Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER XXII. · Of Pre-conceptions.
1Pre-conceptions are common to all Men: and one Pre-conception doth not contradict another. For, who of us doth not lay it down as a Maxim, That Good is advantageous and eligible, and at all Events, to be pursued and followed: that Justice is fair and becoming? Whence, then, arises the Dispute?——In adapting these Preconceptions to particular Cases. As, when one cries; "Such a Person hath acted well: he is a gallant Man:" and another; "No; he hath acted like a Fool." Hence arises the Dispute among Men. This is the Dispute between Jews, and Syrians, and Egyptians, and Romans: not whether Sanctity be preferable to all Things, and in every Instance to be pursued; but whether the eating Swine's Flesh be consistent with Sanctity, or not. This, too, you will find to have been the Dispute between Achilles and Agamemnon. For, call them forth. What say you, Agamemnon? Ought not that to be done, which is fit and right?——Yes, surely.——Achilles, what say you? Is it not agreeable to you, that what is right should be done?——Yes: beyond every other thing. Adapt your Preconceptions, then. Here begins the Dispute. One says; "It is not fit, that I should restore Chryseis to her Father." The other says; "Yes; but it is." One, or the other of them, certainly makes a wrong Adaptation of the Pre-conception of Fitness. Again: one says; "If it be fit, that I should give up Chryseis; it is fit, too, that I should take some one of your Prizes." The other: "What, that you should take my Mistress?" "Ay; yours." "What, mine only? Must I only, then, lose my Prize?" 2. What, then, is it to be properly educated? To learn how to adapt natural Pre-conceptions to particular Cases, conformably to Nature: and, for the future, to distinguish, that some Things are in our own Power; others not. In our own Power, are Choice, and all Actions dependent on Choice: not in our Power, the Body, the Parts of the Body, Property, Parents, Brothers, Children, Country, and, in short, all with whom we are engaged in Society. Where, then, shall we place Good? To what kind of Things shall we adapt the Pre-conception of it? To that in our own Power. 3What, then, is not Health, and Strength, and Life, good? And are not Children, nor Parents, nor Country? Who will have Patience with you? Let us transfer it, then, to the other Sort of Things. Can he who suffers Harm, and is disappointed of good Things, be happy? He cannot. And can he preserve a right Behaviour with regard to Society? How is it possible he should? For I am naturally led to my own Interest. If, therefore, it is for my Interest, to have an Estate, it is for my interest likewise to take it away from my Neighbour. If it is for my Interest to have a Suit of Clothes; it is for my Interest likewise to steal it wherever I find it. Hence Wars, Seditions, Tyranny, unjust Invasions. How shall I, if this be the Case, be able, any longer, to preserve my Duty towards Jupiter? If I suffer Harm, and am disappointed, he takes no care of me. And, what is Jupiter to me, if he cannot help me: or, again; what is he to me, if he chuses I should be in the Condition I am? Henceforward I begin to hate him. What, then, do we build Temples, do we raise Statues, to Jupiter, as to evil Demons, as to the Goddess Fever? How, at this rate, is he the Preserver; and how the Dispenser of Rain and Plenty? If we place the Essence of Good any-where here, all this will follow.——What, then, shall we do? 4This is the Enquiry of him who philosophizes in reality, and labours to bring forth [Truth]. "Do not I now see what is good, and what is evil?" Surely I am in my Senses. Ay: but shall I place Good any-where on this other Side; in Things dependent [only] on my own Choice? Why, every one will laugh at me. Some grey-headed old Fellow will come, with his Fingers covered with Gold Rings, and shake his Head, and say; "Hark ye, Child, it is fit you should learn Philosophy, but it is fit, too, you should have Brains. This is Nonsense. You learn Syllogisms from Philosophers but how you are to act, you know better than they." "Then, why do you chide me, Sir, if I do know." What can I say to this Wretch? If I make no Answer, he will burst. I must e'en answer thus: "Forgive me, as they do People in Love. I am not myself. I have lost my Senses."
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (3)
- See Introduction, §. 10.
- Wars and Fightings are ascribed to the same Causes, by St. James, iv. 1.
- This seems intended to express the Perplexity of a Person convinced, that Good is not to be found in Externals; and afraid of popular Raillery, if he places it in such Things only, as depend on our own Choice.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Of general principles.
The same general principles are common to all men, nor does one such principle contradict another; for which of us does not admit that good is advantageous and eligible, and in all cases to be pursued and followed? Who does not admit that justice is fair and becoming? Where, then, arises the dispute? In adapting these principles to particular cases; as when one cries, Such a person has acted well,—he is a gallant man; and another, No, he has acted like a fool. Hence arise disputes among men. This is the dispute between Jews and Syrians and Egyptians and Romans,—not whether the right be preferable to all things, and in every instance to be sought; but whether the eating swine’s flesh be consistent with right, or not. This, too, you will find to have been the dispute between Achilles and Agamemnon; for call them forth. What say you, Agamemnon,—ought not that to be done which is fit and right? Yes, surely. Achilles, what say you,—is it not agreeable to you, that what is right should be done? Yes; I desire it beyond everything. Apply your principles then. Here begins the dispute. One says, It is not fit that I should restore Chryseis to her father. The other says, Yes; but it is. One or the other of them, certainly, makes a wrong conception of the principle of fitness. Again, the one says, If it be fit that I should give up Chryseis, it is fit, too, that I should take some of your prizes. The other answers, What, that you should take my mistress? Ay; yours. What, mine only? Must I only, then, lose my prize?
What, then, is it to be properly educated? To learn how to apply the principles of natural right to particular cases, and, for the rest, to distinguish that some things are in our power, while others are not. In our own power are the will, and all voluntary actions; out of our power, the body and its parts, property, parents, brothers, children, country, and, in short, all our fellow-beings. Where, then, shall we place good? In what shall we define it to consist? In things within our own power. But are not health and strength and life good? And are not children, parents, country? You talk unreasonably.
Let us, then, try another point of view. Can he who suffers evil, and is disappointed of good, be happy? He cannot. And can he preserve a right behavior with regard to society? How is it possible that he should? I am naturally led to seek my own highest good. If, therefore, it is my highest good to have an estate, it is for my good likewise to take it away from my neighbor. If it is my highest good to have a suit of clothes, it is for my good likewise to steal it wherever I find it. Hence wars, seditions, tyranny, unjust invasions. How shall I, if this be the case, be able any longer to do my duty towards Zeus? If I suffer evil, and am disappointed, he takes no care of me. And what is he to me if he cannot help me; or. again, what is he to me if he chooses I should be in the condition that I am? Then I begin to hate him. What, then, do we build temples, do we raise statues, to Zeus. as to evil demons, as to the goddess Fever? How, then, is he the preserver, and how the dispenser of rain and plenty? If we place the essence of good on any such ground, all this will follow. What, then, shall we do?
This is the inquiry which interests him who philosophizes in earnest, and to some result. Do I not now see what is good, and what is evil, or am I mad? Suppose I place good only in things dependent on my own will? Why, every one will laugh at me. Some gray-headed old fellow will come, with his fingers covered with gold rings, and will shake his head, and say, Hark ye, child, it is fit you should learn philosophy; but it is fit, too, you should have common-sense. All this is nonsense. You learn syllogisms from philosophers; but how you are to act, you know better than they. Then what displeases you if I do know? What can I say to this unfortunate? If I make no answer, he will burst; so I must answer thus: Bear with me, as with lovers. Granted; I am not myself. I have lost my senses.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
On praecognitions.
Praecognitions are common to all men, and praecognition is not contradictory to praecognition. For who of us does not assume that Good is useful and eligible, and in all circumstances that we ought to follow and pursue it? And who of us does not assume that Justice is beautiful and becoming? When then does the contradiction arise? It arises in the adaptation of the praecognitions to the particular cases. When one man says, He has done well: he is a brave man, and another says, Not so; but he has acted foolishly; then the disputes arise among men. This is the dispute among the Jews and the Syrians and the Egyptians and the Romans; not whether holiness should be preferred to all things and in all cases should be pursued, but whether it is holy to eat pig’s flesh or not holy. You will find this dispute also between Agamemnon and Achilles; for call them forth. What do you say, Agamemnon? ought not that to be done which is proper and right? Certainly. Well, what do you say, Achilles? do you not admit that what is good ought to be done? I do most certainly. Adapt your praecognitions then to the present matter. Here the dispute begins. Agamemnon says, I ought not to give up Chryseis to her father. Achilles says, You ought. It is certain that one of the two makes a wrong adaptation of the praecognition of ought or duty. Further, Agamemnon says, Then if I ought to restore Chryseis, it is fit that I take his prize from some of you. Achilles replies, Would you then take her whom I love? Yes, her whom you love. Must I then be the only man who goes without a prize? and must I be the only man who has no prize? Thus the dispute begins.
What then is education? Education is the learning how to adapt the natural praecognitions to the particular things conformably to nature; and then to distinguish that of things some are in our power, but others are not: in our power are will and all acts which depend on the will; things not in our power are the body, the parts of the body, possessions, parents, brothers, children, country and generally, all with whom we live in society. In what then should we place the good? To what kind of things (οὐσίᾳ) shall we adapt it? To the things which are in our power? Is not health then a good thing, and soundness of limb, and life? and are not children and parents and country? Who will tolerate you if you deny this?
Let us then transfer the notion of good to these things. Is it possible then, when a man sustains damage and does not obtain good things, that he can be happy? It is not possible. And can he maintain towards society a proper behaviour? He can not. For I am naturally formed to look after my own interest. If it is my interest to have an estate in land, it is my interest also to take it from my neighbour. If it is my interest to have a garment, it is my interest also to steal it from the bath. This is the origin of wars, civil commotions, tyrannies, conspiracies. And how shall I be still able to maintain my duty towards Zeus? for if I sustain damage and am unlucky, he takes no care of me; and what is he to me if he cannot help me; and further, what is he to me if he allows me to be in the condition in which I am? I now begin to hate him. Why then do we build temples, why set up statues to Zeus, as well as to evil daemons, such as to Fever; and how is Zeus the Saviour, and how the giver of rain, and the giver of fruits? And in truth if we place the nature of Good in any such things, all this follows.
What should we do then? This is the inquiry of the true philosopher who is in labour. Now I do not see what the Good is nor the Bad. Am I not mad? Yes. But suppose that I place the good somewhere among the things which depend on the will: all will laugh at me. There will come some greyhead wearing many gold rings on his fingers, and he will shake his head and say, Hear, my child. It is right that you should philosophize; but you ought to have some brains also: all this that you are doing is silly. You learn the syllogism from philosophers; but you know how to act better than philosophers do.—Man, why then do you blame me, if I know? What shall I say to this slave? If I am silent, he will burst. I must speak in this way: Excuse me, as you would excuse lovers: I am not my own master: I am mad.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (7)
- Praecognitions ( προλήψεις ) is translated Praecognita by John Smith, Select Discourses, p. 4. Cicero says (Topica, 7): Notionem appello quod Graeci tum ἔννοιαν , tum πρόληψιν dicunt. Ea est insita et ante percepta cujusque formae cognitio, enodationis indigens. In the De Natura Deorum (i. 16) he says: Quae est enim gens aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quandam deorum, quam appellat πρόληψιν Epicurus? id est, anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nec intelligi quidquam nec quaeri nec disputari potest. Epicurus, as Cicero says in the following chapter (17), was the first who used πρόληψις in this sense, which Cicero applies to what he calls the ingrafted or rather innate cognitions of the existence of gods, and these cognitions he supposes to be universal; but whether this is so or not, I do not know. See l. c. 2; Tuscul i. 24; De Fin. iii. 6, and πρόληψις in iv. 8. 6.
- The word is ὅσιον , which is very difficult to translate. We may take an instance from ourselves. There is a general agreement about integrity, and about the worship of the supreme being, but a wondrous difference about certain acts or doings in trading, whether they are consistent with integrity or not; and a still more wondrous difference in forms of worship, whether they are conformable to religion or not.
- Horace, Epp. i. 2 .
- Iliad, i. The quarrel of Achilles and Agamemnon about giving up Chryseis to her father.
- The bath was a place of common resort, where a thief had the opportunity of carrying off a bather’s clothes. From men’s desires to have what they have not, and do not choose to labour for, spring the disorders of society, as it is said in the epistle of James, c. iv., v. 1, to which Mrs. Carter refers.
- See i. 19. 6, note 2.
- Upton refers to a passage in the Theaetetus (p. 150, Steph.), where Socrates professes that it is his art to discover whether a young man’s mind is giving birth to an idol (an unreality) and a falsity, or to something productive and true; and he says (p. 151) that those who associate with him are like women in child-birth, for they are in labour and full of trouble nights and days much more than women, and his art has the power of stirring up and putting to rest this labour of child-birth. The conclusion in the chapter is not clear. The student is supposed to be addressed by some rich old man, who really does not know what to say; and the best way of getting rid of him and his idle talk is by dismissing him with a joke. See Schweighaeuser’s note.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1προλήψεις κοιναὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις εἰσίν· καὶ πρόληψις προλήψει οὐ μάχεται. τίς γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐ τίθησιν, ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθὸν συμφέρον ἐστὶ ἐστι καὶ αἱρετὸν καὶ ἐκ πάσης αὐτὸ περιστάσεως δεῖ μετιέναι καὶ διώκειν; τίς δʼ ἡμῶν οὐ τίθησιν, ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον καλόν ἐστι καὶ πρέπον; 2πότʼ οὖν ἡ μάχη γίνεται; περὶ τὴν ἐφαρμογὴν τῶν προλήψεων ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους οὐσίαις, 3ὅταν ὁ μὲν εἴπῃ καλῶς ἐποίησεν, ἀνδρεῖός ἐστιν· οὔ, ἀλλʼ ἀπονενοημένος. ἔνθεν ἡ μάχη γίνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρὸς ἀλλήλους. 4αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ Ἰουδαίων καὶ Σύρων καὶ Αἰγυπτίων καὶ Ῥωμαίων μάχη, οὐ περὶ τοῦ ὅτι τὸ ὅσιον πάντων προτιμητέον καὶ ἐν παντὶ μεταδιωκτέον, ἀλλὰ πότερόν ἐστιν ὅσιον τοῦτο τὸ χοιρείου φαγεῖν ἢ ἀνόσιον. 5ταύτην τὴν μάχην εὑρήσετε καὶ Ἀγαμέμνονος καὶ Ἀχιλλέως. κάλει γὰρ αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸ μέσον. τί λέγεις σύ, ὦ Ἀγάμεμνον; οὐ δεῖ γενέσθαι τὰ δέοντα καὶ τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα; 6δεῖ μὲν οὖν. σὺ δὲ τί λέγεις, ὦ Ἀχιλλεῦ; οὐκ ἀρέσκει σοι γίνεσθαι τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα; ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν πάντων μάλιστα ἀρέσκει. ἐφαρμόσατε οὖν τὰς προλήψεις. ἐντεῦθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ μάχης. 7ὁ μὲν λέγει οὐ χρὴ ἀποδιδόναι με τὴν Χρυσηίδα τῷ πατρί, ὁ δὲ λέγει δεῖ μὲν οὖν. πάντως ὁ ἕτερος αὐτῶν κακῶς ἐφαρμόζει τὴν πρόληψιν τοῦ δέοντος. 8πάλιν ὁ μὲν λέγει οὐκοῦν, εἴ με δεῖ ἀποδοῦναι τὴν Χρυσηίδα, δεῖ με λαβεῖν ὑμῶν τινος τὸ γέρας, ὁ δέ τὴν ἐμὴν οὖν λάβῃς ἐρωμένην;. τὴν σήν φησίν. ἐγὼ οὖν μόνος — ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ μόνος μὴ ἔχω; οὕτως μάχη γίνεται. 9τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ παιδεύεσθαι; μανθάνειν τὰς φυσικὰς προλήψεις ἐφαρμόζειν ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους οὐσίαις καταλλήλως τῇ φύσει καὶ λοιπὸν διελεῖν, 10ὅτι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἐφʼ ἡμῖν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν· ἐφʼ ἡμῖν μὲν προαίρεσις καὶ πάντα τὰ προαιρετικὰ ἔργα, οὐκ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν δὲ τὸ σῶμα, τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, κτήσεις, γονεῖς, ἀδελφοὶ, τέκνα, πατρίς, ἁπλῶς οἱ κοινωνοί. 11ποῦ οὖν θῶμεν τὸ ἀγαθόν; ποίᾳ οὐσίᾳ αὐτὸ ἐφαρμόσομεν; τῇ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν; 12— εἶτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν ὑγίεια καὶ ἀρτιότης καὶ ζωή, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ τέκνα οὐδὲ γονεῖς οὐδὲ πατρίς; — καὶ τίς σου ἀνέξεται; 13μεταθῶμεν οὖν αὐτὸ πάλιν ἐνθάδε. ἐνδέχεται οὖν βλαπτόμενον καὶ ἀποτυγχάνοντα τῶν ἀγαθῶν εὐδαιμονεῖν; — οὐκ ἐνδέχεται. — καὶ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς κοινωνοὺς οἵαν δεῖ … ἀναστροφήν; καὶ πῶς ἐνδέχεται; 14ἐγὼ γὰρ πέφυκα πρὸς τὸ ἐμὸν συμφέρον. εἰ συμφέρει μοι ἀγρὸν ἔχειν, συμφέρει μοι καὶ ἀφελέσθαι αὐτὸν τοῦ πλησίον· εἰ συμφέρει μοι ἱμάτιον ἔχειν, συμφέρει μοι καὶ κλέψαι αὐτὸ ἐκ βαλανείου. ἔνθεν πόλεμοι, στάσεις, τυραννίδες, ἐπιβουλαί. 15πῶς δʼ ἔτι δυνήσομαι τὸ πρὸς τὸν Δία καθῆκον; εἰ γὰρ βλάπτομαι καὶ ἀτυχῶ, οὐκ ἐπιστρέφεταί μου. καὶ τί μοι καὶ αὐτῷ, εἰ οὐ δύναταί μοι βοηθῆσαι; καὶ πάλιν τί μοι καὶ αὐτῷ, εἰ θέλει μʼ ἐν τοιούτοις εἶναι ἐν οἷς εἰμι; ἄρχομαι λοιπὸν μισεῖν αὐτόν. 16τί οὖν ναοὺς ποιοῦμεν, τί οὖν ἀγάλματα, ὡς κακοῖς δαίμοσιν, ὡς πυρετῷ τῷ Διί; καὶ πῶς ἔτι Σωτὴρ καὶ πῶς Ὑέτιος καὶ πῶς Ἐπικάρπιος; καὶ μήν, ἂν ἐνταῦθά που θῶμεν τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, πάντα ταῦτα ἐξακολουθεῖ. 17τί οὖν ποιήσωμεν;— αὕτη ἐστὶ ζήτησις τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦντος τῷ ὄντι καὶ ὠδίνοντος· νῦν ἐγὼ οὐχ ὁρῶ τί ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν· οὐ μαίνομαι; 18ναί· ἀλλʼ ἂν ἐνταῦθά που θῶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἐν τοῖς προαιρετικοῖς, πάντες μου καταγελάσονται. ἥξει τις γέρων πολιὸς χρυσοῦς δακτυλίους ἔχων πολλούς, εἶτα ἐπισείσας τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐρεῖ ἄκουσόν μου, τέκνον· δεῖ μὲν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν, δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐγκέφαλον ἔχειν· ταῦτα μωρά ἐστιν. σὺ παρὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων μανθάνεις συλλογισμόν, 19τί δέ σοι ποιητέον ἐστίν, σὺ κάλλιον οἶδας ἢ οἱ φιλόσοφοι. ἄνθρωπε, τί οὖν μοι ἐπιτιμᾷς, εἰ οἶδα; 20τούτῳ τῷ ἀνδραπόδῳ τί εἴπω; 21ἂν σιωπῶ, ῥήγνυται ἐκεῖνος. ὡς δεῖ λέγειν ὅτι σύγγνωθί μοι ὡς τοῖς ἐρῶσιν· οὐκ εἰμὶ ἐμαυτοῦ, μαίνομαι.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA