Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER XXIII. · Of the Faculty of Speaking.
1A book will always be read with the greater Pleasure, and Ease too, if it be written in a fair Character: therefore every one will the more easily attend to Discourses likewise, ornamented with proper and beautiful Expressions. It ought not then to be said, that there is no such
Thing as the Faculty of Elocution: for this would be at once the Part of an impious and fearful Person. Impious; because he dishonours the Gifts of God; just as if he should deny any Use in the Faculty of Sight, Hearing, and Speech itself. Hath God then given you Eyes in vain? Is it in vain, that he hath infused into them, such a strong and active Spirit, as to be able to represent the Forms of distant Objects? What Messenger is so quick and diligent? Is it in vain, that he hath made the intermediate Air, so yielding, and elastic, that the Sight penetrates through it? And is it in vain, that he hath made the Light; without which all the rest would be useless? Man, be not ingrateful; nor, on the other hand, unmindful of your superior Advantages: but for Sight, and Hearing, and indeed for Life itself and the Supports of it, as Fruits, and Wine, and Oil, be thankful to God: but remember, that he hath given you another Thing, superior to them all; which makes use of them, proves them, estimates the Value of each. For what is it that pronounces upon the Value of each of these Faculties? Is it the Faculty itself? Did you ever perceive the Faculty of Sight or Hearing, to say any thing concerning itself? Or Wheat, or Barley, or Horses, or Dogs? No. These Things are appointed as Instruments and Servants, to obey that which is capable of using the Appearances of Things. If you inquire the Value of any thing; of what do you inquire? What is it that answers you? How then can any Faculty be superior to this; which both uses all the rest as Instruments, and tries and pronounces concerning each of them? For which of them knows, what itself is; and what is its own Value? Which of them knows, when it is to be used, and when not? Which is it, that opens and shuts the Eyes, and turns them away from improper Objects? Is it the Faculty of Sight? No: but that of Choice. Which is it, that opens and shuts the Ears? What is it, by which they are made curious and inquisitive; or, on the contrary, deaf, and unaffected by what is said? Is it the Faculty of Hearing? No: but that of Choice. Will this then, perceiving itself to exist in [Man amidst] the other Faculties, [which are] all blind and deaf, and unable to discern any thing, but those Offices, in which they are appointed to minister, and be subservient to it; and that itself alone sees clearly, and distinguishes the Value of each of the rest; will this, I say, inform us, that any thing is supreme, but itself? What doth the Eye, when it is opened, do more, than see? But whether we ought to look upon the Wife of any one, and in what manner, what is it that tells us? The Faculty of Choice. Whether we ought to believe, or to disbelieve what is said; or whether, if we do believe, we ought to be moved by it, or not; what is it that tells us? Is it not the Faculty of Choice? Again: the very Faculty of Elocution, and that which ornaments Discourse, if there be any such peculiar Faculty, what doth it more, than merely ornament and arrange Expressions, as Curlers do the Hair? But whether it be better to speak, or to be silent; or better to speak in this, or in that Manner; whether this be decent, or indecent; and the Season and Use of each; what is it that tells us, but the Faculty of Choice? What then, would you have it appear, and bear Testimony against itself? What means this? If the Case be thus, that which serves, may be superior to that to which it is subservient; the Horse to the Rider; the Dog, to the Hunter; the Instrument, to the Musician; or Servants to the King. What is it that makes use of all the rest? Choice. What takes care of all? Choice. What destroys the whole Man, at one time, by Hunger; at another, by a Rope, or a Precipice? Choice. Hath Man, then, any thing stronger than this? And how is it possible, that what is liable to Restraint should be stronger, than what is not? What hath a natural Power of hindering the Faculty of Sight? Both Choice, and what depends on Choice. And it is the same of the Faculties of Hearing and Speech. And what hath a natural Power of hindering Choice? Nothing independent on itself, only its own Perversion. Therefore Choice alone is Vice: Choice alone is Virtue. 2Since, then, Choice is such a Faculty, and placed in Authority over all the rest, let it come forth and say to us, that the Body is, of all Things, the most excellent. If even the Body itself pronounced itself to be the most excellent, it could not be borne. But now, what is it, Epicurus, that pronounces all this? What was it, that composed Volumes, concerning the End of [Being], the Nature of Things, the Rule [of Reasoning]; that assumed a philosophic Beard; that, as it was dying, wrote, that it was then spending its last and happiest Day? Was this, Body, or was it the Faculty of Choice? And can you then, without Madness, confess any thing superior to this? Are you in reality so deaf and blind? What then, doth any one, dishonour the other Faculties? Heaven forbid! Doth any one deny, that the Faculty of Sight is useful, and preferable [to the Want of it]? Heaven forbid! It would be stupid, impious, and ungrateful to God. But we render to each its Due. There is some Use of an Ass, tho' not so much as of an Ox; and of a Dog, though not so much as of a Servant; and of a Servant, though not so much as of the Citizens; and of the Citizens, though not so much as of the Magistrates. And, though some are more excellent than others, those Uses, which the last afford, are not to be despised. The Faculty of Elocution hath its Value, though not equal to that of Choice. When therefore I talk thus, let not any one suppose, that I would have you neglect Elocution, any more than your Eyes, or Ears, or Hands, or Feet, or Clothes, or Shoes. But if you ask me, what is the most excellent of Things, what shall I say? I cannot say, Elocution, but a right Choice: for it is that which makes use of this, and all the other Faculties, whether great or small. If this be set right, a bad Man becomes good; if it be wrong, a good Man becomes wicked. By this we are unfortunate, fortunate; we disapprove, or approve each other. In a word, it is this, which, neglected, forms Unhappiness; and, well cultivated, Happiness. 3But to take away the Faculty of Elocution; and to say, that it is in reality nothing, is not only ingrateful to those who gave it, but cowardly too. For such a Person seems to me to be afraid, that, if there be any such Faculty, we may not, on occasion, be able to treat it with Contempt. Such are they too, who deny any Difference between Beauty, and Deformity. Was it possible then, to be affected in the same Manner by seeing Thersites, as Achilles; or Helen, as any other Woman? These also are the foolish and clownish Notions of those, who are ignorant of the Nature of Things; and afraid, that, whoever perceives a Difference, must prefently be carried away, and overcome. But the great Point is to leave to each Thing its own proper Faculty; and then to see what the Value of that Faculty is, and to learn what is the principal Thing, and, upon every Occasion, to follow that, and to make it the chief Object of our Attention: to consider other Things as trifling in Comparison of this; and yet, as far as we are able, not to neglect even these. We ought, for Instance, to take care of our Eyes; but not as of the principal Thing, but only on account of the Principal: because that will no otherwise preserve its own Nature, than by making a due Estimation of the rest, and preferring some to others. What is the usual Practice then? That of a Traveller, who returning into his own Country, and meeting on the Road with a good Inn, being pleased with the Inn, should remain at the Inn. Have you forgot your Intention, Man? You were not travelling to this Place, but only through it. "But this is a fine Place." And how many other fine Inns are there, and how many pleasant Fields? But only to be past through in your Way. The Business is, to return to your Country; to relieve the Anxieties of your Family; to perform the Duties of a Citizen; to marry; have Children; and go through the public Offices. For you did not set out, to chuse the finest Places; but to return, to live in that where you were born, and of which you are appointed a Citizen. 4Such is the present Case. Because by Speech, and verbal Precepts, we are to arrive at Perfection; and purify our own Choice; and rectify that Faculty, of which the Office is, the Use of the Appearances of Things: and, because, for the Delivery of Theorems, a certain Manner of Expression, and some Variety and Subtilty of Discourse, becomes necessary; many, captivated by these very Things, one, by Expression, another, by Syllogisms, a third, by convertible Propositions, just as our Traveller was by the good Inn, go no further: but sit down and waste their Lives shamefully there, as if amongst the Sirens. Your Business, Man, was to prepare yourself for such an Use of the Appearances of Things, as Nature demands: Not to be frustrated of your Desires, or incur your Aversions: never to be disappointed, or unfortunate: but free, unrestrained, uncompelled; conformed to the Administration of Jupiter; obedient to that; finding fault with nothing but able to say, from your whole Soul, the Verses which begin, Conduct me, Jove; and thou, O Destiny. While you have such a Business before you, will you be so pleased with a pretty Form of Expression, or a few Theorems, as to chuse to stay and live with them, forgetful of your Home; and say, "They are fine Things!" Why, who says they are not fine Things; But only as a Passage; as an Inn. For, could you speak like Demosthenes, what hinders, but that you might be a disappointed Wretch? Could you resolve Syllogisms like Chrisippus, what hinders, but that you might be miserable, sorrowful, envious, in short, disturbed, unhappy? Nothing You see then, that these are mere Inns, of small Value; and that your Point in View, is quite another Thing. When I talk thus to some, they suppose, that I am overthrowing all Care about Speaking, and about Theorems: but I do not overthrow that; only the resting in these Things without End, and placing our Hopes there. If any one, by maintaining this, hurts an Audience, place me amongst those hurtful People: for I cannot, when I see one Thing to be the principal and most excellent, call another so, to gain your Favour.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (12)
- These are the Words of Epictetus; to which there are others equivalent afterwards. His Meaning, probably, is, that the Value and Usefulness of the Faculty of Elocution ought not to be denied: in Opposition to the Doctrine of Epicurus, who declared all the liberal Arts and Sciences to be useless and mischievous. See Diog. Laert. L. X. §. 6. and Menage's Notes there.
- He proves the Timidity at the Beginning of §. 3.
- It was an old Notion, that Vision was performed by the Emission of Rays from the Eye to the Object, not the Admission of Rays from the Object into the Eye; and to this Epictetus here refers.
- Mr. Upton gives a different Sense to κρεισσονων; but I think, that both παλιν, and what afterwards follows, justifies the English Translation.
- See B. I. c. 1.
- The Hearer is understood in this Place to say, The Faculty of Choice. It is not improbable, however, that the Greek Word προαιρετικη, may have been omitted in transcribing.
- Celebrated Treatises on these Subjects, composed by Epicurus.
- Celebrated Treatises on these Subjects, composed by Epicurus.
- Celebrated Treatises on these Subjects, composed by Epicurus.
- These Words are Part of a Letter written by Epicurus, when he was dying, to one of his Friends. See Diog. Laert. L. X. §. 22.
- Probably for προαιρετικη: should be read ορατικης; which Word is used by Epictetus, but a little more than a Page before.
- Mr. Upton's Reading ἡν ετυχε.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Of eloquence.
A book will always be read with more pleasure and ease, if it be written in fair characters; and so every one will the more easily attend to discourses likewise, if ornamented with proper and beautiful expressions. It ought not then to be said, that there is no such thing as the faculty of eloquence; for this would be at once the part of an impious and timid person,—impious, because he dishonors the gifts of God; just as if he should deny any use in the faculties of sight, hearing, and speech itself. Has God then given you eyes in vain? Is it in vain that he has infused into them such a strong and active spirit as to be able to represent the forms of distant objects? What messenger is so quick and diligent? Is it in vain that he has made the intermediate air so yielding and elastic that sight penetrates through it? And is it in vain that he has made the light, without which all the rest would be useless? Man, be not ungrateful, nor, on the other hand, unmindful of your superior advantages; but for sight and hearing, and indeed for life itself, and the supports of it, as fruits and wine and oil, be thankful to God; but remember that he has given you another thing, superior to them all, which uses them, proves them, estimates the value of each. For what is it that pronounces upon the value of each of these faculties? Is it the faculty itself? Did you ever perceive the faculty of sight or hearing to say anything concerning itself; or wheat, or barley, or horses, or dogs? No. These things are appointed as instruments and servants, to obey that which is capable of using things as they appear. If you inquire the value of anything, of what do you inquire? What is the faculty that answers you? How then can any faculty be superior to this, which uses all the rest as instruments, and tries and pronounces concerning each of them? For which of them knows what itself is, and what is its own value? Which of them knows when it is to be used, and when not? Which is it that opens and shuts the eyes, and turns them away from improper objects? Is it the faculty of sight? No; but that of Will. Which is it that opens and shuts the ears? Which is it by which they are made curious and inquisitive, or, on the contrary, deaf, and unaffected by what is said? Is it the faculty of hearing? No; but that of Will. This, then, recognizing itself to exist amidst other faculties, all blind and deaf, and unable to discern anything but those offices in which they are appointed to minister and serve, itself alone sees clearly, and distinguishes the value of each of the rest. Will this, I say, inform us that anything is supreme but itself? What can the eye, when it is opened, do more than see? But whether we ought to look upon the wife of any one, and in what manner, what is it that decides us? The faculty of Will. Whether we ought to believe, or disbelieve what is said; or whether, if we do believe, we ought to be moved by it, or not, what is it that decides us? Is it not the faculty of Will? Again, the very faculty of eloquence, and that which ornaments discourse, if any such peculiar faculty there be, what does it more than merely ornament and arrange expressions, as curlers do the hair? But whether it be better to speak or to be silent, or better to speak in this or in that manner, whether this be decent or indecent, and the season and use of each, what is it that decides for us, but the faculty of Will? What, then; would you have it appear, and bear testimony against itself? What means this? If the case be thus, then that which serves may be superior to that to which it is subservient; the horse to the rider, the dog to the hunter, the instrument to the musician, or servants to the king. What is it that makes use of all the rest? The Will. What takes care of all? The Will. What destroys the whole man, at one time, by hunger; at another, by a rope or a precipice? The Will. Has man, then, anything stronger than this? And how is it possible that what is liable to restraint should be stronger than what is not? What has a natural power to restrain the faculty of sight? The Will and its workings. And it is the same with the faculties of hearing and of speech. And what has a natural power of restraining the Will? Nothing beyond itself, only its own perversion. Therefore in the Will alone is vice; in the Will alone is virtue.
Since, then, the Will is such a faculty, and placed in authority over all the rest, suppose it to come forth and say to us that the body is of all things the most excellent! If even the body itself pronounced itself to be the most excellent, it could not be borne. But now, what is it, Epicurus, that pronounces all this? What was it that composed volumes concerning the End, the Nature of things, the Rule; that assumed a philosophic beard; that as it was dying wrote that it was then spending its last and happiest day? Was this the body, or was it the faculty of Will? And can you, then, without madness, admit anything to be superior to this? Are you in reality so deaf and blind? What, then; does any one dishonor the other faculties? Heaven forbid! Does any one assert that there is no use or excellence in the faculty of sight? Heaven forbid! It would be stupid, impious, and ungrateful to God. But we render to each its due. There is some use in an ass, though not so much as in an ox; and in a dog, though not so much as in a servant; and in a servant, though not so much as in the citizens; and in the citizens, though not so much as in the magistrates. And though some are more excellent than others, those uses which the last afford are not to be despised. The faculty of eloquence has thus its value, though not equal to that of the Will. When therefore I talk thus, let not any one suppose that I would have you neglect eloquence, any more than your eyes, or ears, or hands, or feet, or clothes, or shoes. But if you ask me what is the most excellent of things, what shall I say? I cannot say eloquence, but a right Will; for it is this which makes use of that and of all the other faculties, whether great or small. If this be set right, a bad man becomes good; if it be wrong, a good man becomes wicked. By this we are unfortunate or fortunate; we disapprove or approve each other. In a word, it is this which, neglected, forms unhappiness; and, well cultivated, happiness.
But to take away the faculty of eloquence, and to say that it is in reality nothing, is not only ungrateful to those who gave it, but cowardly too. For such a person seems to me to be afraid that, if there be any such faculty, we may on occasion be compelled to respect it. Such are they too, who deny any difference between beauty and deformity. Was it possible, then, to be affected in the same manner by seeing Thersites, as by Achilles; by Helen, as by any other woman? These also are the foolish and clownish notions of those who are ignorant of the nature of things, and afraid that whoever perceives such a difference must presently be carried away and overcome. But the great point is to leave to each thing its own proper faculty, and then to see what the value of that faculty is; to learn what is the principal thing, and upon every occasion to follow that, and to make it the chief object of our attention; to consider other things as trifling in comparison with this, and yet, so far as we are able, not to neglect even these. We ought, for instance, to take care of our eyes; yet not as of the principal thing, but only on account of that which is principal; because that can no otherwise preserve its own nature, than by making a due estimate of the rest, and preferring some to others. What is the usual practice, then? That of a traveller who, returning into his own country, and meeting on the way with a good inn, being pleased with the inn, should remain there. Have you forgotten your intention, man? You were not travelling to this place, but only through it. But this is a fine place. And how many other fine inns are there, and how many pleasant fields, yet they are simply as a means of passage. What is the real business? To return to your country; to relieve the anxieties of your family; to perform the duties of a citizen; to marry, have children, and go through the public offices. For you did not travel in order to choose the finest places; but to return, to live in that where you were born, and of which you are appointed a citizen.
Such is the present case. Because, by speech and such instruction, we are to perfect our education and purify our own will and rectify that faculty which deals with things as they appear; and because, for the statement of theorems, a certain diction, and some variety and subtilty of discourse are needful, many, captivated by these very things,—one by diction, another by syllogisms, a third by convertible propositions, just as our traveller was by the good inn,—go no further, but sit down and waste their lives shamefully there, as if amongst the sirens. Your business, man, was to prepare yourself for such use of the semblances of things as nature demands; not to fail in what you seek, or incur what you shun; never to be disappointed or unfortunate, but free, unrestrained, uncompelled; conformed to the Divine Administration, obedient to that; finding fault with nothing, but able to say, from your whole soul, the verses which begin, Conduct me, Zeus; and thou, O Destiny.
While you have such a business before you, will you be so pleased with a pretty form of expression, or a few theorems, as to choose to stay and live with them, forgetful of your home, and say, They are fine things! Why, who says they are not fine things? But only as a means; as an inn. For what hinders one speaking like Demosthenes from being miserable? What hinders a logician equal to Chrysippus from being wretched, sorrowful, envious, vexed, unhappy? Nothing. You see, then, that these are merely unimportant inns, and what concerns you is quite another thing. When I talk thus to some, they suppose that I am setting aside all care about eloquence and about theorems; but I do not object to that, only the dwelling on these things incessantly, and placing our hopes there. If any one, by maintaining this, hurts his hearers, place me amongst those hurtful people; for I cannot, when I see one thing to be the principal and most excellent, call another so to please you.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Higginson’s notes (2)
- These words are part of a letter written by Epicurus, when he was dying, to one of his friends. Diog. Laert. 10.22.—C. The titles previously given are those of treatises by Epicurus.—H.
- Quotation source: A Fragment of Cleanthes, quoted in full in Enchiridion, c. 52.—H.
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
On the power of speaking.
Every man will read a book with more pleasure or even with more ease, if it is written in fairer characters. Therefore every man will also listen more readily to what is spoken, if it is signified by appropriate and becoming words. We must not say then that there is no faculty of expression: for this affirmation is the characteristic of an impious and also of a timid man. Of an impious man, because he undervalues the gifts which come from God, just as if he would take away the commodity of the power of vision, or of hearing, or of seeing. Has then God given you eyes to no purpose? and to no purpose has he infused into them a spirit so strong and of such skilful contrivance as to reach a long way and to fashion the forms of things which are seen? What messenger is so swift and vigilant? And to no purpose has he made the interjacent atmosphere so efficacious and elastic that the vision penetrates through the atmosphere which is in a manner moved? And to no purpose has he made light, without the presence of which there would be no use in any other thing?
Man, be neither ungrateful for these gifts nor yet forget the things which are superior to them. But indeed for the power of seeing and hearing, and indeed for life itself, and for the things which contribute to support it, for the fruits which are dry, and for wine and oil give thanks to God: but remember that he has given you something else better than all these, I mean the power of using them, proving them and estimating the value of each. For what is that whom gives information about each of these powers, what each of them is worth? Is it each faculty itself? Did you ever hear the faculty of vision saying any thing about itself? or the faculty of hearing? or wheat, or barley, or a horse or a dog? No; but they are appointed as ministers and slaves to serve the faculty which has the power of making use of the appearances of things. And if you inquire what is the value of each thing, of whom do you inquire? who answers you? How then can any other faculty be more powerful than this, which uses the rest as ministers and itself proves each and pronounces about them? for which of them knows what itself is, and what is its own value? which of them knows when it ought to employ itself and when not? what faculty is it which opens and closes the eyes, and turns them away from objects to which it ought not to apply them and does apply them to other objects? Is it the faculty of vision? No; but it is the faculty of the will. What is that faculty which closes and opens the ears? what is that by which they are curious and inquisitive, or on the contrary unmoved by what is said? is it the faculty of hearing? It is no other than the faculty of the will. Will this faculty then, seeing that it is amidst all the other faculties which are blind and dumb and unable to see any thing else except the very acts for which they are appointed in order to minister to this (faculty) and serve it, but this faculty alone sees sharp and sees what is the value of each of the rest; will this faculty declare to us that any thing else is the best, or that itself is? And what else does the eye do when it is opened than see? But whether we ought to look on the wife of a certain person, and in what manner, who tells us? The faculty of the will. And whether we ought to believe what is said or not to believe it, and if we do believe, whether we ought to be moved by it or not, who tells us? Is it not the faculty of the will? But this faculty of speaking and of ornamenting words, if there is indeed any such peculiar faculty, what else does it do, when there happens to be discourse about a thing, than to ornament the words and arrange them as hairdressers do the hair? But whether it is better to speak or to be silent, and better to speak in this way or that way, and whether this is becoming or not becoming, and the season for each and the use, what else tells us than the faculty of the will? Would you have it then to come forward and condemn itself?
What then? it (the will) says, if the fact is so, can that which ministers be superior to that to which it ministers, can the horse be superior to the rider, or the dog to the huntsman, or the instrument to the musician, or the servants to the king? What is that which makes use of the rest? The will. What takes care of all? The will. What destroys the whole man, at one time by hunger, at another time by hanging, and at another time by a precipice? The will. Then is any thing stronger in men than this? and how is it possible that the things which are subject to restraint are stronger than that which is not? What things are naturally formed to hinder the faculty of vision? Both will and things which do not depend on the faculty of the will. It is the same with the faculty of hearing, with the faculty of speaking in like manner. But what has a natural power of hindering the will? Nothing which is independent of the will; but only the will itself, when it is perverted. Therefore this (the will) is alone vice or alone virtue.
Then being so great a faculty and set over all the rest, let it (the will) come forward and tell us that the most excellent of all things is the flesh. Not even if the flesh itself declared that it is the most excellent, would any person bear that it should say this. But what is it, Epicurus, which pronounces this, which wrote about the End (purpose) of our Being, which wrote on the Nature of Things, which wrote about the Canoa (rule of truth), which led you to wear a beard, which wrote when it was dying that it was spending the last and a happy day? Was this the flesh or the will? Then do you admit that you possess any thing superior to this (the will)? and are you not mad? are you in fact so blind and deaf?
What then? does any man despise the other faculties? I hope not. Does any man say that there is no use or excellence in the speaking faculty? I hope not. That would be foolish, impious, ungrateful towards God. But a man renders to each thing its due value. For there is some use even in an ass, but not so much as in an ox: there is also use in a dog, but not so much as in a slave: there is also some use in a slave, but not so much as in citizens: there is also some use in citizens, but not so much as in magistrates. Not indeed because some things are superior, must we undervalue the use which other things have. There is a certain value in the power of speaking, but it is not so great as the power of the will. When then I speak thus, let no man think that I ask you to neglect the power of speaking, for neither do I ask you to neglect the eyes, nor the ears nor the hands nor the feet, nor clothing nor shoes. But if you ask me what then is the most excellent of all things, what must I say? I cannot say the power of speaking, but the power of the will, when it is right (ὀρθὴ). For it is this which uses the other (the power of speaking), and all the other faculties both small and great. For when this faculty of the will is set right, a man who is not good becomes good: but when it fails, a man becomes bad. It is through this that we are unfortunate, that we are fortunate, that we blame one another, are pleased with one another. In a word, it is this which if we neglect it makes unhappiness, and if we carefully look after it, makes happiness.
But to take away the faculty of speaking and to say that there is no such faculty in reality, is the act not only of an ungrateful man towards those who gave it, but also of a cowardly man: for such a person seems to me to fear, if there is any faculty of this kind, that we shall not be able to despise it. Such also are those who say that there is no difference between beauty and ugliness. Then it would happen that a man would be affected in the same way if he saw Thersites and if he saw Achilles; in the same way, if he saw Helen and any other woman. But these are foolish and clownish notions, and the notions of men who know not the nature of each thing, but are afraid, if a man shall see the difference, that he shall immediately be seized and carried off vanquished. But this is the great matter; to leave to each thing the power (faculty) which it has, and leaving to it this power to see what is the worth of the power, and to learn what is the most excellent of all things, and to pursue this always, to be diligent about this, considering all other things of secondary value compared with this, but yet, as far as we can, not neglecting all those other things. For we must take care of the eyes also, not as if they were the most excellent thing, but we must take care of them on account of the most excellent thing, because it will not be in its true natural condition, if it does not rightly use the ether faculties, and prefer some things to others.
What then is usually done? Men generally act as a traveller would do on his way to his own country, when he enters a good inn, and being pleased with it should remain there. Man, you have forgotten your purpose: you were not travelling to this inn, but you were passing through it.—But this is a pleasant inn.—And how many other inns are pleasant? and how many meadows are pleasant? yet only for passing through. But your purpose is this, to return to your country, to relieve your kinsmen of anxiety, to discharge the duties of a citizen, to marry, to beget children, to fill the usual magistracies. For you are not come to select more pleasant places, but to live in these where you were born and of which you were made a citizen. Something of the kind takes place in the matter which we are considering. Since by the aid of speech and such communication as you receive here you must advance to perfection, and purge your will and correct the faculty which makes use of the appearances of things; and since it is necessary also for the teaching (delivery) of theorems to be effected by a certain mode of expression and with a certain variety and sharpness, some persons captivated by these very things abide in them, one captivated by the expression, another by syllogisms, another again by sophisms, and still another by some other inn (πανδοκείου) of the kind; and there they stay and waste away as if they were among Sirens.
Man, your purpose (business) was to make yourself capable of using comformably to nature the appearances presented to you, in your desires not to be frustrated, in your aversion from things not to fall into that which you would avoid, never to have no luck (as one may say), nor ever to have bad luck, to be free, not hindered, not compelled, conforming yourself to the administration of Zeus, obeying it, well satisfied with this, blaming no one, charging no one with fault, able from your whole soul to utter these verses Lead me, O Zeus, and thou too Destiny. Then having this purpose before you, if some little form of expression pleases you, if some theorems please you, do you abide among them and choose to dwell there, forgetting the things at home, and do you say, These things are fine? Who says that they are not fine? but only as being a way home, as inns are. For what hinders you from being an unfortunate man, even if you speak like Demosthenes? and what prevents you, if you can resolve syllogisms like Chrysippus, from being wretched, from sorrowing, from envying, in a word, from being disturbed, from being unhappy? Nothing. You see then that these were inns, worth nothing; and that the purpose before you was something else. When I speak thus to some persons, they think that I am rejecting care about speaking or care about theorems. But I am not rejecting this care, but I am rejecting the abiding about these things incessantly and putting our hopes in them. If a man by this teaching does harm to those who listen to him, reckon me too among those who do this harm: for I am not able, when I see one thing which is most excellent and supreme, to say that another is so, in order to please you.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (13)
- The word for spirit is πνεῦμα , a vital spirit, an animal spirit, a nervous fluid, as Schweighaeuser explains it, or as Plutarch says (De Placit. Philosoph. iv. 15). the spirit which has the power of vision, which permeates from the chief faculty of the mind to the pupil of the eye. and in another passage of the same treatise (iv. 8), the instruments of perception are said to be intelligent spirits ( πνεύματα νοερά ) which have a motion from the chief faculty of the mind to the organs.
- See Schweig.’s note.
- See i. 1.
- Schweighaeuser has this note: That which Epictetus names the προαιρετικὴ δυναμίς and afterwards frequently προαίρεσις , is generally translated by voluntas ( will ); but it has a wider meaning than is generally given to the Latin word, and it comprehends the intellect with the will, and all the active power of the mind which we sometimes designate by the general name Reason.
- On the Greek text Upton remarks that, there are many passages in these dissertations which are ambiguous or rather confused on account of the small questions, and because the matter is not expanded by oratorical copiousness, not to mention other causes.
- The general reading is καὶ προαιρετά . Salmasius proposes καὶ ἀπροαίρετα , which Schweig. says in a note that he accepts, and so he translates it in the Latin; but in his text he has καὶ προαιρετά .
- This appears to be the book which Cicero (Tuscul. iii. 18) entitles on the supreme good ( de summo bono ), which, as Cicero, says, contains all the doctrine of Epicurus. The book on the Canon or Rule is mentioned by Velleius in Cicero de Nat. Deorum i. c. 16. as that celestial volume of Epicurus on the Rule and Judgment. See also De Fin. i. 19.
- This is said in a letter written by Epicurus, when he was dying in great pain (Diog. Laert. x. 22); Cicen) (De Fin. ii. c. 30) quotes this letter.
- The MSS. have προαιρετικῆς δυνάμεως . Lord Shaftesbury suggested φραστικῆς and Salmasius also. Schweig. has put φραστικῆς in the text, and he has done right.
- The Stoics taught that a man should lead an active life. Horace ( Ep. i. 1. 16 ) represents himself as sometimes following the Stoic principles: Nune agilis fio et mersor civilibus undis. but this was only talk. The Stoic should discharge all the duties of a citizen, says Epictetus; he should even marry and beget children. But the marrying may be done without any sense of duty; and the continuance of the human race is secured by the natural love of the male and of the female for conjunction. Still it is good advice, which the Roman censor Metellus gave to his fellow citizens, that, as they could not live without women, they should make the beat of this business of marriage. ( Gellius, i. 6 .)
- The rest of the verses are quoted in the Encheiridion, s. 52.
- Chrysippus wrote a book on the resolution of Syllogisms. Diogenes Laertius (vii.) says of Chrysippus that he was so famous among Dialecticians that most persons thought, if there was Dialectic among the Gods, it would not be any other than that of Chrysippus.
- See Schweig.’s note on ἀκαταληκτικῶς .
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1βιβλίον πᾶς ἂν ἥδιον ἀναγνῴη καὶ ῥᾷον τὸ εὐσημοτέροις γράμμασι γεγραμμένον οὐκοῦν καὶ λόγους πᾶς ἄν τις ῥᾷον ἀκούσειε τοὺς εὐσχήμοσιν ἅμα καὶ εὐπρεπέσιν ὀνόμασι σεσημασμένους. 2οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτο ῥητέον, ὡς οὐδεμία δύναμίς ἐστιν ἀπαγγελτική· τοῦτο γὰρ ἅμα μὲν ἀσεβοῦς ἐστιν ἀνθρώπου, ἅμα δὲ δειλοῦ. ἀσεβοῦς μέν, ὅτι τὰς παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ χάριτας ἀτιμάζει, ὥσπερ εἰ ἀνῄρει τὴν εὐχρηστίαν τῆς ὁρατικῆς ἢ τῆς ἀκουστικῆς δυνάμεως ἢ αὐτῆς τῆς φωνητικῆς. 3εἰκῇ οὖν σοι ὁ θεὸς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἔδωκεν, εἰκῇ πνεῦμα ἐνεκέρασεν αὐτοῖς οὕτως ἰσχυρὸν καὶ φιλότεχνον, ὥστε μακρὰν ἐξικνούμενον ἀναμάσσεσθαι τοὺς τύπους τῶν ὁρωμένων; 4καὶ ποῖος ἄγγελος οὕτως ὠκὺς καὶ ἐπιμελής; εἰκῇ δὲ καὶ τὸν μεταξὺ ἀέρα οὕτως ἐνεργὸν ἐποίησεν καὶ ἔντονον, ὥστε διʼ αὐτοῦ τεινομένου πως διικνεῖσθαι τὴν ὅρασιν; εἰκῇ δὲ φῶς ἐποίησεν, οὗ μὴ παρόντος οὐδενὸς τῶν ἄλλων ὄφελος ἦν; 5ἄνθρωπε, μήτʼ ἀχάριστος ἴσθι μήτε πάλιν ἀμνήμων τῶν κρεισσόνων, ἀλλʼ ὑπὲρ μὲν τοῦ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ νὴ Δία ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ζῆν καὶ τῶν συνεργῶν πρὸς αὐτό, ὑπὲρ καρπῶν ξηρῶν, ὑπὲρ οἴνου, ὑπὲρ ἐλαίου εὐχαρίστει τῷ θεῷ· 6μέμνησο δʼ ὅτι ἄλλο τί σοι δέδωκεν κρεῖττον ἁπάντων τούτων, τὸ χρησόμενον αὐτοῖς, τὸ δοκιμάσον, τὸ τὴν ἀξίαν ἑκάστου λογιούμενον. 7τί γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἀποφαινόμενον ὑπὲρ ἑκάστης τούτων τῶν δυνάμεων, πόσου τις ἀξία ἐστὶν αὐτῶν; μή τι αὐτὴ ἑκάστη ἡ δύναμις; μή τι τῆς ὁρατικῆς ποτʼ ἤκουσας λεγούσης τι περὶ ἑαυτῆς, μή τι τῆς ἀκουστικῆς; [μή τι πυρῶν; μή τι κριθῶν; μή τι ἵππου; μή τι κυνός;] ἀλλʼ ὡς διάκονοι καὶ δοῦλαι τεταγμέναι εἰσὶν ὑπηρετεῖν τῇ χρηστικῇ τῶν φαντασιῶν. 8κἂν πύθῃ, πόσου ἕκαστον ἄξιόν ἐστιν, τίνος πυνθάνῃ; τίς σοι ἀποκρίνεται; πῶς οὖν δύναταί τις ἄλλη δύναμις κρείσσων εἶναι ταύτης, ἣ καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς διακόνοις χρῆται καὶ δοκιμάζει αὐτὴ ἕκαστα καὶ ἀποφαίνεται; 9τίς γὰρ ἐκείνων οἶδεν, τίς ἐστιν αὐτὴ καὶ πόσου ἀξία; τίς ἐκείνων οἶδεν, ὁπότε δεῖ χρῆσθαι αὐτῇ καὶ πότε μή; τίς ἐστιν ἡ ἀνοίγουσα καὶ κλείουσα τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ ἀφʼ ὧν δεῖ ἀποστρέφουσα, τοῖς δὲ προσάγουσα; ἡ ὁρατική; οὔ, ἀλλʼ ἡ προαιρετική. τίς ἡ τὰ ὦτα ἐπικλείουσα καὶ ἀνοίγουσα; 10τίς, καθʼ ἣν περίεργοι καὶ πευθῆνες ἢ πάλιν ἀκίνητοι ὑπὸ λόγου; ἡ ἀκουστική; 11οὐκ ἄλλη ἢ ἡ προαιρετικὴ δύναμις. εἶτʼ αὐτὴ ἰδοῦσα, ὅτι ἐν τυφλαῖς καὶ κωφαῖς ταῖς ἄλλαις ἁπάσαις δυνάμεσίν ἐστι μηδέ τι ἄλλο συνορᾶν δυναμέναις πλὴν αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἔργα, ἐφʼ οἷς τεταγμέναι εἰσὶ διακονεῖν ταύτῃ καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν, αὐτὴ δὲ μόνη ὀξὺ βλέπει καὶ τάς τʼ ἄλλας καθορᾷ, πόσου ἑκάστη ἀξία, καὶ αὑτήν, μέλλει ἡμῖν ἄλλο τι ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸ κράτιστον εἶναι ἢ αὐτήν; 12καὶ τί ποιεῖ ἄλλο ὀφθαλμὸς ἀνοιχθεὶς ἢ ὁρᾷ; εἰ δὲ δεῖ τὴν τοῦ τινος ἰδεῖν γυναῖκα καὶ πῶς, τίς λέγει; 13ἡ προαιρετική. εἰ δὲ δεῖ πιστεῦσαι τοῖς λεχθεῖσιν ἢ ἀπιστῆσαι καὶ πιστεύσαντα ἐρεθισθῆναι ἢ μή, τίς λέγει; 14οὐχ ἡ προαιρετική; ἡ δὲ φραστικὴ αὕτη καὶ καλλωπιστικὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων, εἴ τις ἄρα ἰδία δύναμις, τί ἄλλο ποιεῖ ἤ, ὅταν ἐμπέσῃ λόγος περί τινος, καλλωπίζει τὰ ὀνομάτια καὶ συντίθησιν ὥσπερ οἱ κομμωταὶ τὴν κόμην; 15πότερον δʼ εἰπεῖν ἄμεινον ἢ σιωπῆσαι καὶ οὕτως ἄμεινον ἢ ἐκείνως καὶ τοῦτο πρέπον ἢ οὐ πρέπον, καὶ τὸν καιρὸν ἑκάστου καὶ τὴν χρείαν τίς ἄλλη λέγει ἢ ἡ προαιρετική; θέλεις οὖν αὐτὴν παρελθοῦσαν αὑτῆς καταψηφίσασθαι; 16τί οὖν;, φησίν, εἰ οὕτως τὸ πρᾶγμα ἔχει, καὶ δύναται τὸ διακονοῦν κρεῖσσον εἶναι ἐκείνου ᾧ διακονεῖ, ὁ ἵππος τοῦ ἱππέως ἢ ὁ κύων τοῦ κυνηγοῦ ἢ τὸ ὄργανον τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ ἢ οἱ ὑπηρέται τοῦ βασιλέως. — τί ἐστι τὸ χρώμενον; 17προαίρεσις. τί ἐπιμελεῖται πάντων; προαίρεσις. τί ὅλον ἀναιρεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ποτὲ μὲν λιμῷ, ποτὲ δʼ ἀγχόνῃ, ποτὲ δὲ κατὰ κρημνοῦ; προαίρεσις. 18εἶτα τούτου τί ἰσχυρότερον ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἐστίν; καὶ πῶς οἷόν τε τοῦ ἀκωλύτου τὰ κωλυόμενα; τὴν ὁρατικὴν δύναμιν τίνα πέφυκεν ἐμποδίζειν; 19καὶ προαίρεσις καὶ ἀπροαίρετα. τὴν ἀκουστικὴν ταὐτά, τὴν φραστικὴν ὡσαύτως. προαίρεσιν δὲ τί ἐμποδίζειν πέφυκεν; ἀπροαίρετον οὐδέν, αὐτὴ δʼ ἑαυτὴν διαστραφεῖσα. διὰ τοῦτο κακία μόνη αὕτη γίνεται ἢ ἀρετὴ μόνη. 20εἶτα τηλικαύτη δύναμις οὖσα καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιτεταγμένη παρελθοῦσα ἡμῖν λεγέτω κράτιστον εἶναι τῶν ὄντων τὴν σάρκα. οὐδὲ εἰ αὐτὴ ἡ σὰρξ ἑαυτὴν ἔλεγεν εἶναι κράτιστον, ἠνέσχετο ἄν τις αὐτῆς. 21νῦν δὲ τί ἐστιν, Ἐπίκουρε, τὸ ταῦτα ἀποφαινόμενον; τὸ περὶ Τέλους συγγεγραφός, τὸ τὰ[ς] Φυσικά[ς], τὸ περὶ Κανόνος; τὸ τὸν πώγωνα καθεικός; τὸ γράφον, ὅτε ἀπέθνῃσκεν, ὅτι τὴν τελευταίαν ἄγοντες ἅμα καὶ μακαρίαν ἡμέραν; 22ἡ σὰρξ ἢ ἡ προαίρεσις; εἶτα τούτου τι κρεῖσσον ἔχειν ὁμολογεῖς καὶ οὐ μαίνῃ; οὕτως τυφλὸς ταῖς ἀληθείαις καὶ κωφὸς εἶ; 23τί οὖν; ἀτιμάζει τις τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις; μὴ γένοιτο. λέγει τις μηδεμίαν εἶναι χρείαν ἢ προαγωγὴν … τῆς προαιρετικῆς δυνάμεως; μὴ γένοιτο. ἀνόητον, ἀσεβές, ἀχάριστον πρὸς τὸν θεόν. ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἑκάστῳ ἀποδίδωσιν. 24ἔστι γάρ τις καὶ ὄνου χρεία, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἡλίκη βοός· ἔστι καὶ κυνός, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἡλίκη οἰκέτου· ἔστι καὶ οἰκέτου, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἡλίκη τῶν πολιτῶν· ἔστι καὶ τούτων, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἡλίκη τῶν ἀρχόντων. 25οὐ μέντοι διὰ τὸ ἄλλα εἶναι κρείττονα καὶ ἣν παρέχει τὰ ἕτερα χρείαν ἀτιμαστέον. ἔστι τις ἀξία καὶ τῆς φραστικῆς δυνάμεως, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἡλίκη τῆς προαιρετικῆς. 26ὅταν οὖν ταῦτα λέγω, μή τις οἰέσθω ὅτι ἀμελεῖν ὑμᾶς ἀξιῶ φράσεως· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὀφθαλμῶν οὐδʼ ὤτων οὐδὲ χειρῶν οὐδὲ ποδῶν οὐδʼ ἐσθῆτος οὐδʼ ὑποδημάτων. 27ἀλλʼ ἄν μου πυνθάνῃ τί οὖν ἐστι κράτιστον τῶν ὄντων;, τί εἴπω; τὴν φραστικήν; οὐ δύναμαι· ἀλλὰ τὴν προαιρετικήν, ὅταν ὀρθὴ γένηται. 28τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ κἀκείνῃ χρώμενον καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις πάσαις καὶ μικραῖς καὶ μεγάλαις δυνάμεσιν· τούτου κατορθωθέντος ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος [ἀγαθὸς] γίνεται, ἀποτευχθέντος κακὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται· 29παρʼ ὃ ἀτυχοῦμεν, εὐτυχοῦμεν, μεμφόμεθʼ ἀλλήλους, εὐαρεστοῦμεν, ἁπλῶς ὃ λεληθὸς μὲν κακοδαιμονίαν ποιεῖται, τυχὸν δʼ ἐπιμελείας εὐδαιμονίαν. 30τὸ δʼ αἴρειν τὴν δύναμιν τῆς φραστικῆς καὶ λέγειν μὴ εἶναι μηδεμίαν ταῖς ἀληθείαις οὐ μόνον ἀχαρίστου ἐστὶ πρὸς τοὺς δεδωκότας, ἀλλὰ καὶ δειλοῦ. 31ὁ γὰρ τοιοῦτος φοβεῖσθαί μοι δοκεῖ, μή, εἴπερ ἐστί τις δύναμις κατὰ τὸν τόπον, οὐ δυνηθῶμεν αὐτῆς καταφρονῆσαι. 32τοιοῦτοί εἰσι καὶ οἱ λέγοντες μηδεμίαν εἶναι παραλλαγὴν κάλλους πρὸς αἶσχος. εἶτα ὁμοίως ἦν κινηθῆναι τὸν Θερσίτην ἰδόντα καὶ τὸν Ἀχιλλέα; ὁμοίως τὴν Ἑλένην καὶ ἣν ἔτυχε γυναῖκα; 33καὶ ταῦτα μωρὰ καὶ ἄγροικα καὶ οὐκ εἰδότων τὴν ἑκάστου φύσιν, ἀλλὰ φοβουμένων μὴ ἄν τις αἴσθηται τῆς διαφορᾶς, εὐθὺς συναρπασθεὶς καὶ ἡττηθεὶς ἀπέλθῃ. 34ἀλλὰ τὸ μέγα τοῦτο, ἀπολιπεῖν ἑκάστῳ τὴν αὑτοῦ δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει καὶ ἀπολιπόντα ἰδεῖν τὴν ἀξίαν τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ὄντων καταμαθεῖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐν παντὶ μεταδιώκειν, περὶ τοῦτο ἐσπουδακέναι, πάρεργα τἆλλα πρὸς τοῦτο πεποιημένον, οὐ μέντοι ἀμελοῦντα οὐδʼ ἐκείνων κατὰ δύναμιν. 35καὶ γὰρ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐπιμελητέον, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὡς τοῦ κρατίστου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων διὰ τὸ κράτιστον· ὅτι ἐκεῖνο οὐκ ἄλλως ἕξει κατὰ φύσιν εἰ μὴ ἐν τούτοις εὐλογιστοῦν καὶ τὰ ἕτερα παρὰ τὰ ἕτερα αἱρούμενον. 36τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ γινόμενον; οἷον εἴ τις ἀπιὼν εἰς τὴν πατρίδα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ διοδεύων πανδοκεῖον καλὸν ἀρέσαντος αὐτῷ τοῦ πανδοκείου καταμένοι ἐν τῷ πανδοκείῳ. 37ἄνθρωπε, ἐπελάθου σου τῆς προθέσεως· οὐκ εἰς τοῦτο ὥδευες, ἀλλὰ διὰ τούτου. ἀλλὰ κομψὸν τοῦτο. πόσα δʼ ἄλλα πανδοκεῖα κομψά, πόσοι δὲ λειμῶνες· ἁπλῶς ὡς δίοδος. 38τὸ δὲ προκείμενον ἐκεῖνο· εἰς τὴν πατρίδα ἐπανελθεῖν, τοὺς οἰκείους ἀπαλλάξαι δέους, αὐτὸν τὰ τοῦ πολίτου ποιεῖν, γῆμαι, παιδοποιεῖσθαι, ἄρξαι τὰς νομιζομένας ἀρχάς. 39οὐ γὰρ τοὺς κομψοτέρους ἡμῖν τόπους ἐκλεξόμενος ἐλήλυθας, ἀλλʼ ἐν οἷς ἐγένου καὶ ὧν κατατέταξαι πολίτης, ἐν τούτοις ἀναστραφησόμενος. τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐνταῦθά ἐστι τὸ γινόμενον. 40ἐπεὶ διὰ λόγου καὶ τοιαύτης παραδόσεως ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ τέλειον δεῖ καὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ προαίρεσιν ἐκκαθᾶραι καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν χρηστικὴν τῶν φαντασιῶν ὀρθὴν κατασκευάσαι, ἀνάγκη δὲ τὴν παράδοσιν γίνεσθαι διά τινων θεωρημάτων καὶ διὰ λέξεως ποιᾶς καὶ μετά τινος ποικιλίας καὶ δριμύτητος τῶν θεωρημάτων, 41ὑπʼ αὐτῶν τινες τούτων ἁλισκόμενοι καταμένουσιν αὐτοῦ, ὁ μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς λέξεως, ὁ δʼ ὑπὸ συλλογισμῶν, ὁ δʼ ὑπὸ μεταπιπτόντων, ὁ δʼ ὑπʼ ἄλλου τινὸς τοιούτου πανδοκείου, καὶ προσμείναντες κατασήπονται ὡς παρὰ ταῖς Σειρῆσιν. 42ἄνθρωπε, τὸ προκείμενον ἦν σοι κατασκευάσαι σαυτὸν χρηστικὸν ταῖς προσπιπτούσαις φαντασίαις κατὰ φύσιν, ἐν ὀρέξει ἀναπότευκτον, ἐν δʼ ἐκκλίσει ἀπερίπτωτον, μηδέποτʼ ἀτυχοῦντα, μηδέποτε δυστυχοῦντα, ἐλεύθερον, ἀκώλυτον, ἀνανάγκαστον, συναρμόζοντα τῇ τοῦ Διὸς διοικήσει, ταύτῃ πειθόμενον, ταύτῃ εὐαρεστοῦντα, μηδένα μεμφόμενον, μηδένʼ αἰτιώμενον, δυνάμενον εἰπεῖν τούτους τοὺς στίχους ἐξ ὅλης ψυχῆς ἄγου δέ μʼ, ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σύ γʼ ἡ Πεπρωμένη. 43εἶτα τοῦτο τὸ προκείμενον ἔχων ἀρέσαντός σοι λεξειδίου, ἀρεσάντων θεωρημάτων τινῶν αὐτοῦ καταμένεις καὶ κατοικεῖν προαιρῇ ἐπιλαθόμενος τῶν ἐν οἴκῳ καὶ λέγεις ταῦτα κομψά ἐστιν; τίς γὰρ λέγει μὴ εἶναι αὐτὰ κομψά; 44ἀλλʼ ὡς δίοδον, ὡς πανδοκεῖα. τί γὰρ κωλύει φράζοντα ὡς Δημοσθένης ἀτυχεῖν; τί δὲ κωλύει συλλογισμοὺς ἀναλύοντα ὡς Χρύσιππος ἄθλιον εἶναι, πενθεῖν, φθονεῖν, ἁπλῶς ταράσσεσθαι, κακοδαιμονεῖν; 45οὐδὲ ἕν. ὁρᾷς οὖν ὅτι πανδοκεῖα ἦν ταῦτα οὐδενὸς ἄξια, τὸ δὲ προκείμενον ἄλλο ἦν. 46ταῦτα ὅταν λέγω πρός τινας, οἴονταί με καταβάλλειν τὴν περὶ τὸ λέγειν ἐπιμέλειαν ἢ τὴν περὶ τὰ θεωρήματα. ἐγὼ δʼ οὐ ταύτην καταβάλλω, ἀλλὰ τὸ περὶ ταῦτʼ ἀκαταληκτικῶς ἔχειν καὶ ἐνταῦθα τίθεσθαι τὰς αὑτῶν ἐλπίδας. 47εἴ τις τοῦτο παριστὰς βλάπτει τοὺς ἀκούοντας, κἀμὲ τίθεσθε ἕνα τῶν βλαπτόντων. οὐ δύναμαι δʼ ἄλλο βλέπων τὸ κράτιστον καὶ τὸ κυριώτατον ἄλλο λέγειν εἶναι, ἵνʼ ὑμῖν χαρίσωμαι.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA