Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER XXIII. · Concerning such as read and dispute, ostentatiously.
1First say to yourself, what you would be; and then do, what you have to do. For, in almost every thing else, we see this to be the Practice. Olympic Champions first determine what they would be, and then act accordingly. To a Racer, in a longer Course, there must be one kind of Diet, Walking, Anointing, and Exercise: to one in a shorter, all these must be different; and to a Pentathlete, still more different. You will find the Case the same in the manual Arts. if a Carpenter, you must have such and such Things: if a Smith, such other. For, if we do not refer each of our Actions to some End, we shall act at random: if to an improper one, we shall miss our Aim. Further: there is a general and a particular End. First, to act as a Man. What is comprehended in this? Not to be, though gentle, like a Sheep; nor mischievous, like a wild Beast. But the particular End relates to the Study, and Choice of each Individual. A Harper is to act as a Harper; a Carpenter, as a Carpenter; a Philosopher, as a Philosopher; an Orator, as an Orator. When therefore you say, "Come, and hear me read:" observe first, not to do this at random; and, in the next place, after you have found to what End you refer it, consider whether it be a proper one. Would you be useful, or be praised? You presently hear him say, "What do I value the Praise of the Multitude?" And he says well: for this is nothing to a Musician, or a Geometrician, as such. You would be useful then. In what? Tell us, that we too may run, to make Part of your Audience. Now, is it possible for any one to benefit others, who hath received no Benefit himself? No: for neither can he, who is not a Carpenter, or a Shoemaker, benefit any, in respect to those Arts. Would you know then, whether you have received Benefit? Produce your Principles, Philosopher: What is the Aim and Promise of Desire? Not to be disappointed. What of Aversion? Not to be incurred. Come do we fulfil this Promise? Tell me the Truth: but, if you falsify, I will tell it you. The other Day, when your Audience came but coldly together, and did not receive what you said, with Acclamations of Applause, you went away dejected. Again: the other Day, when you were praised, you went about, asking every body, "What did you think of me?"——"Upon my "Life, Sir, it was prodigious."——"But, how did "I express myself upon that Subject?"——"Which?"——"Where I gave a Description of Pan, and the Nymphs?"——"Most excellently."——And do you tell me, after this, that you regulate your Desires and Aversions conformably to Nature? Get you gone. Persuade somebody else. Did not you, the other Day, praise a Man, contrary to your own Opinion? Did not you flatter a certain Senator? Would you wish your own Children to be like him?——"Heaven forbid!"——"Why "then did you praise and cajole him?"——"He is an ingenious young Man, and attentive to Discourses."——"How so?"——"He admires me." Now indeed you have produced your Proof. After all, what do you think? Do not these very People secretly despise you? When therefore a Man, conscious of no good Action, or Intention, finds some Philosopher saying, "You are a great Genius, and of a frank and candid Disposition;" what do you think he says, but, "This Man hath some Need of me." Pray tell me, what Action of a great Genius he hath shown. You see, he hath long conversed with you, hath heard your Discourses, hath heard your Lectures. Hath he turned his Attention to himself? Hath he perceived his own Faults? Hath he thrown off his Conceit? Doth he seek an Instructor?——Yes, he doth.——An Instructor how to live? No, Fool; but how to talk: for it is upon this Account that he admires you. Hear what he says. "This Man writes with very great Art, and much more finely than Dion." That is quite another Thing. Doth he say, This is a modest, faithful, calm Person? But, if he said this too, I would ask him, since he is faithful, What is it to be faithful? And, if he could not tell, I would add, First learn the Meaning of what you say, and then speak. While you are in this bad Disposition then, and gaping after Applauders, and counting your Hearers, would you be of Benefit to others? "To-day I had many more Hearers." "Yes, many: we think there were five hundred." You say nothing: make them a Thousand.——"Dion never had so great an Audience." "How should he?"——"And they have a fine Taste for Discourses."——"What is excellent, Sir, will move even a Stone." Here is the Language of a Philosopher! Here is the Disposition of one, who is to be beneficial to Mankind! Here is the Man, attentive to Discourses! Who hath read the Works of the Socratic Philosophers, as such; not as if they were the Writings of Orators, like Lysius and Isocrates. "I have often wondered by what Arguments, &c. No: By what Argument: that is the more perfectly accurate Expression." Is this to have read them any otherwise, than as you read little Pieces of Poetry? If you read them as you ought, you would not dwell on such Trifles; but would rather consider such a Passage as this: Anytus and Melitus may kill; but they cannot hurt me. And, I am always so disposed, as to regard none of my Friends, but that Reason, which, after Examination, appears to me to be the best. Hence, who ever heard Socrates say, "I know, or teach, any thing?" But he sent different People to different Instructors: so they came to him, desiring to be recommended to the Philosophers; and he took and recommended them. No: but I warrant you, as he accompanied them, he used to give them such Advice as this: "Hear me discourse To-day at the House of Quadratus."——Why should I hear you? Have you a Mind to show me how finely you put Words together, Sir? And what Good doth that do you? "But praise me."——What do you mean by praising you?——Say, incomparable! prodigious!——Well: I do say it. But, if Praise be that which the Philosophers call by the Appellation of Good, what have I to praise you for? If it be a Good to speak well, teach me, and I will praise you.——"What then, ought these Things to be heard without Pleasure?"——By no means. I do not hear even a Harper, without Pleasure; but am I therefore to stand playing upon the Harp? Hear what Socrates says to his Judges. "It would not be decent for me to appear before you, at this Age, composing Speeches, like a Boy." Like a Boy, says he. For it is, without doubt, a pretty Knack, to chuse out Words, and place them together and then to read or speak them gracefully in public; and, in the midst of the Discourse, to observe, that "he vows by all that is good, there are but Few capable of these Things." But doth a Philosopher apply to People to hear him? Doth not he attract those who are fitted to receive Benefit from him, in the same manner as the Sun, or their necessary Food doth? What Physician applies to any body to be cured by him? (Though now indeed I hear, that the Physicians at Rome apply for Patients; but in my Time they were applied to) "I apply to you, to come and hear that you are in a bad Way; and that you take care of every thing, but what you ought: that you know not what is good or evil; and are unfortunate, and unhappy." A fine Application! And yet, unless the Discourse of a Philosopher hath this Effect, both that, and the Speaker, are void of Life. Rufus used to say, If you are at leisure to praise me, I speak to no Purpose. And indeed he used to speak in such a manner, that each of us, who heard him, supposed, that some Person had accused us to him; he so hit upon what was done by us, and placed the Faults of every one, before his Eyes. 2The School of a Philosopher is a Surgery. You are not to go out of it with Pleasure, but with Pain; for you come there, not in Health: but one of you hath a dislocated Shoulder; another, an Abscess; a third, a Fistula; a fourth, the Headach. And am I then, to sit uttering pretty trifling Thoughts, and little Exclamations, that, when you have praised me, you may each of you go away with the same dislocated Shoulder, the same aching Head, the same Fistula, and the same Abscess, that you brought? And is it for this that young Men are to travel? And do they leave their Parents, their Friends, their Relations, and their Estates, that they may praise you, while you are uttering little Exclamations? Was this the Practice of Socrates? Of Zeno? Of Cleanthes? "What then! is there not in speaking, a Style and Manner of Exhortation?"——Who denies it? Just as there is a Manner of Confutation, and of Instruction. But who ever therefore, added that of Ostentation, for a fourth? For in what doth the exhortatory Manner consist? In being able to show one and all, the Contradictions in which they are involved; and that they care for every thing rather than what they mean to care for: for they mean the Things conducive to Happiness; but they seek them where they are not to be found. To effect this, must a thousand Seats be placed, and an Audience invited; and you, in a fine Robe, or Cloke, ascend the Rostrum, and describe the Death of Achilles? Forbear, for Heaven's sake, to bring, as far as you are able, good Words and Practices into Disgrace. Nothing, to be sure, gives more Force to Exhortation, than when the Speaker shows, that he hath need of the Hearers! But tell me, who, when he hears you reading, or speaking is solicitous about himself? Or turns his Attention upon himself? Or says, when he is gone away, "The Philosopher hit me well." Instead of this, even though you are in high Vogue, is not all that one Man says; "He spoke finely about Xerxes."——"No, says another; but on the Battle of Thermopylæ." Is this the Audience of a Philosopher?
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (7)
- See Note a. p. 196.
- Mr. Upton observes, that these florid Descriptions were the principal Study of the Sophists.
- Dion was a Greek Writer of those Times; called, for his Eloquence, Chrysostom, or Golden-mouthed; as one of the Fathers of the Church was afterwards.
- The Sense seems absolutely to require, that the latter ουτος should be either expunged or changed into τουτο.
- These Words are the Beginning of Xenophon's Memoirs of Socrates; and it was a Debate among the minute Critics, whether Argument or Arguments was the proper Reading. Upton.
- It might be usual for Persons of Fashion to lend their Houses, for Sophists and Orators to declaim in. Upton.
- St. James uses the same Word, when he faith, Faith without Works is dead.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Concerning such as read and dispute ostentatiously.
First, say to yourself what you would be; and then do what you have to do. For in almost everything we see this to be the practice. Olympic champions first determine what they would be, and then act accordingly. To a racer in a longer course there must be one kind of diet, walking, anointing, and training; to one in a shorter, all these must be different; and to a Pentathlete, still more different. You will find the case the same in the manual arts. If a carpenter, you must have such and such things; if a smith, such other. For if we do not refer each of our actions to some end, we shall act at random; if to an improper one, we shall miss our aim. Further, there is a general and a particular end. The first is, to act as a man. What is comprehended in this? To be gentle, yet not sheepish; not to be mischievous, like a wild beast. But the particular end relates to the study and choice of each individual. A harper is to act as a harper; a carpenter, as a carpenter; a philosopher, as a philosopher; an orator, as an orator. When, therefore, you say, Come, and hear me discourse, observe, first, not to do this at random; and, in the next place, after you have found to what end you refer it, consider whether it be a proper one. Would you be useful, or be praised? You presently hear him say, What do I value the praise of the multitude? And he says well; for this is nothing to a musician, or a geometrician, as such. You would be useful then. In what? Tell us, that we too may run to make part of your audience. Now, is it possible for any one to benefit others, who has received no benefit himself? No; for neither can he who is not a carpenter, or a shoemaker, benefit any one in respect to those arts. Would you know, then, whether you have received benefit? Produce your principles, philosopher. What is the aim and promise of desire? Not to be disappointed. What of aversion? Not to be incurred. Come, do we fulfil this promise? Tell me the truth; but, if you falsify, I will tell it to you. The other day, when your audience came but coldly together, and did not receive what you said with acclamations of applause, you went away dejected. Again, the other day when you were praised, you went about asking everybody, What did you think of me? Upon my life, sir, it was prodigious. But how did I express myself upon that subject? Which? Where I gave a description of Pan and the Nymphs. Most excellently. And do you tell me, after this, that you regulate your desires and aversions conformably to Nature? Get you gone! Persuade somebody else.
Did not you, the other day, praise a man contrary to your own opinion? Did not you flatter a certain senator? Yet would you wish your own children to be like him? Heaven forbid! Why then did you praise and cajole him? He is an ingenuous young man, and attentive to discourses. How so? He admires me. Now indeed you have produced your proof.
After all, what do you think? Do not these very people secretly despise you? When a man conscious of no good action or intention finds some philosopher saying, You are a great genius, and of a frank and candid disposition, what do you think he says, but, This man has some need of me? Pray tell me what mark of a great genius he has shown. You see he has long conversed with you, has heard your discourses, has attended your lectures. Has he turned his attention to himself? Has he perceived his own faults? Has he thrown off his conceit? Does he seek an instructor? Yes, he does. An instructor how to live? No, fool, but how to talk; for it is upon this account that he admires you. Hear what he says: This man writes with very great art, and much more finely than Dion. That is quite another thing. Does he say, This is a modest, faithful, calm person? But if he said this too, I would ask him, if be is faithful, what it is to be faithful? And if he could not tell, I would add, First learn the meaning of what you say, and then speak.
While you are in this bad disposition, then, and gaping after applauders, and counting your hearers, can you be of benefit to others? To-day I had many more hearers. Yes, many; we think there were five hundred. You say nothing; estimate them at a thousand. Dion never had so great an audience. How should he? And they have a fine taste for discourses. What is excellent, sir, will move even a stone. Here is the language of a philosopher! Here is the disposition of one who is to be beneficial to mankind! Here is the man, attentive to discourses, who has read the works of the Socratic philosophers, as such; not as if they were the writings of orators, like Lysias and Isocrates! have often wondered by what arguments— No; By what argument; that is the more perfectly accurate expression. Is this to have read them any otherwise than as you read little pieces of poetry? If you read them as you ought, you would not dwell on such trifles, but would rather consider such a passage as this: Anytus and Melitus may kill, but they cannot hurt me. And am always so disposed as to defer to none of my friends, but to that reason which, after examination, appears to me to be the best. Hence, whoever heard Socrates say, know, or teach anything? But he sent different people to different instructors; they came to him, desiring to be introduced to the philosophers; and he took them and introduced them. No; but [you think] as he accompanied them he used to give them such advice as this: Hear me discourse to-day at the house of Quadratus. Why should I hear you? Have you a mind to show me how finely you put words together, sir? And what good does that do you? But praise me. What do you mean by praising you? Say, Incomparable! prodigious! Well; I do say it. But if praise be that which the philosophers call by the appellation of good, what have I to praise you for? If it be good to speak well, teach me, and I will praise you. What, then; ought these things to be heard without pleasure? By no means. I do not hear even a harper without pleasure; but am I therefore to devote myself to playing upon the harp? Hear what Socrates says to his judges: It would not be decent for me to appear before you, at this age, composing speeches like a boy. Like a boy, he says. For it is, without doubt, a pretty accomplishment to select words and place them together, and then to read or speak them gracefully in public; and in the midst of the discourse to observe that he vows by all that is good, there are but few capable of these things. But does a philosopher apply to people to hear him? Does he not attract those who are fitted to receive benefit from him, in the same manner as the sun or their necessary food does? What physician applies to anybody to be cured by him? (Though now indeed I hear that the physicians at Rome apply for patients; but in my time they were applied to.) I apply to you to come and hear that you are in a bad way, and that you take care of everything but what you ought; that you know not what is good or evil, and are unfortunate and unhappy. A fine application! And yet, unless the discourse of a philosopher has this effect, both that and the speaker are lifeless.
Rufus used to say, If you are at leisure to praise me, I speak to no purpose. And indeed he used to speak in such a manner, that each of us who heard him supposed that some person had accused us to him; he so precisely hit upon what was done by us, and placed the faults of every one before his eyes.
The school of a philosopher is a surgery. You are not to go out of it with pleasure, but with pain; for you do not come there in health; but one of you has a dislocated shoulder; another, an abscess; a third, a fistula; a fourth, the headache. And am I, then, to sit uttering pretty, trifling thoughts and little exclamations, that, when you have praised me, you may each of you go away with the same dislocated shoulder, the same aching head, the same fistula. and the same abscess that you brought? And is it for this that young men are to travel? And do they leave their parents, their friends, their relations, and their estates, that they may praise you while you are uttering little exclamations? Was this the practice of Socrates; of Zeno; of Cleanthes?
What then! is there not in speaking a style and manner of exhortation? Who denies it? Just as there is a manner of confutation and of instruction. But who ever, therefore, added that of ostentation for a fourth? For in what doth the hortatory manner consist? In being able to show, to one and all, the contradictions in which they are involved; and that they care for everything rather than what they mean to care for; for they mean the things conducive to happiness, but they seek them where they are not to be found. To effect this, must a thousand seats be placed, and an audience invited; and you, in a fine robe or cloak, ascend the rostrum, and describe the death of Achilles? Forbear, for Heaven’s sake! to bring, so far as you are able, good works and practices into disgrace. Nothing, to be sure, gives more force to exhortation than when the speaker shows that he has need of the hearers; but tell me who, when he hears you reading or speaking, is solicitous about himself; or turns his attention upon himself; or says, when he is gone away, The philosopher hit me well? Instead of this, even though you are in high vogue, one hearer merely remarks to another, He spoke finely about Xerxes! No, says the other; but on the battle of Thermopylae! Is this the audience for a philosopher?
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Higginson’s notes (4)
- Mr. Upton observes that these florid descriptions were the principal study of the Sophists.—C.
- These words are the beginning of Xenophon’s Memoirs of Socrates; and it was a debate among the minute critics, whether argument or arguments was the proper reading.—C.
- Plato, Apology, 18; Crito, 6.—H.
- Plato, Apology, 1.—H.
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
To those who read and discuss for the sake of ostentation.
First say to yourself Who you wish to be: then do accordingly what you are doing; for in nearly all other things we see this to be so. Those who follow athletic exercises first determine what they wish to be, then they do accordingly what follows. If a man is a runner in the long course, there is a certain kind of diet, of walking, rubbing, and exercise: if a man is a runner in the stadium, all these things are different; if he is a Pentathlete, they are still more different. So you will find it also in the arts. If you are a carpenter, you will have such and such things: if a worker in metal, such things. For every thing that we do, if we refer it to no end, we shall do it to no purpose; and if we refer it to the wrong end, we shall miss the mark. Further, there is a general end or purpose, and a particular purpose. First of all, we must act as a man. What is comprehended in this? We must not be like a sheep, though gentle; nor mischievous, like a wild beast. But the particular end has reference to each person’s mode of life and his will. The lute-player acts as a lute-player, the carpenter as a carpenter, the philosopher as a philosopher, the rhetorician as a rhetorician. When then you say, Come and hear me read to you: take care first of all that you are not doing this without a purpose; then if you have discovered that you are doing this with reference to a purpose, consider if it is the right purpose. Do you wish to do good or to be praised? Immediately you hear him saying, To me what is the value of praise from the many? and he says well, for it is of no value to a musician, so far as he is a musician, nor to a geometrician. Do you then wish to be useful? in what? tell us that we may run to your audience room. Now can a man do anything useful to others, who has not received something useful himself? No, for neither can a man do any thing useful in the carpenter’s art, unless he is a carpenter; nor in the shoemaker’s art, unless he is a shoemaker.
Do you wish to know then if you have received any advantage? Produce your opinions, philosopher. What is the thing which desire promises? Not to fail in the object. What does aversion promise? Not to fall into that which you would avoid. Well; do we fulfill their promise? Tell me the truth; but if you lie, I will tell you. Lately when your hearers came together rather coldly, and did not give you applause, you went away humbled. Lately again when you had been praised, you went about and said to all, What did you think of me? Wonderful, master, I swear by all that is dear to me. But how did I treat of that particular matter? Which? The passage in which I described Pan and the nymphs? Excellently. Then do you tell me that in desire and in aversion you are acting according to nature? Be gone; try to persuade somebody else. Did you not praise a certain person contrary to your opinion? and did you not flatter a certain person who was the son of a senator? Would you wish your own children to be such persons?—I hope not—Why then did you praise and flatter him? He is an ingenuous youth and listens well to discourses— How is this?—He admires me. You have stated your proof. Then what do you think? do not these very people secretly despise you? When then a man who is conscious that he has neither done any good nor ever thinks of it, finds a philosopher who says, You have a great natural talent, and you have a candid and good disposition, what else do you think that he says except this, This man has some need of me? Or tell me what act that indicates a great mind has he shown? Observe; he has been in your company a long time; he has listened to your discourses, he has heard you reading; has he become more modest? has he been turned to reflect on himself? has he perceived in what a bad state he is? has he cast away self-conceit? does he look for a person to teach him? He does. A man who will teach him to live? No, fool, but how to talk; for it is for this that he admires you also. Listen and hear what he says: This man writes with perfect art, much better than Dion. This is altogether another thing. Does he say, This man is modest, faithful, free from perturbations? and even if he did say it, I should say to him, Since this man is faithful, tell me what this faithful man is. And if he could not tell me, I should add this, First understand what you say, and then speak.
You then, who are in a wretched plight and gaping after applause and counting your auditors, do you intend to be useful to others?—To-day many more attended my discourse. Yes, many; we suppose five hundred. That is nothing; suppose that there were a thousand—Dion never had so many hearers—How could he?—And they understand what is said beautifully. What is fine, master, can move even a stone—See, these are the words of a philosopher. This is the disposition of a man who will do good to others; here is a man who has listened to discourses, who has read what is written about Socrates as Socratic, not as the compositions of Lysias and Isocrates. I have often wondered by what arguments. Not so, but by what argument: this is more exact than that— What, have you read the words at all in a different way from that in which you read little odes? For if you read them as you ought, you would not have been attending to such matters, but you would rather have been looking to these words: Anytus and Melitus are able to kill me, but they cannot harm me: and I am always of such a disposition as to pay regard to nothing of my own except to the reason which on inquiry seems to me the best. Hence who ever heard Socrates say, I know something and I teach; but he used to send different people to different teachers. Therefore they used to come to him and ask to be introduced to philosophers by him; and he would take them and recommend them.—Not so; but as he accompanied them he would say, Hear me to-day discoursing in the house of Quadratus. Why should I hear you? Do you wish to show me that you put words together cleverly? You put them together, man; and what good will it do you?—But only praise me.—What do you mean by praising?—Say to me, admirable, wonderful.—Well, I say so. But if that is praise whatever it is which philosophers mean by the name (κατηγορία) of good, what have I to praise in you? If it is good to speak well, teach me, and I will praise you.—What then? ought a man to listen to such things without pleasure?— I hope not. For my part I do not listen even to a luteplayer without pleasure. Must I then for this reason stand and play the lute? Hear what Socrates says, Nor would it be seemly for a man of my age, like a young man composing addresses, to appear before you. Like a young man, he says. For in truth this small art is an elegant thing, to select words, and to put them together, and to come forward and gracefully to read them or to speak, and while he is reading to say, There are not many who can do these things, I swear by all that you value.
Does a philosopher invite people to hear him? As the sun himself draws men to him, or as food does, does not the philosopher also draw to him those who will receive benefit? What physician invites a man to be treated by him? Indeed I now hear that even the physicians in Rome do invite patients, but when I lived there, the physicians were invited. I invite you to come and hear that things are in a bad way for you, and that you are taking care of every thing except that of which you ought to take care, and that you are ignorant of the good and the bad and are unfortunate and unhappy. A fine kind of invitation: and yet if the words of the philosopher do not produce this effect on you, he is dead, and so is the speaker. Rufus was used to say: If you have leisure to praise me, I am speaking to no purpose. Accordingly he used to speak in such a way that every one of us who were sitting there supposed that some one had accused him before Rufus: he so touched on what was doing, he so placed before the eyes every man’s faults.
The philosopher’s school, ye men, is a surgery: you ought not to go out of it with pleasure, but with pain. For you are not in sound health when you enter: one has dislocated his shoulder, another has an abscess, a third a fistula, and a fourth a head ache. Then do I sit and utter to you little thoughts and exclamations that you may praise me and go away, one with his shoulder in the same condition in which he entered, another with his head still aching, and a third with his fistula or his abscess just as they were? Is it for this then that young men shall quit home, and leave their parents and their friends and kinsmen and property, that they may say to you, Wonderful! when you are uttering your exclamations. Did Socrates do this, or Zeno, or Cleanthes?
What then? is there not the hortatory style? Who denies it? as there is the style of refutation, and the didactic style. Who then ever reckoned a fourth style with these, the style of display? What is the hortatory style? To be able to show both to one person and to many the struggle in which they are engaged, and that they think more about any thing than about what they really wish. For they wish the things which lead to happiness, but they look for them in the wrong place. In order that this may be done, a thousand seats must be placed and men must be invited to listen, and you must ascend the pulpit in a fine robe or cloak and describe the death of Achilles. Cease, I intreat you by the gods, to spoil good words and good acts as much as you can. Nothing can have more power in exhortation that when the speaker shows to the hearers that he has need of them. But tell me who when he hears you reaching or discoursing is anxious about himself or turns to reflect on himself? or when he has gone out says, The philosopher hit me well: I must no longer do these things. But does he not, even if you have a great reputation, say to some person? He spoke finely about Xerxes; and another says, No, but about the battle of Thermopylae. Is this listening to a philosopher?
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (10)
- Epictetus in an amusing manner touches on the practice of Sophists, Rhetoricians, and others, who made addresses only to get praise. This practice of reciting prose or verse compositions was common in the time of Epictetus, as we may learn from the letters of the younger Pliny, Juvenal, Martial, and the author of the treatise de Causis corruptae eloqwuntiae. Upton.
- Such were the subjects which the literary men of the day de. lighted in.
- Dion of Prusa in Bithynia was named Chrysostomus (golden-mouthed) because of his eloquence. He was a rhetorician and sophist, as the term was then understood, and was living at the same time as Epictetus. Eighty of his orations written in Greek are still extant, and some fragments of fifteen.
- These words are the beginning of Xenophon’s Memorabilia, i. 1. The small critics disputed whether the text should be τίσι λόγοις , or τίνι λόγῳ .
- From the Crito of Plato, c. 6.
- The rich, says Upton, used to lend their houses for recitations, as we learn from Pliny, Ep. viii. 12 and Juvenal, vii. 40. Si dulcedine famae Succensus recites, maculosas commodat aedes. Quadratus is a Roman name. There appears to be a confusion between Socrates and Quadratus. The man says, No. Socrates would not do so: but he would do, as a man might do now. He would say on the road; I hope you will come to hear me. I don’t find anything in the notes on this passage; but it requires explanation.
- κατηγορία is one of Aristotle’s common terms.
- From Plato’s Apology of Socrates.
- Aulus Gellius v. 1 . Seneca, Ep. 52. Upton.
- Cicero, de Officiis i. 18: Quae magno animo et fortiter excellenterque gesta sunt, ea nescio quomodo pleniore ore laudamus. Hino Rhetorum campus de Marathone, Salamine, Plataeis, Thermopylis, Leuctria.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1τίς εἶναι θέλεις, σαυτῷ πρῶτον εἰπέ· εἶθʼ οὕτως ποίει ἃ ποιεῖς. καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων σχεδὸν ἁπάντων οὕτως ὁρῶμεν γινόμενα. 2οἱ ἀθλοῦντες πρῶτον κρίνουσιν, τίνες εἶναι θέλουσιν, εἶθʼ οὕτως τὰ ἑξῆς ποιοῦσιν. εἰ δολιχοδρόμος, τοιαύτη τροφή, τοιοῦτος περίπατος, τοιαύτη τρῖψις, τοιαύτη γυμνασία· εἰ σταδιοδρόμος, πάντα ταῦτα ἀλλοῖα· εἰ πένταθλος, ἔτι ἀλλοιότερα. οὕτως εὑρήσεις καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν. 3εἰ τέκτων, τοιαῦτα ἕξεις· εἰ χαλκεύς, τοιαῦτα. ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν γινομένων ὑφʼ ἡμῶν ἂν μὲν ἐπὶ μηδὲν ἀναφέρωμεν, εἰκῇ ποιήσομεν· ἐὰν δʼ ἐφʼ ὃ μὴ δεῖ, διεσφαλμένως. 4λοιπὸν ἡ μέν τίς ἐστι κοινὴ ἀναφορά, ἡ δʼ ἰδία. πρῶτον ἵνʼ ὡς ἄνθρωπος. ἐν τούτῳ τί περιέχεται; μὴ ὡς πρόβατον, εἰ βλαπτικῶς καὶ ἐπιεικῶς, ὡς θηρίον. 5ἡ δʼ ἰδία πρὸς τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα ἑκάστου καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν. ὁ κιθαρῳδὸς ὡς κιθαρῳδός, ὁ τέκτων ὡς τέκτων, ὁ φιλόσοφος ὡς φιλόσοφος, ὁ ῥήτωρ ὡς ῥήτωρ. 6ὅταν οὖν λέγῃς δεῦτε καὶ ἀκούσατέ μου ἀναγιγνώσκοντος ὑμῖν, σκέψαι πρῶτον μὴ εἰκῇ αὐτὸ ποιεῖν. εἶτʼ ἂν εὕρῃς, ὅτι ἀναφέρεις, σκέψαι, εἰ ἐφʼ ὃ δεῖ. ὠφελῆσαι θέλεις ἢ ἐπαινεθῆναι; 7εὐθὺς ἀκούεις λέγοντος ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦ παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπαίνου τίς λόγος; καὶ καλῶς λέγει. οὐδὲ[ν] γὰρ τῷ μουσικῷ, καθὸ μουσικός ἐστιν, οὐδὲ τῷ γεωμετρικῷ. 8οὐκοῦν ὠφελῆσαι θέλεις; πρὸς τί; εἰπὲ καὶ ἡμῖν, ἵνα καὶ αὐτοὶ τρέχωμεν εἰς τὸ ἀκροατήριόν σου. νῦν δύναταί τις ὠφελῆσαι ἄλλους μὴ αὐτὸς ὠφελημένος; οὔ. οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰς τεκτονικὴν ὁ μὴ τέκτων οὐδʼ εἰς σκυτικὴν ὁ μὴ σκυτεύς. 9θέλεις οὖν γνῶναι, εἰ ὠφέλησαι; φέρε σου τὰ δόγματα, φιλόσοφε. τίς ἐπαγγελία ὀρέξεως; μὴ ἀποτυγχάνειν. τίς ἐκκλίσεως; 10μὴ περιπίπτειν. ἄγε, πληροῦμεν αὐτῶν τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν; εἰπέ μοι τἀληθῆ· ἂν δὲ ψεύσῃ, ἐρῶ σοι· πρῴην ψυχρότερόν σου τῶν ἀκροατῶν συνελθόντων καὶ μὴ ἐπιβοησάντων σοι τεταπεινωμένος ἐξῆλθες· 11πρῴην ἐπαινεθεὶς περιήρχου καὶ πᾶσιν ἔλεγες τί σοι ἔδοξα; θαυμαστῶς, κύριε, τὴν ἐμήν σοι σωτηρίαν. πῶς δʼ εἶπον ἐκεῖνο; τὸ ποῖον; ὅπου διέγραψα τὸν Πᾶνα καὶ τὰς Νύμφας. 12ὑπερφυῶς. εἶτά μοι λέγεις, ἐν ὀρέξει καὶ ἐκκλίσει κατὰ φύσιν ἀναστρέφῃ; ὕπαγε, ἄλλον πεῖθε. 13τὸν δεῖνα δὲ πρῴην οὐκ ἐπῄνεις παρὰ τὸ σοὶ φαινόμενον; τὸν δεῖνα δʼ οὐκ ἐκολάκευες τὸν συγκλητικόν; ἤθελές σου τὰ παιδία εἶναι τοιαῦτα; — μὴ γένοιτο. 14— τίνος οὖν ἕνεκα ἐπῄνεις καὶ περιεῖπες αὐτόν; — εὐφυὴς νεανίσκος καὶ λόγων ἀκουστικός. — πόθεν τοῦτο; — ἐμὲ θαυμάζει. — εἴρηκας τὴν ἀπόδειξιν. εἶτα τί δοκεῖ σοι; αὐτοί σου οὗτοι οὐ καταφρονοῦσιν λεληθότως; 15ὅταν οὖν ἄνθρωπος συνειδὼς ἑαυτῷ μηθὲν ἀγαθὸν μήτε πεποιηκότι μήτʼ ἐνθυμουμένῳ εὕρῃ φιλόσοφον τὸν λέγοντα μεγαλοφυὴς καὶ ἁπλοῦς καὶ ἀκέραιος, τί δοκεῖς ἄλλο αὐτὸν λέγειν ἢ οὗτός τινά ποτέ μου χρείαν ἔχει; 16ἢ εἰπέ μοι, τί μεγαλοφυοῦς ἔργον ἐπιδέδεικται; ἰδοὺ σύνεστί σοι τοσούτῳ χρόνῳ, διαλεγομένου σου ἀκήκοεν, ἀναγιγνώσκοντος ἀκήκοεν. κατέσταλται, ἐπέστραπται ἐφʼ αὑτόν; ᾔσθηται, ἐν οἵοις κακοῖς ἐστιν; ἀποβέβληκεν οἴησιν; ζητεῖ τὸν διδάξοντα; 17— ζητεῖ, φησί. — τὸν διδάξοντα, πῶς δεῖ βιοῦν; οὔ, μωρέ· ἀλλὰ πῶς δεῖ φράζειν· τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα καὶ σὲ θαυμάζει. ἄκουσον αὐτοῦ, τίνα λέγει. οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος πάνυ τεχνικώτατα γράφει, Δίωνος πολὺ κάλλιον. ὅλον ἄλλο ἐστίν. 18μή τι λέγει ὁ ἄνθρωπος αἰδήμων ἐστίν, οὗτος πιστός ἐστιν, οὗτος ἀτάραχός ἐστιν; εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔλεγεν, εἶπον ἂν αὐτῷ ἐπειδὴ οὗτος πιστός ἐστιν, οὗτος ὁ πιστὸς τί ἐστιν; καὶ εἰ μὴ εἶχεν εἰπεῖν, προσέθηκα ἂν ὅτι πρῶτον μάθε, τί λέγεις, εἶθʼ οὕτως λέγε. 19οὕτως οὖν κακῶς διακείμενος καὶ χάσκων περὶ τοὺς ἐπαινέσοντας καὶ ἀριθμῶν τοὺς ἀκούοντάς σου θέλεις ἄλλους ὠφελεῖν; σήμερόν μου πολλῷ πλείονες ἤκουσαν. ναί, πολλοί. δοκοῦμεν ὅτι πεντακόσιοι. οὐδὲν λέγεις· θὲς αὐτοὺς χιλίους. Δίωνος οὐδέποτʼ ἤκουσαν τοσοῦτοι. πόθεν αὐτῷ; καὶ κομψῶς αἰσθάνονται λόγων. 20τὸ καλόν, κύριε, καὶ λίθον κινῆσαι δύναται. ἰδοὺ φωναὶ φιλοσόφου, ἰδοὺ διάθεσις ὠφελήσοντος ἀνθρώπους· ἰδοὺ ἀκηκοὼς ἄνθρωπος λόγου, ἀνεγνωκὼς τὰ Σωκρατικὰ ὡς Σωκρατικά, οὐχὶ δʼ ὡς Λυσίου καὶ Ἰσοκράτους. πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα, τίσιν ποτὲ λόγοις. οὔ· ἀλλὰ τίνι ποτὲ λόγῳ· τοῦτʼ ἐκείνου λειότερον. 21μὴ γὰρ ἄλλως αὐτὰ ἀνεγνώκατε ἢ ὡς ᾠδάρια; ὡς εἴ γε ἀνεγιγνώσκετε ὡς δεῖ, οὐκ ἂν πρὸς τούτοις ἐγίνεσθε, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον ἐβλέπετε ἐμὲ δʼ Ἄνυτος καὶ Μέλητος ἀποκτεῖναι μὲν δύνανται, βλάψαι δʼ οὔ καὶ ὅτι ὡς ἐγὼ ἀ[ι]εὶ τοιοῦτος οἷος μηδενὶ προσέχειν τῶν ἐμῶν ἢ τῷ λόγῳ, ὃς ἄν μοι σκοπουμένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνηται. 22διὰ τοῦτο τίς ἤκουσέ ποτε Σωκράτους λέγοντος ὅτι οἶδά τι καὶ διδάσκω; ἀλλὰ ἄλλον ἀλλαχοῦ ἔπεμπεν. τοιγαροῦν ἤρχοντο πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀξιοῦντες φιλοσόφοις ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ συσταθῆναι κἀκεῖνος ἀπῆγεν καὶ συνίστανεν. 23οὔ· ἀλλὰ προσπέμπων ἔλεγεν ἄκουσόν μου σήμερον διαλεγομένου ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τῇ Κοδράτου. τί σου ἀκούσω; ἐπιδεῖξαί μοι θέλεις, ὅτι κομψῶς συντιθεῖς τὰ ὀνόματα; συντιθεῖς, ἄνθρωπε· καὶ τί σοι ἀγαθόν ἐστιν; 24ἀλλʼ ἐπαίνεσόν με. τί λέγεις τὸ ἐπαίνεσον; εἰπέ μοι οὐᾶ καὶ θαυμαστῶς. ἰδοὺ λέγω. εἰ δʼ ἐστὶν ἔπαινος ἐκεῖνο, ὅ τι ποτὲ λέγουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι τῶν ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κατηγορίᾳ, τί σε ἔχω ἐπαινέσαι; εἰ ἀγαθόν ἐστι τὸ φράζειν ὀρθῶς, δίδαξόν με καὶ ἐπαινέσω. 25τί οὖν; ἀηδῶς δεῖ τῶν τοιούτων ἀκούειν; μὴ γένοιτο. ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδὲ κιθαρῳδοῦ ἀηδῶς ἀκούω· μή τι οὖν τούτου ἕνεκα κιθαρῳδεῖν με δεῖ στάντα; ἄκουσον, τί λέγει Σωκράτης· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν πρέποι, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὥσπερ μειρακίῳ πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι. ὥσπερ μειρακίῳ φησίν. 26ἔστι γὰρ τῷ ὄντι κομψὸν τὸ τεχνίον ἐκλέξαι ὀνομάτια καὶ ταῦτα συνθεῖναι καὶ παρελθόντα εὐφυῶς ἀναγνῶναι ἢ εἰπεῖν καὶ μεταξὺ ἀναγιγνώσκοντα ἐπιφθέγξασθαι ὅτι τούτοις οὐ πολλοὶ δύνανται παρακολουθεῖν, μὰ τὴν ὑμετέραν σωτηρίαν. 27φιλόσοφος δʼ ἐπʼ ἀκρόασιν παρακαλεῖ;— οὐχὶ δʼ ὡς ὁ ἥλιος ἄγει αὐτὸς ἐφʼ ἑαυτὸν τὴν τροφήν, οὕτως δὲ καὶ οὗτος ἄγει τοὺς ὠφεληθησομένους; ποῖος ἰατρὸς παρακαλεῖ, ἵνα τις ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ θεραπευθῇ; καίτοι νῦν ἀκούω ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἰατροὶ παρακαλοῦσιν ἐν Ῥώμῃ· πλὴν ἐπʼ ἐμοῦ παρεκαλοῦντο. 28παρακαλῶ σε ἐλθόντα ἀκοῦσαι, ὅτι σοι κακῶς ἐστι καὶ πάντων μᾶλλον ἐπιμελῇ ἢ οὗ δεῖ σε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ὅτι ἀγνοεῖς τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ καὶ κακοδαίμων εἶ καὶ δυστυχής. κομψὴ παράκλησις. καὶ μὴν ἂν μὴ ταῦτα ἐμποιῇ ὁ τοῦ φιλοσόφου λόγος, νεκρός ἐστι καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ ὁ λέγων. 29εἴωθε λέγειν ὁ Ῥοῦφος εἰ εὐσχολεῖτε ἐπαινέσαι με, ἐγὼ δʼ οὐδὲν λέγω. τοιγαροῦν οὕτως ἔλεγεν, ὥσθʼ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν καθήμενον οἴεσθαι, ὅτι τίς ποτε αὐτὸν διαβέβληκεν· οὕτως ἥπτετο τῶν γιγνομένων, οὕτως πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐτίθει τὰ ἑκάστου κακά. 30ἰατρεῖόν ἐστιν, ἄνδρες, τὸ τοῦ φιλοσόφου σχολεῖον· οὐ δεῖ ἡσθέντας ἐξελθεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἀλγήσαντας. ἔρχεσθε γὰρ οὐχ ὑγιεῖς, ἀλλʼ ὁ μὲν ὦμον ἐκβεβληκώς, ὁ δʼ ἀπόστημα ἔχων, ὁ δὲ σύριγγα, ὁ δὲ κεφαλαλγῶν. 31εἶτʼ ἐγὼ καθίσας ὑμῖν λέγω νοημάτια καὶ ἐπιφωνημάτια, ἵνʼ ὑμεῖς ἐπαινέσαντές με ἐξέλθητε, ὁ μὲν τὸν ὦμον ἐκφέρων οἷον εἰσήνεγκεν, ὁ δὲ τὴν κεφαλὴν ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν, ὁ δὲ τὴν σύριγγα, ὁ δὲ τὸ ἀπόστημα; 32εἶτα τούτου ἕνεκα ἀποδημήσωσιν ἄνθρωποι νεώτεροι καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς τοὺς αὑτῶν ἀπολίπωσιν καὶ τοὺς φίλους καὶ τοὺς συγγενεῖς καὶ τὸ κτησίδιον, ἵνα σοι οὐᾶ φῶσιν ἐπιφωνημάτια λέγοντι; τοῦτο Σωκράτης ἐποίει, τοῦτο Ζήνων, τοῦτο Κλεάνθης; 33τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ προτρεπτικὸς χαρακτήρ; — τίς γὰρ οὐ λέγει; ὡς ὁ ἐλεγκτικός, ὡς ὁ διδασκαλικός. τίς οὖν πώποτε τέταρτον εἶπεν μετὰ τούτων τὸν ἐπιδεικτικόν; 34τίς γάρ ἐστιν ὁ προτρεπτικός; δύνασθαι καὶ ἑνὶ καὶ πολλοῖς δεῖξαι τὴν μάχην ἐν ᾗ κυλίονται· καὶ ὅτι μᾶλλον πάντων φροντίζουσιν ἢ ὧν θέλουσιν. θέλουσι μὲν γὰρ τὰ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν φέροντα, ἀλλαχοῦ δʼ αὐτὰ ζητοῦσι. 35τοῦτο ἵνα γένηται, δεῖ τεθῆναι χίλια βάθρα καὶ παρακληθῆναι τοὺς ἀκουσομένους καὶ σὲ ἐν κομψῷ στολίῳ ἢ τριβωναρίῳ ἀναβάντα ἐπὶ πούλβινον διαγράφειν, πῶς Ἀχιλλεὺς ἀπέθανεν; παύσασθε, τοὺς θεοὺς ὑμῖν, καλὰ ὀνόματα καὶ πράγματα καταισχύνοντες, ὅσον ἐφʼ ἑαυτοῖς. 36οὐδὲν προτρεπτικώτερον ἢ ὅταν ὁ λέγων ἐμφαίνῃ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ὅτι χρείαν αὐτῶν ἔχει. 37ἢ εἰπέ μοι, τίς ἀκούων ἀναγιγνώσκοντός σου ἢ διαλεγομένου περὶ αὑτοῦ ἠγωνίασεν ἢ ἐπεστράφη· εἰς αὑτὸν ἢ ἐξελθὼν εἶπεν ὅτι καλῶς μου ἥψατο ὁ φιλόσοφος· οὐκέτι δεῖ ταῦτα ποιεῖν; 38οὐχὶ δʼ, ἂν λίαν εὐδοκιμῇς, λέγει πρός τινα κομψῶς ἔφρασεν τὰ περὶ τὸν Ξέρξην, ἄλλος οὔ· ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπὶ Πύλαις μάχην; τοῦτό ἐστιν ἀκρόασις φιλοσόφου;
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA