Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER XXIX. · Of Intrepidity.
1The Essence of Good and Evil, is a certain Disposition of the Choice. What are Externals, then? Materials to the Faculty of Choice: in the Management of which, it will attain its own Good or Evil. How, then, will it attain Good? If it doth not admire the Materials themselves: for right Principles, concerning these Materials, constitute a good Choice: but perverse and distorted Principles, a bad one. This Law hath God ordained, who says; "If you wish for Good, receive it from yourself." You say, No: but from another.——"Nay; but from yourself." In consequence of this, when a Tyrant threatens, and sends for me; I say, Against what is your Threatning pointed? If he says, "I will chain you;" I answer, It is my Hands and Feet that you threaten. If he says, "I will cut off your Head;" I answer, It is my Head that you threaten. If he says, "I will throw you into Prison;" I answer, It is the Whole of this paultry Body that you threaten: and, if he threatens Banishment, just the same. Doth not he threaten you, then? If I am persuaded, that these Things are nothing to me, he doth not: but, if I fear any of them, it is me that he threatens. Whom, after all, is it that I fear? The Master of what? Of Things in my own Power? Of these no one is the Master. Of Things not in my Power? And what are these to me? 2What, then! do you Philosophers teach us a Contempt of Kings? By no means. Who of us teaches any one to contend with them, about Things of which they have the Command? Take my Body; take my Possessions; take my Reputation; take those who are about me. If I persuade any one to contend for these Things, as his own, accuse me, with Justice.——"Ay: but I would command your Principles too."——And who hath given you that Power? How can you conquer the Principle of another?——By applying Terror, I will conquer it.——Do not you see, that what conquers itself, is not conquered by another? And nothing but itself can conquer the Choice. Hence, too, the most excellent and equitable Law of God; that the Better should always prove superior to the Worse. Ten are better than One. To what Purpose? For chaining, killing, dragging where they please. for taking away an Estate, Thus Ten conquer One, in the Instance wherein they are better. In what, then, are they worse? When the one hath right Principles, and the others have not. For can they conquer in this Point? How should they? If we were weighed in a Scale, must not the Heavier outweigh? 3That ever Socrates should suffer such Things from the Athenians! Wretch what do you mean by Socrates? Express the Fact as it is. That ever the poor paultry Body of Socrates should be carried away, and dragged to Prison, by such as were stronger [than itself]: that ever any one should give Hemlock to the Body of Socrates; and that it should expire! Do these Things appear wonderful to you? These Things unjust? Is it for such Things as these that you accuse God? Had Socrates, then, no Equivalent for them? In what, then, to him, did the Essence of Good consist? Whom shall we mind; you, or him? And what doth he say? "Anytus and Melitus may indeed kill; but hurt me they cannot." And again: "If it so pleases God, so let it be." 4But shew me, that he who hath the worse Principles, gets the Advantage over him, who hath the better. You never will shew it, nor any thing like it for the Law of Nature and of God, is this; Let the Better be always superior to the Worse. In what? In that, wherein it is better. One Body is stronger than another: Many than One; and a Thief, than one who is not a Thief. Thus I, too, lost my Lamp; because the Thief was better at keeping awake, than I. But he bought a Lamp, at the Price of being a Thief, a Rogue, and a wild Beast. This seemed to him a good Bargain: and much Good may it do him! 5Well: but one takes me by the Coat, and draws me to the Forum; and then all the rest bawl out——"Philosopher, what Good do your Principles do you? See, you are dragging to Prison: see, you are going to lose your Head!"——And, pray what Rule of Philosophy could I contrive, that, when a stronger than myself lays hold on my Coat, I should not be dragged? Or that, when ten Men pull me at once, and throw me into Prison, I should not be thrown there? But have I learnt nothing, then? I have learnt to know, whatever happens, that, if it is not a Matter of Choice, it is nothing to me. Have my Principles, then, done me no Good? What, then! do I seek for any thing else to do me Good, but what I have learnt? Afterwards, as I sit in Prison, I say: He, who makes this Outcry, neither hears what Signal is given, nor understands what is said; nor is it any Concern to him, to know what Philosophers say, or do. Let him alone.——[Well: but I am bid] to come out of Prison again.——If you have no further Need for me, in Prison, I will come out: if you want me again, I will return.——"For how long [will you go on thus?]"——Just as long as Reason requires I should continue in this paultry Body: when that is over, take it, and fare ye well. Only let not this be done inconsiderately; nor from Cowadice; nor upon every slight Pretence: for that, again, would be contrary to the Will of God: for he hath Need of such a World, and such [Creatures] to live on Earth. But, if he sounds a Retreat, as he did to Socrates, we are to obey him, when he sounds it, as our General. 6Well: but are these Things to be said to the World? For what Purpose? Is it not sufficient to be convinced one's self? When Children come to us, clapping their Hands, and saying; "To-morrow is the good Feast of Saturn:" do we tell them, that Good doth not consist in such Things? By no means: but we clap our Hands along with them. Thus, when you are unable to convince any one, consider him as a Child, and clap your Hands with him: or, if you will not do that, at least hold your Tongue. These Things we ought to remember; and, when we are called to any Difficulty, know, that an Opportunity is come, of shewing whewhether we have been well taught. For he who goes from a philosophical Lecture to a difficult Point of Practice, is like a young Man who has been studying to solve Syllogisms. If you propose an easy one, he says; Give me rather a fine intricate one, that I may try my Strength. Even athletic Champions are displeased with a slight Antagonist. He cannot lift me, says one. This is a Youth of Spirit. No: but, I warrant you, when the Occasion calls upon him, he must fall a crying, and say: "I wanted to learn a little longer first."——Learn what? If you did not learn these Things to shew them in Practice, why did you learn them at all? I am persuaded there must be some one among you who sit here, that feels secret Pangs of Impatience, and says; "When will such a Difficulty come to my Share, as hath now fallen to his? Must I sit wasting my Life in a Corner, when I might be crowned at Olympia? When will any one bring the News of such a Combat, for me?" Such should be the Disposition of you all. Even among the Gladiators of Cæsar, there are some who bear it very ill, that they are not brought upon the Stage, and match'd; and who offer Vows to God, and address the Officers, begging to fight. And will none among you, appear such? I would willingly take a Voyage, on purpose to see how a Champion of mine acts; how he treats his Subject.——"I do not chuse such a Subject," say you.——Is it in your Power, then, to take what Subject you chuse? Such a Body is given you; such Parents, such Brothers, such a Country, and such a Rank in it; and, then, you come to me, and say, "Change my Subject." Besides, have not you Abilities to manage that which is given you? It is your Business, [we should say] to propose; mine, to treat the Subject well.——"No. But do not propose such an Argument to me; but such a one: do not offer such an Objection to me; but such a one."——There will be a Time, I suppose, when Tragedians will fancy themselves to be mere Masks, and Buskins, and long Train. These Things are your Materials, Man, and your Subject. Speak something; that we may know, whether you are a Tragedian, or a Buffoon: for both have all the rest, in common. If any one, therefore, should take away his Buskins, and his Mask, and bring him upon the Stage, in his common Dress, is the Tragedian lost, or doth he remain? If he hath a voice, he remains. "Here, this Instant, take upon you the Command." I take it; and, taking it, I shew how a Person, who hath been properly instructed, behaves.——"Lay aside your Robe; put on Rags, and come upon the Stage in that Character."——What then? Is it not in my Power to bring a good Voice [and Manner] along with me?——"In what Character do you now appear?" As a Witness cited by God.——"Come you, then, and bear witness for me; for you are a Witness worthy of being produced by me. Is any thing, external to the Choice, either Good or Evil? Do I hurt any one? Have I placed the Good of each individual in any one, but in himself? What Evidence do you give for God?"——I am in a miserable Condition, O Lord; I am undone: no Mortal cares for me: no Mortal gives me any thing: all blame me; all speak ill of me.——Is this the Evidence you are to give? And will you bring Disgrace upon his Citation, who hath conferred such an Honour upon you, and thought you worthy of being produced as a Witness in such a Cause? 7But he who hath the Power, hath given Sentence. "I judge you to be impious and profane."——What hath befallen you?——I have been judged to be impious and profane——Any thing else?——Nothing——Suppose he had pass'd his Judgment upon an hypothetical Proposition, and pronounced it to be a false Conclusion, that, if it be Day, it is light; what would have befallen the Proposition? In this Case, who is judged; who condemned; the Proposition, or he who is deceived, concerning it? Doth he, who hath the Power of pronouncing any thing, concerning you, know, what Pious, or Impious, mean? Hath he made it his Study, or learned it? Where? From whom? A Musician would not regard him, if he pronounced Bass to be Treble: nor a Mathematician, if he pass'd Sentence, that Lines drawn from the Center to the Circle, are not equal. And shall He, who is truly learned, regard an unlearned Man, when he pronounces upon Pious and Impious, Just and Unjust? 8"Oh the Injuries to which the Learned are exposed!" Is it here that you have learn'd this? Why do not you leave such pitiful Reasonings to idle pitiful Fellows; and let them sit in a Corner, and receive some little sorry Pay; or grumble, that nobody gives them any thing? But do you appear, and make use of what you have learn'd. It is not Reasonings that are wanted now. On the contrary, Books are stuffed full of Stoical Reasonings. What is wanted, then? One to apply them; whose Actions may bear Testimony to his Doctrines. Assume me this Charracter, that we may no longer make use of the Examples of the Ancients, in the Schools; but may have some Example of our own. 9To whom, then, doth the Contemplation of these [speculative Reasonings] belong? To him, that hath Leisure. For Man is an Animal fond of Contemplation. But it is shameful to take a View of these Things, as run-away Slaves do of a Play. We are to sit quietly, and listen, sometimes to the Actor, and sometimes to the Musician: and not do like those, who come in and praise the Actor, and at the same time look round them every Way: then, if any one happens to name their Master, are frighted out of their Wits, and run off. It is shameful for a Philosopher, thus to contemplate the Works of Nature. Now, what, in this Case, is the Master? Man is not the Master of Man; but Death, and Life, and Pleasure, and Pain: for without these, bring Cæsar to me, and you will see how intrepid I shall be. But, if he comes thundering and lightening with these, and these are the Objects of my Terror; what do I else, but, like the run-away Slave, acknowledge my Master? While I have any Respite from these, as the Fugitive comes into the Theatre, so I bathe, drink, sing; but all, with Terror and Anxiety. But, if I free myself from my Masters, that is, from such Things as render a Master terrible, what Trouble, what Master have I remaining? 10What, then, are we to publish these Things to all Men? No. But humour the Vulgar, and say; This poor Man advises me to what he thinks good for himself. I excuse him for Socrates, too, excused the Jailer, who wept when he was to drink the Poison: and said, "How heartily he sheds Tears for us." Was it to him that Socrates said, "For this Reason we sent the Women out of the Way?" No: but to his Friends; to such, as were capable of hearing it; while he humoured the other, as a Child.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (9)
- The Sense of this Passage seems to require that the first αυτο should be read ὁ.
- Socrates, being asked by Crito, in what manner he would be buried? answered, As you please; if you can lay hold on me, and I do not escape from you. Then, smiling, and turning to his Friends, I cannot, says he, persuade Crito, that I, who am now disputing, and ranging the Parts of my Discourse, am Socrates: but he thinks the Corpse, which he will soon behold, to be me; and, therefore, asks how he must bury me. Plato, in Phæd. §. 64. Forster's Edition.
- The two principal Accusers of Socrates.
- This is evidently a Continuation of the Philosopher's Answer to those who reproached him, that his Principles had done him no Good; and, therefore, is translated in the first Person, though it is ωφελησαι and ζητεις in the Greek. This sudden Change of the Person, is very frequent in Epictetus; but would often disturb the Sense, if it was preserved in a Translation. Perhaps ωφελησαι is a Mistake, for ωφελημαι; as Μ, Σ are the same Letters differently turned.
- The Meaning of Epictetus in this Passage is not clear. If he is speaking of a voluntary Death, which some of his Expressions plainly imply, the Instance of Socrates seems improperly chosen: for he did not kill himself; but was sentenced by the Laws of his Country: to which, indeed, he paid so great a Reverence, as to refuse all the Assistance which was offered by his Friends, in order to his Escape.
- Φαινολη. Lord Shaftesbury.
- This imaginary Witness, first extolled, then failing in his Testimony, brings to one's Mind with unspeakable Advantage, that true and faithful Witness, who hath so fully attested the far more important Doctrines of Pardon, Grace, and everlasting Life: and taught Men, on this Foundation, not to be afraid of them that kill the Body; and, after that, have no more that they can do.
- It hath been observed, that this manner of Expression is not to be met with in the Heathen Authors before Christianity: and, therefore, it is one Instance of Scripture Language coming early into common Use.
- The mercenary Profesors of Philosophy, at that time.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Of courage.
The essence of good and evil is a certain disposition of the will.
What are things outward, then?
Materials on which the will may act, in attaining its own good or evil.
How, then, will it attain good?
If it be not dazzled by its own materials; for right principles concerning these materials keep the will in a good state; but perverse and distorted principles, in a bad one. This law hath God ordained, who says, If you wish for good, receive it from yourself. You say, No; but from another. Nay; but from yourself.
Accordingly, when a tyrant threatens, and sends for me, I say, Against what is your threatening pointed? If he says, will chain you, I answer, It is my hands and feet that you threaten. If he says, will cut off your head, I answer, It is my head that you threaten. If he says, will throw you into prison, I answer, It is the whole of this paltry body that you threaten; and if he threatens banishment, just the same.
Does he not threaten you, then?
If I am persuaded that these things are nothing to me, he does not; but if I fear any of them, it is me that he threatens. Who is it, after all, that I fear? The master of what? Of things in my own power? Of these no one is the master. Of things not in my power? And what are these to me?
What, then! do you philosophers teach us a contempt of kings?
By no means. Which of us teaches any one to contend with them about things of which they have the command? Take my body; take my possessions; take my reputation; take away even my friends. If I persuade any one to claim these things as his own, you may justly accuse me. Ay; but I would command your principles too. And who hath given you that power? How can you conquer the principle of another? By applying terror, I will conquer it. Do not you see that what conquers itself .is not conquered by another? And nothing but itself can conquer the will. Hence, too, the most excellent and equitable law of God, that the better should always prevail over the worse. Ten are better than one.
For what purpose?
For chaining, killing, dragging where they please; for taking away an estate. Thus ten conquer one, in the cases wherein they are better.
In what, then, are they worse?
When the one has right principles, and the others have not. For can they conquer in this case? How should they? If we were weighed in a scale, must not the heavier outweigh?
How then came Socrates to suffer such things from the Athenians?
O foolish man! what mean you by Socrates? Express the fact as it is. Are you surprised that the mere body of Socrates should be carried away, and dragged to prison, by such as were stronger; that it should be poisoned by hemlock and die? Do these things appear wonderful to you; these things unjust? Is it for such things as these that you accuse God? Had Socrates, then, no compensation for them? In what, then, to him, did the essence of good consist? Whom shall we regard, you or him? And what says he? Anytus and Melitus may indeed kill; but hurt me they cannot. And again, If it so pleases God, so let it be.
But show me that he who has the worse principles can get the advantage over him who has the better. You never will show it, nor anything like it; for the Law of Nature and of God is this,—let the better always prevail over the worse.
In what?
In that wherein it is better. One body may be stronger than another; many, than one; and a thief, than one who is not a thief. Thus I, for instance, lost my lamp, because the thief was better at keeping awake than I. But for that lamp he paid the price of becoming a thief; for that lamp he lost his virtue and became like a wild beast. This seemed to him a good bargain; and so let it be!
But some one takes me by the collar, and drags me to the forum; and then all the rest cry out, Philosopher, what good do your principles do you? See, you are being dragged to prison; see, you are going to lose your head! And, pray, what rule of philosophy could I contrive, that when a stronger than myself lays hold on my collar, I should not be dragged; or that, when ten men pull me at once, and throw me into prison, I should not be thrown there? But have I learned nothing, then? I have learned to know, whatever happens, that if it concerns not my will, it is nothing to me. Have my principles, then, done me no good? What then; do I seek for anything else to do me good, but what I have learned? Afterwards, as I sit in prison, I say, He who has made all this disturbance neither recognizes any guidance, nor heeds any teaching, nor is it any concern to him to know what philosophers say or do. Let him alone.
Come forth again from prison. If you have no further need for me in prison, I will come out; if you want me again, I will return. For how long? Just so long as reason requires I should continue in this body; when that is over, take it, and fare ye well. Only let us not act inconsiderately, nor from cowardice, nor on slight grounds, since that would be contrary to the will of God; for he hath need of such a world, and such beings to live on earth. But, if he sounds a retreat, as he did to Socrates, we are to obey him when he sounds it, as our General.
Well; but can these things be explained to the multitude?
To what purpose? Is it not sufficient to be convinced one’s self? When children come to us clapping their hands, and saying, To-morrow is the good feast of Saturn; do we tell them that good doth not consist in such things? By no means; but we clap our hands also. Thus, when you are unable to convince any one, consider hint as a child, and clap your hands with him; or, ii you will not do that, at least hold your tongue. These things we ought to remember; and when we are called to any trial, to know that an opportunity is come of showing whether we have been well taught. For he who goes from a philosophical lecture to a difficult point of practice is like a young man who has been studying to solve syllogisms. If you propose an easy one, he says, Give me rather a fine intricate one, that I may try my strength. Thus athletic champions are displeased with a slight antagonist. He cannot lift me, says one. Is this a youth of spirit? No; for when the occasion calls upon him, he may begin crying, and say, wanted to learn a little longer first. Learn what? If you did not learn these things to show them in practice, why did you learn them?
I trust there must be some one among you, sitting here, who feels secret pangs of impatience, and says, When will such a trial come to my share, as hath now fallen to his? Must I sit wasting my life in a corner, when I might be crowned at Olympia? When will any one bring the news of such a combat for me? Such should be the disposition of you all. Even among the gladiators of Caesar, there are some who bear it very ill that they are not brought upon the stage and matched; and who offer vows to God, and address the officers, begging to fight. And will none among you appear such? I would willingly take a voyage on purpose to see how a champion of mine acts; how he meets his occasion.
This is not the contest I would choose, say you. Is it in your power, then, to make the selection? Such a body is given you, such parents, such brothers, such a country, and such a rank in it; and then you come to me, to change the conditions! Have you not abilities to manage that which is given you You should say to me, It is your business to propose; mine, to treat the subject well. No; but you say, Do not meet me with such a perplexity, but such a one; do not offer such an obstacle to me, but such a one. There will be a time, I suppose, when tragedians will fancy themselves to be mere masks, and buskins, and long train. These things are your materials, man, and your stage-properties. Speak something; that we may know whether you are a tragedian or a buffoon; for both have all the rest in common. Suppose any one should take away his buskins and his mask, and bring him upon the stage in his common dress, is the tragedian lost, or does he remain? If he has a voice, he remains. Here, this instant, take upon you the command. I take it; and taking it, I show how a skilful man performs the part. Now lay aside your robe; put on rags, and come upon the stage in that character. What then? Is it not in my power to express the character by a suitable voice?
In what character do you now appear? As a witness summoned by God. Come you, then, and bear witness for me; for you are a fit witness to be produced by me. Is anything which is inevitable to be classed as either good or evil? Do I hurt any one? Have I made the good of each individual to rest on any one but himself? What evidence do you give for God?
I am in a miserable condition, O Lord; I am undone: no mortal cares for me; no mortal gives me anything; all blame me; all speak ill of me.
Is this the evidence you are to give? And will you bring disgrace upon his summons, who hath conferred such an honor upon you, and thought you worthy of being produced as a witness in such a cause?
But some one in authority has given a sentence. I judge you to be impious and profane. What has befallen you?—I have been judged to be impious and profane.—Anything else?—Nothing.—Suppose he had passed his judgment upon any process of reasoning, and had questioned the conclusion that, if it be day, it is light; what would have befallen the proposition? In this case, who is judged, who is condemned,—the proposition, or he who cannot understand it? Does he know, who claims the power of ruling in your case, what pious or impious means? Has he made it his study or learned it? Where? From whom? A musician would not regard him, if he pronounced bass to be treble; nor a mathematician, if he passed sentence, that lines drawn from the centre to the circumference are not equal. And shall he who is instructed in the truth respect an ignorant man, when he pronounces upon pious and impious, just and unjust?
Oh, the persecutions to which the wise are exposed! Is it here that you have learned this talk? Why do not you leave such pitiful discourse to idle, pitiful fellows; and let them sit in a corner, and receive some little mean pay, or grumble that nobody gives them anything? But do you come, and make some use of what you have learned. It is not reasonings that are wanted now, for there are books stuffed full of stoical reasonings.
What is wanted, then?
The man who shall apply them; whose actions may bear testimony to his doctrines. Assume this character for me, that we may no longer make use in the schools of the examples of the ancients, but may have some examples of our own.
To whom, then, does the contemplation of these abstractions belong?
To any one who has leisure for them; for man is a being fond of contemplation. But it is shameful to take only such view of things as truant slaves take of a play. We ought to sit calmly, and listen, whether to the actor or to the musician; and not do like those poor fellows, who come in and admire the actor, constantly glancing about them, and then, if any one happens to mention their master, run frightened away. It is shameful for a philosopher thus to contemplate the works of nature. What, in this parallel case, stands for the master? Man is not the master of man; but death is, and life, and pleasure, and pain; for without these, bring even Caesar to me, and you will see how intrepid I shall be. But, if he comes thundering and lightening with these, and these are the objects of my terror, what do I else but, like the truant slave, acknowledge my master? While I have any respite from these, as the truant comes into the theatre, so I bathe, drink, sing; but all with terror and anxiety. But if I free myself from my masters, that is, from such things as render a master terrible, what trouble, what master have I remaining?
Shall we then insist upon these things with all men?
No. But make allowance for the ignorant, and say, This poor man. advises me to what he thinks good for himself. I excuse him; for Socrates, too, excused the jailer, who wept when he was to drink the poison, and said, How heartily he sheds tears for us! Was it to him that Socrates said, For this reason we sent the women out of the way? No, but to his friends,—to such as were capable of hearing it; while he humored the other, as a child.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
On constancy (or firmness).
The being (nature) of the Good is a certain Will; the being of the Bad is a certain kind of Will. What then are externals? Materials for the Will, about which the will being conversant shall obtain its own good or evil. How shall it obtain the good. If it does not admire (overvalue) the materials; for the opinions about the materials, if the opinions are right, make the will good: but perverse and distorted opinions make the will bad. God has fixed this law, and says, If you would have any thing good, receive it from yourself. You say, No, but I will have it from another.—Do not so: but receive it from yourself. Therefore when the tyrant threatens and calls me, I say, Whom do you threaten? If he says, I will put you in chains, I say, You threaten my hands and my feet. If he says, I will cut off your head, I reply, You threaten my head. If he says, I will throw you into prison, I say, You threaten the whole of this poor body. If he threatens me with banishment, I say the same. Does he then not threaten you at all? If I feel that all these things do not concern me, he does not threaten me at all; but if I fear any of them, it is I whom he threatens. Whom then do I fear? the master of what? The master of things which are in my own power? There is no such master. Do I fear the master of things which are not in my power? And what are these things to me?
Do you philosophers then teach us to despise kings? I hope not. Who among us teaches to claim against them the power over things which they possess? Take my poor body, take my property, take my reputation, take those who are about me. If I advise any persons to claim these things, they may truly accuse me.—Yes, but I intend to command your opinions also.—And who has given you this power? How can you conquer the opinion of another man? By applying terror to it, he replies, I will conquer it. Do you not know that opinion conquers itself, and is not conquered by another? But nothing else can conquer Will except the Will itself. For this reason too the law of God is most powerful and most just, which is this: Let the stronger always be superior to the weaker. Ten are stronger than one. For what? For putting in chains, for killing, for dragging whither they choose, for taking away what a man has. The ten therefore conquer the one in this in which they are stronger. In what then are the ten weaker? If the one possesses right opinions and the others do not. Well then, can the ten conquer in this matter? How is it possible? If we were placed in the scales, must not the heavier draw down the scale in which it is.
How strange then that Socrates should have been so treated by the Athenians. Slave, why do you say Socrates? Speak of the thing as it is: how strange that the poor body of Socrates should have been carried off and dragged to prison by stronger men, and that any one should have given hemlock to the poor body of Socrates, and that it should breathe out the life. Do these things seem strange, do they seem unjust, do you on account of these things blame God? Had Socrates then no equivalent for these things? Where then for him was the nature of good? Whom shall we listen to, you or him? And what does Socrates say? Anytus and Melitus can kill me, but they cannot hurt me: and further, he says, If it so pleases God, so let it be.
But show me that he who has the inferior principles overpowers him who is superior in principles. You will never show this, nor come near showing it; for this is the law of nature and of God that the superior shall always overpower the inferior. In what? In that in which it is superior. One body is stronger than another: many are stronger than one: the thief is stronger than he who is not a thief. This is the reason why I also lost my lamp, because in wakefulness the thief was superior to me. But the man bought the lamp at this price: for a lamp he became a thief, a faithless fellow, and like a wild beast. This seemed to him a good bargain. Be it so. But a man has seized me by the cloak, and is drawing me to the public place: then others bawl out, Philosopher, what has been the use of your opinions? see you are dragged to prison, you are going to be beheaded. And what system of philosophy (εἰσαγωγήν) could I have made so that, if a stronger man should have laid hold of my cloak, I should not be dragged off; that if ten men should have laid hold of me and cast me into prison, I should not be cast in? Have I learned nothing else then? I have learned to see that every thing which happens, if it be independent of my will, is nothing to me. I may ask, if you have not gained by this. Why then do you seek advantage in any thing else than in that in which you have learned that advantage is?
Then sitting in prison I say: The man who cries out in this way neither hears what words mean, nor understands what is said, nor does he care at all to know what philosophers say or what they do. Let him alone.
But now he says to the prisoner, Come out from your prison.—If you have no further need of me in prison, I come out: if you should have need of me again, I will enter the prison.—How long will you act thus?—So long as reason requires me to be with the body: but when reason does not require this, take away the body, and fare you well. Only we must not do it inconsiderately, nor weakly, nor for any slight reason; for, on the other hand, God does not wish it to be done, and he has need of such a world and such inhabitants in it. But if he sounds the signal for retreat, as he did to Socrates, we must obey him who gives the signal, as if he were a general.
Well then, ought we to say such things to the many? Why should we? Is it not enough for a man to be persuaded himself? When children come clapping their hands and crying out, To-day is the good Saturnalia, do we say, The Saturnalia are not good? By no means, but we clap our hands also. Do you also then, when you are not able to make a man change his mind, be assured that he is a child, and clap your hands with him; and if you do not choose to do this, keep silent.
A man must keep this in mind; and when he is called to any such difficulty, he should know that the time is come for showing if he has been instructed. For he who is come into a difficulty is like a young man from a school who has practised the resolution of syllogisms; and if any person proposes to him an easy syllogism, he says, rather propose to me a syllogism which is skilfully complicated that I may exercise myself on it. Even athletes are dissatisfied with slight young men, and say, He cannot lift me.—This is a youth of noble disposition.[You do not so]; but when the time of trial is come, one of you must weep and say, I wish that I had learned more. A little more of what? If you did not learn these things in order to show them in practice, why did you learn them I think that there is some one among you who are sitting here, who is suffering like a woman in labour, and saying, Oh, that such a difficulty does not present itself to me as that which has come to this man; oh, that I should be wasting my life in a corner, when I might be crowned at Olympia. When will any one announce to me such a contest? Such ought to be the disposition of all of you. Even among the gladiators of Caesar (the Emperor) there are some who complain grievously that they are not brought forward and matched, and they offer up prayers to God and address themselves to their superintendents intreating that they may fight. And will no one among you show himself such? I would willingly take a voyage [to Rome] for this purpose and see what my athlete is doing, how he is studying his subject.—I do not choose such a subject, he says. Why, is it in your power to take what subject you choose? There has been given to you such a body as you have, such parents, such brethren, such a country, such a place in your country: —then you come to me and say, Change my subject. Have you not abilities which enable you to manage the subject which has been given to you? [You ought to say]: It is your business to propose; it is mine to exercise myself well. However, you do not say so, but you say, Do not propose to me such a tropic, but such [as I would choose]: do not urge against me such an objection, but such [as I would choose]. There will be a time perhaps when tragic actors will suppose that they are [only] masks and buskins and the long cloak. I say, these things, man, are your material and subject. Utter something that we may know whether you are a tragic actor or a buffoon; for both of you have all the rest in common. If any one then should take away the tragic actor’s buskins and his mask, and introduce him on the stage as a phantom, is the tragic actor lost, or does he still remain? If he has voice, he still remains.
An example of another kind. Assume the governorship of a province. I assume it, and when I have assumed it, I show how an instructed man behaves. Lay aside the laticlave (the mark of senatorial rank), and clothing yourself in rags, come forward in this character. What then have I not the power of displaying a good voice (that is, of doing something that I ought to do)? How then do you now appear (on the stage of life)? As a witness summoned by God. Come forward, you, and bear testimony for me, for you are worthy to be brought forward as a witness by me: is any thing external to the will good or bad? do I hurt any man? have I made every man’s interest dependent on any man except himself? What testimony do you give for God?—I am in a wretched condition, Master (Lord), and I am unfortunate; no man cares for me, no man gives me anything; all blame me, all steak ill of me.—Is this the evidence that you are going to give, and disgrace his summons, who has conferred so much honour on you, and thought you worthy of being called to bear such testimony?
But suppose that he who has the power has declared, I judge you to be impious and profane. What has happened to you? I have been judged to be impious and profane? Nothing else? Nothing else. But if the same person had, passed judgment on an hypothetical syllogism (συνημμένου), and had made a declaration, the conclusion that, if it is day, it is light, I declare to be false, what has happened to the hypothetical syllogism? who is judged in this case? who has been condemned? the hypothetical syllogism, or the man who has been deceived by it? Does he then who has the power of making any declaration about you know what is pious or impious? Has he studied it, and has he learned it? Where? From whom? Then is it the fact that a musician pays no regard to him who declares that the lowest chord in the lyre is the highest; nor yet a geometrician, if he declares that the lines from the centre of a circle to the circumference are not equal; and shall he who is really instructed pay any regard to the uninstructed man when he pronounces judgment on what is pious and what is impious, on what is just and unjust? Oh, the signal wrong done by the instructed. Did they learn this here?
Will you not leave the small arguments (λογάρια) about these matters to others, to lazy fellows, that they may sit in a corner and receive their sorry pay, or grumble that no one gives them any thing; and will you not come forward and make use of what you have learned? For it is not these small arguments that are wanted now: the writings of the Stoics are full of them. What then is the thing which is wanted? A man who shall apply them, one who by his acts shall bear testimony to his words. Assume, I intreat you, this character, that we may no longer use in the schools the examples of the antients, but may have some example of our own.
To whom then does the contemplation of these matters (philosophical inquiries) belong? To him who has leisure, for man is an animal that loves contemplation. But it is shameful to contemplate these things as runaway slaves do: we should sit, as in a theatre, free from distraction, and listen at one time to the tragic actor, at another time to the lute-player; and not do as slaves do. As soon as the slave has taken his station he praises the actor and at the same time looks round: then if any one calls out his master’s name, the slave is immediately frightened and disturbed. It is shameful for philosophers thus to contemplate the works of nature. For what is a master? Man is not the master of man; but death is, and life and pleasure and pain; for if he comes without these things, bring Caesar to me and you will see how firm I am. But when he shall come with these things, thundering and lightning, and when I am afraid of them, what do I do then except to recognize my master like the runaway slave? But so long as I have any respite from these terrors, as a runaway slave stands in the theatre, so do I: I bathe, I drink, I sing; but all this I do with terror and uneasiness. But if I shall release myself from my masters, that is from those things by means of which masters are formidable, what further trouble have I, what master have I still?
What then, ought we to publish these things to all men? No, but we ought to accommodate ourselves to the ignorant (τοῖς ἰδιώταις) and to say: This man recommends to me that which he thinks good for himself: I excuse him. For Socrates also excused the jailor, who had the charge of him in prison and was weeping when Socrates was going to drink the poison, and said, How generously he laments over us. Does he then say to the jailor that for this reason we have sent away the women? No, but he says it to his friends who were able to hear (understand) it; and he treats the jailor as a child.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (28)
- The word is οὐσία . The corresponding Latin word which Cicero introduced is essentia (Seneca, Epist. 58). The English word essence has obtained a somewhat different sense. The proper translation of οὐσία is being or nature.
- This is the maxim of Horace, Epp. i. 6 ; and Macleane’s note,— Nil admirari prope res est una, Numici, Solaque quae possit facere et servare beatum. on which Upton remarks that this maxim is explained very philosophically and learnedly by Lord Shaftesbury (the author of the Characteristics), vol. iii. p. 202. Compare M. Antoninus, xii. 1, Seneca, De Vita Beata, c. 3, writes, Aliarum rerum quae vitam instruunt diligens, sine admiratione cujusquam. Antoninus (i. 15) expresses the sine admiratione by τὸ ἀθαύμαστον .
- This is explained by what follows. Opinion does not really conquer itself; but one opinion can conquer another, and nothing else can.
- The two chief prosecutors of Socrates (Plato, Apology, c. 18; Epictetus, ii 2, 15).
- See i. 18, 15, p. 58.
- ὠφέλησαι . See Schweighaeuser’s note.
- One of those who cry out Philosopher, etc.
- See i. 9. 20.
- See i. 6. 13.
- Socrates was condemned by the Athenians to die, and he was content to die, and thought that it was a good thing; and this was the reason why he made such a defence as he did, which brought on him condemnation; and he preferred condemnation to escaping it by entreating the dicasts (judges), and lamenting, and saying and doing things unworthy of himself, as others did.—Plato, Apology, cc. 29–33. compare Epict. i. 9, 16.
- See i. 25, 8.
- Read θέλῃς instead of θέλῃ . See Schweighaeuser’s note.
- See Schweighaeuser’s note. This appears to be the remark of Epictetus. If it is so, what follows is not clear. Schweighaeuser explains it, But most of you act otherwise.
- The Roman emperors kept gladiators for their own amusement and that of the people (Lipsius, Saturnalia, ii. 16). Seneca says ( De Provid. c. 4), I have heard a mirmillo (a kind of gladiator) in the time of C. Caesar (Caligula) complaining of the rarity of gladiatorial exhibitions: What a glorious period of life is wasting. Virtue, says Seneca, is eager after dangers; and it considers only what it seeks, not what it may suffer. —Upton.
- The word is Hypothesis ( ὑπόθεσις ), which in this passage means matter to work on, material, subject, as in ii. 5, 11, where it means the business of the pilot. In i. 7 hypothesis has the sense of a proposition supposed for the present to be true, and used as the foundation of an argument.
- Tropic ( τροπικόν ), a logical term used by Stoics, which Schweighaeuser translates propositio connexa in syllogismo hypothetico. The meaning of the whole is this. You do not like the work which is set before you: as we say, you are not content to do your duty in that state of life unto which it shall please God to call you. Now this is as foolish, says Wolf, as for a man in any discussion to require that his adversary should raise no objection except such as may serve the man’s own case.
- There will be a time when Tragic actors shall not know what their business is, but will think that it is all show. So, says Wolf, philosophers will be only beard and cloak, and will not show by their life and morals what they really are; or they will be like false monks, who only wear the cowl, and do not show a life of piety and sanctity.
- God is introduced as speaking.—Schweighaeuser.
- The word is Κύριος , the name by which a slave in Epictetus addresses his master (dominus), a physician is addressed by his patient, and in other cases also it is used. It is also used by the Evangelists. They speak of the angel of the Lord (Matt. i. 24); and Jesus is addressed by the same term (Matt. viii. 2), Lord or master. Mrs. Carter has the following note: It hath been observed that this manner of expression is not to be met with in the Heathen authors before Christianity, and therefore it is one instance of Scripture language coming early into common use. But the word ( κύριος ) is used by early Greek writers to indicate one who has power or authority, and in a sense like the Roman dominus, as by Sophocles for instance. The use of the word then by Epictetus was not new, and it may have been used by the Stoic writers long before his time. The language of the Stoics was formed at least two centuries before the Christian aera, and the New Testament writers would use the Greek which was current in their age. The notion of Scripture language coming early into common use is entirely unfounded, and is even absurd. Mrs. Carter’s remark implies that Epictetus used the Scripture language, whereas he used the particular language of the Stoics, and the general language of his age, and the New Testament writers would do the same. There are resemblances between the language of Epictetus and the New Testament writers, such as the expression μὴ γένοιτο of Paul, which Epictetus often uses; but this is a slight matter. The words of Peter (Ep. ii. 1, 4), that by these ye might be partakers of the divine nature, are a Stoic expression, and the writer of this Epistle, I think, took them from the language of the Stoics.
- The words in the text are: περὶ τῆς νήτης (νεάτης) εἶναι ὑπάτην , When ὑπάτη is translated the lowest chord or note, it must be remembered that the names employed in the Greek musical terminology are precisely the opposite to ours. Compare νεάτη the highest note, though the word in itself means lowest. —Key’s Philological Essays, p. 42, note 1.
- I think that Schweighaeuser’s interpretation is right, that the instructed are those who think that they are instructed but are not, as they show by their opinion that they accept in moral matters the judgment of an ignorant man, whose judgment in music or geometry they would not accept.
- He names these small arguments λογάρια , which Cicero (Tusc. Disput. ii. 12) names ratiunculae.
- What is the profit, my brethren, if any one should say that he hath faith and have not works?. . . . . . Thus also faith, if it hath not works, is dead in itself. But a man may say, Thou hast faith, and I have works: shew me thy faith without thy works, and I will shew thee my faith by my works. —Epistle of James, ii. 14–18.
- See Schweighaeuser’s note on ἐπέστη .
- The word is εὐσταθῶ . The corresponding noun is εὐστάθεια , which is the title of this chapter.
- Upton supposes that Epictetus is alluding to the verse of Aristophanes (Acharn. 531), where it is said of Pericles: He flashed, he thundered, and confounded Hellas .
- He calls the uninstructed and ignorant by the Greek word Idiotae, idiots, which we now use in a peculiar sense. An Idiota was a private individual as opposed to one who filled some public office; and thence it had generally the sense of one who was ignorant of any particular art, as, for instance, one who had not studied philosophy.
- Compare the Phaedon of Plato (p. 116). The children of Socrates were brought in to see him before he took the poison by which he died; and also the wives of the friends of Socrates who attended him to his death. Socrates had ordered his wife Xanthippe to be led home before he had his last conversation with his friends, and she was taken away lamenting and bewailing.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1οὐσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ προαίρεσις ποιά, τοῦ κακοῦ προαίρεσις ποιά. 2τί οὖν τὰ ἐκτός; ὗλαι τῇ προαιρέσει, περὶ ἃς ἀναστρεφομένη τεύξεται τοῦ ἰδίου ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ. πῶς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τεύξεται; 3ἂν τὰς ὕλας μὴ θαυμάσῃ. τὰ γὰρ περὶ τῶν ὑλῶν δόγματα ὀρθὰ μὲν ὄντα ἀγαθὴν ποιεῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν, στρεβλὰ δὲ καὶ διεστραμμένα κακήν. 4τοῦτον τὸν νόμον ὁ θεὸς τέθεικεν καὶ φησίν εἰ τι ἀγαθὸν θέλεις, παρὰ σεαυτοῦ λάβε. σὺ λέγεις οὔ· ἀλλὰ παρʼ ἄλλου. μή, ἀλλὰ παρὰ σεαυτοῦ. 5λοιπὸν ὅταν ἀπειλῇ ὁ τύραννος καὶ μὴ καλῇ, λέγω τίνι ἀπειλεῖ; ἂν λέγῃ δήσω σε, φημὶ ὅτι ταῖς χερσὶν ἀπειλεῖ καὶ τοῖς ποσίν. 6ἂν λέγῃ τραχηλοκοπήσω σε, λέγω τῷ τραχήλῳ ἀπειλεῖ. ἂν λέγῃ εἰς φυλακήν σε βαλῶ, ὅλῳ τῷ σαρκιδίῳ· κἂν ἐξορισμὸν ἀπειλῇ, τὸ αὐτό. 7— σοὶ οὖν οὐδὲν ἀπειλεῖ; — εἰ πέπονθα ὅτι ταῦτα οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς ἐμέ, οὐδέν· εἰ δὲ φοβοῦμαί τι τούτων, ἐμοὶ ἀπειλεῖ. 8τίνα λοιπὸν δέδοικα; τὸν τίνων ὄντα κύριον; τῶν ἐπʼ ἐμοί; οὐδὲ εἷς ἐστιν. τῶν οὐκ ἐπʼ ἐμοί; καὶ τί μοι αὐτῶν μέλει; 9ὑμεῖς οὖν οἱ φιλόσοφοι διδάσκετε καταφρονεῖν τῶν βασιλέων; — μὴ γένοιτο. τίς ἡμῶν διδάσκει ἀντιποιεῖσθαι πρὸς αὐτούς, ὧν ἐκεῖνοι ἔχουσιν ἐξουσίαν; 10τὸ σωμάτιον λάβε, τὴν κτῆσιν λάβε, τὴν φήμην λάβε, τοὺς περὶ ἐμὲ λάβε. ἄν τινας τούτων ἀναπείθω ἀντιποιεῖσθαι, τῷ ὄντι ἐγκαλείτω μοι. 11ναί· ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν δογμάτων ἄρχειν θέλω. καὶ τίς σοι ταύτην τὴν ἐξουσίαν δέδωκεν; 12ποῦ δύνασαι νικῆσαι δόγμα ἀλλότριον; προσάγων, φησίν, αὐτῷ φόβον νικήσω. ἀγνοεῖς ὅτι αὐτὸ αὑτὸ ἐνίκησεν, οὐχ ὑπʼ ἄλλου ἐνικήθη· προαίρεσιν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο νικῆσαι δύναται, πλὴν αὐτὴ ἑαυτήν. 13διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ νόμος κράτιστός ἐστι καὶ δικαιότατος· τὸ κρεῖσσον ἀεὶ περιγινέσθω τοῦ χείρονος. 14κρείττονές εἰσιν οἱ δέκα τοῦ ἑνός. πρὸς τί; πρὸς τὸ δῆσαι, πρὸς τὸ ἀποκτεῖναι, πρὸς τὸ ἀπαγαγεῖν ὅπου θέλουσιν, πρὸς τὸ ἀφελέσθαι τὰ ὄντα. νικῶσιν τοίνυν οἱ δέκα τὸν ἕνα ἐν τούτῳ, ἐν ᾧ κρείσσονές εἰσιν. 15ἐν τίνι οὖν χείρονές εἰσιν; ἂν ὁ μὲν ἔχῃ δόγματα ὀρθά, οἱ δὲ μή. τί οὖν; ἐν τούτῳ δύνανται νικῆσαι; πόθεν; εἰ δʼ ἱστάμεθα ἐπὶ ζυγοῦ, οὐκ ἔδει τὸν βαρύτερον καθελκύσαι; 16Σωκράτης οὖν ἵνα πάθῃ ταῦτα ὑπʼ Ἀθηναίων;— ἀνδράποδον, τί λέγεις τὸ Σωκράτης; ὡς ἔχει τὸ πρᾶγμα λέγε· ἵνʼ οὖν τὸ Σωκράτους σωμάτιον ἀπαχθῇ καὶ συρῇ ὑπὸ τῶν ἰσχυροτέρων εἰς δεσμωτήριον καὶ κώνειόν τις δῷ τῷ σωματίῳ τῷ Σωκράτους κἀκεῖνο ἀποψυγῇ; 17ταῦτά σοι φαίνεται θαυμαστά, ταῦτα ἄδικα, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐγκαλεῖς τῷ θεῷ; οὐδὲν οὖν εἶχε Σωκράτης ἀντὶ τούτων; ποῦ ἦν ἡ οὐσία αὐτῷ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ; 18τίνι προσσχῶμεν; σοὶ ἢ αὐτῷ; καὶ τί λέγει ἐκεῖνος; ἐμὲ δʼ Ἄνυτος καὶ Μέλητος ἀποκτεῖναι μὲν δύνανται, βλάψαι δʼ οὔ. καὶ πάλιν εἰ ταύτῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, ταύτῃ γινέσθω. 19ἀλλὰ δεῖξον ὅτι χείρονα ἔχων δόγματα κρατεῖ τοῦ κρείττονος ἐν δόγμασιν. οὐ δείξεις· οὐδʼ ἐγγύς. νόμος γὰρ τῆς φύσεως. καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ οὗτος τὸ κρεῖσσον ἀεὶ περιγινέσθω τοῦ χείρονος. ἐν τίνι; ἐν ᾧ κρεῖσσόν ἐστιν. 20σῶμα σώματος ἰσχυρότερον, οἱ πλείονες τοῦ ἑνός, ὁ κλέπτης τοῦ μὴ κλέπτου. 21διὰ τοῦτο κἀγὼ τὸν λύχνον ἀπώλεσα, ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἀγρυπνεῖν μου κρείσσων ἦν ὁ κλέπτης. ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνος τοσούτου ὠνήσατο λύχνον· ἀντὶ λύχνου κλέπτης ἐγένετο, ἀντὶ λύχνου ἄπιστος, ἀντὶ λύχνου θηριώδης. τοῦτο ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ λυσιτελεῖν. 22ἔστω· ἀλλʼ εἴληπταί μού τις τοῦ ἱματίου καὶ ἕλκει μʼ εἰς τὴν ἀγοράν, εἶτα ἐπικραυγάζουσιν ἄλλοι φιλόσοφε, τί σε ὠφέληκε τὰ δόγματα; ἰδοὺ σύρῃ εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον, ἰδοὺ μέλλεις τραχηλοκοπεῖσθαι. 23καὶ ποίαν ἔπραξα ἂν εἰσαγωγήν, ἵνʼ, ἂν ἰσχυρότερος ἐπιλάβηταί μου τοῦ ἱματίου, μὴ σύρωμαι; ἵνα, ἄν με δέκα περισπάσαντες εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἐμβάλωσιν, μὴ ἐμβληθῶ; 24ἄλλο οὖν οὐδὲν ἔμαθον; ἔμαθον, ἵνα· πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἴδω ὅτι, ἂν ἀπροαίρετον ᾖ, οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς ἐμέ. 25πρὸς τοῦτο οὖν οὐκ ὠφέλησαι; τί οὖν ἐν ἄλλῳ ζητεῖς τὴν ὠφέλειαν ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἔμαθες; 26καθήμενος λοιπὸν ἐν τῇ φυλακῇ λέγω οὗτος ὁ ταῦτα κραυγάζων οὔτε τοῦ σημαινομένου ἀκούει οὔτε τῷ λεγομένῳ παρακολουθεῖ οὔτε ὅλως μεμέληκεν αὐτῷ εἰδέναι περὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων τί λέγουσιν ἢ τί ποιοῦσιν. ἄφες αὐτόν. 27ἀλλʼ ἔξελθε πάλιν ἀπὸ τῆς φυλακῆς. εἰ μηκέτι χρείαν ἔχητέ μου ἐν τῇ φυλακῇ, ἐξέρχομαι· ἂν πάλιν σχῆτε, εἰσελεύσομαι. 28μέχρι τίνος; μέχρις ἂν οὗ λόγος αἱρῇ συνεῖναί με τῷ σωματίῳ· ὅταν δὲ μὴ αἱρῇ, λάβετε αὐτὸ καὶ ὑγιαίνετε. 29μόνον μὴ ἀλογίστως, μόνον μὴ μαλακῶς, μὴ ἐκ τῆς τυχούσης προφάσεως. πάλιν γὰρ ὁ θεὸς οὐ βούλεται· χρείαν γὰρ ἔχει κόσμου τοιούτου, τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς ἀναστρεφομένων τοιούτων. ἐὰν δὲ σημήνῃ τὸ ἀνακλητικὸν ὡς τῷ Σωκράτει, πείθεσθαι δεῖ τῷ σημαίνοντι ὡς στρατηγῷ. 30τί οὖν; λέγειν δεῖ ταῦτα πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς; — ἵνα τί; 31οὐ γὰρ ἀρκεῖ τὸ αὐτὸν πείθεσθαι; τοῖς γὰρ παιδίοις, ὅταν προσελθόντα κροτῇ καὶ λέγῃ σήμερον Σατορνάλια ἀγαθά, λέγομεν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθὰ ταῦτα; οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπικροτοῦμεν. 32καὶ σὺ τοίνυν, ὅταν μεταπεῖσαί τινα μὴ δύνῃ, γίγνωσκε ὅτι παιδίον ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπικρότει αὐτῷ· ἂν δὲ μὴ τοῦτο θέλῃς, σιώπα λοιπόν. 33τούτων δεῖ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ κληθέντα εἴς τινα τοιαύτην περίστασιν εἰδέναι, ὅτι ἐλήλυθεν ὁ καιρὸς τοῦ ἀποδεῖξαι, εἰ πεπαιδεύμεθα. 34νέος γὰρ ἀπὸ σχολῆς ἀπιὼν εἰς περίστασιν ὅμοιός ἐστι τῷ μεμελετηκότι συλλογισμοὺς ἀναλύειν, κἄν τις εὔλυτον αὐτῷ προτείνῃ, λέγει μᾶλλόν μοι πεπλεγμένον κομψῶς προτείνατε, ἵνα γυμνασθῶ. καὶ οἱ ἀθληταὶ τοῖς κούφοις νεανίσκοις δυσαρεστοῦσιν· 35οὐ βαστάζει με, φησίν. οὗτός ἐστιν εὐφυὴς νέος. οὔ· ἀλλὰ καλέσαντος τοῦ καιροῦ κλάειν δεῖ καὶ λέγειν ἤθελον ἔτι μανθάνειν. τίνα; εἰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔμαθες [οὐχ] ὥστʼ ἔργῳ δεῖξαι, πρὸς τί αὐτὰ ἔμαθες; 36ἐγώ τινα οἶμαι τῶν καθημένων ἐνταῦθα ὠδίνειν αὐτὸν ἐφʼ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ λέγειν ἐμοὶ νῦν περίστασιν μὴ ἔρχεσθαι τοιαύτην, ὁποία τούτῳ ἐλήλυθεν; ἐμὲ νῦν κατατριβῆναι καθήμενον ἐν γωνίᾳ δυνάμενον στεφανωθῆναι Ὀλύμπια; πότε τις ἐμοὶ καταγγελεῖ τοιοῦτον ἀγῶνα; οὕτως ἔχειν ἔδει πάντας ὑμᾶς. 37ἀλλʼ ἐν μὲν τοῖς Καίσαρος μονομάχοις εἰσί τινες οἱ ἀγανακτοῦντες ὅτι οὐδεὶς αὐτοὺς προάγει οὐδὲ ζευγνύει καὶ εὔχονται τῷ θεῷ καὶ προσέρχονται τοῖς ἐπιτρόποις δεόμενοι μονομαχῆσαι, ἐξ ὑμῶν δʼ οὐδεὶς φανήσεται τοιοῦτος; 38ἤθελον πλεῦσαι ἐπʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἰδεῖν, τί μου ποιεῖ ὁ ἀθλητής, πῶς μελετᾷ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. 39οὐ θέλω, φησίν, τοιαύτην. ἐπὶ σοὶ γάρ ἐστι λαβεῖν ἣν θέλεις ὑπόθεσιν; δέδοταί σοι σῶμα τοιοῦτον, γονεῖς τοιοῦτοι, ἀδελφοὶ τοιοῦτοι, πατρὶς τοιαύτη, τάξις ἐν αὐτῇ τοιαύτη· εἶτά μοι λέγεις ἐλθὼν ἄλλαξόν μοι τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. εἶτα οὐκ ἔχεις ἀφορμὰς πρὸς τὸ χρήσασθαι τοῖς δοθεῖσιν; 40σόν ἐστι προτεῖναι, ἐμὸν μελετῆσαι καλῶς. οὔ· ἀλλὰ μὴ τοιοῦτό μοι προβάλῃς τροπικόν, ἀλλὰ τοιοῦτον· μὴ τοιαύτην ἐπενέγκῃς τὴν ἐπιφοράν, ἀλλὰ τοιαύτην. 41ἔσται χρόνος τάχα, ἐν ᾧ οἱ τραγῳδοὶ οἰήσονται ἑαυτοὺς εἶναι προσωπεῖα καὶ ἐμβάδας καὶ τὸ σύρμα. ἄνθρωπε, ταῦτα ὕλην ἔχεις καὶ ὑπόθεσιν. 42φθέγξαι τι, ἵνα εἰδῶμεν πότερον τραγῳδὸς εἶ ἢ γελωτοποιός· κοινὰ γὰρ ἔχουσι τὰ ἄλλα ἀμφότεροι. 43διὰ τοῦτο ἂν ἀφέλῃ τις αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς ἐμβάδας καὶ τὸ προσωπεῖον καὶ ἐν εἰδώλῳ αὐτὸν προαγάγῃ, ἀπώλετο ὁ τραγῳδὸς ἢ μένει; ἂν φωνὴν ἔχῃ, μένει. 44καὶ ἐνθάδε. λάβε ἡγεμονίαν. λαμβάνω καὶ λαβὼν δεικνύω, πῶς ἄνθρωπος ἀναστρέφεται πεπαιδευμένος. 45θὲς τὴν πλατύσημον καὶ ἀναλαβὼν ῥάκη πρόσελθε ἐν προσώπῳ τοιούτῳ. τί οὖν; οὐ δέδοταί μοι καλὴν φωνὴν εἰσενεγκεῖν; 46πῶς οὖν ἀναβαίνεις νῦν; ὡς μάρτυς ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κεκλημένος. 47ἔρχου σὺ καὶ μαρτύρησόν μοι· σὺ γὰρ ἄξιος εἶ προαχθῆναι μάρτυς. ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ. μή τι τῶν ἐκτὸς τῆς προαιρέσεως ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἢ κακόν; μή τινα βλάπτω; μή τι ἐπʼ ἄλλῳ τὴν ὠφέλειαν ἐποίησα τὴν ἑκάστου ἢ ἐπʼ αὐτῷ; 48τίνα μαρτυρίαν δίδως τῷ θεῷ; ἐν δεινοῖς εἰμι, κύριε, καὶ δυστυχῶ, οὐδείς μου ἐπιστρέφεται, οὐδείς μοι δίδωσιν οὐδέν, πάντες ψέγουσιν, κακολογοῦσιν. 49ταῦτα μέλλεις μαρτυρεῖν καὶ καταισχύνειν τὴν κλῆσιν ἣν κέκληκεν, ὅτι σε ἐτίμησεν ταύτην τὴν τιμὴν καὶ ἄξιον ἡγήσατο προσαγαγεῖν εἰς μαρτυρίαν τηλικαύτην; 50ἀλλʼ ἀπεφήνατο ὁ ἔχων τὴν ἐξουσίαν κρίνω σε ἀσεβῆ καὶ ἀνόσιον εἶναι. τί σοι γέγονεν; ἐκρίθην ἀσεβὴς καὶ ἀνόσιος εἶναι. 51ἄλλο οὐδέν; οὐδέν. εἰ δὲ περὶ συνημμένου τινὸς ἐπικεκρίκει καὶ ἐδεδώκει ἀπόφασιν τὸ εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, φῶς ἐστιν κρίνω ψεῦδος εἶναι, τί ἐγεγόνει τῷ συνημμένῳ; τίς ἐνθάδε κρίνεται, τίς κατακέκριται; τὸ συνημμένον ἢ ὁ ἐξαπατηθεὶς περὶ αὐτοῦ; 52οὗτος οὖν τίς ποτε ὁ ἔχων ἐξουσίαν τοῦ ἀποφήνασθαί τι περὶ σοῦ; οἶδεν τί ἐστι τὸ εὐσεβὲς ἢ τὸ ἀσεβές; μεμελέτηκεν αὐτό; μεμάθηκεν; ποῦ; παρὰ τίνι; 53εἶτα μουσικὸς μὲν οὐκ ἐπιστρέφεται αὐτοῦ ἀποφαινομένου περὶ τῆς νήτης ὅτι ἐστὶν ὑπάτη οὐδὲ γεωμετρικός, ἂν ἐπικρίνῃ τὰς ἀπὸ κέντρου πρὸς τὸν κύκλον προσπιπτούσας μὴ εἶναι ἴσας· 54ὁ δὲ ταῖς ἀληθείαις πεπαιδευμένος ἀνθρώπου ἀπαιδεύτου ἐπιστραφήσεται ἐπικρίνοντός τι περὶ ὁσίου καὶ ἀνοσίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ δικαίου; ὦ πολλῆς ἀδικίας τῶν πεπαιδευμένων. ταῦτα οὖν ἔμαθες ἐνταῦθα; 55οὐ θέλεις τὰ μὲν λογάρια τὰ περὶ τούτων ἄλλοις ἀφεῖναι, ἀταλαιπώροις ἀνθρωπαρίοις, ἵνʼ ἐν γωνίᾳ καθεζόμενοι μισθάρια λαμβάνωσιν ἢ γογγ[ρ]ύζωσιν, ὅτι οὐδεὶς αὐτοῖς παρέχει οὐδέν, σὺ δὲ χρῆσθαι παρελθὼν οἷς ἔμαθες; 56οὐ γὰρ λογάριά ἐστι τὰ λείποντα νῦν, ἀλλὰ γέμει τὰ βιβλία τῶν Στωικῶν λογαρίων. τί οὖν τὸ λεῖπόν ἐστιν; ὁ χρησόμενος, ὁ ἔργῳ μαρτυρήσων τοῖς λόγοις. 57τοῦτό μοι τὸ πρόσωπον ἀνάλαβε, ἵνα μηκέτι παλαιοῖς ἐν τῇ σχολῇ παραδείγμασι χρώμεθα, ἀλλὰ ἔχωμέν τι καὶ καθʼ ἡμᾶς παράδειγμα. 58ταῦτα οὖν τίνος ἐστὶ θεωρεῖν; τοῦ σχολάζοντος. ἔστι γὰρ φιλοθέωρόν τι ζῷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος. 59ἀλλʼ αἰσχρόν ἐστι θεωρεῖν ταῦτα οὕτως ὡς οἱ δραπέται· ἀλλʼ ἀπερισπάστως καθῆσθαι καὶ ἀκούειν νῦν μὲν τραγῳδοῦ νῦν δὲ κιθαρῳδοῦ, οὐχ ὡς ἐκεῖνοι ποιοῦσιν. ἅμα μὲν ἐπέστη καὶ ἐπῄνεσεν τὸν τραγῳδόν, ἅμα δὲ περιεβλέψατο· εἶτα ἄν τις φθέγξηται κύριον, εὐθὺς σεσόβηνται, ταράσσονται. 60αἰσχρόν ἐστιν οὕτως καὶ τοὺς φιλοσόφους θεωρεῖν τὰ ἔργα τῆς φύσεως. τί γάρ ἐστι κύριος; ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπου κύριος οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ θάνατος καὶ ζωὴ καὶ ἡδονὴ καὶ πόνος. 61ἐπεὶ χωρὶς τούτων ἄγαγέ μοι τὸν Καίσαρα καὶ ὄψει πῶς εὐσταθῶ. ὅταν δὲ μετὰ τούτων ἔλθῃ βροντῶν καὶ ἀστράπτων, ἐγὼ δὲ ταῦτα φοβῶμαι, τί ἄλλο ἢ ἐπέγνωκα τὸν κύριον ὡς ὁ δραπέτης; 62μέχρι δʼ ἂν οὗ τινα ἀνοχὴν ἀπὸ τούτων ἔχω, ὡς δραπέτης ἐφίσταται θεάτρῳ οὕτως κἀγώ· λούομαι, πίνω, ᾁδω, πάντα δὲ μετὰ φόβου καὶ ταλαιπωρίας. 63ἐὰν δʼ ἐμαυτὸν ἀπολύσω τῶν δεσποτῶν, τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἐκείνων, διʼ ἃ οἱ δεσπόται εἰσὶ φοβεροί, ποῖον ἔτι πρᾶγμα ἔχω, ποῖον ἔτι κύριον; 64τί οὖν; κηρύσσειν δεῖ ταῦτα πρὸς πάντας; — οὔ, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἰδιώταις συμπεριφέρεσθαι καὶ λέγειν οὗτος ὃ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν οἴεται τοῦτο κἀμοὶ συμβουλεύει· συγγιγνώσκω αὐτῷ. 65καὶ γὰρ Σωκράτης συνεγίγνωσκεν τῷ ἐπὶ τῆς φυλακῆς κλάοντι, ὅτι ἔμελλεν πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον, καὶ λέγει ὡς γενναίως ἡμᾶς ἀποδεδάκρυκεν. 66μή τι οὖν ἐκείνῳ λέγει ὅτι διὰ τοῦτο τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπελύσαμεν; ἀλλὰ τοῖς γνωρίμοις, τοῖς δυναμένοις αὐτὰ ἀκοῦσαι· ἐκείνῳ δὲ συμπεριφέρεται ὡς παιδίῳ.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA