Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
THE · DISCOURSES · OF · EPICTETUS. · BOOK III. · CHAPTER I. · Of Finery in Dress.
1Certain young Rhetorician coming to him, with his Hair too curiously ornamented, and his Dress very fine; Tell me, says Epictetus, whether you do not think some Horses and Dogs beautiful; and so of all other Animals? I do. Are some Men then likewise beautiful, and others deformed? Certainly. Do we call each of these beautiful then in its Kind, on the same Account, or on some Account, peculiar to itself? You will judge of it, by this: since we see a Dog naturally formed for one thing, a Horse for another, and a Nightingale, for Instance, for another; in general, it will not be absurd to pronounce each of them beautiful, so far as it is in the Condition most suitable to its own Nature: but, since the Nature of each is different, I think each of them must be beautiful, in a different Way. Is it not so? Agreed. Then, what makes a Dog beautiful, makes a Horse deformed; and what makes a horse beautiful, a Dog deformed; if their Natures are different. So it seems probable. For, I suppose, what makes a good Pancratiast makes no good Wrestler, and a very ridiculous Racer; and the very same Person who appears beautiful as a Pentathlete, would appear very deformed, in Wrestling. Very true. What then, makes a Man beautiful? Is it the same, in general, that makes a Dog or a Horse so? The same. What is it then, that makes a Dog beautiful? That Excellency which belongs to a Dog. What, a Horse? The Excellency of a Horse. What, a Man? Must it not be the Excellency belonging to a Man? If then you would appear beautiful, young Man, strive for human Excellency. What is that? Consider, when you praise, without partial Affection, whom you praise: Is it the Honest, or the Dishonest? The Honest. The Sober, or the Dissolute? The Sober. The Temperate, or the Intemperate? The Temperate. Then, if you make yourself such a Character, you know that you will make yourself beautiful: but, while you neglect these Things, though you use every Contrivance to appear beautiful, you must necessarily be deformed. 2I know not how to say any thing further to you: for if I speak what I think, you will be vexed, and perhaps go away, and return no more. And, if I do not speak, consider how I shall act: if you come to me to be improved, and I do not improve you; and you come to me as to a Philosopher, and I do not speak like a Philosopher. Besides: how could it be consistent with my Duty towards yourself, to overlook, and leave you uncorrected? If hereafter you should come to have Sense, you will accuse me, with Reason: "What did Epictetus observe in me, that, when he saw me come to him, in such a shameful Condition, he overlooked it, and never said so much as a Word of it? Did he so absolutely despair of me? Was not I young? Was not I able to hear Reason? How many young Men, at that Age, are guilty of many such Errors? I am told of one Polemo, who, from a most dissolute Youth, became totally changed. Suppose he did not think I should become a Polemo; he might however have set my Locks to rights: he might have stript off my Bracelets and Rings: he might have prevented my picking off the Hairs from my Person. But when he saw me dressed like a——what shall I say?——he was silent." I do not say like what; when you come to your Senses, you will say it yourself, and will know what it is, and who they are who study such a Dress. 3If you should hereafter lay this to my Charge, what Excuse could I make;——Ay: but if I do speak, he will not regard me. Why, did Laius regard Apollo? Did not he go and get drunk, and bid Farewel to the Oracle? What then? Did this hinder Apollo, from telling him the Truth? Now, I am uncertain, whether you will regard me, or not; but Apollo positively knew, that Laius would not regard him, and yet he spoke. "And why did he speak?" You may as well ask, Why is he Apollo; why doth he deliver Oracles; why hath he placed himself in such a Post as a Prophet, and the Fountain of Truth, to whom the Inhabitants of the World should resort? Why is Know Thyself inscribed on the Front of his Temple, when no one minds it? 4Did Socrates prevail on all who came to him, to take care of themselves? Not on the thousandth Part: but however, being, as he himself declares, divinely appointed to such a Post, he never deserted it. What doth he say, even to his Judges? "If you would acquit me, on Condition, that I should no longer act as I do now, I will not accept it, nor desist: but I will accost all I meet, whether young or old, and interrogate them just in the same Manner: but particularly you, my Fellow-citizens; as you are more nearly related to me."——"Are you so curious and officious, Socrates? What is it to you, how we act?——What do you say? While you are of the same Community, and the same Kindred, with me, shall you be careless of yourself, and show yourself a bad Citizen to the City, a bad Kinsman to your Kindred, and a bad Neighbour to your Neighbourhood?"——"Why, who are you?"——Here it is a great Thing to say, "I am He who ought to take care of Mankind;" for it is not every little paultry Heifer that dares resist the Lion: but if the Bull should come up, and resist him, say to him, if you think proper, Who are you? What Business is it of yours? In every Species, Man, there is some one Part which by Nature excells; in Oxen, in Dogs, in Bees, in Horses. Do not say to what excells, Who are you? If you do, it will, some-how or other, find a Voice to tell you; "I am like the purple Thread in a Garment. Do not expect me to be like the rest; or find fault with my Nature, which hath distinguished me from others." 5What then, am I such a one? How should I? Indeed, are you such a one as to be able to hear the Truth? I wish you were. But however, since I am condemned to wear a grey Beard and a Cloke, and you come to me as to a Philosopher, I will not treat you cruelly, nor as if I despaired of you; but will ask you——Who is it, young Man, whom you would render beautiful? Know, first, who you are; and then adorn yourself accordingly. You are a Man; that is, a mortal Animal, capable of a rational Use of the Appearances of Things. And what is this rational Use? A perfect Conformity to Nature. What have you then, particularly excellent? Is it the animal Part? No. The mortal? No. That which is capable of the Use of the Appearances of Things? No. The Excellence lies in the rational Part. Adorn and beautify this; but leave your Hair to him who formed it, as he thought good. Well; what other Denominations have you? Are you a Man, or a Woman? A Man. Then adorn yourself as a Man, not a Woman. A Woman is naturally smooth and delicate; and, if hairy, is a Monster, and shown among the Monsters at Rome. It is the same in a Man, not to be hairy; and, if he is by Nature not so, he is a Monster. But, if he clips and picks off his Hairs, what shall we do with him? Where shall we show him; and how shall we advertise him? A Man to be seen, who would rather be a Woman. What a scandalous Show! Who would not wonder at such an Advertisement? I believe indeed, that these very Pickers themselves would; not apprehending, that it is the very Thing of which they are guilty. 6Of what have you to accuse your Nature, Sir? That it hath made you a Man? Why; were all to be born Women then? In that Case, what would have been the Use of your Finery? For whom would you have made yourself fine, if all were Women? But the whole Affair displeases you. Go to work upon the Whole then. Remove what is the Cause of these Hairs; and make yourself a Woman entirely, that we may be no longer deceived, nor you be half Man, half Woman? To whom would you be agreeable? To the Women? Be agreeable to them as a Man. Ay; but they are pleased with smooth pretty Fellows. Go hang yourself. Suppose they were pleased with Pathics, would you become one? Is this Is this your Business in Life? Were you born to please dissolute Women? Shall we make such a one as you, in the Corinthian Republic, for Instance, Governor of the City, Master of the Youth, Commander of the Army, or Director of the public Games? Will you pick your Hairs, when you are married? For whom, and for what? Will you be the Father of Children, and introduce them into the State, picked, like yourself? O what a fine Citizen, and Senator, and Orator! For Heaven's sake, Sir, ought we to pray for a Succession of young Men, disposed and bred like you! 7Now, when you have once heard this Discourse, go home, and say to yourself; It is not Epictetus who hath told me all these Things (for how should he?) but some propitious God, by him; for it would never have entered the Head of Epictetus, who is not used to dispute with any one. Well, let us obey God then, that we may not incur the divine Displeasure. If a Crow had signified any thing to you, by his Croaking; it is not the Crow that signifies it, but God, by him. And, if you have any thing signified to you by the human Voice, doth he not cause the Man to tell it you; that you may know the divine Efficacy, which declares its Significations to different Persons in different Manners; and signifies the greatest and principal Things, by the noblest Messengers. What else does the Poet mean, when he says, Hermes I sent, his Purpose to restrain. Hermes descending from Heaven, was to warn Him, and the Gods now, likewise, send a Hermes to warn You, not to invert the well-appointed Order of Things; nor be curiously trifling: but suffer a Man to be a Man; and a Woman, a Woman: a beautiful Man, to be beautiful, as a Man; a deformed Man, to be deformed, as a Man: for you do not consist of Flesh and Hair, but of the Faculty of Choice. If you take care to have this beautiful, you will be beautiful. But all this while, I dare not tell you, that you are deformed; for I fancy you would rather hear any thing than this. But consider what Socrates says to the most beautiful and blooming of all Men, Alcibiades. "Endeavour to make yourself beautiful. What doth he mean to say to him; Curl your Locks, and pick the Hairs from your Legs?" Heaven forbid! But, Ornament your Choice: Throw away your wrong Principles. What is to be done with the poor Body then? Leave it to Nature. Another hath taken care of such Things. Give them up to Him. What! then, must one be a Sloven? By no means: but be neat, conformably to your Nature. A Man should be neat, as a Man; a Woman, as a Woman; a Child, as a Child. If not, let us pick out the Mane of a Lion, that he may not be slovenly; and the Comb of a Cock; for he ought to be neat too. Yes, but let it be as a Cock; and a Lion, as a Lion; and a Hound, as a Hound.
Carter’s notes (9)
- These are the Names of Combatants in the Olympic Games. A Pancratiast was one who united the Exercises of Wrestling and Boxing. A Pentathlete, one who contended in all the Five Games of Leaping, Running, Throwing the Discus, Darting, and Wrestling. See Potter's Grecian Antiquities, Vol. I. ch. 21.
- These are the Names of Combatants in the Olympic Games. A Pancratiast was one who united the Exercises of Wrestling and Boxing. A Pentathlete, one who contended in all the Five Games of Leaping, Running, Throwing the Discus, Darting, and Wrestling. See Potter's Grecian Antiquities, Vol. I. ch. 21.
- Epictetus had been before considering the Propriety of his own Character as a Philosopher: but, according to Mr. Upton's very probable Conjecture, the Translation must be—would it not be cruel, &c.
- Polemo was a profligate young Rake of Athens, and even distinguished by the Dissoluteness of his Manners. One Day, after a riotous Entertainment, he came reeling, with a Chaplet on his Head, into the School of Xenocrates. The Audience were greatly offended at his scandalous Appearance: but the Philosopher went on, without any Emotion, in a Discourse upon Temperance and Sobriety. Polemo was so struck by his Arguments, that he soon threw away his Chaplet; and, from that Time, became a Disciple of Xenocrates; and profited so well by his Instructions, that he afterwards succeeded him in the Socratic School.
- Laius, King of Thebes, petitioned Apollo for a Son. The Oracle answered him, That, if Laius became a Father, he should perish by the Hand of his Son. The Prediction was fulfiled by Oedipus. Upton.
- See P. 8. §. 3.
- The bare Use of Objects belongs to all Animals; a rational Use of them is peculiar to Man. See Introduction, §. 7.
- For it is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you. Matt. x. 20.
- This Passage hath a remarkable Likeness to Heb. i. 1, 2, God, who, at sundry Times and in diverse Manners, spake in Times past unto the Fathers by the Prophets, hath, in these last Days, spoken unto us by his Son——
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Of personal adornment.
A certain young rhetorician coming to him with his hair too elaborately ornamented, and his dress very fine, Tell me, said Epictetus, whether you do not think some horses and dogs beautiful and so of all other animals.
I do.
Are some men, then, likewise beautiful, and others deformed?
Certainly.
Do we pronounce all these beautiful the same way, then, or each in some way peculiar to itself? You will judge of it by this; since we see a dog naturally formed for one thing, a horse for another, and a nightingale, for instance, for another, therefore, in general, it will be correct to pronounce each of them beautiful so far as it is developed suitably to its own nature; but since the nature of each is different, I think each of them must be beautiful in a different way. Is it not so?
Agreed.
Then what makes a dog beautiful makes a horse deformed, and what makes a horse beautiful makes a dog deformed, if their natures are different.
So it seems.
For, I suppose, what makes a good Pancratiast makes no good wrestler, and a very ridiculous racer; and the very same person who appears well as a Pentathlete might make a very ill figure in wrestling.
Very true.
What, then, makes a man beautiful? Is it on the same principle that a dog or a horse is beautiful?
The same. What is it, then, that makes a dog beautiful?
That excellence which belongs to a dog.
What a horse?
The excellence of a horse.
What a man? Must it not be the excellence belonging to a man? If, then, you would appear beautiful, young man, strive for human excellence.
What is that?
Consider whom you praise, when unbiassed by partiality; is it the honest or dishonest?
The honest.
The sober or the dissolute?
The sober.
The temperate or the intemperate?
The temperate.
Then, if you make yourself such a character, you know that you will make yourself beautiful; but while you neglect these things, though you use every contrivance to appear beautiful, you must necessarily be deformed.
I know not how to say anything further to you; for if I speak what I think, you will be vexed, and perhaps go away and return no more. And if I do not speak, consider what I am doing. You come to me to be improved, and I do not improve you; and you come to me as to a philosopher, and I do not speak like a philosopher. Besides, how could it be consistent with my duty towards yourself, to pass you by as incorrigible? If, hereafter, you should come to have sense, you will accuse me with reason: What did Epictetus observe in me, that, when he saw me come to him in such a shameful condition, he overlooked it, and never said so much as a word about it? Did he so absolutely despair of me? Was I not young? Was I not able to hear reason? How many young men, at that age, are guilty of many such errors! I am told of one Polemo, who, from a most dissolute youth, became totally changed. Suppose he did not think I should become a Polemo, he might nevertheless have set my locks to rights, he might have stripped off my bracelets and rings, he might have prevented my depilating my person. But when he saw me dressed like a—what shall I say?-he was silent. I do not say like what; when you come to your senses, you will say it yourself, and will know what it is, and who they are who adopt such a dress.
If you should hereafter lay this to my charge, what excuse could I make? Ay; but if I do speak, he will not regard me. Why, did Laius regard Apollo Did not he go and get intoxicated, and bid farewell to the oracle? What then? Did this hinder Apollo from telling him the truth? Now, I am uncertain whether you will regard me or not; but Apollo positively knew that Laius would not regard him, and yet he spoke. And why did he speak? You may as well ask, why is he Apollo; why doth he deliver oracles; why hath he placed himself in such a post as a prophet, and the fountain of truth, to whom the inhabitants of the world should resort? Why is know thyself inscribed on the front of his temple, when no one heeds it?
Did Socrates prevail upon all who came to him, to take care of themselves? Not upon the thousandth part; but being, as he himself declares, divinely appointed to such a post, he never deserted it. What said he even to his judges? If you would acquit me, on condition that I should no longer act as I do now, I would not accept it, nor desist; but I will accost all I meet, whether young or old, and interrogate them in just the same manner; but particularly you, my fellow-citizens, since you are more nearly related to me. Are you so curious and officious, Socrates? What is it to you, how we act? What say you? While you are of the same community and the same kindred with me, will you be careless of yourself, and show yourself a bad citizen to the city, a bad kinsman to your kindred, and a bad neighbor to your neighborhood? Why, who are you? Here one ought nobly to say, am he who ought to take care of mankind. For it is not every little paltry heifer that dares resist the lion; but if the bull should come up, and resist him, would you say to him, Who are you? What business is it of yours? In every species, man, there is some one quality which by nature excels,—in oxen, in dogs, in bees, in horses. Do not say to whatever excels, Who are you? If you do, it will, somehow or other, find a voice to tell you, am like the purple thread in a garment. Do not expect me to be like the rest; nor find fault with my nature, which has distinguished me from others.
What, then; am I such a one? How should I be? Indeed, are you such a one as to be able to hear the truth? I wish you were. But, however, since I am condemned to wear a gray beard and a cloak, and you come to me as a philosopher, I will not treat you cruelly, nor as if I despaired of you; but will ask you, Who is it, young man, whom you would render beautiful? Know, first, who you are; and then adorn yourself accordingly.
You are a human being; that is, a mortal animal, capable of a rational use of things as they appear. And what is this rational use? A perfect conformity to Nature. What have you, then, particularly excellent? Is it the animal part? No. The mortal? No. That which is capable of the mere use of these things? No. The excellence lies in the rational part. Adorn and beautify this; but leave your hair to him who formed it as he thought good.
Well, what other appellations have you? Are you a man or a woman? A man. Then adorn yourself as a man, not as a woman. A woman is naturally smooth and delicate, and if hairy, is a monster, and shown among the monsters at Rome. It is the same thing in a man not to be hairy; and if he is by nature not so, he is a monster. But if he depilates himself, what shall we do with him? Where shall we show him, and how shall we advertise him? man to be seen, who would rather be a woman. What a scandalous show! Who would not wonder at such an advertisement? I believe, indeed, that these very persons themselves would; not apprehending that it is the very thing of which they are guilty.
Of what have you to accuse your nature, sir, that it has made you a man? Why, were all to be born women, then? In that case what would have been the use of your finery? For whom would you have made yourself fine, if all were women? But the whole affair displeases you. Go to work upon the whole, then. Remove your manhood itself and make yourself a woman entirely, that we may be no longer deceived, nor you be half man, half woman. To whom would you be agreeable,—to the women? Be agreeable to them as a man.
Ay; but they are pleased with fops.
Go hang yourself. Suppose they were pleased with every debauchery, would you consent? Is this your business in life? Were you born to please dissolute women? Shall we make such a one as you, in the Corinthian republic for instance, governor of the city, master of the youth, commander of the army, or director of the public games? Will you pursue the same practices when you are married? For whom, and for what? Will you be the father of children, and introduce them into the state, such as yourself?
Oh, what a fine citizen, and senator, and orator! Surely, young man, we ought to pray for a succession of young men disposed and bred like you!
Now, when you have once heard this discourse, go home and say to yourself, It is not Epictetus who has told me all these things,—for how should he?—but some propitious god through him; for it would never have entered the head of Epictetus, who is not used to dispute with any one. Well, let us obey God then, that we may not incur the Divine displeasure. If a crow has signified anything to you by his croaking, it is not the crow that signifies it, but God through him. And if you have anything signified to you through the human voice, doth he not cause that man to tell it to you, that you may know the Divine power which acts thus variously, and signifies the greatest and principal things through the noblest messenger? What else does the poet mean, when he says,— Since we forewarned him,
Sending forth Hermes. watchful Argicide,
Neither to slay, nor woo another’s wife.
Hermes, descending from heaven, was to warn him. and the gods now, likewise, send a Hermes the Argicide as messenger to warn you not to invert the well-appointed order of things, nor be absorbed in fopperies; but suffer a man to be a man, and a woman to be a woman; a beautiful man to be beautiful as a man; a deformed man to be deformed as a man; for your personality lies not in flesh and hair, but in the Will. If you take care to have this beautiful, you will be beautiful. But all this while, I dare not tell you that you are deformed; for I fancy you would rather hear anything than this. But consider what Socrates says to the most beautiful and blooming of all men, Alcibiades. Endeavor to make yourself beautiful. What does he mean to say to him,—Curl your locks, and depilate your legs? Heaven forbid! But rather, Regulate your Will; throw away your wrong principles.
What is to be done with the poor body, then?
Leave it to nature. Another hath taken care of such things. Give them up to him.
What, then; must one be a sloven?
By no means; but act in conformity to your nature. A man should care for his body, as a man; a woman, as a woman; a child, as a child. If not, let us pick out the mane of a lion, that he may not be slovenly; and the comb of a cock, for he too should be tidy. Yes, but let it be as a cock: and a lion, as a lion; and a hound. as a hound.
Higginson’s notes (4)
- These are the names of combatants in the Olympic games. A Pancratiast was one who united the exercises of wrestling and boxing. A Pentathlete, one who contended on all the five games of Leaping, running, throwing the discus, darting, and wrestling.—C.
- By accidentally visiting the school of Xenocrates.—H.
- Laius, king of Thebes , petitioned Apollo for a son. The oracle answered him, that if Laius became a father, he should perish by the hand of his son. The prediction was fulfilled by Oedipus.—C.
- Quotation source: Homer, Odyssey, 1.37.
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
Of finery in dress.
A CERTAIN young man a rhetorician came to see Epictetus, with his hair dressed more carefully than was usual and his attire in an ornamental style; whereupon Epictetus said, Tell me if you do not think that some dogs are beautiful and some horses, and so of all other animals. I do think so, the youth replied. Are not then some men also beautiful and others ugly? Certainly. Do we then for the same reason call each of them in the same kind beautiful, or each beautiful for something peculiar? And you will judge of this matter thus. Since we see a dog naturally formed for one thing, and a horse for another, and for another still, as an example, a nightingale, we may generally and not improperly declare each of them to bebeautiful then when it is most excellent according to its nature; but since the nature of each is different, each of them seems to me to be beautiful in a different way. Is it not so? He admitted that it was. That then which makes a dog beautiful, makes a horse ugly; and that which makes a horse beautiful, makes a dog ugly, if it is true that their natures are different. It seems to be so. For I think that what makes a Pancratiast beautiful, makes a. wrestler to be not good, and a runner to be most ridiculous; and he who is beautiful for the Pentathlon, is very ugly for wrestling. It is so said he. What then makes a man beautiful? Is it that which in its kind makes both a dog and a horse beautiful? It is, he said. What then makes a dog beautiful? The possession of the excellence of a dog. And what makes a horse beautiful? The possession of the excellence of a horse. What then makes a man beautiful? Is it not the possession of the excellence of a man? And do you then, if you wish to be beautiful, young man, labour at this, the acquisition of human excellence. But what is this? Observe whom you yourself praise, when you praise many persons without partiality: do you praise the just or the unjust? The just. Whether do you praise the moderate or the immoderate? The moderate. And the temperate or the intemperate? The temperate. If then you make yourself such a person, you will know that you will make yourself beautiful: but so long as you neglect these things, you must be ugly (αἰσχρόν) even though you contrive all you can to appear beautiful. Further I do not know what to say to you: for if I say to you what I think, I shall offend you, and you will perhaps leave the school and not return to it: and if I do not say what I think, see how I shall be acting, if you come to me to be improved, and I shall not improve you at all, and if you come to me as to a philosopher, and I shall say nothing to you as a philosopher. And how cruel it is to you to leave you uncorrected. If at any time afterwards you shall acquire sense, you will with good reason blame me and say, What did Epictetus observe in me that when he saw me in such a plight coming to him in such a scandalous condition, he neglected me and never said a word? did he so much despair of me? was I not young? was I not able to listen to reason? and how many other young men at this age commit many like errors? I hear that a certain Polemon from being a most dissolute youth underwent such a great change. Well, suppose that he did not think that I should be a Polemon; yet he might have set my hair right, he might have stripped off my decorations, he might have stopped me from plucking the hair out of my body; but when he saw me dressed like—what shall I say?—he kept silent. I do not say like what; but you will say when you come to your senses, and shall know what it is, and what persons use such a dress.
If you bring this charge against me hereafter, what defence shall I make? Why, shall I say that the man will not be persuaded by me? Was Laius persuaded by Apollo? Did he not go away and get drunk and show no care for the oracle? Well then for this reason did Apollo refuse to tell him the truth? I indeed do not know, whether you will be persuaded by me or not; but Apollo knew most certainly that Laius would not be persuaded and yet he spoke. But why did he speak? I say in reply, But why is he Apollo, and why does he deliver oracles, and why has he fixed himself in this place as a prophet and source of truth and for the inhabitants of the world to resort to him? and why are the words Know yourself written in front of the temple, though no person takes any notice of them?
Did Socrates persuade all his hearers to take care of themselves? Not the thousandth part. But however, after he had been placed in this position by the deity, as he himself says, he never left it. But what does he say even to his judges? If you acquit me on these conditions that I no longer do that which I do now, I will not consent and I will not desist; but I will go up both to young and to old, and, to speak plainly, to every man whom I meet, and I will ask the questions which I ask now; and most particularly will I do this to you my fellow citizens, because you are more nearly related to me.—Are you so curious, Socrates, and such a busy—body? and how does it concern you how we act? and what is it that you say? Being of the same community and of the same kin, you neglect yourself, and show yourself a bad citizen to the state, and a bad kinsman to your kinsmen, and a bad neighbour to your neighbours. Who then are you?— Here it is a great thing to say, I am be whose duty it is to take care of men; for it is not every little heifer which dares to resist a lion; but if the bull comes up and resists him, say to the bull, if you choose, and who are you, and what business have you here? Man, in every kind there is produced something which excels; in oxen, in dogs, in bees, in horses. Do not then say to that which excels, Who then are you? If you do, it will find a voice in some way and say, I am such a thing as the purple in a garment: do not expect me to be like the others, or blame my nature that it has made me different from the rest of men.
What then? am I such a man? Certainly not. And are you such a man as can listen to the truth? I wish you were. But however since in a manner I have been condemned to wear a white beard and a cloak, and you come to me as to a philosopher, I will not treat you in a cruel way nor yet as if I despaired of you, but I will say, Young man, whom do you wish to make beautiful? In the first place, know who you are and then adorn yourself appropriately. You are a human being; and this is a mortal animal which has the power of using appearances rationally. But what is meant by rationally? Conformably to nature and completely. What then do you possess which is peculiar? Is it the animal part? No. Is it the condition of mortality? No. Is it the power of using appearances? No. You possess the rational faculty as a peculiar thing: adorn and beautify this; but leave your hair to him who made it as he chose. Come, what other appellations have you? Are you man or woman? Man. Adorn yourself then as man, not as woman. Woman is naturally smooth and delicate; and if she has much hair (on her body), she is a monster and is exhibited at Rome among monsters. And in a man it is monstrous not to have hair; and if he has no hair, he is a monster: but if he cuts off his hairs and plucks them out, what shall we do with him? where shall we exhibit him? and under what name shall we show him? I will exhibit to you a man who chooses to be a woman rather than a man. What a terrible sight! There is no man who will not wonder at such a notice. Indeed I think that the men who pluck out their hairs do what they do without knowing what they do. Man what fault have you to find with your nature? That it made you a man? What then was it fit that nature should make all human creatures women? and what advantage in that case would you have had in being adorned? for whom would you have adorned yourself, if all human creatures were women? But you are not pleased with the matter: set to work then upon the whole business. Take away—what is its name?— that which is the cause of the hairs: make yourself a woman in all respects, that we may not be mistaken: do not make one half man, and the other half woman. Whom do you wish to please? The women? Please them as a man. Well; but they like smooth men. Will you not hang yourself? and if women took delight in catamites, would you become one? Is this your business? were you born for this purpose, that dissolute women should delight in you? Shall we make such a one as you a citizen of Corinth and perchance a praefect of the city, or chief of the youth, or general or superintendent of the games? Well, and when you have taken a wife, do you intend to have your hairs plucked out? To please whom and for what purpose? And when you have begotten children, will you introduce them also into the state with the habit of plucking their hairs? A beautiful citizen, and senator and rhetorician. We ought to pray that such young men be born among us and brought up. Do not so, I intreat you by the Gods, young man: but when you have once heard these words, go away and say to yourself, Epictetus has not said this to me; for how could he? but some propitious God through him: for it Would never have come into his thoughts to say this, since he is not accustomed to talk thus with any person. Come then let us obey God, that we may not be subject to his anger. You say, No. But (I say), if a crow by his croaking signifies any thing to you, it is not the crow which signifies, but God through the crow; and if he signifies any thing through a human voice, will he not cause the man to say this to you, that you may know the power of the divinity, that he signifies to some in this way, and to others in that way, and concerning the greatest things and the chief he signifies through the noblest messenger? What else is it which the poet says: For we ourselves have warned him, and have sent
Hermes the careful watcher, Argus’ slayer,
The husband not to kill nor wed the wife.
Was Hermes going to descend from heaven to say this to him (Aegisthus)? And now the Gods say this to you and send the messenger, the slayer of Argus, to warn you not to pervert that which is well arranged, nor to busy yourself about it, but to allow a man to be a man, and a woman to be a woman, a beautiful man to be as a beautiful man, and an ugly man as an ugly man, for you are not flesh and hair, but you are will (προαίρεσις); and if your will is beautiful, then you will be beautiful. But up to the present time I dare not tell you that you are ugly, for I think that you are readier to hear anything than this. But see what Socrates says to the most beautiful and blooming of men Alcibiades: Try then to be beautiful. What does he say to him? Dress your hair and pluck the hairs from your legs? Nothing of that kind. But adorn your will, take away bad opinions. How with the body? Leave it as it is by nature. Another has looked after these things: intrust them to him. What then, must a man be uncleaned? Certainly not; but what you are and are made by nature, cleanse this. A man should be cleanly as a man, a woman as a woman, a child as a child. You say no: but let us also pluck out the lion’s mane, that he may not be uncleaned, and the cock’s comb for he also ought to be cleaned. Granted, but as a cock, and the lion as a lion, and the hunting dog as a hunting dog.
Long’s notes (9)
- A Pancratiast is a man who is trained for the Pancratium, that is, both for boxing and wrestling. The Pentathlon comprised five exercises, which are expressed by one Greek line, Leaping, running, the quoit, throwing the Javelin, wrestling. Compare Aristotle, Rhet. i. 5.
- (Comp. Horace, Sat. ii. 3, v. 253. Quacro, faciasne quod olim Mutatus Polemon? etc. The story of Polemon is told by Diogenes Laertius. He was a dissolute youth. As he was passing one day the place where Xenocrates was lecturing, he and his drunken companions burst into the school, but Polemon was so affected by the words of the excellent teacher that he came out quite a different man, and ultimately succeeded Xenocrates in the school of the Academy. See Epict. iv. 11. 30.
- Laius consulted the oracle at Delphi how he should have children. The oracle told him not to beget children, and even to expose them if he did. Laius was so foolish as to disobey the god in both respects, for he begot children and brought them up. He did indeed order his child Oedipus to be exposed, but the boy was saved and became the murderer of Laius.
- Plato, Apology, i. 9, etc. and c. 17.
- i. 2. note 4.
- Cicero, de Fin. ii. 11: Horace, Epp. i. 10, 12 . This was the great principle of Zeno, to live according to nature. Bishop Butler in the Preface to his Sermons says of this philosophical principle, that virtue consisted in following nature, that it is a manner of speaking not loose and undeterminate, but clear and distinct, strictly just and true.
- The bare use of objects (appearances) belongs to all animals; a rational use of them is peculiar to man. Mrs. Carter, Introd. § 7.
- ὅλον δι’ ὅλων αὐτὸ ποίησον. Wolf proposed an emendation which Schweighaeuser does not put in his text, but he has expressed it in the Latin version. The Greek is intelligible, if we look to what follows.
- From the Odyssey, i. 37, where Zeus is speaking of Aegisthus.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1εἰσιόντος τινὸς πρὸς αὐτὸν νεανίσκου ῥητορικοῦ περιεργότερον ἡρμοσμένου τὴν κόμην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην περιβολὴν κατακοσμοῦντος Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, εἰ οὐ δοκοῦσίν σοι κύνες τʼ εἶναι καλοί τινες καὶ ἵπποι καὶ οὕτως τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἕκαστον; 2— δοκοῦσιν, ἔφη. — οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄνθρωποι οἱ μὲν καλοί, οἱ δʼ αἰσχροί; — πῶς γὰρ οὔ; — πότερον οὖν κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἕκαστα τούτων ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει καλὰ προσαγορεύομεν ἢ ἰδίως ἕκαστον; οὕτως δʼ ὄψει αὐτό. 3ἐπειδὴ πρὸς ἄλλο μὲν ὁρῶμεν κύνα πεφυκότα, πρὸς ἄλλο[ν] δʼ ἵππον, πρὸς ἄλλο δʼ εἰ οὕτως τύχοι ἀηδόνα, καθόλου μὲν οὐκ ἀτόπως ἀποφήναιτʼ ἄν τις ἕκαστον τηνικαῦτα καλὸν εἶναι, ὁπότε κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν κράτιστʼ ἔχοι· ἐπεὶ δʼ ἡ φύσις ἑκάστου διάφορός ἐστιν, διαφόρως εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν καλόν· ἢ γὰρ οὔ; 4— ὡμολόγει. — οὐκ οὖν ὅπερ κύνα ποιεῖ καλόν, τοῦτο ἵππον αἰσχρόν, ὅπερ δʼ ἵππον καλόν, τοῦτο κύνα αἰσχρόν, εἴ γε διάφοροι αἱ φύσεις εἰσὶν αὐτῶν; 5— ἔοικεν. — καὶ γὰρ τὸ παγκρατιαστὴν οἶμαι ποιοῦν καλὸν τοῦτο παλαιστὴν οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖ, δρομέα δὲ καὶ γελοιότατον· καὶ ὁ πρὸς πενταθλίαν καλὸς ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος πρὸς πάλην αἴσχιστος; — οὕτως, ἔφη. 6— τί οὖν ποιεῖ ἄνθρωπον καλὸν ἢ ὅπερ τῷ γένει καὶ κύνα καὶ ἵππον; — τοῦτο, ἔφη. — τί οὖν ποιεῖ κύνα καλόν; ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ κυνὸς παροῦσα. τί ἵππον; ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἵππου παροῦσα. τί οὖν ἄνθρωπον; μή ποθʼ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἀνθρώπου παροῦσα; 7καὶ σὺ οὖν εἰ θέλεις καλὸς εἶναι, νεανίσκε, τοῦτο ἐκπόνει, τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν ἀνθρωπικήν. 8— τίς δʼ ἐστὶν αὕτη; — ὅρα, τίνας αὐτὸς ἐπαινεῖς, ὅταν δίχα πάθους τινὰς ἐπαινῇς· πότερα τοὺς δικαίους ἢ τοὺς ἀδίκους; — τοὺς δικαίους. — πότερον τοὺς σώφρονας ἢ τοὺς ἀκολάστους; — τοὺς σώφρονας. — τοὺς ἐγκρατεῖς δʼ ἢ τοὺς ἀκρατεῖς; — τοὺς ἐγκρατεῖς. 9— οὐκοῦν τοιοῦτόν τινα ποιῶν σαυτὸν ἴσθι ὅτι καλὸν ποιήσεις· μέχρις δʼ ἂν τούτων ἀμελῇς, αἰσχρόν σʼ εἶναι ἀνάγκη, κἂν πάντα μηχανᾷ ὑπὲρ τοῦ φαίνεσθαί σε καλόν. 10ἐντεῦθεν οὐκέτι ἔχω σοι πῶς εἴπω· ἄν τε γὰρ λέγω ἃ φρονῶ, ἀνιάσω σε καὶ ἐξελθὼν τάχα οὐδʼ εἰσελεύσῃ· ἄν τε μὴ λέγω, ὅρα οἷον ποιήσω, εἰ σὺ μὲν ἔρχῃ πρὸς ἐμὲ ὠφεληθησόμενος, ἐ[ρ]γὼ δʼ οὐκ ὠφελήσω σʼ οὐδέν, καὶ σὺ μὲν ὡς πρὸς φιλόσοφον, ἐγὼ δʼ οὐδὲν ἐρῶ σοι ὡς φιλόσοφος. 11πῶς δὲ καὶ ὠμόν ἐστι πρὸς αὐτόν σε τὸ περιιδεῖν ἀνεπανόρθωτον ἄν ποθʼ ὕστερον φρένας σχῇς, εὐλόγως μοι ἐγκαλέσεις· 12τί εἶδεν ἐν ἐμοὶ ὁ Ἐπίκτητος, ἵνα βλέπων με τοιοῦτον εἰσερχόμενον πρὸς αὐτὸν οὕτως αἰσχρῶς ἔχοντα περιίδῃ καὶ μηδέποτε μηδὲ ῥῆμα εἴπῃ; 13οὕτως μου ἀπέγνω; νέος οὐκ ἤμην; οὐκ ἤμην λόγου ἀκουστικός; πόσοι δʼ ἄλλοι νέοι ἐφʼ ἡλικίας πολλὰ τοιαῦτα διαμαρτάνουσιν; 14τινά ποτʼ ἀκούω Πολέμωνα ἐξ ἀκολαστοτάτου νεανίσκου τοσαύτην μεταβολὴν μεταβαλεῖν. ἔστω, οὐκ ᾤετό με Πολέμωνα ἔσεσθαι· τὴν μὲν κόμην ἠδύνατό μου διορθῶσαι, τὰ μὲν περιάμματά μου περιελεῖν, ψιλούμενόν με παῦσαι ἠδύνατο, ἀλλὰ βλέπων με — τίνος εἴπω; — σχῆμα ἔχοντα ἐσιώπα. 15ἐγὼ οὐ λέγω, τίνος ἐστὶ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦτο· σὺ δʼ αὐτὸ ἐρεῖς τόθʼ, ὅταν εἰς σαυτὸν ἔλθῃς, καὶ γνώσει, οἷόν ἐστι καὶ τίνες αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύουσι. 16τοῦτό μοι ὕστερον ἂν ἐγκαλῇς, τί ἕξω ἀπολογήσασθαι; ναί· ἀλλʼ ἐρῶ καὶ οὐ πεισθήσεται. τῷ γὰρ Ἀπόλλωνι ἐπείσθη ὁ Λάιος; οὐκ ἀπελθὼν καὶ μεθυσθεὶς χαίρειν εἶπεν τῷ χρησμῷ; τί οὖν; παρὰ τοῦτο οὐκ εἶπεν αὐτῷ ὁ Ἀπόλλων τὰς ἀληθείας; 17καίτοι ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ οἶδα οὔτʼ εἰ πεισθήσῃ μοι οὔτʼ εἰ μή· ἐκεῖνος δʼ ἀκριβέστατα ᾔδει, ὅτι οὐ πεισθήσεται, καὶ ὅμως εἶπεν. 18— διὰ τί δʼ εἶπεν; — διὰ τί δὲ Ἀπόλλων ἐστίν; διὰ τί δὲ χρησμῳδεῖ; διὰ τί δʼ εἰς ταύτην τὴν χώραν ἑαυτὸν κατατέταχεν, ὥστε μάντις εἶναι καὶ πηγὴ τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔρχεσθαι τοὺς ἐκ τῆς οἰκουμένης; διὰ τί δὲ προγέγραπται τὸ γνῶθι σαυτὸν μηδενὸς αὐτὸ νοοῦντος; 19Σωκράτης πάντας ἔπειθε τοὺς προσιό ντας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἑαυτῶν; οὐδὲ τὸ χιλιοστὸν μέρος. ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἐπειδὴ εἰς ταύτην τὴν τάξιν ὑπὸ τοῦ δαιμονίου, ὥς φησιν αὐτός, κατετάχθη, μηκέτι ἐξέλιπεν. ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς τί λέγει; 20ἄν μʼ ἀφῆτε, φησίν, ἐπὶ τούτοις, ἵνα μηκέτι ταῦτα πράσσω ἃ νῦν, οὐκ ἀνέξομαι οὐδʼ ἀνήσω· ἀλλὰ καὶ νέῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀεὶ τῷ ἐντυγχάνοντι προσελθὼν πεύσομαι ταῦτα ἃ καὶ νῦν πυνθάνομαι, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα ὑμῶν, φησί, τῶν πολιτῶν, ὅτι ἐγγυτέρω μου γένει ἐστέ. 21οὕτως περίεργος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ πολυπράγμων; τί δέ σοι μέλει, τί ποιοῦμεν; οἷον καὶ λέγεις; κοινωνός μου ὢν καὶ συγγενὴς ἀμελεῖς σεαυτοῦ καὶ τῇ πόλει παρέχεις πολίτην κακὸν καὶ τοῖς συγγενέσι συγγενῆ καὶ τοῖς γείτοσι γείτονα. 22σὺ οὖν τίς εἶ; ἐνταῦθα μέγα ἐστὶ τὸ εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὗτός εἰμι, ᾧ δεῖ μέλειν ἀνθρώπων. οὐδὲ γὰρ λέοντι τὸ τυχὸν βοίδιον τολμᾷ ἀντιστῆναι αὐτῷ· ἂν δʼ ὁ ταῦρος προσελθὼν ἀνθίστηται, λέγε αὐτῷ, ἄν σοι δόξῃ[ς], σὺ δὲ τίς εἶ; καὶ τί σοὶ μέλει; 23ἄνθρωπε, ἐν παντὶ γένει φύεταί τι ἐξαίρετον· ἐν βουσίν, ἐν κυσίν, ἐν μελίσσαις, ἐν ἵπποις. μὴ δὴ λέγε τῷ ἐξαιρέτῳ σὺ οὖν τί εἶ; εἰ δὲ μή, ἐρεῖ σοι φωνήν ποθεν λαβὸν ἐγώ εἰμι τοιοῦτον οἷον ἐν ἱματίῳ πορφύρα· μή μʼ ἀξίου ὅμοιον εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἢ τῇ φύσει μου μέμφου, ὅτι με διαφέροντα παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐποίησεν. 24τί οὖν; ἐγὼ τοιοῦτος; πόθεν; σὺ γὰρ τοιοῦτος οἷος ἀκούειν τἀληθῆ; ὤφελεν. ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἐπεί πως κατεκρίθην πώγωνα ἔχειν πολιὸν καὶ τρίβωνα καὶ σὺ εἰσέρχῃ πρὸς ἐμὲ ὡς πρὸς φιλόσοφον, οὐ χρήσομαί σοι ὠμῶς οὐδʼ ἀπογνωστικῶς, ἀλλʼ ἐρῶ· νεανίσκε, τίνα θέλεις καλὸν ποιεῖν; γνῶθι πρῶτον τίς εἶ καὶ οὕτως κόσμει σεαυτόν. 25ἄνθρωπος εἶ· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ θνητὸν ζῷον χρηστικὸν φαντασίαις λογικῶς. τὸ δὲ λογικῶς τί ἐστιν; φύσει ὁμολογουμένως καὶ τελέως. τί οὖν ἐξαίρετον ἔχεις; τὸ ζῷον; οὔ. τὸ θνητόν; οὔ. τὸ χρηστικὸν φαντασίαις; 26οὔ. τὸ λογικὸν ἔχεις ἐξαίρετον· τοῦτο κόσμει καὶ καλλώπιζε· τὴν κόμην δʼ ἄφες τῷ πλάσαντι ὡς αὐτὸς ἠθέλησεν. 27ἄγε, τίνας ἄλλας ἔχεις προσηγορίας; ἀνὴρ εἶ ἢ γυνή; — ἀνήρ. — ἄνδρα οὖν καλλώπιζε, μὴ γυναῖκα. ἐκείνη φύσει λεία γέγονε καὶ τρυφερά· κἂν ἔχῃ τρίχας πολλάς, τέρας ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς τέρασιν ἐν Ῥώμῃ δείκνυται. 28τοῦτο δʼ ἐπʼ ἀνδρός ἐστι τὸ μὴ ἔχειν· κἂν μὲν φύσει μὴ ἔχῃ, τέρας ἐστίν, ἂν δʼ αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ ἐκκόπτῃ καὶ ἀποτίλλῃ, τί αὐτὸν ποιήσωμεν; ποῦ αὐτὸν δείξωμεν καὶ τί προγράψωμεν; δείξω ὑμῖν ἄνδρα, ὃς θέλει μᾶλλον γυνὴ εἶναι ἢ ἀνήρ. 29ὦ δεινοῦ θεάματος· οὐδεὶς οὐχὶ θαυμάσει τὴν προγραφήν· νὴ τὸν Δία, οἶμαι ὅτι αὐτοὶ οἱ τιλλόμενοι οὐ παρακολουθοῦντες, ὅτι τοῦτʼ αὐτό ἐστιν, ὃ ποιοῦσιν, ποιοῦσιν. ἄνθρωπε, τί ἔχεις ἐγκαλέσαι σου τῇ φύσει; 30ὅτι σε ἄνδρα ἐγέννησεν; τί οὖν; πάσας ἔδει γυναῖκας γεννῆσαι; καὶ τί ἂν ὄφελος ἦν σοι τοῦ κοσμεῖσθαι; τίνι ἂν ἐκοσμοῦ, εἰ πάντες ἦσαν γυναῖκες; 31ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀρέσκει σοι τὸ πραγμάτιον· ὅλον διʼ ὅλων αὐτὸ ποίησον· ἆρον — τί ποτʼ ἐκεῖνο; — τὸ αἴτιον τῶν τριχῶν· ποίησον εἰς ἅπαντα σαυτὸν γυναῖκα, ἵνα μὴ πλανώμεθα, μὴ τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ ἀνδρός, τὸ δʼ ἥμισυ γυναικός. 32τίνι θέλεις ἀρέσαι; τοῖς γυναικαρίοις; ὡς ἀνὴρ αὐτοῖς ἄρεσον. ναί· ἀλλὰ τοῖς λείοις χαίρουσιν. οὐκ ἀπάγξῃ; καὶ εἰ τοῖς κιναίδοις ἔχαιρον, ἐγένου ἂν κίναιδος; 33τοῦτό σοι τὸ ἔργον ἐστίν, ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐγεννήθης, ἵνα σοι αἱ γυναῖκες αἱ ἀκόλαστοι χαίρωσιν; 34τοιοῦτόν σε θῶμεν πολίτην Κορινθίων, κἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, ἀστυνόμον ἢ ἐφήβαρχον ἢ στρατηγὸν ἢ ἀγωνοθέτην; 35ἄγε καὶ γαμήσας τίλλεσθαι μέλλεις; τίνι καὶ ἐπὶ τί; καὶ παιδία ποιήσας εἶτα κἀκεῖνα τιλλόμενα ἡμῖν εἰσάξεις εἰς τὸ πολίτευμα; καλὸς πολίτης καὶ βουλευτὴς καὶ ῥήτωρ. τοιούτους δεῖ νέους εὔχεσθαι ἡμῖν φύεσθαι καὶ ἀνατρέφεσθαι; 36μή, τοὺς θεούς σοι, νεανίσκε· ἀλλʼ ἅπαξ ἀκούσας τῶν λόγων τούτων ἀπελθὼν σαυτῷ εἰπὲ ταῦτά μοι Ἐπίκτητος οὐκ εἴρηκεν· πόθεν γὰρ ἐκείνῳ; ἀλλὰ θεός τίς ποτʼ εὐμενὴς διʼ ἐκείνου. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἐπῆλθεν Ἐπικτήτῳ ταῦτα εἰπεῖν οὐκ εἰωθότι λέγειν πρὸς οὐδένα. ἄγε οὖν τῷ θεῷ πεισθῶμεν, ἵνα μὴ θεοχόλωτοι ὦμεν. 37οὔ· ἀλλʼ ἂν μὲν κόραξ κραυγάζων σημαίνῃ σοί τι, οὐχ ὁ κόραξ ἐστὶν ὁ σημαίνων, ἀλλʼ ὁ θεὸς διʼ αὐτοῦ· ἂν δὲ διʼ ἀνθρωπίνης φωνῆς σημαίνῃ τι, τὸν ἄνθρωπον ποιήσει λέγειν σοι ταῦτα, ἵνʼ ἀγνοῇς τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ δαιμονίου, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν οὕτως, τοῖς δʼ ἐκείνως σημαίνει, περὶ δὲ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ κυριωτάτων διὰ καλλίστου ἀγγέλου σημαίνει; 38τί ἐστιν ἄλλο, ὃ λέγει ὁ ποιητής; ἐπεὶ πρό οἱ εἴπομεν ἡμεῖς, Ἑρμείαν πέμψαντες ἐύσκοπον ἀργειφόντην, μήτʼ αὐτὸν κτείνειν μήτε μνάασθαι ἄκοιτιν. 39ὁ Ἑρμῆς καταβὰς ἔμελλεν αὐτῷ λέγειν ταῦτα καὶ σοὶ νῦν λέγουσιν οἱ θεοὶ ταῦτα Ἑρμείαν πέμψαντες διάκτορον ἀργειφόντην μὴ ἐκστρέφειν τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα μηδὲ περιεργάζεσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἀφεῖναι τὸν ἄνδρα ἄνδρα, τὴν γυναῖκα γυναῖκα, τὸν καλὸν ἄνθρωπον ὡς καλὸν ἄνθρωπον, τὸν αἰσχρὸν ὡς ἄνθρωπον αἰσχρόν. ὅτι οὐκ εἶ κρέας οὐδὲ τρίχες, ἀλλὰ προαίρεσις· 40ταύτην ἂν σχῇς καλήν, τότʼ ἔστι καλός. 41μέχρι δὲ νῦν οὐ τολμῶ σοι λέγειν, ὅτι αἰσχρὸς εἶ· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι πάντα θέλειν ἀκοῦσαι ἢ τοῦτο. 42ἀλλʼ ὅρα, τί λέγει Σωκράτης τῷ καλλίστῳ πάντων καὶ ὡραιοτάτῳ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ· πειρῶ οὖν καλὸς εἶναι. τί αὐτῷ λέγει; πλάσσε σου τὴν κόμην καὶ τίλλε σου τὰ σκέλη; μὴ γένοιτο· ἀλλὰ κόσμει σου τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἔξαιρε τὰ φαῦλα δόγματα. 43τὸ σωμάτιον οὖν πῶς; ὡς πέφυκεν. ἄλλῳ τούτων ἐμέλησεν· ἐκείνῳ ἐπί[σ]τρεψον. 44— τί οὖν; ἀκάθαρτον δεῖ εἶναι; — μὴ γένοιτο· ἀλλʼ ὃς εἶ καὶ πέφυκας, τοῦτον κάθαιρε, ἄνδρα ὡς ἄνδρα καθάριον εἶναι, γυναῖκα ὡς γυναῖκα, παιδίον ὡς παιδίον. 45οὔ· ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ λέοντος ἐκτίλωμεν τὴν κόμην, ἵνα μὴ ἀκάθαρτος ᾖ, καὶ τοῦ ἀλεκτρυόνος τὸν λόφον· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτον καθάριον εἶναι. ἀλλʼ ὡς ἀλεκτρυόνα καὶ ἐκεῖνον ὡς λέοντα καὶ τὸν κυνηγετικὸν κύνα ὡς κυνηγετικόν.