Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER VII. · Of Fearlessness.
1What makes a Tyrant formidable? His Guards, say you, and their Swords; they who belong to the Bed-chamber; and they who shut out those, who would go in. What is the Reason then, that, if you bring a Child to him when he is surrounded by his Guards, it is not afraid? Is it because the Child doth not know what they mean? Suppose then, that any one doth know what is meant by Guards, and that they are armed with Swords; and, for that very Reason, comes in the Tyrant's Way, beings desirous, on account of some Misfortune, to die, and seeking to die easily by the Hand of another: Doth such a Man fear the Guards? No: for he wants the very Thing, that renders them formidable. Well then: if any one, without an absolute Desire to live or die, but, as it may happen, comes in the Way of a Tyrant, what restrains his approaching him without Fear? Nothing. If then another should think concerning his Estate, or Wife, or Children, as this Man doth concerning his Body; and, in short, from some Madness or Folly, should be of such a Disposition, as not to care whether he hath them, or hath them not; but, as Children, playing with Shells, make a Difference indeed in the Play, but do not trouble themselves about the Shells; so he should pay no Regard to the Materials [of Action]; but apply himself to the playing with, and Management of, them; what Tyrant, what Guards, or their Swords, are any longer formidable to such a Man? 2And is it possible, that any one should be thus disposed towards these Things from Madness; and the Galileans, from mere Habit; yet that no one should be able to learn, from Reason and Demonstration, that God made all Things in the World, and the whole World itself, unrestrained and perfect; and all its Parts for the Use of the Whole? All other Creatures are indeed excluded from a Power of comprehending the Administration of the World; but a reasonable Being hath Abilities for the Consideration of all these Things: both that it [self] is a Part, and what Part; and that it is fit the Parts should submit to the Whole. Besides, being by Nature constituted noble, magnanimous, and free, it sees, that, of the Things which relate to it, some are unrestrained and in its own Power, some restrained, and in the Power of others: the unrestrained, such as depend on Choice; the restrained, such as do not depend on it. And, for this Reason, if it esteems its Good and its Interest to consist in Things unrestrained, and in its own Power, it will be free, prosperous, happy, unhurt, magnanimous, pious; thankful to God for every thing; never finding fault with any thing, never censuring any thing that is brought to pass by him. But, if it esteems its Good, and its Interest, to consist in Externals, and Things independent on Choice, it must necessarily be restrained, be hindered, be enslaved to those who have the Power over those Things which it admires, and fears; it must necessarily be impious, as supposing itself injured by God, and unequitable, as claiming more than its Share; it must necessarily too be abject, and mean-spirited. 3What forbids, but that he, who distinguishes these Things, may live with an easy and light Heart, quietly expecting whatever may happen, and bearing contentedly what hath happened? Would you have Poverty [be my Lot]? Bring it; and you shall see what Poverty is, when it hath got one to act it well. Would you have Power? Bring Toils too along with it. Banishment? Where-ever I go, it will be well with me there: for it was well with me here, not on account of the Place, but of the Principles, which I shall carry away with me; for no one can deprive me of these: on the contrary, they alone are my Property, and cannot be taken away; and retaining them, suffices me where-ever I am, or what-ever I do.——"But it is now time to die."——What is it that you call dying? Do not talk of the Thing in a Tragedy Strain; but say, as the Truth is, that it is Time for a compound Piece of Matter to be resolved back into its Original. And where is the Terror of this? What Part of the World is going to be lost? What is going to happen new, or prodigious? Is it for this, that a Tyrant is formidable? Is it on this Account, that the Swords of his Guards seem so large and sharp? Try these Things upon others. For my Part, I have examined the Whole. No one hath an Authority over me. God hath made me free: I know his Commands: after this, no one can enslave me. I have a proper Assertor of my Freedom; proper Judges. Is it not of my Body, that you are the Master? What is that to me then? Of that Trifle my Estate? What is that to me then? Is it not of Banishment and Chains, that you are the Master? Why, all these again, and my whole Body I give up to you: when-ever you please, make a Trial of your Power, and you will find how far it extends. 4Whom then can I any longer fear? Those who belong to the Bed-chamber? Lest they should do——What? Shut me out? If they find me desirous to come in, let them.——"Why do you come to the Door then?"——Because it is fitting for me, that while the Play lasts, I should play too.——"How then are you incapable of being shut out?"——Because, if I am not admitted, I would not wish to go in; but would much rather, that Things should be as they are: for I esteem what God wills, to be better than what I will. I give myself up a Servant and a Follower to him. I pursue, I desire, in short, I will along with Him. Being shut out doth not relate to me; but to those who push to get in. Why then do not I push too? Because I know, that there is not any Good distributed there to those who get in. But when I hear any one congratulated on the Favour of Cæsar, I say, What hath he got?——"A Province."——Hath he then got such Principles too, as he ought to have?——"A public Charge."——Hath he then got with it the Knowledge how to use it too? If not, why should I be thrust about any longer to get in? Some one scatters Nuts and Figs. Children scramble and quarrel for them; but not Men: for they think them Trifles. But, if any one should scatter Shells, not even Children would scramble for these. Provinces are distributing. Let Children look to it. Money. Let Children look to it. Military Command, a Consulship. Let Children scramble for them. Let these be shut out, be beat, kiss the Hands of the Giver, of his Slaves. But to me, they are but mere Figs and Nuts.——"What then is to be done?"——if you miss them, while he is throwing them, do not trouble yourself about it: but, if a Fig should fall into your Lap, take it, and eat it; for one may pay so much Regard even to a Fig. But, if I am to stoop and throw down one, or be thrown down by another, and flatter those who are got in, a Fig is not worth this, nor any other of the Things which are not really good, and which the Philosophers have persuaded me not to esteem as good. 5Show me the Swords of the Guards.——"See how big, and how sharp they are."——What then do these great and sharp Swords do?——"They kill."——And what doth a Fever do?——"Nothing else."——And a Tile?——"Nothing else."——Would you have me then be struck with an awful Admiration of all these, and worship them, and go about a Slave to them all? Heaven forbid! But, having once learnt, that every thing that is born must likewise die, (that the World may not be at a Stand, or the Course of it hindered), I no longer make any Difference, whether this be effected by a Fever, or a Tile, or a Soldier: but, if any Comparison is to be made, I know, that the Soldier will effect it with less Pain, and more speedily. Since then I neither fear any of those Things, which he can inflict upon me, nor covet any thing which he can bestow, why do I stand any longer in Awe of a Tyrant? Why am I struck with Astonishment? Why do I fear his Guards? Why do I rejoice, if he speaks kindly to me, and receives me graciously; and relate to others, in what Manner he spoke to me? For is He Socrates, or Diogenes, that his Praise should show what I am? Or have I set my Heart on imitating his Manners? But, to keep up the Play, I go to him, and serve him, as long as he commands nothing unreasonable or improper. But, if he should say to me, "Go to Salamis, and bring Leo," I answer him, Seek another, for I play no longer.——"Lead him away."——I follow, in Sport.——"But your Head will be taken off."——And will his own always remain on; or yours, who obey him?——"But you will be thrown out, unburied."——If I am the Corpse, I shall be thrown out; but if I am something else than the Corpse, speak more handsomely, as the Thing is, and do not think to fright me. These Things are frightful to Children and Fools. But if any one, who hath once entered into the School of a Philosopher, doth not know what he himself is, he deserves to be frighted, and to flatter what he lately flattered; if he hath not yet learnt, that he is neither Flesh, nor Bones, nor Nerves; but that which makes use of these, and regulates and comprehends the Appearances of Things. 6"Well: but these Reasonings make Men despise the Laws."——And what Reasonings then render those, who use them, more obedient to the Laws? But the Law of Fools is no Law. And yet, see how these Reasonings render us properly disposed, even towards such Persons, since they teach us, not to claim, in Opposition to them, any thing wherein they have it in their Power to be superior to us. They teach us to give up Body, to give up Estate, Children, Parents, Brothers, to yield every thing, to let go every thing, excepting only Principles; which even Jupiter hath excepted, and decreed to be every one's own Property. What Unreasonableness, what Breach of the Laws, is there in this? Where you are superior and stronger, there I give way to you: Where, on the contrary, I am superior, do you submit to me; for this hath been my Study, and not yours. Your Study hath been to walk upon a Mosaic Floor, to be attended by your Servants and Clients, to wear fine Clothes, to have a great Number of Hunters, Fiddlers, and Players. Do I lay any Claim [to these?] but [on the other hand,] have you then studied Principles, or even your own rational Faculty? Do you know, of what Parts it consists? How they are connected; what are its Articulations; what Powers it hath, and of what Kind? Why then do you take it amiss, if another, who hath studied them, hath the Advantage of you in these Things?——"But they are of all Things the greatest."——Well: and who restrains you from being conversant with them, and attending to them ever so carefully? Or who is better provided with Books, with Leisure, with Assistants? Only turn your Thoughts now-and-then to these Matters; bestow but a little Time upon your own ruling Faculty. Consider what it is you have, and whence it came, that uses all other Things, that examines them all, that chuses, that rejects. But while you employ yourself about Externals, you will have those indeed, such as no one else hath; but your ruling Faculty, such as you like to have it, sordid and neglected.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (7)
- Epictetus, probably, means, not any remaining Disciples of Judas of Galilee, but the Christians, whom Julian afterwards affected to call Galileans. It helps to confirm this Opinion, that M. Antoninus (L 2. §. 3.) mentions them, by their proper Name of Christians, as suffering Death out of mere Obstinacy. It would have been more reasonable, and more worthy the Character of these great Men, to have enquired into the Principles, on which the Christians refused to worship Heathen Deities, and by which they were enabled to support their Sufferings with such amazing Constancy, than rashly to pronounce their Behaviour the Effect of Obstinacy and Habit. Epictetus and Antoninus were too exact Judges of human Nature, not to know, that Ignominy, Tortures, and Death, are not, merely on their own Account, Objects of Choice: nor could the Records of any Time or Nation, furnish them with an Example of Multitudes of Persons of both Sexes, of all Ages, Ranks, and natural Dispositions, in distant Countries, and successive Periods, resigning whatever is most valuable and dear to the Heart of Man, from a Principle of Obstinacy, or the mere Force of Habit: not to say, that Habit could have no influence on the first Sufferers.
- This agrees with Eph. v. 20. Giving Thanks always for all Things unto God—.
- The Translation here follows Mr. Upton's Manuscript, and Emendation.
- Nevertheless not as I will, but as Thou wilt. Matth. xxvi. 39.
- The Translation of this Passage follows the Conjecture of Wolfius.
- An Allusion to the Story, mentioned in the first Chapter of this Book, p. 324. Note (e).
- See p. 288. Note (w).
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Of fearlessness.
What makes a tyrant formidable? His guards, say you, and their swords; they who protect his bedchamber, and they who keep out intruders. Why, then, if you bring a child to him amidst these guards, is it not afraid? Is it because the child does not know what they mean? Suppose, then, that any one knows what is meant by guards, and that they are armed with swords; and for that very reason comes in the tyrant’s way, being desirous, on account of some misfortune, to die, and seeking to die easily by the hand of another. Does such a man fear the guards? No; for he desires the very thing that renders them formidable. Well, then; if any one, being without an absolute desire to live or die, but indifferent to it, comes in the way of a tyrant, what prevents his approaching him without fear? Nothing. If, then, another should think concerning his estate, or wife, or children, as this man thinks concerning his body; and, in short, from some madness or folly should be of such a disposition as not to care whether he has them or not; but just as children, playing with shells, are busied with the play, but not with the shells, so he should pay no regard to these affairs, except to carry on the play with them, what tyrant, what guards, or swords are any longer formidable to such a man?
And is it possible that any one should be thus disposed towards these things from madness, and the Galileans from mere habit; yet that no one should be able to learn, from reason and demonstration, that God made all things in the world, and made the whole world itself unrestrained and perfect, and all its parts for the use of the whole? All other creatures are indeed excluded from a power of comprehending the administration of the world; but a reasonable being has abilities for the consideration of all these things,—both that itself is a part, and what part; and that it is fit the parts should submit to the whole. Besides, being by nature constituted noble, magnanimous, and free, it sees that of the things which relate to it some are unrestrained and in its own power, some restrained and in the power of others,—the unrestrained, such as depend on will; the restrained, such as do not depend on it. And for this reason, if it esteems its good and its interest to consist in things unrestrained and in its own power, it will be free, prosperous, happy, safe, magnanimous, pious, thankful to God for everything, never finding fault with anything, never censuring anything that is brought about by him. But if it esteems its good and its interest to consist in externals, and things uncontrollable by will, it must necessarily be restrained, be hindered, be enslaved to those who have the power over those things which it admires and fears; it must necessarily be impious, as supposing itself injured by God, and unjust, as claiming more than its share; it must necessarily, too, be abject and base.
Why may not he, who discerns these things, live with an easy and light heart, quietly awaiting whatever may happen, and bearing contentedly what has happened? Shall it be poverty? Bring it; and you shall see what poverty is when it is met well. Would you have power? Bring toils too along with it. Banishment? Wherever I go, it will be well with me there; for it was well with me here,—not on account of the place, but of the principles which I shall carry away with me; for no one can deprive me of these; on the contrary, they alone are my property, and cannot be taken away; and their possession suffices me wherever I am, or whatever I do.
But it is now time to die. What is that you call dying? Do not talk of the thing in a tragic strain; but state the thing as it is, that it is time for your material part to revert whence it came. And where is the terror of this? What part of the world is going to be lost? What is going to happen that is new or prodigious? Is it for this that a tyrant is formidable? Is it on this account that the swords of his guards seem so large and sharp? Try these things upon others. For my part I have examined the whole. No one has authority over me. God has made me free; I know his commands; after this no one can enslave me. I have a proper vindicator of my freedom; proper judges. Are you the master of my body? But what is that to me? Of my little estate? But what is that to me? Of banishment and chains? Why, all these again, and my whole body, I give up to you; make a trial of your power whenever you please, and you will find how far it extends.
Whom, then, can I any longer fear,—those who guard the chamber? Lest they should do what,—shut me out? If they find me desirous to come in, let them. Why do you come to the door, then? Because it is fitting for me that, while the play lasts, I should play too. How then are you incapable of being shut out? Because, if I am not admitted, I would not wish to go in; but would much rather that things should be as they are, for I esteem what God wills to be better than what I will. To him I yield myself, as a servant and a follower. My pursuits, my desires, my very will, must coincide with his, Being shut out does not affect me; but those who push to get in. Why, then, do not I push too? Because I know that there is no really good thing distributed to those who get in. But when I hear any one congratulated on the favor of Caesar, I ask what he has got. A province. Has he the needed wisdom also? A public office. Has he with it the knowledge how to use it? If not, why should I push my way in?
Some one scatters nuts and figs. Children scramble and quarrel for them; but not men, for they think them trifles. But if any one should scatter shells, not even children would scramble for these. Provinces are being distributed; let children look to it. Money; let children look to it. Military command, a consulship; let children scramble for them. Let these be shut out, be beaten, kiss the hands of the giver or of his slaves. But to me they are mere figs and nuts. What then is to be done? If you miss them, while he is throwing them, do not trouble yourself about it; but if a fig should fall into your lap, take it, and eat it; for one may pay so much regard even to a fig. But if I am to stoop and throw down one [rival], or be thrown down by another, and flatter those who succeed, a fig is not worth this, nor is any other of those things which are not really good, and which the philosophers have persuaded me not to esteem as good.
Show me the swords of the guards. See how large and how sharp they are. What, then, can these great and sharp swords do? They kill. And what can a fever do? Nothing else. And a [falling] tile? Nothing else. Do you then wish me to be bewildered by all these things, and to worship them, and to go about as a slave to them all? Heaven forbid! But having once learned that everything that is born must likewise die (that the world may not be at a stand, nor the course of it hindered), I no longer see any difference, whether this be effected by a fever, or a tile, or a soldier; but if any comparison is to be made, I know that the soldier will effect it with less pain and more speedily. Since then I neither fear any of those things which he can inflict upon me, nor covet anything which he can bestow, why do I stand any longer in awe of a tyrant? Why am I amazed at him? Why do I fear his guards? Why do I rejoice, if he speaks kindly to me, and receives me graciously; and why boast to others of my reception? For is he Socrates or Diogenes, that his praise should show what I am? Or have I set my heart on imitating his manners? But to keep up the play I go to him and serve him, so long as he commands nothing unreasonable or improper. But if he should say to me, Go to Salamis, and bring Leon, I bid him seek another, for I play no longer. Lead him away. I follow as a part of the play. But your head will be taken off. And will his own remain on forever; or yours, who obey him? But you will be thrown out unburied. If I am identical with my corpse, I shall be thrown out; but if I am something else than the corpse, speak more handsomely, as the thing is, and do not think to frighten me. These things are frightful to children and fools. But if any one who has once entered into the school of a philosopher knows not what he himself is, then he deserves to be frightened, and to flatter the last object of flattery; if he has not yet learnt that he is neither flesh, nor bones, nor nerves, but is that which makes use of these, and regulates and comprehends the phenomena of existence.
Well; but these reasonings make men despise the laws. And what reasonings, then, render those who use them more obedient to the laws? But the law of fools is no law. And yet, see how these reasonings render us properly disposed, even towards such persons, since they teach us not to assert against them any claim wherein they can surpass us. They teach us to give up body, to give up estate, children, parents, brothers, to yield everything, to let go everything, excepting only principles; which even Zeus has excepted and decreed to be every one’s own property. What unreasonableness, what breach of the laws, is there in this? Where you are superior and stronger, there I give way to you. Where, on the contrary, I am superior, do you submit to me; for this has been my study, and not yours. Your study has been to walk upon a mosaic floor, to be attended by your servants and clients, to wear fine clothes, to have a great number of hunters, fiddlers, and players. Do I lay any claim to these? On the other hand, have you made a study of principles, or even of your own reason? Do you know of what parts it consists; how they are combined and joined, and with what powers? Why, then, do you take it amiss, if another, who has studied them, has the advantage of you in these things? But they are of all things the greatest. Well; and who restrains you from being conversant with them, and attending to them ever so carefully? Or who is better provided with books, with leisure, with assistants? Only turn your thoughts now and then to these matters; bestow but a little time upon your own ruling faculty. Consider what is the power you have, and whence it came, that uses all other things, that examines them all, that chooses, that rejects. *But while you employ yourself merely about externals, you will possess those indeed beyond all rivals; but all else will be, just as you elect to have it, sordid and neglected.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Higginson’s notes (1)
- As with Socrates; see note, ante.
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
On freedom from fear.
What makes the tyrant formidable? The guards, you say, and their swords, and the men of the bedchamber and those who exclude them who would enter. Why then if you bring a boy (child) to the tyrant when he is with his guards, is he not afraid; or is it because the child does not understand these things? If then any man does understand what guards are and that they have swords, and comes to the tyrant for this very purpose because he wishes to die on account of some circumstance and seeks to die easily by the hand of another, is he afraid of the guards? No, for he wishes for the thing which makes the guards formidable. If then any man neither wishing to die nor to live by all means, but only as it may be permitted, approaches the tyrant, what hinders him from approaching the tyrant without fear? Nothing. If then a man has the same opinion about his property as the man whom I have instanced has about his body; and also about his children and his wife: and in a word is so affected by some madness or despair that he cares not whether he possesses them or not, but like children who are playing with shells care (quarrel) about the play, but do not trouble themselves about the shells, so he too has set no value on the materials (things), but values the pleasure that he has with them and the occupation, what tyrant is then formidable to him or what guards or what swords?
Then through madness is it possible for a man to be so disposed towards these things, and the Galilaeans through habit, and is it possible that no man can learn from reason and from demonstration that God has made all the things in the universe and the universe itself completely free from hindrance and perfect, and the parts of it for the use of the whole? All other animals indeed are incapable of comprehending the administration of it; but the rational animal man has faculties for the consideration of all these things, and for understanding that it is a part, and what kind of a part it is, and that it is right for the parts to be subordinate to the whole. And besides this being naturally noble, magnanimous and free, man sees that of the things which surround him some are free from hindrance and in his power, and the other things are subject to hindrance and in the power of others; that the things which are free from hindrance are in the power of the will; and those which are subject to hindrance are the things which are not in the power of the will. And for this reason if he thinks that his good and his interest be in these things only which are free from hindrance and in his own power, he will be free, prosperous, happy, free from harm, magnanimous, pious, thankful to God for all things; in no matter finding fault with any of the things which have not been put in his power, nor blaming any of them. But if he thinks that his good and his interest are in externals and in things which are not in the power of his will, he must of necessity be hindered, be impeded, be a slave to those who have the power over the things which he admires (desires) and fears; and he must of necessity be impious because he thinks that he is harmed by God, and he must be unjust because he always claims more than belongs to him; and he must of necessity be abject and mean.
What hinders a man, who has clearly separated (comprehended) these things, from living with a light heart and bearing easily the reins, quietly expecting every thing which can happen, and enduring that which has already happened? Would you have me to bear poverty? Come and you will know what poverty is when it has found one who can act well the part of a poor man. Would you have me to possess power? Let me have power, and also the trouble of it. Well, banishment? Wherever I shall go, there it will be well with me; for here also where I am, it was not because of the place that it was well with me, but because of my opinions which I shall carry off with me: for neither can any man deprive me of them; but my opinions alone are mine and they cannot be taken from me, and I am satisfied while I have them, wherever I may be and whatever I am doing. But now it is time to die. Why do you say to die? Make no tragedy show of the thing, but speak of it as it is: it is now time for the matter (of the body) to be resolved into the things out of which it was composed. And what is the formidable thing here? what is going to perish of the things which are in the universe? what new thing or wondrous is going to happen? Is it for this reason that a tyrant is formidable? Is it for this reason that the guards appear to have swords which are large and sharp? Say this to others; but I have considered about all these things; no man has power over me. I have been made free; I know his commands, no man can now lead me as a slave. I have a proper person to assert my freedom; I have proper judges. (I say) are you not the master of my body? What then is that to me? Are you not the master of my property? What then is that to me? Are you not the master of my exile or of my chains? Well, from all these things and all the poor body itself I depart at your bidding, when you please. Make trial of your power, and you will know how far it reaches.
Whom then can I still fear? Those who are over the bedchamber? Lest they should do, what? Shut me out? If they find that I wish to enter, let them shut me out. Why then do you go to the doors? Because I think it befits me, while the play (sport) lasts, to join in it. How then are you not shut out? Because unless some one allows me to go in, I do not choose to go in, but am always content with that which happens; for I think that what God chooses is better than what I choose. I will attach myself as a minister and follower to him; I have the same movements (pursuits) as he has, I have the same desires; in a word, I have the same will (συνφέλω). There is no shutting out for me, but for those who would force their way in. Why then do not I force my way in? Because I know that nothing good is distributed within to those who enter. But when I hear any man called fortunate because he is honoured by Caesar, I say, what does he happen to get? A province (the government of a province). Does he also obtain an opinion such as he ought? The office of a Prefect. Does he also obtain the power of using his office well? Why do I still strive to enter (Caesar’s chamber)? A man scatters dried figs and nuts: the children seize them, and fight with one another; men do not, for they think them to be a small matter. But if a man should throw about shells, even the children do not seize them. Provinces are distributed: let children look to that. Money is distributed: let children look to that. Praetorships, consulships are distributed: let children scramble for them, let them be shut out, beaten, kiss the hands of the giver, of the slaves: but to me these are only dried figs and nuts. What then? If you fail to get them, while Caesar is scattering them about, do not be troubled: if a dried fig come into your lap, take it and eat it; for so far you may value even a fig. But if I shall stoop down and turn another over, or be turned over by another, and shall flatter those who have got into (Caesar’s) chamber, neither is a dried fig worth the trouble, nor any thing else of the things which are not good, which the philosophers have persuaded me not to think good.
Show me the swords of the guards. See how big they are, and how sharp. What then do these big and sharp swords do? They kill. And what does a fever do? Nothing else. And what else a (falling) tile? Nothing else. Would you then have me to wonder at these things and worship them, and go about as the slave of all of them? I hope that this will not happen: but when I have once learned that every thing which has come into existence must also go out of it, that the universe may not stand still nor be impeded, I no longer consider it any difference whether a fever shall do it or a tile, or a soldier. But if a man must make a comparison between these things, I know that the soldier will do it with less trouble (to me), and quicker. When then I neither fear any thing which a tyrant can do to me, nor desire any thing which he can give, why do I still look on with wonder (admiration)? Why am I still confounded? Why do I fear the guards? Why am I pleased if he speaks to me in a friendly way, and receives me, and why do I tell others how he spoke to me? Is he a Socrates, is he a Diogenes that his praise should be a proof of what I am? Have I been eager to imitate his morals? But I keep up the play and go to him, and serve him so long as he does not bid me to do any thing foolish or unreasonable. But if he says to me, Go and bring Leon of Salamis, I say to him, Seek another, for I am no longer playing. (The tyrant says): Lead him away (to prison). I follow; that is part of the play. But your head will be taken off—Does the tyrant’s head always remain where it is, and the heads of you who obey him?—But you will be cast out unburied?—If the corpse is I, I shall be cast out; but if I am different from the corpse, speak more properly according as the fact is, and do not think of frightening me. These things are formidable to children and fools. But if any man has once entered a philosopher’s school and knows not what he is, he deserves to be full of fear and to flatter those whom afterwards he used to flatter; (and) if he has not yet learned that he is not flesh nor bones nor sinews (νεῦρα), but he is that which makes use of these parts of the body and governs there and follows (understands) the appearances of things.
Yes, but this talk makes us despise the laws—And what kind of talk makes men more obedient to the laws who employ such talk? And the things which are in the power of a fool are not law. And yet see how this talk makes us disposed as we ought to be even to these men (fools); since it teaches us to claim in opposition to them none of the things in which they are able to surpass us. This talk teaches us as to the body to give it up, as to property to give that up also, as to children, parents, brothers, to retire from these, to give up all; it only makes an exception of the opinions, which even Zeus has willed to be the select property of every man. What transgression of the laws is there here, what folly? Where you are superior and stronger, there I gave way to you: on the other hand, where I am superior, do you yield to me; for I have studied (cared for) this, and you have not. It is your study to live in houses with floors formed of various stones, how your slaves and dependents shall serve you, how you shall wear fine clothing, have many hunting men, lute players, and tragic actors. Do I claim any of these? have you made any study of opinions, and of your own rational faculty? Do you know of what parts it is composed, how they are brought together, how they are connected, what powers it has, and of what kind? Why then are you vexed, if another who has made it his study, has the advantage over you in these things? But these things are the greatest. And who hinders you from being employed about these things and looking after them? And who has a better stock of books, of leisure, of persons to aid you? Only turn your mind at last to these things, attend, if it be only a short time, to your own ruling faculty ( ἡγεμονικόν): consider what this is that you possess, and whence it came, this which uses all other (faculties), and tries them, and selects and rejects. But so long as you employ yourself about externals you will possess them (externals) as no man else does; but you will have this (the ruling faculty) such as you choose to have it, sordid and neglected.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (13)
- See Schweig.’s note on the text. By the Galilaeans it is probable that Epictetus means the Christians, whose obstinacy Antoninus also mentions (xi. 3). Epictetus, a contemporary of St. Paul, knew little about the Christians, and only knew some examples of their obstinate adherence to the new faith and the fanatical behaviour of some of the converts. That there were wild fanatics among the early Christians is proved on undoubted authority; and also that there always have been such, and now are such. The abuse of any doctrines or religious opinions is indeed no argument against such doctrines or religious opinions; and it is a fact quite consistent with experience that the best things are liable to be perverted, misunderstood, and misused.
- This agrees with Eph. v. 20: Giving thanks always for all things to God. Mrs. Carter. The words are the same in both except that the Apostle has εὐχαριστοῦντες , and Epictetus has χάριυ ἔχον .
- See Schweig.’s note.
- He says that the body will be resolved into the things of which it is composed: none of them will perish. The soul, as he has said elsewhere, will go to him who gave it (iii. 13. note 4). But I do not suppose that he means that the soul will exist as having a separate consciousness.
- καρπιστήν , see iv. 1. 113.
- See i. 19. note 6.
- Nevertheless not as I will, but as thou wilt,, Matthew xxvi. 39. Mrs. Carter. Our resignation to the will of God may be said to be perfect, when our will is lost and resolved up into his; when we rest in his will as our end, as being itself most just and right and good. Bp. Butler, Sermon on the Love of God.
- See iv. 1. note 59.
- I do not see the meaning of ὕστερον : it may perhaps mean after leaving the school. See Schweig.’s note.
- Here Epictetus admits that there is some power in man which uses the body, directs and governs it. He does not say what the power is nor what he supposes it to be. Upon the whole then our organs of sense and our limbs are certainly instruments, which the living persons, ourselves, make use of to perceive and move with. Butler’s Analogy, chap. i.
- The will of a fool does not make law, he says. Unfortunately it does, if we use the word law in the strict sense of law: for law is a general command from a person, an absolute king, for example, who has power to enforce it on those to whom the command is addressed or if not to enforce it, to punish for disobedience to it. This strict use of the word law is independent of the quality of the command, which may be wise or foolish, good or bad. But Epictetus does not use the word law in the strict sense.
- The word is λιφοστρώτοις , which means what we name Mosaic floors or pavements. The word λιφόστρωτον is used by John xix. 13, and rendered in our version by pavement.
- This term ( τὸ ἡγεμονικόν ) has been often used by Epictetus (i. 26. 15. etc), and by M. Antoninus. Here Epictetus gives a definition or description of it: it is the faculty by which we reflect and judge and determine, a faculty which no other animal has, a faculty which in many men is neglected, and weak because it is neglected; but still it ought to be what its constitution forms it to be, a faculty which plainly bears upon it marks of authority over all the rest, and claims the absolute direction of them all, to allow or forbid their gratification (Bp. Butler, Preface to his Sermons). The words in the text ( ἐκλεγόμενον , ἀπεκλεγόμενον , selection and rejection) are expressed by Cicero (De Fin. ix. ii. 11) by eligere and rejicere.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1τί ποιεῖ φοβερὸν τὸν τύραννον; — οἱ δορυφόροι, φησίν, καὶ αἱ μάχαιραι αὐτῶν καὶ ὁ ἐπὶ τοῦ κοιτῶνος καὶ οἱ ἀποκλείοντες τοὺς εἰσιόντας. 2— διὰ τί οὖν, ἂν παιδίον αὐτῷ προσαγάγῃς μετὰ τῶν δορυφόρων ὄντι, οὐ φοβεῖται; ἢ ὅτι οὐκ αἰσθάνεται τούτων τὸ παιδίον; 3ἂν οὖν τῶν δορυφόρων τις αἰσθάνηται καὶ ὅτι μαχαίρας ἔχουσιν, ἐπʼ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο προσέρχηται αὐτῷ θέλων ἀποθανεῖν διά τινα περίστασιν καὶ ζητῶν ὑπʼ ἄλλου παθεῖν αὐτὸ εὐκόλως, μή τι φοβεῖται τοὺς δορυφόρους; — θέλει γὰρ τοῦτο, διʼ ὃ φοβεροί εἰσιν. — 4ἂν οὖν τις μήτʼ ἀποθανεῖν μήτε ζῆν θέλων ἐξ ἅπαντος ἀλλʼ ὡς ἂν διδῶται, προσέρχηται αὐτῷ, τί κωλύει μὴ δεδοικότα προσέρχεσθαι αὐτόν; 5— οὐδέν. — ἄν τις οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὴν κτῆσιν ὡσαύτως ἔχῃ καθάπερ οὗτος πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ πρὸς τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ ἁπλῶς ὑπό τινος μανίας καὶ ἀπονοίας οὕτως ᾖ[ν] διακείμενος, ὥστʼ ἐν μηδενὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὸ ἔχειν ταῦτα ἢ μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλʼ ὡς ὀστρακίοις τὰ παιδία παίζοντα περὶ μὲν τῆς παιδιᾶς διαφέρεται, τῶν ὀστρακίων δʼ οὐ πεφρόντικεν, οὕτως δὲ καὶ οὗτος τὰς μὲν ὕλας παρʼ οὐδὲν ᾖ[ν] πεποιημένος, τὴν παιδιὰν δὲ τὴν περὶ αὐτὰς καὶ ἀναστροφὴν ἀσπάζηται· ποῖος ἔτι τούτῳ τύραννος φοβερὸς ἢ ποῖοι δορυφόροι ἢ ποῖαι μάχαιραι αὐτῶν; 6εἶτα ὑπὸ μανίας μὲν δύναταί τις οὕτως διατεθῆναι πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ὑπὸ ἔθους οἱ Γαλιλαῖοι· ὑπὸ λόγου δὲ καὶ ἀποδείξεως οὐδεὶς δύναται μαθεῖν, ὅτι ὁ θεὸς πάντα πεποίηκεν τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν κόσμον ὅλον μὲν ἀκώλυτον καὶ αὐτοτελῆ, τὰ ἐν μέρει δʼ αὐτοῦ πρὸς χρείαν τῶν ὅλων; 7τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα πάντα ἀπήλλακται τοῦ δύνασθαι παρακολουθεῖν τῇ διοικήσει αὐτοῦ· τὸ δὲ λογικὸν ζῷον ἀφορμὰς ἔχει πρὸς ἀναλογισμὸν τούτων ἁπάντων, ὅτι τε μέρος ἐστὶ καὶ ποῖόν τι μέρος καὶ ὅτι τὰ μέρη τοῖς ὅλοις εἴκειν ἔχει καλῶς. 8πρὸς τούτοις δὲ φύσει γενναῖον καὶ μεγαλόψυχον καὶ ἐλεύθερον γενόμενον ὁρᾷ, διότι τῶν περὶ αὐτὸ τὰ μὲν ἀκώλυτα ἔχει καὶ ἐπʼ αὐτῷ, τὰ δὲ κωλυτὰ καὶ ἐπʼ ἄλλοις· ἀκώλυτα μὲν τὰ προαιρετικά, κωλυτὰ δὲ τὰ ἀπροαίρετα. 9καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, ἐὰν μὲν ἐν τούτοις μόνοις ἡγήσηται τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὑτοῦ καὶ συμφέρον, τοῖς ἀκωλύτοις καὶ ἐφʼ ἑαυτῷ, ἐλεύθερον ἔσται, εὔρουν, εὔδαιμον, ἀβλαβές, μεγαλόφρον, εὐσεβές, χάριν ἔχον ὑπὲρ πάντων τῷ θεῷ, μηδαμοῦ μεμφόμενον μηδενὶ τῶν γενομένων, μηδενὶ ἐγκαλοῦν· 10ἂν δʼ ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς καὶ ἀπροαιρέτοις, ἀνάγκη κωλύεσθαι αὐτό, ἐμποδίζεσθαι, δουλεύειν τοῖς ἐκείνων ἔχουσιν ἐξουσίαν, ἃ τεθαύμακεν καὶ φοβεῖται, 11ἀνάγκη δʼ ἀσεβὲς εἶναι ἅτε βλάπτεσθαι οἰόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἄνισον, ἀεὶ αὑτῷ τοῦ πλείονος περιποιητικόν, ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ ταπεινὸν εἶναι καὶ μικροπρεπές. 12ταῦτα τί κωλύει διαλαβόντα ζῆν κούφως καὶ εὐηνίως, πάντα τὰ συμβαίνειν δυνάμενα πρᾴως ἐκδεχόμενον, τὰ δʼ ἤδη συμβεβηκότα φέροντα; 13θέλεις πενίαν; φέρε καὶ γνώσῃ, τί ἐστι πενία τυχοῦσα καλοῦ ὑποκριτοῦ. 14θέλεις ἀρχάς; φέρε, καὶ πόνους. ἀλλʼ ἐξορισμόν; ὅπου ἂν ἀπέλθω, ἐκεῖ μοι καλῶς ἔσται· καὶ γὰρ ἐνθάδε οὐ διὰ τὸν τόπον ἦν μοι καλῶς, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ δόγματα, ἃ μέλλω μετʼ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀποφέρειν. οὐδὲ γὰρ δύναταί τις ἀφελέσθαι αὐτά, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μόνα ἐμά ἐστι καὶ ἀναφαίρετα καὶ ἀρκεῖ μοι παρόντα, ὅπου ἂν ὦ καὶ ὅ τι ἂν ποιῶ. 15ἀλλʼ ἤδη καιρὸς ἀποθανεῖν. τί λέγεις ἀποθανεῖν; μὴ τραγῴδει τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἀλλʼ εἰπὲ ὡς ἔχει ἤδη καιρὸς τὴν ὕλην, ἐξ ὧν συνῆλθεν, εἰς ἐκεῖνα πάλιν ἀποκαταστῆναι. καὶ τί δεινόν; τί μέλλει ἀπόλλυσθαι τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, τί γενέσθαι καινόν, παράλογον; τούτων ἕνεκα φοβερός ἐστιν ὁ τύραννος; 16διὰ ταῦτα οἱ δορυφόροι μεγάλας δοκοῦσιν ἔχειν τὰς μαχαίρας καὶ ὀξείας; ἄλλοις ταῦτα· ἐμοὶ δʼ ἔσκεπται περὶ πάντων, εἰς ἐμὲ οὐδεὶς ἐξουσίαν ἔχει. 17ἠλευθέρωμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἔγνωκα αὐτοῦ τὰς ἐντολάς, οὐκέτι οὐδεὶς δουλαγωγῆσαί με δύναται, καρπιστὴν ἔχω οἷον δεῖ, δικαστὰς οἵους δεῖ. 18οὐχὶ τοῦ σώματός σου κύριός εἰμι; τί οὖν πρὸς ἐμέ; οὐχὶ τοῦ κτησιδίου; τί οὖν πρὸς ἐμέ; οὐχὶ φυγῆς ἢ δεσμῶν; πάλιν τούτων πάντων καὶ τοῦ σωματίου ὅλου σοι αὐτοῦ ἐξίσταμαι, ὅταν θέλῃς. πείρασαί μοί σου τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ γνώσῃ, μέχρι τίνος αὐτὴν ἔχεις. 19τίνα οὖν ἔτι φοβηθῆναι δύναμαι; τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῦ κοιτῶνος; μὴ τί ποιήσωσιν; ἀποκλείσωσί με; ἄν με εὕρωσι θέλοντα εἰσελθεῖν, ἀποκλεισάτωσαν. — τί οὖν ἔρχῃ ἐπὶ θύρας; — ὅτι καθήκειν ἐμαυτῷ δοκῶ μενούσης τῆς παιδιᾶς συμπαίζειν. 20— πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἀποκλείῃ; — ὅτι ἂν μή τίς με δέχηται, οὐ θέλω εἰσελθεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ μᾶλλον ἐκεῖνο θέλω τὸ γινόμενον. κρεῖττον γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι ὃ ὁ θεὸς θέλει ἢ ὃ ἐγώ. προσκείσομαι διάκονος καὶ ἀκόλουθος ἐκείνῳ, συνορμῶ, συνορέγομαι, ἁπλῶς συνθέλω. ἀποκλεισμὸς ἐμοὶ οὐ γίνεται, ἀλλὰ τοῖς βιαζομένοις. 21διὰ τί οὖν οὐ βιάζομαι; οἶδα γάρ, ὅτι ἔσω ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν διαδίδοται τοῖς εἰσελθοῦσιν. ἀλλʼ ὅταν ἀκούσω τινὰ μακαριζόμενον, ὅτι τιμᾶται ὑπὸ τοῦ Καίσαρος, λέγω τί αὐτῷ συμβαίνει; μή τι οὖν καὶ δόγμα, οἷον δεῖ ἐπαρχίαν; μή τι οὖν καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι ἐπιτροπῇ; 22τί ἔτι διωθοῦμαι; ἰσχαδοκάρυά τις διαρριπτεῖ· τὰ παιδία ἁρπάζει καὶ ἀλλήλοις διαμάχεται· οἱ ἄνδρες οὐχί, μικρὸν γὰρ αὐτὸ ἡγοῦνται. ἂν δʼ ὀστράκια διαρριπτῇ τις, οὐδὲ τὰ παιδία ἁρπάζει. 23ἐπαρχίαι διαδίδονται· ὄψεται τὰ παιδία. ἀργύριον· ὄψεται τὰ παιδία. στρατηγία, ὑπατεία· διαρπαζέτω τὰ παιδία· ἐκκλειέσθω, τυπτέσθω, καταφιλείτω τὰς χεῖρας τοῦ διδόντος, τῶν δούλων· ἐμοὶ δʼ ἰσχαδοκάρυόν ἐστιν. 24τί οὖν, ἂν ἀπὸ τύχης ῥιπτοῦντος αὐτοῦ ἔλθῃ εἰς τὸν κόλπον ἰσχάς; ἄρας κατάφαγε· μέχρι τοσούτου γὰρ ἔστι καὶ ἰσχάδα τιμῆσαι. ἵνα δὲ κ[ρ]ύψω καὶ ἄλλον ἀνατρέψω ἢ ὑπʼ ἄλλου ἀνατραπῶ καὶ κολακεύσω τοὺς εἰσιόντας, οὐκ ἀξία οὔτʼ ἰσχὰς οὔτʼ ἄλλο τι τῶν οὐκ ἀγαθῶν, ἅ με ἀναπεπείκασιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι μὴ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι. 25δείκνυέ μοι τὰς μαχαίρας τῶν δορυφόρων. ἰδοῦ, ἡλίκαι εἰσὶ καὶ πῶς ὀξεῖαι. τί οὖν ποιοῦσιν αἱ μεγάλαι αὗται μάχαιραι καὶ ὀξεῖαι; 26ἀποκτ[ε]ιννύουσιν. πυρετὸς δὲ τί ποιεῖ; ἄλλο οὐδέν. κεραμὶς δὲ τί ποιεῖ; ἄλλο οὐδέν. θέλεις οὖν πάντα ταῦτα θαυμάζω καὶ προσκυνῶ καὶ δοῦλος πάντων περιέρχωμαι; 27μὴ γένοιτο· ἀλλʼ ἅπαξ μαθών, ὅτι τὸ γενόμενον καὶ φθαρῆναι δεῖ, ἵνα ὁ κόσμος μὴ ἵστηται μηδʼ ἐμποδίζηται, οὐκέτι διαφέρομαι, πότερον πυρετὸς αὐτὸ ποιήσει ἢ κεραμὶς ἢ στρατιώτης, ἀλλʼ εἰ δεῖ συγκρῖναι, οἶδʼ ὅτι ἀπονώτερον αὐτὸ καὶ ταχύτερον ὁ στρατιώτης ποιήσει. 28ὅταν οὖν μήτε φοβῶμαί τι ὧν διαθεῖναί με δύναται μήτʼ ἐπιθυμῶ τινος ὧν παρασχεῖν, τί ἔτι θαυμάζω αὐτόν, τί ἔτι τέθηπα; τί φοβοῦμαι τοὺς δορυφόρους; τί χαίρω, ἄν μοι φιλανθρώπως λαλήσῃ καὶ ἀποδέξηταί με, καὶ ἄλλοις διηγοῦμαι, πῶς μοι ἐλάλησεν; 29μὴ γὰρ Σωκράτης ἐστίν, μὴ γὰρ Διογένης, ἵνʼ ὁ ἔπαινος αὐτοῦ ἀπόδειξις ᾖ περὶ ἐμοῦ; 30μὴ γὰρ τὸ ἦθος ἐζήλωκα αὐτοῦ; ἀλλὰ τὴν παιδιὰν σῴζων ἔρχομαι πρὸς [εμ]αὐτὸν καὶ ὑπηρετῶ, μέχρις ἂν ὅτου μηδὲν ἀβέλτερον κελεύῃ μηδʼ ἄρρυθμον. ἂν δέ μοι λέγῃ ἄπελθε ἐπὶ Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον, λέγω αὐτῷ ζήτει ἄλλον· ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐκέτι παίζω. 31ἄπαγε αὐτόν. ἀκολουθῶ ἐν παιδιᾷ. ἀλλʼ ἀφαιρεῖταί σου ὁ τράχηλος. ἐκείνου δʼ αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ ἐπιμένει, ὑμῶν δὲ τῶν πειθομένων; ἀλλʼ ἄταφος ῥιφήσῃ. εἰ ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ νεκρός, ῥιφήσομαι· εἰ δʼ ἄλλος εἰμὶ τοῦ νεκροῦ, κομψότερον λέγε, ὡς ἔχει τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ μὴ ἐκφόβει με. 32τοῖς παιδίοις ταῦτα φοβερά ἐστι καὶ τοῖς ἀνοήτοις. εἰ δέ τις εἰς φιλοσόφου σχολὴν ἅπαξ εἰσελθὼν οὐκ οἶδεν, τί ἐστιν αὐτός, ἄξιός ἐστι φοβεῖσθαι καὶ κολακεύειν ὃ ὕστερον ἐκολάκευεν· εἰ μήπω μεμάθηκεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σὰρξ οὐδʼ ὀστᾶ οὐδὲ νεῦρα, ἀλλὰ τὸ τούτοις χρώμενον, τὸ καὶ διοικοῦν καὶ παρακολουθοῦν ταῖς φαντασίαις. 33ναί· ἀλλʼ οἱ λόγοι οὗτοι καταφρονητὰς ποιοῦσι τῶν νόμων. — καὶ ποῖοι μᾶλλον λόγοι πειθομένους παρέχουσι τοῖς νόμοις τοὺς χρωμένους; νόμος δʼ οὐκ ἔστι τὰ ἐπὶ μωρῷ. 34καὶ ὅμως ὅρα, πῶς καὶ πρὸς τούτους ὡς δεῖ ἔχοντας παρασκευάζουσιν, οἵ γε διδάσκουσιν μηδενὸς ἀντιποιεῖσθαι πρὸς αὐτούς, ἐν οἷς ἂν ἡμᾶς νικῆσαι δύνωνται. 35περὶ τὸ σωμάτιον διδάσκουσιν ἐξίστασθαι, περὶ τὴν κτῆσιν ἐξίστασθαι, περὶ τὰ τέκνα, γονεῖς [δʼ], ἀδελφούς, πάντων παραχωρεῖν, πάντα ἀφιέναι· μόνα τὰ δόγματα ὑπεξαιροῦνται, ἃ καὶ ὁ Ζεὺς ἐξαίρετα ἑκάστου εἶναι ἠθέλησεν. 36ποία ἐνθάδε παρανομία, ποία ἀβελτερία; ὅπου κρείττων εἶ καὶ ἰσχυρότερος, ἐκεῖ σοι ἐξίσταμαι· ὅπου πάλιν ἐγὼ κρείττων, σὺ παραχώρει μοι. ἐμοὶ γὰρ μεμέληκεν, σοὶ δʼ οὔ. 37σοὶ μέλει, πῶς ἐν ὀρθοστρώτοις οἰκῇς, ἔτι πῶς παῖδές σοι καὶ πιλλᾶτοι διακονῶσιν, πῶς ἐσθῆτα περίβλεπτον φορῇς, πῶς κυνηγοὺς πολλοὺς ἔχῃς, πῶς κιθαρῳδούς, τραγῳδούς. 38μή τι ἀντιποιοῦμαι; μή τι οὖν δογμάτων σοι μεμέληκε; μή τι τοῦ λόγου τοῦ σεαυτοῦ; μή τι οἶδας, ἐκ τίνων μορίων συνέστηκεν, πῶς συνάγεται, τίς ἡ διάρθρωσις αὐτοῦ, τίνας ἔχει δυνάμεις καὶ ποίας τινάς; 39τί οὖν ἀγανακτεῖς, εἰ ἄλλος ἐν τούτοις σου πλέον ἔχει ὁ μεμελετηκώς; — ἀλλὰ ταῦτʼ ἔστι τὰ μέγιστα. — καὶ τίς σε κωλύει περὶ ταῦτʼ ἀναστρέφεσθαι καὶ τούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι; τίς δὲ μείζονα ἔχει παρασκευὴν βιβλίων, εὐσχολίας, τῶν ὠφελησόντων; 40μόνον ἀπόνευσόν ποτε ἐπὶ ταῦτα, ἀπόνειμον κἂν ὀλίγον χρόνον τῷ σαυτοῦ ἡγεμονικῷ· σκέψαι τί ποτʼ ἔχεις τοῦτο καὶ πόθεν ἐληλυθός, τὸ πᾶσιν τοῖς ἄλλοις χρώμενον, πάντα τἆλλα δοκιμάζον, ἐκλεγόμενον, ἀπεκλεγόμενον. 41μέχρι δʼ ἂν οὗ περὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀναστρέφῃ, ἐκεῖνα ἕξεις οἷα οὐδείς, τοῦτο δʼ οἷον αὐτὸ ἔχειν θέλεις, ῥυπαρὸν καὶ ἀτημέλητον.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA