Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER II. · In what a Proficient ought to be exercised; and that we neglect the principal Things.
1There are Three Topics in Philosophy, in which he, who would be wise and good, must be exercised. That of the Desires, and Aversions; that he may not be disappointed of the one, nor incur the other. That of the Pursuits, and Avoidances; and, in general, the Duties of Life; that he may act with Order and Consideration, and not carelessly. The Third Topic belongs to Circumspection, and a Freedom from Deception; and, in general, whatever belongs to the Assent. 2Of these Topics, the principal and most urgent, is that of the Passions: for Passion is produced no otherwise, than by a Disappointment of the Desires, and an incurring of the Aversions. It is this which introduces Perturbations, Tumults, Misfortunes, and Calamities: this is the Spring of Sorrow, Lamentation, and Envy: this renders us envious, and emulous; and incapable of hearing Reason. 3The next Topic regards the Duties of Life. For I am not to be undisturbed by Passions, in the same Sense as a Statue is; but as one who preserves the natural and acquired Relations; as a pious Person, as a Son, as a Brother, as a Father, as a Citizen. 4The Third Topic belongs to those who are now making a Proficiency; and is a Security to the other Two, that no unexamined Appearance may surprize us, either in Sleep, or Wine, or in the Spleen. This, say you, is above us. But our present Philosophers, leaving the First and Second Topics [the Affections, and moral Duties], employ themselves wholly about the Third; Convertible, definitive, hypothetical Propositions [and other logical Subtilties]. For, they say, that we must, by engaging even in these Subjects, take care to guard against Deception. Who must? A wise and good Man. Is this Security from Deception, then, the Thing you want? Have you mastered the other Subjects? Are you not liable to be deceived by Money? When you see a fine Girl, do you oppose the Appearance which is raised in your Mind? If your Neighbour inherits an Estate, do you feel no Vexation? Do you, at present, want nothing more than Perseverance? You learn even these very Things, Wretch, with Trembling, and a solicitous Dread of Contempt; and are inquisitive to know, what is said of you; and, if any one comes and tells you, that, in a dispute which was the best of the Philosophers, one of the Company said, that such a one was the only Philosopher, that little Soul of yours grows to the Size of two Cubits, instead of an Inch: but if another should come, and say, "You are mistaken, he is not worth hearing; for what doth he know? He hath the first Rudiments, but nothing more;" you are Thunderstruck; you presently turn pale, and cry out, "I will show him; what a Man, and how great a Philosopher I am." It is evident [what you are], by these very Things; why do you aim to show it by others? Do not you know, that Diogenes showed some Sophist in this Manner, by extending his middle Finger; and, when he was mad with Rage, This, says Diogenes, is He: I have showed him to you. For a Man is not showed in the same Sense as a Stone, or a Piece of Wood, by the Finger; but whoever shows his Principles, shows him as a Man. 5Let us see your Principles too. For is it not evident, that you consider your own Choice as nothing; but look out for something external, and independent on it? As, what such a one will say of you, and what you shall be thought; whether a Man of Letters; whether to have read Chrysippus, or Antipater; for, if Archedemus too, you have every thing you wish. Why are you still solicitous, lest you should not show us what you are? Will you let me tell you, what you have showed us, that you are? A mean, discontented, passionate, cowardly Fellow; complaining of every thing; accusing every body; perpetually restless; good for nothing. This you have showed us. Go now and read Archedemus: and then, if you hear but the Noise of a Mouse, you are a dead Man; for you will die some such Kind of Death as——Who was it? Crinis; who valued himself extremely too, that he understood Archedemus. 6Wretch, why do not you let alone Things, that do not belong to you? These Things become such as are able to learn them, without Perturbation; who can say, "I am not subject to Anger, or Grief, or Envy. I am not restrained; I am not compelled. What remains for me to do? I am at Leisure; I am at Ease. Let us see how convertible Propositions are to be treated: Let us consider, when an Hypothesis is laid down, how we may avoid a Contradiction." To such Persons do these Things belong. They who are safe may light a Fire; go to Dinner, if they please; and sing, and dance: but you come and hoist a Flag, when your Vessel is just sinking.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (3)
- See Introduction, §. 3. 4. 5. 6.
- Extending the middle Finger, with the Antients, was a Mark of the greatest Contempt.
- Crinis was a Stoic Philosopher. The Circumstances of his Death are not now known.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
In what a well-trained man should exercise himself; and that we neglect the principal things.
There are three topics in philosophy, in which he who would be wise and good must be exercised: that of the desires and aversions, that he may not be disappointed of the one, nor incur the other; that of the pursuits and avoidances, and, in general, the duties of life, that he may act with order and consideration, and not carelessly; the third includes integrity of mind and prudence, and, in general, whatever belongs to the judgment.
Of these points the principal and most urgent is that which reaches the passions; for passion is produced no otherwise than by a disappointment of one’s desires and an incurring of one’s aversions. It is this which introduces perturbations, tumults, misfortunes, and calamities; this is the spring of sorrow, lamentation, and envy; this renders us envious and emulous, and incapable of hearing reason.
The next topic regards the duties of life. For I am not to be undisturbed by passions, in the same sense as a statue is; but as one who preserves the natural and acquired relations,—as a pious person, as . son, as a brother, as a father, as a citizen.
The third topic belongs to those scholars who are now somewhat advanced; and is a security to the other two, that no bewildering semblance may surprise us, either in sleep, or wine, or in depression. This, say you, is beyond us. Yet our present philosophers, leaving the first and second topics, employ themselves wholly about the third; dealing in the logical subtilties. For they say that we must, by engaging in these subjects, take care to guard against deception. Who must? A wise and good man. Is this really, then, the thing you need? Have you mastered the other points? Are you not liable to be deceived by money? When you see a fine girl, do you oppose the seductive influence? If your neighbor inherits an estate, do you feel no vexation? Is it not steadfastness which you chiefly need? You learn even these very things, slave, with trembling, and a solicitous dread of contempt; and are inquisitive to know what is said of you. And if any one comes and tells you that, in a dispute as to which was the best of the philosophers, one of the company named a certain person as the only philosopher, that little soul of yours grows to the size of two cubits instead of an inch. But if another comes and says, You are mistaken, he is not worth hearing; for what does he know? He has the first rudiments, but nothing more, you are thunderstruck; you presently turn pale, and cry out, will show what I am; that I am a great philosopher. You exhibit by these very things what you are aiming to show in other ways. Do not you know that Diogenes exhibited some sophist in this manner, by pointing with his middle finger; and when the man was mad with rage, This, said Diogenes, is the very man; I have exhibited him to you. For a man is not shown by the finger in the same sense as a stone or a piece of wood, but whoever points out his principles shows him as a man.
Let us see your principles too. For is it not evident that you consider your own Will as nothing, but are always aiming at something beyond its reach? As, what such a one will say of you, and what you shall be thought,—whether a man of letters; whether to have read Chrysippus or Antipater; and if Archedemus too, you have everything you wish. Why are you still solicitous, lest you should not show us what you are? Shall I tell you what you have shown yourself? A mean, discontented, passionate, cowardly person, complaining of everything, accusing everybody, perpetually restless, good for nothing. This you have shown us. Go now and read Archedemus; and then, if you hear but the noise of a mouse, you are a dead man; for you will die some such kind of death as—Who was it? Crinis; who valued himself extremely too, that he understood Archedemus.
Wretch, why do you not let alone things that do not belong to you? These things belong to such as are able to learn them without perturbation; who can say, am not subject to anger, or grief, or envy. I am not restrained; I am not compelled. What remains for me to do? I am at leisure; I am at ease. Let us now see how logical inversions are to be treated; let us consider, when an hypothesis is laid down, how we may avoid a contradiction. To such persons do these things belong. They who are safe may light a fire, go to dinner if they please, and sing and dance; but you are for spreading sail just when your ship is going down.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Higginson’s notes (2)
- Extending the middle finger, with the ancients, was a mark of the greatest contempt.—C.
- Crinis was a Stoic philosopher. The circumstances of his death are not now known.—C.
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
In what a man ought to be exercised who has made proficiency; In place of προκόψαντα Schweig. suggests that we should read προκόψοντα : and this is probable. and that we neglect the chief things.
There are three things (topics, τόποι) in which a man ought to exercise himself who would be wise and good. The first concerns the desires and the aversions, that a man may not fail to get what he desires, and that he may not fall into that which he does not desire. The second concerns the movements (towards an object) and the movements from an object, and generally in doing what a man ought to do, that he may act according to order, to reason, and not carelessly. The third thing concerns freedom from deception and rashness in judgment, and generally it concerns the assents (συγκαταθέσεις). Of these topics the chief and the most urgent is that which relates to the affects (τὰ πάθη, perturbations); for an affect is produced in no other way than by a failing to obtain that which a man desires or falling into that which a man would wish to avoid. This is that which brings in perturbations, disorders, bad fortune, misfortunes, sorrows, lamentations, and envy; that which makes men envious and jealous; and by these causes we are unable even to listen to the precepts of reason. The second topic concerns the duties of a man; for I ought not to be free from affects (ἀπαθῆ) like a statue, but I ought to maintain the relations (σχέσεις) natural and acquired, as a pious man, as a son, as a father, as a citizen.
The third topic is that which immediately concerns those who are making proficiency, that which concerns the security of the other two, so that not even in sleep any appearance unexamined may surprise us, nor in intoxication, nor in melancholy. This, it may be said, is above our power. But the present philosophers neglecting the first topic and the second (the affects and duties), employ themselves on the third, using sophistical arguments ( μεταπίπτοντας), making conclusions from questioning, employing hypotheses, lying. For a man must, as it is said, when employed on these matters, take care that he is not deceived. Who must? The wise and good man. This then is all that is wanting to you. Have you successfully worked out the rest? Are you free from deception in the matter of money? If you see a beautiful girl, do you resist the appearance? If your neighbour obtains an estate by will, are you not vexed? Now is there nothing else wanting to you except unchangeable firmness of mind (ἀμεταπτωσία)? Wretch, you hear these very things with fear and anxiety that some person may despise you, and with inquiries about what any person may say about you. And if a man come and tell you that in a certain conversation in which the question was, Who is the best philosopher, a man who was present said that a certain person was the chief philosopher, your little soul which was only a finger’s length stretches out to two cubits. But if another who is present says, You are mistaken; it is not worth while to listen to a certain person, for what does he know? he has only the first principles, and no more? then you are confounded, you grow pale, you cry out immediately, I will show him who I am, that I am a great philosopher.— It is seen by these very things: why do you wish to show it by others? Do you not know that Diogenes pointed out one of the sophists in this way by stretching out his middle finger? And then when the man was wild with rage, This, he said, is the certain person: I have pointed him out to you. For a man is not shown by the finger, as a stone or a piece of wood; but when any person shows the man’s principles, then he shows him as a man.
Let us look at your principles also. For is it not plain that you value not at all your own will ( προαίρεσις), but you look externally to things which are independent of your will? For instance, what will a certain person say? and what will people think of you? will you be considered a man of learning; have you read Chrysippus or Antipater? for if you have read Archedemus also, you have every thing [that you can desire]. Why are you still uneasy lest you should not show us who you are? Would you let me tell you what manner of man you have shown us that you are? You have exhibited yourself to us as a mean fellow, querulous, passionate, cowardly, finding fault with every thing, blaming every body, never quiet, vain: this is what you have exhibited to us. Go away now and read Archedemus; then if a mouse should leap down and make a noise, you are a dead man. For such a death awaits you as it did—what was the man’s name?—Crinis; and he too was proud, because he understood Archedemus.
Wretch, will you not dismiss these things that do not concern you at all? These things are suitable to those who are able to learn them without perturbation, to those who can say: I am not subject to anger, to grief, to envy: I am not hindered, I am not restrained. What remains for me? I have leisure, I am tranquil: let us see how we must deal with sophistical arguments; let us see how when a man has accepted an hypothesis he shall not be led away to any thing absurd. To them such things belong. To those who are happy it is appropriate to light a fire, to dine; if they choose, both to sing and to dance. But when the vessel is sinking, you come to me and hoist the sails.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (7)
- καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός is the usual Greek expression to signify a perfect man. The Stoics, according to Stobaeus, absurdly called virtue, καλόν ( beautiful ), because it naturally calls ( καλεῖ ) to itself those who desire it. The Stoics also said that every thing good was beautiful ( καλός ), and that the good and the beautiful were equivalent. The Roman expression is Vir bonus et sapiens . (Hor. Epp., i. 7, 22 and 16, 20 ). Perhaps the phrase καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός arose from the notion of beauty and goodness being the combination of a perfect human being.
- Antoninus, xi. 37, as to sensual desire he should altogether keep away from it; and as to avoidance [aversion] he should not show it with respect to any of the things which are not in our power.
- To point out a man with the middle finger was a way of showing the greatest contempt for him.
- As to Archedemus, see ii. 4, 11. Απέχεις ἅπαντα : this expression is compared by Upton with Matthew vi. 2, ἀπέχουσι μισθὸν .
- Wolf suggests οἷος . Crinis was a Stoic philosopher mentioned by Diogenes Laertius. We may suppose that he was no real philosopher, and that he died of fright.
- See this chapter above.
- τοὺς σιφάρους . On this reading the student may consult the note in Schweighaeuser’s edition. The word σιφάρους , if it is the right reading, is not clear; nor the meaning of this conclusion. The philosopher is represented as being full of anxiety about things which do not concern him, and which are proper subjects for those only who are free from disturbing passions and are quite happy, which i not the philosopher’s condition. He is compared to a sinking ship, and at this very time he is supposed to be employed in the useless labour of hoisting the sails.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1τρεῖς εἰσι τόποι, περὶ οὓς ἀσκηθῆναι δεῖ τὸν ἐσόμενον καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν· ὁ περὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκκλίσεις, ἵνα μήτʼ ὀρεγόμενος ἀποτυγχάνῃ μήτʼ ἐκκλίνων περιπίπτῃ· 2ὁ περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς καὶ ἀφορμὰς καὶ ἁπλῶς ὁ περὶ τὸ καθῆκον, ἵνα τάξει, ἵνα εὐλογίστως, ἵνα μὴ ἀμελῶς· τρίτος ἐστὶν ὁ περὶ τὴν ἀνεξαπατησίαν καὶ ἀνεικαιότητα καὶ ὅλως ὁ περὶ τὰς συγκαταθέσεις. 3τούτων κυριώτατος καὶ μάλιστα ἐπείγων ἐστὶν ὁ περὶ τὰ πάθη· πάθος γὰρ ἄλλως οὐ γίνεται εἰ μὴ ὀρέξεως ἀποτυγχανούσης ἢ ἐκκλίσεως περιπιπτούσης. οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ταραχάς, θορύβους, ἀτυχίας, ὁ δυστυχίας ἐπιφέρων, ὁ πένθη, οἰμωγάς, φθόνους, ὁ φθονερούς, ὁ ζηλοτύπους ποιῶν, διʼ ὧν οὐδʼ ἀκοῦσαι λόγου δυνάμεθα. 4δεύτερός ἐστιν ὁ περὶ τὸ καθῆκον· οὐ δεῖ γάρ με εἶναι ἀπαθῆ ὡς ἀνδριάντα, ἀλλὰ τὰς σχέσεις τηροῦντα τὰς φυσικὰς καὶ ἐπιθέτους ὡς εὐσεβῆ, ὡς υἱόν, ὡς ἀδελφόν, ὡς πατέρα, ὡς πολίτην. 5τρίτος ἐστὶν ὁ ἤδη τοῖς προκόπτουσιν ἐπιβάλλων, ὁ περὶ τὴν αὐτῶν τούτων ἀσφάλειαν, ἵνα μηδʼ ἐν ὕπνοις λάθῃ τις ἀνεξέταστος παρελθοῦσα φαντασία μηδʼ ἐν οἰνώσει μηδὲ μελαγχολῶντος. — τοῦτο ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς, φησίν, ἐστίν. 6— οἱ δὲ νῦν φιλόσοφοι ἀφέντες τὸν πρῶτον τόπον καὶ τὸν δεύτερον καταγίνονται περὶ τὸν τρίτον· μεταπίπτοντας, ἠρωτῆσθαι περαίνοντας, ὑποθετικούς, ψευδομένους. 7— δεῖ γάρ, φησίν, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ὕλαις ταύταις γενόμενον διαφυλάξαι τὸ ἀνεξαπάτητον. 8— τίνα; τὸν καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν. σοὶ οὖν τοῦτο λείπει; τὰς ἄλλας ἐκπεπόνηκας; περὶ κερμάτιον ἀνεξαπάτητος εἶ; ἐὰν ἴδῃς κοράσιον καλόν, ἀντέχεις τῇ φαντασίᾳ; ἂν ὁ γείτων σου κληρονομήσῃ, οὐ δάκνῃ; νῦν οὐδὲν ἄλλο σοι λείπει ἢ ἀμεταπτωσία; 9τάλας, αὐτὰ ταῦτα τρέμων μανθάνεις καὶ ἀγωνιῶν, μή τίς σου καταφρονήσῃ, καὶ πυνθανόμενος, μή τίς τι περὶ σοῦ λέγει. 10κἄν τις ἐλθὼν εἴπῃ σοι ὅτι λόγου γινομένου, τίς ἄριστός ἐστι τῶν φιλοσόφων, παρών τις ἔλεγεν, ὅτι εἷς φιλόσοφος ὁ δεῖνα, γέγονέ σου τὸ ψυχάριον ἀντὶ δακτυλιαίου δίπηχυ. ἂν δʼ ἄλλος παρὼν εἴπῃ οὐδὲν εἴρηκας, οὐκ ἔστιν ἄξιον τοῦ δεῖνος ἀκροᾶσθαι· τί γὰρ οἶδεν; τὰς πρώτας ἀφορμὰς ἔχει, πλέον δʼ οὐδέν, ἐξέστηκας, ὠχρίακας, εὐθὺς κέκραγας ἐγὼ αὐτῷ δείξω, τίς εἰμι, ὅτι μέγας φιλόσοφος. 11βλέπεται ἐξ αὐτῶν τούτων. τί θέλεις ἐξ ἄλλων δεῖξαι; οὐκ οἶδας, ὅτι Διογένης τῶν σοφιστῶν τινα οὕτως ἔδειξεν ἐκτείνας τὸν μέσον δάκτυλον, εἶτα ἐκμανέντος αὐτοῦ οὗτός ἐστιν, ἔφη, ὁ δεῖνα· ἔδειξα ὑμῖν αὐτόν; 12ἄνθρωπος γὰρ δακτύλῳ οὐ δείκνυται ὡς λίθος ἢ ὡς ξύλον, ἀλλʼ ὅταν τις τὰ δόγματα αὐτοῦ δείξῃ, τότε αὐτὸν ὡς ἄνθρωπον ἔδειξεν. 13βλέπωμεν καὶ σοῦ τὰ δόγματα. μὴ γὰρ οὐ δῆλόν ἐστιν, ὅτι σὺ τὴν προαίρεσιν τὴν σαυτοῦ ἐν οὐδενὶ τίθεσαι, ἔξω δὲ βλέπεις εἰς τὰ ἀπροαίρετα, τί ἐρεῖ ὁ δεῖνα καὶ τίς εἶναι δόξεις, εἰ φιλόλογος, εἰ Χρύσιππον ἀνεγνωκὼς ἢ Ἀντίπατρον; εἰ μὲν γὰρ καὶ Ἀρχέδημον, ἀπέχεις ἅπαντα. 14τί ἔτι ἀγωνιᾷς, μὴ οὐ δείξῃς ἡμῖν, τίς εἶ; θέλεις σοι εἴπω, τίνα ἡμῖν ἔδειξας; ἄνθρωπον παριόντα ταπεινόν, μεμψίμοιρον, ὀξύθυμον, δειλόν, πάντα μεμφόμενον, πᾶσιν ἐγκαλοῦντα, μηδέποτε ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντα, πέρπερον· ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἔδειξας. 15ἄπελθε νῦν καὶ ἀναγίγνωσκε Ἀρχέδημον· εἶτα μῦς ἂν καταπέσῃ καὶ ψοφήσῃ, ἀπέθανες. τοιοῦτος γάρ σε μένει θάνατος, οἷον καὶ τὸν — τίνα ποτʼ ἐκεῖνον; — τὸν Κρῖνιν. καὶ ἐκεῖνος μέγα ἐφρόνει, ὅτι ἐνόει Ἀρχέδημον. 16τάλας, οὐ θέλεις ἀφεῖναι ταῦτα τὰ μηδὲν πρὸς σέ; πρέπει ταῦτα τοῖς δυναμένοις δίχα ταραχῆς αὐτὰ μανθάνειν, οἷς ἔξεστιν εἰπεῖν οὐκ ὀργίζομαι, οὐ λυποῦμαι, οὐ φθονῶ, οὐ κωλύομαι, οὐκ ἀναγκάζομαι. τί μοι λοιπόν; εὐσχολῶ, ἡσυχίαν ἄγω. 17ἴδωμεν, πῶς περὶ τὰς μεταπτώσεις τῶν λόγων δεῖ ἀναστρέφεσθαι· ἴδωμεν, πῶς ὑπόθεσίν τις λαβὼν εἰς οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ἀπαχθήσεται. ἐκείνων ἐστὶ ταῦτα. 18τοῖς εὖ παθοῦσι πρέπει πῦρ καίειν, ἀριστᾶν, ἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, καὶ ᾁδειν καὶ ὀρχεῖσθαι· βυθιζομένου δὲ τοῦ πλοίου σύ μοι παρελθὼν ἐπαίρεις τοὺς σιφάρους.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA