Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER X. · How we may investigate the Duties of Life from the Names which we bear.
1Examine who you are. In the first Place, a Man, that is, one who hath nothing superior to the Faculty of Choice; but all Things subject to this; and this itself uninslaved, and unsubjected, to any thing. Consider then, from what you are distinguished by Reason. You are distinguished from wild Beasts: you are distinguished from Cattle. Besides: you are a Citizen of the World, and a Part of it: not a subservient, but a principal, Part. You are capable of comprehending the divine Oeconomy; and of considering the Connections of Things. What then doth the Character of a Citizen promise? To hold no private Interest; to deliberate of nothing as a separate Individual, but like the Hand or the Foot; which, if they had Reason, and comprehended the Constitution of Nature, would never pursue, or desire, but with a Reference to the Whole. Hence the Philosophers rightly say, That, if a wise and good Man could foresee what was to happen, he would help forward Sickness, and Death, and Mutilation, to himself; being sensible, that these Things are appointed from the Order of the Universe; and that the Whole is superior to a Part, and the City, to the Citizen. But, since we do not foreknow what is to happen, it becomes our Duty to adhere to what is more naturally adapted to our Option: for, amongst other Things, we were born for this. 2Remember next, that you are a Son: and what doth this Character promise? To esteem every thing that is his, as belonging to his Father: in every Instance to obey him: not to revile him to another: not to say or do any thing injurious to him: to give way and yield in every thing; co-operating with him to the utmost of his Power. 3After this, know likewise, that you are a Brother: and that to this Character it belongs, to make Concessions; to be easily persuaded; to use gentle Language: never to claim, for yourself, any of the Things independent on Choice; but chearfully to give these, that you may have the larger Share of what is dependent on it. For consider what it is, instead of a Lettuce, for Instance, or a Chair, to procure for yourself a good Temper? How great an Advantage gained! 4If, besides this, you are a Senator of any City, consider yourself as a Senator: if a Youth, as a Youth: if an old Man, as an old Man. For each of these Names, if it comes to be considered, always points out the proper Duties. But, if you go and revile your Brother, I tell you, you have forgotten who you are, and what is your Name. For even if you were a Smith, and made an ill Use of the Hammer, you would have forgotten the Smith: and, if you have forgotten the Brother, and are become, instead of a Brother, an Enemy, do you imagine you have made no Change of one Thing for another, in that Case? If, instead of a Man, a gentle, social Creature, you are become a wild Beast, mischievous, insidious, biting; have you lost nothing? But must you lose Money, in order to suffer Damage; and is there no other Thing, the Loss of which endamages a Man? If you were to part with your Skill in Grammar, or in Music, would you think the Loss of these a Damage? And, if you part with Honour, Decency, and Gentleness, do you think that no Matter? Yet the first are lost by some Cause external, and independent on Choice; but the last, by our own Fault. There is no Shame either in not having, or in losing the one; but either not to have, or to lose, the other, is equally shamefully, and reproachful, and unhappy. What doth the Pathic lose? The Man. What doth the smooth effeminate Fellow lose? Many other Things? but the Man also. What doth an Adulterer lose? The modest, the chaste Character; the Neighbour. What doth an angry Person lose? Something else. A Coward? Something else. No one is wicked without some Loss, or Damage. Now, if, after all, you have made the Loss of Money the only Damage, all these [Wretches] are unhurt and undamaged. Nay, it may be, even Gainers; as, by such Practices, their Money may possibly be increased. But consider: if you refer every thing to Money, the Man who loses his Nose is not hurt. Yes, say you; he is maimed in his Body. Well: but doth he who loses his Smell itself, lose nothing? Is there, then, no Faculty of the Soul, which he who possesses it is the better for; and he who parts with it, the worse? What Sort do you mean? Have we not a natural Sense of Honour? We have. Doth he, who loses this, suffer no Damage? Is he deprived of nothing? Doth he part with nothing that belongs to him? Have we no natural Fidelity No natural Affection? No natural Disposition to mutual Usefulness, to mutual Forbearance? Is he, then, who carelessly suffers himself to be damaged in these Respects, unhurt and undamaged? 5What, then, shall not I hurt him, who hath hurt me? Consider first what Hurt is, and remember what you have heard from the Philosophers. For, if both Good and Evil consist in Choice, see whether what you say, doth not amount to this: "Since he hath hurt himself, by injuring me; shall not I hurt myself by injuring him?" Why do we not make some such Representation to ourselves, as this? Are we hurt, when any Detriment happens to our bodily Possessions; and are we not at all hurt, when any happens to our Faculty of Choice? He who is deceived, or hath done an Injury, hath no Pain in his Head; nor loses an Eye, a Leg, or an Estate: and we wish for nothing beyond these. Whether we have a modest and faithful, or a shameless and unfaithful, Will and Choice, we make not the smallest Difference; except only in the Schools, as far as a few Words go. Therefore all the Improvement we make, reaches only to Words; and beyond them is absolutely nothing.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (2)
- The true Reading of the Greek is ουτ' ουκ εχειν.
- It hath been suggested to me, that διατιλθεις, not διατιθεις is the true Reading; and I have ventured so to translate it. See L. III. c. 1. p. 352, 353. of Mr. Upton's Edition.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
How we may infer the duties of life from its nominal functions.
Consider who you are. In the first place, a man; that is, one who recognizes nothing superior to the faculty of free will, but all things as subject to this; and this itself as not to be enslaved or subjected to anything. Consider, then, from what you are distinguished by reason. You are distinguished from wild beasts; you are distinguished from cattle. Besides, you are a citizen of the universe, and a part of it; not a subordinate, but a principal part. You are capable of comprehending the Divine economy, and of considering the connections of things. What then does the character of a citizen imply? To hold no private interest; to deliberate of nothing as a separate individual, but rather like the hand or the foot, which, if they had reason, and comprehended the constitution of nature, would never pursue, or desire, but with a reference to the whole. Hence the philosophers rightly say, that, if it were possible for a wise and good man to foresee what was to happen, he might co-operate in bringing on himself sickness, and death, and mutilation, being sensible that these things are appointed in the order of the universe; and that the whole is superior to a part. and the city to the citizen. But, since we do not foreknow what is to happen, it becomes our duty to hold to what is more agreeable to our choice, for this too is a part of our birthright.
Remember next, that perhaps you are a son, and what does this character imply? To esteem everything that is his, as belonging to his father; in every instance to obey him; not to revile him to any one; not to say or do anything injurious to him; to give way and yield in everything, co-operating with him to the utmost of his power.
After this, know likewise, that you are a brother too; and that to this character it belongs to make concessions, to be easily persuaded, to use gentle language, never to claim for yourself any non-essential thing, but cheerfully to give up these to be repaid by a larger share of things essential. For consider what it is, instead of a lettuce, for instance, or a chair, to procure for yourself a good temper. How great an advantage gained!
If, beside this, you are a senator of any city, demean yourself as a senator; if a youth, as a youth; if an old man, as an old man. For each of these names, if it comes to be considered, always points out the proper duties; but, if you go and revile your brother, I tell you that you have forgotten who you are, and what is your name. If you were a smith, and made an ill use of the hammer, you would have forgotten the smith; and if you have forgotten the brother, and are become, instead of a brother, an enemy, do you imagine you have made no change of one thing for another, in that case? If, instead of a man,—a gentle, social creature,—you have become a wild beast, mischievous, insidious, biting, have you lost nothing? Is it only the loss of money which is reckoned damage; and is there no other thing, the loss of which damages a man? If you were to part with your skill in grammar or in music, would you think the loss of these a damage; and yet, if you part with honor, decency, and gentleness, do you think that no matter Yet the first may be lost by some cause external and inevitable; but the last only by our own fault. There is no shame in not having or in losing the one; but either not to have or to lose the other is equally shameful and reproachful and unhappy. What does the debauchee lose? Manhood. What does he lose who made him such? Many things, but manhood also. What does an adulterer lose? The modest, the chaste character; the good neighbor. What does an angry person lose? A coward? Each loses his portion. No one is wicked without some loss or damage. Now if, after all, you treat the loss of money as the only damage, all these are unhurt and uninjured. Nay, they may be even gainers; as, by such practices, their money may possibly be increased. But consider; if you refer everything to money, then a man who loses his nose is not hurt. Yes, say you; he is maimed in his body. Well, but does he who loses his sense of smell itself lose nothing? Is there, then, no faculty of the soul which benefits the possessor, and which it is an injury to lose?
Of what sort do you mean?
Have we not a natural sense of honor?
We have.
Does he who loses this suffer no damage? Is he deprived of nothing? Does he part with nothing that belongs to him? Have we no natural fidelity; no natural affection; no natural disposition to mutual usefulness, to mutual forbearance? Is he, then, who carelessly suffers himself to be damaged in these respects still safe and uninjured?
What, then; shall not I injure him who has injured me?
Consider first what injury is; and remember what you have heard from the philosophers. For, if both good and evil lie in the will, see whether what you say does not amount to this: Since he has hurt himself by injuring me, shall I not hurt myself by injuring him? Why do we not make to ourselves some such representation as this? Are we hurt when any detriment happens to our bodily possessions, and are we not at all hurt when our will is depraved? He who has erred, or injured another, has indeed no pain in his head; nor loses an eye, nor a leg, nor an estate; and we wish for nothing beyond these. Whether our will be habitually humble and faithful, or shameless and unfaithful, we regard as a thing indifferent, except only in the discussions of the schools. In that case, all the improvement we make reaches only to words; and beyond them is absolutely nothing.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
How we may discover the duties of life from names.
Consider who you are. In the first place, you are a man and this is one who has nothing superior to the faculty of the will, but all other things subjected to it; and the faculty itself he possesses unenslaved and free from subjection. Consider then from what things you have been separated by reason. You have been separated from wild beasts: you have been separated from domestic animals ( προβάτων). Further, you are a citizen of the world, and a part of it, not one of the subservient (serving), but one of the principal (ruling) parts, for you are capable of comprehending the divine administration and of considering the connexion of things. What then does the character of a citizen promise (profess)? To hold nothing as profitable to himself; to deliberate about nothing as if he were detached from the community, but to act as the hand or foot would do, if they had reason and understood the constitution of nature, for they would never put themselves in motion nor desire any thing otherwise than with reference to the whole. Therefore the philosophers say well, that if the good man had foreknowledge of what would happen, he would co-operate towards his own sickness and death and mutilation, since he knows that these things are assigned to him according to the universal arrangement, and that the whole is superior to the part, and the state to the citizen. But now because we do not know the future, it is our duty to stick to the things which are in their nature more suitable for our choice, for we were made among other things for this.
After this remember that you are a son. What does this character promise? To consider that every thing which is the son’s belongs to the father, to obey him in all things, never to blame him to another, nor to say or do any thing which does him injury, to yield to him in all things and give way, co-operating with him as far as you can. After this know that you are a brother also, and that to this character it is due to make concessions; to be easily persuaded, to speak good of your brother, never to claim in opposition to him any of the things which are independent of the will, but readily to give them up, that you may have the larger share in what is dependent on the will. For see what a thing it is, in place of a lettuce, if it should so happen, or a seat, to gain for yourself goodness of disposition. How great is the advantage.
Next to this, if you are a senator of any state, remember that you are a senator: if a youth, that you are a youth: if an old man, that you are an old man; for each of such names, if it comes to be examined, marks out the proper duties. But if you go and blame your brother, I say to you, You have forgotten who you are and what is your name. In the next place, if you were a smith and made a wrong use of the hammer, you would have forgotten the smith; and if you have forgotten the brother and instead of a brother have become an enemy, would you appear not to have changed one thing for another in that case? And if instead of a man, who is a tame animal and social, you are become a mischievous wild beast, treacherous, and biting, have you lost nothing? But, (I suppose) you must lose a bit of money that you may suffer damage? And does the loss of nothing else do a man damage? If you had lost the art of grammar or music, would you think the loss of it a damage? and if you shall lose modesty, moderation (καταστολήν) and gentleness, do you think the loss nothing? And yet the things first mentioned are lost by some cause external and independent of the will, and the second by our own fault; and as to the first neither to have them nor to lose them is shameful; but as to the second, not to have them and to lose them is shameful and matter of reproach and a misfortune. What does the pathic lose? He loses the (character of) man. What does he lose who makes the pathic what he is? Many other things; and he also loses the man no less than the other. What does he lose who commits adultery? He loses the (character of the) modest, the temperate, the decent, the citizen, the neighbour. What does he lose who is angry? Something else. What does the coward lose? Something else. No man is bad without suffering some loss and damage. If then you look for the damage in the loss of money only, all these men receive no harm or damage; it may be, they have even profit and gain, when they acquire a bit of money by any of these deeds. But consider that if you refer every thing to a small coin, not even he who loses his nose is in your opinion damaged. Yes, you say, for he is mutilated in his body. Well; but does he who has lost his smell only lose nothing? Is there then no energy of the soul which is an advantage to him who possesses it, and a damage to him who has lost it?— Tell me what sort (of energy) you mean.—Have we not a natural modesty?—We have.—Does he who loses this sustain no damage? is he deprived of nothing, does he part with nothing of the things which belong to him? Have we not naturally fidelity? natural affection, a natural disposition to help others, a natural disposition to forbearance? The man then who allows himself to be damaged in these matters, can he be free from harm and uninjured What then? shall I not hurt him, who has hurt me? In the first place consider what hurt (βλάβη) is, and remember what you have heard from the philosophers. For if the good consists in the will (purpose, intention, προαιρέσει), and the evil also in the will, see if what you say is not this: What then, since that man has hurt himself by doing an unjust act to me, shall I not hurt myself by doing some unjust act to him? Why do we not imagine to ourselves (mentally think of) something of this kind? But where there is any detriment to the body or to our possession, there is harm there; and where the same thing happens to the faculty of the will, there is (you suppose) no harm; for he who has been deceived or he who has done an unjust act neither suffers in the head nor in the eye nor in the hip, nor does he lose his estate; and we wish for nothing else than (security to) these things. But whether we shall have the will modest and faithful or shameless and faithless, we care not the least, except only in the school so far as a few words are concerned. Therefore our proficiency is limited to these few words; but beyond them it does not exist even in the slightest degree.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (9)
- Cicero (de Fin. iv. 10); Seneca, Ep. 95.
- See i. 9. M. Antoninus, vi. 44: But my nature is rational and social; and my city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome , but so far as I am a man, it is the world. I have here translated προβάτων by domestic animals. I suppose that the bovine species, and sheep and goats are meant.
- This may appear extravagant; but it is possible to explain it, and even to assent to it. If a man believes that all is wisely arranged in the course of human events, he would not even try to resist that which he knows it is appointed for him to suffer: he would submit and he would endure. If Epictetus means that the man would actively pro— mote the end or purpose which he foreknew, in order that his acts may be consistent with what he foreknows and with his duty, perhaps the philosopher’s saying is too hard to deal with; and as it rests on an impossible assumption of foreknowledge, we may be here wiser than the philosophers, if we say no more about it. Compare Seneca, de Provid. c. 5.
- Antoninus, vi. 42: We are all working together to one end, some with knowledge and design, and others without knowing what they do.
- A lettuce is an example of the most trifling thing. A seat probably means a seat of superiority, a magistrate’s seat, a Roman sella curulis.
- οὗτος ᾖ ἀβλαβής . See Schweig.’s note.
- Socrates. We must by no means then do an act of injustice. Crito. Certainly not. Socrates. Nor yet when you are wronged must you do wrong in return, as most people think, since you must in no way do an unjust act. Plato, Crito, c. 10.
- See the beginning of ii. 16.
- The same remark will apply to most dissertations spoken or written on moral subjects: they are exercises of skill for him who delivers or writes them, or matter for criticism and perhaps a way of spending an idle hour for him who listens; and that is all. Epictetus blames our indolence and indifference as to acts, and the trifling of the schools of philosophy in disputation.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1σκέψαι τίς εἶ. τὸ πρῶτον ἄνθρωπος, τοῦτο δʼ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἔχων κυριώτερον προαιρέσεως, ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ τὰ ἄλλα ὑποτεταγμένα, αὐτὴν δʼ ἀδούλευτον καὶ ἀνυπότακτον. 2σκόπει οὖν, τίνων κεχώρισαι κατὰ λόγον. κεχώρισαι θηρίων, κεχώρισαι προβάτων. 3ἐπὶ τούτοις πολίτης εἶ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ μέρος αὐτοῦ, οὐχ ἓν τῶν ὑπηρετικῶν, ἀλλὰ τῶν προηγουμένων· παρακολουθητικὸς γὰρ εἶ τῇ θείᾳ διοικήσει καὶ τοῦ ἑξῆς ἐπιλογιστικός. 4τίς οὖν ἐπαγγελία πολίτου; μηδὲν ἔχειν ἰδίᾳ συμφέρον, περὶ μηδενὸς βουλεύεσθαι ὡς ἀπόλυτον, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ἄν, εἰ ἡ χεὶρ ἢ ὁ ποὺς λογισμὸν εἶχον καὶ παρηκολούθουν τῇ φυσικῇ κατασκευῇ, οὐδέποτʼ ἂν ἄλλως ὥρμησαν ἢ ὠρέχθησαν ἢ ἐπανενεγκόντες ἐπὶ τὸ ὅλον. 5διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι ὅτι εἰ προῄδει ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τὰ ἐσόμενα, συνήργει ἂν καὶ τῷ νοσεῖν καὶ τῷ ἀποθνῄσκειν καὶ τῷ πηροῦσθαι, αἰσθανόμενός γε, ὅτι ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ὅλων διατάξεως τοῦτο ἀπονέμεται, κυριώτερον δὲ τὸ ὅλον τοῦ μέρους καὶ ἡ πόλις τοῦ πολίτου. 6νῦν δʼ ὅτι οὐ προγιγνώσκομεν, καθήκει τῶν πρὸς ἐκλογὴν εὐφυεστέρων ἔχεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο γεγόναμεν. 7μετὰ τοῦτο μέμνησο, ὅτι υ ἱὸς εἶ. τίς τούτου τοῦ προσώπου ἐπαγγελία; πάντα τὰ αὑτοῦ ἡγεῖσθαι τοῦ πατρός, πάντα ὑπακούειν, μηδέποτε ψέξαι πρός τινα μηδὲ βλαβερόν τι αὐτῷ εἰπεῖν ἢ πρᾶξαι, ἐξίστασθαι ἐν πᾶσιν καὶ παραχωρεῖν συνεργοῦντα κατὰ δύναμιν. μετὰ τοῦτο ἴσθι ὅτι καὶ ἀδελφὸς εἶ. 8καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο δὲ τὸ πρόσωπον ὀφείλεται παραχώρησις, εὐπείθεια, εὐφημία, μηδέποτʼ ἀντιποιήσασθαί τινος πρὸς [ἑ]αὐτὸν τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων, ἀλλʼ ἡδέως ἐκεῖνα προίεσθαι, ἵνʼ ἐν τοῖς προαιρετικοῖς πλέον ἔχῃς. 9ὅρα γὰρ οἷόν ἐστιν ἀντὶ θίδρακος, ἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, καὶ καθέδρας αὐτὸν εὐγνωμοσύνην κτήσασθαι, ὅση ἡ πλεονεξία. 10μετὰ ταῦτα εἰ βουλευτὴς πόλεώς τινος, ὅτι βουλευτής· εἰ νέος, ὅτι νέος· εἰ πρεσβύτης, ὅτι πρεσβύτης· εἰ πατήρ, ὅτι πατήρ. 11ἀεὶ γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων ὀνομάτων εἰς ἐπιλογισμὸν ἐρχόμενον ὑπογράφει τὰ οἰκεῖα ἔργα. 12ἐὰν δʼ ἀπελθὼν ψέγῃς σου τὸν ἀδελφόν, λέγω σοι ἐπελάθου, τίς εἶ καὶ τί σοι ὄνομα. 13εἶτα εἰ μὲν χαλκεὺς ὢν ἐχρῶ τῇ σφύρᾳ ἄλλως, ἐπιλελησμένος ἂν ἦς τοῦ χαλκέως· εἰ δὲ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ ἐπελάθου καὶ ἀντὶ ἀδελφοῦ ἐχθρὸς ἐγένου, οὐδὲν ἀντʼ οὐδενὸς ἠλλάχθαι φανεῖ σεαυτῷ; 14εἰ δʼ ἀντὶ ἀνθρώπου, ἡμέρου ζῴου καὶ κοινωνικοῦ, θηρίον γέγονας βλαβερόν, ἐπίβουλον, δηκτικόν, οὐδὲν ἀπολώλεκας; ἀλλὰ δεῖ σε κέρμα ἀπολέσαι, ἵνα ζημιωθῆς, ἄλλου δʼ οὐδενὸς ἀπώλεια ζημιοῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον; 15εἶτα γραμματικὴν μὲν ἀποβαλὼν ἢ μουσικὴν ζημίαν ἂν ἡγοῦ τὴν ἀπώλειαν αὐτῆς· εἰ δʼ αἰδῶ καὶ καταστολὴν καὶ ἡμερότητα ἀποβαλεῖς, οὐδὲν ἡγῇ τὸ πρᾶγμα; 16καίτοι ἐκεῖνα μὲν παρʼ ἔξωθέν τινα καὶ ἀπροαίρετον αἰτίαν ἀπόλλυται, ταῦτα δὲ παρʼ ἡμᾶς· καὶ ἐκεῖνα μὲν οὔτʼ ἔχειν καλόν ἐστιν οὔτʼ ἀπολλύειν αἰσχρόν ἐστιν, ταῦτα δὲ καὶ μὴ ἔχειν καὶ ἀπολλύειν καὶ αἰσχρόν ἐστι καὶ ἐπονείδιστον καὶ ἀτύχημα. τί ἀπολλύει ὁ τὰ τοῦ κιναίδου πάσχων; 17τὸν ἄνδρα. ὁ δὲ διατιθείς; πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα καὶ αὐτὸς δʼ οὐδὲν ἧττον τὸν ἄνδρα. τί ἀπολλύει ὁ μοιχεύων; 18τὸν αἰδήμονα, τὸν ἐγκρατῆ, τὸν κόσμιον, τὸν πολίτην, τὸν γείτονα. τί ἀπολλύει ὁ ὀργιζόμενος; ἄλλο τι. ὁ φοβούμενος; 19ἄλλο τι. οὐδεὶς δίχα ἀπωλείας καὶ ζημίας κακός ἐστιν. λοιπὸν εἰ τὴν ζημίαν ζητεῖς ἐν κέρματι, πάντες οὗτοι ἀβλαβεῖς, ἀζήμιοι, ἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, καὶ ὠφελούμενοι καὶ κερδαίνοντες, ὅταν διά τινος τούτων τῶν ἔργων κέρμα αὐτοῖς προσγένηται. 20ὅρα δʼ εἰ ἐπὶ κερμάτιον πάντα ἀνάγεις, ὅτι οὐδʼ ὁ τὴν ῥῖνά σοι ἀπολλύων ἔσται βεβλαμμένος. — ναί, φησίν, κεκολόβωται γὰρ τὸ σῶμα. 21— ἄγε, ὁ δὲ τὴν ὀσφρασίαν αὐτὴν ἀπολωλεκὼς οὐδὲν ἀπολλύει; ψυχῆς οὖν δύναμις οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία, ἣν ὁ μὲν κτησάμενος ὠφελεῖται, ὁ δʼ ἀποβαλὼν ζημιοῦται; 22— ποίαν καὶ λέγεις; — οὐδὲν ἔχομεν αἰδῆμον φύσει; — ἔχομεν. — ὁ τοῦτο ἀπολλύων οὐ ζημιοῦται, οὐδενὸς στερίσκεται, οὐδὲν ἀποβάλλει τῶν πρὸς αὑτόν; 23οὐκ ἔχομεν φύσει τι πιστόν, φύσει στερκτικόν, φύσει ὠφελητικόν, ἀλλήλων φύσει ἀνεκτικόν; ὅστις οὖν εἰς ταῦτα περιορᾷ ζημιούμενον ἑαυτόν, οὗτος ᾖ ἀβλαβὴς καὶ ἀζήμιος; 24τί οὖν; μὴ βλάψω τὸν βλάψαντα; — πρῶτον μὲν ἰδού, τί ἐστι βλάβη καὶ μνήσθητι ὧν ἤκουσας παρὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων. 25εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν προαιρέσει καὶ τὸ κακὸν ὡσαύτως ἐν προαιρέσει, βλέπε μὴ τοιοῦτʼ ἐστιν ὃ λέγεις τί οὖν; 26ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος ἑαυτὸν ἔβλαψεν πρὸς ἐμέ τι ἄδικον ποιήσας, ἐγὼ ἐμαυτὸν μὴ βλάψω πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἄδικόν τι ποιήσας; 27τί οὖν οὐ τοιοῦτόν τι φανταζόμεθα, ἀλλʼ ὅπου τι σωματικὸν ἐλάττωμα ἢ εἰς κτῆσιν, ἐκεῖ ἡ βλάβη, ὅπου εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν, οὐδεμία βλάβη; 28οὔτε γὰρ τὴν κεφαλὴν ἀλγεῖ ὁ ἐξαπατηθεὶς ἢ ἀδικήσας οὔτε τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν οὔτε τὸ ἰσχίον οὔτε τὸν ἀγρὸν ἀπολλύει. 29ἡμεῖς δʼ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἐθέλομεν ἢ ταῦτα· τὴν προαίρεσιν δὲ π[ρ]ότερον αἰδήμονα καὶ πιστὴν ἕξομεν ἢ ἀναίσχυντον καὶ ἄπιστον, οὐδʼ ἐγγὺς διαφερόμεθα πλὴν μόνον ἐν τῇ σχολῇ μέχρι τῶν λογαρίων. 30τοιγαροῦν μέχρι τῶν λογαρίων προκόπτομεν, ἔξω δʼ αὐτῶν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐλάχιστον.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA