Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER VI. · Concerning Those who grieve at being pitied.
1It vexes me, say you, to be pitied. Is this your Affair then, or theirs, who pity you? And further: How is it in your Power to prevent it?——"It is, if I show them, that I do not need Pity."——But are you now in such a Condition, as not to need Pity, or are you not?——"I think I am. But these People do not pity me for what, if any thing, would deserve Pity, my Faults; but for Poverty, and want of Power, and Sicknesses, and Deaths, and other Things of that Kind."——Are you then prepared to convince the World, that none of these Things is in reality an Evil: but that it is possible for a Person to be happy, even when he is poor, and without Honours, and Power? Or are you prepared to appear to them, rich and powerful? The last of these is the Part of an arrogant, silly, worthless Fellow. Observe too, by what Means this Fiction must be carried on. You must hire some paultry Slaves, and get possessed of a few little Pieces of Plate, and often show them in public; and, though they are the same, endeavour to conceal that they are the same: you must have gay Clothes, and other Finery; and make a Show of being honoured by your great People; and endeavour to sup with them, or be thought to sup with them; and use some vile Arts with your Person, to make it Person, to make it appear handsomer and genteeller than it really is. All this you must contrive, if you would take the second Way not to be pitied. And the first is impracticable, as well as tedious, to undertake the very Thing, that Jupiter himself could not do: to convince all Mankind what Things are really good and evil. Is this granted you? The only Thing granted you is, to convince yourself: and you have not yet done that: and do you, notwithstanding, undertake to convince others? Why, who hath lived so long with you, as you have with yourself? Who is so likely to have Faith in you, in order to be convinced by you, as you in yourself? Who is a better Wisher, or a nearer Friend to you, than you to yourself? How is it then, that you have not yet convinced yourself. Should not you now turn these Things every way in your Thoughts? What you were studying was this: to learn to be exempt from Grief, Perturbation, and Meanness, and to be free. Have not you heard then, that the only way that leads to this is, to give up what doth not depend on Choice: to withdraw from it; and confess, that it belongs to others? What kind of Thing then is another's Opinion about you?——"Independent on Choice."——Is it nothing then to you?——"Nothing."——While you are still piqued and disturbed about it then, do you think, that you are convinced concerning Good and Evil. 2Letting others alone then, why will you not be your own Scholar and Teacher? Let others look to it, whether it be for their Advantage to think and act contrary to Nature: but no one is nearer to me than myself. What then is the Meaning of this? I have heard the Reasonings of Philosophers, and assented to them: yet, in fact, I am never the more relieved. Am I so stupid, and yet in other Things, that I had an Inclination to, I was not found very stupid: but I quickly learned Grammar, and the Exercises of the Palæstra, and Geometry, and the Solution of Syllogisms. Hath not Reason then convinced me? And yet there is no one of the other Things, that I so much approved or liked from the very first. And now I read concerning these Subjects, I hear Discourses upon them, I write about them, and I have not yet found any Reasoning of greater Strength than this. What then do I want? Is it not, that the contrary Principles are not removed out of my Mind? Is it not, that I have not strengthened these Opinions by Exercise, nor accustomed them to occur in Action; but, like Arms thrown aside, they are grown rusty, and do not fit me? Yet neither in the Palæstra, nor writing, nor reading, nor solving Syllogisms, am I contented with mere Learning: but I turn the Arguments every way, which are presented to me, and I compose others; and the same of convertible Propositions. But the necessary Theorems, by which I might become exempted from Fear, Grief, Passion, unrestrained and free, I neither exercise, nor study, with a proper Application. And then I trouble myself, what others will say of me; whether I shall appear to them worthy of Regard; whether I shall appear happy.——Will you not see, Wretch, what you can say of yourself? What sort of Person you appear to yourself, in your Opinions, in your Desires, in your Aversions, in your Pursuits, in your Preparation, in your Intention, in the other proper Works of a Man? But, instead of that, do you trouble yourself, whether others pity you?——"Very true. But I am pitied improperly."——Then are not you pained by this? And is not he who is in Pain to be pitied.——"Yes."——How then are you pitied improperly? For you render yourself worthy of Pity by what you suffer upon being pitied. 3What says Antisthenes then? Have you never heard? "It is kingly, O Cyrus, to do well, and to be ill spoken of." My Head is well, and all around me think it akes. What is that to me? I am free from a Fever; and they compassionate me, as if I had one. "Poor Soul, what a long while have you had this Fever!" I say too, with a dismal Countenance, Ay, indeed, it is now a long time that I have been ill.——"What can be the Consequence then?"——What pleases God. And at the same time I secretly laugh at them, who pity me. What forbids then, but that the same may be done in the other Case? I am poor: but I have right Principles concerning Poverty. What is it to me then, if People pity me for my Poverty? I am not in Power, and others are: but I have such Opinions as I ought to have concerning Power, and the want of Power. Let them see to it, who pity me. But I am neither hungry, nor thirsty, nor cold. But, because they are hungry and thirsty, they suppose me to be so too. What can I do for them then? Am I to go about, making Proclamation, and saying, Do not deceive yourselves, good People, I am very well: I regard neither Poverty, nor want of Power, nor any thing else, but right Principles. These I possess unrestrained. I care for nothing farther.——But what trifling is this? How have I right Principles, when I am not contented to be what I am; but am out of my Wits, how I shall appear?——But others will get more, and be preferred to me.——Why, what is more reasonable, than that they who take pains for any thing, should get most in that Particular, in which they take pains? They have taken pains for Power; you, for right Principles: they, for Riches; you, for proper Use of the Appearances of things. See whether they have the Advantage of you in that, for which you have taken pains, and which they neglect: if they assent better, concerning the natural Bounds and Limits of Things; if their Desires are less disappointed than yours, their Aversions less incurred; if they take a better Aim in their Intention, in their Purposes, in their Pursuits: whether they preserve a becoming Behaviour, as Men, as Sons, as Parents, and so on in respect of the other Relations of Life. But, if they are in Power, and you not: why will you not speak the Truth to yourself; that you do nothing for the sake of Power; but that they do every thing? And it is very unreasonable, that he who carefully seeks any thing, should be less successful than he who neglects it.——"No: but since I take Care to have right Principles, it is more reasonable that I should have Power."——Yes, in respect to what you take Care about, your Principles. But give up to others the Things, in which they have taken more Care than you. Else it is just as if, because you have right Principles, you should think it fit, that when you shoot an Arrow, you should hit the Mark better than an Archer, or that you should forge better than a Smith. Therefore let alone taking pains about Principles, and apply yourself to the Things which you wish to possess, and then fall a crying, if you do not suceeed; for you deserve to cry. But now you say, that you are engaged in other Things; intent upon other Things: and it is a true Saying, that one Business doth not suit with another. One Man, as soon as he rises and goes out, seeks to whom he may pay his Compliments; whom he may flatter; to whom he may send a Present; how he may please the Dancer [in vogue]; how, by doing ill-natured Offices to one, he may oblige another. Whenever he prays, he prays for nothing like these: whenever he sacrifice, he sacrifices for Things like these. To these he transfers the Pythagorean Precept; Let not the stealing God of Sleep surprise, &c. Where have I failed in Point of Flattery? What have I done? Any thing like a free, brave-spirited Man? If he should find any thing of this Sort, he rebukes and accuses himself. "What Business had you to say that? For could not you have lied? Even the Philosophers say, there is no Objection against telling a Lye." 4But on the other hand, if you have in reality been careful about nothing else, but to make a right Use of the Appearance of Things; as soon as you are up in a Morning, consider, what do I want in order to be free from Passion? What, to enjoy Tranquillity? What am I? Am I mere worthless Body? Am I Estate? Am I Reputation? None of these. What then? I am a reasonable Creature. What then is required of me? Recollect your Actions. Where have I failed, in any Requisite for Prosperity? What have I done, either unfriendly, or unsociable? What have I omitted, that was necessary in these Points? 5Since there is so much Difference then in your Desires, your Actions, your Wishes, would you yet have an equal Share with others in those Things, about which you have not taken Pains, and they have? And do you wonder, after all, and are you out of Humour, if they pity you? But they are not out of Humour, if you pity them. Why? Because they are convinced, that they are in Possession of their proper Good; but you are not convinced that you are. Hence you are not contented with your own Condition; but desire theirs: whereas they are contented with theirs, and do not desire yours. For, if you were really convinced, that it is you who are in Possession of what is good, and that they are mistaken, you would not so much as think what they say about you.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (3)
- The Text here is either corrupt, or very elliptical and obscure; and the Translation conjectural. Ανω κατα hath the same Sense in the next Page but one, which is assigned to it here. The και before μανθανειν is omitted, as being probably a Corruption of the last Syllable of the preceding Word, written twice over. Mr. Upton's MS. cuts the Difficulty short, by leaving out several Words; in consequence of which, the Translation would be; How is it then, that you have not yet brought yourself to learn to be exempt, &c.
- I have translated thus, on the Supposition, that ου in the Original ought to be repeated.
- See the Pythagorean Verses (quoted in B. III. c. 10.) of which these Questions are a Parody.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Concerning those who are annoyed at being pitied.
It vexes me, say you, to be pitied. Is this your affair, then, or theirs who pity you? And further, how is it in your power to prevent it? It is, if I show them that I do not need pity. But are you now in such a condition as not to need pity, or are you not? think I am. But these people do not pity me for what, if anything, would deserve pity, my faults; but for poverty, and want of power, and sicknesses, and deaths, and other things of that kind. Are you, then, prepared to convince the world that none of these things is in reality an evil; but that it is possible for a person to be happy, even when he is poor, and without honors and power? Or are you prepared to put on the appearance of being rich and powerful? The last of these is the part of an arrogant, silly, worthless fellow. Observe, too, by what means this fiction must be carried on. You must hire some poor slaves, and get possessed of a few little pieces of plate, and often show them in public; and though they are the same, endeavor to conceal that they are the same; you must have gay clothes and other finery, and make a show of being honored by your great people; and endeavor to sup with them, or be thought to sup with them; and use some vile arts with your person, to make it appear handsomer and genteeler than it really is. All this you must contrive, if you would take the second way not to be pitied. And the first is impracticable as well as tedious, to undertake the very thing that Zeus himself could not do,—to convince all mankind what things are really good and evil. Is this granted you? The only thing granted you is to convince yourself; and you have not yet done that; and yet do you undertake to convince others? Why, who has lived so long with you as you have with yourself? Who is so likely to have faith in you, in order to be convinced by you, as yourself? Who is more truly a well-wisher or a friend to you than yourself? How is it, then, that you have not yet convinced yourself? Should you not now revolve these things? What you were studying was this: to learn to be exempt from grief, perturbation, and meanness, and to be free. Have you not heard, then, that the only way that leads to this is to give up what is beyond the control of will; to withdraw from it, and confess that it belongs to others? To what order of things belongs another’s opinion about you? Things uncontrollable by will. Is it nothing then to you? Nothing. While you are still piqued and disturbed about it, then, do you consider that you are convinced concerning good and evil?
Letting others alone, then, why will you not be your own scholar and teacher? Let others look to it, whether it be for their advantage to think and act contrary to nature; but no one is nearer to me than myself. What means this? I have heard the reasonings of philosophers, and assented to them; yet, in fact, I am not the more relieved. Am I so stupid? And yet, in other things to which I had an inclination, I was not found very stupid; but I quickly learned grammar and the exercises of the palaestra, and geometry, and the solution of syllogisms. Has not reason, then, convinced me? And yet there is no one of the other things that I so much approved or liked from the very first. And now I read concerning these subjects, I hear discourses upon them, I write about them, and I have not yet found any principle more sure then this. What, then, do I need? Is not this the difficulty, that the contrary principles are not removed out of my mind? Is it not that I have not strengthened these opinions by exercise, nor practised them in action; but, like arms thrown aside, they are grown rusty, and do not suit me? Yet neither in the palaestra, nor writing, nor reading, nor solving syllogisms, am I contented with merely learning; but I apply in every way the forms of arguments which are presented to me, and I invent others; and the same of convertible propositions. But the necessary principles by which I might become exempted from fear, grief, and passion, and be unrestrained and free, I do not exercise, nor bestow on them the proper care. And then I trouble myself what others will say of me; whether I shall appear to them worthy of regard; whether I shall appear happy. Will you not see, foolish man, what you can say of yourself; what sort of person you appear to yourself in your opinions, in your desires, in your aversions, in your pursuits, in your preparation, in your intention, in the other proper works of a man? But instead of that, do you trouble yourself whether others pity you? Very true. But I am pitied without reason. Then are you not pained by this? And is not he who is in pain to be pitied? Yes. How, then, are you pitied without reason? For you render yourself worthy of pity by what you suffer upon being pitied.
What says Antisthenes, then? Have you never heard?—It is kingly, O Cyrus, to do well and to be ill spoken of. My head is well, and all around me think it aches. What is that to me? I am free from a fever; and they compassionate me as if I had one. Poor soul, what a long while have you had this fever! I say, too, with a dismal countenance, Ay, indeed, it is now a long time that I have been ill. What can be the consequence, then? What pleases God. And at the same time I secretly laugh at those who pity me. What forbids, then, but that the same may be done in the other case? I am poor, but I have right principles concerning poverty. What is it to me, then, if people pity me for my poverty? I am not in power and others are; but I have such opinions as I ought to have concerning power and the want of power. Let them see to it who pity me. I am neither hungry, nor thirsty, nor cold. But because they are hungry and thirsty, they suppose me to be so too. What can I do for them? Am I to go about making proclamation, and saying, Do not deceive yourselves, good people, I am very well; I care for neither poverty, nor want of power, nor anything else but right principles? These I possess unrestrained, and care for nothing further.
But what trifling is this! How have I right principles when I am not contented to be what I am; but am in agony as to how I shall appear? But others will get more, and be preferred to me. Well, what is more reasonable than that they who take pains for anything should get most in that particular direction in which they take pains? They have taken pains for power; you, for right principles. They, for riches; you, for a proper use of the phenomena of existence. See whether they have the advantage of you in that for which you have taken pains, and which they neglect; if they judge better concerning the natural bounds and limits of things; if their desires are less often disappointed than yours, their aversions less often incurred; if they aim better in their intentions, in their purposes, in their pursuits; if they preserve a becoming behavior as men, as sons, as parents, and so on with the other relations of life. But if they are in power, and you not, why will you not speak the truth to yourself; that you do nothing for the sake of power, but that they do everything? It were very reasonable that he who carefully seeks anything should be less successful than he who neglects it! No; but since I take care to have right principles, it is more reasonable that I should excel. Yes, in respect to what you take pains about, your principles. But give up to others the things in which they have taken more pains than you. Else it is just as if, because you have right principles, you should expect to aim an arrow better than an archer, or to forge better than a smith. In that case cease to take pains about principles, and apply yourself to those things which you wish to possess, and then begin crying, if you do not succeed; for you deserve to cry. But now you claim that you are engaged and absorbed in other things; and they say well that no man can be of two trades. One man, as soon as he rises and goes out, seeks to whom he may pay his compliments, whom he may flatter, to whom he may send a present, how he may please the favorite; how, by doing mischief to one, he may oblige another. Whenever he prays, he prays for things like these; whenever he sacrifices, he sacrifices for things like these. To these he transfers the Pythagorean precept,—
Let not the stealing god of Sleep surprise.
Where have I failed in point of flattery? What have I done,—anything like a free, brave-spirited man? If he should find anything of this sort, he rebukes and accuses himself. What business had you to say that? For could you not have lied? Even the philosophers say there is no objection against telling a lie.
But, on the other hand, if you have in reality been careful about nothing else but to make a right use of the phenomena of existence; then, as soon as you are up in the morning, consider what you need in order to be free from passion; what, to enjoy tranquillity? In what do I consist,—merely in body, in estate, in reputation? None of these. What, then? I am a reasonable creature. What, then, is required of me? Meditate upon your actions. Where have I failed in any requisite for prosperity? What have I done, either unfriendly or unsocial? What have I omitted that was necessary in these points?
Since there is so much difference, then, in your desires, your actions, your wishes, would you yet have an equal share with others in those things about which you have not taken pains, and they have? And do you wonder, after all, and are you out of humor, if they pity you? But they are not out of humor, if you pity them. Why? Because they are convinced that they are in possession of their proper good; but you are not convinced that you are. Hence you are not contented with your own condition, but desire theirs; whereas they are contented with theirs, and do not desire yours. For if you were really convinced that it is you who are in possession of what is good, and that they are mistaken, you would not so much as think what they say about you.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Higginson’s notes (1)
- See the Pythagorean verses (quoted in Book III. c. 10) of which these questions are a parody—C.
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
Against those who lament over being pitied.
I am grieved, a man says, at being pitied. Whether then is the fact of your being pitied a thing which concerns you or those who pity you? Well, is it in your power to stop this pity?—It is in my power, if I show them that I do not require pity.—And whether then are you in the condition of not deserving (requiring) pity, or are you not in that condition?—I think that I am not: but these persons do not pity me, for the things for which, if they ought to pity me, it would be proper, I mean, for my faults; but they pity me for my poverty, for not possessing honourable offices, for diseases and deaths and other such things—Whether then are you prepared to convince the many, that not one of these things is an evil, but that it is possible for a man who is poor and has no office (ἀνάρχοντι) and enjoys no honour to be happy; or to shew yourself to them as rich and in power? For the second of these things belong to a man who is boastful, silly and good for nothing. And consider by what means the pretence must be supported. It will be necessary for you to hire slaves an I to possess a few silver vessels, and to exhibit them in public, if it is possible, though they are often the same, and to attempt to conceal the fact that they are the same, and to have splendid garments, and all other things for display, and to show that you are a man honoured by the great, and to try to sup at their houses, or to be supposed to sup there, and as to your person to employ some mean arts, that you may appear to be more handsome and nobler than you are. These things you must contrive, if you choose to go by the second path in order not to be pitied. But the first way is both impracticable and long, to attempt the very thing which Zeus has not been able to do, to convince all men what things are good and bad. Is this power given to you? This only is given to you, to convince yourself; and you have not convinced yourself. Then I ask you, do you attempt to persuade other men? and who has lived so long with you as you with yourself? and who has so much power of convincing you as you have of convincing yourself; and who is better disposed and nearer to you than you are to yourself? How then have you not yet convinced yourself in order to learn? At present are not things upside down? Is this what you have been earnest about doing, to learn to be free from grief and free from disturbance, and not to be humbled (abject), and to be free? Have you not heard then that there is only one way which leads to this end, to give up (dismiss) the things which do not depend on the will, to withdraw from them, and to admit that they belong to others? For another man then to have an opinion about you, of what kind is it?—It is a thing independent of the will—Then is it nothing to you?—It is nothing—When then you are still vexed at this and disturbed, do you think that you are convinced about good and evil?
Will you not then letting others alone be to yourself both scholar and teacher?—The rest of mankind will look after this, whether it is to their interest to be and to pass their lives in a state contrary to nature: but to me no man is nearer than myself. What then is the meaning of this, that I have listened to the words of the philosophers and I assent to them, but in fact I am no way made easier (more content)? Am I so stupid? And yet in all other things such as I have chosen, I have not been found very stupid; but I learned letters quickly, and to wrestle, and geometry, and to resolve syllogisms. Has not then reason convinced me? and indeed no other things have I from the beginning so approved and chosen (as the things which are rational): and now I read about these things, hear about them, write about them; I have so far discovered no reason stronger than this (living according to nature). In what then am I deficient? Have the contrary opinions not been eradicated from me? Have the notions (opinions) themselves not been exercised nor used to be applied to action, but as armour are laid aside and rusted and cannot fit me? And yet neither in the exercises of the palaestra, nor in writing or reading am I satisfied with learning, but I turn up and down the syllogisms which are proposed, and I make others, and sophistical syllogisms also. But the necessary theorems by proceeding from which a man can become free from grief, fear, passions (affects), hindrance, and a free man, these I do not exercise myself in nor do I practise in these the proper practice (study). Then I care about what others will say of me, whether I shall appear to them worth notice, whether I shall appear happy.—
Wretched man, will you not see what you are saying about yourself? What do you appear to yourself to be? in your opinions, in your desires, in your aversions from things (ἐν τῷ ἐκκλίνειν), in your movements (purposes, ἐν ὁρμῇ) in your preparation (for anything), in your designs (plans), and in other acts suitable to a man? But do you trouble yourself about this, whether others pity you? —Yes, but I am pitied not as I ought to be.—Are you then pained at this? and is he who is pained, an object of pity? —Yes—How then are you pitied not as you ought to be? For by the very act that you feel (suffer) about being pitied, you make yourself deserving of pity. What then says Antisthenes? Have you not heard? It is a royal thing, O Cyrus, to do right (well) and to be ill spoken of. My head is sound, and all think that I have the head ache. What do I care for that? I am free from fever, and people sympathize with me as if I had a fever, (and say), Poor man, for so long a time you have not ceased to have fever. I also say with a sorrowful countenance, In truth it is now a long time that I have been ill. What will happen then? As God may please: and at the same time I secretly laugh at those who are pitying me. What then hinders the same being done in this case also? I am poor, but I have a right opinion about poverty. Why then do I care if they pity me for my poverty? I am not in power (not a magistrate); but others are: and I have the opinion which I ought to have about having and not having power. Let them look to it who pity me: but I am neither hungry nor thirsty nor do I suffer cold; but because they are hungry or thirsty they think that I too am. What then shall I do for them? Shall I go about and proclaim and say, Be not mistaken, men, I am very well, I do not trouble myself about poverty, nor want of power, nor in a word about anything else than right opinions. These I have free from restraint, I care for nothing at all.—What foolish talk is this? How do I possess right opinions when I am not content with being what I am, but am uneasy about what I am supposed to be?
But you say, others will get more and be preferred to me—What then is more reasonable than for those who have laboured about any thing to have more in that thing in which they have laboured? They have laboured for power, you have laboured about opinions; and they have laboured for wealth, you for the proper use of appearances. See if they have more than you in this about which you have laboured, and which they neglect; if they assent better than you with respect to the natural rules (measures) of things; if they are less disappointed than you in their desires; if they fall less into things which they would avoid than you do; if in their intentions, if in the things which they propose to themselves, if in their purposes, if in their motions towards an object they take a better aim; if they better observe a proper behaviour, as men, as sons, as parents, and so on as to the other names by which we express the relations of life. But if they exercise power, and you do not, will you not choose to tell yourself the truth, that you do nothing for the sake of this (power), and they do all? But it is most unreasonable that he who looks after anything should obtain less than he who does not look after it.
Not so: but since I care about right opinions, it is more reasonable for me to have power.—Yes in the matter about which you do care, in opinions. But in a matter in which they have cared more than you, give way to them. The case is just the same as if because you have right opinions, you thought that in using the bow you should hit the mark better than an archer, and in working in metal you should succeed better than a smith. Give up then your earnestness about opinions and employ yourself about the things which you wish to acquire; and then lament, if you do not succeed; for you deserve to lament. But now you say that you are occupied with other things, that you are looking after other things; but the many say this truly, that one act has no community with another. He who has risen in the morning seeks whom (of the house of Caesar) he shall salute, to whom he shall say something agreeable, to whom he shall send a present, how he shall please the dancing man, how by bad behaviour to one he may please another. When he prays, he prays about these things; when he sacrifices, he sacrifices for these things: the saying of Pythagoras Let sleep not come upon thy languid eyes he transfers to these things. Where have I failed in the matters pertaining to flattery? What have I done? Any thing like a free man, any thing like a noble minded man? And if he finds any thing of the kind, he blames and accuses himself: Why did you say this? Was it not in your power to lie? Even the philosophers say that nothing hinders us from telling a lie. But do you, if indeed you have cared about nothing else except the proper use of appearances, as soon as you have risen in the morning reflect, What do I want in order to be free from passion (affects), and free from perturbation? What am I? Am I a poor body, a piece of property, a thing of which something is said? 1 am none of these. But what am I? I am a rational animal. What then is required of me? Reflect on your acts. Where have I omitted the things which conduce to happiness (εὔροιαν)? What have I done which is either unfriendly or unsocial? what have I not done as to these things which I ought to have done?
So great then being the difference in desires, actions, wishes, would you still have the same share with others in those things about which you have not laboured, and they have laboured? Then are you surprised if they pity you, and are you vexed? But they are not vexed if you pity them. Why? Because they are convinced that they have that which is good, and you are not convinced. For this reason you are not satisfied with your own, but you desire that which they have: but they are satisfied with their own, and do not desire what you have: since if you were really convinced, that with respect to what is good, it is you who are the possessor of it and that they have missed it, you would not even have thought of what they say about you.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (7)
- Here it is implied that there are things which God cannot do. Perhaps he means that as God has given man certain powers of will and therefore of action, he cannot at the same time exercise the contradictory powers of forcing man’s will and action; for this would be at the same time to give power and to take it away. Butler remarks (Analogy, chap. 5) the present is so far from proving in event a discipline of virtue to the generality of men that on the contrary they seem to make it a discipline of vice. In fact all men are not convinced and cannot be convinced in the present constitution of things what things are good and bad.
- Something is perhaps wrong in the text here. See Schweig.’s note.
- In place of μεπαπίπτοντας Schweig. suggests that Arrian wrote καὶ τἄλλα ὡσαύτως or something of the kind. On μεταπίπτοντας see Epictetus, i. 7.
- M. Antoninus, vii. 36.
- ὄψονται . See i. 4, note 4.
- Schweig. says that he has not observed that this proverb is mentioned by any other writer, and that he does not quite see the meaning of it, unless it be what he expresses in the Latin version (iv. 10. 24), alterum opus cum altero nihil commune habet. I think that the context explains it: if you wish to obtain a particular end, employ the proper means, and not the means which do not make for that end.
- See iii. i. note 2. Epictetus is making a parody of the verses of Pythagoras. See Schweig.’s remarks on the words He who has risen etc. I have of necessity translated κακοηφισάμενος in an active sense; but if this is right, I do not understand how the word is used so.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1ἀνιῶμαι, φησίν, ἐλεούμενος. — πότερον οὖν σὸν ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ ἐλεεῖσθαί σε ἢ τῶν ἐλεούντων; τί δʼ; ἐπὶ σοί ἐστι τὸ παῦσαι αὐτό; — ἐπʼ ἐμοί, ἂν δεικνύω αὐτοῖς μῆ ἄξιον ἐλέου ὄντα ἐμαυτόν. 2— πότερον δʼ ἤδη σοι ὑπάρχει τοῦτο, τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐλέου ἄξιον ἢ οὐχ ὑπάρχει; — δοκῶ ἔγωγε, ὅτι ὑπάρχει. ἀλλʼ οὗτοί γʼ οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐλεοῦσιν, ἐφʼ οἷς, εἴπερ ἄρα, ἦν ἄξιον, ἐπὶ τοῖς ἁμαρτανομένοις, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ πενίᾳ καὶ ἀναρχίᾳ καὶ νόσοις καὶ θανάτοις καὶ ἄλλοις τοιούτοις. 3— πότερον οὖν πείθειν παρεσκεύασαι τοὺς πολλούς, ὡς ἄρα οὐδὲν τούτων κακόν ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ οἷόν τε καὶ πένητι καὶ ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀτίμῳ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἢ σαυτὸν ἐπιδεικνύειν αὐτοῖς πλουτοῦντα καὶ ἄρχοντα; 4τούτων γὰρ τὰ μὲν δεύτερα ἀλαζόνος καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίου. καὶ ἡ προσποίησις ὅρα διʼ οἵων ἂν γένοιτο· δουλάριά σε χρήσασθαι δεήσει καὶ ἀργυρωμάτια ὀλίγα κεκτῆσθαι καὶ ταῦτα ἐν φανερῷ δεικνύειν, εἰ οἷόν τε, ταὐτὰ πολλάκις καὶ λανθάνειν πειρᾶσθαι ὅτι ταὐτά ἐστιν, καὶ ἱματίδια στιλπνὰ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πομπὴν καὶ τὸν τιμώμενον ἐπιφαίνειν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιφανῶν τούτων καὶ δειπνεῖν πειρᾶσθαι παρʼ αὐτοῖς ἢ δοκεῖν γε, ὅτι δειπνεῖς, καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα δέ τινα κακοτεχνεῖν, ὡς εὐμορφότερον φαίνεσθαι καὶ γενναιότερον τοῦ ὄντος· 5ταῦτά σε δεῖ μηχανᾶσθαι, εἰ τὴν δευτέραν ὁδὸν ἀπιέναι θέλεις ὥστε μὴ ἐλεεῖσθαι. ἡ πρώτη δὲ καὶ ἀνήνυτος καὶ μακρά, ὃ ὁ Ζεὺς οὐκ ἠδυνήθη ποιῆσαι, τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐπιχειρεῖν, πάντας ἀνθρώπους πεῖσαι, τίνα ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά. 6μὴ γὰρ δέδοταί σοι τοῦτο; ἐκεῖνο μόνον σοι δέδοται, σαυτὸν πεῖσαι. καὶ οὔπω πέπεικας· εἶτά μοι νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς πείθειν τοὺς ἄλλους; 7καὶ τίς σοι τοσούτῳ χρόνῳ σύνεστιν ὡς σὺ σαυτῷ; τίς δὲ οὕτως πιθανός ἐστί σοι πρὸς τὸ πεῖσαι ὡς σὺ σαυτῷ; τίς δʼ εὐνούστερον καὶ οἰκειότερον ἔχων ἢ σὺ σαυτῷ; 8πῶς οὖν οὔπω πέπεικας σαυτὸν μαθεῖν; νῦν οὐχὶ ἄνω κάτω; τοῦτʼ ἔστι περὶ ὃ ἐσπούδακας; οὐ μανθάνειν, ὥστε ἄλυπος εἶναι καὶ ἀτάραχος καὶ ἀταπείνωτος καὶ ἐλεύθερος; 9πρὸς ταῦτα οὖν οὐκ ἀκήκοας, ὅτι μία ἐστὶν ἡ ὁδὸς ἡ φέρουσα, ἀφεῖναι τὰ ἀπροαίρετα καὶ ἐκστῆναι αὐτῶν καὶ ὁμολογῆσαι αὐτὰ ἀλλότρια; 10τὸ οὖν ἄλλον τι ὑπολαβεῖν περὶ σοῦ ποίου εἴδους ἐστίν; — τοῦ ἀπροαιρέτου. — οὐκοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς σέ; — οὐδέν. — ἔτι οὖν δακνόμενος ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ ταρασσόμενος οἴει πεπεῖσθαι περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν; 11οὐ θέλεις οὖν ἀφεὶς τοὺς ἄλλους αὐτὸς σαυτῷ γενέσθαι καὶ μαθητὴς καὶ διδάσκαλος; ὄψονται οἱ ἄλλοι, εἰ λυσιτελεῖ αὐτοῖς παρὰ φύσιν ἔχειν καὶ διεξάγειν, ἐμοὶ δʼ οὐδείς ἐστιν ἐγγίων ἐμοῦ. 12τί οὖν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν λόγους ἀκήκοα τοὺς τῶν φιλοσόφων καὶ συγκατατίθεμαι αὐτοῖς, ἔργῳ δʼ οὐδὲν γέγονα κουφότερος; μή τι οὕτως ἀφυής εἰμι; καὶ μὴν περὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα ἐβουλήθην, οὐ λίαν ἀφυὴς εὑρέθην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γράμματα ταχέως ἔμαθον καὶ παλαίειν καὶ γεωμετρεῖν καὶ συλλογισμοὺς ἀναλύειν. 13μή τι οὖν οὐ πέπεικέ με ὁ λόγος; καὶ μὴν οὐκ ἄλλα τινὰ οὕτως ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐδοκίμασα ἣ εἱλόμην καὶ νῦν περὶ τούτων ἀναγιγνώσκω, ταῦτα ἀκούω, ταῦτα γράφω· ἄλλον οὐχ εὑρήκαμεν μέχρι νῦν ἰσχυρότερον τούτου λόγον. 14τί οὖν τὸ λεῖπόν μοι ἐστίν; μὴ οὐκ ἐξῄρηται τἀναντία δόγματα; μὴ αὐταὶ αἱ ὑπολήψεις ἀγύμναστοί εἰσιν οὐδʼ εἰθισμέναι ἀπαντᾶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα, ἀλλʼ ὡς ὁπλάρια ἀποκείμενα κατίωται καὶ οὐδὲ περιαρμόσαι μοι δύναται; 15καίτοι οὔτʼ ἐπὶ τοῦ παλαίειν οὔτʼ ἐπὶ τοῦ γράφειν ἢ ἀναγιγνώσκειν ἀρκοῦμαι τῷ μαθεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἄνω κάτω στρέφω τοὺς προτεινομένους καὶ ἄλλους πλέκω καὶ μεταπίπτοντας ὡσαύτως. 16τὰ δʼ ἀναγκαῖα θεωρήματα, ἀφʼ ὧν ἔστιν ὁρμώμενον ἄλυπον γενέσθαι, ἄφοβον ἀπαθῆ, ἀκώλυτον, ἐλεύθερον, ταῦτα δʼ οὐ γυμνάζω οὐδὲ μελετῶ κατὰ ταῦτα τὴν προσήκουσαν μελέτην. 17εἶτά μοι μέλει, τί οἱ ἄλλοι περὶ ἐμοῦ ἐροῦσιν, εἰ φανοῦμαι αὐτοῖς ἀξιόλογος, εἰ φανοῦμαι εὐδαίμων; 18ταλαίπωρε, οὐ θέλεις βλέπειν, τί σὺ λέγεις περὶ σαυτοῦ; τίς φαίνῃ σαυτῷ; τίς ἐν τῷ ὑπολαμβάνειν, τίς ἐν τῷ ὀρέγεσθαι, τίς ἐν τῷ ἐκκλίνειν· τίς ἐν ὁρμῇ, παρασκευῇ, ἐπιβολῇ, τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς ἀνθρωπικοῖς ἔργοις; 19ἀλλὰ μέλει σοι, εἴ σε ἐλεοῦσιν οἱ ἄλλοι; — ναί· ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἐλεοῦμαι. — οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ τούτῳ ὀδυνᾷ; ὁ δέ γε ὀδυνώμενος ἐλεεινός ἐστιν; — ναί. — πῶς οὖν ἔτι παρὰ ἀξίαν ἐλεῇ; αὐτοῖς γὰρ οἷς περὶ τὸν ἔλεον πάσχεις κατασκευάζεις σεαυτὸν ἄξιον τοῦ ἐλεεῖσθαι. 20τί οὖν λέγει Ἀντισθένης; οὐδέποτʼ ἤκουσας; βασιλικόν, ὦ Κῦρε, πράττειν μὲν εὖ, κακῶς δʼ ἀκούειν. 21τὴν κεφαλὴν ὑγιᾶ ἔχω καὶ πάντες οἴονται ὅτι κεφαλαλγῶ. τί μοι μέλει; ἀπύρετός εἰμι καὶ ὡς πυρέσσοντί μοι συνάχθονται· τάλας, ἐκ τοσούτου χρόνου οὐ διέλειπες πυρέσσων. λέγω καὶ ἐγὼ σκυθρωπάσας ὅτι ναί· ταῖς ἀληθείαις πολὺς ἤδη χρόνος, ἐξ οὗ μοι κακῶς ἐστιν. τί οὖν γένηται; ὡς ἂν ὁ θεὸς θέλῃ. καὶ ἅμα ὑποκαταγελῶ τῶν οἰκτειρόντων με. 22τί οὖν κωλύει καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὁμοίως; πένης εἰμί, ἀλλὰ ὀρθὸν δόγμα ἔχω περὶ πενίας. τί οὖν μοι μέλει, εἴ μʼ ἐπὶ τῇ πενίᾳ ἐλεοῦσιν; οὐκ ἄρχω, ἄλλοι δʼ ἄρχουσιν. ἀλλʼ ὃ δεῖ ὑπειληφέναι, ὑπείληφα περὶ τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ μὴ ἄρχειν. 23ὄψονται οἱ ἐλεοῦντές με, ἐγὼ δʼ οὔτε πεινῶ οὔτε διψῶ οὔτε ῥιγῶ, ἀλλʼ ἀφʼ ὧν αὐτοὶ πεινῶσιν ἢ διψῶσιν οἴονται κἀμέ. τί οὖν αὐτοῖς ποιήσω; περιερχόμενος κηρύσσω καὶ λέγω μὴ πλανᾶσθε, ἄνδρες, ἐμοὶ καλῶς ἐστιν· οὔτε πενίας ἐπιστρέφομαι οὔτε ἀναρχίας οὔτε ἁπλῶς ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἢ δογμάτων ὀρθῶν· ταῦτα ἔχω ἀκώλυτα, οὐδενὸς πεφρόντικα ἔτι; 24καὶ τίς αὕτη φλυαρία; πῶς ἔτι ὀρθὰ δόγματα ἔχω μὴ ἀρκούμενος τῷ εἶναι ὅς εἰμι, ἀλλʼ ἐπτοημένος ὑπὲρ τοῦ δοκεῖν; 25ἀλλʼ ἄλλοι πλειόνων τεύξονται καὶ προτιμηθήσονται. — τί οὖν εὐλογώτερον ἢ τοὺς περί τι ἐσπουδακότας ἐν ἐκείνῳ πλεῖον ἔχειν, ἐν ᾧ ἐσπουδάκασιν; περὶ ἀρχὰς ἐσπουδάκασιν, σὺ περὶ δόγματα· καὶ περὶ πλοῦτον, σὺ περὶ τὴν χρῆσιν τῶν φαντασιῶν. 26ὅρα, εἰ ἐν τούτῳ σου πλέον ἔχουσιν, περὶ ὃ σὺ μὲν ἐσπούδακας, ἐκεῖνοι δʼ ἀμελοῦσιν· εἰ συγκατατίθενται μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φυσικὰ μέτρα, εἰ ὀρέγονταί σου ἀναποτευκτότερον, εἰ ἐκκλίνουσιν ἀπεριπτωτότερον, εἰ ἐν ἐπιβολῇ, ἐν προθέσει, εἰ ἐν ὁρμῇ μᾶλλον εὐστοχοῦσιν, εἰ τὸ πρέπον σῴζουσιν ὡς ἄνδρες, ὡς υἱοί, ὡς γονεῖς, εἶθʼ ἑξῆς κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα τῶν σχέσεων ὀνόματα. 27εἰ δʼ ἄρχουσιν ἐκεῖνοι, σὺ δʼ οὐ θέλεις σαυτῷ τὰς ἀληθείας εἰπεῖν, ὅτι σὺ μὲν οὐδὲν τούτου ἕνεκα ποιεῖς, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ πάντα, ἀλογώτατον δὲ τὸν ἐπιμελούμενόν τινος ἔλαττον φέρεσθαι [οὐ] ἢ τὸν ἀμελοῦντα; 28⟨οὔ,⟩ ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ φροντίζω ἐγὼ δογμάτων ὀρθῶν, εὐλογώτερόν μέ ἐστιν ἄρχειν. — ἐν ᾧ φροντίζεις, ἐν δόγμασιν· ἐν ᾧ δʼ ἄλλοι μᾶλλόν σου πεφροντίκασιν, ἐκείνοις παραχώρει. οἷον εἰ διὰ τὸ δόγματα ἔχειν ὀρθὰ ἠξίους τοξεύων μᾶλλον ἐπιτυγχάνειν τῶν τοξοτῶν ἢ χαλκεύων μᾶλλον τῶν χαλκέων. 29ἄφες οὖν τὴν περὶ τὰ δόγματα σπουδὴν καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἀναστρέφου, ἃ κτήσασθαι θέλεις, καὶ τότε κλαῖε, ἐάν σοι μὴ προχωρῇ· κλαίειν γὰρ ἄξιος εἶ. 30νῦν δὲ πρὸς ἄλλοις γίνεσθαι λέγεις, ἄλλων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγουσιν, ὅτι ἔργον ἔργῳ οὐ κοινωνεῖ. 31ὁ μὲν ἐξ ὄρθρου ἀναστὰς ζητεῖ, τίνα ἐξ οἴκου ἀσπάσηται, τίνι κεχαρισμένον λόγον εἴπῃ, τίνι δῶρον πέμψῃ, πῶς τῷ ὀρχηστῇ ἀρέσῃ, πῶς κακοηθισάμενος ἄλλον ἄλλῳ χαρίσηται. 32ὅταν εὔχηται, περὶ τούτων εὔχεται· ὅταν θύῃ, ἐπὶ τούτοις θύει· τὸ τοῦ Πυθαγόρου μὴ δʼ ὕπνον μαλακοῖσιν ἐπʼ ὄμμασι προσδέξασθαι ἐνταῦθα παρατέθεικεν. 33πῇ παρέβην; τῶν πρὸς κολακείαν. τί ἔρεξα; μή τι ὡς ἐλεύθερος, μή τι ὡς γενναῖος; κἂν εὕρῃ τι τοιοῦτον, ἐπιτιμᾷ ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖ τί γάρ σοι καὶ τοῦτο εἰπεῖν; οὐ γὰρ ἐνῆν ψεύσασθαι; λέγουσιν καὶ οἱ φιλόσοφοι, ὅτι οὐδὲν κωλύει ψεῦδος εἰπεῖν. 34σὺ δʼ εἴπερ ταῖς ἀληθείαις οὐδενὸς ἄλλου πεφρόντικας ἢ χρήσεως οἵας δεῖ φαντασιῶν, εὐθὺς ἀναστὰς ἕωθεν ἐνθυμοῦ τίνα μοι λείπει πρὸς ἀπάθειαν; τίνα πρὸς ἀταραξίαν; τίς εἰμι; μή τι σωμάτιον, μή τι κτῆσις, μή τι φήμη; οὐδὲν τούτων. ἀλλὰ τί; λογικόν εἰμι ζῷον. 35τίνα οὖν τὰ ἀπαιτήματα; ἀναπόλει τὰ πεπραγμένα. πῇ παρέβην τῶν πρὸς εὔροιαν; τί ἔρεξα ἢ ἄφιλον ἢ ἀκοινώνητον ἢ ἄγνωμον; τί μοι δέον οὐκ ἐτελέσθη πρὸς ταῦτα; 36τοσαύτης οὖν διαφορᾶς οὔσης τῶν ἐπιθυμουμένων, τῶν ἔργων, τῶν εὐχῶν ἔτι θέλεις τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἐκείνοις, περὶ ἃ σὺ μὲν οὐκ ἐσπούδακας, ἐκεῖνοι δʼ ἐσπουδάκασιν; 37εἶτα θαυμάζεις, εἴ σʼ ἐλεοῦσιν, καὶ ἀγανακτεῖς; ἐκεῖνοι δʼ οὐκ ἀγανακτοῦσιν, εἰ σὺ αὐτοὺς ἐλεεῖς. διὰ τί; ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι μὲν πεπεισμένοι εἰσίν, ὅτι ἀγαθῶν τυγχάνουσιν, σὺ δʼ οὐ πέπεισαι. 38διὰ τοῦτο σὺ μὲν οὐκ ἀρκῇ τοῖς σοῖς, ἀλλʼ ἐφίεσαι τῶν ἐκείνων· ἐκεῖνοι δʼ ἀρκοῦνται τοῖς ἑαυτῶν καὶ οὐκ ἐφίενται τῶν σῶν. ἐπεί τοι εἰ ταῖς ἀληθείαις ἐπέπεισο, ὅτι περὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ σὺ ὁ ἐπιτυγχάνων εἶ, ἐκεῖνοι δʼ ἀποπεπλάνηνται, οὐδʼ ἂν ἐνεθυμοῦ, τί λέγουσι περὶ σοῦ.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA