Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER XII. · Of Attention.
1When you let go your Attention for a little while, do not fancy you may recover it when-ever you please: but remember this, That, by means of the Fault of To-day, your Affairs must necessarily be in a worse Condition for the future. First, what is the saddest Thing of all, a Habit arises of not attending; and then a Habit of deferring the Attention, and always driving off from time to time, and procrastinating a prosperous Life, a Propriety of Behaviour, and the Thinking and Acting conformably to Nature. Now, if the Procrastination of any thing is advantageous, the absolute Omission of it is still more advantageous but, if it be not advantageous, why do not you preserve a constant Attention?——"I would play To-day."——What then? Ought you not to do it, with proper Attention to yourself?——"I would sing."——Well: and what forbids but that you may sing, with Attention to yourself? For there is no Part of Life exempted, to which Attention doth not extend. For will you do it the worse by attending, and the better by not attending? What else in Life is best performed by inattentive People? Doth a Smith forge the better by not attending? Doth a Pilot steer the safer by not attending? Or is any other, even of the minutest Operations, performed the better by Inattention? Do not you perceive, that, when you have let your Mind loose, it is no longer in your Power to call it back, either to Propriety, or Modesty, or Moderation? But you do every thing as it happens: you follow your Inclinations. 2To what then am I to attend? Why, in the first Place, to those universal Maxims, which you must always have at hand; and not sleep, or get up, or drink, or eat, or converse without them: that no one is the Master of another's Choice; and it is in Choice alone that Good and Evil consist. No one therefore is the Master either to procure me any Good, or to involve me in any Evil: but I alone have the Disposal of myself, with regard to these Things. Since these then are secured to me, what need have I to be troubled about Externals? What Tyrant is formidable? What Distemper? What Poverty? What Offence?——"I have not pleased such a one."——Is he my Concern then? Is he my Conscience?——"No."——Why do I trouble myself any further about him then?——"But he is thought to be of some Consequence."——Let him look to that, and they who think him so. But I have One, whom I must please, to whom I must submit, whom I must obey; God, and those who are next Him. He hath entrusted me with myself, and made my Choice subject to myself alone, having given me Rules for the right Use of it. If I follow the proper Rules in Syllogisms, in convertible Propositions, I do not regard, nor care for any one, who says any thing contrary to them. Why then am I vext at being censured in Matters of greater Consequence? What is the Reason of this Perturbation? Nothing else, but that in this Instance I want Exercise. For every Science despises Ignorance, and the Ignorant; and not only the Sciences, but even the Arts. Take any Shoemaker, take any Smith you will, and he laughs at the rest of the World, with regard to his own Business. 3In the first place then, these are the Maxims we must have ready, and do nothing without them; but direct the Soul to this Mark, to pursue nothing external, nothing that belongs to others, but as He, who hath the Power, hath appointed: Things dependent on Choice are to be pursued always; and the rest, as it is permitted. Besides this, we must remember, who we are, and what Name we bear, and endeavour to direct the several Offices of Life to the rightful Demands of its several Relations: what is the proper Time for Singing, what for Play, in what Company: what will be the Consequence of our Performance: whether our Companions will despise us, or we ourselves: when to employ Raillery, and whom to ridicule: upon what Occasions to comply, and with whom; and then, in complying, how to preserve our own Character. 4Where-ever you deviate from any of these Rules, the Damage is immediate; not from any thing external, but from the very Action itself.——"What then, is it possible, by these Means, to be faultless!" Impracticable: but this is possible, to use a constant Endeavour to be faultless. For we shall have Cause to be satisfied, if, by never remitting this Attention, we shall be exempt at least from a few Faults. But now, when you say, I will begin to attend To-morrow; be assured, it is the same Thing as if you say, "I will be shameless, impertinent, base, To-day: it shall be in the Power of others to grieve me: I will be passionate, I will be envious To-day." See to how many Evils you give yourself up.——"But all will be well To-morrow."——How much better To-day? If it be for your Interest To-morrow, much more To-day, that it may be in your Power To-morrow too, and that you may not defer it again to the third Day.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (2)
- Ειωθει, perhaps, should be ωθειται.
- The tutelar Genius, and Fortune. Of the former, see B. I ch. 14. §. 2. Of both. see B. IV. ch. 4. §. 4. By changing και τοις into και τοι, the Translation will be; But, next to Him, He hath intrusted me with myself.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Of taking pains.
When you cease to take pains for a little while, do not fancy that you may recommence whenever you please; but remember this, that by means of the fault of to-day, your affairs must necessarily be in a worse condition for the future. The first and worst evil is that there arises a habit of neglect; and then a habit of postponing effort, and constantly procrastinating as to one’s successes and good behavior and orderly thought and action. Now, if procrastination as to anything is advantageous, it must be still more advantageous to omit it altogether; but if it be not advantageous, why do you not take pains all the time? would play to-day. What then? Ought you not to take proper pains about it? would sing. But why not take proper pains about it? For there is no part of life exempted, about which pains are not needed. For will you do anything the worse by taking pains, and the better by neglect? What else in life is best performed by heedless people? Does a smith forge the better by heedlessness? Does a pilot steer more safely by heedlessness? Or is any other, even of the minutest operations, best performed heedlessly? Do you not perceive that, when you have let your mind loose, it is no longer in your power to call it back, either to propriety, or modesty, or moderation? But you do everything at haphazard; you merely follow your inclinations.
To what, then, am I to direct my pains?
Why, in the first place, to those universal maxims which you must always have at hand; and not sleep, or arise, or drink, or eat, or converse without them : that no one is the master of another’s will; and that it is in the will alone that good and evil lie. No one, therefore, is my master, either to procure me any good, or to involve me in any evil; but 1 alone have the disposal of myself with regard to these things. Since these, then, are secured to me, what need have I to be troubled about externals? What tyrant is formidable? What disease? What poverty? What offence? I have not pleased such a one. Is he my concern then? Is he my conscience? No. Why, then, do I trouble myself any further about him? But he is thought to be of some consequence. Let him look to that; and they who think him so. But I have One whom I must please, to whom I must submit, whom I must obey,—God, and those who surround him. He has intrusted me with myself, and made my will subject to myself alone, having given me rules for the right use of it. If I follow the proper rules in syllogisms, in convertible propositions, I do not heed or regard any one who says anything contrary to them. Why, then, am I vexed at being censured in matters of greater consequence? What is the reason of this perturbation? Nothing else, but that in this instance I want practice. For every science despises ignorance and the ignorant; and not only the sciences, but even the arts. Take any shoemaker, take any smith you will, and he may laugh at the rest of the world, so far as his own business is concerned.
In the first place, then, these are the maxims we must have ready, and do nothing without them, but direct the soul to this mark; to pursue nothing external, nothing that belongs to others, but as he who has the power has appointed. Things controllable by will are to be pursued always; and the rest as may be permitted. Besides this, we must remember who we are, and what name we bear, endeavoring to use all the circumstances of life in their proper relations: what is the proper time for singing, what for play, and in what company; what will be the consequence of our performance; whether our companions will despise us, or we ourselves; when to employ raillery, and whom to ridicule; upon what occasions to comply, and with whom; and then, in complying, how to preserve our own character.
Wherever you deviate from any of these rules, the damage is immediate; not from anything external, but from the very action itself. What, then; is it possible by these means to be faultless? Impracticable; but this is possible, to use a constant endeavor to be faultless. For we shall have cause to be satisfied, if, by never remitting our pains, we shall be exempt at least from a few faults. But now, when you say you will begin to take pains to-morrow, be assured that it is the same thing as if you said, Today I will be shameless, impertinent, base, it shall be in the power of others to grieve me; I will be passionate, I will be envious to-day. See to how many evils you give yourself up. But all will be well tomorrow. How much better to-day? If it be for your interest to-morrow, how much more to-day, that it may be in your power to-morrow too, and that you may not again deter it until the third day.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
On attention
When you have remitted your attention for a short time, do not imagine this, that you will recover it when you choose; but let this thought be present to you, that in consequence of the fault committed to-day your affairs must be in a worse condition for all that follows. For first, and what causes most trouble, a habit of not attending is formed in you; then a habit of deferring your attention. And continually from time to time you drive away by deferring it the happiness of life, proper behaviour, the being and living conformably to nature. If then the procrastination of attention is profitable, the complete omission of attention is more profitable; but if it is not profitable, why do you not maintain your attention constant?—To-day I choose to play—Well then, ought you not to play with attention?—I choose to sing—What then hinders you from doing so with attention? Is there any part of life excepted, to which attention does not extend? For will you do it (any thing in life) worse by using attention, and better by not attending at all? And what else of the things in life is done better by those who do not use attention? Does he who works in wood work better by not attending to it? Does the captain of a ship manage it better by not attending? and is any of the smaller acts done better by inattention? Do you not see that when you have let your mind loose, it is no longer in your power to recall it, either to propriety, or to modesty, or to moderation: but you do every thing that comes into your mind in obedience to your inclinations.
To what things then ought I to attend? First to those general (principles) and to have them in readiness, and without them not to sleep, not to rise, not to drink, not to eat, not to converse (associate) with men; that no man is master of another man’s will, but that in the will alone is the good and the bad. No man then has the power either to procure for me any good or to involve me in any evil, but I alone myself over myself have power in these things. When then these things are secured to me, why need I be disturbed about external things? What tyrant is formidable, what disease, what poverty, what offence (from any man)? Well, I have not pleased a certain person. Is he then (the pleasing of him) my work, my judgment? No. Why then should I trouble myself about him?—But he is supposed to be some one (of importance)—He will look to that himself; and those who think so will also. But I have one whom I ought to please, to whom I ought to subject myself, whom I ought to obey, God and those who are next to him. He has placed me with myself, and has put my will in obedience to myself alone, and has given me rules for the right use of it; and when I follow these rules in syllogisms, I do not care for any man who says any thing else (different): in sophistical argument, I care for no man. Why then in greater matters do those annoy me who blame me? What is the cause of this perturbation? Nothing else than because in this matter (topic) I am not disciplined. For all knowledge (science) despises ignorance and the ignorant; and not only the sciences, but even the arts. Produce any shoemaker that you please, and he ridicules the many in respect to his own work (business). Produce any carpenter.
First then we ought to have these (rules) in readiness, and to do nothing without them, and we ought to keep the soul directed to this mark, to pursue nothing external, and nothing which belongs to others (or is in the power of others), but to do as he has appointed who has the power; we ought to pursue altogether the things which are in the power of the will, and all other things as it is permitted. Next to this we ought to remember who we are, and what is our name, and to endeavour to direct our duties towards the character (nature) of our several relations (in life) in this manner: what is the season for singing, what is the season for play, and in whose presence; what will be the consequence of the act; whether our associates will despise us, whether we shall despise them; when to jeer (σκῶψαι), and whom to ridicule; and on what occasion to comply and with whom; and finally, in complying how to maintain our own character. But wherever you have deviated from any of these rules, there is damage immediately, not from any thing external, but from the action itself.
What then? is it possible to be free from faults, (if you do all this)? It is not possible; but this is possible, to direct your efforts incessantly to being faultless. For we must be content if by never remitting this attention we shall escape at least a few errors. But now when you have said, To-morrow I will begin to attend, you must be told that you are saying this, To-day I will be shameless, disregardful of time and place, mean; it will be in the power of others to give me pain; to-day I will be passionate, and envious. See how many evil things you are permitting yourself to do. If it is good to use attention to-morrow, how much better is it to do so to-day? if to-morrow it is in your interest to attend, much more is it to-day, that you may be able to do so to-morrow also, and may not defer it again to the third day.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (8)
- See Schweig.’s note on the words εἰώθει ὑπερτιφέμενον , in place of which he proposes ἐξωφῇ ὑπερτιφέμενος . Compare Persius, Sat. v. 66. Cras hoc fiet. Idem cras fiet, etc., and Martial, v. 58.
- Compare iv. 4, 39, i. 14, 12; and Encheirid. e. 32, and the remark of Simplicius. Schweig. explains the words τοῖς μετ’ ἐκεῖνον thus: qui post Illum (Deum) et sub Illo rebus humanis praesunt; qui proximum ab Illo locum tenent.
- Compare ii. 13, 15 and 20; and Antoninus, vi. 35: Is it not strange if the architect and the physician shall have more respect to the reason (the principles) of their own arts than man to his own reason, which is common to him and the gods?
- Quid sumus, aut quidnam victuri gignimur. Persius, Sat. iii. 67.
- Schweig. thinks that the text will be better translated according to Upton’s notion and H. Stephen’s (hors de propos) by Quid sit abs re futurum, what will be out of season. Perhaps he is right.
- Schweig. says that the sense of the passage, as I have rendered it, requires the reading to be καταφρονήσουσι ; and it is so, at least in the better Greek writers.
- See iii. 14, 7, . 29, 64.
- Compare Antoninus, viii. 22: Attend to the matter which is before thee, whether it is an opinion, or an act, or a word. Thou sufferest this justly, for thou choosest rather to become good to-morrow than to be good to-day.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1ὅταν ἀφῇς πρὸς ὀλίγον τὴν προσοχήν, μὴ τοῦτο φαντάζου, ὅτι, ὁπόταν θέλῃς, ἀναλήψῃ αὐτήν, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο πρόχειρον ἔστω σοι, ὅτι παρὰ τὸ σήμερον ἁμαρτηθὲν εἰς τἆλλα χεῖρον ἀνάγκη σοι τὰ πράγματα ἔχειν. 2πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάντων χαλεπώτατον ἔθος τοῦ μὴ προσέχειν ἐγγίνεται, εἶτα ἔθος τοῦ ἀναβάλλεσθαι τὴν προσοχήν· ἀ[ι]εὶ δʼ εἰς ἄλλον καὶ ἄλλον χρόνον εἴωθας ὑπερτίθεσθαι τὸ εὐροεῖν, τὸ εὐσχημονεῖν, τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν καὶ διεξάγειν. 3εἰ μὲν οὖν λυσιτελὴς ἡ ὑπέρθεσίς ἐστιν, ἡ παντελὴς ἀπόστασις αὐτῆς ἐστι λυσιτελεστέρα· εἰ δʼ οὐ λυσιτελεῖ, τί οὐχὶ διηνεκῆ τὴν προσοχὴν φυλάσσεις; 4σήμερον παῖξαι θέλω. τί οὖν κωλύει προσέχοντα; ᾆσαι. τί οὖν κωλύει προσέχοντα; μὴ γὰρ ἐξαιρεῖταί τι μέρος τοῦ βίου, ἐφʼ ὃ οὐ διατείνει τὸ προσέχειν; χεῖρον γὰρ αὐτὸ προσέχων ποιήσεις, βέλτιον δὲ μὴ προσέχων; 5καὶ τί ἄλλο τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ κρεῖσσον ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ προσεχόντων γίνεται; ὁ τέκτων μὴ προσέχων … ; ⟨ὁ κυβερνήτης μὴ προσέχων⟩ κυβερνᾷ ἀσφαλέστερον; ἄλλο δέ τι τῶν μικροτέρων ἔργων ὑπὸ ἀπροσεξίας ἐπιτελεῖται κρεῖσσον; 6οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ, ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν ἀφῇς τὴν γνώμην, οὐκ ἔτι ἐπὶ σοί ἐστιν ἀνακαλέσασθαι αὐτήν, οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ εὔσχημον, οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ αἰδῆμον, οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ κατεσταλμένον; ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ ἐπελθὸν ποιεῖς, ταῖς προθυμίαις ἐπακολουθεῖς. 7τίσιν οὖν δεῖ με προσέχειν;— πρῶτον μὲν ἐκείνοις τοῖς καθολικοῖς καὶ ἐκεῖνα πρόχειρα ἔχειν καὶ χωρὶς ἐκείνων μὴ καθεύδειν, μὴ ἀνίστασθαι, μὴ πίνειν, μὴ ἐσθίειν, μὴ συμβάλλειν ἀνθρώποις· ὅτι προαιρέσεως ἀλλοτρίας κύριος οὐδείς, ἐν ταύτῃ δὲ μόνῃ τἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν. 8οὐδεὶς οὖν κύριος οὔτʼ ἀγαθόν μοι περιποιῆσαι οὔτε κακῷ με περιβαλεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ αὐτὸς ἐμαυτοῦ κατὰ ταῦτα ἐξουσίαν ἔχω μόνος. 9ὅταν οὖν ταῦτα ἀσφαλῆ μοι ᾖ, τί ἔχω περὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ταράσσεσθαι; ποῖος τύραννος φοβερός, ποία νόσος, ποία πενία, ποῖον πρόσκρουσμα; 10— ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἤρεσα τῷ δεῖνι. — μὴ οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἐμόν ἐστιν ἔργον, μή τι ἐμὸν κρίμα; — οὔ. — τί οὖν ἔτι μοι μέλει; — ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ τις εἶναι. — 11ὄψεται αὐτὸς καὶ οἷς δοκεῖ, ἐγὼ δʼ ἔχω, τίνι με δεῖ ἀρέσκειν, τίνι ὑποτετάχθαι, τίνι πείθεσθαι· τῷ θεῷ καὶ μετʼ ἐκεῖνον 12… ἐμὲ ἐκεῖνος συνέστησεν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν προαίρεσιν ὑπέταξεν ἐμοὶ μόνῳ δοὺς κανόνας εἰς χρῆσιν αὐτῆς τὴν ὀρθήν, οἷς ὅταν κατακολουθήσω, ἐν συλλογισμοῖς οὐκ ἐπιστρέφομαι οὐδενὸς τῶν ἄλλο τι λεγόντων, ἐν μεταπίπτουσιν οὐ φροντίζω οὐδενός. διὰ τί οὖν ἐν τοῖς μείζοσιν ἀνιῶσί με οἱ ψέγοντες; 13τί τὸ αἴτιον ταύτης τῆς ταραχῆς; οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ ἀγύμναστός εἰμι. 14ἐπεί τοι πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη καταφρονητική ἐστι τῆς ἀγνοίας καὶ τῶν ἀγνοούντων καὶ οὐ μόνον αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ τέχναι. φέρε ὃν θέλεις σκυτέα καὶ τῶν πολλῶν καταγελᾷ περὶ τὸ αὑτοῦ ἔργον· φέρε ὃν θέλεις τέκτονα. 15πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ἔχειν πρόχειρα καὶ μηδὲν δίχα τούτων ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ τετάσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν σκοπόν, μηδὲν τῶν ἔξω διώκειν, μηδὲν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ἀλλʼ ὡς διέταξεν ὁ δυνάμενος, τὰ προαιρετικὰ ἐξ ἅπαντος, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα ὡς ἂν διδῶται. 16ἐπὶ τούτοις δὲ μεμνῆσθαι, τίνες ἐσμὲν καὶ τί ἡμῖν ὄνομα, καὶ πρὸς τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν σχέσεων πειρᾶσθαι τὰ καθήκοντα ἀπευθύνειν· 17τίς καιρὸς ᾠδῆς, τίς καιρὸς παιδ[ε]ιᾶς, τίνων παρόντων· τί ἔσται ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος· μή τι καταφρονήσωσιν ἡμῶν οἱ συνόντες, μή τι ἡμεῖς αὐτῶν· πότε σκῶψαι καὶ τίνας ποτὲ καταγελάσαι καὶ ἐπὶ τίνι ποτὲ συμπεριενεχθῆναι καὶ τίνι, καὶ λοιπὸν ἐν τῇ συμπεριφορᾷ πῶς τηρῆσαι τὸ αὑτοῦ. ὅπου δʼ ἂν ἀπονεύσῃς ἀπό τινος τούτων, εὐθὺς ζημία, 18οὐκ ἔξωθέν ποθεν, ἀλλʼ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς ἐνεργείας. 19τί οὖν; δυνατὸν ἀναμάρτητον ἤδη εἶναι; ἀμήχανον, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο δυνατὸν πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν τετάσθαι διηνεκῶς. ἀγαπητὸν γάρ, εἰ μηδέποτʼ ἀνιέντες ταύτην τὴν προσοχὴν ὀλίγων γε ἁμαρτημάτων ἐκτὸς ἐσόμεθα. νῦν δʼ ὅταν εἴπῃς 20ἀπαύριον προσέξω, ἴσθι ὅτι τοῦτο λέγεις σήμερον ἔσομαι ἀναίσχυντος, ἄκαιρος, ταπεινός· ἐπʼ ἄλλοις ἔσται τὸ λυπεῖν με· ὀργισθήσομαι σήμερον, φθονήσω. 21βλέπε, ὅσα κακὰ σεαυτῷ ἐπιτρέπεις. ἀλλʼ εἴ σοι αὔριον καλῶς ἔχει, πόσῳ κρεῖττον σήμερον· εἰ αὔριον συμφέρει, πολὺ μᾶλλον σήμερον, ἵνα καὶ αὔριον δυνηθῇς καὶ μὴ πάλιν ἀναβάλῃ εἰς τρίτην.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA