Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER VIII. · Concerning such as hastily run into the philosophic Dress.
1Never commend or censure any one for common Actions, nor ascribe them either to Skilfulness or Unskilfulness; and thus you will at once be free both from Rashness and Ill-nature. Such a one bathes in a mighty little Time. Doth he therefore do it ill? Not at all. But what? In a mighty little Time.——"Is every thing well done then?"——By no means. But what is done from good Principles is well done; what from bad ones, ill. But till you know from what Principle any one acts, neither commend nor censure the Action. But the Principle is not easily judged of from the external Appearances. Such a one is a Carpenter, Why? He uses an Axe. What signifies that? Such a one is a Musician: for he sings. What signifies that? Such a one is a Philosopher. Why? Because he wears a Cloke and long Hair. What then do Mountebanks wear? And so, when People see any of these acting indecently, they presently say, "See what the Philosopher doth," But they ought rather, from his acting indecently, to say, he is no Philosopher. For, if indeed the Idea, which we have of a Philosopher, and his Profession, was, to wear a Cloke and long Hair, they would say right: but, if it be rather to keep himself free from Faults, since he doth not fulfil his Profession, why do not they deprive him of his Title? For this is the Way with regard to other Arts. When we see any one handle an Axe aukwardly, we do not say, "Where is the Use of this Art? See how ill Carpenters perform." But we say the very contrary: "This Man is no Carpenter; for he handles an Axe aukwardly." So, if we hear any one sing badly, we do not say, "Observe how Musicians sing." but rather, "This Fellow is no Musician." It is with regard to Philosophy alone, that People are thus affected. When they see any one acting contrary to the Profession of a Philosopher, they do not take away his Title; but, laying it down, that he is a Philosopher, and then assuming from the very Fact that he behaves indecently, they infer, that Philosophy is of no Use. 2"What then is the Reason of this?" Because we pay some Regard to the Pre-conception which we have of a Carpenter, and a Musician, and so of other Artists; but not of a Philosopher; which being thus vague and confused, we judge of it only from external Appearances. And of what other Art do we take up our Judgment from the Dress and the Hair? Hath it not Theorems too, and Materials, and an End, [to distinguish it?] What then is the Subject-matter of a Philosopher? Is it a Cloke?——No: but Reason. What his End? To wear a Cloke?——No: but to have his Reason correct. What are his Theorems? Are they how to get a great Beard, or long Hair?——No: but rather, as Zeno expresses it, To know the Elements of Reason, what each of them is in particular, and how they are adapted to each other, and what are their Consequences. 3Why then will you not first see, whether, by acting in an unbecoming Manner, he answers his Profession, and so proceed to blame the Study? Whereas now, when you act soberly yourself, you say, from what he appears to do amiss, "Observe the Philosopher!" As if it was decent to call a Person, who doth such Things, a Philosopher. And, again, "This is philosophical!" But you do not say, "Observe the Carpenter, or observe the Musician," when you know one of them to be an Adulterer, or see him to be a Glutton. So, in some small Degree, even You perceive, that the profession of a Philosopher is; but are misled, and confounded by your own Carelessness. But indeed even they, who are called Philosophers, enter upon their Profession by Things which are common to them with others. As soon as they have put on a Cloke, and let their Beard grow, they cry, "I am a Philosopher." Yet no one says, "I am a Musician;" because he hath bought a Fiddle and Fiddlestick: nor, "I am a Smith," because he is drest in the Vulcanian Cap and Apron. But they take their Name from their Art, not from their Habit. 4For this Reason, Euphrates was in the Right to say, "I long endeavoured to conceal my embracing the Philosophic Life; and it was of Use to me. For, in the first place, I knew that, what I did right, I did it not for Spectators; but for myself. I eat in a proper Manner, for myself. I had a composed Look, and Walk, all for God and myself. Then, as I fought alone, I was alone in Danger. Philosophy was in no Danger, on my doing any thing shameful, or unbecoming: nor did I hurt the rest of the World; which, by offending as a Philosopher, I might have done. For this Reason, they who were ignorant of my Intention, used to wonder, that while I conversed, and lived intirely with Philosophers, I never took up the Character. And where was the Harm, that I should be discovered to be a Philosopher, by my Actions, and not by the usual Badges. See how I eat, how I drink, how I sleep, how I bear, how I forbear; how I assist others; how I make use of my Desires, how of my Aversions; how I preserve the natural and acquired Relations, without Confusion, and without Impediment. Judge of me from hence, if you can. But, if you are so deaf and blind, that you would not suppose Vulcan himself to be a good Smith, unless you saw the Cap upon his Head, where is the Harm of not being found out by so foolish a Judge?" 5It was thus too that Socrates concealed himself from the Generality: and some even came and desired him to recommend them to Philosophers. Did he use to be displeased then, like us; and say, What! do not you take me for a Philosopher? No: he took and recommended them; contented with only being a Philosopher, and rejoicing in not being vexed, that he was not thought one. For he remembered his Business: and what is the Business of a wise and good Man? To have many Scholars? By no means. Let those see to it, who have made this their Study. Well then: is it to be a perfect Master of difficult Theorems? Let others see to that too. In what then was he, and did he desire to be, somebody? In what constituted his Hurt or Advantage? "If, says he, any one can hurt me, I am doing nothing. If I depend for my Advantage upon another, I am nothing. Do I wish for any thing, and it doth not come to pass? I am unhappy." To such a Combat he invited every one, and, in my Opinion, yielded to no one. But do you think it was by making Proclamation, and saying, "I am such a one?" Far from it: but by being such a one For this, again, is Folly and Insolence to say, "I am impassive and undisturbed. Be it known to you, Mortals, that while you are fluctuating and bustling about for Things of no Value, I alone am free from all Perturbation."——Are you then so far from being contented with having no Pain yourself, that you must needs make Proclamation: "Come hither, all you who have the Gout, or the Headake, or a Fever, or are lame, or blind; and see me free from every Distemper." This is vain. and shocking, unless you could show, like Æsculapius, by what Method of Cure they may presently become as free from Distempers as yourself, and bring your own Health as a Proof of it. 6Such is the Cynic, honoured with the Sceptre and Diadem from Jove: who says, "That you may see, O Mankind, that you do not seek Happiness and Tranquillity where it is, but where it is not, behold, I am sent an Example to you, from God; who have neither Estate, nor House, nor Wife, nor Children, nor even a Bed, or Coat, or Furniture. And see how healthy I am. Try me: and, if you see me free from Perturbation, hear the Remedies, and by what Means I was cured." This now is benevolent and noble. But consider whose Business it is.——Jupiter's, or his whom he judges worthy of this Office; that he may never discover any thing to the World, by which he may invalidate his own Testimony, which he gives for Virtue, and against Externals. No sickly Pale his beauteous Features wear,
Nor from his Cheek he wipes the languid Tear. Homer. And not only this, but he doth not desire or seek for Company or Place, or Amusement, as Boys do the Vintage Time, or Holy-Days: always fortified by virtuous Shame, as others are by Walls, and Gates, and Centinels. 7But now they, who have only such an Inclination to Philosophy, as bad Stomachs have to some Kinds of Food, of which they will presently grow sick, immediately run to the Sceptre, to the Kingdom. They let grow their Hair, assume the Cloke, bare the Shoulder, wrangle with all they meet; and even, if they see any one in a thick warm Coat, wrangle with him. First harden yourself against all Weather, Man. Consider your Inclination; whether it be not that of a bad Stomach, or of a longing Woman. First study to conceal what you are; philosophise a little while by yourself. Fruit is produced thus. The Seed must first be buried in the Ground, lie hid there some time, and grow up by degrees, that it may come to Perfection. But, if it produces the Ear before the Stalk hath its proper Joints, it is imperfect, and of the Garden of Adonis. Now you are a poor Plant of this Kind. You have blossomed too soon: the Winter will kill you. See what Countrymen say about Seeds of any Sort, when the warm Weather comes too early. They are in great Anxiety, for fear the Seeds should shoot out too luxuriantly; and then, one Frost taking them, shows how prejudicial their Forwardness was. Beware you too, Man. You have shot out luxuriantly, you have sprung forth towards a trifling Fame, before the proper Season. You seem to be somebody, as a Fool may among Fools. You will be taken by the Frost: or rather, you are already frozen downwards, at the Root: you still blossom indeed a little at the Top, and therefore you think you are still alive and flourishing. Let us, at least, ripen naturally. Why do you lay us open? Why do you force us? We cannot yet bear the Air. Suffer the Root to grow; then the first, then the second, then the third Joint of the Stalk to spring from it; and thus Nature will force out the Fruit, whether I will or not. For who that is big with, and full of such Principles, doth not perceive too his own Qualifications, and exert his Efforts to correspondent Operations? Not even a Bull is ignorant of his own Qualifications, when any wild Beast approaches the Herd, nor waits for any one to encourage him; nor a Dog, when he spies any Game. And, if I have the Qualifications of a good Man, shall I wait for you to qualify me for my own proper Operations? but believe me, I have them not yet. Why then would you with me to be withered before my Time, as you are?
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (6)
- Perhaps the true Reading is ὃ ὁ φιλοσοφος.
- See p. 257. Note (m).
- Which were the Characteristics of the Cynics.
- At the Feast of Adonis, there were carried about little Earthen Pots, filled with Mould, in which grew several Sorts of Herbs. These were called Gardens: and from thence the Gardens of Adonis came to be proverbially applied to Things unfruitful or fading; because those Herbs were only sowed so long before the Festiyal, as to sprout forth and be green at that Time, and then were presently cast into the Water. See Potter's Grecian Antiquities, Chap. 20. p. 363.
- Here is a strong Similitude to the Seed in the Gospels, that sprung up quickly, and withered.
- This Passage hath some Difficulty in the Original; and, probably, may have been corrupted. The Translation hath given what seems to be the Sense.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Concerning such as hastily assume the philosophic dress.
Never commend or censure any one for common actions, nor attribute to them either skilfulness or unskilfulness; and thus you will at once be free both from rashness and ill-nature. Such a one bathes hastily. Does he therefore do it ill? Not at all.—But what? Hastily. Is everything well done, then? By no means. But what is done from good principles is well done; what from bad ones, ill. Till you know from what principle any one acts, neither commend nor censure the action. But the principle is not easily discerned from the external appearance. Such a one is a carpenter. Why? He uses an axe. What proof is that? Such a one is a musician, for he sings. What proof is that? Such a one is a philosopher. Why? Because he wears a cloak and long hair. What then do mountebanks wear? And so, when people see any.of these acting indecently, they presently say, See what the philosopher does. But they ought rather, from his acting indecently, to say that he is no philosopher. For if indeed the essence of philosophic pursuits is to wear a cloak and long hair, they say right; but if it be rather to keep himself free from faults, since he does not fulfil his profession, why do not they deprive him of his title? For this is the way with regard to other arts. When we see any one handle an axe awkwardly, we do not say, Where is the use of this art? See how poorly carpenters acquit themselves, but we say the very contrary, This man is no carpenter; for he handles an axe awkwardly. So, if we hear any one sing badly, we do not say, Observe how musicians sing, but rather, This fellow is no musician. It is with regard to philosophy alone that people are thus affected. When they see any one acting inconsistently with the profession of a philosopher, they do. not take away his title; but assuming that he is a philosopher, and then reasoning from his improper behavior, they infer that philosophy is of no use.
What then is the reason of this? Because we pay some regard to the idea which we have of a carpenter and a musician, and so of other artists, but not of a philosopher; which idea being thus vague and confused, we judge of it only from external appearances. And of what other art do we form our opinion from the dress or the hair? Has it not principles too, and materials, and an aim? What, then, are the materials of a philosopher,—a cloak? No, but reason. What his aim,—to wear a cloak? No, but to have his reason in good order. What are his principles? Are they how to get a great beard, or long hair? No, but rather, as Zeno expresses it, to know the elements of reason, what is each separately and how linked together, and what their consequences.
Why, then, will you not first see, whether when acting improperly he fulfils his profession, ere you proceed to blame the study? Whereas now, when acting soberly yourself, you say, in regard to whatever he appears to do amiss, Observe the philosopher! as if it were proper to call a person who does such things a philosopher. And again, This is philosophical! But you do not say, Observe the carpenter, or observe the musician, when you know one of them to be an adulterer, or see him to be a glutton. So, in some small degree, even you perceive what the profession of a philosopher is, but are misled and confounded by your own carelessness. And, indeed, even those called philosophers enter upon their profession by commonplace beginnings. As soon as they have put on the cloak and let their beards grow, they cry, am a philosopher. Yet no one says, am a musician, merely because he has bought a fiddle and fiddlestick; nor, am a smith, because he is dressed in the cap and apron. But they take their name from their art, not from their garb.
For this reason, Euphrates was in the right to say, long endeavored to conceal my embracing the philosophic life; and it was of use to me. For, in the first place, I knew that whatever I did right I did not for spectators, but for myself. I ate in a seemly manner, for my own approbation. I preserved composure of look and manner, all for God and myself. Then, as I contended alone, I alone was in danger. Philosophy was in no danger, on my doing anything shameful or unbecoming; nor did I hurt the rest of the world, which, by offending as a philosopher, I might have done. For this reason, they who were ignorant of my intention, used to wonder that while I conversed and lived entirely with philosophers, I never took up the character. And where was the harm, that I should be discovered to be a philosopher by my actions, rather than by the usual badges? See how I eat, how I drink, how I sleep, how I bear, how I forbear; how I assist others; how I direct my desires, how my aversions; how I preserve the natural and acquired relations, without confusion and without obstruction. Judge of me hence, if you can. But if you are so deaf and blind that you would not suppose Hephaistos himself to be a good smith, unless you saw the cap upon his head, where is the harm in not being found out by so foolish a judge?
It was thus, too, that Socrates concealed himself from the multitude; and some even came and desired him to introduce them to philosophers. Was he accustomed to be displeased, then, like us; and to say, What! do not you take me for a philosopher? No, he took them and introduced them; contented with merely being a philosopher, and rejoicing in feeling no annoyance that he was not thought one. For he remembered his business; and what is the business of a wise and good man,—to have many scholars? By no means. Let those see to it who have made this their study. Well, then; is it to be a perfect master of difficult theorems? Let others see to that too. What, then, was his position, and what did he desire to be? What constituted his hurt or advantage? If, said he, any one can still hurt me, I am accomplishing nothing; If I depend for my advantage upon another, I am nothing. Have I any wish unaccomplished? Then I am unhappy. To such a combat he invited every one, and, in my opinion, yielded to no one. But do you think it was by making proclamation, and saying, I am such a one? Far from it; but by being such a one. For it is folly and insolence to say, I am passive and undisturbed. Be it known to you, mortals, that while you are disturbed and vexed about things of no value, I alone am free from all perturbation. Are you, then, so little satisfied with your exemption from pain. that you must needs make proclamation: Come hither, all you who have the gout, or the headache, or a fever, or are lame, or blind; and see me, free from every distemper? This is vain and shocking, unless you can show, like Aesculapius, by what method of cure they may presently become as free from distempers as yourself, and can bring your own health as a proof of it.
Such is the Cynic honored with the sceptre and diadem from Zeus; who says, That you may see, O mankind, that you do not seek happiness and tranquillity where it is, but where it is not, behold, I am sent an example to you from God,—who have neither estate, nor house, nor wife, nor children, nor even a bed, coat, or furniture. And yet see how in what good condition I am. Try me; and if you see me free from perturbation, hear the remedies, and by what means I was cured. This now is benevolent and noble. But consider whose business it is. That of Zeus, or his whom he judges worthy of this office; that he may never show to the world anything to impeach his own testimony for virtue and against externals.
Neither pallid of hue, nor wiping tears from his cheek.
And not only this, but he does not desire or seek for company or place or amusement, as boys do the vintage time, or holidays; being always fortified by virtuous shame, as others are by walls and gates and sentinels.
But now, they who have only such an inclination to philosophy as weak stomachs have to some kinds of food, of which they will presently grow sick, expect to hasten to the sceptre, to the kingdom. They let their hair grow, assume the cloak, bare the shoulder, wrangle with all they meet; and if they see any one in a thick, warm coat, must needs wrangle with him. First harden yourself against all weather, man. Consider your inclination; whether it be not that of a weak stomach, or of a longing woman. First study to conceal what you are; philosophize a little while by yourself. Fruit is produced thus: the seed must first be buried in the ground, lie hid there some time, and grow up by degrees, that it may come to perfection. But if it produces the ear before the stalk has its proper joints, it is imperfect, and of the garden of Adonis. Now you are a poor plant of this kind. You have blossomed too soon; the winter will kill you. See what countrymen say about seeds of any sort, when the warm weather comes too early. They are in great anxiety for fear the seeds should shoot out too luxuriantly; and then one frost taking them may show how prejudicial their forwardness was. Beware you, too, O man. You have shot out luxuriantly; you have sprung forth towards a trifling fame, before the proper season. You seem to be somebody, as a fool may among fools. You will be taken by the frost; or rather, you are already frozen downward at the root; you still blossom, indeed, a little at the top, and therefore you think you are still alive and flourishing.
Let us, at least, ripen naturally. Why do you lay us open? Why do you force us? We cannot yet bear the air. Suffer the root to grow; then the first, then the second, then the third joint of the stalk to spring from it; and thus Nature will force out the fruit, whether I will or not. For who that is charged with such principles, but must perceive, too, his own powers, and strive to put them in practice. Not even a bull is ignorant of his own powers, when any wild beast approaches the herd, nor waits he for any one to encourage him; nor does a dog when he spies any game. And if I have the powers of a good man, shall I wait for you to qualify me for my own proper actions? But believe me, I have them not quite yet. Why, then, would you wish me to be withered before my time, as you are?
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Higginson’s notes (2)
- Quotation source: Homer, Odyssey, 11.528-529.
- At the feast of Adonis there were carried about little earthen pots filled with mould, in which grew several sorts of herbs. These were called gardens; and from thence the gardens of Adonis came to be proverbially applied to things unfruitful or fading; because those herbs were only sowed so long before the festival as to sprout forth and be green at that time, and then were presently cast into the water.—C.
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
Against those who hastily rush into the use of the philosophic dress.
Never praise nor blame a man because of the things which are common (to all, or to most), and do not ascribe to him any skill or want of skill; and thus you will be free from rashness and from malevolence. This man bathes very quickly. Does he then do wrong? Certainly not. But what does he do? He bathes very quickly. Are all things then done well? By no means: but the acts which proceed from right opinions are done well; and those which proceed from bad opinions are done ill. But do you, until you know the opinion from which a man does each thing, neither praise nor blame the act. But the opinion is not easily discovered from the external things (acts). This man is a carpenter. Why? Because he uses an axe. What then is this to the matter? This man is a musician because he sings. And what does that signify? This man is a philosopher. Because he wears a cloak and long hair. And what does a juggler wear? For this reason if a man sees any philosopher acting indecently, immediately he says, See what the philosopher is doing; but he ought because of the man’s indecent behaviour rather to say that he is not a philosopher. For if this is the preconceived notion (πρόληψις) of a philosopher and what he professes, to wear a cloak and long hair, men would say well; but if what he professes is this rather, to keep himself free from faults, why do we not rather, because he does not make good his professions, take from him the name of philosopher? For so we do in the case of all other arts. When a man sees another handling an axe badly, he does not say, what is the use of the carpenter’s art? See how badly carpenters do their work; but he says just the contrary, This man is not a carpenter, for he uses an axe badly. In the same way if a man hears another singing badly, he does not say, See how musicians sing; but rather, This man is not a musician. But it is in the matter of philosophy only that people do this. When they see a man acting contrary to the profession of a philosopher, they do not take away his title, but they assume him to be a philosopher, and from his acts deriving the fact that he is behaving indecently they conclude that there is no use in philosophy.
What then is the reason of this? Because we attach value to the notion (πρόληψιν) of a carpenter, and to that of a musician, and to the notion of other artisans in like manner, but not to that of a philosopher, and we judge from externals only that it is a thing confused and ill defined. And what other kind of art has a name from the dress and the hair; and has not both theorems and a material and an end? What then is the material (matter) of the philosopher? Is it a cloak? No, but reason. What is his end? is it to wear a cloak? No, but to possess the reason in a right state. Of what kind are his theorems? Are they those about the way in which the beard becomes great or the hair long? No, but rather what Zeno says, to know the elements of reason, what kind of a thing each of them is, and how they are fitted to one another, and what things are consequent upon them. Will you not then see first if he does what he professes when he acts in an unbecoming manner, and then blame his study (pursuit)? But now when you yourself are acting in a sober way, you say in consequence of what he seems to you to be doing wrong, Look at the philosopher, as if it were proper to call by the name of philosopher one who does these things; and further, This is the conduct of a philosopher. But you do not say, Look at the carpenter, when you know that a carpenter is an adulterer or you see him to be a glutton; nor do you say, See the musician. Thus to a certain degree even you perceive (understand) the profession of a philosopher, but you fall away from the notion, and you are confused through want of care.
But even the philosophers themselves as they are called pursue the thing (philosophy) by beginning with things which are common to them and others: as soon as they have assumed a cloak and grown a beard, they say, I am a philosopher. But no man will say, I am a musician, if he has bought a plectrum (fiddlestick) and a lute: nor will he say, I am a smith, if he has put on a cap and apron. But the dress is fitted to the art; and they take their name from the art, and not from the dress. For this reason Euphrates used to say well, A long time I strove to be a philosopher without people knowing it; and this, he said, was useful to me: for first I knew that when I did any thing well, I did not do it for the sake of the spectators, but for the sake of myself: I ate well for the sake of myself; I had my countenance well composed and my walk: all for myself and for God. Then, as I struggled alone, so I alone also was in danger: in no respect through me, if I did anything base or unbecoming, was philosophy endangered; nor did I injure the many by doing any thing wrong as a philosopher. For this reason those who did not know my purpose used to wonder how it was that while I conversed and lived altogether with all philosophers, I was not a philosopher myself. And what was the harm for me to be known to be a philosopher by my acts and not by outward marks? See how I eat, how I drink, how I sleep, how I bear and forbear, how I co-operate, how I employ desire, how I employ aversion (turning from things), how I maintain the relations (to things) those which are natural or those which are acquired, how free from confusion, how free from hindrance. Judge of me from this, if you can. But if you are so deaf and blind that you cannot conceive even Hephaestus to be a good smith, unless you see the cap on his head, what is the harm in not being recognized by so foolish a judge?
So Socrates was not known to be a philosopher by most persons; and they used to come to him and ask to be introduced to philosophers. Was he vexed then as we are, and did he say, And do you not think that I am a philosopher? No, but he would take them and introduce them, being satisfied with one thing, with being a philosopher; and being pleased also with not being thought to be a philosopher, he was not annoyed: for he thought of his own occupation. What is the work of an honourable and good man? To have many pupils? By no means. They will look to this matter who are earnest about it. But was it his business to examine carefully difficult theorems? Others will look after these matters also, In what then was he, and who was he and whom did he wish to be? He was in that (employed in that) wherein there was hurt (damage) and advantage. If any man can damage me, he says, I am doing nothing: if I am waiting for another man to do me good, I am nothing. If I wish for any thing, and it does not happen, I am unfortunate. To such a contest he invited every man, and I do not think that he would have declined the contest with any one. What do you suppose? was it by proclaiming and saying, I am such a man? Far from it, but by being such a man. For further, this is the character of a fool and a boaster to say, I am free from passions and disturbance: do not be ignorant, my friends, that while you are uneasy and disturbed about things of no value, I alone am free from all perturbation. So is it not enough for you to feel no pain, unless you make this proclamation: Come together all who are suffering gout, pains in the head, fever, ye who are lame, blind, and observe that I am sound (free) from every ailment—This is empty and disagreeable to hear, unless like Aesculapius you are able to show immediately by what kind of treatment they also shall be immediately free from disease, and unless you show your own health as an example.
For such is the Cynic who is honoured with the sceptre and the diadem by Zeus, and says, That you may see, O men, that you seek happiness and tranquillity not where it is, but where it is not, behold I am sent to you by God as an example, I who have neither property nor house, nor wife nor children, not even a bed, nor coat nor household utensil; and see how healthy 1 am: try me, and if you see that I am free from perturbations, hear the remedies and how I have been cured (treated). This is both philanthropic and noble. But see whose work it is, the work of Zeus, or of him whom he may judge worthy of this service, that he may never exhibit any thing to the many, by which he shall make of no effect his own testimony,—whereby he gives testimony to virtue, and bears evidence against external things: His beauteous face pales not, nor from his cheeks He wipes a tear. And not this only, but he neither desires nor seeks any thing, nor man nor place nor amusement, as children seek the vintage or holidays; always fortified by modesty as others are fortified by walls and doors and doorkeepers.
But now (these men) being only moved to philosophy, as those who have a bad stomach are moved to some kinds of food which they soon loathe, straightway (rush) towards the sceptre and to the royal power. They let the hair grow, they assume the cloak, they show the shoulder bare, they quarrel with those whom they meet; and if they see a man in a thick winter coat, they quarrel with him. Man, first exercise yourself in winter weather: see your movements (inclinations) that they are not those of a man with a bad stomach or those of a longing woman. First strive that it be not known what you are: be a philosopher to yourself (or, philosophize to yourself) a short time. Fruit grows thus: the seed must be buried for some time, hid, grow slowly in order that it may come to perfection. But if it produces the ear before the jointed stem, it is imperfect, a produce of the garden of Adonis. Such a poor plant are you also: you have blossomed too soon; the cold weather will scorch you up. See what the husbandmen say about seeds when there is warm weather too early. They are afraid lest the seeds should be too luxuriant, and then a single frost should lay hold of them and show that they are too forward. Do you also consider, my man: you have shot out too soon, you have hurried towards a little fame before the proper season: you think that you are something, a fool among fools: you will be caught by the frost, and rather you have been frost-bitten in the root below, but your upper parts still blossom a little, and for this reason you think that you are still alive and flourishing. Allow us to ripen in the natural way: why do you bare (expose) us? why do you force us? we are not yet able to bear the air. Let the root grow, then acquire the first joint, then the second, and then the third: in this way then the fruit will naturally force itself out, even if I do not choose. For who that is pregnant and filled with such great principles does not also perceive his own powers and move towards the corresponding acts? A bull is not ignorant of his own nature and his powers, when a wild beast shows itself, nor does he wait for one to urge him on; nor a dog when he sees a wild animal. But if I have the powers of a good man, shall I wait for you to prepare me for my own (proper) acts? At present I have them not, believe me. Why then do you wish me to be withered up before the time, as you have been withered up?
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (12)
- See iv. 4. 44.
- Compare Horace, Ep. i 19, 12 etc. Quid, si quis vultu torvo ferus et pede nudo Exiguaeque togae simulet textore Catonem, Virtutemne reprs aentet moresque Catonis?
- See iii. 15. 8
- Yea a man may say, Thou hast faith, and I have works: shew me thy faith without thy works, and I will shew thee my faith by my works, Epistle of James, ii. 18. So a moral philosopher may say, I show my principles, not by what I profess, but by that which I do.
- See the statues of Hephaestus, Montfaucon, Antiq. vol. i. lib. iii. c. 1. Upton.
- In what then was he seems to mean in what did he employ himself ?
- The text of Schweighaeuser is οὐκ ἂν μοι δοκῇ ἐκστῆναι οὐδενί . he says temere οὐκ ἂν μοι δοκεῖ ed. Bas. et seqq. But δοκεῖ is right.
- Compare iii. c. 22.
- Quotation source: —Odyssey, xi. 528
- The word is φαινόλη , which seems to be the Latin paenula.
- The gardens of Adonis are things growing in earthen vessels, carried about for show only, not for use. The gardens of Adonis is a proverbial expression applied to things of no value, to plants, for instance, which last only a short time, have no roots, and soon wither. Much things, we may suppose, were exhibited at the festivals of Adonis. Schweig.’s note.
- See Schweig.’s note.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1μηδέποτʼ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν τινα μήτʼ ἐπαινέσητε μήτε ψέξητε μήτε τέχνην τινὰ ἢ ἀτεχνίαν προσμαρτυρήσητε· καὶ ἅμα μὲν προπετείας ἑαυτοὺς ἀπαλλάξετε, ἅμα δὲ κακοηθείας. 2οὗτος ταχέως λούεται. κακῶς οὖν ποιεῖ; οὐ πάντως. 3ἀλλὰ τί; ταχέως λούεται. — πάντα οὖν καλῶς γίνεται; — οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ δογμάτων ὀρθῶν καλῶς, τὰ δʼ ἀπὸ μοχθηρῶν μοχθηρῶς. σὺ δὲ μέχρις ἂν καταμάθῃς τὸ δόγμα, ἀφʼ οὗ τις ποιεῖ ἕκαστα, μήτʼ ἐπαίνει τὸ ἔργον μήτε ψέγε. 4δόγμα δʼ ἐκ τῶν ἐκτὸς οὐ ῥᾳδίως κρίνεται. οὗτος τέκτων ἐστίν. διὰ τί; χρῆται σκεπάρνῳ. τί οὖν τοῦτο; οὗτος μουσικός· ᾁδει γάρ. καὶ τί τοῦτο; οὗτος φιλόσοφος. διὰ τί; 5τρίβωνα γὰρ ἔχει καὶ κόμην. οἱ δʼ ἀγύρται τί ἔχουσιν; διὰ τοῦτο, ἂν ἀσχημονοῦντά τις ἴδῃ τινὰ αὐτῶν, εὐθὺς λέγει ἰδοὺ ὁ φιλόσοφος τί ποιεῖ. ἔδει δʼ ἀφʼ ὧν ἠσχημόνει μᾶλλον λέγειν αὐτὸν μὴ εἶναι φιλόσοφον. 6εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου πρόληψις καὶ ἐπαγγελία, ἔχειν τρίβωνα καὶ κόμην, καλῶς ἂν ἔλεγον· εἰ δʼ ἐκείνη μᾶλλον, ἀναμάρτητον εἶναι, διὰ τί οὐχὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πληροῦν τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν ἀφαιροῦνται αὐτὸν τῆς προσηγορίας; 7οὕτως γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν. ὅταν ἴδῃ τις κακῶς πελεκῶντα, οὐ λέγει τί ὄφελος τεκτονικῆς; ἰδοὺ οἱ τέκτονες οἷα ποιοῦσι κακά, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τοὐναντίον λέγει οὗτος οὐκ ἔστι τέκτων, πελεκᾷ γὰρ κακῶς. 8ὁμοίως κἂν ᾁδοντός τινος ἀκούσῃ κακῶς, οὐ λέγει ἰδοὺ πῶς ᾁδουσιν οἱ μουσικοί, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον οὗτος [ὅτι] οὐκ ἔστι μουσικός. 9ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίας δὲ μόνης τοῦτο πάσχουσιν· ὅταν τινὰ ἴδωσι παρὰ τὸ ἐπάγγελμα τὸ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ποιοῦντα, οὐχὶ τῆς προσηγορίας ἀφαιροῦνται αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ θέντες εἶναι φιλόσοφον, εἶτʼ ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ τοῦ γινομένου λαβόντες, ὅτι ἀσχημονεῖ, ἐπάγουσι μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν. τί οὖν τὸ αἴτιον; 10ὅτι τὴν μὲν τοῦ τέκτονος πρόληψιν πρεσβεύομεν καὶ τὴν τοῦ μουσικοῦ καὶ ὡσαύτως τῶν ἄλλων τεχνιτῶν, τὴν τοῦ φιλοσόφου δʼ οὔ, ἀλλʼ ἅτε συγκεχυμένην καὶ ἀδιάρθρωτον ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκτὸς μόνον κρίνομεν. 11καὶ ποία ἄλλη τέχνη ἀπὸ σχήματος ἀναλαμβάνεται καὶ κόμης, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ θεωρήματα ἔχει καὶ ὕλην καὶ τέλος; 12τίς οὖν ὕλη τοῦ φιλοσόφου; μὴ τρίβων; οὔ, ἀλλὰ ὁ λόγος. τί τέλος; μή τι φορεῖν τρίβωνα; οὔ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν ἔχειν τὸν λόγον. ποῖα θεωρήματα; μή τι τὰ περὶ τοῦ πῶς πώγων μέγας γίνεται ἢ κόμη βαθεῖα; ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἃ Ζήνων λέγει, γνῶναι τὰ τοῦ λόγου στοιχεῖα, ποῖόν τι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστι καὶ πῶς ἁρμόττεται πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ἀκόλουθά ἐστιν. 13οὐ θέλεις οὖν ἰδεῖν πρῶτον, εἰ πληροῖ τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν ἀσχημονῶν, καὶ οὕτως τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι ἐγκαλεῖν; νῦν δʼ, αὐτὸς ὅταν σωφρονῇς, ἐξ ὧν ποιεῖν σοι δοκεῖ κακῶς, λέγεις ὅρα τὸν φιλόσοφον (ὡς οὐ πρέποντος λέγειν τὸν ταῦτα ποιοῦντα φιλόσοφον) καὶ πάλιν τοῦτο φιλόσοφός ἐστιν. ὅρα δὲ τὸν τέκτονα οὐ λέγεις, ὅταν μοιχεύοντά τινα γνῷς ἢ λιχνεύοντα ἴδῃς, οὐδὲ ὅρα τὸν μουσικόν. 14οὕτως ἐπὶ ποσὸν αἰσθάνῃ καὶ αὐτὸς τῆς ἐπαγγελίας τοῦ φιλοσόφου, ἀπολισθάνεις δὲ καὶ συγχέῃ ὑπὸ ἀμελετησίας. 15ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ καλούμενοι φιλόσοφοι ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν τὸ πρᾶγμα μετίασιν· εὐθὺς ἀναλαβόντες τρίβωνα καὶ πώγωνα καθέντες φασὶν ἐγὼ φιλόσοφός εἰμι. 16οὐδεὶς δʼ ἐρεῖ ἐγὼ μουσικός εἰμι, ἂν πλῆκτρον καὶ κιθάραν ἀγοράσῃ, οὐδʼ ἐγὼ χαλκεύς εἰμι, ἂν πιλίον καὶ περίζωμα περιθῆται, ἀλλʼ ἁρμόζεται μὲν τὸ σχῆμα πρὸς τὴν τέχνην, ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης δὲ τὸ ὄνομα, οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ σχήματος ἀναλαμβάνουσιν. 17διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς Εὐφράτης ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἐπὶ πολὺ ἐπειρώμην λανθάνειν φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ἦν μοι, φησίν, τοῦτο ὠφέλιμον. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ᾔδειν, ὅσα καλῶς ἐποίουν, ὅτι οὐ διὰ τοὺς θεατὰς ἐποίουν, ἀλλὰ διʼ ἐμαυτόν· ἤσθιον ἐμαυτῷ καλῶς, κατεσταλμένον εἶχον τὸ βλέμμα, τὸν περίπατον· πάντα ἐμαυτῷ καὶ θεῷ. 18εἶτα ὥσπερ μόνος ἠγωνιζόμην, οὕτως μόνος καὶ ἐκινδύνευον· οὐδὲν ἐμοὶ δράσαντι τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἀπρεπὲς τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐκινδυνεύετο, οὐδʼ ἔβλαπτον τοὺς πολλοὺς ὡς φιλόσοφος ἁμαρτάνων. 19διὰ τοῦτο οἱ μὴ εἰδότες μου τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ἐθαύμαζον, πῶς πᾶσι φιλοσόφοις χρώμενος καὶ συζῶν αὐτὸς οὐκ ἐφιλοσόφουν. 20καὶ τί κακόν, ἐν οἷς ἐποίουν ἐπιγιγνώσκεσθαι τὸν φιλόσοφον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς συμβόλοις μή; βλέπε, πῶς ἐσθίω, πῶς πίνω, πῶς καθεύδω, πῶς ἀνέχομαι, πῶς ἀπέχομαι, πῶς συνεργῶ, πῶς ὀρέξει χρῶμαι, πῶς ἐκκλίσει, πῶς τηρῶ τὰς σχέσεις τὰς φυσικὰς ἢ ἐπιθέτους ἀσυγχύτως καὶ ἀπαραποδίστως· ἐκεῖθέν με κρῖνε, εἰ δύνασαι. 21εἰ δʼ οὕτως κωφὸς εἶ καὶ τυφλός, ἵνα μηδὲ τὸν Ἥφαιστον ὑπολαμβάνῃς καλὸν χαλκέα, ἂν μὴ τὸ πιλίον ἴδῃς περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν περικείμενον, τί κακὸν ὑφʼ οὕτως ἠλιθίου κριτοῦ ἀγνοεῖσθαι; 22οὕτως ἐλάνθα νε παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις Σωκράτης καὶ ἤρχοντο πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀξιοῦντες φιλοσόφοις συσταθῆναι. 23μή τι οὖν ἠγανάκτει ὡς ἡμεῖς καὶ ἔλεγεν ἐγὼ δέ σοι οὐ φαίνομαι φιλόσοφος;; ἀλλʼ ἀπῆγεν καὶ συνίστα ἑνὶ ἀρκούμενος τῷ εἶναι φιλόσοφος, χαίρων δὲ καί, ὅτι μὴ δοκῶν οὐκ ἐδάκνετο· ἐμέμνητο γὰρ τοῦ ἰδίου ἔργου. 24τί ἔργον καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ; μαθητὰς πολλοὺς ἔχειν; οὐδαμῶς. ὄψονται οἱ περὶ τοῦτο ἐσπουδακότες. ἀλλὰ θεωρήματα δύσκολα ἀκριβοῦν; ὄψονται καὶ περὶ τούτων ἄλλοι. 25ποῦ οὖν αὐτὸς καὶ ἦν τις καὶ εἶναι ἤθελεν; ὅπου βλάβη καὶ ὠφέλεια. εἴ μέ τις, φησίν, βλάψαι δύναται, ἐγὼ οὐδὲν ποιῶ· εἰ ἄλλον περιμένω, ἵνα με ὠφελήσῃ, ἐγὼ οὐδέν εἰμι. θέλω τι καὶ οὐ γίνεται· ἐγὼ ἀτυχής εἰμι. 26εἰς τοσοῦτο σκάμμα προεκαλεῖτο πάντα ὁντιναοῦν καὶ οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκεῖ ἐκστῆναι οὐδενί — τί δοκεῖτε; καταγγέλλων καὶ λέγων ἐγὼ τοιοῦτός εἰμι; μὴ γένοιτο, ἀλλὰ ὢν τοιοῦτος. 27πάλιν γὰρ τοῦτο μωροῦ καὶ ἀλαζόνος ἐγὼ ἀπαθής εἰμι καὶ ἀτάραχος· μὴ ἀγνοεῖτε, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ὅτι ὑμῶν κυκωμένων καὶ θορυβουμένων περὶ τὰ μηδενὸς ἄξια μόνος ἐγὼ ἀπήλλαγμαι πάσης ταραχῆς. 28οὕτως οὐκ ἀρκεῖ σοι τὸ μηδὲν ἀλγεῖν, ἂν μὴ κηρύσσῃς συνέλθετε πάντες οἱ ποδαγρῶντες, οἱ κεφαλαλγοῦντες, οἱ πυρέσσοντες, οἱ χωλοί, οἱ τυφλοί, καὶ ἴδετέ με ἀπὸ παντὸς πάθους ὑγιᾶ; 29τοῦτο κενὸν καὶ φορτικόν, εἰ μή τι[ς] ὡς ὁ Ἀσκληπιὸς εὐθὺς ὑποδεῖξαι δύνασαι, πῶς θεραπεύοντες εὐθὺς ἔσονται ἄνοσοι κἀκεῖνοι, καὶ εἰς τοῦτο φέρεις παράδειγμα τὴν ὑγίειαν τὴν σεαυτοῦ. 30τοιοῦτος γάρ τίς ἐστιν ὁ Κυνικὸς τοῦ σκήπτρου καὶ διαδήματος ἠξιωμένος παρὰ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ λέγων ἵνʼ ἴδητε, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ ἀταραξίαν οὐχ ὅπου ἐστὶ ζητεῖτε, 31ἀλλʼ ὅπου μή ἐστιν, ἰδοὺ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν παράδειγμα ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀπέσταλμαι μήτε κτῆσιν ἔχων μήτε οἶκον μήτε γυναῖκα μήτε τέκνα, ἀλλὰ μηδʼ ὑπόστρωμα μηδὲ χιτῶνα μηδὲ σκεῦος· καὶ ἴδετε, πῶς ὑγιαίνω· πειράθητέ μου κἂν ἴδητε ἀτάραχον, ἀκούσατε τὰ φάρμακα καὶ ὑφʼ ὧν ἐθεραπεύθην. 32τοῦτο γὰρ ἤδη καὶ φιλάνθρωπον καὶ γενναῖον. ἀλλʼ ὁρᾶτε, τίνος ἔργον ἐστίν· τοῦ Διὸς ἢ ὃν ἂν ἐκεῖνος ἄξιον κρίνῃ ταύτης τῆς ὑπηρεσίας, ἵνα μηδαμοῦ μηδὲν παραγυμνώσῃ πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς, διʼ οὗ τὴν μαρτυρίαν τὴν αὑτοῦ, ἣν τῇ ἀρετῇ μαρτυρεῖ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς καταμαρτυρεῖ, αὐτὸς ἄκυρον ποιήσῃ· οὔτʼ ὠχρήσαντα χρόα κάλλιμον οὔτε παρειῶν δάκρυʼ ὀμορξάμενον. 33καὶ οὐ μόνον ταῦτα, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ ποθοῦντά τι ἢ ἐπιζητοῦντα, ἄνθρωπον ἢ τόπον ἢ διαγωγήν, ὡς τὰ παιδία τὸν τρυγητὸν ἢ τὰς ἀργίας, αἰδοῖ πανταχοῦ κεκοσμημένον, ὡς οἱ ἄλλοι τοίχοις καὶ θύραις καὶ θυρωροῖς. 34νῦν δʼ αὐτὸ μόνον κινηθέντες πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, ὡς οἱ κακοστόμαχοι πρός τι βρωμάτιον, ὃ μετὰ μικρὸν σικχαίνειν μέλλουσιν, εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὸ σκῆπτρον, ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλείαν. καθεῖκε τὴν κόμην, ἀνείληφε τρίβωνα, γυμνὸν δεικνύει τὸν ὦμον, μάχεται τοῖς ἀπαντῶσιν κἂν ἐν φαινόλῃ τινὰ ἴδῃ, μάχεται αὐτῷ. 35ἄνθρωπε, χειμάσκησον πρῶτον· ἰδοῦ σου τὴν ὁρμήν, μὴ κακοστομάχου ἢ κισσώσης γυναικός ἐστιν. ἀγνοεῖσθαι μελέτησον πρῶτον, τίς εἶ· σαυτῷ φιλοσόφησον ὀλίγον χρόνον. 36οὕτως καρπὸς γίνεται· κατορυγῆναι δεῖ εἰς χρόνον τὸ σπέρμα, κρυφθῆναι, κατὰ μικρὸν αὐξηθῆναι, ἵνα τελεσφορήσῃ. ἂν δὲ πρὸ τοῦ γόνυ φῦσαι τὸν στάχυν ἐξενέγκῃ, ἀτελές ἐστιν, ἐκ κήπου Ἀδωνιακοῦ. 37τοιοῦτον εἶ καὶ σὺ φυτάριον· θᾶττον τοῦ δέοντος ἤνθηκας, ἀποκαύσει σε ὁ χειμών. 38ἰδοῦ, τί λέγουσιν οἱ γεωργοὶ περὶ τῶν σπερμάτων, ὅταν πρὸ ὥρας θερμασίαι γένωνται. ἀγωνιῶσιν, μὴ ἐξυβρίσῃ τὰ σπέρματα, εἶτα αὐτὰ πάγος εἷς λαβὼν ἐξελέγξῃ. 39ὅρα καὶ σύ, ἄνθρωπε· ἐξύβρικας, ἐπιπεπήδηκας δοξαρίῳ πρὸ ὥρας· δοκεῖς τις εἶναι, μωρὸς παρὰ μωροῖς· ἀποπαγήσῃ, μᾶλλον δʼ ἀποπέπηγας ἤδη ἐν τῇ ῥίζῃ κάτω, τὰ δʼ ἄνω σου μικρὸν ἔτι ἀνθεῖ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖς ἔτι ζῆν καὶ θάλλειν. 40ἄφες ἡμᾶς γε κατὰ φύσιν πεπανθῆναι. τί ἡμᾶς ἀποδύεις, τί βιάζῃ; οὔπω δυνάμεθα ἐνεγκεῖν τὸν ἀέρα. ἔασον τὴν ῥίζαν αὐξηθῆναι, εἶτα γόνυ λαβεῖν τὸ πρῶτον, εἶτα τὸ δεύτερον, εἶτα τὸ τρίτον· εἶθʼ οὕτως ὁ καρπὸς ἐκβιάσεται τὴν φύσιν, κἂν ἐγὼ μὴ θέλω. 41τίς γὰρ ἐγκύμων γενόμενος καὶ πλήρης τηλικούτων δογμάτων οὐχὶ αἰσθάνεταί τε τῆς αὑτοῦ παρασκευῆς καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ κατάλληλα ἔργα ὁρμᾷ; 42ἀλλὰ ταῦρος μὲν οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν καὶ παρασκευήν, ὅταν ἐπιφανῇ τι θηρίον, οὐδʼ ἀναμένει τὸν προτρεψόμενον, οὐδὲ κύων, ὅταν ἴδῃ τι τῶν ἀγρίων ζῴων· 43ἐγὼ δʼ ἂν ἴσχω τὴν ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ παρασκευήν, ἐκδέξομαι, ἵνα με σὺ παρασκευάσῃς ἐπὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἔργα; νῦν δʼ οὔπω ἔχω, πίστευσόν μοι. τί οὖν με πρὸ ὥρας ἀποξηρᾶναι θέλεις, ὡς αὐτὸς ἐξηράνθης;
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA