Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER XIX. · Concerning Those who embrace Philosophy only in Word.
1The Argument, called The ruling one, concerning which Disputants questioned each other, appears to have its Rise from hence. Of the following Propositions, any Two imply a Contradiction to the Third. They are these. That every thing past is necessarily true: That an Impossibility is not the Consequence of a Possibility: And, That something is a Possibility, which neither is nor will be true. Diodorus, perceiving this Contradiction, made use of the Probability of the Two first, to prove, That nothing is possible, which neither is nor will be true. Some again hold the Second and Third; That something is possible, which neither is nor will be true; and, That an Impossibility is not the Consequence of a Possibility: and, consequently, assert, That not every thing past is necessarily true. This Way Cleanthes and his Followers, took; whom Antipater copiously defends. Others, lastly, maintain the First and Third; That something is possible, which neither is nor will be true: and That every thing past is necessarily true: but then, That an Impossibility may be the Consequence of a Possibility. But all these Three Propositions cannot be at once maintained, because of their mutual Contradiction. If any one should ask me then, which of them I maintain; I answer him, That I cannot tell. But I have heard it related, That Diodorus held one Opinion about them; the Followers of Panthœdes, I think, and Cleanthes, another; and Chrysippus a third. What then is yours? None. Nor was I born to examine the Appearances of Things to my own Mind; to compare what is said by others, and thence to form some Principle of my own, as to the Topic [which you mention]. Therefore, [in respect to it,] I am no better than a Grammarian [who repeats what he hath read]. Who was the Father of Hector? Priam. Who were his Brothers? Paris and Deiphobus. Who was his Mother? Hecuba. This I have heard related. From whom? From Homer, But I believe Hellanicus, and other Authors, have written on the same Subject. And what better Account have I of the ruling Argument? But, if I was vain enough, I might, especially at an Entertainment, astonish all the Company by an Enumeration of Authors, relating to it. Chrysippus hath written wonderfully, in his first Book of Possibilities. Cleanthes and Archedemus have each written separately on this Subject. Antipater too hath written, not only in his Treatise of Possibilities, but purposely in a Discourse on the ruling Argument. Have not you read the Work? "No."——Read it then. And what Good will it do him? He will be more trifling and impertinent than he is already. For what else have you gained by reading it? What Principle have you formed upon this Subject? But you tell us of Helen, and Priam, and the Isle of Calypso, which never was, nor ever will be. And here, indeed, it is of no great Consequence, if you retain the Story, without forming any Principle of your own. But it is our Misfortune to do so, much more in Morality than upon such Subjects as these. 2Talk to me concerning Good and Evil. Hear. The Wind from Ilium to the Cicon's Shore
Hath driven me—— Of Things, some are good, some evil, and some indifferent. Now the good, are the Virtues, and whatever partakes of them; and the evil, Vices, and what partakes of Vice: the indifferent, lie between these, as Riches, Health, Life, Death, Pleasure, Pain. Whence do you know this? Hellanicus says it, in his Egyptian History. For what doth it signify, whether one names the History of Hellanicus, or the Ethics of Diogenes, or Chrysippus, or Cleanthes? Have you then examined any of these Things, and formed a Principle of your own? But show me, how you are used to exercise yourself on Shipboard. Remember this Division, when the Mast rattles, and some idle Fellow stands by you, while you are screaming, and says, "For Heaven's sake, talk as you did a little while ago. Is it Vice to suffer Shipwreck? Or doth it partake of Vice?" Would not you take up a Log, and throw it at his Head? "What have we to do with you, Sir? We are perishing, and you come and jest." Again: if Cæsar should summon you, to answer an Accusation, Remember the Division. If, when you are going in, pale and trembling, any one should meet you, and say, "Why do you tremble, Sir? What is this Affair you are engaged in? Doth Cæsar within, give Virtue and Vice to those who approach him?"——"What do you too insult me, and add to my Evils ?"——"Nay, but tell me, Philosopher, why you tremble? Is there any other Danger, but Death, or a Prison, or bodily Pain, or Exile, or Defamation?"——"Why what should there be else?"——"Are any of these Vice? Or do they partake of Vice? What then, did you yourself use to say of these Things"——"What have you to do with me, Sir? My own Evils are enough for me."——"You say right. Your own Evils are indeed enough for you; your Baseness, your Cowardice, and that Arrogance, by which you were elated, as you sat in the Schools. Why did you plume yourself with what is not your own? Why did you call yourself a Stoic?" 3Observe yourselves thus in your Actions, and you will find of what Sect you are. You will find, that most of you are Epicureans; a few Peripatetics, and those but loose ones. For, by what Action will you prove, that you think Virtue equal, and even superior, to all other Things? Show me a Stoic, if you have one. Where? Or how should you? You can show, indeed, a Thousand, who repeat the Stoic Reasonings. But do they repeat the Epicurean worse? Are they not just as perfect in the Peripatetic? Who then is a Stoic? as we call that a Phidian Statue, which is formed according to the Art of Phidias; so show me some one Person, formed according to the Principles which he professes. Show me one, who is sick, and happy; in Danger, and happy; dying, and happy; exiled, and happy; disgraced, and happy. Show him me; for, by Heaven, I long to see a Stoic. But you [will say] you have not one perfectly formed. Show me then one who is forming: one who is approaching towards this Character. Do me this Favour. Do not refuse an old Man a Sight which he hath never yet seen. Do you suppose, that you are [asked] to show the Jupiter or Minerva of Phidias, a Work of Ivory or Gold? Let any of you show me a human Soul, willing to have the same Sentiments with those of God: not to accuse either God or Man: not to be disappointed of its Desire, or incur its Aversion: not to be angry: not to be envious: not to be jealous: in a Word, willing from a Man to become a God; and, in this poor mortal Body, aiming to have Fellowship with Jupiter. Show him to me. But you cannot. Why then do you impose upon yourselves, and play Tricks with others? Why do you put on a Dress not your own; and walk about in it, mere Thieves and Pilferers of Names and Things, which do not belong to you? Here, I am your Preceptor, and you come to be instructed by me. And indeed my Intention is to secure you from being restrained, compelled, hindered: to make you free, prosperous, happy; looking to God upon every Occasion, great or small. And you come to learn and study these Things. Why then do not you finish your Work, if you have the proper Intention; and I, besides the Intention, the proper Qualifications? What is wanting? When I see an Artificer, and the Materials lying ready, I expect the Work. Now here is the Artificer; here are the Materials; what is it we want? Is not the Thing capable of being taught? It is. Is it not in our own Power then? The only Thing of all others that is so. Neither Riches, nor Health, nor Fame, nor, in short, any thing else is in our Power, except a right Use of the Appearances of Things. This alone is, by Nature, not subject to Restraint, not subject to Hindrance. Why then do not you finish it? Tell me the Cause. It must be by my Fault, or yours, or from the Nature of the Thing. The Thing itself is practicable, and the only one in our Power. The Fault then must be either in me, or in you, or, more truly, in both. Well then, shall we now, at last, bring this Intention along with us? Let us lay aside all that is past. Let us begin. Only believe me, and you will see the Consequence.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (9)
- The curious Reader may see this whole Matter explained, with the greatest Acuteness and Accuracy, by the very learned and ingenious Mr. Harris, in Mr. Upton's Notes.
- This is spoken to Epictetus by one of his Hearers.
- With Mr. Upton, I read ουδεν: but it seems necessary, that ουδε should likewise stand; and it is so translated.
- Some Philosophers affected to show their Learning at such Times; and it is against this idle Ostentation that Epictetus points his Discourse: for the Study of Logic itself, under proper Regulations, he often strongly recommends.
- This I apprehend to be spoken by one of the Scholars of Epictetus; who seeing the Contempt with which his Master treats logical Subtleties, in the foregoing Paragraph, desires him to discourse upon Ethics.
- Epictetus gives this absurd Reply to ridicule the Fondness of his Scholars for quoting Authors, and making a Parade of their Reading: and insinuates, that it is not at all material, whether a Person, who on such Subjects, means nothing further than Talk, knows what he is talking of, or blunders about it ever so grossly.
- Of Things into good, evil, and indifferent.
- The Peripatetics held other Things besides Virtue to be good; but not in near so high a Degree.
- See Note e. B. ii. c. 16.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Concerning those who embrace philosophy only in words.
The science of the ruling argument appears to have its rise from hence. Of the following propositions, any two imply a contradiction to the third. They are these: That everything past is necessarily true; that an impossibility is not the consequence of a possibility; and, that something is a possibility, which neither is nor will be true. Diodorus, perceiving this contradiction, combined the first two, to prove that nothing is possible, which neither is nor will be true. Some again hold the second and third,—that something is possible, which neither is nor will be true; and that an impossibility is not the consequence of a possibility; and consequently assert, that not everything past is necessarily true. This way Cleanthes and his followers took; whom Antipater copiously defends. Others, lastly, maintain the first and third,—that something is possible; which neither is nor will be true; and that everything past is necessarily true; but then, that an impossibility may be the consequence of a possibility. But all these three propositions cannot be at once maintained, because of their mutual contradiction.
If any one should ask me, then, which of them I maintain, I answer him, that really I cannot tell. But I have heard it related that Diodorus held one opinion about them; the followers of Panthaedes, I think, and Cleanthes, another; and Chrysippus a third.
What then is your opinion?
I express none. I was born to examine things as they appear to my own mind; to compare what is said by others, and thence to form some conviction of my own on any topic. Of these things I have merely technical knowledge. Who was the father of Hector? Priam. Who were his brothers? Paris and Deiphobus. Who was his mother? Hecuba. this I have heard related. From whom? Homer. But I believe Hellanicus, and other authors, have written on the same subject. And what better account have I of the ruling argument? But, if I were vain enough, I might, especially at some entertainment, astonish all the company by an enumeration of authors relating to it. Chrysippus has written wonderfully, in his first Book of Possibilities. Cleanthes and Archedemus have each written separately on this subject. Antipater too has written, not only in his Treatise of Possibilities, but especially in a discourse on the ruling argument. Have you not read the work? No. Read it then. And what good will it do him? He will be more trifling and impertinent than he is already. For what else have you gained by reading it? What conviction have you formed upon this subject? But you tell us of Helen, and Priam, and the isle of Calypso, something which never was, nor ever will be. And in these matters, indeed, it is of no great consequence if you retain the story, without forming any principle of your own. But we commit this error much more in dealing with moral questions, than upon such subjects as these.
Talk to me concerning good and evil. Hear:— Winds blew from Ilium to Ciconian shores. The expression became proverbial, signifying from bad to worse.
Some things are good, some evil, and some indifferent. Now the good are the virtues, and whatever partakes of them; and the evil are vices, and what partakes of vice; the indifferent lie between these, as riches, health, life, death, pleasure, pain.
Whence do you know this?
[Suppose I say] Hellanicus says it, in his Egyptian History. For what does it signify, whether one quotes the history of Hellanicus, or the ethics of Diogenes, or Chrysippus, or Cleanthes? Have you then examined any of these things, and formed convictions of your own? How, for instance, would you conduct yourself on shipboard? Remember these distinctions, when the mast rattles, and some idle fellow stands by you while you are screaming, and says: For heaven’s sake! talk as you did a little while ago. Is it vice to suffer shipwreck; or does it partake of vice? Would you not take up a log, and throw it at his head? What have we to do with you, sir? We are perishing, and you come and jest. Again, if Caesar should summon you to answer an accusation, remember these distinctions. If, when you are going in, pale and trembling, any one should meet you and say, Why do you tremble, sir? What is this affair you are engaged in? Does Caesar, within there, give virtue and vice to those who approach him? What, do you too insult me, and add to my evils? Nay, but tell me, philosopher, why you tremble. Is there any other danger, but death, or a prison, or bodily pain, or exile, or slander? Why, what else should there be? Are any of these vice; or do they partake of vice? What, then, did you yourself use to say of these things? What have you to do with me, sir? My own evils are enough for me. You say rightly. Your own evils are indeed enough for you; your baseness, your cowardice, and that arrogance by which you were elated, as you sat in the schools. Why did you assume plumage not your own? Why did you call yourself a Stoic?
Observe yourselves thus in your actions, and you will find of what sect you are. You will find that most of you are Epicureans; a few are Peripatetics, and those but loose ones. For by what action will you prove that you think virtue equal, and even superior, to all other things? Show me a Stoic, if you have one. Where? Or how should you? You can show, indeed, a thousand who repeat the Stoic reasonings. But do they repeat the Epicurean less well? Are they not just as perfect in the Peripatetic? Who then is a Stoic? As we call that a Phidian statue which is formed according to the art of Phidias, so show me some one person formed according to the principles which he professes. Show me one who is sick, and happy; in danger, and happy; dying, and happy; exiled, and happy; disgraced, and happy. Show him to me; for, by Heaven! I long to see a Stoic. But you have not one fully developed? Show me then one who is developing; one who is approaching towards this character. Do me this favor. Do not refuse an old man a sight which he has never yet seen. Do you suppose that you are to show the Zeus or Athena of Phidias, a work of ivory or gold? Let any of you show me a human soul desiring to be in unity with God; not to accuse either God or man; not to be disappointed of its desire, nor incur its aversion; not to be angry; not to be envious; not to be jealous; in a word, desiring from a man to become a god; and, in this poor mortal body, aiming to have fellowship with Zeus. Show him to me. But you cannot. Why then do you impose upon yourselves, and play tricks with others? Why do you put on a dress not your own, and walk about in it, mere thieves and pilferers of names and things which do not belong to you? I am now your preceptor, and you come to be instructed by me. And indeed my aim is to secure you from being restrained, compelled, hindered; to make you free, prosperous, happy; looking to God upon every occasion, great or small. And you come to learn and study these things. Why then do you not finish your work, if you have the proper aims, and I, besides the aim, the proper qualifications? What is wanting? When I see an artificer, and the materials lying ready, I await the work. Now here is the artificer; here are the materials; what is it we want? Is not the thing capable of being taught? It is. Is it not in our own power, then? The only thing of all others that is so. Neither riches nor health nor fame nor, in short, anything else is in our power except a right use of the semblances of things. This alone is, by nature, not subject to restraint, not subject to hindrance. Why then do not you finish it? Tell me the cause. It must be my fault, or yours, or from the nature of the thing. The thing itself is practicable, and the only thing in our power. The fault then must be either in me or in you, or, more truly, in both. Well, then, shall we at length begin to carry such an aim with us? Let us lay aside all that is past. Let us begin. Only believe me, and you shall see.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Higginson’s notes (2)
- A logical subtlety.—H.
- Quotation source: Homer, Odyssey, ix. 39.
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
Against those who embrace philosophical opinions only in words.
The argument called the ruling argument (ὁ κυριεύων λόγος) appears to have been proposed from such principles as these: there is in fact a common contradiction between one another in these three propositions, each two being in contradiction to the third. The propositions are, that every thing past must of necessity be true; that an impossibility does not follow a possibility; and that a thing is possible which neither is nor will be true. Diodorus observing this contradiction employed the probative force of the first two for the demonstration of this proposition, That nothing is possible which is not tine and never will be. Now another will hold these two: That something is possible. which is neither true nor ever will be: and That an impossibility does not follow a possibility. But he will not allow that every thing which is past is necessarily true, as the followers of Cleanthes seem to think, and Antipater copiously defended them. But others maintain the other two propositions, That a thing is possible which is neither true nor will be true: and That everything which is past is necessarily true; but then they will maintain that an impossibility can follow a possibility. But it is impossible to maintain these three propositions, because of their common contradiction.
If then any man should ask me, which of these propositions do you maintain? I will answer him, that I do not know; but I have received this story, that Diodorus maintained one opinion, the followers of Panthoides, I think, and Cleanthes maintained another opinion, and those of Chrysippus a third. What then is your opinion? I was not made for this purpose, to examine the appearances that occur to me, and to compare what others say and to form an opinion of my own on the thing. Therefore I differ not at all from the grammarian. Who was Hector’s father? Priam. Who were his brothers? Alexander and Deiphobus. Who was their mother? Hecuba.—I have heard this story. From whom? From Homer. And Hellanicus also, I think, writes about the same things, and perhaps others like him. And what further have I about the ruling argument? Nothing. But, if I am a vain man, especially at a banquet I surprise the guests by enumerating those who have written on these matters. Both Chrysippus has written wonderfully in his first book about Possibilities, and Cleanthes has written specially on the subject, and Archedemus. Antipater also has written not only in his work about Possibilities, but also separately in his work on the ruling argument. Have you not read the work? I have not read it. Read. And what profit will a man have from it? he will be more trifling and impertinent than he is now; for what else have you gained by reading it? What opinion have you formed on this subject? none; but you will tell us of Helen and Priam, and the island of Calypso which never was and never will be. And in this matter indeed it is of no great importance if you retain the story, but have formed no opinion of your own. But in matters of morality (Ethic) this happens to us much more than in these things of which we are speaking.
Speak to me about good and evil. Listen: The wind from Ilium to Ciconian shores Brought me.
Of things some are good, some are bad, and others are indifferent. The good then are the virtues and the things which partake of the virtues: the bad are the vices, and the things which partake of them; and the indifferent are the things which lie between the virtues and the vices, wealth, health, life, death, pleasure, pain. Whence do you know this? Hellanicus says it in his Egyptian history; for what difference does it make to say this, or to say that Diogenes has it in his Ethic, or Chrysippus or Cleanthes? Have you then examined any of these things and formed an opinion of your own? Show how you are used to behave in a storm on shipboard? Do you remember this division (distinction of things), when the sail rattles and a man, who knows nothing of times and seasons, stands by you when you are screaming and says, Tell me, I ask you by the Gods, what you were saying just now, Is it a vice to suffer shipwreck: does it participate in vice? Will you not take up a stick and lay it on his head? What have we to do with you, man? we are perishing and you come to mock us? But if Caesar send for you to answer a charge, do you remember the distinction? If when you are going in pale and trembling, a person should come up to you and say, Why do you tremble, man? what is the matter about which you are engaged? Does Caesar who sits within give virtue and vice to those who go in to him? You reply, Why do you also mock me and add to my present sorrows?—Still tell me, philosopher, tell me why you tremble? Is it not death of which you run the risk, or a prison, or pain of the body, or banishment, or disgrace? What else is there? Is there any vice or anything which partakes of vice? What then did you use to say of these things?—What have you to do with me, man? my own evils are enough for me. And you say right. Your own evils are enough for you, your baseness, your cowardice, your boasting which you showed when you sat in the school. Why did you decorate yourself with what belonged to others? Why did you call yourself a Stoic?
Observe yourselves thus in your actions, and you will find to what sect you belong. You will find that most of you are Epicureans, a few Peripatetics, and those feeble. For wherein will you show that you really consider virtue equal to everything else or even superior? But show me a Stoic, if you can. Where or how? But you can show me an endless number who utter small arguments of the Stoics. For do the same persons repeat the Epicurean opinions any worse? And the Peripatetic, do they not handle them also with equal accuracy? who then is a Stoic? As we call a statue Phidiac, which is fashioned according to the art of Phidias; so show me a man who is fashioned according to the doctrines which he utters. Show me a man who is sick and happy, in danger and happy, dying and happy, in exile and happy, in disgrace and happy. Show him: I desire, by the gods, to see a Stoic. You cannot show me one fashioned so; but show me at least one who is forming, who has shown a tendency to be a Stoic. Do me this favour: do not grudge an old man seeing a sight which I have not seen yet. Do you think that you must show me the Zeus of Phidias or the Athena, a work of ivory and gold? Let any of you show me a human soul ready to think as God does, and not to blame either God or man, ready not to be disappointed about any thing, not to consider himself damaged by any thing, not to be angry, not to be envious, not to be jealous; and why should I not say it direct? desirous from a man to become a god, and in this poor mortal body thinking of his fellowship with Zeus. Show me the man. But you cannot. Why then do you delude yourselves and cheat others? and why do you put on a guise which does not belong to you, and walk about being thieves and pilferers of these names and things which do not belong to you?
And now I am your teacher, and you are instructed in my school. And I have this purpose, to make you free from restraint, compulsion, hindrance, to make you free, prosperous, happy, looking to God in everything small and great. And you are here to learn and practise these things. Why then do you not finish the work, if you also have such a purpose as you ought to have, and if I in addition to the purpose also have such qualification as I ought to have? What is that which is wanting? When I see an artificer and material lying by him, I expect the work. Here then is the artificer, here the material; what is it that we want? Is not the thing one that can be taught? It is. Is it not then in our power? The only thing of all that is in our power. Neither wealth is in our power, nor health, nor reputation, nor in a word any thing else except the right use of appearances. This (right use) is by nature free from restraint, this alone is free from impediment. Why then do you not finish the work? Tell me the reason. For it is either through my fault that you do not finish it, or through your own fault, or through the nature of the thing. The thing itself is possible, and the only thing in our power. It remains then that the fault is either in me or in you, or, what is nearer the truth, in both. Well then, are you willing that we begin at last to bring such a purpose into this school, and to take no notice of the past? Let us only make a beginning. Trust to me, and you will see.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (10)
- Compare Gellius xvii. c. 19 .
- See the long note communicated to Upton by James Harris; and Schweighaeuser’s note.
- Diodorus, surnamed Cronus, lived at Alexandria in the time of Ptolemaeus Soter. He was of the school named the Megaric, and distinguished in dialectic.
- If you assume any two of these three, they must be in contradiction to the third and destroy it.
- speak to me, etc. may be supposed to be said to Epictetus, who has been ridiculing logical subtleties and the grammarians’ learning. When he is told to speak of good and evil, he takes a verse of the Odyssey, the first which occurs to him, and says, Listen. There is nothing to listen to, but it is as good for the hearer as any thing else. Then he utters some philosophical principles, and being asked where he learned them, he says, from Hellanicus, who was an historian, not a philosopher. He is bantering the hearer: it makes no matter from what author I learned them; it is all the same. The real question is, have you examined what Good and Evil are, and have you formed an opinion yourself?
- Quotation source: —Odyssey, ix. 39.
- The Peripatetics allowed many things to be good which contributed to a happy life; but still they contended that the smallest mental excellence was superior to all other things. Cicero, De Fin. v. 5. 31.
- See ii. c. 8. 20.
- to blame God means to blame the constitution and order of things, for to do this appeared to Epictetus to be absurd and wicked; as absurd as for the potter’s vessel to blame the potter, if that can be imagined, for making it liable to wear out and to break.
- Our fellowship is with the Father and with his son Jesus Christ, 1 John i. 3. The attentive reader will observe several passages besides those which have been noticed, in which there is a striking conformity between Epictetus and the Scriptures: and will perceive from them, either that the Stoics had learnt a good deal of the Christian language or that treating a subject practically and in earnest leads men to such strong expressions as we often find in Scripture and sometimes in the philosophers, especially Epictetus. Mrs. Carter. The word fellowship in the passage of John and of Epictetus is κοινωνία . See i. 29. note 19.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1ὁ κυριεύων λόγος ἀπὸ τοιούτων τινῶν ἀφορμῶν ἠρωτῆσθαι φαίνεται· κοινῆς γὰρ οὔσης μάχης τοῖς τρισὶ τούτοις πρὸς ἄλληλα, τῷ [τὸ] πᾶν παρεληλυθὸς ἀληθὲς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ τῷ [ἀ]δυνατῷ ἀδύνατον μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ τῷ [**] δυνατὸν εἶναι ὃ οὔτʼ ἔστιν ἀληθὲς οὔτʼ ἔσται, συνιδὼν τὴν μάχην ταύτην ὁ Διόδωρος τῇ τῶν πρώτων δυεῖν πιθανότητι συνεχρήσατο πρὸς παράστασιν τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι δυνατόν, ὃ οὔτʼ ἔστιν ἀληθὲς οὔτʼ ἔσται. 2λοιπὸν ὁ μέν τις ταῦτα τηρήσει τῶν δυεῖν, ὅτι ἔστι τέ τι δυνατόν, ὃ οὔτʼ ἔστιν ἀληθὲς οὔτʼ ἔσται, καὶ δυνατῷ ἀδύνατον οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ· οὐ πᾶν δὲ παρεληλυθὸς ἀληθὲς ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, καθάπερ οἱ περὶ Κλεάνθην φέρεσθαι δοκοῦσιν, οἷς ἐπὶ πολὺ συνηγόρησεν Ἀντίπατρος. 3οἱ δὲ τἆλλα δύο, ὅτι δυνατόν τʼ ἐστίν, ὃ οὔτʼ ἔστιν ἀληθὲς οὔτʼ ἔσται, καὶ πᾶν παρεληλυθὸς ἀληθὲς ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, δυνατῷ δʼ ἀδύνατον ἀκολουθεῖ. 4τὰ τρία δʼ ἐκεῖνα τηρῆσαι ἀμήχανον διὰ τὸ κοινὴν εἶναι αὐτῶν μάχην. 5ἂν οὖν τίς μου πύθηται σὺ δὲ ποῖα αὐτῶν τηρεῖς; ἀποκρινοῦμαι πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅτι οὐκ οἶδα· παρείληφα δʼ ἱστορίαν τοιαύτην, ὅτι Διόδωρος μὲν ἐκεῖνα ἐτήρει, οἱ δὲ περὶ Πανθοίδην οἶμαι καὶ Κλεάνθην τὰ ἄλλα, οἱ δὲ περὶ Χρύσιππον τὰ ἄλλα. 6σὺ οὖν τί; οὐδὲ γέγονα πρὸς τούτῳ, τῷ βασανίσαι τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ φαντασίαν καὶ συγκρῖναι τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ δόγμα τι ἐμαυτοῦ ποιήσασθαι κατὰ τὸν τόπον. διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲν διαφέρω τοῦ γραμματικοῦ. 7τίς ἦν ὁ τοῦ Ἕκτορος πατήρ; Πρίαμος. τίνες ἀδελφοί; Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ Δηίφοβος. μήτηρ δʼ αὐτῶν τίς; Ἑκάβη. παρείληφα ταύτην τὴν ἱστορίαν. παρὰ τίνος; παρʼ Ὁμήρου. γράφει δὲ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν δοκῶ καὶ Ἑλλάνικος καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τοιοῦτος. 8κἀγὼ περὶ τοῦ Κυριεύοντος τί ἄλλο ἔχω ἀνωτέρω; ἀλλʼ ἂν ὦ κενός, μάλιστα ἐπὶ συμποσίῳ καταπλήσσομαι τοὺς παρόντας ἐξαριθμούμενος τοὺς γεγραφότας. 9γέγραφεν δὲ καὶ Χρύσιππος θαυμαστῶς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ Δυνατῶν. καὶ Κλεάνθης δʼ ἰδίᾳ γέγραφεν περὶ τούτου καὶ Ἀρχέδημος. γέγραφεν δὲ καὶ Ἀντίπατρος, οὐ μόνον δʼ ἐν τοῖς περὶ Δυνατῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατʼ ἰδίαν ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ Κυριεύοντος. οὐκ ἀνέγνωκας τὴν σύνταξιν; 10οὐκ ἀνέγνωκα. ἀνάγνωθι. καὶ τί ὠφεληθήσεται; φλυαρότερος ἔσται καὶ ἀκαιρότερος ἢ νῦν ἐστιν. σοὶ γὰρ τί ἄλλο προσγέγονεν ἀναγνόντι; ποῖον δόγμα πεποίησαι κατὰ τὸν τόπον; ἀλλʼ ἐρεῖς ἡμῖν Ἑλένην καὶ Πρίαμον καὶ τὴν τῆς Καλυψοῦς νῆσον τὴν οὔτε γενομένην οὔτʼ ἐσομένην. 11καὶ ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐδὲν μέγα τῆς ἱστορίας κρατεῖν, ἴδιον δὲ δόγμα μηδὲν πεποιῆσθαι. ἐπὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν δὲ πάσχομεν αὐτὸ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπὶ τούτων. 12εἰπέ μοι περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. ἄκουε· Ἰλιόθεν με φέρων ἄνεμος Κικόνεσσι πέλασσεν. τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἀγαθά, 13τὰ δὲ κακά, τὰ δʼ ἀδιάφορα. ἀγαθὰ μὲν οὖν αἱ ἀρεταὶ καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῶν, κακὰ δὲ κακίαι καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα κακίας, ἀδιάφορα δὲ τὰ μεταξὺ τούτων, πλοῦτος, ὑγίεια, ζωή, θάνατος, ἡδονή, πόνος. 14πόθεν οἶδας; Ἑλλάνικος λέγει ἐν τοῖς Αἰγυπτιακοῖς. τί γὰρ διαφέρει τοῦτο εἰπεῖν ἢ ὅτι Διογένης ἐν τῇ Ἠθικῇ ἢ Χρύσιππος ἢ Κλεάνθης; βεβασάνικας οὖν τι αὐτῶν καὶ δόγμα σεαυτοῦ πεποίησαι; 15δείκνυε πῶς εἴωθας ἐν πλοίῳ χειμάζεσθαι. μέμνησαι ταύτης τῆς διαιρέσεως, ὅταν ψοφήσῃ τὸ ἱστίον καὶ ἀνακραυγάσαντί σοι κακόσχολός πως παραστὰς εἴπῃ λέγε μοι τοὺς θεούς σοι ἃ πρῴην ἔλεγες· μή τι κακία[ς] ἐστὶ τὸ ναυαγῆσαι, μή τι κακίας μετέχον; 16οὐκ ἄρας ξύλον ἐνσείσεις αὐτῷ; τί ἡμῖν καὶ σοί, ἄνθρωπε; ἀπολλύμεθα καὶ σὺ ἐλθὼν παίζεις. 17ἂν δέ σε ὁ Καῖσαρ μεταπέμψηται κατηγορούμενον, μέμνησαι τῆς διαιρέσεως, ἄν τίς σοι εἰσιόντι καὶ ὠχριῶντι ἅμα καὶ τρέμοντι προσελθὼν εἴπῃ τί τρέμεις, ἄνθρωπε; περὶ τίνων σοί ἐστιν ὁ λόγος; μή τι ἔσω ὁ Καῖσαρ ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν τοῖς εἰσερχομένοις δίδωσι; 18τί μοι ἐμπαίζεις καὶ σὺ πρὸς τοῖς ἐμοῖς κακοῖς; ὅμως, φιλόσοφε, εἰπέ μοι, τί τρέμεις; οὐχὶ θάνατός ἐστι τὸ κινδυνευόμενον ἢ δεσμωτήριον ἢ πόνος τοῦ σώματος ἢ φυγὴ ἢ ἀδοξία; τί γὰρ ἄλλο; μή τι κακία, μή τι μέτοχον κακίας; σὺ οὖν τίνα ταῦτα ἔλεγες; 19τί ἐμοὶ καὶ σοί, ἄνθρωπε; ἀρκεῖ ἐμοὶ τὰ ἐμὰ κακά. καὶ καλῶς λέγεις. ἀρκεῖ γάρ σοι τὰ σὰ κακά, ἡ ἀγέννεια, ἡ δειλία, ἡ ἀλαζονεία, ἣν ἠλαζονεύου ἐν τῇ σχολῇ καθήμενος. τί τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις ἐκαλλωπίζου; τί Στωικὸν ἔλεγες σεαυτόν; 20Τηρεῖτε οὕτως ἑαυτοὺς ἐν οἷς ἐπράσσετε καὶ εὑρήσετε τίνος ἔσθʼ αἱρέσεως. τοὺς πλείστους ὑμῶν Ἐπικουρείους εὑρήσετε, ὀλίγους τινὰς Περιπατητικοὺς καὶ τούτους ἐκλελυμένους. 21ποῦ γὰρ ἵνʼ ὑμεῖς τὴν ἀρετὴν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἴσην ἢ καὶ κρείττονα ἔργῳ ὑπολάβητε; Στωικὸν δὲ δείξατέ μοι, εἴ τινα ἔχητε. 22ποῦ ἢ πῶς; ἀλλὰ τὰ λογάρια τὰ Στωικὰ λέγοντας μυρίους. τὰ γὰρ Ἐπικούρεια αὐτοὶ οὗτοι χεῖρον λέγουσι; τὰ γὰρ Περιπατητικὰ οὐ καὶ αὐτὰ ὁμοίως ἀκριβοῦσιν; 23τίς οὖν ἐστι Στωικός; ὡς λέγομεν ἀνδριάντα Φειδιακὸν τὸν τετυπωμένον κατὰ τὴν τέχνην τὴν Φειδίου, οὕτως τινά μοι δείξατε κατὰ τὰ δόγματα ἃ λαλεῖ τετυπωμένον. 24δείξατέ μοί τινα νοσοῦντα καὶ εὐτυχοῦντα, κινδυνεύοντα καὶ εὐτυχοῦντα, ἀποθνῄσκοντα καὶ εὐτυχοῦντα, πεφυγαδευμένον καὶ εὐτυχοῦντα, ἀδοξοῦντα καὶ εὐτυχοῦντα. δείξατʼ· ἐπιθυμῶ τινα νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς ἰδεῖν Στωικόν. 25ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἔχετε τὸν τετυπωμένον δεῖξαι· τόν γε τυπούμενον δείξατε, τὸν ἐπὶ ταῦτα κεκλικότα. εὐεργετήσατέ με· μὴ φθονήσητε ἀνθρώπῳ γέροντι ἰδεῖν θέαμα, ὃ μέχρι νῦν οὐκ εἶδον. 26οἴεσθε ὅτι τὸν Δία τὸν Φειδίου δείξετε ἢ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν, ἐλεφάντινον καὶ χρυσοῦν κατασκεύασμα. ψυχὴν δειξάτω τις ὑμῶν ἀνθρώπου θέλοντος ὁμογνωμονῆσαι τῷ θεῷ καὶ μηκέτι μήτε θεὸν μήτʼ ἄνθρωπον μέμφεσθαι, μὴ ἀποτυχεῖν τινος, μὴ περιπεσεῖν τινι, μὴ ὀργισθῆναι, μὴ φθονῆσαι, μὴ ζηλοτυπῆσαι (τί γὰρ δεῖ περιπλέκειν; 27), θεὸν ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἐπιθυμοῦντα γενέσθαι καὶ ἐν τῷ σωματίῳ τούτῳ τῷ νεκρῷ περὶ τῆς πρὸς τὸν Δία κοινωνίας βουλευόμενον. δείξατε. ἀλλὰ οὐκ ἔχετε. τί οὖν αὑτοῖς ἐμπαίζετε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους κυβεύετε; 28καὶ περιθέμενοι σχῆμα ἀλλότριον περιπατεῖτε κλέπται καὶ λωποδύται τούτων τῶν οὐδὲν προσηκόντων ὀνομάτων καὶ πραγμάτων; 29καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν παιδευτής εἰμι ὑμέτερος, ὑμεῖς δὲ παρʼ ἐμοὶ παιδεύεσθε. κἀγὼ μὲν ἔχω ταύτην τὴν ἐπιβολήν, ἀποτελέσαι ὑμᾶς ἀκωλύτους, ἀναναγκάστους, ἀπαραποδίστους, ἐλευθέρους, εὐροοῦντας, εὐδαιμονοῦντας, εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἀφορῶντας ἐν παντὶ καὶ μικρῷ καὶ μεγάλῳ· ὑμεῖς δὲ ταῦτα μαθησόμενοι καὶ μελετήσοντες πάρεστε. 30διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ ἀνύετε τὸ ἔργον, εἰ καὶ ὑμεῖς ἔχετʼ ἐπιβολὴν οἵαν δεῖ κἀγὼ πρὸς τῇ ἐπιβολῇ καὶ παρασκευὴν οἵαν δεῖ; 31τί τὸ λεῖπόν ἐστιν; ὅταν ἴδω τέκτονα, ὅτῳ ὕλη πάρεστιν παρακειμένη, ἐκδέχομαι τὸ ἔργον. καὶ ἐνθάδε τοίνυν ὁ τέκτων ἐστίν, ἡ ὕλη ἐστίν· τί ἡμῖν λείπει; 32οὐκ ἔστι διδακτὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα; διδακτόν. οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν ἐφʼ ἡμῖν; μόνον μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων πάντων. οὔτε πλοῦτός ἐστιν ἐφʼ ἡμῖν οὔθʼ ὑγίεια οὔτε δόξα οὔτε ἄλλο τι ἁπλῶς πλὴν ὀρθὴ χρῆσις φαντασιῶν. τοῦτο ἀκώλυτον φύσει μόνον, τοῦτο ἀνεμπόδιστον. 33διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ ἀνύετε; εἴπατέ μοι τὴν αἰτίαν. ἢ γὰρ παρʼ ἐμὲ γίνεται ἢ παρʼ ὑμᾶς ἢ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος. αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ μόνον ἐφʼ ἡμῖν. λοιπὸν οὖν ἢ παρʼ ἐμέ ἐστιν ἢ παρʼ ὑμᾶς ἤ, ὅπερ ἀληθέστερον, παρʼ ἀμφοτέρους. τί οὖν; 34θέλετε ἀρξώμεθά ποτε τοιαύτην ἐπιβολὴν κομίζειν ἐνταῦθα; τὰ μέχρι νῦν ἀφῶμεν. ἀρξώμεθα μόνον, πιστεύσατέ μοι, καὶ ὄψεσθε.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA