Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER IV. · Of Improvement.
1HE who is entering on a State of Improvement, having learnt from the Philosophers, that the Object of Desire is Good, of Aversion, Evil, and having learnt too, that Prosperity and Ease are no otherwise attainable by Man, than in not being disappointed of his Desire, nor incurring his Aversion: such an one removes totally from himself and postpones Desire, and applies Aversion only to things dependent on Choice. For if he should be averse to Things independent on Choice; he knows, that he must sometimes incur his Aversion, and be unhappy. Now if Virtue promises Happiness, Prosperity, and Ease; then, an Improvement in Virtue is certainly an Improvement in each of these. For to whatever Point the Perfection of any thing absolutely brings us, Improvement is always an Approach towards it. 2How happens it then, that when we confess Virtue to be such, yet we seek, and make an ostentatious Show of Improvement in other Things? What is the Business of Virtue? A prosperous Life. Who is in a State of Improvement then? He who hath read the many Treatises of Chrysippus? Why, doth Virtue consist in having read Chrysippus through? If it doth, Improvement is confessedly nothing else than understanding a great deal of Chrysippus: otherwise we confess Virtue to produce one Thing; and declare Improvement, which is an Approach to it, to be quite another Thing. 3This Person, says one [of you], is already able to read Chrysippus, by himself.——"Certainly, Sir, you have made a vast Improvement!" What Improvement? Why do you ridicule him? Why do you withdraw him from a Sense of his Misfortunes? Why do not you show him the Business of Virtue, that he may know where to seek Improvement?——Seek it there, Wretch, where your Business lies. And where doth your Business lie? In Desire and Aversion; that you may neither be disappointed of the one, nor incur the other; in exerting the Powers of Pursuit and Avoidance, that you may not be liable to fail; in Assent and Suspense, that you may not be liable to be deceived. The first and most necessary is the first Topic. But if you seek to avoid incurring your Aversion, trembling and lamenting all the while, at this rate how do you improve? 4Show me then your Improvement in this Point. As if I should say to a Wrestler, Show me your Shoulders; and he should answer me, "See my Poisers."——Do you and your Poisers look to that: I desire to see the Effect of them. "Take the Treatise on the Subject of the active Powers, and see how thoroughly I have perused it." I do not enquire into this, Wretch: but how you exert those Powers; how you manage your Desires and Aversions, how your Intentions and Purposes; how you are prepared for Events, whether conformably or contrary to Nature. If conformably, give me Evidence of that, and I will say you improve: if contrary, go your way, and not only comment on these Treatises, but write such yourself; and what Service will it do you? Do not you know that the whole Volume is sold for Half a Crown? Doth he who comments upon it, then, value himself at more than Half a Crown? Never look for your Business in one Thing, and for Improvement in another. Where is Improvement, then? If any of you, withdrawing himself from Externals, turns to his own Faculty of Choice, to exercise, and finish, and render it conformable to Nature; elevated, free, unrestrained, unhindered, faithful, decent: if he hath learnt too, that whoever desires, or is averse to, Things out of his own Power, can neither be faithful nor free, but must necessarily be changed and tossed up and down with them; must necessarily too be subject to others, to such as can procure or prevent what he desires or is averse to: if, rising in the Morning, he observes and keeps to these Rules; bathes and eats as a Man of Fidelity and Honour; and thus, on every Subject of Action, exercises himself in his principal Duty; as a Racer, in the Business of Racing; as a public Speaker, in the Business of exercising his Voice: this is he, who truly improves this is he, who hath not travelled in vain. But if he is wholly intent on reading Books, and hath laboured that Point only, and travelled for that: I bid him go home immediately, and not neglect his domestic Affairs; for what he travelled for, is nothing. The only real Thing is, studying how to rid his Life of Lamentation, and Complaint, and Alas! and I am undone, and Misfortune, and Disappointment; and to learn what Death, what Exile, what Prison, what Poison is: That he may be able to say in a Prison, like Socrates, "My dear Crito; if it thus pleases the Gods, thus let it be;" and not——"Wretched old Man, have I kept my grey Hairs for this!" Who speaks thus? Do you suppose I will name some mean and despicable Person? Is it not Priam who says it? Is it not Oedipus? Nay, how many Kings say it? For what else is Tragedy, but the Sufferings of Men, struck by an Admiration of Externals, represented in that Kind of Poetry? If one was to be taught by Fictions, that Externals independent upon Choice are nothing to us; I, for my Part, should wish for such a Fiction, as that, by which I might live prosperously and undisturbed. What you wish for, it is your Business to consider. 5Of what Service, then, is Chrysippus to us? To teach you, that those Things are not false, on which Prosperity and Ease depend. "Take my Books, and you will see, how true and conformable to Nature those Things are, which render me easy." How great a Happiness! And how great the Benefactor, who shows the Way! To Triptolemus all Men have raised Temples and Altars, because he gave us a milder Kind of Food: but to him who hath discovered, and brought to Light, and communicated, the Truth to all; the Means, not of living, but of living well; who among you ever raised an Altar or a Temple, or dedicated a Statue, or who worships God on that Account? We offer Sacrifices on the Account of those [Benefactors] who have given us Corn and the Vine; and shall we not give Thanks to God, for those who have produced that Fruit in the human Understanding, by which they proceed to discover to us the true Doctrine of Happiness?
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (6)
- See Enchiridion, c. ii. Note (b).
- Chrysippus is called, by Cicero, the most subtile Interpreter of the Stoic Dreams, and the Support of the Portico. He composed 705 Volumes; which is not very wonderful, as he was so fond of Quotations, that in one of his Pieces he transcribed almost an entire Play of Euripides. His chief Study was Logic, which he carried to a trifling Degree of Subtility There is nothing now remaining of his Works but some of their Titles. He died about 200 Years before the Christian Æra, and was honoured by the Athenians with a Statue in the Ceranicus. His Death is said to have been occasioned by an immoderate Fit of Laughing, at seeing an Ass eat Figs. Chrysippus desired the Ass might have a Glass of Wine to wath them down; and was so diverted with his own Conceit, that it cost him his Life. He is said to have been a very copious and laborious Writer, but obscure and immoral; though one would be inclined to think, from the Respect with which he is mentioned by Epictetus, that this latter Accusation was groundless.
- See Introduction, §. 4, 5, 6.
- An Allusion to the antient Custom among Philosophers, of travelling into foreign Countries, for Improvement.
- What ought to be our Dispositions towards Good and Evil, may be learned from Philosophy: but what that certainly-attainable Good, and that Evil which, without our own Faults, we need never incur, are, Christianity alone can teach. That alone can enable us to unite the Wisdom, Courage, Dignity, and Composure of the Stoics, with the Humility that belongs to our frail Nature, and the various Affections that are inseparable from Humanity.
- Epictetus speaks with great Thankfulness to Heaven on the Account of Chrysippus, a subtile and perplexed Writer, from whose Instructions, only a few studious abstracted Persons could derive any Benefit. How much stronger ought to be the Gratitude of those, who are blessed with the Knowledge of Him, who hath brought Life and Immortality to Light (the Word is the same in Epictetus and St. Paul); who hath rendered the Way to Virtue and to Happiness not only intelligible, but accessible, to all Mankind; and who is Himself the Way, the Truth, and the Life.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Of progress.
He who is entering on a state of progress, having learned from the philosophers that good should be sought and evil shunned, and having learned, too, that prosperity and peace are no otherwise attainable by man than in not missing what he seeks, nor incurring what he shuns,—such a one totally extirpates and banishes all wayward desire, and shuns only those things over which he can have control. For if he should attempt to shun those things over which he has no control, he knows that he must sometimes incur that which he shuns, and be unhappy. Now if virtue promises happiness, prosperity, and peace, then progress in virtue is certainly progress in each of these. For to whatever point the perfection of anything absolutely brings us, progress is always an approach towards it.
How happens it, then, that when we confess virtue to be such, yet we seek, and make an ostentatious show of progress in other things! What is the business of virtue?
A life truly prosperous.
Who is in a state of progress, then? He who has best studied Chrysippus? Why, does virtue consist in having read Chrysippus through? If so, progress is confessedly nothing else than understanding a great deal of Chrysippus; otherwise we confess virtue to consist in one thing, and declare progress, which is an approach to it, to be quite another thing.
This person, they say, is already able to understand Chrysippus, by himself. Certainly, sir, you have made a vast improvement! What improvement? Why do you delude him? Why do you withdraw him from a sense of his real needs? Why do not you show him the real function of virtue, that he may know where to seek progress? Seek it there, O unfortunate, where your work lies. And where does your work lie? In learning what to seek and what to shun, that you may neither be disappointed of the one nor incur the other; in practising how to pursue and how to avoid, that you may not be liable to fail; in practising intellectual assent and doubt, that you may not be liable to be deceived. These are the first and most necessary things. But if you merely seek, in trembling and lamentation, to keep away all possible ills, what real progress have you made?
Show me then your progress in this point. As if I should say to a wrestler, Show me your muscle; and he should answer me, See my dumb-bells. Your dumb-bells are your own affair; I desire to see the effect of them.
Take the treatise on the active powers, and see how thoroughly I have perused it.
I do not inquire into this, O slavish man, but how you exert those powers, how you manage your desires and aversions, your intentions and purposes, how you meet events,—whether in accordance with nature’s laws or contrary to them. If in accordance, give me evidence of that, and I will say you improve; if the contrary, you may go your way, and not only comment on these treatises, but write such yourself; and yet what service will it do you? Do not you know that the whole volume is sold for five denarii? Does he who comments upon it, then, value himself at more than that sum? Never make your life to lie in one thing and yet seek progress in another.
Where is progress, then?
If any of you, withdrawing himself from externals, turns to his own will, to train, and perfect, and render it conformable to nature,—noble, free, unrestrained, unhindered, faithful, humble;—if he has learned, too, that whoever desires or shuns things beyond his own power can neither be faithful nor free, but must necessarily take his chance with them, must necessarily too be subject to others, to such as can procure or prevent what he desires or shuns; if, rising in the morning, he observes and keeps to these rules; bathes regularly, eats frugally, and to every subject of action applies the same fixed principles,—if a racer to racing, if an orator to oratory,—this is he who truly makes progress; this is he who has not labored in vain. But if he is wholly intent on reading books, and has labored that point only, and travelled for that, I bid him go home immediately and do his daily duties; since that which he sought is nothing.
The only real thing is to study how to rid life of lamentation, and complaint, and Alas! and I am undone, and misfortune, and failure; and to learn what death, what exile, what a prison, what poison is; that he may be able to say in a prison, like Socrates, My dear Crito, if it thus pleases the gods, thus let it be; and not, Wretched old man, have I kept my gray hairs for this! [Do you ask] who speaks thus? Do you think I quote some mean and despicable person? Is it not Priam who says it? Is it not Oedipus? Nay, how many kings say it? For what else is tragedy but the dramatized sufferings of men, bewildered by an admiration of externals? If one were to be taught by fictions that things beyond our will are nothing to us, I should rejoice in such a fiction, by which I might live prosperous and serene. But what your own aims are, it is your business to consider.
Of what service, then, is Chrysippus to us?
To teach you that those things are not false on which true prosperity and peace depend. Take my books, and you will see how true and conformable to nature those things are which give me peace. How great a happiness! And how great the benefactor who shows the way! To Triptolemus all men have raised temples and altars, because he gave us a milder kind of food; but to him who has discovered and brought to light and communicated the truth to all,—the means, not merely of living, but of living well,—who among you ever raised an altar or a temple, or dedicated a statue; or who worships God in his name? We offer sacrifices in memory of those who have given us corn and the vine; and shall we not give thanks to God for those who have nurtured such fruit in the human breast,—even the truth which makes us blessed?
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Higginson’s notes (2)
- Chrysippus was regarded as the highest authority among the later Stoics; but not one of his seven hundred volumes bas come down to posterity.—H.
- Triptolemus was said to have introduced agriculture and vegetable food among men, under the guidance of Demeter.—H.
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
Of progress or improvement.
He who is making progress, having learned from philosophers that desire means the desire of good things, and aversion means aversion from bad things; having learned too that happiness and tranquillity are not attainable by man otherwise than by not failing to obtain what he desires, and not falling into that which he would avoid; such a man takes from himself desire altogether and defers it, but he employs his aversion only on things which are dependent on his will. For if he attempts to avoid anything independent of his will, he knows that sometimes he will fall in with something which he wishes to avoid, and he will be unhappy. Now if virtue promises good fortune and tranquillity and happiness, certainly also the progress towards virtue is progress towards each of these things. For it is always true that to whatever point the perfecting of anything leads us, progress is an approach towards this point.
How then do we admit that virtue is such as I have said, and yet seek progress in other things and make a display of it? What is the product of virtue? Tranquillity. Who then makes improvement? Is it he who has read many books of Chrysippus? But does virtue consist in having understood Chrysippus? If this is so, progress is clearly nothing else than knowing a great deal of Chrysippus. But now we admit that virtue produces one thing, and we declare that approaching near to it is another thing, namely, progress or improvement. Such a person, says one, is already able to read Chrysippus by himself. Indeed, sir, you are making great progress. What kind of progress? But why do you mock the man? Why do you draw him away from the perception of his own misfortunes? Will you not show him the effect of virtue that he may learn where to look for improvement? Seek it there, wretch, where your work lies. And where is your work? In desire and in aversion, that you may not be disappointed in your desire, and that you may not fall into that which you would avoid; in your pursuit and avoiding, that you commit no error; in assent and suspension of assent, that you be not deceived. The first things, and the most necessary, are those which I have named. But if with trembling and lamentation you seek not to fall into that which you avoid, tell me how you are improving.
Do you then show me your improvement in these things? If I were talking to an athlete, I should say, Show me your shoulders; and then he might say, Here are my Halteres. You and your Halteres look to that. I should reply, I wish to see the effect of the Halteres. So, when you say: Take the treatise on the active powers ( ὁρμή), and see how I have studied it. I reply, Slave, I am not inquiring about this, but how you exercise pursuit and avoidance, desire and aversion, how you design and purpose and prepare yourself, whether conformably to nature or not. If conformably, give me evidence of it, and I will say that you are making progress: but if not conformably, be gone, and not only expound your books, but write such books yourself; and what will you gain by it? Do you not know that the whole book costs only five denarii? Does then the expounder seem to be worth more than five denarii? Never then look for the matter itself in one place, and progress towards it in another.
Where then is progress? If any of you, withdrawing himself from externals, turns to his own will ( προαίρεσις) to exercise it and to improve it by labour, so as to make it conformable to nature, elevated, free, unrestrained, unimpeded, faithful, modest; and if he has learned that he who desires or avoids the things which are not in his power can neither be faithful nor free, but of necessity he must change with them and be tossed abort with them as in a tempest, and of necessity must subject himself to others who have the power to procure or prevent what he desires or would avoid; finally, when he rises in the morning, if he observes and keeps these rules, bathes as a man of fidelity, eats as a modest man; in like manner, if in every matter that occurs he works out his chief principles τὰ προηγούμενα) as the runner does with reference to running, and the trainer of the voice with reference to the voice—this is the man who truly makes progress, and this is the man who has not travelled in vain. But if he has strained his efforts to the practice of reading books, and labours only at this, and has travelled for this, I tell him to return home immediately, and not to neglect his affairs there; for this for which he has travelled is nothing. But the other thing is something, to study how a man can rid his life of lamentation and groaning, and saying, Woe to me, and wretched that I am, and to rid it also of misfortune and disappointment, and to learn what death is, and exile, and prison, and poison, that he may be able to say when he is in fetters, Dear Crito, if it is the will of the gods that it be so, let it be so; and not to say, Wretched am I, an old man; have I kept my grey hairs for this? Who is it that speaks thus? Do you think that I shall name some man of no repute and of low condition? Does not Priam say this? Does not Oedipus say this? Nay, all kings say it! For what else is tragedy than the perturbations ( πάθη) of men who value externals exhibited in this kind of poetry? But if a man must learn by fiction that no external things which are independent of the will concern us, for my part I should like this fiction, by the aid of which I should live happily and undisturbed. But you must consider for yourselves what you wish.
What then does Chrysippus teach us? The reply is, to know that these things are not false, from which happiness comes and tranquillity arises. Take my books, and you will learn how true and conformable to nature are the things which make me free from perturbations. O great good fortune! 0 the great benefactor who points out the way! To Triptolemus all men have erectedtemples and altars, because he gave us food by cultivation; but to him who discovered truth and brought it to light and communicated it to all, not the truth which shows us how to live, but how to live well, who of you for this reason has built an altar, or a temple, or has dedicated a statue, or who worships God for this? Because the gods have given the vine, or wheat, we sacrifice to them: but because they have produced in the human mind that fruit by which they designed to show us the truth which relates to happiness, shall we not thank God for this?
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (9)
- τὸ εὔρουν or ἡ εὔροια is translated happiness. The notion is that of flowing easily, as Seneca (Epp. 120) explains it: beata vita, secundo defluens cursu.
- ὑπερτέθειται . The Latin translation is: in futurum tempus rejicit. Wolf says: Significat id, quod in Enchiridio dictum est: philosophies tironem non nimium tribuere sibi, sed quasi addubitantem expectare dum confirmetur judicium.
- Diogenes Laertius (Chrysippus, lib. vii.) states that Chrysippus wrote seven hundred and five books, or treatises, or whatever the word συγγράμματα means. He was born at Soli , in Cilicia , or at Tarsus , in B. C. 280 , as it is reckoned, and on going to Athens he became a pupil of the Stoic Cleanthes.
- Compare iii. c. 2. The word is τόποι .
- Halteres are gymnastic instruments (Galen. i. De Sanitate tuenda; Martial, xiv. 49; Juvenal, vi. 420, and the Scholiast. Upton). Halteres is a Greek word, literally leapers. They are said to have been masses of lead, used for exercise and in making jumps. The effect of such weights in taking a jump is well known to boys who have used them. A couple of bricks will serve the purpose, Martial says (xiv. 49):— Quid pereunt stulto fortes haltere lacerti? Exercet melius vinea fossa viros. Juvenal (vi. 421) writes of a woman who uses dumb-bells till she sweats, and is then rubbed dry by a man, Quum lassata gravi ceciderunt brachia massa. (Macleane’s Juvenal.) As to the expression, Ὄψει σὺ, καὶ οἱ ἁλτῆρες , see Upton’s note. It is also a Latin form: Epicurus hoc viderit, Cicero, Acad. ii. c. 7; haec fortuna viderit, Ad Attic. vi. 4. It occurs in M. Antoninus, viii. 41, v. 25; and in Acta Apostol. xviii. 15.
- μεταρριπίζεσθαι . Compare James, Ep. i. 6: ὁ γὰρ διακρινόμενος ἔοικε κλύδωνι θαλάσσης ἀνεμιζομένῳ καὶ ῥιπιζομένῳ .
- This is said in the Criton of Plato, 1; but not in exactly the same way.
- So kings and such personages speak in the Greek tragedies. Compare what M. Antoninus (xi. 6) says of Tragedy.
- ἀνεστάκασιν See the note of Schweig. on the use of this form of the verb.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1ὁ προκόπτων μεμαθηκὼς παρὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων ὅτι ἡ μὲν ὄρεξις ἀγαθῶν ἐστιν, ἡ δʼ ἔκκλισις πρὸς κακά, μεμαθηκὼς δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλως τὸ εὔρουν καὶ ἀπαθὲς περιγίνεται τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἢ ἐν ὀρέξει μὲν μὴ ἀποτυγχάνοντι, ἐν ἐκκλίσει ⟨δὲ⟩ μὴ περιπίπτοντι, τὴν μὲν ὄρεξιν ἦρκεν ἐξ αὑτοῦ εἰσάπαν καὶ ὑπερτέθειται, τῇ ἐκκλίσει δὲ πρὸς μόνα χρῆται τὰ προαιρετικά. 2τῶν γὰρ ἀπροαιρέτων ἄν τι ἐκκλίνῃ, οἶδεν ὅτι περιπεσεῖταί ποτέ τινι παρὰ τὴν ἔκκλισιν τὴν αὑτοῦ καὶ δυστυχήσει. 3εἰ δʼ ἡ ἀρετὴ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν εὐδαιμονίαν ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπάθειαν καὶ εὔροιαν, πάντως καὶ ἡ προκοπὴ ⟨ἡ⟩ πρὸς αὐτὴν πρὸς ἕκαστον τούτων ἐστὶ προκοπή. 4ἀεὶ γὰρ πρὸς ὃ ἂν ἡ τελειότης τινὸς καθάπαξ ἄγῃ, πρὸς αὐτὸ ἡ προκοπὴ συνεγγισμός ἐστιν. 5πῶς οὖν τὴν μὲν ἀρετὴν τοιοῦτόν τι ὁμολογοῦμεν, τὴν προκοπὴν δʼ ἐν ἄλλοις ζητοῦμεν καὶ ἐπιδείκνυμεν; τί ἔργον ἀρετῆς; 6εὔροια. τίς οὖν προκόπτει; ὁ πολλὰς Χρυσίππου συντάξεις ἀνεγνωκώς; 7μὴ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοῦτʼ ἔστι Χρύσιππον νενοηκέναι; εἰ γὰρ τοῦτʼ ἔστιν, ὁμολογουμένως ἡ προκοπὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ πολλὰ τῶν Χρυσίππου νοεῖν. 8νῦν δʼ ἄλλο μέν τι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιφέρειν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἄλλο[ν] δὲ τὸν συνεγγισμόν, τὴν προκοπὴν ἀποφαίνομεν. 9οὗτος, φησίν, ἤδη καὶ διʼ αὑτοῦ δύναται Χρύσιππον ἀναγιγνώσκειν. εὖ, νὴ τοὺς θεούς, προκόπτεις, ἄνθρωπε· ποίαν προκοπήν. 10τί ἐμπαίζεις αὐτῷ; τί δʼ ἀπάγεις αὐτὸν τῆς συναισθήσεως τῶν αὑτοῦ κακῶν; οὐ θέλεις δεῖξαι αὐτῷ τὸ ἔργον τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἵνα μάθῃ ποῦ τὴν προκοπὴν ζητῇ; 11ἐκεῖ ζήτησον αὐτήν, ταλαίπωρε, ὅπου σου τὸ ἔργον. ποῦ δέ σου τὸ ἔργον; ἐν ὀρέξει καὶ ἐκκλίσει, ἵνʼ ἀναπότευκτος ᾖς καὶ ἀπερίπτωτος, ἐν ὁρμαῖς καὶ ἀφορμαῖς, ἵνʼ ἀναμάρτητος, ἐν προ⟨ς⟩θέσει καὶ ἐποχῇ, ἵνʼ ἀνεξαπάτητος. 12πρῶτοι δʼ εἰσὶν οἱ πρῶτοι τόποι καὶ ἀναγκαιότατοι. ἂν δὲ τρέμων καὶ πενθῶν ζητῇς ἀπερίπτωτος εἶναι, ἄρα πῶς προκόπτεις; 13σὺ οὖν ἐνταῦθά μοι δεῖξόν σου τὴν προκοπήν. καθάπερ εἰ ἀθλητῇ διελεγόμην δεῖξόν μοι τοὺς ὤμους, εἶτα ἔλεγεν ἐκεῖνος ἴδε μου τοὺς ἁλτῆρας. ὄψει σὺ καὶ οἱ ἁλτῆρες, ἐγὼ τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα τῶν ἁλτήρων ἰδεῖν βούλομαι. 14λάβε τὴν περὶ ὁρμῆς σύνταξιν καὶ γνῶθι πῶς αὐτὴν ἀνέγνωκα. ἀνδράποδον, οὐ τοῦτο ζητῶ, ἀλλὰ πῶς ὁρμᾷς καὶ ἀφορμᾷς, πῶς ὀρέγῃ καὶ ἐκκλίνεις, πῶς ἐπιβάλλῃ καὶ προ[σ]τίθεσαι καὶ παρασκευάζῃ, πότερα συμφώνως τῇ φύσει ἢ ἀσυμφώνως. 15εἰ γὰρ συμφώνως, τοῦτό μοι δείκνυε καὶ ἐρῶ σοι ὅτι προκόπτεις· εἰ δʼ ἀσυμφώνως, ἄπελθε καὶ μὴ μόνον ἐξηγοῦ τὰ βιβλία, ἀλλὰ καὶ γράφε αὐτὸς τοιαῦτα. 16καὶ τί σοι ὄφελος; οὐκ οἶδας ὅτι ὅλον τὸ βιβλίον πέντε δηναρίων ἐστίν; ὁ οὖν ἐξηγούμενος αὐτὸ δοκεῖ ὅτι πλείονος ἄξιός ἐστιν ἢ πέντε δηναρίων; 17μηδέποτε οὖν ἀλλαχοῦ τὸ ἔργον ζητεῖτε, ἀλλαχοῦ τὴν προκοπήν. 18ποῦ οὖν προκοπή; εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἀποστὰς τῶν ἐκτὸς ἐπὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἐπέστραπται τὴν αὑτοῦ, ταύτην ἐξεργάζεσθαι καὶ ἐκπονεῖν, ὥστε σύμφωνον ἀποτελέσαι τῇ φύσει, ὑψηλὴν ἐλευθέραν ἀκώλυτον ἀνεμπόδιστον πιστὴν αἰδήμονα· 19μεμάθηκέν τε, ὅτι ὁ τὰ μὴ ἐφʼ αὑτῷ ποθῶν ἢ φεύγων οὔτε πιστὸς εἶναι δύναται οὔτʼ ἐλεύθερος, ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκη μεταπίπτειν καὶ μεταρριπίζεσθαι ἅμα ἐκείνοις καὶ αὐτόν, ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ ὑποτεταχέναι ἄλλοις ἑαυτόν, τοῖς ἐκεῖνα περιποιεῖν ἢ κωλύειν δυναμένοις· 20καὶ λοιπὸν ἕωθεν ἀνιστάμενος ταῦτα τηρεῖ καὶ φυλάσσει, λούεται ὡς πιστός, ὡς αἰδήμων ἐσθίει, ὡσαύτως ἐπὶ τῆς ἀεὶ παραπιπτούσης ὕλης τὰ προηγούμενα ἐκπονῶν, ὡς ὁ δρομεὺς δρομικῶς καὶ ὁ φώνασκος φωνασκικῶς· 21οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ προκόπτων ταῖς ἀληθείαις καὶ ὁ μὴ εἰκῇ ἀποδεδημηκὼς οὗτός ἐστιν. 22εἰ δʼ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις ἕξιν τέταται καὶ ταύτην ἐκπονεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐκδεδήμηκε, λέγω αὐτῷ αὐτόθεν πορεύεσθαι εἰς οἶκον καὶ μὴ ἀμελεῖν τῶν ἐκεῖ· 23τοῦτο γὰρ ἐφʼ ὃ ἀποδεδήμηκεν οὐδέν ἐστιν· ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο, με⟨λε⟩τᾶν ἐξελεῖν τοῦ αὑτοῦ βίου πένθη καὶ οἰμωγὰς καὶ ⟨τὸ⟩ οἴμοι καὶ τὸ τάλας ἐγὼ καὶ δυστυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν καὶ μαθεῖν, 24τί ἐστι θάνατος, τί φυγή, τί δεσμωτήριον, τί [νοσ]κών⟨ε⟩ιον, ἵνα δύνηται λέγειν ἐν τῇ φυλακῇ ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, εἰ ταύτῃ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτῃ γινέσθω καὶ μὴ ἐκεῖνα τάλας ἐγώ, γέρων ἄνθρωπος, ἐπὶ ταῦτά μου τὰς πολιὰς ἐτήρησα. 25τίς λέγει ταῦτα; δοκεῖτε ὅτι ὑμῖν ἄδοξόν τινα ἐρῶ καὶ ταπεινόν; Πρίαμος αὐτὰ οὐ λέγει; Οἰδίπους οὐ λέγει; ἀλλʼ ὁπόσοι βασιλεῖς λέγουσιν; 26τί γάρ εἰσιν ἄλλο τραγῳδίαι ἢ ἀνθρώπων πάθη τεθαυμακότων τὰ ἐκτὸς διὰ μέτρου τοιοῦδʼ ἐπιδεικνύμενα; 27εἰ γὰρ ἐξαπατηθέντα τινὰ ἔδει μαθεῖν, ὅτι τῶν ἐκτὸς καὶ ἀπροαιρέτων οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἐγὼ μὲν ἤθελον τὴν ἀπάτην ταύτην, ἐξ ἧς ἤμελλον εὐρόως καὶ ἀταράχως βιώσεσθαι, ὑμεῖς δʼ ὄψεσθʼ αὐτοὶ τί θέλετε. 28τί οὖν ἡμῖν παρέχει Χρύσιππος; ἵνα γνῷς, φησίν, ὅτι οὐ ψευδῆ ταῦτά ἐστιν, ἐξ ὧν ἡ εὔροιά ἐστι καὶ ἀπάθεια ἀπαντᾷ, 29λάβε μου τὰ βιβλία καὶ γνώσῃ ὡς … τε καὶ σύμφωνά ἐστι τῇ φύσει τὰ ἀπαθῆ με ποιοῦντα. ὦ μεγάλης εὐτυχίας, ὦ μεγάλου εὐεργέτου τοῦ δεικνύοντος τὴν ὁδόν. 30εἶτα Τριπτολέμῳ μὲν ἱερὰ καὶ βωμοὺς πάντες ἄνθρωποι ἀνεστάκασιν, 31ὅτι τὰς ἡμέρους τροφὰς ἡμῖν ἔδωκεν, τῷ δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν εὑρόντι καὶ φωτίσαντι καὶ εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἐξενεγκόντι, οὐ τὴν περὶ τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν, τίς ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τούτῳ βωμὸν ἱδρύσατο ἢ ναὸν ἢ ἄγαλμα ἀνέθηκεν ἢ τὸν θεὸν ἐπὶ τούτῳ προσκυνεῖ; 32ἀλλʼ ὅτι μὲν ἄμπελον ἔδωκαν ἢ πυρούς, ἐπιθύομεν τούτου ἕνεκα, ὅτι δὲ τοιοῦτον ἐξήνεγκαν καρπὸν ἐν ἀνθρωπίνῃ διανοίᾳ, διʼ οὗ τὴν ἀλήθειαν τὴν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας δείξειν ἡμῖν ἤμελλον, τούτου δʼ ἕνεκα οὐκ εὐχαριστήσωμεν τῷ θεῷ;
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA