Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER V. · Concerning the Academics.
1If any one opposes very evident Truths, it is not easy to find a Reason which may persuade him, to alter his Opinion. This arises neither from his own Strength, nor from the Weakness of his Teacher: but when, after being driven upon an Absurdity, he becomes petrified, how shall we deal with him any longer by Reason? 2Now there are two Sorts of Petrifaction: The one, a Petrifaction of the Understanding; the other, of the Sense of Shame, when a Person hath obstinately set himself not to assent to evident Truths, nor to quit the Defence of Contradictions. We all dread a bodily Mortification; and would make use of every Contrivance to avoid it: but none of us is troubled about a Mortification in the Soul. And yet, indeed, even with regard to the Soul, when a Person is so affected, as not to apprehend or understand any thing, we think him in a sad Condition: but where the Sense of Shame and Modesty is under an absolute Mortification, we go so far, as even to call this, Strength of Mind. 3Are you certain that you are awake?——"I am not (replies such a Person): for neither am I certain, when, in dreaming, I appear to myself to be awake."——Is there no Difference, then, between these Appearances?——"None." ——Shall I argue with this Man any longer? For what Steel or what Caustic can I apply, to make him sensible of his Mortification? He is sensible of it: and pretends not to be so. He is even worse than dead. Doth not he see the Repugnancy of contradictory Propositions? He sees it; and is never the better. He is neither moved, nor improves. Nay, he is in a yet worse Condition: his Sense of Shame and Modesty is utterly extirpated. His reasoning Faculty indeed is not extirpated; but turned wild and savage. Shall I call this, Strength of Mind? By no means: unless we allow it be such in the vilest Debauchées, publickly to speak and act whatever comes into their Heads.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (2)
- The Academics held, that there is nothing to be known; that we have not Faculties to distinguish between Truth and Falshood; and their Custom was neither to affirm nor deny any thing.
- A Sceptic was held to be an Esprit fort.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Concerning the academics. The New Academy denied the existence of any universal truths.—H.
It is said that there are those who will oppose very evident truths, and yet it is not easy to find a reason which may persuade such an one to alter his opinion. This may arise neither from his own strength nor from the weakness of his teacher; but when a man becomes obstinate in error, reason cannot always reach him.
Now there are two sorts of obstinacy: the one, of the intellect; the other, of the will. A man may obstinately set himself not to assent to evident truths, nor to quit the defence of contradictions. We all dread a bodily paralysis, and would make use of every contrivance to avoid it; but none of us is troubled about a paralysis of the soul. And yet, indeed, even with regard to the soul, when a person is so affected as not to apprehend or understand anything, we think him in a sad condition; but where the emotions of shame and modesty are under an absolute paralysis, we go so far as even to call this strength of mind!
Are you certain that you are awake? am not, replies such a person, for neither am I certain when in dreaming I appear to myself to be awake. Is there no difference, then, between these appearances? None. Shall I argue with this man any longer? For what steel or what caustic can I apply, to make him sensible of his paralysis? If he is sensible of it, and pretends not to be so, he is even worse than dead. He sees not his inconsistency, or, seeing it, holds to the wrong. He moves not, makes no progress; he rather falls back. His sense of shame is gone; his reasoning faculty is not gone, but brutalized. Shall I call this strength of mind? By no means,—unless we allow it to be such in the vilest debauchees publicly to speak and act out their worse impulses.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
Against the academics.
If a man, said Epictetus, opposes evident truths, it is not easy to find arguments by which we shall make him change his opinion. But this does not arise either from the man’s strength or the teacher’s weakness; for when the man, though he has been confuted, is hardened like a stone, how shall we then be able to deal with him by argument?
Now there are two kinds of hardening, one of the understanding, the other of the sense of shame, when a man is resolved not to assent to what is manifest nor to desist from contradictions. Most of us are afraid of mortification of the body, and would contrive all means to avoid such a thing, but we care not about the soul’s mortification. And indeed with regard to the soul, if a man be in such a state as not to apprehend anything, or understand at all, we think that he is in a bad condition: but if the sense of shame and modesty are deadened, this we call even power (or strength).
Do you comprehend that you are awake? I do not, the man replies, for I do not even comprehend when in my sleep I imagine that I am awake. Does this appearance then not differ from the other? Not at all, he replies. Shall I still argue with this man? And what fire or what iron shall I apply to him to make him feel that he is deadened? He does perceive, but he pretends that he does not. He is even worse than a dead man. He does not see the contradiction: he is in a bad condition. Another does see it, but he is not moved, and makes no improvement: he is even in a worse condition. His modesty is extirpated, and his sense of shame; and the rational faculty has not been cut off from him, but it is brutalised. Shall I name this strength of mind? Certainly not, unless we also name it such in catamites, through which they do and say in public whatever comes into their head.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (3)
- See Lecture V., The New Academy, Levin’s Lectures Introductory to the Phoilsophical Writings of Cicero, Cambridge , 1871 .
- ἀπαχθείς . See the note in Schweig.’s edition.
- Compare Cicero, Academ. Prior. ii. 6.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1ἄν τις, φησίν, ἐνίστηται πρὸς τὰ ἄγαν ἐκφανῆ, πρὸς τοῦτον οὐ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν εὑ⟨ρεῖν λόγ⟩ον, διʼ οὗ μεταπείσει τις αὐτόν. 2τοῦτο δʼ οὔτε παρὰ ⟨τὴν ἐκεί⟩νου γίνεται δύναμιν οὔτε παρὰ τὴν τοῦ διδάσκοντος ἀσθένειαν, ἀλλʼ ὅταν ἀπαχθεὶς ἀπολιθωθῇ, πῶς ἔτι χρήσηταί τις αὐτῷ διὰ λόγου; 3Ἀπολιθώσεις δʼ εἰσὶ διτταί· ἡ μὲν τοῦ νοητικοῦ ἀπολίθωσις, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἐντρεπτικοῦ, ὅταν τις παρατεταγμένος ᾖ μὴ ἐπινεύειν τοῖς ἐναργέσι μηδʼ ἀπὸ τῶν μαχομένων ἀφίστασθαι. 4οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τὴν μὲν σωματικὴν ἀπονέκρωσιν φοβούμεθα καὶ πάντʼ ἂν μηχανησαίμεθα ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ περιπεσεῖν τοιούτῳ τινί, τῆς ψυχῆς δʼ ἀπονεκρουμένης οὐδὲν ἡμῖν μέλει. 5καὶ νὴ Δία ἐπὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἂν μὲν ᾖ οὕτως διακείμενος, ὥστε μηδενὶ παρακολουθεῖν μηδὲ συνιέναι μηδέν, καὶ τοῦτον κακῶς ἔχειν οἰόμεθα· ἂν δέ τινος τὸ ἐντρεπτικὸν καὶ αἰδῆμον ἀπονεκρωθῇ, τοῦτο ἔτι καὶ δύναμιν καλοῦμεν. Καταλαμβάνεις ὅτι ἐγρήγορας; 6οὔ, φησίν· οὐδὲ γάρ, ὅταν ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις φαντάζωμαι, ὅτι ἐγρήγορα. οὐδὲν οὖν διαφέρει αὕτη ἡ φαντασία ἐκείνης; οὐδέν. ἔτι τούτῳ διαλέγομαι; 7καὶ ποῖον αὐτῷ πῦρ ἢ ποῖον σίδηρον προσαγάγω, ἵνʼ αἴσθηται ὅτι νενέκρωται; αἰσθανόμενος οὐ προσποιεῖται· ἔτι χείρων ἐστὶ τοῦ νεκροῦ. μάχην οὗτος οὐ συνορᾷ· κακῶς ἔχει. 8συνορῶν οὗτος οὐ κινεῖται οὐδὲ προκόπτει· ἔτι ἀθλιώτερον ἔχει. 9ἐκτέτμηται τὸ αἰδῆμον αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐντρεπτικὸν καὶ τὸ λογικὸν οὐκ ἀποτέτμηται, ἀλλʼ ἀποτεθηρίωται. 10ταύτην ἐγὼ δύναμιν εἴπω; μὴ γένοιτο, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὴν τῶν κιναίδων, καθʼ ἣν πᾶν τὸ ἐπελθὸν ἐν μέσῳ καὶ ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA