Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER XXIII. · Against Epicurus.
1Even Epicurus is sensible, that we are by Nature sociable: but having once placed our Good in the mere Shell, he can say nothing afterwards different from that. For, again, he strenuously maintains, that we ought not to admire, or receive, any thing separated from the Nature of Good. And he is in the right to maintain it. But how, then, came any such Suspicions [as your Doctrines imply, to arise], if we have no natural Affection towards an Offspring? Why do you, Epicurus, dissuade a wise Man from bringing up Children? Why are you afraid, that, upon their Account, he may fall into Uneasinesses? Doth he fall into any for a Mouse, that feeds within his House? What is it to him, if a little Mouse bewails itself there? But Epicurus knew, that, if once a Child is born, it is no longer in our Power not to love and be solicitous for it. For the same Reason, he says, a wise man will not engage himself in public Business for he knew very well, what such an Engagement would oblige him to do: For what should restrain any one from Affairs, if we may behave among Men, as we would among a Swarm of Flies 2And doth He, who knows all this, dare to bid us not bring up Children? Not even a Sheep, or a Wolf, deserts its Offspring; and shall Man? What would you have? That we should be as silly as Sheep? Yet even these do not desert their Offspring. Or as savage as Wolves? Neither do these desert them. Pray, who would mind you, if he saw his Child fallen upon the Ground, and crying? For my part, I am of Opinion, that your Father and Mother, even if they could have foreseen, that you would have been the Author of such Doctrines, would not, however, have thrown you away.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (1)
- This Passage is obscure; and variously read, and explained by the Commentators. It is here translated conjecturally.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Against Epicurus.
Even Epicurus is sensible that we are by nature sociable beings; but having once placed our good in the mere outward shell, he can say nothing afterwards inconsistent with that; for again, he strenuously maintains that we ought not to admire or accept anything separated from the nature of good, and he is in the right to maintain it. But how, then, arise any affectionate anxieties, unless there be such a thing as natural affection towards our offspring? Then why do you, Epicurus, dissuade a wise man from bringing up children? Why are you afraid that upon their account he may fall into anxieties? Does he fall into any for a mouse, that feeds within his house? What is it to him, if a little mouse bewails itself there? But Epicurus knew that, if once a child is born, it is no longer in our power not to love and be solicitous for it. On the same grounds he says that a wise man will not engage himself in public business, knowing very well what must follow. If men are only so many flies, why should he not engage in it?
And does he, who knows all this, dare to forbid us to bring up children? Not even a sheep, or a wolf, deserts its offspring; and shall man? What would you have, that we should be as silly as sheep? Yet even these do not desert their offspring. Or as savage as wolves? Neither do these desert them. Pray, who would mind you, if he saw his child fallen upon the ground and crying? For my part, I am of opinion that your father and another, even if they could have foreseen that you would have been the author of such doctrines, would not have thrown you away.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
Against Epicurus.
Even Epicurus perceives that we are by nature social, but having once placed our good in the husk he is no longer able to say anything else. For on the other hand lie strongly maintains this, that we ought not to admire nor to accept any thing which is detached from the nature of good; and he is right in maintaining this. How then are we [suspicious], if we have no natural affection to our children? Why do you advise the wise man not to bring up children? Why are you afraid that he may thus fall into trouble? For does he fall into trouble on account of the mouse which is nurtured in the house? What does he care if a little mouse in the house makes lamentation to him? But Epicurus knows that if once a child is born, it is no longer in our power not to love it nor care about it. For this reason, Epicurus says, that a man who has any sense also does not engage in political matters; for he knows what a man must do who is engaged in such things; for indeed, if you intend to behave among men as you would among a swarm of flies, what hinders you? But Epicurus, who knows this, ventures to say that we should not bring up children. But a sheep does not desert its own offspring, nor yet a wolf; and shall a man desert his child? What do you mean? that we should be as silly as sheep? but not even do they desert their offspring: or as savage as wolves, but not even do wolves desert their young. Well, who would follow your advice, if he saw his child weeping after falling on the ground? For my part I think that even if your mother and your father had been told by an oracle, that you would say what you have said, they would not have cast you away.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (2)
- That is in the body; see i. 20, 17. Compare ii. 20, at the beginning of the chapter.
- The word ὑπονοητικοί is not intelligible. Schweighaeuser suggests that it ought to be προνοητικοί , how have we any care for others? Epicurus taught that we should not marry nor beget children nor engage in public affairs, because these things disturb our tranquillity.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1ἐπινοεῖ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ὅτι φύσει ἐσμὲν κοινωνικοί, ἀλλʼ ἅπαξ ἐν τῷ κελύφει θεὶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡμῶν οὐκέτι δύναται ἄλλο οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν. 2πάλιν γὰρ ἐκείνου λίαν κρατεῖ, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἀπεσπασμένον οὐδὲν τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ οὐσίας οὔτε θαυμάζειν οὔτʼ ἀποδέχεσθαι· καὶ καλῶς αὐτοῦ κρατεῖ. 3πῶς οὖν ὑπονοητικοί ἐσμεν, οἷς μὴ φυσικὴ ἔστι πρὸς τὰ ἔγγονα φιλοστοργία; διὰ τί ἀποσυμβουλεύεις τῷ σοφῷ τεκνοτροφεῖν; τί φοβῇ μὴ διὰ ταῦτα εἰς λύπας ἐμπέσῃ; 4διὰ γὰρ τὸν μῦν τὸν ἔσω τρεφόμενον ἐμπίπτει; τί οὖν αὐτῷ μέλει, ἂν μυίδιον μικρὸν ἔσω κατακλαίῃ αὐτοῦ; 5ἀλλʼ οἶδεν, ὅτι, ἂν ἅπαξ γένηται παιδίον, οὐκέτι ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ἐστι μὴ στέργειν μηδὲ φροντίζειν ἐπʼ αὐτῷ. 6διὰ τοῦτο φησὶν οὐδὲ πολιτεύσεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα· οἶδεν γὰρ τίνα δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸν πολιτευόμενον· ἐπείτοι εἰ ὡς ἐν μυίαις μέλλεις ἀναστρέφεσθαι, τί κωλύει; 7ἀλλʼ ὅμως εἰδὼς ταῦτα τολμᾷ λέγειν ὅτι μὴ ἀναιρώμεθα τέκνα. ἀλλὰ πρόβατον μὲν οὐκ ἀπολείπει τὸ αὑτοῦ ἔγγονον οὐδὲ λύκος, ἄνθρωπος δʼ ἀπολείπει; 8τί θέλεις; μωροὺς ἡμᾶς εἶναι ὡς τὰ πρόβατα; οὐδʼ ἐκεῖνα ἀπολείπει. θηριώδεις ὡς τοὺς λύκους; οὐδʼ ἐκεῖνοι ἀπολείπουσιν. 9ἄγε, τίς δέ σοι πείθεται ἰδὼν παιδίον αὐτοῦ κλαῖον ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν πεπτωκός; 10ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἐμαντεύσατο ἡ μήτηρ σου καὶ ὁ πατήρ, ὅτι μέλλεις ταῦτα λέγειν, οὐκ ἄν σε ἔρριψαν.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA