Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER XVII. · How to adopt Pre-conceptions to particular Cases.
1What is the first Business of one who studies Philosophy? To part with Self-Conceit. For it is impossible for any one to begin to learn what he hath a Conceit that he already knows. We all go to the Philosophers, talking at all Adventures upon negative and positive Duties; Good and Evil; Fair and Base. We praise, censure, accuse; we judge and dispute about fair and base Enterprises. And for what do we go to the Philosophers? To learn what we suppose ourselves not to know. And what is this? Theorems. We are desirous to hear what the Philosophers say, for its Elegance and Acuteness; and some with a View only to Gain. Now it is ridiculous to suppose, that a Person will learn any thing, but what he desires to learn; or make an Improvement, in what he doth not learn. But most are deceived, in the same Manner as Theopompus, the Orator, when he blames Plato, for defining every thing. "For, what, says he, did none of us, before you, use the Words Good and Just: or did we utter them as empty Sounds, without understanding what each of them meant?" Why, who tells you, Theopompus, that we had not natural Ideas and Preconceptions of each of these? But it is not possible, to adapt Pre-conceptions to their correspondent Subjects, without having minutely distinguished them, and examined what is the proper Subject to each. You may make the same Objection to the Physicians. For who of us did not use the Words, Wholesome and Unwholesome, before Hippocrates was born: or did we utter them as empty Sounds? For we have some Pre-conception of Wholesome too; but we cannot adapt it. Hence, one says, Let the Patient abstain from Meat; another, Give it him: one says, Let him be bled; another, Cup him. And what is the Reason, but not being able to adapt the Pre-conception of Wholesome, to particular Cases? Thus, too in Life: who of us doth not talk of Good and Evil; Advantageous and Disadvantageous: for who of us hath not a Pre-conception of each of these? But is it then a distinct and perfect one? Show me this. How shall I show it? 2Adapt it properly to particular Subjects. Plato, to go no farther, puts Definitions under the Pre-conception of Useful; but you, under that of Useless. Can both of you be right? How is it possible? Again: doth not one Man adapt the Preconception of Good, to Riches? Another, not to Riches, but to Pleasure, or Health? Upon the whole, if none of us, who use Words, either utter them without Meaning, or need to take any manner of Care in distinguishing our Pre-conceptions, why do we differ? Why do we wrangle? Why do we censure each other? But what Occasion have I to mention this mutual Contradiction? If you yourself adapt your Pre-conceptions properly, how comes it to pass, that you do not prosper? Why do you meet with any Hindrance? Let us for the present omit the second Topic, concerning the Pursuits, and the Duties relative to them: Let us omit the Third too, concerning Assent. I make you a Present of all these. Let us insist only on the First; which affords almost a sensible Proof, that you do not adapt your Pre-conceptions right. You desire what is possible in itself, and possible for you. Why then are you hindered? Why are not you in a prosperous Way? You do not decline what is necessary. Why then do you incur any thing [which is your Aversion?] Why are you unfortunate? When you desire any thing, why doth it not happen? When you do not desire it, why doth it happen? For this is the greatest Demonstration of ill Success and Misery. I desire something; and it doth not happen: and what is more wretched than I? From an Impatience of this, Medea came to murder her own Children: an Action of a noble Spirit in this View; for she had a proper Impression of what it was to be disappointed of one's Desire. "Thus I shall punish him, who hath injured and dishonoured me: and what is so wicked a Wretch good for? But how is this to be effected? I will murder the Children: but that will be punishing myself. And what do I care?" This is the Error of a Soul indued with great Powers. For she knew not where the Completion of our Desires is to be found: that it is not to be had from without; nor by altering the Appointment of Things. Do not desire the Man for your Husband, and nothing which you do desire will fail to happen. Do not desire to keep him to yourself. Do not desire to stay at Corinth; and, in a Word, have no Will, but the Will of God; and who shall restrain you; who shall compel you, any more than Jupiter? When you have such a Guide, and conform your Will and Inclinations to his, what need you fear being disappointed? Yield up your Desire and Aversion [as Slaves] to Riches, or Poverty; the one will be disappointed, the other incurred. Yield them up to Health, Power, Honours, your Country, Friends, Children, in short, to any thing independent on Choice, you will be unfortunate. But yield them up to Jupiter, and the other Gods. Give yourself up to these: let these govern: let both be ranged on the same Side with these; and how can you be any longer unprosperous? But if, poor Wretch, you envy, and pity, and are jealous, and tremble, and never cease, a single Day, from complaining of yourself, and the Gods, why do you boast of your Education? What Education, Man? That you have learned convertible Syllogisms? Why do not you, if possible, unlearn all these, and begin again; convinced, that hitherto, you have not even touched upon the Point? And, for the future, beginning from this Foundation, proceed, in Order, to the Superstructure; that nothing may happen which you do not wish, and that every thing may happen which you do. Give me but one young Man, who brings this Intention with him to the School; who is a Champion for this Point; and says, "I yield up all the rest: it suffices me, if once I become able to pass my Life, free from Hindrance and Grief: to stretch out my Neck to all Events, as free; and to look up to Heaven, as the Friend of God, fearing nothing that can happen." Let any one of you show himself of such a Disposition, that I may say, "Come into the Place, young Man, that is of right your own; for you are destined to be an Ornament to Philosophy. Yours are these Possessions; yours these Books; yours these Discourses." Then, when he hath master'd, and got the better of this first Class, let him come to me again, and say; "I desire indeed to be free from Passion, and Perturbation; but I desire too, as a pious, a philosophic, and a carefully attentive Man, to know, what is my Duty to God, to my Parents, to my Relations, to my Country, and to Strangers." "Come into the second Class too; for this likewise is yours." "But I have now sufficiently studied the second Class too; and I would willingly be secure, and unshaken by Error and Delusion, not only awake, but even when asleep; when warmed with Wine; when diseased with the Spleen." "You are a God, Man: your Intentions are great." 3"No. But I, for my part, desire to understand what Chrysippus says, in his logical Treatise of the Pseudomenos."——Go hang yourself, pitiful Wretch, with such an Intention as this. What Good will it do you? You will read the Whole lamenting all the while; and say to others, trembling, "Do as I do."——"Shall I read to you, my Friend, and you to me?——You write surprisingly, Sir; and you very finely imitate the Stile of Plato; and you, of Xenophon; and you, of Antisthenes." And thus, having relating your Dreams to each other, you return again to the same State. Your Desires and Aversions, your Pursuits, your Intentions, your Resolutions, your Wishes and Endeavours, are just what they were. You do not so much as seek for one to advise you; but are offended when you hear such Things as these; and cry, "An ill-natured old Fellow! He never wept over me, when I was setting out, nor said; To what a Danger are you going to be exposed! If you come off safe, Child, I will illuminate my House." "This would have been the Part of a good-natured Man." Truly, it will be a mighty Happiness, if you do come off safe: it will be worth while to make an Illumination. For you ought to be immortal, and exempt from Sickness, to be sure. 4Throwing away then, I say, this Self-conceit, by which we fancy, we have gained some Knowledge of what is useful, we should come to philosophic Reasoning, as we do to Mathematics and Music: otherwise we shall be far from making any Improvement, even if we have read over all the Collections and Compositions, not only of Chrysippus, but of Antipater and Archedemus too.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (6)
- See B. II. c. 11. §. 1.
- i. e. The Topic of the Desires and Aversions.
- There are several Readings and Conjectures. I have followed Wolfius; who reads, for ασιτως, ασειστος; as agreeing best with the Sense.
- The Pseudomenos was a famous Problem among the Stoics; and it is this. When a Person says, I lie; doth he lie, or doth he not? If he lies, he speaks Truth: if he speaks Truth, he lies. The Philosophers composed many Books on this Difficulty. Chrysippus wrote six. Philetas wasted himself to Death in studying to answer it. Menage on Diog. Laert. L. II. §. 108. Brucker Hist. Crit. Philos. vol. i. p. 613, 614.
- This is spoken by Epictetus, in the Person of one of his Scholars; to ridicule their complimenting each other on their Writings, while they neglected the more important Concern of moral Improvements.
- Σε δει should be σε εδει.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
How to apply general principles to particular cases.
What is the first business of one who studies philosophy? To part with self-conceit. For it is impossible for any one to begin to learn what he thinks that he already knows. We all go to the philosophers, talking at random upon negative and positive duties; good and evil; fair and base. We praise, censure, accuse; we judge and dispute about fair and base enterprises. And yet for what do we go to the philosophers? To learn what we suppose ourselves not to know. And what is this? Propositions. We are desirous to hear what the philosophers say, for its elegance and acuteness; and some with a view only to gain. Now it is ridiculous to suppose that a person will learn anything but what he desires to learn; or make an improvement, in what he does not learn. But most are deceived, in the same manner as Theopompus, the orator, when he blames Plato for defining everything. For, he says, did none of us, before you, use the words good and just; or did we utter them as empty sounds, without understanding what each of them meant? Why, who tells you, Theopompus, that we had not natural ideas and general principles as to each of these? But it is not possible to apply principles in detail, without having minutely distinguished them, and examined what details appertain to each. You may make the same objection to the physicians. For who of us did not use the words wholesome and unwholesome, before Hippocrates was born; or did we utter them as empty sounds? For we have some general conception of what is wholesome too, but we cannot apply it. Hence one says, let the patient abstain from meat; another, give it to him. One says, let him be bled; another, cup him. And what is the reason, but not being able to adapt the general conception of wholesomeness to particular cases? Thus, too, in life; who of us does not talk of good or evil, advantageous and disadvantageous; for who of us has not a general conception of each of these? But is it then a distinct and perfect one? Show me this.
How shall I show it?
Apply it properly in detail. Plato, to go no further, puts definitions under the general head of useful; but you, under that of useless. Can both of you be right? How is it possible? Again, does not one man adapt the general conception of good to riches; another not to riches, but to pleasure or health? In general, unless we who use words employ them vaguely, or without proper care in discrimination, why do we differ? Why do we wrangle? Why do we censure each other? But what occasion have I to mention this mutual contradiction? If you yourself apply your principles properly, how comes it to pass that you do not prosper? Why do you meet with any hindrance? Let us for the present omit our second point concerning the pursuits and the duties relative to them; let us omit the third too, concerning assent. I waive all these for you. Let us insist only on the first, which affords almost a sensible proof that you do not properly apply your principles. You desire what is possible in itself, and possible for you. Why then are you hindered? Why are you not in a prosperous way? You do not shrink from the inevitable. Why then do you incur anything undesirable? Why are you unfortunate? When you desire anything, why does it not happen? When you do not desire it, why happens it? For this is the greatest proof of ill success and misery: I desire something and it does not happen; and what is more wretched than I? From such impatience Medea came to murder her own children,—a lofty action in this point of view alone, that she had a proper impression of what it was to fail of one’s aim. Thus I shall punish him who has injured and dishonored me; and what is so wicked a wretch good for? But how is this to be effected? I will murder the children; but that will be punishing myself. And what care I? This is the error of a powerful soul. For she knew not where the fulfilment of our desires is to be found; that it is not to be had from without, nor by altering the appointment of things. Do not demand the man for your husband, and then nothing which you desire will fail to happen. Do not desire to keep him to yourself. Do not desire to stay at Corinth, and, in a word, have no will but the will of God, and who shall restrain you; who shall compel you, any more than Zeus? When you have such a guide, and conform your will and inclinations to his, why need you fear being disappointed? Fix your desire and aversion on riches or poverty; the one will be disappointed, the other incurred. Fix them on health. power, honors, your country, friends, children,—in short, on anything beyond the control of your will,—you will be unfortunate. But fix them on Zeus, on the gods; give yourself up to these; let these govern; let your powers be ranged on the same side with these, and how can you be any longer unprosperous? But if, poor wretch, you envy, and pity, and are jealous, and tremble, and never cease a single day from complaining of yourself and the gods, why do you boast of your education? What education, man,—that you have learned syllogisms? Why do not you, if possible, unlearn all these, and begin again, convinced that hitherto you have not even touched upon the essential point? And for the future, beginning from this foundation, proceed in order to the superstructure; that nothing may happen which you do not wish, and that everything may happen which you desire. Give me but one young man who brings this intention with him to the school, who is a champion for this point, and says, yield up all the rest; it suffices me, if once I become able to pass my life free from hindrance and grief, to stretch out my neck to all events as freely, and to look up to Heaven as the friend of God, fearing nothing that can happen. Let any one of you show himself of such a disposition, that I may say, Come into the place, young man, that is of right your own; for you are destined to be an ornament to philosophy. Yours are these possessions; yours these books; yours these discourses. Then, when he has thoroughly mastered this first class, let him come to me again and say, desire indeed to be free from passion and perturbation; but I desire too, as a pious, a philosophic, and a diligent man, to know what is my duty to God, to my parents, to my relations, to my country, and to strangers. Come into the second class too; for this likewise is yours. But I have now sufficiently studied the second class too; and I would willingly be secure and unshaken by error and delusion, not only when awake, but even when asleep; when warmed with wine; when diseased with the spleen. You are becoming as a god, man; your aims are sublime!
Nay; but I, for my part, desire to understand what Chrysippus says, in his logical treatise of the Pseudomenos. Go hang yourself, pitiful man, with only such an aim as this! What good will it do you? You will read the whole, lamenting all the while; and say to others, trembling, Do as I do. Shall I read to you, my friend, and you to me? You write amazingly well; and you very finely imitate the style of Plato; and you, of Xenophon; and you, of Antisthenes. And thus, having related your dreams to each other, you return again to the same state. Your desires and aversions, your pursuits, your intentions, your resolutions, your wishes, and endeavors are just what they were. You do not so much as seek for one to advise you, but are offended when you hear such things as these, and cry, An ill-natured old man! He never wept over me, when I was setting out, nor said, To what a danger are you going to be exposed? If you come off safe, child, I will illuminate my house. This would have been the part of a man of feeling. Truly it will be a mighty happiness if you do come off safe; it will be worth while to make an illumination. For you ought to be immortal and exempt from sickness, to be sure.
Throwing away, then, I say, this self-conceit, by which we fancy we have gained some knowledge of what is useful, we should come to philosophic reasoning as we do to mathematics and music; otherwise we shall be far from making any improvement, even if we have read over all the compends and commentaries, not only of Chrysippus, but of Antipater, and Archedemus too.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Higginson’s notes (2)
- The topic of the Desires and Aversions .—C.
- The Pseudomenos was a famous problem among the Stoics, and it is this. When a person says, lie , does he lie, or does he not? If he lies, he speaks truth; if he speaks truth, he lies. Chrysippus wrote six books upon it.—C.
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
How we must adapt preconceptions to particular cases.
What is the first business of him who philosophizes? To throw away self-conceit (οἴησις). For it is impossible for a man to begin to learn that which he thinks that he knows. As to things then which ought to be done and ought not to be done, and good and bad, and beautiful and ugly, all of us talking of them at random go to the philosophers; and on these matters we praise, we censure, we accuse, we blame, we judge and determine about principles honourable and dishonourable. But why do we go to the philosophers? Because we wish to learn what we do not think that we know. And what is this? Theorems. For we wish to learn what philosophers say as being something elegant and acute; and some wish to learn that they may get profit from what they learn. It is ridiculous then to think that a person wishes to learn one thing, and will learn another; or further, that a man will make proficiency in that which he does not learn. But the many are deceived by this which deceived also the rhetorician Theopompus, when he blames even Plato for wishing everything to be defined. For what does he say? Did none of us before you use the words Good or Just, or do we utter the sounds in an unmeaning and empty way without understanding what they severally signify? Now who tells you, Theopompus, that we had not natural notions of each of these things and preconceptions (προλήψεις)? But it is not possible to adapt preconceptions to their correspondent objects if we have not distinguished (analyzed) them, and inquired what object must be subjected to each preconception. You may make the same charge against physicians also. For who among us did not use the words healthy and unhealthy before Hippocrates lived, or did we utter these words as empty sounds? For we have also a certain preconception of health, but we are not able to adapt it. For this reason one says, abstain from food; another says, give food; another says, bleed; and another says, use cupping. What is the reason? is it any other than that a man cannot properly adapt the preconception of health to particulars?
So it is in this matter also, in the things which concern life. Who among us does not speak of good and bad, of useful and not useful; for who among us has not a preconception of each of these things? Is it then a distinct and perfect preconception? Show this. How shall I show this? Adapt the preconception properly to the particular things. Plato, for instance, subjects definitions to the preconception of the useful, but you to the preconception of the useless. Is it possible then that both of you are right? How is it possible? Does not one man adapt the preconception of good to the matter of wealth, and another not to wealth, but to the matter of pleasure and to that of health? For, generally, if all of us who use those words know sufficiently each of them, and need no diligence in resolving (making distinct) the notions of the preconceptions, why do we differ, why do we quarrel, why do we blame one another?
And why do I now allege this contention with one another and speak of it? If you yourself properly adapt your preconceptions, why are you unhappy, why are you hindered? Let us omit at present the second topic about the pursuits (ὅρμας) and the study of the duties which relate to them. Let us omit also the third topic, which relates to the assents ( συγκαταθέσεις): I give up to you these two topics. Let us insist upon the first, which presents an almost obvious demonstration that we do not properly adapt the preconoeptions. Do you now desire that which is possible and that which is possible to you? Why then are you hindered? why are you unhappy? Do you not now try to avoid the unavoidable? Why then do you fall in with any thing which you would avoid? Why are you unfortunate? Why, when you desire a thing, does it not happen, and, when you do not desire it, does it happen? For this is the greatest proof of unhappiness and misery: I wish for something, and it does not happen. And what is more wretched than I?
It was because she could not endure this that Medea came to murder her children: an act of a noble spirit in this view at least, for she had a just opinion what it is for a thing not to succeed which a person wishes. Then she says, Thus I shall be avenged on him (my husband) who has wronged and insulted me; and what shall I gain if he is punished thus? how then shall it be don? I shall kill my children, but I shall punish myself also: and what do I care? This is the aberration of soul which possesses great energy. For she did not know wherein lies the doing of that which we wish; that you cannot get this from without, nor yet by the alteration and new adaptation of things. Do not desire the man (Jason, Medea’s husband), and nothing which you desire will fail to happen: do not obstinately desire that he shall live with you: do not desire to remain in Gerinth; and in a word desire nothing than that which God wills.— And who shall hinder you? who shall compel you? No man shall compel you any more than he shall compel Zeus.
When you have such a guide and your wishes and desires are the same as his, why do you still fear disappointment? Give up your desire to wealth and your aversion to poverty, and you will be disappointed in the one, you will fall into the other. Well give them up to health, and you will be unfortunate: give them up to magistracies, honours, country, friends, children, in a word to any of the things which are not in man’s power (and you will be unfortunate). But give them up to Zeus and to the rest of the gods; surrender them to the gods, let the gods govern, let your desire and aversion be ranged on the side of the gods, and wherein will you be any longer unhappy? But if, lazy wretch, you envy, and complain, and are jealous, and fear, and never cease for a single day complaining both of yourself and of the gods, why do you still speak of being educated? What kind of an education, man? Do you mean that you have been employed about sophistical syllogisms (συλλογισμοὺς μεταπίπτοντας)? Will you not, if it is possible, unlearn all these things and begin from the beginning, and see at the same time that hitherto you have not even touched the matter; and then commencing from this foundation, will you not build up all that comes after, so that nothing may happen which you do not choose, and nothing shall fail to happen which you do choose?
Give me one young man who has come to the school with this intention, who is become a champion for this matter and says, I give up every thing else, and it is enough for me if it shall ever be in my power to pass my life free from hindrance and free from trouble, and to stretch out (present) my neck to all things like a free man, and to look up to heaven as a friend of God and fear nothing that can happen. Let any of you point out such a man that I may say, Come, young man, into the possession of that which is your own, for it is your destiny to adorn philosophy: yours are these possessions, yours these books, yours these discourses. Then when he shall have laboured sufficiently and exercised himself in this part of the matter ( τόπον), let him come to me again and say, I desire to be free from passion and free from perturbation; and I wish as a pious man and a philosopher and a diligent person to know what is my duty to the gods, what to my parents, what to my brothers, what to my country, what to strangers.(I say) Come also to the second matter (τόπον): this also is yours.—But I have now sufficiently studied the second part (τόπον) also, and I would gladly be secure and unshaken, and not only when I am awake, but also when I am asleep, and when I am filled with wine, and when I am melancholy. Man, you are a god, you have great designs.
No: but I wish to understand what Chrysippus says in his treatise of the Pseudomenos (the Liar).—Will you not hang yourself, wretch, with such your intention? And what good will it do you? You will read the whole with sorrow, and you will speak to others trembling. Thus you also do. Do you wish me, brother, to read to you, and you to me?—You write excellently, my man; and you also excellently in the style of Xenophon, and you in the style of Plato, and you in the style of Antisthenes Then having told your dreams to one another you return to the same things: your desires are the same, your aversions the same, your pursuits are the same, and your designs and purposes, you wish for the same things and work for the same. In the next place you do not even seek for one to give you advice, but you are vexed if you hear such things (as I say). Then you say, An ill-natured old fellow: when I was going away, he did not weep nor did he say, Into what danger you are going: if you come off safe, my child, I will burn lights. This is what a good natured man would do. It will be a great thing for you if you do return safe, and it will be worth while to burn lights for such a person: for you ought to be immortal and exempt from disease.
Casting away then, as I say, this conceit of thinking that we know something useful, we must come to philosophy as we apply to geometry, and to music: but if we do not, we shall not even approach to proficiency though we read all the collections and commentaries of Chrysippus and those of Antipater and Archedemus.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (15)
- See ii. 11. 1, and iii. 14. 8.
- Theorems are defined by Cicero, de Fato, c. 6, Percepta appelle quae dicuntur Graece θεωρήματα .
- This rhetorician or orator, as Epictetus names him, appears to be the same person as Theopompus of Chios , the historian.
- That Epictetus does not quite correctly compare the notion of what is wholesome to the human body with the preconceived notion (anticipata notione) of moral good and bad, will be apparent to those who have carefully inquired into the various origin and principles of oar notions. Schweigh. Also see his note on ἀνάτεινον .
- The topic of the desires and aversions. Sec. iii. c. 2.
- Compare i. c. 27, 10.
- This is the meaning of what Medea says in the Medea of Euripides Epictetus does not give the words of the poet.
- Compare iv. 7. 20.
- If you would subject all things to yourself, subject yourself to reason. Seneca, Ep. 37.
- See i. 7. 1.
- The Pseudomenos was a treatise by Chrysippus (Diog. Laert. vii. Chrysippus). The Pseudomenos was a famous problem among the Stoics, and it is this. When a person says, I lie; doth he lie, or doth he not? If he lies, he speaks truth: if he speaks truth, he lies. The philosophers composed many books on this difficulty. Chrysippus wrote six. Philetas wasted himself in studying to answer it. Mrs. Carter.
- Epictetus is ridiculing the men who compliment one another on their writings. Upton compares Horace, Epp. ii. 2. 87. ut alter Alterius sermone meros audiret honores— Discedo Alcaeus puncto lllius? ille meo quis? Quis nisi Callimachus?
- Compare i. 19. 4.
- Schweighaeuser has no doubt that we ought instead of συναγωγάς , collections, to read εἰσαγωγάς , introductions.
- As to Archedemus, see ii. 4, 11; and Antipater, ii. 19, 2.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1τί πρῶτόν ἐστιν ἔργον τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦντος; ἀποβαλεῖν οἴησιν· ἀμήχανον γάρ, ἅ τις εἰδέναι οἴεται, ταῦτα ἄρξασθαι μανθάνειν. 2τὰ μὲν οὖν ποιητέα καὶ οὐ ποιητέα καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ καὶ καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ πάντες ἄνω καὶ κάτω λαλοῦντες ἐρχόμεθα πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσόφους, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐπαινοῦντες ψέγοντες, ἐγκαλοῦντες μεμφόμενοι, περὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων καλῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν ἐπικρίνοντες καὶ διαλαμβάνοντες. 3τίνος δʼ ἕνεκα προσερχόμεθα τοῖς φιλοσόφοις; ἃ οὐκ οἰόμεθα εἰδέναι. τίνα δʼ ἐστὶ ταῦτα; τὰ θεωρήματα. ἃ γὰρ λαλοῦσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι, μαθεῖν θέλομεν ὡς κομψὰ καὶ δριμέα, οἱ δʼ, ἵνʼ ἀπʼ αὐτῶν περιποιήσωνται. 4γελοῖον οὖν τὸ οἴεσθαι, ὅτι ἄλλα μέν τις μαθεῖν βούλεται, ἄλλα δὲ μαθήσεται, ἢ λοιπὸν ὅτι προκόψει τις ἐν οἷς οὐ μανθάνει. 5τὸ δʼ ἐξαπατῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς τοῦτʼ ἔστιν, ὅπερ καὶ Θεόπομπον τὸν ῥήτορα, ὅπου καὶ Πλάτωνι ἐγκαλεῖ ἐπὶ τῷ βούλεσθαι ἕκαστα ὁρίζεσθαι. 6τί γὰρ λέγει; οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν πρὸ σοῦ ἔλεγεν ἀγαθὸν ἢ δίκαιον; ἢ μὴ παρακολουθοῦντες τί ἐστι τούτων ἕκαστον ἀσήμως καὶ κενῶς ἐφθεγγόμεθα τὰς φωνάς; 7τίς γάρ σοι λέγει, Θεόπομπε, ὅτι ἐννοίας οὐκ εἴχομεν ἑκάστου τούτων φυσικὰς καὶ προλήψεις; ἀλλʼ οὐχ οἷόν τʼ ἐφαρμόζειν τὰς προλήψεις ταῖς καταλλήλοις οὐσίαις μὴ διαρθρώσαντα αὐτὰς καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο σκεψάμενον, ποίαν τινὰ ἑκάστῃ αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ὑποτακτέον. 8ἐπεὶ τοιαῦτα λέγε καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἰατρούς· τίς γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐκ ἔλεγεν ὑγιεινόν τι καὶ νοσερόν, πρὶν Ἱπποκράτη γενέσθαι; ἢ κενῶς τὰς φωνὰς ταύτας ἀπηχοῦμεν; 9ἔχομεν γάρ τινα καὶ ὑγιεινοῦ πρόληψιν, ἀλλʼ ἐφαρμόσαι οὐ δυνάμεθα. διὰ τοῦτο ὁ μὲν λέγει ἀνάτεινον, ὁ δὲ λέγει δὸς τροφήν· καὶ ὁ μὲν λέγει φλεβοτόμησον, ὁ δὲ λέγει σικύασον. τί τὸ αἴτιον; ἄλλο γε ἢ ὅτι τὴν τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ πρόληψιν οὐ δύναται καλῶς ἐφαρμόσαι τοῖς ἐπὶ μέρους; 10οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐνθάδʼ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον. ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ συμφέρον καὶ ἀσύμφορον τίς ἡμῶν οὐ λαλεῖ; τίς γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐκ ἔχει τούτων ἑκάστου πρόληψιν; ἆρʼ οὖν διηρθρωμένην καὶ τελείαν; 11τοῦτο δεῖξον. πῶς δείξω; ἐφάρμοσον αὐτὴν καλῶς ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους οὐσίαις. εὐθὺς τοὺς ὅρους Πλάτων μὲν ὑποτάσσει τῇ τοῦ χρησίμου προλήψει, σὺ δὲ τῇ τοῦ ἀχρήστου. 12δυνατὸν οὖν ἐστιν ἀμφοτέρους ὑμᾶς ἐπιτυγχάνειν; πῶς οἷόν τε; τῇ δὲ τοῦ πλούτου οὐσίᾳ οὐχ ὁ μέν τις ἐφαρμόζει τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πρόληψιν, ὁ δʼ οὔ; τῇ δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς, τῇ δὲ τῆς ὑγείας; 13καθόλου γὰρ εἰ πάντες οἱ τὰ ὀνόματα λαλοῦντες μὴ κενῶς ἴσμεν ἕκαστα τούτων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἐπιμελείας περὶ τὴν διάρθρωσιν τῶν προλήψεων δεόμεθα, τί διαφερόμεθα, τί πολεμοῦμεν, τί ψέγομεν ἀλλήλους; 14καὶ τί μοι νῦν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους μάχην παραφέρειν καὶ ταύτης μεμνῆσθαι; σὺ αὐτὸς εἰ ἐφαρμόζεις καλῶς τὰς προλήψεις, διὰ τί δυσροεῖς, διὰ τί ἐμποδίζῃ; 15ἀφῶμεν ἄρτι τὸν δεύτερον τόπον τὸν περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς καὶ τὴν κατὰ ταύτας περὶ τὸ καθῆκον φιλοτεχνίαν. ἀφῶμεν καὶ τὸν τρίτον τὸν περὶ τὰς συγκαταθέσεις. 16χαρίζομαί σοι ταῦτα πάντα. στῶμεν ἐπὶ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ σχεδὸν αἰσθητὴν παρέχοντος τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ μὴ ἐφαρμόζειν καλῶς τὰς προλήψεις. 17νῦν σὺ θέλεις τὰ δυνατὰ καὶ τὰ σοὶ δυνατά; τί οὖν ἐμποδίζῃ; διὰ τί δυσροεῖς; νῦν οὐ φεύγεις τὰ ἀναγκαῖα; διὰ τί οὖν περιπίπτεις τινί, διὰ τί δυστυχεῖς; διὰ τί θέλοντός σού τι οὐ γίνεται καὶ μὴ θέλοντος γίνεται; 18ἀπόδειξις γὰρ αὕτη μεγίστη δυσροίας καὶ κακοδαιμονίας. θέλω τι καὶ οὐ γίνεται· καὶ τί ἐστιν ἀθλιώτερον ἐμοῦ; οὐ θέλω τι καὶ γίνεται· καὶ τί ἐστιν ἀθλιώτερον ἐμοῦ; 19τοῦτο καὶ ἡ Μήδεια οὐχ ὑπομείνασα ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀποκτεῖναι τὰ τέκνα. μεγαλοφυῶς κατά γε τοῦτο. εἶχε γὰρ ἣν δεῖ φαντασίαν, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ἃ θέλει τινὶ μὴ προχωρεῖν. 20εἶτα οὕτως τιμωρήσομαι τὸν ἀδικήσαντά με καὶ ὑβρίσαντα. καὶ τί ὄφελος τοῦ κακῶς οὕτως διακειμένου; πῶς οὖν γένηται; ἀποκτείνω μὲν τὰ τέκνα. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμα υτὴν τιμωρήσομαι. καὶ τί μοι μέλει; 21τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἔκπτωσις ψυχῆς μεγάλα νεῦρα ἐχούσης. οὐ γὰρ ᾔδει, ποῦ κεῖται τὸ ποιεῖν ἃ θέλομεν, ὅτι τοῦτο οὐκ ἔξωθεν δεῖ λαμβάνειν οὐδὲ τὰ πράγματα μετατιθέντα καὶ μεθαρμοζόμενον. 22μὴ θέλε τὸν ἄνδρα, καὶ οὐδὲν ὧν θέλεις οὐ γίνεται. μὴ θέλε αὐτὸν ἐξ ἅπαντός σοι συνοικεῖν, μὴ θέλε μένειν ἐν Κορίνθῳ καὶ ἁπλῶς μηδὲν ἄλλο θέλε ἢ ἃ ὁ θεὸς θέλει. καὶ τίς σε κωλύσει, τίς ἀναγκάσει; οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸν Δία. 23ὅταν τοιοῦτον ἔχῃς ἡγεμόνα καὶ τοιούτῳ συνθέλῃς καὶ συνορέγῃ, τί φοβῇ ἔτι μὴ ἀποτύχῃς; 24χάρισαί σου τὴν ὄρεξιν καὶ τὴν ἔκκλισιν πενίᾳ καὶ πλούτῳ· ἀποτεύξῃ, περιπεσῇ. ἀλλʼ ὑγιείᾳ· δυστυχήσεις· ἀρχαῖς, τιμαῖς, πατρίδι, φίλοις, τέκνοις, ἁπλῶς ἄν τινι τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων. ἀλλὰ τῷ Διὶ χάρισαι αὐτάς, τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς· 25ἐκείνοις παράδος, ἐκεῖνοι κυβερνάτωσαν, μετʼ ἐκείνων τετάχθωσαν· καὶ ποῦ ἔτι δυσροήσεις; 26εἰ δὲ φθονεῖς, ἀταλαίπωρε, καὶ ἐλεεῖς καὶ ζηλοτυπεῖς καὶ τρέμεις καὶ μίαν ἡμέραν οὐ διαλείπεις, ἐν ᾗ οὐ κατακλάεις καὶ σαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν θεῶν, καὶ τί ἔτι λέγεις πεπαιδεῦσθαι; 27ποίαν παιδείαν, ἄνθρωπε; ὅτι συλλογισμοὺς ἔπραξας, μεταπίπτοντας; οὐ θέλεις ἀπομαθεῖν, εἰ δυνατόν, πάντα ταῦτα καὶ ἄνωθεν ἄρξασθαι συναισθανόμενος ὅτι μέχρι νῦν οὐδʼ ἥψω τοῦ πράγματος, 28καὶ λοιπὸν ἔνθεν ἀρξάμενος προσοικοδομεῖν τὰ ἑξῆς, πῶς μηδὲν ἔσται σοῦ μὴ θέλοντος, θέλοντος μηδὲν οὐκ ἔσται; 29δότε μοι ἕνα νέον κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ἐληλυθότα εἰς σχολήν, τούτου τοῦ πράγματος ἀθλητὴν γενόμενον καὶ λέγοντα ὅτι ἐμοὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα χαιρέτω, ἀρκεῖ δʼ εἰ ἐξέσται ποτὲ ἀπαραποδίστῳ καὶ ἀλύπῳ διαγαγεῖν καὶ ἀνατεῖναι τὸν τράχηλον πρὸς τὰ πράγματα ὡς ἐλεύθερον καὶ εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀναβλέπειν ὡς φίλον τοῦ θεοῦ μηδὲν φοβούμενον τῶν συμβῆναι δυναμένων. δειξάτω τις ὑμῶν αὐτὸν τοιοῦτον, ἵνα εἴπω· 30ἔρχου, νεανίσκε, εἰς τὰ σά· σοὶ γὰρ εἵμαρται κοσμῆσαι φιλοσοφίαν, σά ἐστι ταῦτα τὰ κτήματα, σὰ τὰ βιβλία, σοὶ οἱ λόγοι. 31εἶθʼ, ὅταν τοιοῦτον ἐκπονήσῃ καὶ καταθλήσῃ τὸν τόπον, πάλιν ἐλθών μοι εἰπάτω ἐγὼ θέλω μὲν καὶ ἀπαθὴς εἶναι καὶ ἀτάραχος, θέλω δʼ ὡς εὐσεβὴς καὶ φιλόσοφος καὶ ἐπιμελὴς εἰδέναι τί μοι πρὸς θεούς ἐστι καθῆκον, τί πρὸς γονεῖς, τί πρὸς ἀδελφούς, τί πρὸς τὴν πατρίδα, τί πρὸς ξένους. 32ἔρχου καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν δεύτερον τόπον· σός ἐστι καὶ οὗτος. 33ἀλλʼ ἤδη καὶ τὸν δεύτερον τόπον ἐκμεμελέτηκα. ἤθελον δʼ ἀσφαλῶς καὶ ἀσείστως καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐγρηγορώς, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθεύδων καὶ οἰνωμένος καὶ ἐν μελαγχολίᾳ. σὺ θεὸς εἶ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, σὺ μεγάλας ἔχεις ἐπιβολάς. 34οὔ· ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ θέλω γνῶναι, τί λέγει Χρύσιππος ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ Ψευδομένου. οὐκ ἀπάγξῃ μετὰ τῆς ἐπιβολῆς ταύτης, τάλας; καὶ τί σοι ὄφελος ἔσται; πενθῶν ἅπαν ἀναγνώσῃ καὶ τρέμων πρὸς ἄλλους ἐρεῖς. 35οὕτως καὶ ὑμεῖς ποιεῖτε. θέλεις ἀναγνῶ σοι, ἀδελφέ; καὶ σὺ ἐμοί. θαυμαστῶς, ἄνθρωπε, γράφεις· καὶ σὺ μεγάλως εἰς τὸν Ξενοφῶντος χαρακτῆρα, σὺ εἰς τὸν Πλάτωνος, 36σὺ εἰς τὸν Ἀντισθένους. εἶτʼ ἀλλήλοις ὀνείρους διηγησάμενοι πάλιν ἐπὶ ταὐτὰ ἐπανέρχεσθε· ὡσαύτως ὀρέγεσθε, ὡσαύτως ἐκκλίνετε, ὁμοίως ὁρμᾶτε, ἐπιβάλλεσθε, προ[σ]τίθεσθε, ταὐτὰ εὔχεσθε, περὶ ταὐτὰ σπουδάζετε. εἶτα οὐδὲ ζητεῖτε τὸν ὑπομνήσοντα ὑμᾶς, 37ἀλλʼ ἄχθεσθε, ἐὰν ἀκούητε τούτων. εἶτα λέγετε ἀφιλόστοργος γέρων· ἐξερχομένου μου οὐκ ἔκλαυσεν οὐδʼ εἶπεν 1εἰς οἵαν περίστασιν ἀπέρχῃ μοι, τέκνον· ἂν σωθῇς, ἅψω λύχνους. ταῦτʼ ἔστι τὰ τοῦ φιλοστόργου; 38μέγα σοι ἀγαθὸν ἔσται σωθέντι τοιούτῳ καὶ λύχνων ἄξιον. ἀθάνατον γὰρ εἶναί σε δεῖ καὶ ἄνοσον. 39ταύτην οὖν, ὅπερ λέγω, τὴν οἴησιν τὴν τοῦ δοκεῖν εἰδέναι τι τῶν χρησίμων ἀποβάλλοντας ἔρχεσθαι δεῖ πρὸς τὸν λόγον, ὡς πρὸς τὰ γεωμετρικὰ προσάγομεν, ὡς πρὸς τὰ μουσικά· 40εἰ δὲ μή, οὐδʼ ἐγγὺς ἐσόμεθα τῷ προκόψαι, κἂν πάσας τὰς εἰσαγωγὰς καὶ τὰς συντάξεις τὰς Χρυσίππου μετὰ τῶν Ἀντιπάτρου καὶ Ἀρχεδήμου διέλθωμεν.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA