Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER XV. · What it is that Philosophy promises.
1When one consulted him, How he might persuade his Brother to forbear treating him ill: Philosophy, answered Epictetus, doth not promise to procure any thing external to Man; otherwise it would admit something beyond its proper Subject-matter. For the Subject-matter of a Carpenter is Wood; of a Statuary, Brass: and so, of the Art of Living, the Subject-matter is each Person's own Life. What, then, is my Brother's? That, again, belongs to his own Art [of Living]; but to your's is external: like an Estate, like Health, like reputation. Now Philosophy promises none of these. In every Circumstance I will preserve the governing Part conformable to Nature. Whose governing Part? His in whom I exist. But how, then, is my Brother to lay aside his Anger against me? Bring him to me, and I will tell him; but I have nothing to say to you about his Anger. 2Well: but I still farther ask, How am I to keep myself in a State of Mind conformable to Nature, though he should not be reconciled to me? No great Thing is brought to Perfection suddenly; when not so much as a Bunch of Grapes or a Fig is. If you tell me, that you would at this Minute have a Fig, I will answer you, that there must be Time. Let it first blossom, then bear Fruit, then ripen. Is then the Fruit of a Fig tree not brought to Perfection suddenly, and in one Hour; and would you possess the Fruit of the human Mind in so short a Time, and without Trouble? I tell you, expect no such thing.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (1)
- The Philosopher had forgot that Fig-trees do not blossom: and is less excusable than the English Translators of the Bible, Hab. iii. 17. to whom Fig-trees were not so familiar. But the Hebrew Word used there signifies rather in general to shoot out, thrive, than in particular to flower. The LXX have Καρποφορησει; reading, perhaps, תפךה for תפךח. This Note was given to the Translator by a Friend.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
What philosophy promises.
When one consulted him, how he might persuade his brother to forbear treating him ill, Philosophy, answered Epictetus, does not promise to procure any outward good for man; otherwise it would include something beyond its proper theme. For as the material of a carpenter is wood; of a statuary, brass; so of the art of living, the material is each man’s own life.
What, then, is my brother’s life?
That, again, is matter for his own art, but is external to you; like property, health, or reputation. Philosophy undertakes none of these. In every circumstance I will keep my will in harmony with nature. To whom belongs that will? To Him in whom I exist.
But how, then, is my brother’s unkindness to be cured?
Bring him to me, and I will tell him; but I have nothing to say to you about his unkindness.
But the inquirer still further asking for a rule for self-government, if he should not be reconciled, Epictetus answered thus,—
No great thing is created suddenly, any more than a bunch of grapes or a fig. If you tell me that you desire a fig, I answer you, that there must be time. Let it first blossom, then bear fruit, then ripen. Since, then, the fruit of a fig-tree is not brought to perfection suddenly, or in one hour, do you think to possess instantaneously and easily the fruit of the human mind? I warn you, expect it not.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
What philosophy promises.
When a man was consulting him how he should persuade his brother to cease being angry with him, Epictetus replied, Philosophy does not propose to secure for a man any external thing. If it did (or, if it were not, as I say), philosophy would be allowing something which is not within its province. For as the carpenter’s material is wood, and that of the statuary is copper, so the matter of the art of living is each man’s life.—What then is my brother’s?—That again belongs to his own art; but with respect to yours, it is one of the external things, like a piece of land, like health, like reputation. But Philosophy promises none of these. In every circumstance I will maintain, she says, the governing part conformable to nature. Whose governing part? His in whom I am, she says.
How then shall my brother cease to be angry with me? Bring him to me and I will tell him. But I have nothing to say to you about his anger.
When the man, who was consulting him, said, I seek to know this, How, even if my brother is not reconciled to me, shall I maintain myself in a state conformable to nature? Nothing great, said Epictetus, is produced suddenly, since not even the grape or the fig is. If you say to me now that you want a fig, I will answer to you that it requires time: let it flower first, then put forth fruit, and then ripen. Is then the fruit of a fig-tree not perfected suddenly and in one hour, and would you possess the fruit of a man’s mind in so short a time and so easily? Do not expect it, even if I tell you.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (2)
- This is τὸ ἡγεμονικόν , a word often used by Antoninus, ii. 2; vi. S.
- The philosopher had forgot that fig-trees do not blossom (Mrs. Carter). The flowers of a fig are inside the fleshy receptacle which becomes the fruit. Schweig. prints μὴ δ᾽ ἂν, ἐγώ σοι λέγω, προσδόκα : and in his Latin version he prints: Id vero, ego tibi dico, ne expectes. I neither understand his pointing, nor his version. Wolf translates it, Etsi ego tibi dixero (virtutem brevi parari posse), noli credere : which is light Wolf makes ἄν go with λέγω .
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1συμβουλευομένου τινός, πῶς τὸν ἀδελφὸν πείσῃ μηκέτι χαλεπῶς αὐτῷ ἔχειν, 2οὐκ ἐπαγγέλλεται, ἔφη, φιλοσοφία τῶν ἐκτός τι περιποιήσειν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξω τι τῆς ἰδίας ὕλης ἀναδέξεται. ὡς γὰρ τέκτονος ὕλη τὰ ξύλα, ἀνδριαντοποιοῦ ὁ χαλκός, οὕτως τῆς περὶ βίον τέχνης ὕλη ὁ βίος αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου. 3— τί οὖν ὁ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ; — πάλιν τῆς αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τέχνης ἐστίν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν σὴν τῶν ἐκτός ἐστιν, ὅμοιον ἀγρῷ, ὅμοιον ὑγείᾳ, ὅμοιον εὐδοξίᾳ. τούτων δʼ οὐδὲν ἐπαγγέλλεται· φιλοσοφία. 4ἐν πάσῃ περιστάσει τηρήσω τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχον. — τὸ τίνος; — τὸ ἐκείνου, ἐν ᾧ εἰμί. 5— πῶς οὖν ἐκεῖνός μοι μὴ ὀργίζηται; — φέρε μοι ἐκεῖνον κἀκείνῳ ἐρῶ, σοὶ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ὀργῆς οὐδὲν ἔχω λέγειν. 6εἰπόντος δὲ τοῦ συμβουλευομένου ὅτι Τοῦτο ζητῶ, πῶς ἂν ἐκείνου καὶ μὴ διαλλασσομένου κατὰ φύσιν ἔχοιμι, 7οὐδέν, ἔφη, τῶν μεγάλων ἄφνω γίνεται, ὅπου γε οὐδʼ ὁ βότρυς οὐδὲ σῦκον. ἄν μοι νῦν λέγῃς ὅτι θέλω σῦκον, ἀποκρινοῦμαί σοι ὅτι χρόνου δεῖ. ἄφες ἀνθήσῃ πρῶτον, εἶτα προβάλῃ τὸν καρπόν, εἶτα πεπανθῇ. 8εἶτα συκῆς μὲν καρπὸς ἄφνω καὶ μιᾷ ὥρᾳ οὐ τελειοῦται, γνώμης δʼ ἀνθρώπου καρπὸν θέλεις οὕτως διʼ ὀλίγου καὶ εὐκόλως κτήσασθαι; μηδʼ ἂν ἐγώ σοι λέγω, προσδόκα.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA