Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER XXVI. · What is the Property of Error in Life.
1EVERY Error in Life implies a Contradiction: for, since he who errs, doth not mean to err, but to be in the Right, it is evident, that he acts contrary to his Meaning. What doth a Thief mean? His own Interest. If, then, Thieving be against his Interest, he acts contrary to his own Meaning. Now every rational Soul is naturally averse to Self-contradiction: but so long as any one is ignorant, that it is a Contradiction, nothing restrains him from acting contradictorily: but, whenever he discovers it, he must as necessarily renounce and avoid it, as any one must dissent from a Falshood, whenever he perceives it to be a Falshood: but, while this doth not appear, he assents to it, as to a Truth. 2He then is an able Speaker, and excels at once in Exhortation and Conviction, who can discover, to each Man, the Contradiction by which he errs, and prove clearly to him, that what he would, he doth not; and what he would not do, that he doth. For, if that be shown, he will depart from it, of his own accord: but, till you have shown it, be not surprised that he remains where he is: for he doth it on the Appearance, that he acts rightly. Hence Socrates, relying on this Faculty, used to say, "It is not my Custom to cite any other Witness of my Assertions; but I am always contented with my Opponent. I call and summon him for my Witness; and his single Evidence is instead of all others." For he knew, that, if a rational Soul be moved by any thing, the Scale must turn, whether it will or no. Show the governing Faculty of Reason a Contradiction, and it will renounce it: but, till you have shown it, rather blame yourself, than him who is unconvinced. End of the Second Book.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (4)
- For that which I do, I allow not: for what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that I do. Rom. vii. 15.
- See B. I. c. 18. Note a.
- See c. 12. §. 2.
- Something here is lost in the Original. The Translation hath connected the Sense in the best and shortest Manner it could.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
What is the test of error.
Every error implies a contradiction; for since he who errs does not wish to err, but to be in the right, it is evident that he acts contrary to his wish. What does a thief desire to attain? His own interest. If, then, thieving be really against his interest, he acts contrary to his own desire. Now, every rational soul is naturally averse to self-contradiction; but so long as any one is ignorant that it is a contradiction, nothing restrains him from acting contradictorily; but whenever he discovers it, he must as necessarily renounce and avoid it, as any one must dissent from a falsehood whenever he perceives it to be a falsehood; only while this does not appear, he assents to it as to a truth.
He, then, is gifted in speech, and excels at once in exhortation and conviction, who can disclose to each man the contradiction by which he errs, and prove clearly to him that what he would he doth not, and what he would not, that he doth. For, if that be shown, he will depart from it of his own accord; but, till you have shown it, be not surprised that he remains where he is; for he proceeds on the semblance of acting rightly. Hence Socrates, relying on this faculty, used to say. It is not my custom to cite any other witness for my assertions; but I am always contented with my opponent. I call and summon him for my witness; and his single evidence serves instead of all others. For he knew that if a rational soul be moved by anything, the scale must turn whether it will or no. Show the governing faculty of Reason a contradiction, and it will renounce it; but till you have shown it, rather blame yourself than him who remains unconvinced.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
What is the property of error.
Every error comprehends contradiction: for since he who errs does not wish to err, but to be right, it is plain that he does not do what he wishes. For what does the thief wish to do? That which is for his own interest. If then the theft is not for his interest, he does not do that which he wishes. But every rational soul is by nature offended at contradiction, and so long as it does not understand this contradiction, it is not hindered from doing contradictory things: but when it does understand the contradiction, it must of necessity avoid the contradiction and avoid it as much as a man must dissent from the false when he sees that a thing is false; but so long as this falsehood does not appear to him, he assents to it as to truth.
He then is strong in argument and has the faculty of exhorting and confuting, who is able to show to each man the contradiction through which he errs and clearly to prove how he does not do that which he wishes and does that which he does not wish. For if any one shall show this, a man will himself withdraw from that which he does; but so long as you do not show this, do not be surprised if a man persists in his practice; for having the appearance of doing right, he does what he does. For this reason Socrates also trusting to this power used to say, I am used to call no other witness of what I say, but I am always satisfied with him with whom I am discussing, and I ask him to give his opinion and call him as a witness, and though he is only one, he is sufficient in the place of all. For Socrates knew by what the rational soul is moved, just like a pair of scales, and then it must incline, whether it chooses or not. Show the rational governing faculty a contradiction, and it will withdraw from it; but if you do not show it, rather blame yourself than him who is not persuaded.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (3)
- Compare Xenophon, Mem. iii. 9. 4 .
- There is some deficiency in the text. Cicero (Acad. Prior. i. 12), but enim necesse est lancem in libra ponderibus impositis deprimi; sic snimum perspicuis cedere, appears to supply the deficiency.
- M. Antoninus, v. 28; x. 4.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1πᾶν ἁμάρτημα μάχην περιέχει. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ ἁμαρτάνων οὐ θέλει ἁμαρτάνειν, ἀλλὰ κατορθῶσαι, δῆλον ὅτι ὃ μὲν θέλει οὐ ποιεῖ. 2τί γὰρ ὁ κλέπτης θέλει πρᾶξαι; τὸ αὑτῷ συμφέρον. οὐκ οὖν, εἰ ἀσύμφορόν ἐστιν αὐτῷ τὸ κλέπτειν, ὃ μὲν θέλει ποιεῖ. 3πᾶσα δὲ ψυχὴ λογικὴ φύσει διαβέβληται πρὸς μάχην· καὶ μέχρι μὲν ἂν μὴ παρακολουθῇ τούτῳ, ὅτι ἐν μάχῃ ἐστίν, οὐδὲν κωλύεται τὰ μαχόμενα ποιεῖν· παρακολουθήσαντα δὲ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ἀποστῆναι τῆς μάχης καὶ φυγεῖν οὕτως ὡς καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ψεύδους ἀνανεῦσαι πικρὰ ἀνάγκη τῷ αἰσθανομένῳ, ὅτι ψεῦδός ἐστιν· μέχρι δὲ τοῦτο μὴ φαντάζηται, ὡς ἀληθεῖ ἐπινεύει αὐτῷ. 4δεινὸς οὖν ἐν λόγῳ, ὁ δʼ αὐτὸς καὶ προτρεπτικὸς καὶ ἐλεγκτικὸς οὗτος ὁ δυνάμενος ἑκάστῳ παραδεῖξαι τὴν μάχην, καθʼ ἣν ἁμαρτάνει, καὶ σαφῶς παραστῆσαι, πῶς ὃ θέλει οὐ ποιεῖ καὶ ὃ μὴ θέλει ποιεῖ. 5ἂν γὰρ τοῦτο δείξῃ τις, αὐτὸς ἀφʼ αὑτοῦ ἀναποχωρήσει. μέχρι δὲ μὴ δεικνύῃς, μὴ θαύμαζε, εἰ ἐπιμένει· κατορθώματος γὰρ φαντασίαν λαμβάνων ποιεῖ αὐτό. 6διὰ τοῦτο καὶ Σωκράτης ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει πεποιθὼς ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἐγὼ ἄλλον μὲν οὐδένα εἴωθα παρέχειν μάρτυρα ὧν λέγω, ἀρκοῦμαι δʼ ἀεὶ τῷ προσδιαλεγομένῳ καὶ ἐκεῖνον ἐπιψηφίζω καὶ καλῶ μάρτυρα καὶ εἷς ὢν οὗτος ἀρκεῖ μοι ἀντὶ πάντων. 7ᾔδει γάρ, ὑπὸ τίνος λογικὴ ψυχὴ κινεῖται, ζυγῷ ἐπιρρέψει, ἄν τε θέλῃς ἄν τε μή. λογικῷ ἡγεμονικῷ δεῖξον μάχην καὶ ἀποστήσεται· ἂν δὲ μὴ δεικνύῃς, αὐτὸς σαυτῷ μᾶλλον ἐγκάλει ἢ τῷ μὴ πειθομένῳ.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA