Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER XXI. · Of Inconsistency.
1There are some Things which Men confess, with Ease; others, with Difficulty. No one, for Instance, will confess himself a Fool or a Blockhead; but, on the contrary, you will hear every one say, "I wish my Fortune was equal to my Mind." But they easily confess themselves fearful; and say, "I am somewhat timorous, I confess: but in other respects you will not find me a Fool." No one will easily confess himself intemperate in his Desires; upon no Account dishonest, nor absolutely very envious, or meddling: but many confess themselves to have the Weakness of being compassionate. What is the Reason of all this? The principal is, an Inconsistency and Confusion in what relates to Good and Evil. But different People have different Inducements. In general, whatever they imagine to be base, they do not absolutely confess. Fear and Compassion, they imagine to belong to a well-meaning Disposition; but Stupidity, to a Slave. Offences against Society they do not own: but, in most Faults, they are brought to a Confession, chiefly from imagining, that there is something involuntary in them; as in Fear and Compassion. And, though a Person should in some measure confess himself intemperate in his Desires, he accuses his Passion, and expects Forgiveness, as for an involuntary Fault. But Dishonesty is not imagined to be, by any means, involuntary. In Jealousy too, there is something, they suppose, of involuntary; and this likewise, in some degree, they confess. 2Conversing among such Men, therefore, thus confused, thus ignorant what they say, what are, or are not, their Evils, whence they have them, and how they may be delivered of them; it is worth while, I think, to ask one's self continually, "Am I too one of these? What do I imagine myself to be? How do I conduct myself? As a prudent, as a temperate Man? Do I, too, ever talk at this Rate, That I am sufficiently instructed for what may happen? Have I that Persuasion, That I know nothing, which becomes one who knows nothing? Do I go to a Master, as to an Oracle, prepared to obey; or do I, as well as others, like a stupid Driveller, enter the School, only to learn the History [of Philosophy], and understand Books, which I did not understand before; or, perhaps, to explain them to others?" You have been fighting at home, with your Servant, Sir: you have turned the House upside-down, and alarmed the Neighbourhood: and do you come to me, with a pompous Show of Wisdom, and sit and pass Judgment how I explain a Sentence? How I prate whatever comes into my Head? Do you come, envious and dejected, that nothing is brought you from home? And, in the midst of the Disputations, sit thinking on nothing, but how your Father or your Brother may behave to you? "What are they saying about me at home? Now they think I am improving and say, He will come back with universal Knowledge. I wish I could learn every thing before my Return: but this requires much Labour; and nobody sends me any thing. The Baths are very bad at Nicopolis; and Things go very ill both at home, and here." 3After all this, it is said, nobody is the better for the philosophic School. Why, who comes to the School? I mean, who comes to be reformed? Who, to submit his Principles to Correction? Who, with a Sense of his Wants? Why do you wonder then, that you bring back from the School, the very Thing you carried there. For you do not come to lay aside, or correct, or change, your Principles. How should you? Far from it. Rather consider this, therefore, whether you have not what you come for. You come to talk about Theorems. Well: and are not you more impertinently talkative than you were? Do not these paultry Theorems furnish you with Matter for Ostentation? Do not you solve convertible and hypothetical Syllogisms? Why then, are you still displeased, if you have the very Thing for which you came?——"Very true but, if my Child, or my Brother, should die; or if I must die, or be tortured myself, what Good will these Things do me?"——Why, did you come for this? Did you attend upon me for this? Was it upon any such Account, that you ever lighted your Lamp, or sat up at Night? Or did you, when you went into the Walk, propose any Appearance to your own Mind to be discussed, instead of a Syllogism? Did any of you ever go through such a Subject jointly? And, after all, you say, Theorems are useless. To whom? To such as apply them ill. For Medicines for the Eyes are not useless to those, who apply them when, and as, they ought. Fomentations are not useless: Poisers are not useless: but they are useless to some; and, on the contrary, useful to others. If you should ask me now, Are Syllogisms useful I answer, that they are useful: and, if you please, I will show you how.——"Will they be of Service to me, then?"——Why: did you ask, Man, whether they would be useful, to you, or in general? If any one in a Dysentery should ask me, whether Acids be useful; I answer, They are. "Are they useful for me, then?"——I say, No. First try to get the Flux stopt, and the Exulceration healed. Do you too first get your Ulcers healed; your Fluxes stopt. Quiet your Mind, and bring it free from Distraction, to the School; and then you will know what is the Force of Reasoning.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (4)
- Mr. Upton's Copy.
- We have no Expression exactly like that in the Greek. The Translation comes the nearest to it, of any I could think on.
- This seems to be spoken by Epictetus, to one of his Scholars.
- The Greek is pointed at αποδειξω; but the Sense requires the Stop, at πως.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Of inconsistency.
There are some things which men confess with ease, and others with difficulty. No one, for instance, will confess himself a fool or a blockhead; but, on the contrary, you will hear every one say, wish my fortune were in proportion to my abilities. But they easily confess themselves fearful, and say, am somewhat timorous, I confess; but in other respects you will not find me a fool. No one will easily confess himself intemperate in his desires, upon no account dishonest, nor indeed very envious or meddling; but many confess themselves to have the weakness of being compassionate. What is the reason of all this? The principal reason is an inconsistency and confusion in what relates to good and evil. But different people have different motives, and in general, whatever they imagine to be base, they do not absolutely confess. Fear and compassion they imagine to belong to a well-meaning disposition; but stupidity, to a slave. Offences against society they do not own; but in most faults they are brought to a confession chiefly from imagining that there is something involuntary in them, as in fear and compassion. And though a person should in some measure confess himself intemperate in his desires, he accuses his passion, and expects forgiveness, as for an involuntary fault. But dishonesty is not imagined to be, by any means, involuntary. In jealousy too there is something they suppose involuntary and this likewise, in some degree, they confess.
Conversing therefore with such men, thus confused, thus ignorant what they say, and what are or are not their ills, whence they have them, and how they may be delivered from them, it is worth while, I think, to ask one’s self continually, Am I too one of these? What do I imagine myself to be? How do I conduct myself,—as a prudent, as a temperate man? Do I, too, ever talk at this rate,—that I am sufficiently instructed for what may happen? Have I that persuasion that I know nothing which becomes one who knows nothing? Do I go to a master as to an oracle, prepared to obey; or do I also, like a mere driveller, enter the school only to learn and understand books which I did not understand before, or perhaps to explain them to others?
You have been fighting at home with your manservant; you have turned the house upside-down, and alarmed the neighborhood; and do you come to me with a pompous show of wisdom, and sit and criticise how I explain a sentence, how I prate whatever comes into my head? Do you come, envious and dejected that nothing has come from home for you, and in the midst of the disputations sit thinking on nothing but how your father or your brother may treat you? What are they saying about me at home? Now they think I am improving, and say, He will come back with universal knowledge. I wish I could learn everything before my return; but this requires much labor, and nobody sends me anything. The baths are very bad at Nicopolis; and things go very ill both at home and here.
After all this, it is said, nobody is the better for the philosophic school. Why, who comes to the school? I mean, who comes to be reformed; who, to submit his principles to correction; who, with a sense of his wants? Why do you wonder, then, that you bring back from the school the very thing you carried there? For you do not come to lay aside, or correct, or change, your principles. How should you? Far from it. Rather consider this, therefore, whether you have not what you have come for. You have come to talk about theorems. Well; and are you not more impertinently talkative than you were? Do not these paltry theorems furnish you with matter for ostentation? Do you not solve convertible and hypothetical syllogisms? Why, then, are you still displeased, if you have the very thing for which you came?
Very true; but if my child or my brother should die; or if I must die or be tortured myself, what good will these things do me? Why, did you come for this? Did you attend upon me for this? Was it upon any such account that you ever lighted your lamp, or sat up at night? Or did you, when you went into the walk, propose any delusive semblance to your own mind to be discussed, instead of a syllogism? Did any of you ever go through such a subject jointly? And after all, you say, theorems are useless. To whom? To such as apply them ill. For medicines for the eyes are not useless to those who apply them when and as they ought. Fomentations are not useless, dumb-bells are not useless: but they are useless to some, and on the contrary, useful to others. If you should ask me, now, are syllogisms useful? I should answer that they are useful; and, if you please, I will show you how. Will they be of service to me, then? Why, did you ask, man, whether they would be useful to you, or in general? If any one in a dysentery should ask me whether acids be useful, I should answer, they are. Are they useful for me, then? I say, no. First try to get the flux stopped, and the ulceration healed. Do you too first get your ulcers healed, your fluxes stopped. Quiet your mind, and bring it free from distraction to the school; and then you will know what force there is in reasoning.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
Of inconsistency.
Some things men readily confess, and other things they do not. No one then will confess that he is a fool or without understanding; but quite the contrary you will hear all men saying, I wish that I had fortune equal to my understanding. But men readily confess that they are timid, and they say: I am rather timid, I confess; but as to other respects you will not find me to be foolish. A man will not readily confess that he is intemperate; and that he is unjust, he will not confess at all. He will by no means confess that he is envious or a busy body. Most men will confess that they are compassionate. What then is the reason?—The chief thing (the ruling thing) is inconsistency and confusion in the things which relate to good and evil. But different men have different reasons; and generally what they imagine to be base, they do not confess at all. But they suppose timidity to be a characteristic of a good disposition, and compassion also; but silliness to be the absolute characteristic of a slave. And they do not at all admit (confess) the things which are. offences against society. But in the case of most errors for this reason chiefly they are induced to confess them, because they imagine that there is something involuntary in them as in timidity and compassion; and if a man confess that he is in any respect intemperate, he alleges love (or passion) as an excuse for what is involuntary. But men do not imagine injustice to be at all involuntary. There is also in jealousy, as they suppose, something involuntary; and for this reason they confess to jealousy also.
Living then among such men, who are so confused, so ignorant of what they say, and of the evils which they have or have not, and why they have them, or how they shall be relieved of them, I think it is worth the trouble for a man to watch constantly (and to ask) whether I also am one of them, what imagination I have about myself, how I conduct myself, whether I conduct myself as a prudent man, whether I conduct myself as a temperate man, whether I ever say this, that I have been taught to be prepared for every thing that may happen. Have I the consciousness, which a man who knows nothing ought to have, that I know nothing? Do I go to my teacher as men go to oracles, prepared to obey? or do I like a snivelling boy go to my school to learn history and understand the books which I did not understand before, and, if it should happen so, to explain them also to others?—Man, you have had a fight in the house with a poor slave, you have turned the family upside down, you have frightened the neighbours, and you come to me as if you were a wise man, and you take your seat and judge how I have explained some word, and low I have babbled whatever came into my head. You come full of envy, and humbled, because you bring nothing from home; and you sit during the discussion thinking of nothing else than how your father is disposed towards you and your brother. What are they saying about me there? now they think that I am improving, and are saying, He will return with all knowledge. I wish I could learn every thing before I return: but much labour is necessary, and no one sends me any thing, and the baths at Nicopolis are dirty; every thing is bad at home, and bad here.
Then they say, no one gains any profit from the school. —Why, who comes to the school? who comes for the purpose of being improved? who comes to present his opinions to be purified? who comes to learn what he is in want of? Why do you wonder then if you carry back from the school the very things which you bring into it? For you come not to lay aside (your principles) or to correct them or to receive other principles in place of them. By no means, nor any thing like it. You rather look to this, whether you possess already that for which you come. You wish to prattle about theorems? What then? Do you not become greater triflers? Do not your little theorems give you some opportunity of display? You solve sophistical syllogisms. Do you not examine the assumptions of the syllogism named the Liar? Do you not examine hypothetical syllogisms? Why then are you still vexed if you receive the things for which you come to the school? Yes; but if my child die or my brother, or if I must die or be racked, what good will these things do me?— Well, did you come for this? for this do you sit by my side? did you ever for this light your lamp or keep awake? or, when you went out to the walking place, did you ever propose any appearance that had been presented to you instead of a syllogism, and did you and your friends discuss it together? Where and when? Then you say, Theorems are useless. To whom? To such as make a bad use of them. For eye—salves are not useless to those who use them as they ought and when they ought. Fomentations are not useless. Dum-bells are not useless; but they are useless to some, useful to others. If you ask me now if syllogisms are useful, I will tell you that they are useful, and if you choose, I will prove it.—How then will they in any way be useful to me? Man, did you ask if they are useful to you, or did you ask generally? Let him who is suffering from dysentery, ask me if vinegar is useful; I will say that it is useful.—Will it then be useful to me?—I will say, no. Seek first for the discharge to be stopped and the ulcers to be closed. And do you, O men, first cure the ulcers and stop the discharge; be tranquil in your mind, bring it free from distraction into the school, and you will know what power reason has.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (8)
- Schweig. has some remarks on the title of this chapter. He says that this discourse does not keep to the same subject, but proceeds from that with which it began to other things.
- καταστολὰς ποιήσας . I have omitted these words because I don’t understand them; nor do the commentators. The word καταστολή occurs in ii. 10. 15, where it is intelligible.
- Literally, because to you or for you nothing is brought from home. Perhaps the meaning is explained by what follows. The man has no comfort at home; he brings nothing by the thought of which he is comforted.
- See i. 7.
- See ii. 17. 34.
- τί με ταῦτα ὠφελήσει ; Schweig. in his note says that he has written the text thus; but he has not. He has written τί μετὰ ταῦτα ὠφελήσει ; The με appears to be necessary, and he has rendered the passage accordingly; and rightly, I think.
- See i. 4, note 5 on Halteres.
- See ii. 25.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1τὰ μὲν ῥᾳδίως ὁμολογοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι, τὰ δʼ οὐ ῥᾳδίως. οὐδεὶς οὖν ὁμολογήσει ὅτι ἄφρων ἐστὶν ἢ ἀνόητος, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τοὐναντίον πάντων ἀκούσεις λεγόντων ὤφελον ὡς φρένας ἔχω οὕτως καὶ τύχην εἶχον. 2δειλοὺς δὲ ῥᾳδίως ἑαυτοὺς ὁμολογοῦσι καὶ λέγουσιν ἐγὼ δειλότερός εἰμι, ὁμολογῶ· τὰ δʼ ἄλλʼ οὐχ εὑρήσεις με μωρὸν ἄνθρωπον. 3ἀκρατῆ οὐ ῥᾳδίως ὁμολογήσει τις, ἄδικον οὐδʼ ὅλως, φθονερὸν οὐ πάνυ ἢ περίεργον, ἐλεήμονα οἱ πλεῖστοι. 4τί οὖν τὸ αἴτιον; τὸ μὲν κυριώτατον ἀνομολογία καὶ ταραχὴ ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, ἄλλοις δʼ ἄλλα αἴτια καὶ σχεδὸν ὅσα ἂν αἰσχρὰ φαντάζωνται, ταῦτα οὐ πάνυ ὁμολογοῦσι· 5τὸ δὲ δειλὸν εἶναι εὐγνώμονος ἤθους φαντάζονται καὶ τὸ ἐλεήμονα, τὸ δʼ ἠλίθιον εἶναι παντελῶς ἀνδραπόδου· καὶ τὰ περὶ κοινωνίαν δὲ πλημμελήματα οὐ πάνυ προσίενται. 6ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πλείστων ἁμαρτημάτων κατὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα φέρονται ἐπὶ τὸ ὁμολογεῖν αὐτά, ὅτι φαντάζονταί τι ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶναι ἀκούσιον καθάπερ ἐν τῷ δειλῷ καὶ ἐλεήμονι. 7κἂν ἀκρατῆ που παρομολογῇ τις αὑτόν, ἔρωτα προσέθηκεν, ὥστε συγγνωσθῆναι ὡς ἐπʼ ἀκουσίῳ. τὸ δʼ ἄδικον οὐδαμῶς φαντάζονται ἀκούσιον. ἔνι τι καὶ τῷ ζηλοτύπῳ, ὡς οἴονται, τοῦ ἀκουσίου· διὰ τοῦτο καὶ περὶ τούτου παρομολογοῦσιν. 8ἐν οὖν τοιούτοις ἀνθρώποις ἀναστρεφόμενον, οὕτως τεταραγμένοις, οὕτως οὐκ εἰδόσιν οὔθʼ ὅ τι λέγουσιν οὔθʼ ὅ τι ἔχουσιν κακὸν ἢ εἰ ἔχουσιν ἢ παρὰ τί ἔχουσιν ἢ πῶς παύσονται αὐτῶν, καὶ αὐτὸν οἶμαι ἐφιστάνειν ἄξιον συνεχὲς 9μή που καὶ αὐτὸς εἷς εἰμι ἐκείνων; τίνα φαντασίαν ἔχω περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ; πῶς ἐμαυτῷ χρῶμαι; μή τι καὶ αὐτὸς ὡς φρονίμῳ, μή τι καὶ αὐτὸς ὡς ἐγκρατεῖ; μὴ καὶ αὐτὸς λέγω ποτὲ ταῦτα, ὅτι εἰς τὸ ἐπιὸν πεπαίδευμαι; 10ἔχω ἣν δεῖ συναίσθησιν τὸν μηδὲν εἰδότα, ὅτι οὐδὲν οἶδα; ἔρχομαι πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλον ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ χρηστήρια πείθεσθαι παρεσκευασμένος; ἢ καὶ αὐτὸς κορύζης μεστὸς εἰς τὴν σχολὴν εἰσέρχομαι μόνην τὴν ἱστορίαν μαθησόμενος καὶ τὰ βιβλία νοήσων, ἃ πρότερον οὐκ ἐνόουν, ἂν δʼ οὕτως τύχῃ, καὶ ἄλλοις ἐξηγησόμενος; 11ἄνθρωπʼ, ἐν οἴκῳ διαπεπύκτευκας τῷ δουλαρίῳ, τὴν οἰκίαν ἀνάστατον πεποίηκας, τοὺς γείτονας συντετάραχας· καὶ ἔρχῃ μοι καταστολὰς ποιήσας ὡς σοφὸς καὶ καθήμενος κρίνεις, πῶς ἐξηγησάμην τὴν λέξιν, πῶς τί ποτʼ ἐφλυάρησα τὰ ἐπελθόντα μοι; 12φθονῶν ἐλήλυθας, τεταπεινωμένος, ὅτι σοι ἐξ οἴκου φέρεται οὐδέν, καὶ κάθῃ μεταξὺ λεγομένων τῶν λόγων αὐτὸς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐνθυμούμενος ἢ πῶς ὁ πατὴρ τὰ πρός σε ἢ πῶς ὁ ἀδελφός; 13τί λέγουσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ ἄνθρωποι περὶ ἐμοῦ; νῦν οἴονταί με προκόπτειν καὶ λέγουσιν ὅτι ἥξει ἐκεῖνος πάντα εἰδώς. 14ἤθελόν πώς ποτε πάντα μαθὼν ἐπανελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ πόνου χρεία καὶ οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν πέμπει καὶ ἐν Νικοπόλει σαπρῶς λούει τὰ βαλανεῖα καὶ ἐν οἴκῳ κακῶς καὶ ὧδε κακῶς. 15εἶτα λέγουσιν οὐδεὶς ὠφελεῖται ἐκ τῆς σχολῆς. τίς γὰρ ἔρχεται εἰς σχολήν, τίς γάρ, ὡς θεραπευθησόμενος; τίς ὡς παρέξων αὑτοῦ τὰ δόγματα ἐκκαθαρθησόμενα, τίς συναισθησόμενος τίνων δεῖται; 16τί οὖν θαυμάζετʼ, εἰ ἃ φέρετʼ εἰς τὴν σχολήν, αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἀποφέρετε πάλιν; οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἀποθησόμενοι ἢ ἐπανορθώσοντες ἢ ἄλλʼ ἀντʼ αὐτῶν ληψόμενοι ἔρχεσθε. 17πόθεν; οὐδʼ ἐγγύς. ἐκεῖνο γοῦν βλέπετε μᾶλλον, εἰ ἐφʼ ὃ ἔρχεσθε τοῦτο ὑμῖν γίνεται. θέλετε λαλεῖν περὶ τῶν θεωρημάτων. τί οὖν; οὐ φλυαρότεροι γίνεσθε; οὐχὶ δὲ παρέχει τινὰ ὕλην ὑμῖν πρὸς τὸ ἐπιδείκνυσθαι τὰ θεωρημάτια; οὐ συλλογισμοὺς ἀναλύετε, μεταπίπτοντας; οὐκ ἐφοδεύετε Ψευδομένου λήμματα, ὑποθετικούς; τί οὖν ἔτι ἀγανακτεῖτε εἰ ἐφʼ ἃ πάρεστε, ταῦτα λαμβάνετε; 18ναί· ἀλλʼ ἂν ἀποθάνῃ μου τὸ παιδίον ἢ ὁ ἀδελφὸς ἢ ἐμὲ ἀποθνῄσκειν δέῃ ἢ στρεβλοῦσθαι, τί με τὰ τ⟨οι⟩αῦτα ὠφελήσει; 19μὴ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἦλθες, μὴ γὰρ τούτου ἕνεκά μοι παρακάθησαι, μὴ γὰρ διὰ τοῦτό ποτε λύχνον ἧψας ἢ ἠγρύπνησας; ἢ εἰς τὸν περίπατον ἐξελθὼν προέβαλές ποτε σαυτῷ φαντασίαν τινὰ ἀντὶ συλλογισμοῦ καὶ ταύτην κοινῇ ἐφωδεύσατε; 20ποῦ ποτε; εἶτα λέγετε ἄχρηστα τὰ θεωρήματα. τίσιν; τοῖς οὐχ ὡς δεῖ χρωμένοις. τὰ γὰρ κολλύρια οὐκ ἄχρηστα τοῖς ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ ἐγχριομένοις, τὰ μαλάγματα δʼ οὐκ ἄχρηστα, οἱ ἁλτῆρες οὐκ ἄχρηστοι, ἀλλὰ τισὶν ἄχρηστοι, τισὶν πάλιν χρήσιμοι. 21ἄν μου πυνθάνῃ νῦν χρήσιμοί εἰσιν οἱ συλλογισμοί; ἐρῶ σοι ὅτι χρήσιμοι, κἂν θέλῃς, ἀποδείξω, πῶς. ἐμὲ οὖν τι ὠφελήκασιν; ἄνθρωπε, μὴ γὰρ ἐπύθου, εἰ σοὶ χρήσιμοι, ἀλλὰ καθόλου; 22πυθέσθω μου καὶ ὁ δυσεντερικός, εἰ χρήσιμον ὄξος, ἐρῶ ὅτι χρήσιμον. ἐμοὶ οὖν χρήσιμον; ἐρῶ οὔ. ζήτησον πρῶτον σταλῆναί σου τὸ ῥεῦμα, τὰ ἑλκύδρια ἀπουλωθῆναι. καὶ ὑμεῖς, ἄνδρες, τὰ ἕλκη πρῶτον θεραπεύετε, τὰ ῥεύματα ἐπιστήσατε, ἠρεμήσατε τῇ διανοίᾳ, ἀπερίσπαστον αὐτὴν ἐνέγκατε εἰς τὴν σχολήν· καὶ γνώσεσθε οἵαν ἰσχὺν ὁ λόγος ἔχει.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA