Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER XXVI. · What the Law of Life is.
1As one [of his Scholars] was reading hypothetical Syllogisms; it is likewise a Law in these, says Epictetus, to admit what follows from the Hypothesis: but much more is it a Law in Life, to do what follows from Nature. For, if we desire in every Subject of Action, and in every Circumstance, to keep up to Nature; we must, on every Occasion, evidently make it our Aim, neither to let Consequences escape our Observation, nor to admit Contradictions. Philosophers, therefore, first exercise us in Theory, which is the more easy Task, and then lead us to the more difficult: for in Theory, there is nothing to oppose our following what we are taught; but in Life, there are many Things to draw us aside. It is ridiculous then, to say, we must begin from these: for it is not easy to begin from the most difficult: and this Excuse must be made to those Parents, who dislike that their Children should learn philosophical Speculations.——"Am I to blame then, Sir, and ignorant of my Duty, and of what is incumbent on me? If this is neither to be learnt, nor taught, why do you find fault with me? If it is to be taught, pray teach me yourself: or, if you cannot, give me Leave to learn it from those who profess to understand it. Besides: do you think that I voluntarily fall into Evil, and miss of Good? Heaven forbid! What then, is the Cause of my Faults?" Ignorance. "Are you not willing then, that I should get rid of my Ignorance? Who was ever taught the Art of Music, or Navigation, by Anger? Do you expect then, that your Anger should teach me the Art of Living?"——This howver, is allowed to be said only by one who really hath that Intention. But he who reads these Things, and applies to the Philosophers, merely for the sake of shewing, at an Entertainment, that he understands hypothetical Syllogisms; what doth he do it for, but to be admired by some Senator, who happens to sit near him . . . . . 2. . . . . . . I once saw a Person weeping and embracing the Knees of Epaphroditus; and deploring his hard Fortune, that he had not 50,000l. left. What said Epaphroditus, then? Did he laugh at him, as we should do? No: but cried out with Astonishment, Poor Man! How could you be silent? How could you bear it? 3. . . . . . . The first Step, therefore, towards becoming a Philosopher, is, being sensible in what State the ruling Faculty of the Mind is; for, when a Person knows it to be in a weak one, he will not immediately employ it in great Attempts, But, for want of this, some, who can scarce get down a Morsel, buy, and set themselves to swallow, whole Treatises; and so they throw them up again, or cannot digest them: and then come Cholics, Fluxes, and Fevers. Such Persons ought to consider what they can bear. Indeed, it is easy to convince an ignorant Person in Theory; but in Matters relating to Life, no one offers himself to Conviction; and we hate those who have convinced us. Socrates used to say, that we ought not to live a Life unexamined.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (1)
- The Text is so very corrupt in some Parts of this Chapter, that the Translation must have been wholly conjectural, and therefore is omitted.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
What the rule of life is.
S some one was reading hypothetical propositions, Epictetus remarked that it was a rule in these to admit whatever was in accordance with the hypothesis, but much more a rule in life to do what was in accordance with nature. For, if we desire in every matter and on every occasion to conform to nature, we must on every occasion evidently make it our aim, neither to omit anything thus conformabley nor to admit anything inconsistent. Philosophers, therefore, first exercise us in theory, which is the more easy task, and then lead us to the more difficult; for in theory there is nothing to hinder our following what we are taught, but in life there are many things to draw us aside. It is ridiculous, then, to say we must begin with these applications, for it is not easy to begin with the most difficult; and this excuse children should make to those parents who dislike that they should study philosophy. Am I to blame then, sir, and ignorant of my duty, and of what is incumbent on me? If this is neither to be learned, nor taught, why do you find fault with me? If it is to be taught, pray teach me yourself; or, if you cannot, let me learn it from those who profess to understand it. For what think you; that I voluntarily fall into evil, and miss good? Heaven forbid! What, then, is the cause of my faults? Ignorance. Are you not willing, then, that I should get rid of my ignorance? Who was ever taught the art of music, or navigation, by anger? Do you expect, then, that your anger should teach me the art of living?
This, however, can properly be said only by one who is really in earnest. But he who reads these things, and applies to the philosophers, merely for the sake of showing, at some entertainment, that he understands hypothetical reasonings, what aim has he but to be admired by some senator, who happens to sit near him? Great possessions may be won by such aims as that, but what we hold as wealth passes there for folly. It is hard, therefore, to overcome by appearances, where vain things thus pass for great.
I once saw a person weeping and embracing the Knees of Epaphroditus, and deploring his hard fortune, that he had not more than 150,000 drachmae left. What said Epaphroditus then? Did he laugh at him, as we should do? No; but cried out with astonishment: Poor man! How could you be silent under it? How could you bear it?
The first step, therefore, towards becoming a philosopher is to be sensible in what state the ruling faculty of the mind is; for on knowing it to be weak, no person will immediately employ it in great attempts. But, for want of this, some who can scarce digest a crumb will yet buy and swallow whole treatises; and so they throw them up again, or cannot digest them; and then come colics, fluxes, and fevers. Such persons ought to consider what they can bear. Indeed, it is easy to convince an ignorant person, so far as concerns theory; but in matters relating to life, no one offers himself to conviction, and we hate those who have convinced us. Socrates used to say, that we ought not to live a life unexamined.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Higginson’s notes (2)
- This passage is omitted as inexplicable by Mrs. Carter. Schweighaeuser says, Tentare interpretationem possum; praestare non possum. A passage just below I also have omitted, as the text is admitted to be in a hopeless state.—H.
- Plato, Apologia, i. 28. —H.
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
What is the law of life.
When a person was reading hypothetical arguments, Epictetus said, This also is an hypothetical law that we must accept what follows from the hypothesis. But much before this law is the law of life, that we must act conformably to nature. For if in every matter and circumstance we wish to observe what is natural, it is plain that in every thing we ought to make it our aim that neither that which is consequent shall escape us, and that we do not admit the contradictory. First then philosophers exercise us in theory(contemplation of things), which is easier; and then next they lead us to the more difficult things; for in theory, there is nothing which draws us away from following what is taught; but in the matters of life, many are the things which distract us. He is ridiculous then who says that he wishes to begin with the matters of real life, for it is not easy to begin with the more difficult things; and we ought to employ this fact as an argument to those parents who are vexed at their children learning philosophy: Am I doing wrong then my father, and do I not know what is suitable to me and becoming? If indeed this can neither be learned nor taught, why do you blame me? but if it can be taught, teach me; and if you can not, allow me to learn from those who say that they know how to teach. For what do you think? do you suppose that I voluntarily fall into evil and miss the good? I hope that it may not be so. What is then the cause of my doing wrong? Ignorance. Do you not choose then that I should get rid of my ignorance? Who was ever taught by anger the art of a pilot or music? Do you think then that by means of your anger I shall learn the art of life? He only is allowed to speak in this way who has shown such an intention. But if a mar. only intending to make a display at a banquet and to show that he is acquainted with hypothetical arguments reads them and attends the philosophers, what other object has he than that some man of senatorian rank who sits by him may admire? For there (at Rome) are the really great materials (opportunities), and the riches here (at Nicopolis) appear to be trifles there. This is the reason why it is difficult for a man to be master of the appearances, where the things which disturb the judgment are great. I know a certain person who complained, as he embraced the knees of Epaphroditus, that he had only one hundred and fifty times ten thousand denarii remaining. What then did Epaphroditus do? Did he laugh at him, as we slaves of Epaphroditus did? No, but he cried out with amazement, Poor man, how then did you keep silence, how did you endure it?
When Epictetus had reproved(called) the person who was reading the hypothetical arguments, and the teacher who had suggested the reading was laughing at the reader, Epictetus said to the teacher, You are laughing at yourself: you did not prepare the young man nor did you ascertain whether he was able to understand these matters; but perhaps, you are only employing him as a reader. Well then said Epictetus, if a man has not ability enough to understand a complex (syllogism), do we trust him in giving praise, do we trust him in giving blame, do we allow that he is able to form a judgment about good or bad? and if such a man blames any one, does the man care for the blame? and if he praises any one, is the man elated, when in such small matters as an hypothetical syllogism he who praises cannot see what is consequent on the hypothesis?
This then is the beginning of philosophy, a man’s perception of the state of his ruling faculty; for when a man knows that it is weak, then he will not employ it on things of the greatest difficulty. But at present, if men cannot swallow even a morsel, they buy whole volumes and attempt to devour them; and this is the reason why they vomit them up or suffer indigestion: and then come gripings, defluxes, and fevers. Such men ought to consider what their ability is. In theory it is easy to convince an ignorant person; but in the affairs of real life no one offers himself to be convinced, and we hate the man who has convinced us. But Socrates advised us not to live a life which is not subjected to examination.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (8)
- ἐπὶ τῆς θεωρίας . Intelligere quid verum rectumque sit, prius est et facilius. Id vero exsequi et observare, posterius et difficilius. —Wolf. This is a profound and useful remark of Epictetus. General principles are most easily understood and accepted. The difficulty is in the application of them. What is more easy, for example, than to understand general principles of law which are true and good? But in practice cases are presented to us which as Bacon says, are immersed in matter; and it is this matter which makes the difficulty of applying the principles, and requires the ability and study of an experienced man. It is easy, and it is right, to teach the young the general principles of the rules of life; but the difficulty of applying them is that in which the young and the old too often fail. So if you ask whether virtue can be taught, the answer is that the rules for a virtuous life can be delivered; but the application of the rules is the difficulty, as teachers of religion and morality know well, if they are fit to teach. If they do not know this truth, they are neither fit to teach the rules, nor to lead the way to the practice of them by the only method which is possible; and this method is by their own example, assisted by the example of those who direct the education of youth, and of those with whom young persons live.
- Such an intention appears to mean the intention of learning. The son alone can say this to his father, when the son studies philosophy for the purpose of living a good life, and not for the purpose of display. —Wolf.
- I have followed Schweihaeuser’s explanation of this difficult passage, and I have accepted his emendation ἐκσείοντα , in place of the MSS, reading ἐκεῖ ὄντα .
- This was a large sum. He is speaking of drachmae, or of the Roman equivalents denarii. In Roman language the amount would be briefly expressed by sexagies centena millia H. S., or simply by sexagies.
- See Schweighaeuser’s note; and all his notes on this chapter, which is rather difficult.
- See ii. c 11.
- Seneca, De Tranquillitate animi, c. 9, says: What is the use of countless books and libraries, when the owner scarcely reads in his whole life the tables of contents? The number only confuses a learner, does not instruct him. It is much better to give yourself up to a few authors than to wander through many.
- See Plato’s Apology, c. 28; and Antoninus, iii. 5.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1ἀναγιγνώσκοντος δὲ τοὺς ὑποθετικοὺς ἔφη Νόμος ὑποθετικός ἐστι καὶ οὗτος τὸ ἀκόλουθον τῇ ὑποθέσει παραδέχεσθαι. πολὺ πρότερον δὲ νόμος βιωτικός ἐστιν οὗτος τὸ ἀκόλουθον τῇ φύσει πράττειν. 2εἰ γὰρ ἐπὶ πάσης ὕλης καὶ περιστάσεως βουλόμεθα τηρῆσαι τὸ κατὰ φύσιν, δῆλον ὅτι ἐν παντὶ στοχαστέον τοῦ μήτε τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἡμᾶς ἐκφυγεῖν μήτε παραδέξασθαι τὸ μαχόμενον. 3πρῶτον οὖν ἐπὶ τῆς θεωρίας γυμνάζουσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ φιλόσοφοι ὅπου ῥᾷον, εἶτα οὕτως ἐπὶ τὰ χαλεπώτερα ἄγουσιν· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστι τὸ ἀνθέλκον ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἀκολουθῆσαι τοῖς διδασκομένοις, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν βιωτικῶν πολλὰ τὰ περισπῶντα. γελοῖος οὖν ὁ λέγων πρῶτον βούλεσθαι ἐπʼ ἐκείνων· 4οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον ἄρχεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν χαλεπωτέρων. 5καὶ τοῦτον ἀπολογισμὸν ἔδει φέρειν πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς τοὺς ἀγανακτοῦντας ἐπὶ τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν τὰ τέκνα. οὐκοῦν ἁμαρτάνω, πάτερ, καὶ οὐκ οἶδα τὸ ἐπιβάλλον ἐμαυτῷ καὶ προσῆκον· εἰ μὲν οὐδὲ μαθητόν ἐστιν οὐδὲ διδακτόν, τί μοι ἐγκαλεῖς; εἰ δὲ διδακτόν, δίδασκε· εἰ δὲ σὺ μὴ δύνασαι, ἄφες με μαθεῖν παρὰ τῶν λεγόντων εἰδέναι. 6ἐπεὶ τί δοκεῖς; ὅτι θέλων περιπίπτω κακῷ καὶ ἀποτυγχάνω τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ; μὴ γένοιτο. τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ἁμαρτάνειν με; 7ἡ ἄγνοια. οὐ θέλεις οὖν ἀποθῶμαι τὴν ἄγνοιαν; τίνα πώποτε ὀργὴ[ν] ἐδίδαξε τὰ κυβερνητικά, τὰ μουσικά; τὰ βιωτικὰ οὖν διὰ τὴν ὀργήν σου δοκεῖς ὅτι μαθήσομαι; 8ταῦτα ἐκείνῳ μόνῳ λέγειν ἔξεστι τῷ τοιαύτην ἐπιβολὴν ἐνηνοχότι. 9εἰ δέ τις μόνον ἐπιδείκνυσθαι θέλων ἐν συμποσίῳ ὅτι οἶδεν τοὺς ὑποθετικοὺς ἀναγιγνώσκει ταῦτα καὶ προσέρχεται τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, οὗτος ἄλλο τι πράσσει ἵνα αὐτὸν συγκλητικὸς παρακατακείμενος θαυμάσει; 10ἐκεῖ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι αἱ μεγάλαι ὗλαί εἰσι καὶ οἱ ἐνθάδε πλοῦτοι ἐκεῖ παίγνια δοκοῦσιν. διὰ τοῦτο ἐκεῖ δύσκολον κρατῆσαι τῶν αὑτοῦ φαντασιῶν, ὅπου τὰ ἐκ σείοντα μεγάλα. 11ἐγώ τινα οἶδα κλαίοντα Ἐπαφροδίτου τῶν γονάτων ἁπτόμενον καὶ λέγοντα ταλαιπωρεῖν· ἀπολελεῖφθαι γὰρ αὐτῷ μηδέν, εἰ μὴ ἑκατὸν πεντήκοντα μυριάδας. 12τί οὖν ὁ Ἐπαφρόδιτος; κατεγέλασεν ὡς ὑμεῖς; οὔ· ἀλλʼ ἐπιθαυμάσας λέγει τάλας, πῶς οὖν ἐσιώπας, πῶς ἐκαρτέρεις; 13ταράξας δὲ τὸν ἀναγιγνώσκοντα τοὺς ὑποθετικοὺς καὶ γελάσαντος τοῦ ὑποθεμένου αὐτῷ τὴν ἀνάγνωσιν Σεαυτοῦ, ἔφη, καταγελᾷς· οὐ προεγύμνασας τὸν νεανίσκον οὐδʼ ἔγνως εἰ δύναται τούτοις παρακολουθεῖν, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἀναγνώστῃ αὐτῷ χρῇ. 14τί οὖν, ἔφη, μὴ δυναμένῃ διανοίᾳ συμπεπλεγμένου ἐπικρίσει παρακολουθεῖν ἔπαινον πιστεύομεν, ψόγον πιστεύομεν, ἐπίκρισιν περὶ τῶν καλῶς ἢ κακῶς γινομένων; κἄν τινα κακῶς λέγῃ, οὗτος ἐπιστρέφεται, κἂν ἐπαινῇ τινα, ἐπαίρεται; ἐν τοῖς οὕτως μικροῖς μὴ εὑρίσκων τὸ ἑξῆς; 15αὕτη οὖν ἀρχὴ τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν, αἴσθησις τοῦ ἰδίου ἡγεμονικοῦ πῶς ἔχει· μετὰ γὰρ τὸ γνῶναι ὅτι ἀσθενῶς οὐκ ἔτι θελήσει χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰ μεγάλα. 16νῦν δὲ μὴ δυνάμενοί τινες τὸν ψωμὸν καταπίνειν σύνταξιν ἀγοράσαντες ἐπιβάλλονται ἐσθίειν. διὰ τοῦτο ἐμοῦσιν ἢ ἀπεπτοῦσιν· εἶτα στρόφοι καὶ κατάρροιαι καὶ πυρετοί. ἔδει δʼ ἐφιστάνειν, εἰ δύνανται. 17ἀλλʼ ἐν μὲν θεωρίᾳ ῥᾴδιον ἐξελέγξαι τὸν οὐκ εἰδότα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον οὔτε παρέχει ἑαυτόν τις ἐλέγχῳ τόν τʼ ἐξελέγξαντα μισοῦμεν. 18ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν ἀνεξέταστον βίον μὴ ζῆν.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA