Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER V. · Concerning the Quarrelsome, and Ferocious.
1A wise and good Person neither quarrels with any one himself, nor, as far as possible, suffers another. The Life of Socrates affords us an Example of this too, as well as of the other [Virtues]; who not only every-where avoided quarrelling himself, but did not even suffer others to quarrel. See in Xenophon's Symposium, how many Quarrels he ended; how, again, he bore with Thrasymachus, with Polus, with Callicles; how, with his Wife, how, with his Son, who attempted to confute him, and cavilled with him. For he well remembered, that no one is Master of the ruling Faculty of another; and therefore he desired nothing but what was his own.——"And what is that?"——Not that this [or that] Person should be moved conformably to Nature; for that belongs to others; but that while they act in their own Way, as they please, he should nevertheless be affected, and live conformably to Nature, only doing what belongs to himself, in order to make them too live conformably to Nature. For this is the Point, that a wife and good Person hath in view. To have the Command of an Army? No: but if it be allotted him, to preserve on this Subject of Action, the right Conduct of his own ruling Faculty. To marry? No: but if a Marriage be allotted him, to preserve himself, on this Subject of Action, conformable to Nature. But, if he would have his Wife, or his Child, exempt from Fault, he would have that his own, which belongs to others. And being instructed, consists in this very Point, To learn what Things are our own, and what belong to others. 2What room is there then for quarrelling, to a Person thus disposed? For doth he wonder at any thing that happens? Doth it appear new to him? Doth not he expect worse and more grievous Injuries from bad People, than happen to him? Doth he not reckon it so much gained, as they come short of the last Extremities? Such a one hath reviled you.——You are much obliged to him, that he hath not struck you.——But he hath struck you too.——You are much obliged to him, that he hath not wounded you too.——But he hath wounded you too.——You are much obliged to him, that he hath not killed you. For when did he ever learn, or from whom, that he is a gentle, that he is a social Animal: that the very Injury itself is a great Mischief to the Injurious? As then he hath not learned these Things, nor believes them, why should he not follow what appears for his Interest? Your Neighbour hath thrown Stones. What then? Is it any Fault of yours? But your Goods are broken. What then? Are you a Piece of Furniture? No: but your Essence consists in the Faculty of Choice. What Behaviour then is assigned you, in Return? If you consider yourself as a Wolf——to bite again, to throw more Stones. But if you ask the Question, as a Man, examine your Treasure: see what Faculties you have brought into the World with you. Are they Dispositions to Ferocity? To Revenge? When is a Horse miserable? When he is deprived of his natural Faculties. Not when he cannot crow, but when he cannot run. And a a Dog? not when he cannot fly, but when he cannot hunt. Is not a Man then also unhappy in the same manner? Not he, who cannot strangle Lions, or grasp Statues, (for he hath received no Faculties for this purpose from Nature;) but who hath lost his Rectitude of Mind, his Fidelity. Such a one is the Person, who ought to be publicly lamented, for the Misfortunes into which he is fallen: not, by Heaven, either he who is born or dies; but he, whom it hath befallen while he lives to lose what is properly his own: not his paternal Possessions, his paultry Estate, or his House, his Lodging, or his Slaves, (for none of these are a Man's own; but all belonging to others, servile, dependent, and given at different Times, to different Persons, by the Disposers of them;) but his personal Qualifications as a Man, the Impressions which he brought into the World stampt upon his Mind: such as we seek in Money; and, if we find them, allow it to be good; if not, throw it away. "What Impression hath this Piece of Money?"——"Trajan's." "Give it me."——Nero's." Throw it away. It is false: it is good for nothing. So in the other Case. "What Impression have his Principles?" "Gentleness, social Affection, Patience, Good-nature." Bring them hither. I receive them. I make such a Man a Citizen; I receive him for a Neighbour, a fellow Traveller. Only see that he hath not the Neronian Impression. Is he passionate? Is he resentful? Is he querulous? Would he, if he took the Fancy, break the Head of those who fall in his way? Why then do you call him a Man? For is every thing distinguished by a mere outward Form? Then say, just as well, that a Piece of Wax is an Apple, or that it hath the Smell and Taste too. But the external Figure is not enough: nor, consequently, is it sufficient to make a Man, that he hath a Nose and Eyes, if he hath not the proper Principles of a Man. Such a one doth not understand Reason, or apprehend when he is confuted. He is an Ass. Another is dead to the Sense of Shame. He is a worthless Creature; any thing, rather than a Man. Another seeks whom he may kick or bite: so that he is neither Sheep nor Ass. But what then? He is a wild Beast, 3"Well: but would you have me despised then?"——By whom? By those who know you? And how can They despise you, who know you to be gentle and modest? But, perhaps, by those who do not know you? And what is that to You? For no other Artist troubles himself about the Ignorant.——"But People will be much the readier to attack me."——Why do you say me? Can any one hurt your Choice, or restrain you from treating conformably to Nature, the Appearances that are presented to you? Why then are you disturbed, and desirous to make yourself appear formidable? Why do not you make public Proclamation, that you are at Peace with all Mankind, however they may act and that you chiefly laugh at those, who suppose they can hurt you. "These Wretches neither know who I am, or in what consist my Good and Evil: or that there is no Access for them to what is really mine." Thus the Inhabitants of a fortified City laugh at the Besiegers. "What Trouble now are these People giving themselves for nothing? Our Wall is secure; we have Provisions for a very long Time, and every other Preparation." These are what render a City fortified, and impregnable: but nothing but its Principles render the human Soul so. For what Wall is so strong, what Body so impenetrable, or what Possession so unalienable, or what Dignity so secured against Stratagems? All Things else, every-where else, are mortal, easily reduced; and whoever, in any degree, fixes his Mind upon them, must necessarily be subject to Perturbation, Despair, Terrors, Lamentations, disappointed Desires, and incurred Aversions. 4And will we not fortify then the only Place of Security that is granted us; and, withdrawing ourselves from what is mortal and servile, diligently improve what is immortal, and by Nature free? Do we not remember, that no one either hurts or benefits another: but the Principle, which we hold concerning every thing, doth it? It is this that hurts us; this that overturns us. Here is the Fight, the Sedition, the War. It was nothing else, that made Eteocles and Polynices Enemies, but their Principle concerning Empire, and their Principle concerning Exile: that the one seemed the extremest Evil; the other, the greatest Good. Now the very Nature of every one is to pursue Good, to avoid Evil; to esteem him as an Enemy and Betrayer, who deprives us of the one, and involves us in the other, though he be a Brother, or a Son, or Father. For nothing is more nearly related to us than Good. So that if Good and Evil consist in Externals, there is no Affection between Father and Son, Brother and Brother; but all is every-where full of Enemies, Betrayers, Sycophants. But if a right Choice be the only Good, and a wrong one the only Evil, what further room is there for quarrelling, for reviling? About what? About what is nothing to us? Against whom? Against the Ignorant, against the Unhappy, against those who are deceived in Things of the greatest Importance? 5Mindful of this, Socrates lived in his own House, patiently bearing a furious Wife, a senseless Son. For what were the Effects of her Fury? The throwing as much Water as the pleased on his Head, the trampling a Cake under her Feet. "And what is this to me, if I think such Things nothing to me? This very Point is my Business: and neither a Tyrant, nor a Master, shall restrain my Will; nor Multitudes, though I am a single Person; nor one ever so strong, though I am ever so weak. For this is given by God to every one, free from Restraint." 6These Principles make Friendship in Families, Concord in Cities, Peace in Nations. They make a Person grateful to God, every-where in good Spirits, [about Externals,] as belonging to others, as of no Value. But we, alas! are able indeed to write and read these Things, and to praise them when they are read; but very far from being convinced by them. Therefore what is said of the Lacedemonians, Lions at Home, Foxes at Ephesus, may be applied to us too: Lions in the School, but Foxes out of it.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (6)
- Perhaps for κινη ουτος τι, should be read, κινηται ουτος; and the Translation follows this Conjecture.
- Like Hercules and Diogenes. See p. 228. Note (b).
- An Allusion to a Passage in Euripides. The general Sense of which is, That we ought to lament the Person who is born, from a Consideration of the Evils into which he is coming, and to rejoice over the Dead, who is at rest from his Labours. Upton.There is an Account in Herodotus, of a People of Thrace, who used to assemble, and condole with a Family where any one was born; and, on the contrary, express great joy and Congratulation where ever there happened a Death. L. 5. c. 4.
- Nero being declared an Enemy by the Senate, his Coin was, in consequence of this, prohibited and destroyed.
- The Name of some Animal would suit better here, than the Epithet αχρηστος. But χοιρος, a Hog, is a Word too unlike; and I can think of no better.
- Alcibiades sent a fine great Cake, as a Present to Socrates: which so provoked the Jealousy of the meek Xantippe, that she threw it down, and stampt upon it. Socrates only laughed, and said, "Now you will have no Share in it yourself." Upton from Ælian.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Concerning the quarrelsome and ferocious.
A wise and good person neither quarrels with any one himself, nor, as far as possible, suffers another to do so. The life of Socrates affords us an example of this too, as well as of other things; since he not only everywhere avoided quarrelling himself, but did not even suffer others to quarrel. See in Xenophon’s Banquet how many quarrels he ended; how, again, he bore with Thrasymachus, with Polus, with Callicles; how with his wife, how with his son, who attempted to confute him, and cavilled at him. For he well remembered that no one is master of the ruling faculty of another; and therefore he desired nothing but what was his own. And what is that? Not that any particular person should be dealt with conformably to nature, for that belongs to others; but that while they act in their own way, as they please, he should nevertheless live conformably to nature, only doing what belongs to himself, in order to make them live conformably to nature also. For this is the point that a wise and good person has in view. To have the command of an army? No; but if it be allotted him, to properly apply his own powers in that sphere. To marry? No; but if marriage be allotted him, to act in this sphere also according to the laws of nature. But if he expects perfection in his wife or his child, then he asks to have that for his own which really belongs to others. And wisdom consists in this very point, to learn what things are our own and what belong to others.
What room is there then for quarrelling, to a person thus disposed? For does he wonder at anything that happens? Does it appear strange to him? Does he not prepare for worse and more grievous injuries from bad people than actually happen to him? Does he not reckon it so much gained if they come short of the last extremities? Such a one has reviled you. You are much obliged to him that he has not struck you. But he has struck you too. You are much obliged to him that he has not wounded you too. But he has wounded you too. You are much obliged to him that he has not killed you. For when did he ever learn, or from whom, that he is a gentle, that he is a social, animal; that the very injury itself is a great mischief to him who inflicts it? As, then, he has not learned these things, nor believes them, why should he not follow what appears to be for his interest? Your neighbor has thrown stones. What then; is it any fault of yours? But your goods are broken. What then; are you a piece of furniture? No, but your essence consists in the faculty of will. What behavior then is assigned you in return? If you are considering yourself as a wolf, then to bite again, to throw more stones. But if you ask the question as a man, then examine your treasure; see what faculties you have brought into the world with you. Are they fitted for ferocity; for revenge? When is a horse miserable? When he is deprived of his natural faculties; not when he cannot crow, but when he cannot run. And a dog? Not when he cannot fly, but when he cannot hunt. Is not a man, then, also unhappy in the same manner; not he who cannot strangle lions or perform great athletic feats (for he has received no faculties for this purpose from nature); but he who has lost his rectitude of mind, his fidelity? This is he who ought to receive public condolence for the misfortunes into which he is fallen; not, by Heaven! either he who has the misfortune to be born or to die; but he whom it has befallen while he lives to lose what is properly his own; not his paternal possessions, his paltry estate or his house, his lodging or his slaves, for none of these are a man’s own; but all these belong to others, are servile, dependent, and very variously assigned by the disposers of them. But his personal qualifications as a man, the impressions which he brought into the world stamped upon his mind; such as we look for in money, accepting or rejecting it accordingly. What impression has this piece of money? Trajan’s. Give it me. Nero’s. Throw it away. It is false; it is good for nothing. So in the other case. What stamp have his principles? Gentleness, social affection, patience, good-nature. Bring them hither. I receive them. I make such a man a citizen; I receive him for a neighbor, a fellow-traveller. Only see that he have not the Neronian stamp. Is he passionate? Is he resentful? Is he querulous? Would he, if he took the fancy, break the heads of those who fell in his way? Why then do you call him a man? For is everything determined by a mere outward form? Then say, just as well, that a piece of wax is an apple, or that it has the smell and taste too. The external figure is not enough; nor, consequently, is it sufficient to constitute a man that he has a nose and eyes, if he have not the proper principles of a man. Such a one does not understand reason, or apprehend when he is confuted. He is like an ass. Another is dead to the sense of shame. He is a worthless creature; anything rather than a man. Another seeks whom he may kick or bite; so that he is neither sheep nor ass. But what then? He is a wild beast.
Well, but would you have me despised, then? By whom,—by those who know you? And how can they despise you who know you to be gentle and modest? But perhaps by those who do not know you? And what is that to you? For no other artist troubles himself about those ignorant of art. But people will be much readier to attack me. Why do you say me? Can any one hurt your will, or restrain you from treating, conformably to nature, the phenomena of existence? Why, then, are you disturbed and desirous to make yourself appear formidable? Why do you not make public proclamation that you are at peace with all mankind, however they may act; and that you chiefly laugh at those who suppose they can hurt you? These wretches neither know who I am, nor in what consist my good and evil; nor how little they can touch what is really mine. Thus the inhabitants of a fortified city laugh at the besiegers. What trouble, now, are these people giving themselves for nothing! Our wall is secure; we have provisions for a very long time, and every other preparation. These are what render a city fortified and impregnable; but nothing but its principles render the human soul so. For what wall is so strong, what body so impenetrable, what possession so unalienable, what dignity so secured against stratagems? All things else, everywhere else, are mortal, easily reduced; and whoever in any degree fixes his mind upon them must necessarily be subject to perturbation, despair, terrors, lamentations, disappointed desires, and unavailing aversions.
And will we not fortify, then, the only citadel that is granted us; and withdrawing ourselves from what is mortal and servile, diligently improve what is immortal and by nature free? Do we not remember that no one either hurts or benefits another; but only the views which we hold concerning everything? It is this that hurts us; this that overturns us. Here is the fight, the sedition, the war. It was nothing else that made Eteocles and Polynices enemies, but their views concerning empire, and their principles concerning exile; that the one seemed the extremest evil, the other the greatest good. Now, the very nature of every one is to pursue good, to avoid evil; to esteem him as an enemy and betrayer who deprives us of the one and involves us in the other, though he be a brother, or a son, or father. For nothing is more nearly related to us than good. So that if good and evil consist in externals, there is no affection between father and son, brother and brother; but all is everywhere full of enemies, betrayers, sycophants. But if a right choice be the only good, and a wrong one the only evil, what further room is there for quarrelling, for reviling? About what can it be? About what is nothing to us. Against whom? Against the ignorant, against the unhappy, against those who are deceived in the most important respects.
Mindful of this, Socrates lived in his own house, patiently bearing a furious wife, a senseless son. For what were the effects of her fury? The throwing as much water as she pleased on his head, the trampling a cake under her feet. And what is this to me, if I think such things nothing to me? This very point is my business; and neither a tyrant, nor a master; shall restrain my will; nor multitudes, though I am a single person; nor one ever so strong, though I am ever so weak. For this is given by God to every one, free from restraint.
These principles make friendship in families, concord in cities, peace in nations. They make a person grateful to God, everywhere courageous, as dealing with things merely foreign and of minor importance. But we, alas! are able indeed to write and read these things, and to praise them when they are read; but very far from being convinced by them. In that case, what is said of the Lacedemonians,—
Lions at home, foxes at Ephesus, may be applied to us, too; lions in the school, but foxes out of it.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Higginson’s notes (2)
- Nero being declared an enemy by the Senate, his coin was, in consequence of this, prohibited and destroyed.—C.
- Alcibiades sent a fine great cake as a present to Socrates; which so provoked the jealousy of the meek Xantippe, that she threw it down and stamped upon it. Socrates only laughed, and said, Now you will have no share in it yourself. —C.
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
Against the quarrelsome and ferocious.
The wise and good man neither himself fights with any person, nor does he allow another, so far as he can prevent it. And an example of this as well as of all other things is proposed to us in the life of Socrates, who not only himself on all occasions avoided fights (quarrels), but would not allow even others to quarrel. See in Xenophon’s Symposium how many quarrels he settled, how further he endured Thrasymachus and Polus and Callicles; how he tolerated his wife, and how he tolerated his son who attempted to confute him and to cavil with him. For he remembered well that no man has in his power another man’s ruling principle. He wished therefore for nothing else than that which was his own. And what is this? Not that this or that man may act according to nature; for that is a thing which belongs to another; but that while others are doing their own acts, as they choose, he may never the less be in a condition conformable to nature and live in it, only doing what is his own to the end that others also may be in a state conformable to nature. For this is the object always set before him by the wise and good man. Is it to be commander (a praetor) of an army? No: but if it is permitted him, his object is in this matter to maintain his own ruling principle. Is it to marry? No; but if marriage is allowed to him, in this matter his object is to maintain himself in a condition conformable to nature. But if he would have his son not to do wrong or his wife, he would have what belongs to another not to belong to another: and to be instructed is this, to learn what things are a man’s own and what belongs to another. How then is there left any place for fighting (quarrelling) to a man who has this opinion (which he ought to have)? Is he surprised at any thing which happens, and does it appear new to him? Does he not expect that which comes from the bad to be worse and more grievous than what actually befals him? And does he not reckon as pure gain whatever they (the bad) may do which falls short of extreme wickedness? Such a person has reviled you. Great thanks to him for not having struck you. But he has struck me also. Great thanks that he did not wound you. But he wounded me also. Great thanks that he did not kill you. For when did he learn or in what school that man is a tame animal, that men love one another, that an act of injustice is a great harm to him who does it. Since then he has not learned this and is not convinced of it, why shall he not follow that which seems to be for his own interest? Your neighbour has thrown stones. Have you then done any thing wrong? But the things in the house have been broken. Are you then a utensil? No; but a free power of will. What then is given to you (to do) in answer to this? If you are like a wolf, you must bite in return, and throw more stones. But if you consider what is proper for a man, examine your storehouse, see with what faculties you came into the world. Have you the disposition of a wild beast, have you the disposition of revenge for an injury? When is a horse wretched? When he is deprived of his natural faculties, not when he cannot crow like a cock, but when he cannot run. When is a dog wretched? Not when he cannot fly, but when he cannot track his game. Is then a man also unhappy in this way, not because he cannot strangle lions or embrace statues, for he did not come into the world in the possession of certain powers from nature for this purpose, but because he has lost his probity and his fidelity? People ought to meet and lament such a man for the misfortunes into which he has fallen; not indeed to lament because a man has been born or has died, but because it has happened to him in his life time to have lost the things which are his own, not that which he received from his father, not his land and house, and his inn, and his slaves; for not one of these things is a man’s own, but all belong to others, are servile, and subject to account (ὑπεύθυνα), at different times given to different persons by those who have them in their power: but I mean the things which belong to him as a man, the marks (stamps) in his mind with which he came into the world, such as we seek also on coins, and if we find them, we approve of the coins, and if we do not find the marks, we reject them. What is the stamp on this Sestertius? The stamp of Trajan. Present it. It is the stamp of Nero. Throw it away: it cannot be accepted, it is counterfeit. So also in this case: What is the stamp of his opinions? It is gentleness, a sociable disposition, a tolerant temper, a disposition to mutual affection. Produce these qualities. I accept them: I consider this man a citizen, I accept him as a neighbour, a companion in my voyages. Only see that he has not Nero’s stamp. Is he passionate, is he full of resentment, is he fault-finding? If the whim seizes him, does he break the heads of those who come in his way? (If so), why then did you say that he is a man? Is every thing judged (determined) by the bare form? If that is so, say that the form in wax is an apple and has the smell and the taste of an apple. But the external figure is not enough: neither then is the nose enough and the eyes to make the man, but he must have the opinions of a man. Here is a man who does not listen to reason, who does not know when he is refuted: he is an ass: in another man the sense of shame is become dead: he is good for nothing, he is any thing rather than a man. This man seeks whom he may meet and kick or bite, so that he is not even a sheep or an ass, but a kind of wild beast.
What then? would you have me to be despised?—By whom? by those who know you? and how shall those who know you despise a man who is gentle and modest? Perhaps you mean by those who do not know you? What is that to you? For no other artisan cares for the opinion of those who know not his art.—But they will be more hostile to me for this reason.—Why do you say me? Can any man injure your will, or prevent you from using in a natural way the appearances which are presented to you? In no way can he. Why then are you still disturbed and why do you choose to show yourself afraid? And why do you not come forth and proclaim that you are at peace with all men whatever they may do, and laugh at those chiefly who think that they can harm you? These slaves, you can say, know not either who I am, nor where lies my good or my evil, because they have no access to the things which are mine.
In this way also those who occupy a strong city mock the besiegers, (and say): What trouble these men are now taking for nothing: our wall is secure, we have food for a very long time, and all other resources. These are the things which make a city strong and impregnable: but nothing else than his opinions makes a man’s soul impregnable. For what wall is so strong, or what body is so hard, or what possession is so safe, or what honour (rank, character) so free from assault (as a man’s opinions)? All (other) things every where are perishable, easily taken by assault, and if any man in any way is attached to them, he must be disturbed, expect what is bad, he must fear, lament, find his desires disappointed, and fall into things which he would avoid. Then do we not choose to make secure the only means of safety which are offered to us, and do we not choose to withdraw ourselves from that which is perishable and servile and to labour at the things which are imperishable and by nature free; and do we not remember that no man either hurts another or does good to another, but that a man’s opinion about each thing, is that which hurts him, is that which overturns him; this is fighting, this is civil discord, this is war? That which made Eteocles and Polynices enemies was nothing else than this opinion which they had about royal power, their opinion about exile, that the one is the extreme of evils, the other the greatest good. Now this is the nature of every man to seek the good, to avoid the bad; to consider him who deprives us of the one and involves us in the other an enemy and treacherous, even if he be a brother, or a son or a father. For nothing is more akin to us than the good: therefore if these things (externals) are good and evil, neither is a father a friend to sons, nor a brother to a brother, but all the world is every where full of enemies, treacherous men, and sycophants. But if the will (προαίρεσις, the purpose, the intention) being what it ought to be, is the only good; and if the will being such as it ought not to be, is the only evil, where is there any strife, where is there reviling? about what? about the things which do not concern us? and strife with whom? with the ignorant, the unhappy, with those who are deceived about the chief things?
Remembering this Socrates managed his own house and endured a very ill tempered wife and a foolish (ungrateful?) son. For in what did she show her bad temper? In pouring water on his head as much as she liked, and in trampling on the cake (sent to Socrates). And what is this to me, if I think that these things are nothing to me? But this is my business; and neither tyrant shall check my will nor a master; nor shall the many check me who am only one, nor shall the stronger check me who am the weaker; for this power of being free from check (hindrance) is given by God to every man. For these opinions make love in a house (family), concord in a state, among nations peace, and gratitude to God; they make a man in all things cheerful (confident) in externals as about things which belong to others, as about things which are of no value. We indeed are able to write and to read these things, and to praise them when they are read, but we do not even come near to being convinced of them. Therefore what is said of the Lacedaemonians, Lions at home, but in Ephesus foxes, will fit in our case also, Lions in the school, but out of it foxes.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (19)
- See ii, 12. 15 .
- See Xenophon, Memorabilia, ii. 2 ,
- The word στρατηγῆσαι may be translated either way.
- See iv. 1. 77, and the use of θαυμάζειν .
- See ii. 10. 14, iv. 1. 120. So Plato says (Legg. vi.), that a man who has had right education is wont to be the most divine and the tamest of animals. Upton. On the doing wrong to another, see Plato’s Critc, and Epictetus iv. 1. 167.
- See iii. 1. 40.
- Like Hercules and Diogenes See iii. 12. 2.
- The allusion is to a passage (a fragment) in the Cresphontes of Euripides translated by Cicero into Latin Iambics (Tusc. Disp. i. 48)— ἔδει γὰρ ἡμᾶς σύλλογον ποιουμένους τὸν φύντα φρηνεῖν εἰς ὅς’ ἔρχεται κάκα. τὸν δ᾽αὖ φανόντα καὶ πόνων πεπαυμένον χαίροντας, εὐφημοῦντας ἐκπέμπειν δόμων. Herodotus (v. 4) says of the Trausi, a Thracian tribe: when a child is born, the relatives sit round it and lament over all the evils which it must suffer on coming into the world and enumerate all the calamities of mankind: but when one dies, they hide him in the earth with rejoicing and pleasure, reckoning all the evils from which he is now released and in possession of all happiness.
- The word is πανδοκεῖον , which Schweig. says that he does not understand. He supposes the word to be corrupt; unless we take it to mean the inn in which a man lives who has no home. I do not understand the word here.
- See the note of Schweig. on the word τετράσσαρον in the text.
- This does not mean, it is said, that Nero issued counterfeit coins, for there are extant many coins of Nero which both in form and in the purity of the metal are complete. A learned numismatist, Francis Wise, fellow of Trinity College Oxford, in a letter to Upton, says that he can discover no reason for Nero’s coins being rejected in commercial dealings after his death except the fact of the tyrant having been declared by the Senate to be an enemy to the Commonwealth. (Suetonius, Nero, c. 49 .) When Domitian was murdered, the Senate ordered his busts to be taken down, as the French now do after a revolution, and all memorials of him to be destroyed (Suetonius, Domitian, c. 23 ). Dion also reports (LX.) that when Caligula was murdered, it was ordered that all the brass coin which bore his image should be melted, and, I suppose, coined again. There is more on this subject in Wise’s letter. I do not believe that genuine coins would be refused in commercial dealings for the reasons which Wise gives, at least not refused in parts distant from Rome. Perhaps Epictetus means that some people would not touch the coins of the detestable Nero.
- He says τὸ κήρινον , which Mrs. Carter translates a piece of wax. Perhaps it means a piece of wax in the form of an apple.
- The word is ἐπιφύησονται , the form of which is not Greek. Schweig. has no remark on it, and he translates the word by adorientur. The form ought to be ἐπιφύσονται . See Stephens’ Lexicon on the word ἐπιφύομαι . Probably the word is corrupted.
- Mrs. Carter renders φοβερόν by formidable, and in the Latin translation it is rendered formidabilem, but that cannot be the meaning of the word here.
- Eteocles and Polynices were the sons of the unfortunate Oedipus, who quarrelled about the kingship of Thebes and killed one another This quarrel is the subject of the Seven against Thebes of Aeschylus and the Phoenissae of Euripides. See ii. 22. note 3.
- Every man in everything he does naturally acts upon the forethought and apprehension of avoiding evil or obtaining good. Bp. Butler, Analogy, Chap. 2. The bishop’s naturally is the φύσις of Epictetus.
- Socrates’ wife Xanthippe is charged by her eldest son Lamprocles with being so ill-tempered as to be past all endurance (Xenophon, Memorab. ii. 2, 7 ). Xenophon in this chapter has reported the conversation of Socrates with his son on this matter. Diogenes Laertius (ii.) tells the story of Xanthippe pouring water on the head of Socrates, and dirty water, as Seneca says (De Constantia, c. 18). Aelian (xi. 12) reports that Alcibiades sent Socrates a large and good cake, which Xanthippe trampled under her feet. Socrates only laughed and said, Well then, you will not have your share of it. The philosopher showed that his philosophy was practical by enduring the torment of a very ill-tempered wife, one of the greatest calamities that can happen to a man, and the trouble of an undutiful son.
- This is one of the wisest and noblest expressions of Epictetus.
- See Aristophanes, the Peace, v. 1188: πολλὰ γὰρ δὴ μ’ ἠδίκησαν, ὄντες οἴκοι μὲν λέοντες, ἐν μάχῃ δ’ ἀλώπεκες. Upton.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς οὔτʼ αὐτὸς μάχεταί τινι οὔτʼ ἄλλον ἐᾷ κατὰ δύναμιν. 2παράδειγμα δὲ καὶ τούτου καθάπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔκκειται ἡμῖν ὁ βίος ὁ Σωκράτους, ὃς οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς πανταχοῦ ἐξέφυγεν μάχην, ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ἄλλους μάχεσθαι εἴα. 3ὅρα παρὰ Ξενοφῶντι ἐν τῷ Συμποσίῳ πόσας μάχας λέλυκεν, πῶς πάλιν ἠνέσχετο Θρασυμάχου, πῶς Πώλου, πῶς Καλλικλέους, πῶς τῆς γυναικὸς ἠνείχετο, πῶς τοῦ υἱοῦ ἐξελεγχόμενος ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ, σοφιζόμενος. 4λίαν γὰρ ἀσφαλῶς ἐμέμνητο, ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἀλλοτρίου ἡγεμονικοῦ κυριεύει. οὐδὲν οὖν ἄλλο ἤθελεν ἢ τὸ ἴδιον. 5τί δʼ ἔστι τοῦτο; οὐχ ἱκ … ος οὗτος … κατὰ φύσιν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀλλότριον· ἀλλʼ ὅπως ἐκείνων τὰ ἴδια ποιούντων, ὡς αὐτοῖς δοκεῖ, αὐτὸς μηδὲν ἧττον κατὰ φύσιν ἕξει καὶ διεξάξει μόνον τὰ αὑτοῦ ποιῶν πρὸς τὸ κἀκείνους ἔχειν κατὰ φύσιν. 6τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν, ὃ ἀεὶ πρόκειται τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ. στρατηγῆσαι; οὔ· ἀλλʼ, ἂν διδῶται, ἐπὶ ταύτης τῆς ὕλης τὸ ἴδιον ἡγεμονικὸν τηρῆσαι. γῆμαι; οὔ· ἄλλʼ, ἂν διδῶται γάμος, ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ὕλῃ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχοντα αὑτὸν τηρῆσαι. 7ἂν δὲ θέλῃ τὸν υἱὸν μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν ἢ τὴν γυναῖκα, θέλει τὰ ἀλλότρια μὴ εἶναι ἀλλότρια. καὶ τὸ παιδεύεσθαι, τοῦτʼ ἔστιν μανθάνειν τὰ ἴδια καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια. 8ποῦ οὖν ἔτι μάχης τόπος τῷ οὕτως ἔχοντι; μὴ γὰρ θαυμάζει τι τῶν γινομένων; μὴ γὰρ καινὸν αὐτῷ φαίνεται; μὴ γὰρ οὐ χείρονα καὶ χαλεπώτερα προσδέχεται τὰ παρὰ τῶν φαύλων ἢ ἀποβαίνει αὐτῷ; μὴ γὰρ οὐ κέρδος λογίζεται πᾶν ὅ τι ἀπολείπουσιν τοῦ ἐσχάτου; 9ἐλοιδόρησέν σε ὁ δεῖνα. πολλὴ χάρις αὐτῷ, ὅτι μὴ ἔπληξεν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔπληξεν. πολλὴ χάρις, ὅτι μὴ ἔτρωσεν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔτρωσεν. πολλὴ χάρις, ὅτι μὴ ἀπέκτεινεν. 10πότε γὰρ ἔμαθεν ἢ παρὰ τίνι, ὅτι ἥμερόν ἐστι ζῷον, ὅτι φιλάλληλον, ὅτι μεγάλη βλάβη τῷ ἀδικοῦντι αὐτὴ ἡ ἀδικία; ταῦτα οὖν μὴ μεμαθηκὼς μηδὲ πεπεισμένος, διὰ τί μὴ ἀκολουθήσῃ τῷ φαινομένῳ συμφέροντι; 11βέβληκεν ὁ γείτων λίθους. μή τι οὖν σὺ ἡμάρτηκας; ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐν οἴκῳ κατεάγη. σὺ οὖν σκευάριον εἶ; 12οὔ, ἀλλὰ προαίρεσις. τί οὖν σοι δίδοται πρὸς τοῦτο; ὡς μὲν λύκῳ ἀντιδάκνειν καὶ ἄλλους πλείονας λίθους βάλλειν· ἀνθρώπῳ δʼ ἐὰν ζητῇς, ἐπίσκεψαί σου τὸ ταμιεῖον, ἴδε τίνας δυνάμεις ἔχων ἐλήλυθας· μή τι τὴν θηριώδη; μή τι τὴν μνησικακητικήν; 13ἵππος οὖν πότʼ ἄθλιός ἐστιν; ὅταν τῶν φυσικῶν δυνάμεων στέρηται· οὐχ ὅταν μὴ δύνηται κοκκύζειν, ἀλλʼ ὅταν μὴ τρέχειν. ὁ δὲ κύων; ὅταν πέτεσθαι μὴ δύνηται; 14ἀλλʼ ὅταν μὴ ἰχνεύειν. μή ποτʼ οὖν οὕτως καὶ ἄνθρωπος δυστυχής ἐστιν οὐχ ὁ μὴ δυνάμενος λέοντας πνίγειν ἢ ἀνδριάντας περιλαμβάνειν (οὐ γὰρ πρὸς τοῦτο δυνάμεις τινὰς ἔχων ἐλήλυθεν παρὰ τῆς φύσεως), ἀλλʼ ὁ ἀπολωλεκὼς τὸ εὔγνωμον, ὁ τὸ πιστόν; 15τοῦτον ἔδει συνελθόντας θρηνεῖν, εἰς ὅσα κακὰ ἐλήλυθεν· οὐχὶ μὰ Δία τὸν φύντα ἢ τὸν ἀποθανόντα, ἀλλʼ ᾧ ζῶντι συμβεβήκει ἀπολέσαι τὰ ἴδια, οὐ τὰ πατρῷα, τὸ ἀγρίδιον καὶ τὸ οἰκίδιον καὶ τὸ πανδοκεῖον καὶ τὰ δουλάρια (τούτων γὰρ οὐδὲν ἴδιον τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἀλλότρια, δοῦλα, ὑπεύθυνα ἄλλοτε ἄλλοις διδόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν κυρίων), 16ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀνθρωπικά,τοὺς χαρακτῆρας, οὓς ἔχων ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἐλήλυθεν, οἵους καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν νομισμάτων ζητοῦντες, ἂν μὲν εὕρωμεν, δοκιμάζομεν, ἂν δὲ μὴ εὕρωμεν, ῥιπτοῦμεν. 17τίνος ἔχει τὸν χαρακτῆρα τοῦτο τὸ τετράσσαρον; Τραιανοῦ; φέρε. Νέρωνος; ῥῖψον ἔξω, ἀδόκιμόν ἐστιν, σαπρόν. οὕτως καὶ ἐνθάδε. τίνα ἔχει χαρακτῆρα τὰ δόγματα αὐτοῦ; ἥμερον, κοινωνικόν, ἀνεκτικόν, φιλάλληλον. φέρε, παραδέχομαι, ποιῶ πολίτην τοῦτον, παραδέχομαι γείτονα, σύμπλουν. 18ὅρα μόνον, μὴ Νερωνιανὸν ἔχει χαρακτῆρα. μή τι ὀργίλος ἐστίν, μή τι μηνιτής, μή τι μεμψίμοιρος; ἂν αὐτῷ φανῇ, πατάσσει τὰς κεφαλὰς τῶν ἀπαντώντων. 19τί οὖν ἔλεγες, ὅτι ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν; μὴ γὰρ ἐκ ψιλῆς μορφῆς κρίνεται τῶν ὄντων ἕκαστον; ἐπεὶ οὕτως λέγε καὶ τὸ κήρινον μῆλον εἶναι. 20καὶ ὀδμὴν ἔχειν αὐτὸ δεῖ καὶ γεῦσιν· οὐκ ἀρκεῖ ἡ ἐκτὸς περιγραφή. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἡ ῥὶς ἐξαρκεῖ καὶ οἱ ὀφθαλμοί, ἀλλʼ ἂν τὰ δόγματα ἔχῃ ἀνθρωπικά. 21οὗτος οὐκ ἀκούει λόγου, οὐ παρακολουθεῖ ἐλεγχόμενος· ὄνος ἐστίν. τούτου τὸ αἰδῆμον ἀπονενέκρωται· ἄχρηστός ἐστιν, πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ ἄνθρωπος. οὗτος ζητεῖ, τίνα ἀπαντήσας λακτίσῃ ἢ δάκῃ· ὥστε οὐδὲ πρόβατον ἢ ὄνος, ἀλλά τί ποτε ἄγριον θηρίον. 22τί οὖν; θέλεις με καταφρονεῖσθαι; — ὑπὸ τίνων; ὑπὸ εἰδότων; καὶ πῶς καταφρονήσουσιν εἰδότες τοῦ πρᾴου, τοῦ αἰδήμονος; ἀλλʼ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγνοούντων; τί σοι μέλει; οὔ τινι γὰρ ἄλλῳ τεχνίτῃ τῶν ἀτέχνων. — ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐπιφυήσονταί μοι. 23—τί λέγεις τὸ ἐμοί; δύναταί τις τὴν προαίρεσιν τὴν σὴν βλάψαι ἢ κωλῦσαι ταῖς προσπιπτούσαις φαντασίαις χρῆσθαι ὡς πέφυκεν;— 24οὔ. — τί οὖν ἔτι ταράσσῃ καὶ φοβερὸν σαυτὸν θέλεις ἐπιδεικνύειν; οὐχὶ δὲ παρελθὼν εἰς μέσον κηρύσσεις, ὅτι εἰρήνην ἄγεις πρὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους, ὅ τι ἂν ἐκεῖνοι ποιῶσι, καὶ μάλιστʼ ἐκείνων καταγελᾷς, ὅσοι σε βλάπτειν δοκοῦσιν; ἀνδράποδα ταῦτα οὐκ οἶδεν οὐδὲ τίς εἰμὶ οὐδὲ ποῦ μου τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν· οὐ πρόσοδος αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰ ἐμά. 25οὕτως καὶ ἐχυρὰν πόλιν οἱ οἰκοῦντες καταγελῶσι τῶν πολιορκούντων· νῦν οὗτοι τί πρᾶγμα ἔχουσιν ἐπὶ τῷ μηδενί; ἀσφαλές ἐστιν ἡμῶν τὸ τεῖχος, τροφὰς ἔχομεν ἐπὶ πάμπολυν χρόνον, τὴν ἄλλην ἅπασαν παρασκευήν. 26ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ πόλιν ἐχυρὰν καὶ ἀνάλωτον ποιοῦντα, ἀνθρώπου δὲ ψυχὴν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ δόγματα. ποῖον γὰρ τεῖχος οὕτως ἰσχυρὸν ἢ ποῖον σῶμα οὕτως ἀδαμάντινον ἢ ποία κτῆσις ἀναφαίρετος ἢ ποῖον ἀξίωμα οὕτως ἀνεπιβούλευτον; 27πάντα πανταχοῦ θνητά, εὐάλωτα, οἷς τισιν τὸν ὁπωσοῦν προσέχοντα πᾶσα ἀνάγκη ταράσσεσθαι, κακελπιστεῖν, φοβεῖσθαι, πενθεῖν, ἀτελεῖς ἔχειν τὰς ὀρέξεις, περιπτωτικὰς ἔχειν τὰς ἐκκλίσεις. 28εἶτα οὐ θέλομεν τὴν μόνην δεδομένην ἡμῖν ἀσφάλειαν ἐχυρὰν ποιεῖν; οὐδʼ ἀποστάντες τῶν θνητῶν καὶ δούλων τὰ ἀθάνατα καὶ φύσει ἐλεύθερα ἐκπονεῖν; οὐδὲ μεμνήμεθα, ὅτι οὔτε βλάπτει ἄλλος ἄλλον οὔτε ὠφελεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὸ περὶ ἑκάστου τούτων δόγμα, τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ βλάπτον, τοῦτο τὸ ἀνατρέπον, τοῦτο μάχη, τοῦτο στάσις, τοῦτο πόλεμος; 29Ἐτεοκλέα καὶ Πολυνείκη τὸ πεποιηκὸς οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, τὸ δόγμα τὸ περὶ τυραννίδος, τὸ δόγμα τὸ περὶ φυγῆς, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἔσχατον τῶν κακῶν, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν. 30φύσις δʼ αὕτη παντός, τὸ διώκειν τὸ ἀγαθόν, φεύγειν τὸ κακόν· τὸν ἀφαιρούμενον θατέρου καὶ περιβάλλοντα τῷ ἐναντίῳ, τοῦτον ἡγεῖσθαι πολέμιον, ἐπίβουλον, κἂν ἀδελφὸς ᾖ, κἂν υἱός, κἂν πατήρ. 31τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ συγγενέστερον οὐδέν· λοιπὸν εἰ ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά, οὔτε πατὴρ υἱοῖς φίλος οὔτʼ ἀδελφὸς ἀδελφῷ, πάντα δὲ πανταχοῦ μεστὰ πολεμίων, ἐπιβούλων, συκοφαντῶν. 32εἰ δʼ οἵα δεῖ προαίρεσις, τοῦτο μόνον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, καὶ οἵα μὴ δεῖ, τοῦτο μόνον κακόν, ποῦ ἔτι μάχη, ποῦ λοιδορία; περὶ τίνων; περὶ τῶν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς; πρὸς τίνας; πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντας, πρὸς τοὺς δυστυχοῦντας, πρὸς τοὺς ἠπατημένους περὶ τῶν μεγίστων; 33τούτων Σωκράτης μεμνημένος τὴν οἰκ[ε]ίαν τὴν αὑτοῦ ᾤκει γυναικὸς ἀνεχόμενος τραχυτάτης, υἱοῦ ἀγνώμονος. τραχεῖα γὰρ πρὸς τί ἦν; ἵνʼ ὕδωρ καταχέῃ τῆς κεφαλῆς ὅσον καὶ θέλει, ἵνα καταπατήσῃ τὸν πλακοῦντα· καὶ τί πρὸς ἐμέ, ἂν ὑπολάβω, ὅτι ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς ἐμέ; 34τοῦτο δʼ ἐμὸν ἔργον ἐστὶ καὶ οὔτε τύραννος κωλύσει με θέλοντα οὔτε δεσπότης οὔτε οἱ πολλοὶ τὸν ἕνα οὔθʼ ὁ ἰσχυρότερος τὸν ἀσθενέστερον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀκώλυτον δέδοται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἑκάστῳ. 35ταῦτα τὰ δόγματα ἐν οἰκίᾳ φιλίαν ποιεῖ, ἐν πόλει ὁμόνοιαν, ἐν ἔθνεσιν εἰρήνην, πρὸς θεὸν εὐχάριστον, πανταχοῦ θαρροῦντα, ὡς περὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ὡς περὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίων. 36ἀλλʼ ἡμεῖς γράψαι μὲν καὶ ἀναγνῶναι ταῦτα καὶ ἀναγιγνωσκόμενα ἐπαινέσαι ἱκανοί, πεισθῆναι δʼ οὐδʼ ἐγγύς. 37τοιγαροῦν τὸ περὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων λεγόμενον οἴκοι λέοντες, ἐν Ἐφέσῳ δʼ ἀλώπεκες καὶ ἐφʼ ἡμῶν ἁρμόσει· ἐν σχολῇ λέοντες, ἔξω δʼ ἀλώπεκες.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA