Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER XIII. · Of Solicitude.
1When I see any one solicitous, I say, What doth this Man mean? Unless he wanted something or other, not in his own Power, how could he still be solicitous? A Musician, for Instance, feels no Solicitude, while he is singing by himself: but when he appears upon the Stage he doth; even if his Voice be ever so good, or he plays ever so well. For what he wants is not only to sing well, but likewise to gain Applause. But this is not, in his own Power. In short, where his Skill lies, there is his Courage. (Bring any ignorant Person, and he doth not mind him.) But in the Point which he neither understands, nor hath studied, there he is solicitous. What Point is that? He doth not understand what a Multitude is; nor what the Applause of a Multitude. He hath learnt, indeed, how to strike Bass and Treble; but what the Applause of the many is, and what Force it hath in Life, he neither understands, nor hath studied. Hence he must necessarily tremble, and turn pale. I cannot, indeed, say, that a Man is no Musician, when i see him afraid; but I can say something else; and that not one, but many Things. And, first of all, I call him a Stranger; and say, This Man doth not know in what Country he is: and though he hath lived here so long, he is ignorant of the Laws and Customs of the State; and what is permitted, and what not: nor hath he ever consulted any Lawyer, who might tell and explain to him the Laws. Yet no Man writes a Will, without knowing how it ought to be written, or consulting some one who doth know: nor doth he rashly sign a Bond, or give Security. But he uses his Desire and Aversion, exerts his Pursuits, Intentions, and Resolutions, without consulting any Lawyer about the Matter. How do you mean, without a Lawyer? He knows not, that he chuses what is not allowed him; and doth not chuse what is necessary: and he knows not what is his own, and what belongs to others: for if he did know, he would never be hindered; would never be restrained; would never be solicitous. How so? Why: doth any one fear Things that are not Evils? No. Doth any one fear Things, that are Evils indeed, but which it is in his own Power to prevent? No, surely. 2If, then, the Things independent on Choice, are neither good nor evil; and all that do depend on Choice, are in our own Power, and can neither be taken away from us, or given to us, unless we please; what room is there left for Solicitude? But we are solicitous about this paultry Body, or Estate, of ours; or about the Determination of Cæsar; and not at all about any thing internal. Are we ever solicitous not to take up a false Opinion? No: for this is in our own Power. Or not to exert our Pursuits, contrary to Nature? No: nor this neither. When, therefore, you see any one pale with Solicitude, as the Physician pronounces from the Complexion, that such a Patient is disordered in the Spleen, another in the Liver; so do you likewise say, this Man is disordered in his Desires and Aversions: he cannot walk steady; he is in a Fermentation. For nothing else changes the Complexion, or causes a Trembling, or sets the Teeth a chattering. No Force, no Firmness, the pale Coward shows;
He shifts his Place; his Colour comes and goes.
Terror and Death in his wild Eye-balls stare;
With chatt'ring Teeth be stands, and stiffen'd Hair. Pope's Homer. Therefore Zeno, when he was to meet Antigonus, felt no Solicitude. For over what he admired, Antigonus had no Power; and those Things of which he had the Power, Zeno did not regard. But Antigonus felt a Solicitude when he was to meet Zeno; and with Reason: for he was desirous to please him; and this was external. But Zeno was not desirous to please Antigonus: for no one skilful in any Art, is desirous to please a Person unskilful. I am desirous [says one of his Scholars] to please You. For what? Do you know the Rules, by which one Man judges of another? Have you studied to understand what a good, and what a bad Man is; and how each becomes such? Why then are not you yourself a good Man; On what Account am I not? Because no good Man laments, nor sighs, nor groans no good Man turns pale, and trembles, and says, "How will such a one receive me; how will he hear me?"——As he thinks fit, Wretch. Why do you trouble yourself about what belongs to others? Is it not his Fault, if he receives you ill? Yes, surely. And can one Person be in fault, and another the Sufferer? No. Why then are you solicitous, about what belongs to others? Well: but I am solicitous how I shall speak to him. What then, cannot you speak to him as you will? But I am afraid I shall be disconcerted. If you were going to write the Name of Dion, should you be afraid of being disconcerted. By no means. What is the Reason? Is it not because you have studied how to write? Yes. And if you were going to read, would it not be exactly the same? Exactly. What is the Reason? Because every Art hath a certain Assurance and Confidence, in the Subjects that belong to it. Have you not studied then, how to speak? And what else did you study at School? Syllogisms, and convertible Propositions. For what Purpose? Was it not in order to talk properly? And what is that, but to talk seasonably, and cautiously, and intelligibly, and without Flutter and Hesitation; and, in consequence of all this, with Courage? Very true. When, therefore, you go into the Field on Horseback, are you solicitous about one, who is here now on Foot? Solicitous in a Point which you have studied, and another hath not? Ay, but the Person [with whom I am to talk] hath Power to kill me. Then speak the Truth, pitiful Wretch, and do not be arrogant; nor take the Philosopher upon you; nor conceal from yourself who are your Masters but while you may thus be laid hold on by the Body, follow every one who is stronger than you. Socrates, indeed, had studied how to speak, who talked in such a manner to Tyrants, and Judges, and in a Prison. Diogenes had studied how to speak, who talked in such a manner to Alexander, to Philip, to the Pirates, to the Person who bought him. This belonged to them who had studied the Point; who had Courage. But do you walk off about your own Affairs, and never stir from them. Retire into some Corner, and there sit and weave Syllogisms, and propose them to others. For there is not, in you, one able To rule the sacred Citadel within.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (3)
- Antigonus Gonatas, King of Macedon, had so great an Esteem for Zeno, that he often took a Journey to Athens to visit him; and endeavoured, by magnificent Promises, to allure him to his Court; but without Success. He gave it as a Reason, for the distinguished Regard which he paid him, that, though he had made him many, and very considerable Offers, Zeno never appeared either mean or insolent.
- This is a Stoic Extravagance. The very Thing that constitutes the Fault of the one in this Case is, that he makes the other suffer. However, if, instead of vainly affecting Insensibility, we extend our View, to the future Rewards of those who bear ill Treatment as they ought, the Position is true and useful.
- When Diogenes was sailing to Ægina, he was taken by Pirates, and carried to Crete; and there set to Sale. Being asked what he could do; he answered, Govern Men: and pointing to a well-dress'd Corinthian, who was passing by, Sell me (said he) to him; for he wants a Master. The Corinthian, whose Name was Xeniades, bought him, and appointed him the Tutor to his Children; and Diogenes perfectly well discharged his Trust.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Of anxiety.
When I see any one anxious, I say, what does this man mean? Unless he wanted something or other not in his own power, how could he still be anxious? A musician, for instance, feels no anxiety while he is singing by himself; but when he appears upon the stage he does, even if his voice be ever so good, or he plays ever so well. For what he wishes is not only to sing well, but likewise to gain applause. But this is not in his own power. In short, where his skill lies, there is his courage. Bring any ignorant person, and he does not mind him; but in the point which he neither understands nor has studied, there he is anxious.
What point is that?
He does not understand what a multitude is, nor what the applause of a multitude. He has learnt, indeed, how to sound bass and treble; but what the applause of the many is, and what force it has in life, he neither understands nor has studied. Hence he must necessarily tremble and turn pale. I cannot indeed say that a man is no musician, when I see him afraid; but I can say something else, and indeed many things. And first of all I call him a stranger, and say, this man does not know in what country he is; and though he has lived here so long, he is ignorant of the laws and customs of the state, and what is permitted and what not; nor has he ever consulted any legal adviser, who might tell and explain to him the laws. But no man writes a will without knowing how it ought to be written, or consulting some one who knows; nor does he rashly sign a bond, or give security. Yet he indulges his desires and aversions, exerts his pursuits, intentions, and resolutions, without consulting any legal adviser about the matter.
How do you mean, without a legal adviser?
He knows not when he chooses what is not allowed him, and does not choose what is necessary; and he knows not what is his own, and what belongs to others; for if he did know he would never be hindered, would never be restrained, would never be anxious.
How so? Why, does any one fear things that are not evils? No.
Does any one fear things that seem evils indeed, but which it is in his own power to prevent?
No, surely.
If, then, the things independent of our will are neither good nor evil, and all things that do depend on will are in our own power, and can neither be taken away from us nor given to us unless we please, what room is there left for anxiety? But we are anxious about this paltry body or estate of ours, or about what Caesar thinks, and not at all about anything internal. Are we ever anxious not to take up a false opinion? No; for this is within our own power. Or not to follow any pursuit contrary to nature? No, nor this. When, therefore, you see any one pale with anxiety, just as the physician pronounces from the complexion that such a patient is disordered in the spleen, and another in the liver, so do you likewise say, this man is disordered in his desires and aversions; he cannot walk steadily; he is in a fever. 70r nothing else changes the complexion, or causes trembling, or sets the teeth chattering. He crouching walks, or squats upon his heels.
Therefore Zeno, when he was to meet Antigonus, felt no anxiety. For over that which he prized, Antigonus had no power; and those things over which he had power, Zeno did not regard. But Antigonus felt anxiety when he was to meet Zeno, and with reason, for he was desirous to please him; and this was external ambition. But Zeno was not solicitous to please Antigonus; for no one skilful in any art is solicitous to please a person unskilful.
I am solicitous to please you.
For what? Do you know the rules by which one man judges of another? Have you studied to understand what a good and what a bad man is, and how each becomes such? Why, then, are not you yourself a good man?
In what respect am I not?
Because no good man laments or sighs or groans; no good man turns pale and trembles and says, How will such a one receive me; how will he hear me? As he thinks fit, foolish man. Why do you trouble yourself about what belongs to others? Is it not his fault if he receives you ill?
Yes, surely.
And can one person be in fault and another the sufferer?
No.
Why, then, are you anxious about what belongs to others?
Well; but I am anxious how I shall speak to him.
What, then; cannot you speak to him as you will?
But I am afraid I shall be disconcerted.
If you were going to write down the name of Dion, should you be afraid of being disconcerted?
By no means.
What is the reason? Is it because you have learned how to write?
Yes.
And if you were going to read, would it not be exactly the same?
Exactly. What is the reason?
Because every art gives a certain assurance and confidence on its own ground.
Have you not learned, then, how to speak? And what else did you study at school?
Syllogisms and convertible propositions.
For what purpose? Was it not in order to talk properly? And what is that but to talk seasonably and discreetly and intelligently, and without flutter or hesitation, and, by means of all this, with courage?
Very true.
When, therefore, you go into the field on horseback, are you anxious on being matched against one who is on foot,—you being practised and he unpractised?
Ay, but the person has power to kill me.
Then speak the truth, O unfortunate! and be not arrogant, nor take the philosopher upon you, nor conceal from yourself who are your masters; but while you are thus to be held by the body, follow the strongest. Socrates, indeed, had studied how to speak, who talked in such a manner to tyrants and judges, and in prison. Diogenes had studied how to speak, who talked in such a manner to Alexander, to Philip, to the pirates, to the person who bought him. This belonged to those who had studied the matter; who had courage. But do you go where you belong and remain there. Retire into some corner, and there sit and weave syllogisms, and propose them to others. For there is not in you a man who can rule the city.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Higginson’s notes (3)
- Quotation source: Homer, Iliad, xiii. 281.—H.
- Antigonus Gonatas, king of Macedon , had so great an esteem for Zeno, that he often took a journey to Athens to visit him, and endeavored, by magnificent promises, to allure him to his court, but without success. He gave it as a reason for the distinguished regard which he paid him, that, though he had made him many and very considerable offers, Zeno never appeared either mean or insolent.—C.
- When Diogenes was sailing to Aegina , he was taken by pirates, and carried to Crete , and there exposed to sale. Being asked what he could do, he answered, Govern men; and pointing to a well-dressed Corinthian who was passing by, Sell me, said he, to him; for he wants a master. The Corinthian, whose name was Xeniades, bought him, and appointed him the tutor to his children; and Diogenes perfectly well discharged his trust.—C.
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
On anxiety (solicitude).
When I see a man anxious, I say, What does this man want? If he did not want some thing which is not in his power, how could he be anxious? For this reason a lute player when he is singing by himself has no anxiety, but when he enters the theatre, he is anxious even if he has a good voice and plays well on the lute; for he not only wishes to sing well, but also to obtain applause: but this is not in his power. Accordingly, where he has skill, there he has confidence. Bring any single person who knows nothing of music, and the musician does not care for him. But in the matter where a man knows nothing and has not been practised, there he is anxious. What matter is this? He knows not what a crowd is or what the praise of a crowd is. However he has learned to strike the lowest chord and the highest; but what the praise of the many is, and what power it has in life he neither knows nor has he thought about it. Hence he must of necessity tremble and grow pale. I cannot then say that a man is not a lute player when I see him afraid, but I can say something else, and not one thing, but many. And first of all I call him a stranger and say, This man does not know in what part of the world he is, but though he has been here so long, he is ignorant of the laws of the State and the customs, and what is permitted and what is not; and he has never employed any lawyer to tell him and to explain the laws. But a man does not write a will, if he does not know how it ought to be written, or he employs a person who does know; nor does he rashly seal a bond or write a security. But he uses his desire without a lawyer’s advice, and aversion, and pursuit (movement), and attempt and purpose. How do you mean without a lawyer? He does not know that he wills what is not allowed, and does not will that which is of necessity; and he does not know either what is his own or what is another man’s; but if he did know, he would never be impeded, he would never be hindered, he would not be anxious. How so?—Is any man then afraid about things which are not evils?—No.—Is he afraid about things which are evils, but still so far within his power that they may not happen?—Certainly he is not.— If then the things which are independent of the will are neither good nor bad, and all things which do depend on the will are within our power, and no man can either take them from us or give them to us, if we do not choose, where is room left for anxiety? But we are anxious about our poor body, our little property, about the will of Caesar; but not anxious about things internal. Are we anxious about not forming a false opinion?—No, for this is in my power.—About not exerting our movements contrary to nature?—No, not even about this.—When then you see a man pale, as the physician says, judging from the complexion, this man’s spleen is disordered, that man’s liver; so also say, this man’s desire and aversion are disordered, he is not in the right way, he is in a fever. For nothing else changes the colour, or causes trembling or chattering of the teeth, or causes a man to Sink in his knees and shift from foot to foot. For this reason when Zeno was going to meet Antigonus, he was not anxious, for Antigonus had no power over any of the things which Zeno admired; and Zeno did not care for those things over which Antigonus had power. But Antigonus was anxious when he was going to meet Zeno, for he wished to please Zeno; but this was a thing external (out of his power). But Zeno did not want to please Antigonus; for no man who is skilled in any art wishes to please one who has no such skill.
Should I try to please you? Why? I suppose, you know the measure by which one man is estimated by another. Have you taken pains to learn what is a good man and what is a bad man, and how a man becomes one or the other? Why then are you not good yourself? —How, he replies, am I not good?—Because no good man laments or groans or weeps, no good man is pale and trembles, or says, How will he receive me, how will he listen to me?—Slave, just as it pleases him. Why do you care about what belongs to others? Is it now his fault if he receives badly what proceeds from you?—Certainly.— And is it possible that a fault should be one man’s, and the evil in another?—No.—Why then are you anxious about that which belongs to others?—Your question is reasonable; but I am anxious how I shall speak to him. Cannot you then speak to him as you choose?—But I fear that I may be disconcerted?—If you are going to write the name of Dion, are you afraid that you would be disconcerted?—By no means.—Why? is it not because you have practised writing the name?—Certainly.—Well, if you were going to read the name, would you not feel the same? and why? Because every art has a certain strength and confidence in the things which belong to it. —Have you then not practised speaking? and what else did you learn in the school? Syllogisms and sophistical propositions? For what purpose? was it not for the purpose of discoursing skilfully? and is not discoursing skilfully the same as discoursing seasonably and cautiously and with intelligence, and also without making mistakes and without hindrance, and besides all this with confidence?— Yes.—When then you are mounted on a horse and go into a plain, are you anxious at being matched against a man who is on foot, and anxious in a matter in which you are practised, and he is not?—Yes, but that person (to whom I am going to speak) has power to kill me. Speak the truth then, unhappy man, and do not brag, nor claim to be a philosopher, nor refuse to acknowledge your masters, but so long as you present this handle in your body, follow every man who is stronger than yourself. So, crates used to practise speaking, he who talked as he did to the tyrants, to the dicasts (judges), he who talked in his prison. Diogenes had practised speaking, he who spoke as he did to Alexander, to the pirates, to the person who bought him. These men were confident in the things which they practised. But do you walk off to your own affairs and never leave them: go and sit in a corner, and weave syllogisms, and propose them to another. There is not in you the man who can rule a state.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (7)
- See i. 29, note 20.
- Quotation source: —Iliad, xiii. 281.
- In Diogenes Laertius (Zeno, vii.) there is a letter from Antigonus to Zeno and Zeno’s answer. Simplicius (note on the Encheiridion. c. 51) supposes this Antigonus to be the King of Syria ; but Upton remarks that it is Antigonus Gonatas, king of Macedonia .
- See i. c. 7.
- The original is but that person ( ἐκεῖνος ) has power to kill me. That person must be the person already mentioned, and Mrs. Carter has done right in adding this explanation.
- The Thirty tyrants of Athens , as they were named (Xenophon, Hellenica, ii .). The talk of Socrates with Critias and Charicles two of the Thirty is reported in Xenophon’s Memorabilia ( i. 2, 33 ). The defence of Socrates before those who tried him and his conversation in prison are reported in Plato’s Apology, and in the Phaedon and Crito. Diogenes was captured by some pirates and sold (iv. 1, 115).
- There is some corruption here.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1ὅταν ἀγωνιῶντα ἴδω ἄνθρωπον, λέγω· οὗτος τί ποτε θέλει; εἰ μὴ τῶν οὐκ ἐφʼ αὑτῷ τι ἤθελεν, πῶς ἂν ἔτι ἠγωνία; 2διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ κιθαρῳδὸς μόνος μὲν ᾁδων οὐκ ἀγωνιᾷ, εἰς θέατρον δʼ εἰσερχόμενος, κἂν λίαν εὔφωνος ᾖ καὶ καλῶς κιθαρίζῃ· οὐ γὰρ ᾆσαι μόνον θέλει καλῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐδοκιμῆσαι, τοῦτο δʼ οὐκέτι ἐστὶν ἐπʼ αὐτῷ. 3λοιπὸν οὗ μὲν ἡ ἐπιστήμη αὐτῷ πρόσεστιν, ἐκεῖ τὸ θάρσος· φέρε ὃν θέλεις ἰδιώτην καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστρέφεται· ὅπου δʼ οὐκ οἶδεν οὐδὲ μεμελέτηκεν, ἐκεῖ ἀγωνιᾷ. 4τί δʼ ἔστι τοῦτο; οὐκ οἶδεν, τί ἐστιν ὄχλος οὐδὲ τί ὄχλου ἔπαινος· ἀλλὰ τὴν νήτην μὲν τύπτειν ἔμαθεν καὶ τὴν ὑπάτην, ἔπαινος δʼ ὁ παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν τί ἐστι καὶ τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει ἐν βίῳ οὔτε οἶδεν οὔτε μεμελέτηκεν αὐτό. 5ἀνάγκη λοιπὸν τρέμειν καὶ ὠχριᾶν. κιθαρῳδὸν μὲν οὖν οὐ δύναμαι εἰπεῖν μὴ εἶναι, ὅταν ἴδω τινὰ φοβούμενον, ἄλλο δέ τι δύναμαι εἰπεῖν καὶ οὐδὲ ἕν, ἀλλὰ πολλά. 6καὶ πρῶτον πάντων ξένον αὐτὸν καλῶ καὶ λέγω· οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐκ οἶδεν ποῦ τῆς γῆς ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ ἐκ τοσούτου χρόνου ἐπιδημῶν ἀγνοεῖ τοὺς νόμους τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰ ἔθη καὶ τί ἔξεστι καὶ τί οὐκ ἔξεστιν. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ νομικόν τινα παρέλαβεν πώποτε τὸν ἐροῦντα αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξηγησόμενον τὰ νόμιμα· 7ἀλλὰ διαθήκην μὲν οὐ γράφει μὴ εἰδὼς πῶς δεῖ γράφειν ἢ παραλαβὼν τὸν εἰδότα οὐδʼ ἐγγύην ἄλλως σφραγίζεται ἢ ἀσφάλειαν γράφει, ὀρέξει δὲ χρῆται δίχα νομικοῦ καὶ ἐκκλίσει καὶ ὁρμῇ καὶ ἐπιβολῇ καὶ προθέσει. 8πῶς δίχα νομικοῦ; οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι θέλει τὰ μὴ διδόμενα καὶ οὐ θέλει τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ οὐκ οἶδεν οὔτε τὰ ἴδια οὔτε τὰ ἀλλότρια. εἰ δέ γʼ ᾔδει, οὐδέποτʼ ἂν ἐνεποδίζετο, οὐδέποτʼ ἐκωλύετο, οὐκ ἂν ἠγωνία. 9πῶς γὰρ οὔ; φοβεῖταί τις οὖν ὑπὲρ τῶν μὴ κακῶν; — οὔ. — τί δʼ; ὑπὲρ τῶν κακῶν μέν, ἐπʼ αὐτῷ δʼ ὄντων ὥστε μὴ συμβῆναι; 10— οὐδαμῶς. — εἰ οὖν τὰ μὲν ἀπροαίρετα οὔτʼ ἀγαθὰ οὔτε κακά, τὰ προαιρετικὰ δὲ πάντα ἐφʼ ἡμῖν καὶ οὔτʼ ἀφελέσθαι τις ἡμῶν αὐτὰ δύναται οὔτε περιποιῆσαι ἃ οὐ θέλομεν αὐτῶν, ποῦ ἔτι τόπος ἀγωνίας; 11ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ σωματίου ἀγωνιῶμεν, ὑπὲρ τοῦ κτησιδίου, περὶ τοῦ τί δόξει τῷ Καίσαρι, περὶ τῶν ἔσω δʼ οὐδενός. μή τι περὶ τοῦ μὴ ψεῦδος ὑπολαβεῖν; — οὔ· ἐπʼ ἐμοὶ γάρ ἐστιν. — μή τι τοῦ ὁρμῆσαι παρὰ φύσιν; — οὐδὲ περὶ τούτου. — 12ὅταν οὖν ἴδῃς τινὰ ὠχριῶντα, ὡς ὁ ἰατρὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ χρώματος λέγει τούτου ὁ σπλὴν πέπονθε, τούτου δὲ τὸ ἧπαρ, οὕτως καὶ σὺ λέγε τούτου ὄρεξις καὶ ἔκκλισις πέπονθεν, οὐκ εὐοδεῖ, φλεγμαίνει. 13χρῶμα γὰρ οὐ μεταβάλλει οὐδὲν ἄλλο οὐδὲ τρόμον ποιεῖ οὐδὲ ψόφον τῶν ὀδόντων οὐδὲ μετοκλάζει καὶ ἐπʼ ἀμφοτέρους πόδας ἵζει. 14διὰ τοῦτο Ζήνων μὲν Ἀντιγόνῳ μέλλων ἐντυγχάνειν οὐκ ἠγωνία· ἃ γὰρ οὗτος ἐθαύμαζεν, τούτων οὐδενὸς εἶχεν ἐκεῖνος ἐξουσίαν, ὧν δʼ εἶχεν ἐκεῖνος οὐκ ἐπεστρέφετο οὗτος· 15Ἀντίγονος δὲ Ζήνωνι μέλλων ἐντυγχάνειν ἠγωνία, καὶ εἰκότως· ἤθελε γὰρ ἀρέσκειν αὐτῷ, τοῦτο δʼ ἔξω ἔκειτο· οὗτος δʼ ἐκείνῳ οὐκ ἤθελεν, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλος τις τεχνίτης τῷ ἀτέχνῳ. 16ἐγώ σοι ἀρέσαι θέλω; ἀντὶ τίνος; οἶδας γὰρ τὰ μέτρα, καθʼ ἃ κρίνεται ἄνθρωπος ὑπʼ ἀνθρώπου; μεμέλ[ετ]ηκέ σοι γνῶναι, τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος καὶ τί κακὸς καὶ πῶς ἑκάτερον γίγνεται; διὰ τί οὖν σὺ αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς οὐκ εἶ; 17— πῶς, φησίν, οὐκ εἰμί; — ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἀγαθὸς πενθεῖ οὐδὲ στενάζει, οὐδεὶς οἰμώζει, οὐδεὶς ὠχριᾷ καὶ τρέμει οὐδὲ λέγει πῶς μʼ ἀποδέξεται, πῶς μου ἀκούσει; 18ἀνδράποδον, ὡς ἂν αὐτῷ δοκῇ. τί οὖν σοὶ μέλει περὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων; νῦν οὐκ ἐκείνου ἁμάρτημά ἐστι τὸ κακῶς ἀποδέξασθαι τὰ παρὰ σοῦ; — πῶς γὰρ οὔ; — δύναται δʼ ἄλλου μὲν εἶναι ἁμάρτημα, ἄλλου δὲ κακόν; — οὔ. — τί οὖν ἀγωνιᾷς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων; 19— ναί· ἀλλʼ ἀγωνιῶ, πῶς ἐγὼ αὐτῷ λαλήσω. — εἶτʼ οὐκ ἔξεστι γὰρ ὡς θέλεις αὐτῷ λαλῆσαι; — ἀλλὰ δέδοικα μὴ ἐκκρουσθῶ. 20— μή τι γράφειν μέλλων τὸ Δίωνος ὄνομα δέδοικας μὴ ἐκκρουσθῇς; — οὐδαμῶς. — τί τὸ αἴτιον; οὐχ ὅτι μεμελέτηκας γράφειν; — πῶς γὰρ οὔ; — τί δʼ; ἀναγιγνώσκειν μέλλων οὐχ ὡσαύτως ἂν εἶχες; — ὡσαύτως. — τί τὸ αἴτιον; ὅτι πᾶσα τέχνη ἰσχυρόν τι ἔχει καὶ θαρραλέον ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῆς. 21λαλεῖν οὖν οὐ μεμελέτηκας; καὶ τί ἄλλο ἐμελέτας ἐν τῇ σχολῇ; — συλλογισμοὺς καὶ μεταπίπτοντας. — ἐπὶ τί; οὐχ ὥστε ἐμπείρως διαλέγεσθαι; τὸ δʼ ἐμπείρως ἐστὶν οὐχὶ εὐκαίρως καὶ ἀσφαλῶς καὶ συνετῶς, ἔτι δʼ ἀπταίστως καὶ ἀπαραποδίστως, ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ τούτοις τεθαρρηκότως; — ναί. 22— ἱππεὺς οὖν ὢν εἰς πεδίον ἐληλυθὼς πρὸς πεζὸν ἀγωνιᾶς, ὅπου σὺ μεμελέτηκας, ἐκεῖνος δʼ ἀμελέτητός ἐστιν; — ναί· ἀλλὰ ἐξουσίαν ἔχει ἀποκτεῖναί με. 23— λέγε οὖν τὰ ἀληθῆ, δύστηνε, καὶ μὴ ἀλαζονεύου μηδὲ φιλόσοφος εἶναι ἀξίου μηδὲ ἀγνόει σου τοὺς κυρίους, ἀλλὰ μέχρις ἂν ἔχῃς ταύτην τὴν λαβὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, ἀκολούθει παντὶ τῷ ἰσχυροτέρῳ. 24λέγειν δὲ Σωκράτης ἐμελέτα ὁ πρὸς τοὺς τυράννους οὕτως διαλεγόμενος, ὁ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς, ὁ ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ. λέγειν Διογένης μεμελετήκει ὁ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον οὕτως λαλῶν, ὁ πρὸς Φίλιππον, ὁ πρὸς τοὺς πειρατάς, ὁ πρὸς τὸν ὠνησάμενον αὐτόν … 25(25, 26) ἐκείνοις, οἷς μεμέλ[ετ]ηκεν, τοῖς θαρροῦσι· σὺ δʼ ἐπὶ τὰ σαυτοῦ βάδιζε καὶ ἐκείνων ἀποστῇς μηδέποτε· εἰς τὴν γωνίαν ἀπελθὼν κάθησο καὶ πλέκε συλλογισμοὺς καὶ ἄλλῳ πρότεινε· 27οὐκ ἔστι δʼ ἐν σοὶ πόλεος ἡγεμὼν ἀνήρ.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA