Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER XIV. · Concerning Naso.
1When a certain Roman came to him with his Son, and had heard one Lesson, This, said Epictetus, is the Method of Teaching; and stopt. When the other desired him to go on; Every Art, answered he is tedious, when it is delivered to a Person ignorant and unskilful in it. Indeed the Things performed by the common Arts, quickly discover the Use for which they were made; and most of them have something engaging and agreeable. Thus the Trade of a Shoemaker, if one would stand by, and endeavour to comprehend it, is an unpleasant Thing: but the Shoe is useful; and besides, not disagreeable to see. The Trade of a Smith is extremely uneasy to an ignorant Person that chances to be present: but the Work shows the Usefulness of the Art. You will see this much more strongly in Music: for if you stand by, while a Person is learning, it will appear to you of all Sciences the most unpleasant: but the Effects are agreeable and delightful, even to those who do not understand it. 2Now here, we imagine it to be the Work
of one who studies Philosophy, to adapt his Will to
whatever happens. So that none of the Things
which happen, may happen against our Inclination;
nor those which do not happen, be wished for by
us. Hence they who have settled this Point, have
it in their Power never to be disappointed of their
Desire, or incur their Aversion; but to lead a Life
exempt from Sorrow, Fear, and Perturbation, in
themselves; and in Society, preserving all the natural and adventitious Relations of a Son, a Father,
a Brother, a Citizen, a Husband, a Wife, a Neighbour, a Fellow-Traveller, a Ruler, or a Subject.
Something like this, is what we imagine to be the
Work of a Philosopher. It remains to inquire, how
it is to be effected. Now we see, that a Carpenter,
by learning certain Things, becomes a Carpenter;
and a Pilot, by learning certain Things, becomes
a Pilot. Probably, then, it is not sufficient, in the
present Case, merely to be willing to be wise and
good; but it is moreover necessary that certain
Things should be learned. What these Things are,
is the Question. The Philosophers say, that we
are first to learn that there is a God; and that his
Providence directs the whole; and that it is impossible to conceal from him, not only our Actions,
but even our Thoughts and Emotions. We are
next to learn, what the Gods are: for such as they
are found to be, such must he, who would please
and obey them, to the utmost of his Power, endeavour to be. If the Deity is faithful, he too must
be faithful: if free, beneficent, and exalted, he
must be free, beneficent, and exalted, likewise;
and, in all his Words and Actions, behave as an
Imitator of God. 3Whence, then, are we to begin? If you will give me Leave, I will tell you. It is necessary, in the first place, that you should understand Words. So then! I do not understand them now? No. You do not. How is it, then, that I use them? Just as the Illiterate do written Expressions; and Brutes, the Appearances of Things. For Use is one Thing, and Understanding another. But if you think you understand them, bring whatever Word you please, and let us see whether we understand it, or not. Well: but it is a grievous Thing for a Man to be confuted who is grown old; and perhaps arrived, through a regular Course of Military Service, to the Dignity of a Senator. I know it very well: for you now come to me, as if you wanted nothing. And how can it enter into your Imagination, that there should be any thing in which you are defective? You are rich; and perhaps have a Wife and Children, and a great Number of Domestics. Cæsar takes Notice of you: you have many Friends at Rome: you render to all their Dues: you know how to requite a Favour, and revenge an Injury. In what are you deficient? Suppose then, I should prove to you, that you are deficient, in what is most necessary and important to Happiness; and that hitherto you have taken care of every Thing, rather than your Duty; and, to complete all, that you understand neither what God or Man, or Good or Evil, means? That you are ignorant of all the rest, perhaps, you may bear to be told: but if I prove to you, that you are ignorant even of yourself, how will you bear with me, and how will you have Patience to stay and be convinced? Not at all. You will immediately be offended, and go away. And yet what Injury have I done you; unless a Looking-Glass injures a Person not handsome, when it shows him to himself, such as he is? Or unless a Physician can be thought to affront his Patient, when he says to him; "Do you think, Sir, that you ail nothing? You have a Fever. Eat no Meat To-day, and drink Water." Nobody cries out here, "What an intolerable Affront!" But, if you say to any one, Your Desires are in a Fermentation; your Aversions are low; your Intentions, contradictory; your Pursuits, not conformable to Nature; your Opinions, rash, and mistaken; he presently goes away, and complains, he is affronted. 4This is the Nature of our Proceedings. As in a crowded Fair, the Horses and Cattle are brought to be sold, and the greatest Part of Men come either to buy or sell; but there are a few, who come only to look at the Fair, and inquire, How it is carried on; and why in that Manner; and who appointed it; and for what Purpose. Thus, in the Fair of the World, some, like Cattle, trouble themselves about nothing but Fodder. For, as to all you, who busy yourselves about Professions, and Farms, and Domestics, and public Posts, these Things are nothing else but mere Fodder. But there are some few Men, among the Crowd, who are fond of looking on, and considering: "What then, after all, is the World? Who governs it? Hath it no Governor? How is it possible, when neither a City nor a House can remain ever so short a Time, without some one to govern and take care of it, that this vast and beautiful System should be administered, in a fortuitous and disorderly Manner? Is there then a Governor? What sort of one is he? And how doth he govern; and what are we, who are under him? And for what designed? Have we some Connexion and Relation to him; or none?" In this manner are the Few affected; and apply themselves only to view the Fair, and then depart. Well: and are they laughed at by the Multitude? Why, so are the Lookers-on, by the Buyers and Sellers; and, if the Cattle had any Apprehension, they too would laugh at such, as admired any thing but Fodder.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (1)
- The Translation follows Mr. Upton. Παρατυγχανοντι.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Concerning Naso.
When a certain Roman came to him with his son, and had heard one lesson, This, said Epictetus, is the method of teaching; and ceased. When the other desired him to go on, he answered, Every art seems tedious, when it is delivered to a person ignorant and unskilful in it. The things performed by the common arts quickly manifest the use for which they were made; and most of them have something attractive and agreeable. Thus the trade of a shoemaker, as one seeks to learn it, is an unpleasant thing; but the shoe is useful, and not unpleasing to the eye. The trade of a smith is extremely unattractive to an ignorant observer; but the work shows the usefulness of the art. You will see this much more strongly in music; for if you stand by while a person is learning, it will appear to you of all sciences the most unpleasant; but the effects are agreeable and delightful, even to those who do not understand it.
So here we take it to be the work of one who studies philosophy, to bring his will into harmony with events; so that none of the things which happen may happen against our inclination, nor those which do not happen be desired by us. Hence they who have settled this point have it in their power never to be disappointed in what they seek, nor to incur what they shun; but to lead their own lives without sorrow, fear, or perturbation, and in society to preserve all the natural or acquired relations of son, father, brother, citizen, husband, wife, neighbor, fellow-traveller, ruler, or subject. Something like this is what we take to be the work of a philosopher. It remains to inquire, how it is to be effected. Now ,e see that a carpenter becomes a carpenter by learning certain things; and a pilot, by learning certain. things, becomes a pilot. Probably, then, it is not sufficient, in the present case, merely to be willing to be wise and good; but it is moreover necessary that certain things should be learned. What these things are, is the question. The philosophers say that we are first to learn that there is a God, and that his providence directs the whole; and that it is not merely impossible to conceal from him our actions, but even our thoughts and emotions. We are next to learn what the gods are; for such as they are found to be, such must he seek to be to the utmost of his power, who would please and obey them. If the Deity is faithful, he too must be faithful; if free, beneficent, and noble, he must be free, beneficent, and noble likewise, in all his words and actions behaving as an imitator of God.
Whence, then, are we to begin?
If you will give me leave, I will tell you. It is necessary, in the first place, that you should understand words.
So then! I do not understand them now? No. You do not. How is it, then, that I use them?
Just as the illiterate use the words of the learned, and as brutes use the phenomena of nature. For use is one thing, and understanding another. But if you think you understand them, bring whatever words you please, and let us see whether we understand them or not.
Well; but it is a grievous thing for a man to be confuted who has grown old, and has perhaps served through his three campaigns to a senatorship.
I know it very well. For you now come to me, as if you wanted nothing. And how can it enter into your imagination that there should be anything in which you are deficient? You are rich; and perhaps have a wife and children, and a great number of domestics. Caesar takes notice of you; you have many friends at Rome; you render to all their dues; you know how to requite a favor, and revenge an injury. In what are you deficient? Suppose, then, I should prove to you that you are deficient in what is most necessary and important to happiness; and that hitherto you have taken care of everything, rather than your duty; and to complete all, that you understand not what God or man, or good or evil, means? That you are ignorant of all the rest, perhaps, you may bear to be told; but if I prove to you that you are ignorant even of yourself, how will you bear with me, and how will you have patience to stay and be convinced? Not at all. You will immediately be offended, and go away. And yet what injury have I done you; unless a looking-glass injures a person not handsome, when it shows him to himself such as he is; or unless a physician can be thought to affront his patient, when he says to him: Do you think, sir, that you are not ill? You have a fever. Eat no meat to-day, and drink water? Nobody cries out here, What an intolerable affront! But if you say to any one: You exhibit feverishness in your desires, and low habits in what you shun; your aims are contradictory, your pursuits not conformable to nature, your opinions rash and mistaken, he presently goes away, and complains that he is affronted.
This is the position we assume. As, in a crowded fair, the horses and cattle are brought to be sold, and most men come either to buy or sell; but there are a few who come only to look at the fair, and inquire how it is carried on, and why in that manner, and who appointed it, and for what purpose,—thus, in this fair [of the world] some, like cattle, trouble themselves about nothing but fodder. To all of you who busy yourselves about possessions and farms and domestics and public posts, these things are nothing else but mere fodder. But there are some few men among the crowd who are fond of looking on, and considering: What then, after all, is the world? Who governs it? Has it no governor? How is it possible, when neither a city nor a house can remain, ever so short a time, without some one to govern and take care of it, that this vast and beautiful system should be administered in a fortuitous and disorderly manner? Is there then a governor? Of what sort is he, and how does he govern? And what are we who are under him, and for what designed? Have we some connection and relation to him, or none? In this manner are the few affected, and apply themselves only to view the fair, and then depart. Well; and they are laughed at by the multitude? Why, so are the lookers-on, by the buyers and sellers; and if the cattle had any apprehension, they too would laugh at such as admired anything but fodder.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
To Naso.
When a certain Roman entered with his son and listened to one reading, Epictetus said, This is the method of instruction; and he stopped. When the Roman asked him to go on, Epictetus said, Every art when it is taught causes labour to him who is unacquainted with it and is unskilled in it, and indeed the things which proceed from the arts immediately show their use in the purpose for which they were made; and most of them contain something attractive and pleasing. For indeed to be present and to observe how a shoemaker learns is not a pleasant thing; but the shoe is useful and also not disagreeable to look at. And the discipline of a smith when he is learning is very disagreeable to one who chances to be present and is a stranger to the art: but the work shows the use of the art. But you will see this much more in music; for if you are present while a person is learning, the discipline will appear most disagreeable; and yet the results of music are pleasing and delightful to those who know nothing of music. And here we conceive the work of a philosopher to be something of this kind: he must adapt his wish (βούλησιν) to what is going on, so that neither any of the things which are taking place shall take place contrary to our wish, nor any of the things which do not take place shall not take place when we wish that they should. From this the result is to those who have so arranged the work of philosophy, not to fail in the desire, nor to fall in with that which they would avoid; without uneasiness, without fear, without perturbation to pass through life themselves, together with their associates maintaining the relations both natural and acquired, as the relation of son, of father, of brother, of citizen, of man, of wife, of neighbour, of fellow traveller, of ruler, of ruled. The work of a philosopher we conceive to be something like this. It remains next to inquire how this must be accomplished.
We see then that the carpenter ( τέκτων) when he has learned certain things becomes a carpenter; the pilot by learning certain things becomes a pilot. May it not then in philosophy also not be sufficient to wish to be wise and good, and that there is also a necessity to learn certain things? We inquire then what these things are. The philosophers say that we ought first to learn that there is a God and that he provides for all things; also that it is not possible to conceal from him our acts, or even our intentions and thoughts. The next thing is to learn what is the nature of the Gods; for such as they are discovered to be, he, who would please and obey them, must try with all his power to be like them. If the divine is faithful, man also must be faithful; if it is free, man also must be free; if beneficent, man also must be beneficent; if magnanimous, mall also must be magnanimous; as being then an imitator of God he must do and say every thing consistently with this fact.
With what then must we begin? If you will enter on the discussion, I will tell you that you must first understand names (words).—So then you say that I do not now understand names.—You do not understand them.— How then do I use them?—Just as the illiterate use written language, as cattle use appearances: for use is one thing, understanding is another. But if you think that you understand them, produce whatever word you please, and let us try whether we understand it.—But it is a disagreeable thing for a man to be confuted who is now old, and, it may be, has now served his three campaigns.—I too know this: for now you are come to me as if you were in want of nothing: and what could you even imagine to be wanting to you? You are rich, you have children and a wife perhaps, and many slaves: Caesar knows you, in Rome you have many friends, you render their dues to all, you know how to requite him who does you a favour, and to repay in the same kind him who does you a wrong. What do you lack? If then I shall shew you that you lack the things most necessary and the chief things for happiness, and that hitherto you have looked after every thing rather than what you ought, and, to crown all, that you neither know what God is nor what man is, nor what is good nor what is bad; and as to what I have said about your ignorance of other matters, that may perhaps be endured, but if I say that you know nothing about yourself, how is it possible that you should endure me and bear the proof and stay here? It is not possible; but you immediately go off in bad humour. And yet what harm have I done you? unless the mirror also injures the ugly man because it shows him to himself such as he is; unless the physician also is supposed to insult the sick man, when he says to him, Man, do you think that you ail nothing? But you have a fever: go without food to—day; drink water. And no one says, what an insult! But if you say to a man, Your desires are inflamed, your aversions are low, your intentions are inconsistent, your pursuits (movements) are not conformable to nature, your opinions are rash and false, the man immediately goes away and says, He has insulted me.
Our way of dealing is like that of a crowded assembly. Beasts are brought to be sold and oxen; and the greater part of the men come to buy and sell, and there are some few who come to look at the market and to inquire how it is carried on, and why, and who fixes the meeting and for what purpose. So it is here also in this assembly (of life): some like cattle trouble themselves about nothing except their fodder. For to all of you who are busy about possessions and lands and slaves and magisterial offices, these are nothing except fodder. But there are a few who attend the assembly, men who love to look on and consider what is the world, who governs it. Has it no governor? And how is it possible that a city or a family cannot continue to exist, not even the shortest time without an administrator and guardian, and that so great and beautiful a system should be administered with such order and yet without a purpose and by chance? There is then an administrator. What kind of administrator and how does he govern? And who are we, who were produced by him, and for what purpose? Have we some connexion with him and some relation towards him, or none? This is the way in which these few are affected, and then they apply themselves only to this one thing, to examine the meeting and then to go away. What then? They are ridiculed by the many, as the spectators at the fair are by the traders; and if the beasts had any understanding, they would ridicule those who admired anything else than fodder.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (8)
- Encheiridion, c. 8: Do not seek (wish) that things which take place shall take place as you desire, but desire that things which take place shall take place as they do, and you will live a tranquil life.
- Compare iii. 2. 4, iv. 8. 20. Antoninus (viii. 27) writes: There are three relations [between thee and other things]: the one to the body which surrounds thee; the second to the divine cause from which all things come to all; and the third to those who live with thee. This is precise, true and practical. Those who object to the divine cause, may write in place of it the nature and constitution of things. for there is a constitution of things, which the philosopher attempts to. discover; and for most practical purposes, it is immaterial whether we say that it is of divine origin or has some other origin, or no origin can be discovered. The fact remains that a constitution of things exists; or, if that expression be not accepted, we may say that we conceive that it exists and we cannot help thinking so.
- See i. 14. 13, ii. 8. 14. Socrates ( Xen. Mem. i. 1. 19 ) said the same. That man should make himself like the Gods is said also by Antoninus, x. 8.—See Plato, De Legg. i. 4. (Upton.) When God is said to provide for all things, this is what the Greeks called πρόνοια , providence. (Epictetus, i. 16, iii. 17.) In the second of these passages there is a short answer to some objections made to Providence. Epictetus could only know or believe what God is by the observation of phaenomena; and he could only know what he supposed to be God’s providence by observing his administration of the world and all that happens in it. Among other works of God is man, who possesses certain intellectual powers which enable him to form a judgment of God’s works, and a judgment of man himself. Man has or is supposed to have certain moral sentiments, or a capacity of acquiring them in some way. On the supposition that all man’s powers are the gift of God, man’s power of judging what happens in the world under God’s providence is the gift of God: and if he should not be satisfied with God’s administration, we have the conclusion that man, whose powers are from God, condemns that administration which is also from God. Thus God and man, who is God’s work, are in opposition to one another. If a man rejects the belief in a deity and in a providence, because of the contradictions and difficulties involved in this belief or supposed to be involved in it, and if he finds the contradictions and difficulties such as he cannot reconcile with his moral sentiments and judgments, he will be consistent in rejecting the notion of a deity and of providence. But he must also consistently admit that his moral sentiments and judgments are his own, and that he cannot say how he acquired them, or how he has any of the corporeal or intellectual powers which he is daily using. By the hypothesis they are not from God. All then that a man can say is that he has such powers.
- See ii. 10, i. 17. 12, ii. 11. 4, etc. M. Antoninus, x. 8.
- The original is to add the colophon, which is a proverbial expresssion and signifies to give the last touch to a thing.
- See the fragments of Menander quoted by Upton.
- Sunt In Fortunae qui casibus omnnia ponunt, Et mundum credunt nullo rectore moveri. Juvenal, xiii. 86 .
- From the fact that man has some intelligence Voltaire concludes that we must admit that there is a greater intelligence. (Letter to Mde. Necker. Vol. 67, ed. Kehl. p. 278.)
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1εἰσελθόντος τινὸς τῶν Ῥωμαικῶν μετὰ υἱοῦ καὶ ἐπακούοντος ἑνὸς ἀναγνώσματος Οὗτος, ἔφη, ὁ τρόπος ἐστὶ τῆς διδασκαλίας καὶ ἀπεσιώπησεν. 2ἀξιοῦντος δʼ ἐκείνου εὑρεῖν τὰ ἑξῆς Κόπον ἔχει, ἔφη, πᾶσα τέχνη τῷ ἰδιώτῃ καὶ ἀπείρῳ αὐτῆς, ὅταν παραδιδῶται. 3καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα τήν τε χρείαν εὐθὺς ἐνδείκνυται πρὸς ὃ γέγονεν καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα αὐτῶν ἔχει τι καὶ ἀγωγὸν καὶ ἐπίχαρι. 4καὶ γὰρ σκυτεὺς πῶς μὲν μανθάνει τις παρεῖναι καὶ παρακολουθεῖν ἀτερπές, τὸ δʼ ὑπόδημα χρήσιμον καὶ ἰδεῖν ἄλλως οὐκ ἀηδές. 5καὶ τέκτονος ἡ μὲν μάθησις ἀνιαρὰ μάλιστα τῷ ἰδιώτῃ παρατυγχάνοντι, τὸ δʼ ἔργον ἐπιδείκνυσι τὴν χρείαν τῆς τέχνης. 6πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ μουσικῆς ὄψει αὐτό· ἂν γὰρ παρῇς τῷ διδασκομένῳ, φανεῖταί σοι πάντων ἀτερπέστατον τὸ μάθημα, τὰ μέντοι ἀπὸ τῆς μουσικῆς ἡδέα καὶ ἐπιτερπῆ τοῖς ἰδιώταις ἀκούειν. 7καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ μὲν ἔργον τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦντος τοιοῦτόν τι φανταζόμεθα, ὅτι δεῖ τὴν αὑτοῦ βούλησιν συναρμόσαι τοῖς γινομένοις, ὡς μήτε τι τῶν γινομένων ἀκόντων ἡμῶν γίνεσθαι μήτε τῶν μὴ γινομένων θελόντων ἡμῶν μὴ γίνεσθαι. 8ἐξ οὗ περίεστι τοῖς συστησαμένοις αὐτὸ ἐν ὀρέξει μὴ ἀποτυγχάνειν, ἐν ἐκκλίσει δὲ μὴ περιπίπτειν, ἀλύπως, ἀφόβως, ἀταράχως διεξάγειν καθʼ αὑτὸν μετὰ τῶν κοινωνῶν τηροῦντα τὰς σχέσεις τάς τε φυσικὰς καὶ ἐπιθέτους, τὸν υἱόν, τὸν πατέρα, τὸν ἀδελφόν, τὸν πολίτην, τὸν ἄνδρα, τὴν γυναῖκα, τὸν γείτονα, τὸν σύνοδον, τὸν ἄρχοντα, τὸν ἀρχόμενον. 9τὸ ἔργον τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦντος τοιοῦτόν τι φανταζόμεθα. λοιπὸν ἐφεξῆς τούτῳ ζητοῦμεν, πῶς ἔσται τοῦτο. 10ὁρῶμεν οὖν ὅτι ὁ τέκτων μαθών τινα γίνεται τέκτων, ὁ κυβερνήτης μαθών τινα γίνεται κυβερνήτης. μή ποτʼ οὖν καὶ ἐνθάδε οὐκ ἀπαρκεῖ τὸ βούλεσθαι καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι, χρεία δὲ καὶ μαθεῖν τινα; ζητοῦμεν οὖν τίνα ταῦτα. 11λέγουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι, ὅτι μαθεῖν δεῖ πρῶτον τοῦτο, ὅτι ἔστι θεὸς καὶ προνοεῖ τῶν ὅλων καὶ οὐκ ἔστι λαθεῖν αὐτὸν οὐ μόνον ποιοῦντα, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ διανοούμενον ἢ ἐνθυμούμενον· εἶτα ποῖοί τινες εἰσίν. 12οἷοι γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνοι εὑρεθῶσιν, τὸν ἐκείνοις ἀρέσοντα καὶ πεισθησόμενον ἀνάγκη πειρᾶσθαι κατὰ δύναμιν ἐξομοιοῦσθαι ἐκείνοις· 13εἰ πιστόν ἐστι τὸ θεῖον, καὶ τοῦτον εἶναι πιστόν· εἰ ἐλεύθερον, καὶ τοῦτον ἐλεύθερον· εἰ εὐεργετικόν, καὶ τοῦτον εὐεργετικόν· εἰ μεγαλόφρον, καὶ τοῦτον μεγαλόφρονα· ὡς θεοῦ τοίνυν ζηλωτὴν τὰ ἑξῆς πάντα καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. 14πόθεν οὖν ἄρξασθαι δεῖ;— ἂν συγκαθῇς, ἐρῶ σοι ὅτι πρῶτον δεῖ σε τοῖς ὀνόμασι παρακολουθεῖν. — ὥστʼ ἐγὼ νῦν οὐ παρακολουθῶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν; 15— οὐ παρακολουθεῖς. — πῶς οὖν χρῶμαι αὐτοῖς; — οὕτως ὡς οἱ ἀγράμματοι ταῖς ἐγγραμμάτοις φωναῖς, ὡς τὰ κτήνη ταῖς φαντασίαις· ἄλλο γάρ ἐστι χρῆσις, ἄλλο παρακολούθησις. 16εἰ δʼ οἴει παρακολουθεῖν, φέρε ὃ θέλεις ὄνομα καὶ βασανίσωμεν αὑτούς, εἰ παρακολουθοῦμεν. 17— ἀλλʼ ἀνιαρὸν τὸ ἐξελέγχεσθαι πρεσβύτερον ἄνθρωπον ἤδη κἂν οὕτως τύχῃ τὰς τρεῖς στρατείας ἐστρατευμένον. 18— οἶδα κἀγώ. νῦν γὰρ σὺ ἐλήλυθας πρὸς ἐμὲ ὡς μηδενὸς δεόμενος. τίνος δʼ ἂν καὶ φαντασθείης ὡς ἐνδέοντος; πλουτεῖς, τέκνα ἔχεις τυχὸν καὶ γυναῖκα καὶ οἰκέτας πολλούς, ὁ Καῖσάρ σε οἶδεν, ἐν Ῥώμῃ πολλοὺς φίλους κέκτησαι, τὰ καθήκοντα ἀποδίδως, οἶδας τὸν εὖ ποιοῦντα ἀντευποιῆσαι καὶ τὸν κακῶς ποιοῦντα κακῶς ποιῆσαι. 19τί σοι λείπει; ἂν οὖν σοι δείξω, ὅτι τὰ ἀναγκαιότατα καὶ μέγιστα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ ὅτι μέχρι δεῦρο πάντων μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν προσηκόντων ἐπιμεμέλησαι, καὶ τὸν κολοφῶνα ἐπιθῶ· οὔτε τί θεός ἐστιν οἶδας οὔτε τί ἄνθρωπος οὔτε τί ἀγαθὸν οὔτε τί κακόν, 20καὶ τὸ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἴσως ἀνεκτόν, ὅτι δʼ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἀγνοεῖς, πῶς δύνασαι ἀνασχέσθαι μου καὶ ὑποσχεῖν τὸν ἔλεγχον καὶ παραμεῖναι; 21οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλʼ εὐθὺς ἀπαλλάσσῃ χαλεπῶς ἔχων. καίτοι τί σοι ἐγὼ κακὸν πεποίηκα; εἰ μὴ καὶ τὸ ἔσοπτρον τῷ αἰσχρῷ, ὅτι δεικνύει αὐτὸν αὐτῷ οἷός ἐστιν· εἰ μὴ καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς τὸν νοσοῦντα [ὅταν αὐτὸν] ὑβρίζει, ὅταν εἴπῃ αὐτῷ ἄνθρωπε, δοκεῖς μηδὲν ἔχειν, πυρέσσεις δέ· ἀσίτησον σήμερον, ὕδωρ πίε· καὶ οὐδεὶς λέγει ὦ δεινῆς ὕβρεως. 22ἐὰν δέ τινι εἴπῃς αἱ ὀρέξεις σου φλεγμαίνουσιν, αἱ ἐκκλίσεις ταπειναί εἰσιν, αἱ ἐπιβολαὶ ἀνομολογούμεναι, αἱ ὁρμαὶ ἀσύμφωνοι τῇ φύσει, αἱ ὑπολήψεις εἰκαῖαι καὶ ἐψευσμέναι, εὐθὺς ἐξελθὼν λέγει ὕβρισέν με. 23τοιαῦτά ἐστι τὰ ἡμέτερα ὡς ἐν πανηγύρει. τὰ μὲν κτήνη π[α]ραθησόμενα ἄγεται καὶ οἱ βόες, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν ὠνησόμενοι οἱ δὲ πωλήσοντες· ὀλίγοι δέ τινές εἰσιν οἱ κατὰ θέαν ἐρχόμενοι τῆς πανηγύρεως, πῶς τοῦτο γίνεται καὶ διὰ τί καὶ τίνες οἱ τιθέντες τὴν πανήγυριν καὶ ἐπὶ τίνι. 24οὕτως καὶ ἐνθάδʼ ἐν τῇ πανηγύρει ταύτῃ· οἱ μέν τινες ὡς κτήνη οὐδὲν πλέον πολυπραγμονοῦσι τοῦ χόρτου· ὅσοι γὰρ περὶ κτῆσιν καὶ ἀγροὺς καὶ οἰκέτας καὶ ἀρχάς τινας ἀναστρέφεσθε, ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ χόρτος ἐστίν· 25ὀλίγοι δʼ εἰσὶν οἱ πανηγυρίζοντες ἄνθρωποι φιλοθεάμονες. τί ποτʼ οὖν ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος, τίς αὐτὸν διοικεῖ. οὐδείς; 26καὶ πῶς οἷόν τε πόλιν μὲν ἢ οἶκον μὴ δύνασθαι διαμένειν μηδʼ ὀλιγοστὸν χρόνον δίχα τοῦ διοικοῦντος καὶ ἐπιμελομένου, τὸ δʼ οὕτως μέγα καὶ καλὸν κατασκεύασμα εἰκῇ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν οὕτως εὐτάκτως οἰκονομεῖσθαι; 27ἔστιν οὖν ὁ διοικῶν. ποῖός τις καὶ πῶς ὁ διοικῶν; ἡμεῖς δὲ τίνες ὄντες ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ γεγόναμεν καὶ πρὸς τί ἔργον; ἆρά γʼ ἔχομέν τινα ἐπιπλοκὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ σχέσιν ἢ οὐδεμίαν; 28ταῦτʼ ἔστιν ἃ πάσχουσιν οὗτοι οἱ ὀλίγοι· καὶ λοιπὸν τούτῳ μόνῳ σχολάζουσι τῷ τὴν πανήγυριν ἱστορήσαντας ἀπελθεῖν. 29τί οὖν; καταγελῶνται ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ οἱ θεαταὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμπόρων· καὶ εἰ τὰ κτήνη συναίσθησίν τινα εἶχεν, κατεγέλα τῶν ἄλλο τι τεθαυμακότων ἢ τὸν χόρτον.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA