Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER IX. · Concerning a certain Orator, who was going to Rome on a Law Suit.
1When a Person came to him, who was going to Rome, on a Law Suit, in which his Dignity was concerned; and, after telling him the Occasion of his Journey, asked him, what he thought of the Affair? If you ask me, says Epictetus, what will happen to you at Rome, and whether you shall gain, or lose your Cause, I have no Theorem for this. But if you ask me, how you shall fare; I can answer, If you have right Principles, well, if wrong ones, ill. For Principle is to every one, the Cause of Action. For what is the Reason, that you so earnestly desired to be voted Governor of the Gnossians? Principle. What is the Reason, that you are now going to Rome? Principle. And in Winter too; and with Danger, and Expence? Why: because it is necessary. What tells you so? Principle. If then, Principles are the Causes of all our Actions, where-ever any one hath bad Principles, the Effect will be answerable to the Cause. Well then: are all our Principles found? Are both yours, and your Antagonists? How then do you differ? Or are yours better than his? Why? You think so; and so doth he, that his are better; and so do Madmen. This is a bad Criterion. But show me, that you have made some Examination, and taken some Care of your Principles. As you now take a Voyage to Rome, for the Government of the Gnossians, and are not contented to stay at home, with the Honours you before enjoyed, but desire something greater, and more illustrious; did you ever take such a Voyage, in order to examine your own Principles; and to throw away the bad ones, if you happened to have any? Did you ever apply to any one, upon this Account? What Time did you ever let yourself? What Age? Run over your Years. If you are ashamed of me, do it to yourself. Did you examine your Principles, when you were a Child? Did you not then do every thing, just as you do every thing, now? When you were a Youth, and frequented the Schools of the Orators, and made Declamations yourself, did you ever imagine, that you were deficient in any thing? And when you became a Man, and entered upon public Business, pleaded Causes, and acquired Credit, who, any longer, appeared to be equal to you? How would you have borne, that any one should examine, whether your Principles were bad? What, then, would you have me say to you? Assist me in this Affair. I have no Theorem for that. Neither are you come to me, if it be upon that Account you came, as to a Philosopher; but as you would come to an Herb-seller, or a Shoe-maker. To what Purposes then, have the Philosophers Theorems? For preserving and conducting the ruling Faculty conformably to Nature, whatever happens. Do you think this a small Thing? No: but the greatest. Well: and doth it requires but a short time? And may it be taken, as you pass by? If you can, take it then: and so you will say, "I have visited Epictetus."——Ay: just as you would a Stone, or a Statue. For you have seen me, and nothing more. But he visits a Man, as a Man, who learns his Principles; and, in return, shows his own. Learn my Principles. Show me yours. Then say, you have visited me. Let us confute each other. If I have any bad Principle, take it away. If you have any, bring it forth. This is visiting a Philosopher. No. But "It lies in our Way; and, while we are about hiring a Ship, we may call on Epictetus. Let us see what it is he says." And then, when you are gone, you say, "Epictetus is nothing. His Language was inaccurate, was barbarous." For what else did you come to judge of? "Well: but if I employ myself in these Things, I shall be without an Estate, like you; without Plate, without Equipage, like you."——Nothing perhaps is necessary to be said to this, but that I do not want them. But, if you possess many Things, you still want others: so that, whether you will or not, you are poorer than I. 2What then do I want? What you have not: Constancy; a Mind conformable to Nature; and Freedom from Perturbation. Patron, or no Patron, what care I? But you do. I am richer than you. I am not anxious what Cæsar will think of me. I flatter no one, on that Account. This I have, instead of Silver and Gold Plate. You have your Vessels, of Gold; but your Discourse, your Principles, your Assents, your Pursuits, your Desires, of mere Earthen Ware. When I have all these conformable to Nature, why should not I bestow some Study upon my Reasoning too? I am at Leisure. My Mind is under no Distraction. In this Freedom from Distraction, what shall I do? Have I any thing more becoming a Man, than this? You, when you have nothing [to do], are restless; you go to the Theatre, or perhaps to bathe. "Why should not the Philosopher polish his Reasoning? You have fine crystal and myrrhine Vases; I have acute Forms of Reasoning. To you, all you have appears, little; to me, all I have, great. Your Appetite is unsatiable; mine is satisfied. When Children thrust their Hand into a narrow Jar of Nuts and Figs, if they fill it, they cannot get it out again; then they fall a crying. Drop a few of them, and you will get out the rest. And do you too drop your Desire: do not covet many Things, and you will get [some].
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (3)
- The first ως I apprehend should be ὦς, and is so translated.
- I can find no Sense of αναλυετε, which suits this Place. Perhaps the Reading should be παρα λουεσθε; and it is so translated. Bathing was a common Amusement of idle People. See B. III. c. 24. p. 495. of Mr. Upton's Edition.
- ——————and how they quaff in Gold,Crystal and myrrhine Cups, imboss'd with Gems. Paradise Regained, B. IV. v. 118.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Concerning a certain orator, who was going to Rome on a lawsuit.
A person came to him who was going to Rome on a lawsuit in which his dignity was concerned; and after telling him the occasion of his journey, asked him what he thought of the affair. If you ask me, says Epictetus, what will happen to you at Rome, and whether you shall gain or lose your cause, I have no suggestion as to that. But if you ask me how you shall fare, I can answer, If you have right principles, well; if wrong ones, ill. For every action turns upon its principle. What was the reason that you so earnestly desired to be chosen Governor of the Gnossians? Principle. What is the reason that you are now going to Rome? Principle. And in winter too, and with danger and expense? Why, because it is necessary. What tells you so? Your principle. If, then, principles are the source of all our actions, wherever any one has bad principles the effect will correspond to the cause. Well, then; are all our principles sound? Are both yours and your antagonist’s? How then do you differ? Or are yours better than his? Why? You think so, and so thinks he of his, and so do madmen. This is a bad criterion. But show me that you have given some attention and care to your principles. As you now take a voyage to Rome for the government of the Gnossians, and are not contented to stay at home with the honors you before enjoyed, but desire something greater and more illustrious, did you ever take such a voyage in order to examine your own principles and to throw away the bad ones, if you happened to have any? Did you ever apply to any one upon this account? What time did you ever appoint to yourself for it? What age? Run over your years. If you are ashamed of me, do it for yourself. Did you examine your principles when you were a child? Did not you act then as now? When you were a youth, and frequented the schools of the orators, and yourself made declamations, did you ever imagine that you were deficient in anything? And when you became a man and entered upon public business, pleaded causes, and acquired credit, whom did you then recognize as your equal? How would you have borne that any one should examine whether your principles were bad? What, then, would you have me say to you?
Assist me in this affair.
I have no suggestion to offer for that. Neither are you come to me, if it be upon that account you came, as to a philosopher; but as you would come to an herb-seller or a shoemaker.
For what purposes, then, can the philosophers give suggestions?
For preserving and conducting the Reason conformably to Nature, whatever happens. Do you think this a small thing?
No, but the greatest.
Well, and does it require but a short time, and may it be taken as you pass by? If you can, take it then; and so you will say, have visited Epictetus. Ay; just as you would visit a stone or a statue. For you have seen me, and nothing more. But he visits a man, as a man, who learns his principles, and, in return, shows his own. Learn my principles; show me yours. Then say you have visited me. Let us confute each other. If I have any bad principle, take it away. If you have any, bring it forth. This is visiting a philosopher. No, but It lies in our way, and while we are about hiring a ship, we may call on Epictetus. Let us see what he says. And then when you are gone, you say, Epictetus is nothing. His language was inaccurate, was barbarous. For what else did you come to criticise? Well; but if I employ myself in these things, I shall be without an estate, like you,—without plate, without equipage, like you. Nothing, perhaps, is necessary to be said to this, but that I do not want them. But if you possess many things, you still want others; so that whether you will or not, you are poorer than I.
What then do I need?
What you have not,—constancy, a mind conformable to Nature, and a freedom from perturbation. Patron or no patron, what care I? But you do. I am richer than you; I am not anxious what Caesar will think of me; I flatter no one on that account. This I have, instead of silver and gold plate. You have your vessels of gold; but your discourse, your principles, your opinions, your pursuits, your desires, are of mere earthen ware. When I have all these conformable to Nature, why should not I bestow some study upon my reasoning too? I am at leisure. My mind is under no distraction. In this freedom from distraction, what shall I do? Have I anything more becoming a man than this? You, when you have nothing to do, are restless; you go to the theatre, or perhaps to bathe. Why should not the philosopher polish his reasoning? You have fine crystal and myrrhine vases; I have acute forms of arguing. To you, all you have appears little; to me all I have seems great. Your appetite is insatiable; mine is satisfied. When children thrust their hand into a narrow jar of nuts and figs, if they fill it, they cannot get it out again; then they begin crying. Drop a few of them, and you will get out the rest. And do you too drop your desire; do not demand much, and you will attain.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Higginson’s notes (1)
- And how they quaff in gold, Crystal and myrrhine cups, imbossed with gems. Paradise Regained, iv. 181. Myrrhine cups were probably a kind of agate described by Pliny , which, when burnt, had the smell of myrrh. See Teatro Critico, Tom. 6, disc. 4.6.—C.
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
To a certain rhetorician who was going up to Rome on a suit.
When a certain person came to him, who was going up to Rome on account of a suit which had regard to his rank, Epictetus enquired the reason of his going to Rome, and the man then asked what he thought about the matter. Epictetus replied, If you ask me what you will do in Rome, whether you will succeed or fail, I have no rule (θεώρημα) about this. But if you ask me how you will fare, I can tell you: if you have right opinions (δόγματα), you will fare well; if they are false, you will fare ill. For to every man the cause of his acting is opinion. For what is the reason why you desired to be elected governor of the Cnossians? Your opinion. What is the reason that you are now going up to Rome? Your opinion. And going in winter, and with danger and expense.—I must go.—What tells you this? Your opinion. Then if opinions are the causes of all actions, and a man has bad opinions, such as the cause may be, such also is the effect. Have we then all sound opinions, both you and your adversary? And how do you differ? But have you sounder opinions than your adversary? Why? You think so. And so does he think that his opinions are better; and so do madmen. This is a bad criterion. But show to me that you have made some inquiry into your opinions and have taken some pains about them. And as now you are sailing to Rome in order to become governor of the Cnossians, and you are not content to stay at home with the honours which you had, but you desire something greater and more conspicuous, so when did you ever make a voyage for the purpose of examining your own opinions, and casting them out, if you have any that are bad? Whom have you approached for this purpose? What time have you fixed for it? What age? Go over the times of your life by yourself, if you are ashamed of me (knowing the fact) when you were a boy, did you examine your own opinions? and did you not then, as you do all things now, do as you did do? and when you were become a youth and attended the rhetoricians, and yourself practised rhetoric, what did you imagine that you were deficient in? And when you were a young man and engaged in public matters, and pleaded causes yourself, and were gaining reputation, who then seemed your equal? And when would you have submitted to any man examining and showing that your opinions are bad? What then do you wish me to say to you?—Help me in this matter.—I have no theorem (rule) for this. Nor have you, if you came to me for this purpose, come to me as a philosopher, but as to a seller of vegetables or a shoemaker. For what purpose then have philosophers theorems? For this purpose, that whatever may happen, our ruling faculty may be and continue to be conformable to nature. Does this seem to you a small thing?—No; but the greatest. —What then? does it need only a short time? and is it possible to seize it as you pass by? If you can, seize it.
Then you will say, I met with Epictetus as I should meet with a stone or a statue: for you saw me, and nothing snore. But he meets with a man as a man, who learns his opinions, and in his turn shows his own. Learn my opinions: show me yours; and then say that you have visited me. Let us examine one another: if I have any bad opinion, take it away: if you have any, show it. This is the meaning of meeting with a philosopher.—Not so, (you say): but this is only a passing visit, and while we are hiring the vessel, we can also see Epictetus. Let us see what he says. Then you go away and say: Epictetus was nothing; he used solecisms and spoke in a barbarous way. For of what else do you come as judges?—Well, but a man may say to me, if I attend to such matters (as you do), I shall have no land, as you have none; I shall have no silver cups as you have none, nor fine beasts as you have none.—In answer to this it is perhaps sufficient to say: I have no need of such things: but if you possess many things, you have need of others: whether you choose or not, you are poorer than I am. What then have I need of? Of that which you have not: of firmness, of a mind which is conformable to nature, of being free from perturbation. Whether I have a patron or not, what is that to me? but it is something to you. I am richer than you: I am not anxious what Caesar will think of me: for this reason, I flatter no man. This is what I possess instead of vessels of silver and gold. You have utensils of gold; but your discourse, your opinions, your assents, your movements (pursuits), your desires are of earthen ware. But when I have these things conformable to nature, why should I not employ my studies also upon reason? for I have leisure: my mind is not distracted. What shall I do, since I have no distraction? What more suitable to a man have I than this? When you have nothing to do, you are disturbed, you go to the theatre or you wander about without a purpose. Why should not the philosopher labour to improve his reason? You employ yourself about crystal vessels: I employ myself about the syllogism named the lying: you about myrrhine vessels; I employ myself about the syllogism named the denying (τοῦ ἀποφάσκοντος). To you every thing appears small that you possess: to me all that I have appears great. Your desire is insatiable: mine is satisfied. To (children) who put their hand into a narrownecked earthen vessel and bring out figs and nuts, this happens; if they fill the hand, they cannot take it out, and then they cry. Drop a few of them and you will draw things out. And do you part with your desires: do not desire many things and you will have what you want.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (4)
- See Schweig.’s note.
- The Roman word patronus, which at that time had the sense of a protector.
- On the syllogism named lying ( ψευδόμενος ) see Epict. ii. 17. 34.
- Murrhina vasa were reckoned very precious by the Romans, and they gave great prices for them. It is not certain of what material they were made. Pliny (xxxvii. c. 2) has something about them.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1εἰσελθόντος δέ τινος πρὸς αὐτόν, ὃς εἰς Ῥώμην ἀνῄει δίκην ἔχων περὶ τιμῆς τῆς αὑτοῦ, πυθόμενος τὴν αἰτίαν, διʼ ἣν ἄνεισιν, ἐπερωτήσαντος ἐκείνου, τίνα γνώμην ἔχει περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, 2εἴ μου πυνθάνῃ, τί πράξεις ἐν Ῥώμῃ, φησίν, πότερον κατορθώσεις ἢ ἀποτεύξῃ, θεώρημα πρὸς τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχω· εἰ δὲ πυνθάνῃ, πῶς πράξεις, τοῦτο εἰπεῖν, ὅτι, εἰ μὲν ὀρθὰ δόγματα ἔχεις, καλῶς, εἰ δὲ φαῦλα, κακῶς. παντὶ γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ πράσσειν τι δόγμα. 3τί γάρ ἐστιν, ὃ ἐπεθύμησας προστάτης χειροτονηθῆναι Κνωσίων; τὸ δόγμα. τί ἐστιν, διʼ ὃ νῦν εἰς Ῥώμην ἀνέρχῃ; τὸ δόγμα. καὶ μετὰ χειμῶνος καὶ κινδύνου καὶ ἀναλωμάτων; — ἀνάγκη γάρ ἐστιν. — τίς σοι λέγει τοῦτο; 4τὸ δόγμα. οὐκοῦν εἰ πάντων αἴτια τὰ δόγματα, φαῦλα δέ τις ἔχει δόγματα, οἷον ἂν ᾖ τὸ αἴτιον, τοιοῦτον καὶ τὸ ἀποτελούμενον. 5ἆρʼ οὖν πάντες ἔχομεν ὑγιῆ δόγματα καὶ σὺ καὶ ὁ ἀντίδικός σου; καὶ πῶς διαφέρεσθε; ἀλλὰ σὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκεῖνος; διὰ τί; δοκεῖ σοι. κἀκείνῳ καὶ τοῖς μαινομένοις. τοῦτο πονηρὸν κριτήριον. 6ἀλλὰ δεῖξόν μοι, ὅτι ἐπίσκεψίν τινα καὶ ἐπιμέλειαν πεποίησαι τῶν σαυτοῦ δογμάτων. καὶ ὡς νῦν εἰς Ῥώμην πλεῖς ἐπὶ τῷ προστάτης εἶναι Κνωσίων καὶ οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ σοι μένειν ἐν οἴκῳ τὰς τιμὰς ἔχοντι ἃς εἶχες, ἀλλὰ μείζονός τινος ἐπιθυμεῖς καὶ ἐπιφανεστέρου, πότε οὕτως ἔπλευσας ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὰ δόγματα ἐπισκέψασθαι τὰ σαυτοῦ καὶ εἴ τι φαῦλον ἔχεις, ἐκβαλεῖν; 7τίνι προσελήλυθας τούτου ἕνεκα; ποῖον χρόνον ἐπέταξας σαυτῷ, ποίαν ἡλικίαν; ἔπελθέ σου τοὺς χρόνους, εἰ ἐμὲ αἰσχύνῃ, αὐτὸς πρὸς σαυτόν. 8ὅτε παῖς ἦς, ἐξήταζες τὰ σαυτοῦ δόγματα; οὐχὶ δʼ ὡς πάντα ποιεῖς, ἐποίεις ἃ ἐποίεις; ὅτε δὲ μειράκιον ἤδη καὶ τῶν ῥητόρων ἤκουες καὶ αὐτὸς ἐμελέτας, τί σοι λείπειν ἐφαντάζου; 9ὅτε δὲ νεανίσκος καὶ ἤδη ἐπολιτεύου καὶ δίκας αὐτὸς ἔλεγες καὶ εὐδοκίμεις, τίς σοι ἔτι ἴσος ἐφαίνετο; ποῦ δʼ ἂν ἠνέσχου ὑπό τινος ἐξεταζόμενος, ὅτι πονηρὰ ἔχεις δόγματα; 10τί οὖν σοι θέλεις εἴπω; — βοήθησόν μοι εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα. — οὐκ ἔχω πρὸς τοῦτο θεωρήματα· οὐδὲ σύ, εἰ τούτου ἕνεκα ἐλήλυθας πρὸς ἐμέ, ὡς πρὸς φιλόσοφον ἐλήλυθας, ἀλλʼ ὡς πρὸς λαχανοπώλην, ἀλλʼ ὡς πρὸς σκυτέα. 11— πρὸς τί οὖν ἔχουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι θεωρήματα; — πρὸς τοῦτο, ὅ τι ἂν ἀποβῇ, τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἡμῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν καὶ διεξάγειν. μικρόν σοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο; — οὔ· ἀλλὰ τὸ μέγιστον. — τί οὖν; ὀλίγου χρόνου χρείαν ἔχει καὶ ἔστι παρερχόμενον αὐτὸ λαβεῖν; εἰ δύνασαι, λάμβανε. 12εἶτʼ ἐρεῖς συνέβαλ[λ]ον Ἐπικτήτῳ ὡς λίθῳ, ὡς ἀνδριάντι. εἶδες γάρ με καὶ πλέον οὐδέν. ἀνθρώπῳ δʼ ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ συμβάλλει ὁ τὰ δόγματα αὐτοῦ καταμανθάνων καὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει τὰ ἴδια δεικνύων. 13κατάμαθέ μου τὰ δόγματα, δεῖξόν μοι τὰ σὰ καὶ οὕτως λέγε συμβεβληκέναι μοι. ἐλέγξωμεν ἀλλήλους· εἴ τι ἔχω κακὸν δόγμα, ἄφελε αὐτό· εἴ τι ἔχεις, θὲς εἰς τὸ μέσον. τοῦτό ἐστι φιλοσόφῳ συμβάλλειν. 14οὔ· ἀλλὰ πάροδός ἐστι καὶ ἕως τὸ πλοῖον μισθούμεθα, δυνάμεθα καὶ Ἐπίκτητον ἰδεῖν· ἴδωμεν, τί ποτε λέγει. εἶτʼ ἐξελθὼν οὐδὲν ἦν ὁ Ἐπίκτητος, ἐσολοίκιζεν, ἐβαρβάριζεν. τίνος γὰρ ἄλλου κριταὶ εἰσέρχεσθε; 15ἀλλʼ ἂν πρὸς τούτοις, φησίν, ὦ, ἀγρὸν οὐχ ἕξω ὡς οὐδὲ σύ, ποτήρια ἀργυρᾶ οὐχ ἕξω ὡς οὐδὲ σύ, κτήνη καλὰ ὡς οὐδὲ σύ. 16πρὸς ταῦτα ἴσως ἀρκεῖ ἐκεῖνο εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἀλλὰ χρείαν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἔχω· σὺ δʼ ἂν πολλὰ κτήσῃ, ἄλλων χρείαν ἔχεις, θέλεις οὐ θέλεις, πτωχότερός μου. 17— τίνος οὖν ἔχω χρείαν; — τοῦ σοὶ μὴ παρόντος· τοῦ εὐσταθεῖν, τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν τὴν διάνοιαν, τοῦ μὴ ταράττεσθαι. 18πάτρων, οὐ πάτρων, τί μοι μέλει; σοὶ μέλει. πλουσιώτερός σου εἰμί· οὐκ ἀγωνιῶ, τί φρονήσει περὶ ἐμοῦ ὁ Καῖσαρ· οὐδένα κολακεύω τούτου ἕνεκα. ταῦτα ἔχω ἀντὶ τῶν ἀργυρωμάτων, ἀντὶ τῶν χρυσωμάτων. σὺ χρυσᾶ σκεύη, ὀστράκινον τὸν λόγον, τὰ δόγματα, τὰς συγκαταθέσεις, τὰς ὁρμάς, τὰς ὀρέξεις. 19ὅταν δὲ ταῦτα ἔχω κατὰ φύσιν, διὰ τί μὴ φιλοτεχνήσω καὶ περὶ τὸν λόγον; εὐσχολῶ γάρ· οὐ περισπᾶταί μου ἡ διάνοια. τί ποιήσω μὴ περισπώμενος; τούτου τί ἀνθρωπικώτερον ἔχω; 20ὑμεῖς ὅταν μηδὲν ἔχητε, ταράσσεσθε, εἰς θέατρον εἰσέρχεσθε ἢ ἀναλύετε· διὰ τί ὁ φιλόσοφος μὴ ἐξεργάσηται τὸν αὑτοῦ λόγον; 21σὺ κρυστάλλινα, ἐγὼ τὰ τοῦ Ψευδομένου· σὺ μούρρινα, ἐγὼ τὰ τοῦ Ἀποφάσκοντος. σοὶ πάντα μικρὰ φαίνεται ἃ ἔχεις, ἐμοὶ τὰ ἐμὰ πάντα μεγάλα. ἀπλήρωτός σου ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιθυμία, ἡ ἐμὴ πεπλήρωται. 22τοῖς παιδίοις εἰς στενόβρογχον κεράμιον καθιεῖσιν τὴν χεῖρα καὶ ἐκφέρουσιν ἰσχαδοκάρυα τοῦτο συμβαίνει· ἂν πληρώσῃ τὴν χεῖρα, ἐξενεγκεῖν οὐ δύναται, εἶτα κλάει. ἄφες ὀλίγα ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐξοίσεις. καὶ σὺ ἄφες τὴν ὄρεξιν· μὴ πολλῶν ἐπιθύμει καὶ οἴσεις.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA