ἴδῃς κακοδαιμονοῦντας, δυσροοῦντας, πενθοῦντας, ἀποφαίνου θαρρῶν μὴ εἶναι ἐλευθέρους. — ἀποφαίνομαι. 53— οὐκοῦν ἀπὸ μὲν ὠνῆς καὶ πράσεως καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐν κτήσει κατατάξεως ἤδη ἀποκεχωρήκαμεν. εἰ γὰρ ὀρθῶς ὡμολόγησας ταῦτα, ἄν τε μέγας βασιλεὺς κακοδαιμονῇ, οὐκ ἂν ἐλεύθερος, ἄν τε μικρὸς ἄν θʼ ὑπατικὸς ἄν τε δισύπατος. — ἔστω. 54ἔτι οὖν ἀπόκριναί μοι κἀκεῖνο· δοκεῖ σοι μέγα τι εἶναι καὶ γενναῖον ἡ ἐλευθερία καὶ ἀξιόλογον; — πῶς γὰρ οὔ; — ἔστιν οὖν τυγχάνοντά τινος οὕτως μεγάλου καὶ ἀξιολόγου καὶ γενναίου ταπεινὸν εἶναι; — οὐκ ἔστιν. 55— ὅταν οὖν ἴδῃς τινὰ ὑποπεπτωκότα ἑτέρῳ ἢ κολακεύοντα παρὰ τὸ φαινόμενον αὐτῷ, λέγε καὶ τοῦτον θαρρῶν μὴ εἶναι ἐλεύθερον· καὶ μὴ μόνον, ἂν δειπναρίου ἕνεκα αὐτὸ ποιῇ, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἐπαρχίας ἕνεκα κἂν ὑπατείας. ἀλλʼ ἐκείνους μὲν μικροδούλους λέγε τοὺς μικρῶν τινων ἕνεκα ταῦτα ποιοῦντας, τούτους δʼ, ὡς εἰσὶν ἄξιοι, μεγαλοδούλους. 56— ἔστω καὶ ταῦτα. — δοκεῖ δέ σοι ἡ ἐλευθερία αὐτεξούσιόν τι εἶναι καὶ αὐτόνομον; — πῶς γὰρ οὔ; — ὅντινα οὖν ἐπʼ ἄλλῳ κωλῦσαι ἔστι καὶ ἀναγκάσαι, θαρρῶν λέγε μὴ εἶναι ἐλεύθερον. 57καὶ μή μοι πάππους αὐτοῦ καὶ προπάππους βλέπε καὶ ὠνὴν ζήτει καὶ πρᾶσιν, ἀλλʼ ἂν ἀκούσῃς λέγοντος ἔσωθεν καὶ ἐκ πάθους κύριε, κἂν δώδεκα ῥάβδοι προάγωσιν, λέγε δοῦλον· κἂν ἀκούσῃς λέγοντος τάλας ἐγώ, οἷα πάσχω, λέγε δοῦλον· ἂν ἁπλῶς ἀποκλαιόμενον ἴδῃς, μεμφόμενον, δυσροοῦντα, λέγε δοῦλον περιπόρφυρον ἔχοντα. 58ἂν οὖν μηδὲν τούτων ποιῇ, μήπω εἴπῃς ἐλεύθερον, ἀλλὰ τὰ δόγματα αὐτοῦ κατάμαθε, μή τι ἀναγκαστά, μή τι κωλυτικά, μή τι δυσροητικά· κἂν εὕρῃς τοιοῦτον, λέγε δοῦλον ἀνοχὰς ἔχοντα ἐν Σατο[υ]ρναλίοις· λέγε, ὅτι ὁ κύριος αὐτοῦ ἀποδημεῖ· εἶθʼ ἥξει καὶ γνώσῃ οἷα πάσχει. 59— τίς ἥξει; — πᾶς ὃς ἂν ἐξουσίαν ἔχῃ τῶν ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ τινος θελομένων πρὸς τὸ περιποιῆσαι ταῦτα ἢ ἀφελέσθαι. — οὕτως οὖν πολλοὺς κυρίους ἔχομεν; — οὕτως. τὰ γὰρ πράγματα προτέρους τούτων κυρίους ἔχομεν· ἐκεῖνα δὲ πολλά ἐστιν. διὰ ταῦτα ἀνάγκη καὶ τοὺς τούτων τινὸς ἔχοντας ἐξουσίαν κυρίους εἶναι· 60ἐπεί τοι οὐδεὶς αὐτὸν τὸν Καίσαρα φοβεῖται, ἀλλὰ θάνατον, φυγήν, ἀφαίρεσιν τῶν ὄντων, φυλακήν, ἀτιμίαν. οὐδὲ φιλεῖ τις τὸν Καίσαρα, ἂν μή τι ᾖ πολλοῦ ἄξιος, ἀλλὰ πλοῦτον φιλοῦμεν, δημαρχίαν, στρατηγίαν, ὑπατείαν. ὅταν ταῦτα φιλῶμεν καὶ μισῶμεν καὶ φοβώμεθα, ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἐξουσίαν αὐτῶν ἔχοντας κυρίους ἡμῶν εἶναι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὡς θεοὺς αὐτοὺς προσκυνοῦμεν· 61ἐννοοῦμεν γάρ, ὅτι τὸ ἔχον ἐξουσίαν τῆς μεγίστης ὠφελείας θεῖόν ἐστιν, εἶθʼ ὑποτάσσομεν κακῶς οὗτος δʼ ἔχει [τῆς μεγίστης ὠφελείας· θεῖόν ἐστιν. εἶθʼ ὑποτάσσομεν κακῶς, οὗτος δʼ ἔχει] τῆς μεγίστης ὠφελείας ἐξουσίαν. ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ γενόμενον ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐπενεχθῆναι κακῶς. 62τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ ποιοῦν ἀκώλυτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ αὐτεξούσιον; πλοῦτος γὰρ οὐ ποιεῖ οὐδʼ ὑπατεία οὐδʼ ἐπαρχία οὐδὲ βασιλεία, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τι ἄλλο εὑρεθῆναι. 63τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ ἐν τῷ γράφειν ἀκώλυτον ποιοῦν καὶ ἀπαραπόδιστον; — ἡ ἐπιστήμη τοῦ γράφειν. — τί δʼ ἐν τῷ κιθαρίζειν; — ἡ ἐπιστήμη τοῦ κιθαρίζειν. — οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τῷ βιοῦν ἡ ἐπιστήμη τοῦ βιοῦν. 64ὡς μὲν οὖν ἁπλῶς, ἀκήκοας· σκέψαι δʼ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους. τὸν ἐφιέμενόν τινος τῶν ἐπʼ ἄλλοις ὄντων ἐνδέχεται ἀκώλυτον εἶναι; — οὔ. — ἐνδέχεται ἀπαραπόδιστον; 65— οὔ. — οὐκοῦν οὐδʼ ἐλεύθερον. ὅρα οὖν· πότερον οὐδὲν ἔχομεν, ὃ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν μόνοις ἐστίν, ἢ πάντα ἢ τὰ μὲν ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ἐστιν, τὰ δʼ ἐπʼ ἄλλοις; 66— πῶς λέγεις; — τὸ σῶμα ὅταν θέλῃς ὁλόκληρον εἶναι, ἐπὶ σοί ἐστιν ἢ οὔ; — οὐκ ἐπʼ ἐμοί. — ὅταν δʼ ὑγιαίνειν; — οὐδὲ τοῦτο. — ὅταν δὲ καλὸν εἶναι; — οὐδὲ τοῦτο. — ζῆν δὲ καὶ ἀποθανεῖν; — οὐδὲ τοῦτο. — οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἀλλότριον, ὑπεύθυνον παντὸς τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου. 67— ἔστω. — τὸν ἀγρὸν δʼ ἐπὶ σοί ἐστιν ἔχειν, ὅταν θέλῃς καὶ ἐφʼ ὅσον θέλεις καὶ οἷον θέλεις; — οὔ. — τὰ δὲ δουλάρια; — οὔ. — τὰ δʼ ἱμάτια; — οὔ. — τὸ δὲ οἰκίδιον; — οὔ. — τοὺς δʼ ἵππους; — τούτων μὲν οὐδέν. — ἂν δὲ τὰ τέκνα σου ζῆν θέλῃς ἐξ ἅπαντος ἢ τὴν γυναῖκα ἢ τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἢ τοὺς φίλους, ἐπὶ σοί ἐστιν; — οὐδὲ ταῦτα. 68πότερον οὖν οὐδὲν ἔχεις αὐτεξούσιον, ὃ ἐπὶ μόνῳ ἐστὶ σοί, ἢ ἔχεις τι τοιοῦτον; — οὐκ οἶδα. — ὅρα οὖν οὕτως καὶ σκέψαι αὐτό. 69μή τις δύναταί σε ποιῆσαι συγκαταθέσθαι τῷ ψεύδει; — οὐδείς. — οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τῷ συγκαταθετικῷ τόπῳ ἀκώλυτος εἶ καὶ ἀνεμπόδιστος. 70— ἔστω. — ἄγε, ὁρμῆσαι δέ σε ἐφʼ ὃ μὴ θέλεις τις δύναται ἀναγκάσαι; — δύναται. ὅταν γάρ μοι θάνατον ἢ δεσμὰ ἀπειλῇ, ἀναγκάζει μʼ ὁρμῆσαι. — ἂν οὖν καταφρονῇς τοῦ ἀποθανεῖν καὶ τοῦ δεδέσθαι, ἔτι αὐτοῦ ἐπιστρέφῃ; 71— οὔ. — σὸν οὖν ἐστιν ἔργον τὸ καταφρονεῖν θανάτου ἢ οὐ σόν; — ἐμόν. — σὸν ἄρα ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ὁρμῆσαι ἢ οὔ; — ἔστω ἐμόν. — τὸ δʼ ἀφορμῆσαι τίνος; 72σὸν καὶ τοῦτο. — τί οὖν, ἂν ἐμοῦ ὁρμήσαντος περιπατῆσαι ἐκεῖνός με κωλύσῃ; — τί σου κωλύσει; μή τι τὴν συγκατάθεσιν; — οὔ· ἀλλὰ τὸ σωμάτιον. — ναί, ὡς λίθον. — ἔστω· ἀλλʼ οὐκέτι ἐγὼ περιπατῶ. 73— τίς δέ σοι εἶπεν τὸ περιπατῆσαι σὸν ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀκώλυτον; ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο ἔλεγον ἀκώλυτον μόνον τὸ ὁρμῆσαι· ὅπου δὲ σώματος χρεία καὶ τῆς ἐκ τούτου συνεργείας, πάλαι ἀκήκοας, ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι σόν. 74— ἔστω καὶ ταῦτα. — ὀρέγεσθαι δέ σε οὗ μὴ θέλεις τις ἀναγκάσαι δύναται; — οὐδείς. — προθέσθαι δʼ ἢ ἐπιβαλέσθαι τις ἢ ἁπλῶς χρῆσθαι ταῖς προσπιπτούσαις φαντασίαις; 75— οὐδὲ τοῦτο· ἀλλὰ ὀρεγόμενόν με κωλύσει τυχεῖν οὗ ὀρέγομαι. — ἂν τῶν σῶν τινος ὀρέγῃ καὶ τῶν ἀκωλύτων, πῶς σε κωλύσει; — οὐδαμῶς. — τίς οὖν σοι λέγει, ὅτι ὁ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ὀρεγόμενος ἀκώλυτός ἐστιν; 76Ὑγείας οὖν μὴ ὀρέγωμαι;— μηδαμῶς, μηδʼ ἄλλου ἀλλοτρίου μηδενός. 77ὃ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπὶ σοὶ παρασκευάσαι ἢ τηρῆσαι ὅτε θέλεις, τοῦτο ἀλλότριόν ἐστιν. μακρὰν ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ οὐ μόνον τὰς χεῖρας, ἀλλὰ πολὺ πρότερον τὴν ὄρεξιν· εἰ δὲ μή, παρέδωκας σαυτὸν δοῦλον, ὑπέθηκας τὸν τράχηλον, ἂν θαυμάσῃς τῶν [τι] μὴ σῶν ᾧ τινι ἂν τῶν ὑπευθύνων καὶ θνητῶν προσπαθῇς. — ἡ χεὶρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμή; 78— μέρος ἐστὶ σόν, φύσει δὲ πηλός, κωλυτόν, ἀναγκαστόν, δοῦλον παντὸς τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου. 79καὶ τί σοι λέγω χεῖρα; ὅλον τὸ σῶμα οὕτως ἔχειν σε δεῖ ὡς ὀνάριον ἐπισεσαγμένον, ἐφʼ ὅσον ἂν οἷόν τε ᾖ, ἐφʼ ὅσον ἂν διδῶται· ἂν δʼ ἀγγαρεία ᾖ καὶ στρατιώτης ἐπιλάβηται, ἄφες, μὴ ἀντίτεινε μηδὲ γόγγυζε. εἰ δὲ μή, πληγὰς λαβὼν οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸ ὀνάριον. 80ὅταν δὲ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα οὕτως ἔχειν σε δέῃ, ὅρα, τί ἀπολείπεται περὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα τοῦ σώματος ἕνεκα παρασκευάζεται. ὅταν ἐκεῖνο ὀνάριον ᾖ, τἆλλα γίνεται χαλινάρια τοῦ ὀναρίου, σαγμάτια, ὑποδημάτια, κριθαί, χόρτος. ἄφες κἀκεῖνα, ἀπόλυε θᾶττον καὶ εὐκολώτερον ἢ τὸ ὀνάριον. 81καὶ ταύτην τὴν παρασκευὴν παρασκευασάμενος καὶ τὴν ἄσκησιν ἀσκήσας τὰ ἀλλότρια ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων διακρίνειν, τὰ κωλυτὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκωλύτων, ταῦτα πρὸς σαυτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι, ἐκεῖνα μὴ πρὸς σαυτόν, ἐνταῦθα ἐπιστρόφως ἔχειν τὴν ὄρεξιν, ἐνταῦθα τὴν ἔκκλισιν, μή τι ἔτι φοβῇ τινα; 82— οὐδένα. — περὶ τίνος γὰρ φοβήσῃ; περὶ τῶν σεαυτοῦ, ὅπου σοι ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ; καὶ τίς τούτων ἐξουσίαν ἔχει; τίς ἀφελέσθαι αὐτὰ δύναται, τίς ἐμποδίσαι; οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸν θεόν. 83ἀλλʼ ὑπὲρ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῆς κτήσεως; ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων; ὑπὲρ τῶν οὐδὲν πρὸς σέ; καὶ τί ἄλλο ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐμελέτας ἢ διακρίνειν τὰ σὰ καὶ οὐ σά, τὰ ἐπὶ σοὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ σοί, τὰ κωλυτὰ καὶ ἀκώλυτα; τίνος δὲ ἕνεκα προσῆλθες τοῖς φιλοσόφοις; ἵνα μηδὲν ἧττον ἀτυχῇς καὶ δυστυχῇς; 84οὐκοῦν ἄφοβος μὲν οὕτως ἔσει καὶ ἀτάραχος. λύπη δὲ τί πρὸς σέ; ὧν γὰρ προσδοκωμένων φόβος γίνεται, καὶ λύπη παρόντων. ἐπιθυμήσεις δὲ τίνος ἔτι; τῶν μὲν γὰρ προαιρετικῶν ἅτε καλῶν ὄντων καὶ παρόντων σύμμετρον ἔχεις καὶ καθισταμένην τὴν ὄρεξιν, τῶν δʼ ἀπροαιρέτων οὐδενὸς ὀρέγῃ, ἵνα καὶ τόπον σχῇ τὸ ἄλογον ἐκεῖνο καὶ ὠστικὸν καὶ παρὰ τὰ μέτρα ἠπειγμένον; 85ὅταν οὖν πρὸς τὰ πράγματα οὕτως ἔχῃς, τίς ἔτι ἄνθρωπος δύναται φοβερὸς εἶναι; τί γὰρ ἔχει ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ φοβερὸν ἢ ὀφθεὶς ἢ λαλήσας ἢ ὅλως συναναστραφείς; οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ ἵππος ἵππῳ ἢ κύων κυνὶ ἢ μέλισσα μελίσσῃ. ἀλλὰ τὰ πράγματα ἑκάστῳ φοβερά ἐστιν· ταῦτα δʼ ὅταν περιποιεῖν τις δύνηταί τινι ἢ ἀφελέσθαι, τότε καὶ αὐτὸς φοβερὸς γίνεται. 86πῶς οὖν ἀκρόπολις καταλύεται; οὐ σιδήρῳ οὐδὲ πυρί, ἀλλὰ δόγμασιν. ἂν γὰρ τὴν οὖσαν ἐν τῇ πόλει καθέλωμεν, μή τι καὶ τὴν τοῦ πυρετοῦ, μή τι καὶ τὴν τῶν καλῶν γυναικαρίων, μή τι ἁπλῶς τὴν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀκρόπολιν καὶ τοὺς ἐν ἡμῖν τυράννους ἀποβεβλήκαμεν, οὓς ἐφʼ ἑκάστοις καθʼ ἡμέραν ἔχομεν, ποτὲ μὲν τοὺς αὐτούς, ποτὲ δʼ ἄλλους; 87ἀλλʼ ἔνθεν ἄρξασθαι δεῖ καὶ ἔνθεν καθελεῖν τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, ἐκβάλλειν τοὺς τυράννους· τὸ σωμάτιον ἀφεῖναι, τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ, τὰς δυνάμεις, τὴν κτῆσιν, τὴν φήμην, ἀρχάς, τιμάς, τέκνα, ἀδελφούς, φίλους, πάντα ταῦτα ἡγήσασθαι ἀλλότρια. 88κἂν ἔνθεν ἐκβληθῶσιν οἱ τύραννοι, τί ἔτι ἀποτειχίζω τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ἐμοῦ γε ἕνεκα; ἑστῶσα γὰρ τί μοι ποιεῖ; τί ἔτι ἐκβάλλω τοὺς δορυφόρους; ποῦ γὰρ αὐτῶν αἰσθάνομαι; ἐπʼ ἄλλους ἔχουσιν τὰς ῥάβδους καὶ τοὺς κοντοὺς καὶ τὰς μαχαίρας. 89ἐγὼ δʼ οὐπώποτʼ οὔτε θέλων ἐκωλύθην οὔτʼ ἠναγκάσθην μὴ θέλων καὶ πῶς τοῦτο δυνατόν; προσκατατέταχά μου τὴν ὁρμὴν τῷ θεῷ. θέλει μʼ ἐκεῖνος πυρέσσειν· κἀγὼ θέλω. θέλει ὁρμᾶν ἐπί τι· κἀγὼ θέλω. θέλει ὀρέγεσθαι· κἀγὼ θέλω. θέλει με τυχεῖν τινος· κἀγὼ βούλομαι. 90οὐ θέλει· οὐ βούλομαι. ἀποθανεῖν οὖν θέλω· στρεβλωθῆναι οὖν θέλω. τίς ἔτι με κωλῦσαι δύναται παρὰ τὸ ἐμοὶ φαινόμενον ἢ ἀναγκάσαι; οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸν Δία. 91οὕτως ποιοῦσι καὶ τῶν ὁδοιπόρων οἱ ἀσφαλέστεροι. ἀκήκοεν ὅτι λῃστεύεται ἡ ὁδός· μόνος οὐ τολμᾷ καθεῖναι, ἀλλὰ περιέμεινεν συνοδίαν ἢ πρεσβευτοῦ ἢ ταμίου ἢ ἀνθυπάτου καὶ προσκατατάξας ἑαυτὸν παρέρχεται ἀσφαλῶς. 92οὕτως καὶ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ποιεῖ ὁ φρόνιμος. πολλὰ λῃστήρια, τύραννοι, χειμῶνες, ἀπορίαι, ἀποβολαὶ τῶν φιλτάτων. 93ποῦ τις καταφύγῃ; πῶς ἀλῄστευτος παρέλθῃ; ποίαν συνοδίαν περιμείνας ἀσφαλῶς διέλθῃ; τίνι προσκατατάξας ἑαυτόν; 94τῷ δεῖνι, τῷ πλουσίῳ, τῷ ὑπατικῷ. καὶ τί μοι ὄφελος; αὐτὸς ἐκδύεται, οἰμώζει, πενθεῖ. τί δʼ, ἂν ὁ συνοδοιπόρος αὐτὸς ἐπʼ ἐμὲ στραφεὶς λῃστής μου γένηται; 95τί ποιήσω; φίλος ἔσομαι Καίσαρος· ἐκείνου με ὄντα ἑταῖρον οὐδεὶς ἀδικήσει. πρῶτον μέν, ἵνα γένωμαι, π[ρ]όσα με δεῖ τλῆναι καὶ παθεῖν, ποσάκις καὶ ὑπὸ πόσων λῃστευθῆναι· εἶτα ἐὰν γένωμαι, καὶ οὗτος θνητός ἐστιν [καὶ οὗτος θνητός]. 96ἂν δʼ αὐτὸς ἔκ τινος περιστάσεως ἐχθρός μου γένηται, ἀναχωρῆσαί πού ποτε κρεῖσσον; 97εἰς ἐρημίαν; ἄγε, ἐκεῖ πυρετὸς οὐκ ἔρχεται; τί οὖν γένηται; οὐκ ἔστιν εὑρεῖν ἀσφαλῆ σύνοδον, πιστόν, ἰσχυρόν, ἀνεπιβούλευτον; 98οὕτως ἐφίστησιν καὶ ἐννοεῖ, ὅτι, ἐὰν τῷ θεῷ προσκατατάξῃ ἑαυτόν, διελεύσεται ἀσφαλῶς. 99πῶς λέγεις προσκατατάξαι;— ἵνʼ, ὃ ἂν ἐκεῖνος θέλῃ, καὶ αὐτὸς θέλῃ καί, ὃ ἂν ἐκεῖνος μὴ θέλῃ, τοῦτο μηδʼ αὐτὸς θέλῃ. 100— πῶς οὖν τοῦτο γένηται; — πῶς γὰρ ἄλλως ἢ ἐπισκεψαμένῳ τὰς ὁρμὰς τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὴν διοίκησιν; τί μοι δέδωκεν ἐμὸν καὶ αὐτεξούσιον, τί αὑτῷ κατέλ[ε]ιπεν; τὰ προαιρετικά μοι δέδωκεν, ἐπʼ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκεν, ἀνεμπόδιστα, ἀκώλυτα. τὸ σῶμα τὸ πήλινον πῶς ἐδύνατο ἀκώλυτον ποιῆσαι; ὑπέταξεν οὖν τῇ τῶν ὅλων περιόδῳ, τὴν κτῆσιν, τὰ σκεύη, τὴν οἰκίαν, τὰ τέκνα, τὴν γυναῖκα. 101τί οὖν θεομαχῶ; τί θέλω τὰ μὴ θελητά, τὰ μὴ δοθέντα μοι ἐξ ἅπαντος ἔχειν; ἀλλὰ πῶς; ὡς δέδοται καὶ ἐφʼ ὅσον δύναται. ἀλλʼ ὁ δοὺς ἀφαιρεῖται. τί οὖν ἀντιτείνω; οὐ λέγω, ὅτι ἠλίθιος ἔσομαι τὸν ἰσχυρότερον βιαζόμενος, ἀλλʼ ἔτι πρότερον ἄδικος. 102πόθεν γὰρ ἔχων αὐτὰ ἦλθον; ὁ πατήρ μου αὐτὰ ἔδωκεν. ἐκείνῳ δὲ τίς; τὸν ἥλιον δὲ τίς πεποίηκε, τοὺς καρποὺς δὲ τίς, τὰς δʼ ὥρας τίς, τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους συμπλοκὴν καὶ κοινωνίαν τίς; 103εἶτα σύμπαντα εἰληφὼς παρʼ ἄλλου καὶ αὐτὸν σεαυτόν, ἀγανακτεῖς καὶ μέμφῃ τὸν δόντα, ἄν σού τι ἀφέληται; 104τίς ὢν καὶ ἐπὶ τί ἐληλυθώς; οὐχὶ ἐκεῖνός σε εἰσήγαγεν; οὐχὶ τὸ φῶς ἐκεῖνός σοι ἔδειξεν; οὐ συνεργοὺς δέδωκεν; οὐ καὶ αἰσθήσεις; οὐ λόγον; ὡς τίνα δὲ εἰσήγαγεν; οὐχ ὡς θνητόν; οὐχ ὡς μετὰ ὀλίγου σαρκιδίου ζήσοντα ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ θεασόμενον τὴν διοίκησιν αὐτοῦ καὶ συμπομπεύσοντα αὐτῷ καὶ συνεορτάσοντα πρὸς ὀλίγον; 105οὐ θέλεις οὖν, ἕως δέδοταί σοι, θεασάμενος τὴν πομπὴν καὶ τὴν πανήγυριν εἶτα, ὅταν σʼ ἐξάγῃ, πορεύεσθαι προσκυνήσας καὶ εὐχαριστήσας ὑπὲρ ὧν ἤκουσας καὶ εἶδες; 106οὔ· ἀλλʼ ἔτι ἑορτάζειν ἤθελον. καὶ γὰρ οἱ μύσται μυεῖσθαι; τάχα καὶ οἱ ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ ἄλλους ἀθλητὰς βλέπειν· ἀλλὰ ἡ πανήγυρις πέρας ἔχει· ἔξελθε, ἀπαλλάγηθι ὡς εὐχάριστος, ὡς αἰδήμων· δὸς ἄλλοις τόπον· δεῖ γενέσθαι καὶ ἄλλους, καθάπερ καὶ σὺ ἐγένου, καὶ γενομένους ἔχειν χώραν καὶ οἰκήσεις, τὰ ἐπιτήδεια. ἂν δʼ οἱ πρῶτοι μὴ ὑπεξάγωσιν, τί ὑπολείπεται; τί ἄπληστος εἶ; τί ἀνίκανος; τί στενοχωρεῖς τὸν κόσμον; 107— ναί· ἀλλὰ τὰ τεκνία μετʼ ἐμαυτοῦ εἶναι θέλω καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα. — σὰ γάρ ἐστιν; οὐχὶ τοῦ δόντος; οὐχὶ καὶ τοῦ σὲ πεποιηκότος; εἶτα οὐκ ἐκστήσῃ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων; οὐ παραχωρήσεις τῷ κρείσσονι; 108— τί οὖν μʼ εἰσῆγεν ἐπὶ τούτοις; — καὶ εἰ μὴ ποιεῖ σοι, ἔξελθε· οὐκ ἔχει χρείαν θεατοῦ μεμψιμοίρου. τῶν συνεορταζόντων δεῖται, τῶν συγχορευόντων, ἵνʼ ἐπικροτῶσι μᾶλλον, ἐπιθειάζωσιν, ὑμνῶσι δὲ τὴν πανήγυριν. 109τοὺς ἀταλαιπώρους δὲ καὶ δειλοὺς οὐκ ἀηδῶς ὄψεται ἀπολελειμμένους τῆς πανηγύρεως· οὐδὲ γὰρ παρόντες ὡς ἐν ἑορτῇ διῆγον οὐδʼ ἐξεπλήρουν τὴν χώραν τὴν πρέπουσαν, ἀλλʼ ὠδυνῶντο, ἐμέμφοντο τὸν δαίμονα, τὴν τύχην, τοὺς συνόντας· ἀναίσθητοι καὶ ὧν ἔτυχον καὶ τῶν ἑαυτῶν δυνάμεων, ἃς εἰλήφασι πρὸς τὰ ἐναντία, μεγαλοψυχίας, γενναιότητος, ἀνδρείας, αὐτῆς τῆς νῦν ζητουμένης ἐλευθερίας. 110— ἐπὶ τί οὖν εἴληφα ταῦτα; — χρησόμενος. — μέχρι τίνος; — μέχρις ἂν ὁ χρήσας θέλῃ. — ἂν οὖν ἀναγκαῖά μοι ᾖ; — μὴ πρόσπασχε αὐτοῖς καὶ οὐκ ἔσται. σὺ αὐτὰ αὑτῷ μὴ εἴπῃς ἀναγκαῖα καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν. 111ταύτην τὴν μελέτην ἕωθεν εἰς ἑσπέραν μελετᾶν ἔδει. ἀπὸ τῶν μικροτάτων, ἀπὸ τῶν εὐεπηρεαστοτάτων ἀρξάμενος, ἀπὸ χύτρας, ἀπὸ ποτηρίου, εἶθʼ οὕτως ἐπὶ χιτωνάριον πρόσελθε, ἐπὶ κυνάριον, ἐπὶ ἱππάριον, ἐπὶ ἀγρίδιον· ἔνθεν ἐπὶ σαυτόν, τὸ σῶμα, τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, τὰ τέκνα, τὴν γυναῖκα, τοὺς ἀδελφούς. 112πανταχοῦ περιβλέψας ἀπόρριψον ἀπὸ σεαυτοῦ· κάθηρον τὰ δόγματα, μή τι προσήρτηταί σοι τῶν οὐ σῶν, μή τι συμπέφυκεν, μή τι ὀδυνήσει σʼ ἀποσπώμενον. 113καὶ λέγε γυμναζόμενος καθʼ ἡμέραν, ὡς ἐκεῖ, μὴ ὅτι φιλοσοφεῖς (ἔστω φορτικὸν τὸ ὄνομα), ἀλλʼ ὅτι καρπιστὴν δίδως. τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ταῖς ἀληθείαις ἐλευθερία. 114ταύτην ἠλευθερώθη Διογένης παρʼ Ἀντισθένους καὶ οὐκέτι ἔφη καταδουλωθῆναι δύνασθαι ὑπʼ οὐδενός. 115διὰ τοῦτο πῶς ἑάλω, πῶς τοῖς πειραταῖς ἐχρῆτο· μή τι κύριον εἶπέν τινα αὐτῶν; καὶ οὐ λέγω τὸ ὄνομα· οὐ γὰρ τὴν φωνὴν φοβοῦμαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ πάθος, ἀφʼ οὗ ἡ φωνὴ ἐκπέμπεται. 116πῶς ἐπιτιμᾷ αὐτοῖς, ὅτι κακῶς ἔτρεφον τοὺς ἑαλωκότας· πῶς ἐπράθη· μή τι κύριον ἐζήτει; ἀλλὰ δοῦλον. πῶς δὲ πραθεὶς ἀνεστρέφετο πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην· εὐθὺς διελέγετο πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅτι οὐχ οὕτως ἐστολίσθαι δεῖ αὐτόν, οὐχ οὕτως κεκάρθαι, περὶ τῶν υἱῶν, πῶς δεῖ αὐτοὺς διάγειν. 117καὶ τί θαυμαστόν; εἰ γὰρ παιδοτρίβην ἐώνητο, ἐν τοῖς παλαιστρικοῖς ὑπηρέτῃ ἂν αὐτῷ ἐχρῆτο ἢ κυρίῳ; εἰ δʼ ἰατρόν, ὡσαύτως, εἰ δʼ ἀρχιτέκτονα. καὶ οὕτως ἐφʼ ἑκάστης ὕλης τὸν ἔμπειρον τοῦ ἀπείρου κρατεῖν πᾶσα ἀνάγκη. 118ὅστις οὖν καθόλου τὴν περὶ βίον ἐπιστήμην κέκτηται, τί ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτον εἶναι δεῖ τὸν δεσπότην; τίς γάρ ἐστιν ἐν νηὶ κύριος; — ὁ κυβερνήτης. — διὰ τί; ὅτι ὁ ἀπειθῶν αὐτῷ ζημιοῦται. 119— ἀλλὰ δεῖραί με δύναται. — μή τι οὖν ἀζημίως; — οὕτως μὲν κἀγὼ ἔκρινον. — ἀλλʼ ὅτι οὐκ ἀζημίως, διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔξεστιν· οὐδενὶ δʼ ἀζήμιόν ἐστι τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἄδικα. 120— καὶ τίς ἡ ζημία τῷ δήσαντι τὸν αὑτοῦ δοῦλον, ἣν δοκεῖς; — τὸ δῆσαι· τοῦτο ὃ καὶ σὺ ὁμολογήσεις, ἂν θέλῃς σῴζειν, ὅτι ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔστι θηρίον, ἀλλʼ ἥμερον ζῷον. 121ἐπεὶ πότʼ ἄμπελος πράσσει κακῶς; ὅταν παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτῆς φύσιν πράσσῃ. πότʼ ἀλεκτρυών; 122ὡσαύτως. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄνθρωπος. τίς οὖν αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις; δάκνειν καὶ λακτίζειν καὶ εἰς φυλακὴν βάλλειν καὶ ἀποκεφαλίζειν; οὔ· ἀλλʼ εὖ ποιεῖν, συνεργεῖν, ἐπεύχεσθαι. τότʼ οὖν κακῶς πράσσει, ἄν τε θέλῃς ἄν τε μή, ὅταν ἀγνωμονῇ. 123ὥστε Σωκράτης οὐκ ἔπραξε κακῶς;— οὔ, ἀλλʼ οἱ δικασταὶ καὶ οἱ κατήγοροι. — οὐδʼ ἐν Ῥώμῃ Ἑλουίδιος; — οὔ, ἀλλʼ ὁ ἀποκτείνας αὐτόν. — πῶς λέγεις; 124— ὡς καὶ σὺ ἀλεκτρυόνα οὐ λέγεις κακῶς πρᾶξαι τὸν νικήσαντα καὶ κατακοπέντα, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀπλῆγα ἡττηθέντα· οὐδὲ κύνα εὐδαιμονίζεις τὸν μήτε διώκοντα μήτε πονοῦντα, ἀλλʼ ὅταν ἱδρῶντα ἴδῃς, ὅταν ὀδυνώμενον, ὅταν ῥηγνύμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ δρόμου. 125τί παραδοξολογοῦμεν, εἰ λέγομεν παντὸς κακὸν εἶναι τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου φύσιν; τοῦτο παράδοξόν ἐστιν; σὺ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν ἄλλων οὐ λέγεις; διὰ τί ἐπὶ μόνου οὖν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἄλλως φέρῃ; 126ἀλλʼ ὅτι λέγομεν ἥμερον εἶναι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὴν φύσιν καὶ φιλάλληλον καὶ πιστήν, τοῦτο παράδοξον οὐκ ἔστιν; — οὐδὲ τοῦτο. 127— πῶς οὖν ἔτι οὐ δερόμενος βλάπτεται ἢ δεσμευόμενος ἢ ἀποκεφαλιζόμενος; οὐχὶ οὕτως μέν· εἰ γενναίως πάσχει, καὶ προσκερδαίνων καὶ προσωφελούμενος ἀπέρχεται, ἐκεῖνος δὲ βλαπτόμενός ἐστιν ὁ τὰ οἰκτρότατα πάσχων καὶ αἴσχιστα, ὁ ἀντὶ ἀνθρώπου λύκος γινόμενος ἢ ἔχις ἢ σφήξ; 128ἄγε οὖν ἐπέλθωμεν τὰ ὡμολογημένα. ὁ ἀκώλυτος ἄνθρωπος ἐλεύθερος, ᾧ πρόχειρα τὰ πράγματα ὡς βούλεται. ὃν δʼ ἔστιν ἢ κωλῦσαι ἢ ἀναγκάσαι ἢ ἐμποδίσαι ἢ ἄκοντα εἴς τι ἐμβαλεῖν, δοῦλός ἐστιν. 129τίς δʼ ἀκώλυτος; ὁ μηδενὸς τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἐφιέμενος. τίνα δʼ ἀλλότρια; ἃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐφʼ ἡμῖν οὔτʼ ἔχειν οὔτε μὴ ἔχειν οὔτε ποιὰ ἔχειν ἢ πῶς ἔχοντα. 130οὐκοῦν τὸ σῶμα ἀλλότριον, τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ ἀλλότρια, ἡ κτῆσις ἀλλοτρία. ἂν οὖν τινι τούτων ὡς ἰδίῳ προσπαθῇς, δώσεις δίκας ἃς ἄξιον τὸν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἐφιέμενον. 131αὕτη ἡ ὁδὸς ἐπʼ ἐλευθερίαν ἄγει, αὕτη μόνη ἀπαλλαγὴ δουλείας, [μόνῃ] τὸ δυνηθῆναί ποτʼ εἰπεῖν ἐξ ὅλης ψυχῆς τὸ ἄγου δέ μʼ, ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σύ γʼ ἡ Πεπρωμένη, ὅποι ποθʼ ὑμῖν εἰμι διατεταγμένος. 132ἀλλὰ τί λέγεις, φιλόσοφε; καλεῖ σε ὁ τύραννος ἐροῦντά τι ὧν οὐ πρέπει σοι. λέγεις ἢ οὐ λέγεις; εἰπέ μοι. — ἄφες σκέψωμαι. — νῦν σκέψῃ; ὅτε δʼ ἐν τῇ σχολῇ ἦς, τί ἐσκέπτου; οὐκ ἐμελέτας, τίνα ἐστὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τίνα οὐδέτερα; — Ἐσκεπτόμην. — τίνα οὖν ἤρεσκεν ὑμῖν; 133— τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, τὰ ἄδικα καὶ αἰσχρὰ κακά. — μή τι τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθόν; — οὔ. — μή τι τὸ ἀποθανεῖν κακόν; — οὔ. — μή τι φυλακή; — οὔ. — λόγος δʼ ἀγεννὴς καὶ ἄπιστος καὶ φίλου προδοσία καὶ κολακεία τυράννου τί ὑμῖν ἐφαίνετο; 134— κακά. — τί οὖν; οὐχὶ σκέπτῃ, οὐχὶ δʼ ἔσκεψαι καὶ βεβούλευσαι. ποία γὰρ σκέψις, εἰ καθήκει μοὶ δυναμένῳ τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθὰ ἐμαυτῷ περιποιῆσαι, τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ μὴ περιποιῆσαι; καλὴ σκέψις καὶ ἀναγκαία, πολλῆς βουλῆς δεομένη. τί ἡμῖν ἐμπαίζεις, ἄνθρωπε; 135οὐδέποτε τοιαύτη σκέψις γίνεται. οὐδʼ εἰ ταῖς ἀληθείαις κακὰ μὲν ἐφαντάζου τὰ αἰσχρά, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα οὐδέτερα, ἦλθες ἂν ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐπίστασιν, οὐδʼ ἐγγύς· ἀλλʼ αὐτόθεν διακρίνειν εἶχες, ὥσπερ ὄψει τῇ διανοίᾳ. 136πότε γὰρ σκέπτῃ, εἰ τὰ μέλανα λευκά ἐστιν, εἰ τὰ βαρέα κοῦφα; οὐχὶ δὲ τοῖς ἐναργῶς φαινομένοις ἐπακολουθεῖς; πῶς οὖν νῦν σκέπτεσθαι λέγεις, εἰ τὰ οὐδέτερα τῶν κακῶν φευκτότερα; 137ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἔχεις τὰ δόγματα ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ φαίνεταί σοι οὔτε ταῦτα οὐδέτερα, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα κακά, οὔτʼ ἐκεῖνα κακά, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς. 138οὕτως γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἴθισας σεαυτόν· ποῦ εἰμι; ἐν σχολῇ. καὶ ἀκούουσί μου τίνες; λέγω μετὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων. ἀλλʼ ἐξελήλυθα τῆς σχολῆς· ἆρον ἐκεῖνα τὰ τῶν σχολαστικῶν καὶ τῶν μωρῶν. οὕτως καταμαρτυρεῖται φίλος ὑπὸ φιλοσόφου, οὕτως παρασιτεῖ φιλόσοφος, 139οὕτως ἐπʼ ἀργυρίῳ ἐκμισθοῖ ἑαυτόν, οὕτως ἐν συγκλήτῳ τις οὐ λέγει τὰ φαινόμενα· ἔνδοθεν τὸ δόγμα αὐτοῦ βοᾷ, 140οὐ ψυχρὸν καὶ ταλαίπωρον ὑποληψείδιον ἐκ λόγων εἰκαίων ὡς ἐκ τριχὸς ἠρτημένον, ἀλλὰ ἰσχυρὸν καὶ χρηστικὸν καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ διὰ τῶν ἔργων γεγυμνάσθαι μεμυημένον. 141παραφύλαξον σαυτόν, πῶς ἀκούεις — οὐ λέγω, ὅτι τὸ παιδίον σου ἀπέθανεν· πόθεν σοι; ἀλλʼ ὅτι σου τὸ ἔλαιον ἐξεχέθη, ὁ οἶνος ἐξεπόθη, 142ἵνα τις ἐπιστὰς διατεινομένῳ σοι τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ μόνον εἴπῃ φιλόσοφε, ἄλλα λέγεις ἐν τῇ σχολῇ· τί ἡμᾶς ἐξαπατᾷς; τί σκώληξ ὢν λέγεις, ὅτι ἄνθρωπος εἶ; 143ἤθελον ἐπιστῆναί τινι αὐτῶν συνουσιάζοντι, ἵνα ἴδω, πῶς τείνεται καὶ ποίας φωνὰς ἀφίησιν, εἰ μέμνηται τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ, τῶν λόγων οὓς ἀκούει ἢ λέγει ἢ ἀναγιγνώσκει. 144καὶ τί ταῦτα πρὸς ἐλευθερίαν;— οὐκ ἄλλα μὲν οὖν ἢ ταῦτʼ, ἄν τε θέλητε ὑμεῖς οἱ πλούσιοι ἄν τε μή. 145— καὶ τί[ς] σοι μαρτυρεῖ ταῦτα; — τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ αὐτοὶ ὑμεῖς οἱ τὸν κύριον τὸν μέγαν ἔχοντες καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνου νεῦμα καὶ κίνημα ζῶντες, κἄν τινα ὑμῶν ἴδῃ μόνον συνεστραμμένῳ βλέμματι, ἀποψυχόμενοι, τὰς γραίας θεραπεύοντες καὶ τοὺς γέροντας καὶ λέγοντες ὅτι οὐ δύναμαι τοῦτο ποιῆσαι· οὐκ ἐξεστί μοι; 146διὰ τί οὐκ ἔξεστίν σοι; οὐκ ἄρτι ἐμάχου μοι λέγων ἐλεύθερος εἶναι; ἀλλὰ Ἄπρυλλά με κεκώλυκεν. λέγε οὖν τὰς ἀληθείας, δοῦλε, καὶ μὴ δραπέτευέ σου τοὺς κυρίους μηδʼ ἀπαρνοῦ μηδὲ τόλμα καρπιστὴν διδόναι τοσούτους ἔχων τῆς δουλείας ἐλέγχους. 147καίτοι τὸν μὲν ὑπʼ ἔρωτος ἀναγκαζόμενόν τι ποιεῖν παρὰ τὸ φαινόμενον καὶ ἅμα μὲν ὁρῶντα τὸ ἄμεινον, ἅμα δʼ οὐκ ἐξευτονοῦντα ἀκολουθῆσαι αὐτῷ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἄν τις συγγνώμης ἄξιον ὑπολάβοι, ἅθʼ ὑπό τινος βιαίου καὶ τρόπον τινὰ θείου κατεσχημένον. 148σοῦ δὲ τίς ἀνάσχοιτο τῶν γραῶν ἐρῶντος καὶ τῶν γερόντων καὶ ἐκείνας ἀπομύσσοντος καὶ ἀποπλύνοντος καὶ δωροδοκοῦντος καὶ ἅμα μὲν νοσούσας θεραπεύοντος ὡς δούλου, ἅμα δʼ ἀποθανεῖν εὐχομένου καὶ τοὺς ἰατροὺς διακρίνοντος, εἰ ἤδη θανασίμως ἔχουσιν; ἢ πάλιν ὅταν ὑπὲρ τῶν μεγάλων τούτων καὶ σεμνῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ τιμῶν τὰς χεῖρας τῶν ἀλλοτρίων δούλων καταφιλῇς, ἵνα μηδʼ ἐλευθέρων δοῦλος ᾖς; 149εἶτά μοι σεμνὸς περιπατεῖς στρατηγῶν, ὑπατεύων, οὐκ οἶδα, πῶς ἐστρατήγησας, πόθεν τὴν ὑπατείαν ἔλαβες, τίς σοι αὐτὴν ἔδωκεν; 150ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδὲ ζῆν ἤθελον, εἰ διὰ Φηλικίωνα ἔδει ζῆσαι τῆς ὀφρύος αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ δουλικοῦ φρυάγματος ἀνασχόμενον. οἶδα γάρ, τί ἐστι δοῦλος εὐτυχῶν ὡς δοκεῖ καὶ τετυφ[λ]ωμένος. 151σὺ οὖν, φησίν, ἐλεύθερος εἶ;— θέλω νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ εὔχομαι, ἀλλʼ οὔπω δύναμαι ἀντιβλέψαι τοῖς κυρίοις, ἔτι τιμῶ τὸ σωμάτιον, ὁλόκληρον αὐτὸ ἔχειν ἀντὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι καίτοι μηδʼ ὁλόκληρον ἔχων. 152ἀλλὰ δύναμαί σοι δεῖξαι ἐλεύθερον, ἵνα μηκέτι ζητῇς τὸ παράδειγμα. Διογένης ἦν ἐλεύθερος. πόθεν τοῦτο; οὐχ ὅτι ἐξ ἐλευθέρων ἦν (οὐ γὰρ ἦν), ἀλλʼ ὅτι αὐτὸς ἦν, ὅτι ἀποβεβλήκει πάσας τὰς τῆς δουλείας [β]λαβὰς οὐδʼ ἦν, ὅπως τις προσέλθῃ πρὸς αὐτὸν οὐδʼ ὅθεν λάβηται πρὸς τὸ καταδουλώσασθαι. 153πάντα εὔλυτα εἶχεν, πάντα μόνον προσηρτημένα. εἰ τῆς κτήσεως ἐπελάβου, αὐτὴν ἀφῆκεν ἄν σοι μᾶλλον ἢ ἠκολούθησεν διʼ αὐτήν· εἰ τοῦ σκέλους, τὸ σκέλος· εἰ ὅλου τοῦ σωματίου, ὅλον τὸ σωμάτιον· οἰκείους, φίλους, πατρίδα ὡσαύτως. ᾔδει, πόθεν ἔχει καὶ παρὰ τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ τίσιν λαβών. 154τοὺς μέν γʼ ἀληθ[ε]ινοὺς προγόνους, τοὺς θεούς, καὶ τὴν τῷ ὄντι πατρίδα οὐδεπώποτʼ ἂν ἐγκατέλ[ε]ιπεν οὐδὲ παρεχώρησεν ἄλλῳ μᾶλλον πείθεσθαι αὐτοῖς καὶ ὑπακούειν οὐδʼ ὑπεραπέθανεν ἂν εὐκολώτερον τῆς πατρίδος ἄλλος. 155οὐ γὰρ ἐζήτει ποτὲ δόξαι τι ποιεῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων, ἀλλʼ ἐμέμνητο, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ γενόμενον ἐκεῖθέν ἐστιν καὶ ὑπὲρ ἐκείνης πράττεται καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ διοικοῦντος αὐτὴν παρεγγυᾶται. 156τοιγαροῦν ὅρα, τί λέγει αὐτὸς καὶ γράφει· διὰ τοῦτό σοι, φησίν, ἔξεστιν, ὦ Διόγενες, καὶ τῷ Περσῶν βασιλεῖ καὶ Ἀρχιδάμῳ τῷ Λακεδαιμονίων ὡς βούλει διαλέγεσθαι. 157ἆρά γʼ ὅτι ἐξ ἐλευθέρων ἦν; πάντες γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ πάντες Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Κορίνθιοι διὰ τὸ ἐκ δούλων εἶναι οὐκ ἠδύναντο αὐτοῖς ὡς ἠβούλοντο διαλέγεσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἐδεδοίκεσαν καὶ ἐθεράπευον; 158διὰ τί οὖν, φησίν, ἔξεστιν; ὅτι τὸ σωμάτιον ἐμὸν οὐχ ἡγοῦμαι, ὅτι οὐδενὸς δέομαι, ὅτι ὁ νόμος μοι πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἄλλο οὐδέν. ταῦτα ἦν τὰ ἐλεύθερον ἐκεῖνον ἐάσαντα. 159καὶ ἵνα μὴ δόξῃς, ὅτι παράδειγμα δείκνυμι ἀνδρὸς ἀπεριστάτου μήτε γυναῖκα ἔχοντος μήτε τέκνα μήτε πατρίδα ἢ φίλους ἢ συγγενεῖς, ὑφʼ ὧν κάμπτεσθαι καὶ περισπᾶσθαι ἠδύνατο, λάβε Σωκράτη καὶ θέασαι γυναῖκα καὶ παιδία ἔχοντα, ἀλλὰ ὡς ἀλλότρια[ν], πατρίδα, ἐφʼ ὅσον ἔδει καὶ ὡς ἔδει, φίλους, συγγενεῖς, πάντα ταῦτα ὑποτεταχότα τῷ νόμῳ καὶ τῇ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον εὐπειθείᾳ. 160διὰ τοῦτο, στρατεύεσθαι μὲν ὁπότʼ ἔδει, πρῶτος ἀπῄει κἀκεῖ ἐκινδύνευεν ἀφειδέστατα· ἐπὶ Λέοντα δʼ ὑπὸ τῶν τυράννων πεμφθείς, ὅτι αἰσχρὸν ἡγεῖτο, οὐδʼ ἐπεβουλεύσατο εἰδώς, ὅτι ἀποθανεῖν δεήσει, ἂν οὕτως τύχῃ. 161καὶ τί αὐτῷ διέφερεν; ἄλλο γάρ τι σῴζειν ἤθελεν· οὐ τὸ σαρκίδιον, ἀλλὰ τὸν πιστόν, τὸν αἰδήμονα. 162ταῦτα ἀπαρεγχείρητα, ἀνυπότακτα. εἶθʼ ὅτʼ ἀπολογεῖσθαι ἔδει ὑπὲρ τοῦ ζῆν, μή τι ὡς τέκνα ἔχων ἀναστρέφεται, μή τι ὡς γυναῖκα; ἀλλʼ ὡς μόνος. τί δʼ, ὅτε πιεῖν ἔδει τὸ φάρμακον, πῶς ἀναστρέφεται; 163δυνάμενος διασωθῆναι καὶ τοῦ Κρίτωνος αὐτῷ λέγοντος ὅτι ἔξελθε διὰ τὰ παιδία τί λέγει; ἕρμαιον ἡγεῖτο αὐτό; πόθεν; ἀλλὰ τὸ εὔσχημον σκοπεῖ, τἆλλα δʼ οὐδʼ ὁρᾷ, οὐδʼ ἐπιλογίζεται. οὐ γὰρ ἤθελεν, φησίν, σῶσαι τὸ σωμάτιον, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο, ὃ τῷ δικαίῳ μὲν αὔξεται καὶ σῴζεται, τῷ δʼ ἀδίκῳ μειοῦται καὶ ἀπόλλυται. 164Σωκράτης δʼ αἰσχρῶς οὐ σῴζεται, ὁ μὴ ἐπιψηφίσας Ἀθηναίων κελευόντων, ὁ τοὺς τυράννους ὑπεριδών, ὁ τοιαῦτα περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ καλοκἀγαθίας διαλεγόμενος· 165τοῦτον οὐκ ἔστι σῶσαι αἰσχρῶς, ἀλλʼ ἀποθνῄσκων σῴζεται, οὐ φεύγων. καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ὑποκριτὴς παυόμενος ὅτε δεῖ σῴζεται μᾶλλον ἢ ὑποκρινόμενος παρὰ καιρόν. 166τί οὖν ποιήσει τὰ παιδία; εἰ μὲν εἰς Θετταλίαν ἀπῄειν, ἐπεμελήθητε αὐτῶν· εἰς Ἅιδου δέ μου ἀποδημήσαντος οὐδεὶς ἔσται ὁ ἐπιμελησόμενος; ὅρα, πῶς ὑποκορίζεται καὶ σκώπτει τὸν θάνατον. 167εἰ δʼ ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ ἦμεν, εὐθὺς ἂν καταφιλοσοφήσαντες ὅτι τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας δεῖ τοῖς ἴσοις ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ προσθέντες ὅτι ὄφελος ἔσομαι πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις σωθείς, ἀποθανὼν δʼ οὐδενί, εἰ [γ]ἄρʼ ἔδει διὰ τρώγλης ἐκδύντας, ἐξήλθομεν ἄν. 168καὶ πῶς ἂν ὠφελήσαμέν τινα; ποῦ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι ἔμενον ἐκεῖνοι; ἢ οἳ ὄντες ἦμεν ὠφέλιμοι, οὐχὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀποθανόντες ἂν ὅτε ἔδει καὶ ὡς ἔδει ὠφελήσαμεν ἀνθρώπους; 169καὶ νῦν Σωκράτους ἀποθανόντος οὐθὲν ἧττον ἢ καὶ πλεῖον ὠφέλιμός ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις ἡ μνήμη ὧν ἔτι ζῶν ἔπραξεν ἢ εἶπεν. 170ταῦτα μελέτα, ταῦτα τὰ δόγματα, τούτους τοὺς λόγους, εἰς ταῦτα ἀφόρα τὰ παραδείγματα, εἰ θέλεις ἐλεύθερος εἶναι, εἰ ἐπιθυμεῖς κατʼ ἀξίαν τοῦ πράγματος. 171καὶ τί θαυμαστόν, εἰ τηλικοῦτο πρᾶγμα τοσούτων καὶ τηλικούτων ὠνῇ; ὑπὲρ τῆς νομιζομένης ἐλευθερίας ταύτης οἱ μὲν ἀπάγχονται, οἱ δὲ κατακρημνίζουσιν αὑτούς, ἔστι δʼ ὅτε καὶ πόλεις ὅλαι ἀπώλοντο· 172ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀληθ[ε]ινῆς καὶ ἀνεπιβουλεύτου καὶ ἀσφαλοῦς ἐλευθερίας ἀπαιτοῦντι τῷ θεῷ ἃ δέδωκεν οὐκ ἐκστήσῃ; οὐχ, ὡς Πλάτων λέγει, μελετήσεις οὐχὶ ἀποθνῄσκειν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ στρεβλοῦσθαι καὶ φεύγειν καὶ δέρεσθαι καὶ πάνθʼ ἁπλῶς ἀποδιδόναι τἀλλότρια; 173ἔσει τοίνυν δοῦλος ἐν δούλοις, κἂν μυριάκις ὑπατεύσῃς, κἂν εἰς τὸ παλάτιον ἀναβῇς, οὐδὲν ἧττον· καὶ αἰσθήσει, ὅτι παράδοξα μὲν ἴσως φασὶν οἱ φιλόσοφοι, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ Κλεάνθης ἔλεγεν, οὐ μὴν παράλογα. 174ἔργῳ γὰρ εἴσῃ, ὅτι ἀληθῆ ἐστι καὶ τούτων τῶν θαυμαζομένων καὶ σπουδαζομένων ὄφελος οὐδέν ἐστι τοῖς τυχοῦσι· τοῖς δὲ μηδέπω τετευχόσι φαντασία γίνεται, ὅτι παραγενομένων αὐτῶν ἅπαντα παρέσται αὐτοῖς τὰ ἀγαθά· εἶθʼ ὅταν παραγένηται, τὸ καῦμα ἴσον, ὁ ῥιπτασμὸς ὁ αὐτός, ἡ ἄση, ἡ τῶν οὐ παρόντων ἐπιθυμία. 175οὐ γὰρ ἐκπληρώσει τῶν ἐπιθυμουμένων ἐλευθερία παρασκευάζεται, ἀλλὰ ἀνασκευῇ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας. 176καὶ ἵνʼ εἰδῇς, ὅτι ἀληθῆ ταῦτά ἐστιν, ὡς ἐκείνων ἕνεκα πεπόνηκας, οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ ταῦτα μετάθες τὸν πόνον· ἀγρύπνησον ἕνεκα τοῦ δόγμα περιποιήσασθαι ἐλευθεροποιόν, 177θεράπευσον ἀντὶ γέροντος πλουσίου φιλόσοφον, περὶ θύρας ὄφθητ[α]ι τὰς τούτου· οὐκ ἀσχημονήσεις ὀφθείς, οὐκ ἀπελεύσῃ κενὸς οὐδʼ ἀκερδής, ἂν ὡς δεῖ προσέλθῃς. εἰ δὲ μή, πείρασόν γʼ· οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσχρὰ ἡ πεῖρα.