Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER VIII. · Wherein consists the Essence of Good.
1God is beneficial. Good is also beneficial. It should seem, then, that where the Essence of God is, there too is the Essence of Good. What then is the Essence of God? Flesh?——By no means. An Estate?——Fame?——By no means. Intelligence? Knowledge? Right Reason?——Certainly. Here then, without more ado, seek the Essence of Good. For, do you seek it in a Plant?——No.——Or in a Brute?——No.——If then you seek it only in a rational Subject, why do you seek it any where but in what is distinct from Irrationals? Plants have not the Use of the Appearances of Things; and therefore you do not apply the Term Good to them.——Good, then, requires the Use of these Appearances. And nothing else? If so, you may say, that Good, and Happiness, and Unhappiness, belong to mere Animals. But this you do not say; and you are right: for, how much soever they have the Use of the Appearances of Things, they have not the Faculty of understanding that Use; and with good Reason for they are made to be subservient to others, and not Principals themselves. Why was an Ass made? Was it as a Principal? No: but because we had need of a Back able to carry Burthens. We had needed to that he should walk; therefore he had the Use of the Appearances of Things added; otherwise he could not have walked. But here his Endowments end: for, if an Understanding of that Use had been likewise added, he would not, in Reason, have been subject to us, nor have done us these Services; but would have been like, and equal to ourselves. Why will you not, therefore, seek the Essence of Good in that, without which, you will not say, there can be Good in any thing? 2What then? Are not these likewise the Works of the Gods? They are: but not Principals, nor Parts of the Gods. But you are a Principal. You are a distinct Portion of the Essence of God; and contain a certain Part of him in yourself. Why then are you ignorant of your noble Birth? Why do not you consider, whence you came? Why do not you remember, when you are eating, who you are who eat; and whom you feed? When you are in the Company of Women; when you are conversing; when you are exercising; when you are disputing; do not you know, that it is a God you feed; a God you exercise? You carry a God about with you, Wretch, and know nothing. of it. Do you suppose I mean some God without you of Gold or Silver? It is within yourself you carry him; and profane him, without being sensible of it, by impure Thoughts, and unclean Actions. If even the Image of God were present, you would not dare to act as you do: and when God himself is within you, and hears and sees all, are not you ashamed to think and act thus; insensible of your own Nature, and hateful to God? 3After all, why are we afraid, when we send a young Man from the School, into Action, that he should behave indecently, eat indecently, converse indecently with Women: that he should either debase himself by a shabby Dress, or clothe himself too finely? Doth not he know the God within him? Doth not he know with whom he sets out? Have we Patience to hear him say, "I wish to have you with me." Have you not God? Do you seek any other, while you have him? Or will He tell you any other than these things? If you were a Statue of Phidias, either Jupiter or Minerva, you would remember both yourself and the Artist; and, if you had any Sense, you would endeavor to do nothing unworthy of him who formed you, or of yourself: nor to appear in an unbecoming Manner, to Spectators. And are you now careless how you appear, because you are the Workmanship of Jupiter? And yet, what Comparison is there, either between the Artists, or the Things they have formed? What Work of any [human] Artist contains in itself, those Faculties which are shown, in forming it? Is it any thing but Marble, or Brass, or Gold, or Ivory? And the Minerva of Phidias, when its Hand is once extended, and a Victory placed in it, remains in that Attitude, for ever. But the Works of God are indued with Motion, Breath, the Use of the Appearances of Things, Judgment. Being, then, the Formation of such an Artist, will you dishonor him; especially, when he hath not only formed, but intrusted, and given the Guardianship of you, to yourself? Will you not only be forgetful of this, but, moreover, dishonour the Trust? If God had committed some Orphan to your Charge, would you have been thus careless of him? He hath delivered yourself to your Care; and says, "I had no one fitter to be trusted than you: preserve this Person for Me, such as he is by Nature; modest, faithful, sublime, unterrified, dispassionate, tranquil:" And will you not preserve him? 4But it will be said; "Whence this supercilious Look, and Gravity of Face" [in our young Philosopher]——"I have not yet so much Gravity, as the Case deserves. I do not yet trust to what I have learned, and assented to. I still fear my own Weakness. Let me but take Courage a little, and then you shall see such a Look, and such an Appearance, as I ought to have. Then I will show you the Statue, when it is finished, when it is polished. Do you think I will show you a supercilious Countenance? Heaven forbid! For Olympian Jupiter doth not lift up his Brow; but keeps a steady Countenance, as becomes him who is about to say, —————Th' immutable Decree
No Force can shake: what is, that ought to be. Pope. "Such will I show myself to you: faithful, modest, noble, tranquil."——"What, and immortal too, and exempt from Age and Sickness?" No. But sickening and dying as becomes a God. This is in my Power; this I can do. The other is not in my Power, nor can I do it. Shall I show you the Nerves of a Philosopher? "What Nerves are those?" A Desire undisappointed; an Aversion unincurred; Pursuits duly exerted; a careful Resolution; an unerring Assent. These you shall see.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (2)
- See Introduction, §. 19.See 1 Cor. vi. 19. 2 Cor. vi. 16. 2 Tim. 1. 14. 1 John iii. 24. iv. 12, 13. But though the simple Expression of carrying God about with us, may seem to have some nearly parallel to it in the New Testament, yet those represent the Almighty in a more venerable Manner; as taking the Hearts of Good Men for a Temple to dwell in. But the other Expressions here of Feeding and Exercising God, and the Whole of the Paragraph, and indeed of the Stoic System, shew the real Sense of even its more decent Phrases to be vastly different from that of Scripture.
- An Allusion to the Combatants in the public Exercises. Who used to show their Shoulders, Muscles, and Nerves, as a Proof of their Strength. See B. I. c. 4. §. 4. B. II. c. 18. §. 5. B. III. c. 22 §. 5.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Wherein consists the essence of good.
God is beneficial. Good is also beneficial. It should seem, then, that where the essence of God is, there too is the essence of good. What then is the essence of God,—flesh? By no means. An estate? Fame? By no means. Intelligence? Knowledge? Right reason? Certainly. Here, then, without more ado, seek the essence of good. For do you seek that quality in a plant? No. Or in a brute? No. If, then, you seek it only in a rational subject, why do you seek it anywhere but in what distinguishes that from things irrational? Plants make no voluntary use of things, and therefore you do not apply the term of good to them. Good, then, implies such use. And nothing else? If so, you may say that good and-happiness and unhappiness belong to mere animals. But this you do not say, and you are right; for, how much soever they have the use of things, they have not the intelligent use, and with good reason; for they are made to be subservient to others, and not of primary importance. Why was an ass made? Was it as being of primary importance? No; but because we had need of a back able to carry burdens. We had need too that he should be capable of locomotion; therefore he had the voluntary use of things added, otherwise he could not have moved. But here his endowments end; for, if an understanding of that use had been likewise added, he would not, in reason, have been subject to us, nor have done us these services, but would have been like and equal to ourselves. Why will you not, therefore, seek the essence of good in that without which you cannot say that there is good in anything?
What then? Are not all these likewise the works of the gods? They are; but not primary existences, nor parts of the gods. But you are a primary existence. You are a distinct portion of the essence of God, and contain a certain part of him in yourself. Why then are you ignorant of your noble birth? Why do not you consider whence you came? Why do not you remember, when you are eating, who you are who eat, and whom you feed? When you are in the company of women, when you are conversing, when you are exercising, when you are disputing, do not you know that it is the Divine you feed, the Divine you exercise? You carry a God about with you, poor wretch, and know nothing of it. Do you suppose I mean some god without you of gold or silver? It is within yourself that you carry him; and you do not observe that you profane him by impure thoughts and unclean actions. If the mere external image of God were present, you would not dare to act as you do; and when God himself is within you, and hears and sees all, are not you ashamed to think and act thus,—insensible of your own nature, and at enmity with God?
Why, then, are we afraid, when we send a young man from the school into active life, that he should behave indecently, eat indecently, converse indecently with women; that he should either debase himself by slovenliness, or clothe himself too finely? Knows he not the God within him? Knows he not in what company he goes? It is provoking to hear him say [to his instructor], wish to have you with me. Have you not God? Do you seek any other, while you have him? Or will He tell you any other things than these? If you were a statue of Phidias. as Zeus or Athena, you would remember both yourself and the artist; and if you had any sense, you would endeavor to be in no way unworthy of him who formed you, nor of yourself; nor to appear in an unbecoming manner to spectators. And are you now careless how you appear when you are the workmanship of Zeus himself? And yet, what comparison is there, either between the artists, or the things they have formed? What work of any artist has conveyed into its structure those very faculties which are shown in shaping it? Is it anything but marble, or brass, or gold, or ivory? And the Athena of Phidias, when its hand is once extended, and a Victory placed in it, remains in that attitude forever. But the works of God are endowed with motion, breath, the powers of use and judgment. Being, then, the work of such an artist, will you dishonor him, especially when he hath not only formed you, but given your guardianship to yourself? Will you not only be forgetful of this, but, moreover, dishonor the trust? If God had committed some orphan to your charge, would you have been thus careless of him? He has delivered yourself to your care; and says, had no one fitter to be trusted than you; preserve this person for me, such as he is by nature,—modest, faithful, noble, unterrified, dispassionate, tranquil. And will you not preserve him?
But it will be said: What need of this lofty look, and dignity of face?
I answer, that I have not yet so much dignity as the case demands; for I do not yet trust to what I have learned, and accepted. I still fear my own weakness. Let me but take courage a little, and then you shall see such a look, and such an appearance, as I ought to have. Then I will show you the statue when it is finished, when it is polished. Do you think I will show you a supercilious countenance? Heaven forbid! For Olympian Zeus doth not haughtily lift his brow, but keeps a steady countenance, as becomes him who is about to say,— My promise is irrevocable, sure.
Such will I show myself to you; faithful, modest, noble, tranquil.
What, and immortal too, and exempt from age and sickness?
No. But sickening and dying as becomes the divine within me. This is in my power; this I can do. The other is not in my power, nor can I do it. Shall I show you the muscular training of a philosopher?
What muscles are those?
A will undisappointed, evils avoided, powers duly exerted, careful resolutions, unerring decisions.
These you shall see.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Higginson’s notes (1)
- Quotation source: Iliad, 1.526
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
What is the nature ( ἡ οὐσία ) of the Good
God is beneficial. But the Good also is beneficial. It is consistent then that where the nature of God is, there also the nature of the good should be. What then is the nature of God? Flesh? Certainly not. An estate in land? By no means. Fame? No. Is it intelligence, knowledge, right reason? Yes. Herein then simply seek the nature of the good; for I suppose that you do not seek it in a plant. No. Do you seek it in an irrational animal? No. If then you seek it in a rational animal, why do you still seek it any where except in the superiority of rational over irrational animals? Now plants have not even the power of using appearances, and for this reason you do not apply the term good to them. The good then requires the use of appearances. Does it require this use only? For if you say that it requires this use only, say that the good, and that happiness and unhappiness are in irrational animals also. But you do not say this, and you do right; for if they possess even in the highest degree the use of appearances, yet they have not the faculty of understanding the use of appearances; and there is good reason for this, for they exist for the purpose of serving others, and they exercise no superiority. For the ass, I suppose, does not exist for any superiority over others. No; but because we had need of a back which is able to bear something; and in truth we had need also of his being able to walk, and for this reason he received also the faculty of making use of appearances, for other wise he would not have been able to walk. And here then the matter stopped. For if he had also received the faculty of comprehending the use of appearances, it is plain that consistently with reason he would not then have beer subjected to us, nor would he have done us these services, but he would have been equal to us and like to us.
Will you not then seek the nature of good in the rational animal? for if it is not there, you will not choose to say that it exists in any other thing (plant or animal). What then? are not plants and animals also the works of God? They are; but they are not superior things, nor yet parts of the Gods. But you are a superior thing; you are a portion separated from the deity; you have in yourself a certain portion of him. Why then are you ignorant of your own noble descent? Why do you not know whence you came? will you not remember when you are eating, who you are who eat and whom you feed? When you are in conjunction with a woman, will you not remember who you are who do this thing? When you are in social intercourse, when you are exercising yourself, when you are engaged in discussion, know you not that you are nourishing a god, that you are exercising a god? Wretch, you are carrying about a god with you, and you know it not. Do you think that I mean some God of silver or of gold, and external? You carry him within yourself, and you perceive not that you are polluting him by impure thoughts and dirty deeds. And if an image of God were present, you would not dare to do any of the things which you are doing: but when God himself is present within and sees all and hears all, you are not ashamed of thinking such things and doing such things, ignorant as you are of your own nature and subject to the anger of God. Then why do we fear when we are sending a young man from the school into active life, lest he should do anything improperly, eat improperly, have improper intercourse with women; and lest the rags in which he is wrapped should debase him, lest fine garments should make him proud? This youth (if he acts thus) does not know his own God: he knows not with whom he sets out (into the world). But can we endure when he says I wish I had you (God) with me. Have you not God with you? and do you seek for any other, when you have him? or will God tell you any thing else than this? If you were a statue of Phidias, either Athena or Zeus, you would think both of yourself and of the artist, an if you had any understanding (power of perception) you would try to do nothing unworthy of him who made you or of yourself, and try not to appear in an unbecoming dress (attitude) to those who look on you. But now because Zeus has made you, for this reason do you care not how you shall appear? And yet is the artist (in the one case) like the artist in the other? or the work in the one case like the other? And what work of an artist, for instance, has in itself the faculties, which the artist shows in making it? Is it not marble or bronze, or gold or ivory? and the Athena of Phidias when she has once extended the hand and received in it the figure of Victory stands in that attitude for ever. But the works of God have power of motion, they breathe, they have the faculty of using the appearances of things, and the power of examining them. Being the work of such an artist do you dishonour him? And what shall I say, not only that he made you, but also entrusted you to yourself and made you a deposit to yourself? Will you not think of this too, but do you also dishonour your guardianship? But if God had entrusted an orphan to you, would you thus neglect him? He has delivered yourself to your own care, and says, I had no one fitter to intrust him to than yourself: keep him for me such as he is by nature, modest, faithful, erect, unterrifled, free from passion and perturbation. And then you do not keep him such. But some will say, whence has this fellow got the arrogance which he displays and these supercilious looks?—I have not yet so much gravity as befits a philosopher; for I do not yet feel confidence in what I have learned and in what I have assented to: I still fear my own weakness. Let me get confidence and then you shall see a countenance such as I ought to have and an attitude such as I ought to have: then I will show to you the statue, when it is perfected, when it is polished. What do you expect? a supercilious countenance? Does the Zeus at Olympia lift up his brow? No, his look is fixed as becomes him who is ready to say Irrevocable is my word and shall not fail. Such will I show myself to you, faithful, modest, noble, free from perturbation—What, and immortal too, exempt from old age, and from sickness? No, but dying as becomes a god, sickening as becomes a god. This power I possess; this I can do. But the rest I do not possess, nor can I do. I will show the nerves (strength) of a philosopher. What Lerves are these? A desire never disappointed, an aversion which never falls on that which it would avoid, a proper pursuit (ὁρμήν), a diligent purpose, an assent which is not rash. These you shall see.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (11)
- Schweighaeuser observes that the title of this chapter would more correctly be ὁ Τεὸς ἐν ὑμῖν , God in man. There is no better chapter in the book.
- Socrates (Xenophon, Mem. iv. 6, 8 ) concludes that the useful is good to him to whom it is useful.
- I do not remember that Epictetus has attempted any other description of the nature of God. He has done more wisely than some who have attempted to answer a question which cannot be answered. But see ii. 14, 11–13.
- Compare Cicero, de Office. i. 27.
- Noble descent. See i. c. 9. The doctrine that God is in man is an old doctrine. Euripides said. (Apud Theon. Soph. Progym.):— Ὀ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐστιν ἐν ἑκάστῳ Θεός. .The doctrine became a common place of the poets (Ovid, Fast. vi.), Est deus in nobis, agitante calescimus illo; and Horace, Sat. ii. 6, 79, Atque affigit humo divinae particulam aurae. See i. 14, note 4.
- Mrs. Carter has a note here. See 1 Cor. vi. 19, 2 Cor. vi. 16, 2 Tim. i. 14, 1 John iii. 24, iv. 12, 13. But though the simple expression of carrying God about with us may seem to have some nearly parallel to it in the New Testament, yet those represent the Almighty in a more venerable manner, as taking the hearts of good men for a temple to dwell in. But the other expressions here of feeding and exercising God, and the whole of the paragraph, and indeed of the Stoic system, show the real sense of even its more decent phrases to be vastly different from that of Scripture. The passage in 1 Cor. vi. 19 is, What? know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you, which ye have of God and ye are not your own ? This follows v. 18, which is an exhortation to flee fornication . The passage in 2 Cor. vi. 16 is And what agreement hath the temple of God with idols? for ye are the temple of the living God; as God hath said, I will dwell in them and walk in them, etc. Mrs. Carter has not correctly stated the sense of these two passages. It is certain that Epictetus knew nothing of the writers of the Epistles in the New Testament; but whence did these writers learn such forms of expression as we find in the passages cited by Mrs. Carter? I believe that they drew them from the Stoic philosophers who wrote before Epictetus and that they applied them to the new religion which they were teaching. The teaching of Paul and of Epictetus does not differ: the spirit of God is in man. Swedenborg says, In these two faculties (rationality and liberty) the Lord resides with every man, whether he be good or evil, they being the Lord’s mansions in the human race. But the mansion of the Lord is nearer with a man, in proportion as the man opens the superior degrees by these faculties; for by the opening thereof he comes into superior degrees of love and wisdom, and consequently nearer to the Lord. Hence it may appear that as these degrees are opened, so a man is in the Lord and the Lord in him. Swedeuborg, Angelic Wisdom, 240. Again, the faculty of thinking rationally, viewed in itself, is not man’s, but God’s in man. I am not quite sure in what sense the administration of the Eucharist ought to be understood in the church of England service. Some English divines formerly understood, and perhaps some now understand, the ceremony as a commemoration of the blood of Christ shed for us and of his body which was broken; as we see in T. Burnet’s Posthumous work (de Fide et Officiis Christianorum, p. 80). It was a commemoration of the last supper of Jesus and the Apostles. But this does not appear to be the sense in which the ceremony is now understood by some priests and by some members of the church of England , whose notions approach near to the doctrine of the Catholic mass. Nor does it appear to be the sense of the prayer made before delivering the bread and wine to the Communicants, for the prayer is Grant us, gracious Lord, so to eat the flesh of thy dear son Jesus Christ and to drink his blood that our sinful bodies may be made clean by his body and our souls washed through his most precious blood and that we may evermore dwell in him and he in us. This is a different thing from Epictetus’ notion of God being in man, and also different, as I understand it, from the notion contained in the two passages of Paul; for it is there said generally that the Holy Ghost is in man or God in man, not that God is in man by virtue of a particular ceremony. It should not be omitted that there is after the end of the Communion service an admonition that the sacramental bread and wine remain what they were, and that the natural body and blood of our Saviour Christ are in heaven and not here; it being against the truth of Christ’s natural body to be at one time in more places than one. It was affirmed by the Reformers and the best writers of the English church that the presence of Christ in the Eucharist is a spiritual presence, and in this opinion they followed Calvin and the Swiss divines: and yet in the Prayer book we have the language that I have quoted; and even Calvin, who only maintained a spiritual presence, said, that the verity is nevertheless joined to the signs, and that in the sacrament we have true Communion in Christ’s body and blood (Contemporary Review, p. 464, August 1874 ). What would Epictetus have thought of the subtleties of our days?
- The Athena of Phidias was in the Parthenon on the Athenian Acropolis, a colossal chryselephantine statue, that is, a frame work of wood, covered with ivory and gold (Pausanias, i. 24). The figure of Victory stood on the hand of the goddess, as we frequently see in coins. See. i. 6, 23, and the note in Schweig.’s edition. Cicero, de Natura Deorum, iii. 34.
- The great statue at Olympia was the work of Phidias (Pausanias, v. 11). It was a seated colossal chryselephantine statue, and held a Victory in the right Land.
- Quotation source: —Iliad, i. 526.
- An allusion to the combatants in the public exercises, who used to show their shoulders, muscles and sinews as a proof of their strength. See i. 4, ii. 18, iii. 22 (Mrs. Carter).
- ἔκκλισιν . See Book iii. c. 2.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1ὁ θεὸς ὠφέλιμος· ἀλλὰ καὶ τἀγαθὸν ὠφέλιμον. εἰκὸς οὖν, ὅπου ἡ οὐσία τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐκεῖ εἶναι καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. 2τίς οὖν οὐσία θεοῦ; σάρξ; μὴ γένοιτο. ἀγρός; μὴ γένοιτο. φήμη; μὴ γένοιτο. νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη, λόγος ὀρθός. 3ἐνταῦθα τοίνυν ἁπλῶς ζήτει τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἐπεί τοι μή τι αὐτὴν ἐν φυτῷ ζητεῖς; οὔ. μή τι ἐν ἀλόγῳ; οὔ. ἐν λογικῷ οὖν ζητῶν τί ἔτι ἀλλαχοῦ ζητεῖς ἢ ἐν τῇ παραλλαγῇ τῇ πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα; 4τὰ φυτὰ οὐδὲ φαντασίαις χρηστικά ἐστιν· διὰ τοῦτο οὐ λέγεις ἐπʼ αὐτῶν τὸ ἀγαθόν. δεῖται οὖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν χρήσεως φαντασιῶν. 5ἆρά γε μόνης; εἰ γὰρ μόνης, λέγε καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις τὰ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι καὶ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ κακοδαιμονίαν. 6νῦν δʼ οὐ λέγεις καὶ καλῶς ποιεῖς· εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα χρῆσιν φαντασιῶν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ παρακολούθησίν γε τῇ χρήσει τῶν φαντασιῶν οὐκ ἔχει. καὶ εἰκότως. ὑπηρετικὰ γὰρ γέγονεν ἄλλοις, οὐκ αὐτὰ προηγούμενα. 7ὁ ὄνος ἐπεὶ γέγονεν μή τι προηγουμένως; οὔ· ἀλλʼ ὅτι νώτου χρείαν. εἴχομεν βαστάζειν τι δυναμένου. ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία καὶ περιπατοῦντος αὐτοῦ χρείαν εἴχομεν· διὰ τοῦτο προσείληφε καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι φαντασίαις· ἄλλως γὰρ περιπατεῖν οὐκ ἐδύνατο. 8καὶ λοιπὸν αὐτοῦ που πέπαυται. εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτός που προσειλήφει παρακολούθησιν τῇ χρήσει τῶν φαντασιῶν, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι κατὰ λόγον οὐκέτʼ ἂν ἡμῖν ὑπετέτακτο οὐδὲ τὰς χρείας ταύτας παρεῖχεν, ἀλλʼ ἦν ἂν ἴσος ἡμῖν καὶ ὅμοιος. 9οὐ θέλεις οὖν ἐκεῖ ζητεῖν τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, οὗ μὴ παρόντος ἐπʼ οὐδενὸς τῶν ἄλλων θέλεις λέγειν τὸ ἀγαθόν; 10τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔστι θεῶν ἔργα κἀκεῖνα; ἔστιν, ἀλλʼ οὐ προηγούμενα οὐδὲ μέρη θεῶν. 11σὺ δὲ προηγούμενον εἶ, σὺ ἀπόσπασμα εἶ τοῦ θεοῦ· ἔχεις τι ἐν σεαυτῷ μέρος ἐκείνου. τί οὖν ἀγνοεῖς σου τὴν συγγένειαν; τί οὐκ οἶδας, πόθεν ἐλήλυθας; 12οὐ θέλεις μεμνῆσθαι, ὅταν ἐσθίῃς, τίς ὢν ἐσθίεις καὶ τίνα τρέφεις; ὅταν συνουσίᾳ χρῇ, τίς ὢν χρῇ; ὅταν ὁμιλίᾳ; ὅταν γυμνάζῃ, ὅταν διαλέγῃ, οὐκ οἶδας ὅτι θεὸν τρέφεις, θεὸν γυμνάζεις; θεὸν περιφέρεις, τάλας, καὶ ἀγνοεῖς. 13δοκεῖς με λέγειν ἀργυροῦν τινα ἢ χρυσοῦν ἔξωθεν; ἐν σαυτῷ φέρεις αὐτὸν καὶ μολύνων οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ ἀκαθάρτοις μὲν διανοήμασι, ῥυπαραῖς δὲ πράξεσι. 14καὶ ἀγάλματος μὲν τοῦ θεοῦ παρόντος οὐκ ἂν τολμήσαις τι τούτων ποιεῖν ὧν ποιεῖς. αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ παρόντος ἔσωθεν καὶ ἐφορῶντος πάντα καὶ ἐπακούοντος οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ ταῦτα ἐνθυμούμενος καὶ ποιῶν, ἀναίσθητε τῆς αὑτοῦ φύσεως καὶ θεοχόλωτε; 15λοιπὸν ἡμεῖς τί φοβούμεθα ἐκπέμποντες νέον ἐπί τινας πράξεις ἐκ τῆς σχολῆς, μὴ ἄλλως ποιήσῃ τι, μὴ ἄλλως φάγῃ, μὴ ἄλλως συνουσιάσῃ, μὴ ταπεινώσῃ αὐτὸν ῥάκη περιτεθέντα, μὴ ἐπάρῃ κομψὰ ἱμάτια; 16οὗτος οὐκ οἶδεν αὑτοῦ θεόν, οὗτος οὐκ οἶδεν, μετὰ τίνος ἀπέρχεται. ἀλλʼ ἀνεχόμεθα λέγοντος αὐτοῦ σὲ ἤθελον ἔχειν; 17ἐκεῖ τὸν θεὸν οὐκ ἔχεις; εἶτʼ ἄλλον τινὰ ζητεῖς ἐκεῖνον ἔχων; 18ἢ ἄλλα σοι ἐρεῖ ἐκεῖνος ἢ ταῦτα; ἀλλʼ εἰ μὲν τὸ ἄγαλμα ἦς τὸ Φειδίου, ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ ἢ ὁ Ζεύς, ἐμέμνησο ἂν καὶ σαυτοῦ καὶ τοῦ τεχνίτου καὶ εἴ τινα αἴσθησιν εἶχες, ἐπειρῶ ἂν μηδὲν [ἂν] ἀνάξιον ποιεῖν τοῦ κατασκευάσαντος μηδὲ σεαυτοῦ μηδʼ ἐν ἀπρεπεῖ σχήματι φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ὁρῶσι· 19νῦν δέ σε ὅτι ὁ Ζεὺς πεποίηκεν, διὰ τοῦτο ἀμελεῖς οἷόν τινα δείξεις σεαυτόν; καὶ τί ὁ τεχνίτης τῷ τεχνίτῃ ὅμοιος ἢ τὸ κατασκεύασμα τῷ κατασκευάσματι; 20καὶ ποῖον ἔργον τεχνίτου εὐθὺς ἔχει τὰς δυνάμεις ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἃς ἐμφαίνει διὰ τῆς κατασκευῆς; οὐχὶ λίθος ἐστὶν ἢ χαλκὸς ἢ χρυσὸς ἢ ἐλέφας; καὶ ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ ἡ Φειδίου ἅπαξ ἐκτείνασα τὴν χεῖρα καὶ τὴν Νίκην ἐπʼ αὐτῆς δεξαμένη ἕστηκεν οὕτως ὅλῳ τῷ αἰῶνι, τὰ δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ κινούμενα, ἔμπνοα, χρηστικὰ φαντασιῶν, δοκιμαστικά. 21τούτου τοῦ δημιουργοῦ κατασκεύασμα ὢν καταισχύνεις αὐτό; τί δʼ; ὅτι οὐ μόνον σε κατεσκεύασεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ σοὶ μόνῳ ἐπίστευσεν καὶ παρακατέθετο, 22οὐδὲ τούτου μεμνήσῃ, ἀλλὰ καὶ καταισχυνεῖς τὴν ἐπιτροπήν; εἰ δέ σοι ὀρφανόν τινα ὁ θεὸς παρέθετο, οὕτως ἂν αὐτοῦ ἠμέλεις; 23παραδέδωκέ σοι σεαυτὸν καὶ λέγει οὐκ εἶχον ἄλλον πιστότερόν σου· τοῦτόν μοι φύλασσε τοιοῦτον οἷος πέφυκεν, αἰδήμονα, πιστόν, ὑψηλόν, ἀκατάπληκτον, ἀπαθῆ, ἀτάραχον. εἶτα σὺ οὐ φυλάσσεις; 24ἀλλʼ ἐροῦσιν· πόθεν ἡμῖν οὗτος ὀφρῦν ἐνήνοχεν καὶ σεμνοπροσωπεῖ; οὔπω κατʼ ἀξίαν. ἔτι γὰρ οὐ θαρρῶ οἷς ἔμαθον καὶ συγκατεθέμην· ἔτι τὴν ἀσθένειαν τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ φοβοῦμαι. 25ἐπεί τοι ἄφετέ με θαρρῆσαι καὶ τότε ὄψεσθε βλέμμα οἷον δεῖ καὶ σχῆμα οἷον δεῖ, τότε ὑμῖν δείξω τὸ ἄγαλμα, ὅταν τελειωθῇ, ὅταν στιλπνωθῇ. 26τί δοκεῖτε; ὀφρῦν; μὴ γένοιτο. μὴ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς ὁ ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ ὀφρῦν ἀνέσπακεν; ἀλλὰ πέπηγεν αὐτοῦ τὸ βλέμμα, οἷον δεῖ εἶναι τοῦ ἐροῦντος οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν παλινάγρετον οὐδʼ ἀπατηλόν. 27τοιοῦτον ὑμῖν δείξω ἐμαυτόν, πιστόν, αἰδήμονα, γενναῖον, ἀτάραχον. 28μή τι οὖν ἀθάνατον ἀγήρων, μή τι ἄνοσον; ἀλλʼ ἀποθνῄσκοντα θείως, νοσοῦντα θείως. ταῦτα ἔχω, ταῦτα δύναμαι· τὰ δʼ ἄλλα οὔτʼ ἔχω οὔτε δύναμαι. 29δείξω ὑμῖν νεῦρα φιλοσόφου. ποῖα νεῦρα; ὄρεξιν ἀναπότευκτον, ἔκκλισιν ἀπερίπτωτον, ὁρμὴν καθήκουσαν, πρόθεσιν ἐπιμελῆ, συγκατάθεσιν ἀπρόπτωτον. ταῦτα ὄψεσθε.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA