Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER XVIII. · That we ought not to be alarmed, by any News that is brought us.
1When any alarming News is brought you, always have it at Hand, that no News can be brought you, concerning what is in your own Choice. Can any one bring you News, that your Opinions or Desires are ill conducted? By no means: but that somebody is dead. What is that to you then? That somebody speaks ill of you. And what is that to you then? That your Father is forming some Contrivance, or other. Against what? Against your Choice? How can he? Well: but against your Body; against your Estate? You are very safe: this is not against you.——But the Judge [perhaps] hath pronounced you guilty of Impiety. And did not the Judges pronounce the same of Socrates? Is his pronouncing a Sentence, any Business of yours? No. Then why do you, any longer, trouble yourself about it? There is a Duty incumbent on your Father; which, unless he performs, he loses the Character of a Father, of natural Affection, of Tenderness. Do not want him to lose any thing else, by this: for no Person is ever guilty in one Instance, and a Sufferer in another. Your Duty, on the other hand, is to make your Defence, with Constancy, Modesty, and Mildness: otherwise you lose the Character of filial Piety; of Modesty, and Generosity of Mind. Well: and is your Judge free from Danger? No. He runs an equal Hazard. Why then, are you still afraid of his Decision? What have you to do with the Evil of another? Making a bad Defence would be your own Evil. Let it be your only Care to avoid that: but whether Sentence is passed on you, or not, as it is the Business, so it is the Evil, of another. "Such a one threatens you."——Me? No.——"He censures you."——Let him look to it, how he doth his own Business——"He will give an unjust Sentence against you.——Poor Wretch!
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
That we ought not to be alarmed by any news that is brought us.
When any alarming news is brought you, always have it ready in mind that no news can be brought you concerning what is within the power of your own Will. Can any one bring you news that your opinions or desires are ill conducted? By no means; only that such a person is dead. What is that to you then? That somebody speaks ill of you. And what is that to you then? That your father is perhaps forming some contrivance or other. Against what? Against your Will? How can he? No; but against your body, against your estate? You are very safe; this is not against you. But the Judge has pronounced you guilty of impiety. And did not the Judges pronounce the same of Socrates? Is his pronouncing a sentence any business of yours? No. Then why do you any longer trouble yourself about it? There is a duty incumbent on your father, which unless he performs, he loses the character of a father, of natural affection, of tenderness. Do not desire him to lose anything else by this; for every man suffers precisely where he errs. Your duty, on the other hand, is to meet the case with firmness, modesty, and mildness; otherwise you forfeit piety, modesty, and nobleness. Well, and is your Judge free from danger? No; he runs an equal hazard. Why, then, are you still afraid of his decision? What have you to do with the ills of another? Meeting the case wrongly would be your own ill. Let it be your only care to avoid that; but whether sentence is passed on you or not, as it is the business of another, so the ill belongs to him. Such a one threatens you. Me? No. He censures you. Let him look to it, how he does his own duty. He will give an unjust sentence against you. Poor wretch!
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
That we ought not to be disturbed by any news.
When any thing shall be reported to you which is of a nature to disturb, have this principle in readiness, that the news is about nothing which is within the power of your will. Can any man report to you that you have formed a bad opinion, or had a bad desire? By no means. But perhaps he will report that some person is dead. What then is that to you? He may report that some person speaks ill of you. What then is that to you? Or that your father is planning something or other. Against whom? Against your will (προαίρεσις)? How can he? But is it against your poor body, against your little property? You are quite safe: it is not against you. But the judge declares that you have committed an act of impiety. And did not the judges (δίκασται) make the same declaration against Socrates? Does it concern you that the judge has made this declaration? No. Why then do you trouble yourself any longer about it? Your father has a certain duty, and if he shall not fulfil it, he loses the character of a father, of a man of natural affection, of gentleness. Do not wish him to lose any thing else on this account. For never does a man do wrong in one thing, and suffer in another. On the other side it is your duty to make your defence firmly, modestly, without anger: but if you do not, you also lose the character of a son, of a man of modest behavior, of generous character. Well then, is the judge free from danger? No; but he also is in equal danger. Why then are you still afraid of his decision? What have you to do with that which is another man’s evil? It is your own evil to make a bad defence: be on your guard against this only. But to be condemned or not to be condemned, as that is the act of another person, so it is the evil of another person. A certain person threatens you. Me? No. He blames you. Let him see how he manages his own affairs. He is going to condemn you unjustly. He is a wretched man.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1ὅταν σοί τι προσαγγελθῇ ταρακτικόν, ἐκεῖνο ἔχε πρόχειρον, ὅτι ἀγγελία περὶ οὐδενὸς προαιρετικοῦ γίνεται. 2μή τι γὰρ δύναταί σοί τις ἀγγεῖλαι, ὅτι κακῶς ὑπέλαβες ἢ κακῶς ὠρέχθης; — οὐδαμῶς. — ἀλλʼ ὅτι ἀπέθανέν τις· τί οὖν πρὸς σέ; ὅτι σε κακῶς τις λέγει· τί οὖν πρὸς σέ; 3ὅτι ὁ πατὴρ τάδε τινὰ ἑτοιμάζεται· ἐπὶ τίνα; μή τι ἐπὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν; πόθεν δύναται; ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τὸ σωμάτιον, ἐπὶ τὸ κτησείδιον· ἐσώθης, οὐκ ἐπὶ σέ. 4[οὐκοῦν] ἀλλʼ ὁ κριτὴς ἀποφαίνεται ὅτι ἠσέβησας. περὶ Σωκράτους δʼ οὐκ ἀπεφήναντο οἱ δικασταί; μή τι σὸν ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ ἐκεῖνον ἀποφήνασθαι; — οὔ. — τί οὖν ἔτι σοι μέλει; 5ἔστι τι τοῦ πατρός σου ἔργον, ὃ ἂν μὴ ἐκπληρώσῃ, ἀπώλεσεν τὸν πατέρα, τὸν φιλόστοργον, τὸν ἥμερον. ἄλλο δὲ μηδὲν ζήτει τούτου ἕνεκα αὐτὸν ἀπολές[θ]αι. οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ μέν τις ἁμαρτάνει, εἰς ἄλλο δὲ βλάπτεται. 6πάλιν σὸν ἔργον τὸ ἀπολογηθῆναι εὐσταθῶς, αἰδημόνως, ἀοργήτως. εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπώλεσας καὶ σὺ τὸν υἱόν, τὸν αἰδήμονα, τὸν γενναῖον. 7τί οὖν; ὁ κριτὴς ἀκίνδυνός ἐστιν; οὔ· ἀλλὰ κἀκείνῳ τὰ ἴσα κινδυνεύεται. τί οὖν ἔτι φοβῇ, τί ἐκεῖνος κρινεῖ; τί σοὶ καὶ τῷ ἀλλοτρίῳ κακῷ; 8σὸν κακόν ἐστι τὸ κακῶς ἀπολογηθῆναι· τοῦτο φυλάσσου μόνον· κριθῆναι δʼ ἢ μὴ κριθῆναι ὥσπερ ἄλλου ἐστὶν ἔργον, οὕτως κακὸν ἄλλου ἐστίν. 9ἀπειλεῖ σοι ὁ δεῖνα. ἐμοί; οὔ. ψέγει σε. αὐτὸς ὄψεται, πῶς ποιεῖ τὸ ἴδιον ἔργον. μέλλει σε κατακρινεῖν ἀδίκως. ἄθλιος.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA