Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER XI. · Of Natural Affection.
1When one of the great Men came to visit him, Epictetus, having inquired into the Particulars of his Affairs, asked him, Whether he had a Wife and Children? The other replying, that he had; Epictetus likewise inquired, In what Manner do you live with them? Very miserably, says he——How so? For Men do not marry, and get Children, to be miserable; but rather to make themselves happy.——But, I am so very miserable about my Children, that the other Day, when my Daughter was sick, and appeared to be in Danger; I could not bear even to be with her; but ran away, till it was told me that she was recovered.——And pray do you think this was acting right? It was acting naturally, said he.——Well: do but convince me that it was acting naturally, and I will convince you that every thing natural is right.——All, or most of us Fathers are affected in the same Way.——I do not deny the Fact: but the Question between us is, whether it be right. For, by this Way of Reasoning, it must be said, that Tumours happen for the Good of the Body, because they do happen: and even that Vices are natural, because all or the most Part of us are guilty of them. Do you show me then how such a Behaviour as yours, appears to be natural. I cannot undertake that. But do you rather show me, how it appears to be neither natural, nor right. If we were disputing about Black and White, what Criterion must we call in, to distinguish them? The Sight. If about Hot and Cold, and Hard and Soft, what? The Touch. Well then: when we are debating about Natural and Unnatural, and Right and Wrong; what Criterion are we to take? I cannot tell. And yet, to be ignorant of a Criterion of Colours, or of Smells, or Tastes, might perhaps be no very great Loss. But do you think, that he suffers only a small Loss, who is ignorant of what is Good and Evil, and Natural and Unnatural, to Man? No. The very greatest. Well: tell me; Are all Things which are judged good and proper by some, rightly judged to be so? Is it possible, that the several Opinions of Jews, and Syrians, and Egyptians, and Romans, concerning Food, should all be right? How can it be possible? I suppose then, it is absolutely necessary, if the Opinions of the Egyptians be right, the others must be wrong: if those of the Jews be good, all the rest must be bad. How can it be otherwise? And where Ignorance is, there likewise is Want of Learning, and Instruction, in necessary Points. It is granted. Then, as you are sensible of this, you will for the future apply to nothing, and think of nothing else, but how to acquaint yourself with the Criterion of what is agreeable to Nature: and to use that in judging of each particular Case. 2At present the Assistance I have to give you, towards what you desire, is this. Doth Affection seem to you to be a right and a natural Thing? How should it be otherwise? Well: and is Affection natural and right, and Reason not so? By no means. Is there any Opposition, then, between Reason. and Affection? I think not. If there was, of two Opposites if one be natural, the other must necessarily be unnatural. Must it not? It must. What we find, then, at once affectionate, and reasonable, that we may safely pronounce to be right and good. Agreed. Well, then: you will not dispute, but that to run away, and leave a sick Child, is contrary to Reason. It remains for us to consider, whether it be consistent with Affection. Let us consider it. Did you, then, from an Affection to your Child, do right in running away, and leaving her? Hath her Mother no Affection for the Child? Yes, surely, she hath. Would it have been right, then, that her Mother too should leave her; or would it not? It would not. And doth not her Nurse love her? She doth. Then ought not she likewise to leave her? By no means. And doth not her Preceptor love her? He doth. Then ought not he also to have run away, and left her: and so the Child to have been left alone, and unassisted, from the great Affection of her Parents, and her Friends; or to die in the Hands of People, who neither loved her, nor took care of her. Heaven forbid! But is it not unreasonable and unjust, that what you think right in yourself, on the Account of your Affection; should not be allowed to others, who have the very same Affection as you? It is absurd. Pray, if you were sick yourself, should you be willing to have your family, and even your Wife and Children, so very affectionate, as to leave you helpless and alone? By no means. Or would you wish to be so loved by your Friends, as from their excessive Affection, always to be left alone when you were sick? Or would you not rather wish, if it were possible, to have such a Kind of Affection from your Enemies, as to make them always keep from you? If so, it remains, that your Behaviour was by no means affectionate. Well then: was it merely nothing that induced you to desert your Child? How is that possible? No: but it was some such Motive, as induced a Person at Rome to hide his Face while a Horse was running, to which he earnestly wished Success: and when, beyond his Expectation, it won the Race; he was obliged to have Recourse to Spunges, to recover his Senses. And what was this Motive? At present perhaps it cannot be accurately explained. It is sufficient to be convinced, (if what Philosophers say be true) that we are not to seek it from without: but that there is universally one and the same Cause, which moves us to do or forbear any Action; to speak or not to speak; to be elated or depressed; to avoid or pursue: that very Cause which hath now moved us two; you, to come, and sit and hear me; and me, to speak as I do. And what is that? Is it any thing else, than that it seemed right to us to do so? Nothing else. And if it had seemed otherwise to us, what should we have done else than what we thought right? This, and not the Death of Patroclus, was the Cause of Lamentation to Achilles, (for every Man is not thus affected by the Death of a Friend) that it seemed right to him. This too was the Cause of your running away from your Child, that it seemed right and if hereafter you should stay with her, it will be because that seemed right. You are now returning to Rome, because it seems right to you: but if you should alter your Opinion, you will not return. In a word neither Death, nor Exile, nor Pain, nor any thing of this Kind, is the Cause of our doing, or not doing, any Action: but our Opipions and Principles. Do I convince you of this, or not? You do. 3Well then such as the Cause is, such will be the Effect. From this Day forward, then, whenever we do any thing wrong, we will impute it only to the Principle from which we act: and we will endeavour to remove that, and cut it up by the Roots, with greater Care than we would Wens and Tumours from the Body. In like manner, we will ascribe what we do right, to the same Cause: and we will accuse neither Servant, nor Neighbour, nor Wife, nor Children, as the Causes of any Evils to ns; persuaded, that if we had not such Principles, such Consequences would not follow. Of these Principles we ourselves, and not Externals, are the Masters. Agreed. From this Day, then, we will neither consider nor enquire of what Sort, or in what Condition, any thing is our Estate, or Slaves, or Horses, or Dogs, but only our Principles. I wish to do it. You see, then, that it is necessary for you to become a Scholar: that Kind of Animal which every one laughs at; if you really desire to make an Examination of your Principles. But this, as you are sensible, is not the Work of an Hour or a Day.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (1)
- The Stoics say, that wise and good Men have the truly natural Affection towards their Children, and bad Persons have it not. Diog. Laert. L. vii. §. 120.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Of natural affection.
When an important personage once came to visit him, Epictetus, having inquired into the particulars of his affairs, asked him whether he had a wife and children. The other replying that he had, Epictetus likewise inquired, In what manner do you live with them? Very miserably, says he. How so? For men do not marry, and have children, in order to be miserable, but rather to make themselves happy. But I am so very miserable about my children that the other day, when my daughter was sick and appeared to be in danger, I could not bear even to be with her, but ran away, till it was told me that she was recovered. And pray do you think this was acting right? It was acting naturally, said he. Well, do but convince me that it was acting naturally, and I can as well convince you that everything natural is right. All, or most of us fathers, are affected in the same way. I do not deny the fact; but the question between us is, whether it is right. For by this way of reasoning it must be said that diseases happen for the good of the body, because they do happen; and even that vices are natural, because all, or most of us, are guilty of them. Do you show me, then, how such a behavior as yours appears to be natural.
I cannot undertake that; but do you rather show me that it is neither natural nor right.
If we were disputing about black and white, what criterion must we call in, to distinguish them?
The sight. If about hot and cold, or hard and soft, what? The touch.
Well, then, when we are debating about natural and unnatural and right and wrong what criterion are we to take?
I cannot tell.
And yet to be ignorant of a criterion of colors, or of smells, or tastes, might perhaps be no very great loss; but do you think that he suffers only a small loss who is ignorant of what is good and evil, and natural and unnatural to man?
No,—the very greatest.
Well, tell me; are all things which are judged good and proper by some rightly judged to be so? Thus, is it possible that the several opinions of Jews, and Syrians, and Egyptians, and Romans, concerning food should all be right?
How can it be possible?
I suppose, then, it is absolutely necessary that, if the opinions of the Egyptians be right, the others must be wrong; if those of the Jews be good, all the rest must be bad.
How can it be otherwise?
And where ignorance is, there likewise is want of wisdom and instruction in the most necessary points.
It is granted.
Then, as you are sensible of this, you will for the future apply yourself to nothing, and think of nothing else, but how to learn the criterion of what is agreeable to nature; and to use that in judging of each particular case. At present the assistance I have to give you towards what you desire is this: Does affection seem to you to be a right and a natural thing?
How should it be otherwise?
Well, and is affection natural and right, and reason not so?
By no means.
Is there any opposition, then, between reason and affection?
I think not.
Suppose there were; if one of two opposites be natural, the other must necessarily be unnatural, must it not?
It must.
What we find, then, to accord at once with love and reason, that we may safely pronounce to be right and good.
Agreed.
Well, then; you will not dispute this, that to run away, and leave a sick child, is contrary to reason. It remains for us to consider whether it be consistent with affection.
Let us consider it.
Did you, then, from an affection to your child, do right in running away and leaving her? Has her mother no affection for the child?
Yes, surely she has.
Would it have been right, then, that her mother too should leave her, or would it not?
It would not.
And does not her nurse love her?
She does.
Then ought she likewise to leave her?
By no means.
And does not her preceptor love her?
He does.
Then ought he also to have run away and left her,—the child being thus left alone and unassisted, from the great affection of her parents and her friends, or left to die among people who neither loved her nor took care of her?
Heaven forbid!
But is it not unreasonable and unjust that what you think right in yourself, on account of your affection, should not be allowed to others, who have the very same affection with you
It is absurd.
Pray, if you were ill yourself should you be willing to have your family, and even your wife and children, so very affectionate as to leave you helpless and alone?
By no means.
Or would you wish to be so loved by your friends as from their excessive affection always to be left alone when you were ill? Or would you not rejoice, if it were possible, to have such a kind of affection from your enemies, as to make them thus let you alone? If so, it remains, that your behavior was by no means affectionate. But now, was there no other motive that induced you to desert your child?
How is that possible?
I mean some such motive as induced a person at Rome to hide his face while a horse was running to which he earnestly wished success; and when, beyond his expectation, it won the race he was obliged himself to be sponged, to recover from his faintness.
And what was this motive?
At present, perhaps, it cannot be made clear to you. It is sufficient to be convinced, if what philosophers say be true, that we are not to seek any motive merely from without; but that there is the same [unseen] motive in all cases, which moves us to do or forbear any action; to speak or not to speak; to be elated or depressed; to avoid or pursue,—that very impulse which hath now moved us two; you, to come, and sit and hear me; and me, to speak as I do.
And what is that?
Is it anything else than that it seemed right to us to do so?
Nothing else.
And if it had seemed otherwise to us. what else should we have done than what we thought right? This, and not the death of Patroclus, was the real source of the lamentation of Achilles,—for every man is not thus affected by the death of a friend,—that it seemed right to him. This too was the cause of your running away from your child, that it then seemed right; and if hereafter you should stay with her, it will be because that seems right. You are now returning to Rome because it seems right to you; but if you should alter your opinion you will not return. In a word, neither death, nor exile, nor pain, nor anything of this kind, is the real cause of our doing or not doing any action, but our inward opinions and principles. Do I convince you of this, or not?
You do.
Well, then, such as the cause is, such will be the effect. From this day forward, then, whenever we do anything wrong, we will impute it to the wrong principle from which we act; and we will endeavor to remove and extirpate that, with greater care than we would remove wens and tumors from the body. In like manner, we will ascribe what we do right to the same cause; and we will accuse neither servant, nor neighbor, nor wife, nor children, as the cause of any evil to us,—persuaded that if we had not accepted certain principles, we should not carry them to such consequences. The control of these principles lies in us, and not in any outward things. Of these principles we ourselves, and not things outward, are the masters.
Agreed.
From this day, then, we will not so closely inquire as to any external conditions,—estate or slaves, or horses, or dogs,—but only make sure of our own principles.
Such is my desire, said the visitor.
You see, then, that it is necessary for you to become a student, that being whom every one laughs at, if you really desire to make an examination of your own principles; but this, as you should know, is not the work of an hour or a day.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
Of natural affection.
When he was visited by one of the magistrates, Epictetus inquired of him about several particulars, and asked if he had children and a wife. The man replied that he had; and Epictetus inquired further, how he felt under the circumstances. Miserable, the man said. Then Epictetus asked, In what respect, for men do not marry and beget children in order to be wretched, but rather to be happy. But I, the man replied, am so wretched about my children that lately, when my little daughter was sick and was supposed to be in danger, I could not endure to stay with her, but I left home till a person sent me news that she had recovered. Well then, said Epictetus, do you think that you acted right? I acted naturally, the man replied. But convince me of this that you acted naturally, and I will convince you that everything which takes place according to nature takes place rightly. This is the case, said the man, with all or at least most fathers. I do not deny that: but the matter about which we are inquiring is whether such behaviour is right; for in respect to this matter we must say that tumours also come for the good of the body, because they do come; and generally we must say that to do wrong is natural, because nearly all or at least most of us do wrong. Do you show me then how your behaviour is natural. I cannot, he said; but do you rather show me how it is not according to nature, and is not rightly done.
Well, said Epictetus, if we were inquiring about white and black, what criterion should we employ for distinguishing between them? The sight, he said. And if about hot and cold, and hard and soft, what criterion? The touch. Well then, since we are inquiring about things which are according to nature, and those which are done rightly or not rightly, what kind of criterion do you think that we should employ? I do not know, he said. And yet not to know the criterion of colours and smells, and also of tastes, is perhaps no great harm; but if a man do not know the criterion of good and bad, and of things according to nature and contrary to nature, does this seem to you a small harm? The greatest harm (I think). Come tell me, do all things which seem to some persons to be good and becoming, rightly appear such; and at present as to Jews and Syrians and Egyptians and Romans, is it possible that the opinions of all of them in respect to food are right? How is it possible? he said. Well, I suppose, it is absolutely necessary that, if the opinions of the Egyptians are right, the opinions of the rest must be wrong: if the opinions of the Jews are right, those of the rest cannot be right. Certainly. But where there is ignorance, there also there is want of learning and training in things which are necessary. He assented to this. You then, said Epictetus, since you know this, for the future will employ yourself seriously about nothing else, and will apply your mind to nothing else than to learn the criterion of things which are according to nature, and by using it also to determine each several thing. But in the present matter I have so muck as this to aid you towards what you wish. Does affection to those of your family appear to you to be according to nature and to be good? Certainly. Well, is such affection natural and good, and is a thing consistent with reason not good? By no means. Is then that which is consistent with reason in contradiction with affection? I think not. You are right, for if it is otherwise, it is necessary that one of the contradictions being according to nature, the other must be contrary to nature. Is it not so? It is, he said. Whatever then we shall discover to be at the same time affectionate and also consistent with reason, this we confidently declare to be right and good. Agreed. Well then to leave your sick child and to go away is not reasonable, and I suppose that you will not say that it is; but it remains for us to inquire if it is consistent with affection. Yes, let us consider. Did you then, since you had an affectionate disposition to your child, do right when you ran off and left her; and has the mother no affection for the child? Certainly, she has. Ought then the mother also to have left her, or ought she not? She ought not. And the nurse, does she love her? She does. Ought then she also to have left her? By no means. And the paedagogue, does he not love her? He does love her. Ought then he also to have deserted her? and so should the child have been left alone and without help on account of the great affection of you the parents and of those about her, or should she have died in the hands of those who neither loved her nor cared for her? Certainly not. Now this is unfair and unreasonable, not to allow those who have equal affection with yourself to do what you think to be proper for yourself to do because you have affection. It is absurd. Come then, if you were sick, would you wish your relations to be so affectionate, and all the rest, children and wife, as to leave you alone and deserted? By no means. And would you wish to be so loved by your own that through their excessive affection you would always be left alone in sickness? or for this reason would you rather pray, if it were possible, to be loved by your enemies and deserted by them? But if this is so, it results that your behaviour was not at all an affectionate act.
Well then, was it nothing which moved you and induced you to desert your child? and how is that possible? But it might be something of the kind which moved a man at Rome to wrap up his head while a horse was running which he favoured; and when contrary to expectation the horse won, he required sponges to recover from his fainting fit. What then is the thing which moved? The exact discussion of this does not belong to the present occasion perhaps; but it is enough to be convinced of this, if what the philosophers say is true, that we must not look for it anywhere without, but in all cases it is one and the same thing which is the cause of our doing or not doing something, of saying or not saying something, of being elated or depressed, of avoiding any thing or pursuing: the very thing which is now the cause to me and to you, to you of coming to me and sitting and hearing, and to me of saying what I do say. And what is this? Is it any other than our will to do sc? No other. But if we had willed otherwise, what else should we have been doing than that which we willed to do? This then was the cause of Achilles’ lamentation, not the death of Patroclus; for another man does not behave thus on the death of his companion; but it was because he chose to do so. And to you this was the very cause of your then running away, that you chose to do so; and on the other side, if you should (hereafter) stay with her, the reason will be the same. And now you are going to Rome because you choose; and if you should change your mind, you will not go thither. And in a word, neither death nor exile nor pain nor anything of the kind is the cause of our doing anything or not doing; but our own opinions and our wills ( δόγματα).
Do I convince you of this or not? You do convince me. Such then as the causes are in each case, such also are the effects. When then we are doing anything not rightly, from this day we shall impute it to nothing else than to the will (δόγμα or opinion) from which we have done it: and it is that which we shall endeavour to take away and to extirpate more than the tumours and abscesses out of the body. And in like manner we shall give the same account of the cause of the things which we do right; and we shall no longer allege as causes of any evil to us, either slave or neighbour, or wife or children, being persuaded, that if we do not think things to be what we do think them to be, we do not the acts which follow from such opinions; and as to thinking or not thinking, that is in our power and not in externals. It is so, he said. From this day then we shall inquire into and examine nothing else, what its quality is, or its state, neither land nor slaves nor horses nor dogs, nothing else than opinions. I hope so. You see then that you must become a Scholasticus, an animal whom all ridicule, if you really intend to make an examination of your own opinions: and that this is not the work of one hour or day, you know yourself.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (4)
- When we are children our parents put us in the hands of a paedagogue to see on all occasions that we take no harm. —Epictetus, Frag. 97.
- κἂν μεταδόξῃ , if you should change your mind, as we say. So we may translate, in the previous part of this chapter, ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν , and the like, we had a mind to such and such a thing. Below it is said that the causes of our actions are our opinions and our wills, where the Greek for wills is δόγματα . If we translate ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν , seemed right, as some persons would translate it, that is not the meaning, unless we understand seemed right in a sense in which it is often used, that is, a man’s resolve to do so and so. See Schweig.’s note on ὑπόληψις and δόγμα . As Antoninus says (viii. 1): How then shall a man do this (what his nature requires)? If he has principles ( δόγματα ) from which come his affects ( ὅρμαι ) and his acts ( πράξεις )?
- He uses the word δόγματα , which contains the same element or root as δοκεῖ , ἔδοξε .
- A Scholasticus is one who frequents the schools; a studious and literary person, who does not engage in the business of active life.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1ἀφικομένου δέ τινος πρὸς αὐτὸν τῶν ἐν τέλει πυθόμενος παρʼ αὐτοῦ τὰ ἐπὶ μέρους ἠρώτησεν, εἰ καὶ τέκνα εἴη αὐτῷ καὶ γυνή. 2τοῦ δʼ ὁμολογήσαντος προσεπύθετο· πῶς τι οὖν χρῇ τῷ πράγματι; — ἀθλίως, ἔφη. 3— καὶ ὅς· τίνα τρόπον; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τούτου γʼ ἕνεκα γαμοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι καὶ παιδοποιοῦνται, ὅπως ἄθλιοι ὦσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅπως εὐδαίμονες. 4— ἀλλʼ ἐγώ, ἔφη, οὕτως ἀθλίως ἔχω περὶ τὰ παιδάρια, ὥστε πρῴην νοσοῦντός μου τοῦ θυγατρίου καὶ δόξαντος κινδυνεύειν οὐχ ὑπέμεινα οὐδὲ παρεῖναι αὐτῷ νοσοῦντι, φυγὼν δʼ ᾠχόμην, μέχρις οὗ προσήγγειλέ τις μοι ὅτι ἔχει καλῶς. 5— τί οὖν; ὀρθῶς φαίνει σαυτῷ ταῦτα πεποιηκέναι; — φυσικῶς, ἔφη. — ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό με πεῖσον, ἔφη, σύ, διότι φυσικῶς, καὶ ἐγώ σε πείσω, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν γινόμενον ὀρθῶς γίνεται. 6— τοῦτο, ἔφη, πάντες ἢ οἵ γε πλεῖστοι πατέρες πάσχομεν. — οὐδʼ ἐγώ σοι ἀντιλέγω, ἔφη, ὅτι οὐ γίνεται, τὸ δʼ ἀμφισβητούμενον ἡμῖν ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, εἰ ὀρθῶς. 7ἐπεὶ τούτου γʼ ἕνεκα καὶ τὰ φύματα δεῖ λέγειν ἐπʼ ἀγαθῷ γίνεσθαι τοῦ σώματος, ὅτι γίνεται, καὶ ἁπλῶς τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν, ὅτι πάντες σχεδὸν ἢ οἵ γε πλεῖστοι ἁμαρτάνομεν. 8δεῖξον οὖν μοι σύ, πῶς κατὰ φύσιν ἐστίν. — οὐ δύναμαι, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ σύ μοι μᾶλλον δεῖξον, πῶς οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ φύσιν οὐδʼ ὀρθῶς γίνεται. 9— καὶ ὅς· ἀλλʼ εἰ ἐζητοῦμεν, ἔφη, περὶ λευκῶν καὶ μελάνων, ποῖον ἂν κριτήριον παρεκαλοῦμεν πρὸς διάγνωσιν αὐτῶν; — τὴν ὅρασιν, ἔφη. — τί δʼ εἰ περὶ θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν καὶ σκληρῶν καὶ μαλακῶν, ποῖόν τι; — τὴν ἁφήν. — 10οὐκοῦν, ἐπειδὴ περὶ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τῶν ὀρθῶς ἢ οὐκ ὀρθῶς γινομένων ἀμφισβητοῦμεν, ποῖον θέλεις κριτήριον παραλάβωμεν; 11— οὐκ οἶδʼ, ἔφη. — καὶ μὴν τὸ μὲν τῶν χρωμάτων καὶ ὀσμῶν, ἔτι δὲ χυλῶν κριτήριον ἀγνοεῖν τυχὸν οὐ μεγάλη ζημία, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ παρὰ φύσιν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δοκεῖ σοι μικρὰ ζημία εἶναι τῷ ἀγνοοῦντι; 12— ἡ μεγίστη μὲν οὖν. — φέρε, εἰπέ μοι, πάντα ἃ δοκεῖ τισιν εἶναι καλὰ καὶ προσήκοντα, ὀρθῶς δοκεῖ; καὶ νῦν Ἰουδαίοις καὶ Σύροις καὶ Αἰγυπτίοις καὶ Ῥωμαίοις οἷόν τε πάντα τὰ δοκοῦντα περὶ τροφῆς ὀρθῶς δοκεῖν; 13— καὶ πῶς οἷόν τε; — ἀλλʼ οἶμαι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, εἰ ὀρθά ἐστι τὰ Αἰγυπτίων, μὴ ὀρθὰ εἶναι τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, εἰ καλῶς ἔχει τὰ Ἰουδαίων, μὴ καλῶς ἔχειν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων. 14— πῶς γὰρ οὔ; — ὅπου δʼ ἄγνοια, ἐκεῖ καὶ ἀμαθία καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ἀπαιδευσία. 15— συνεχώρει. — σὺ οὖν, ἔφη, τούτων αἰσθόμενος οὐδὲν ἄλλο τοῦ λοιποῦ σπουδάσεις οὐδὲ πρὸς ἄλλῳ τινὶ τὴν γνώμην. ἕξεις ἢ ὅπως τὸ κριτήριον τῶν κατὰ φύσιν καταμαθὼν τούτῳ προσχρώμενος διακρινεῖς τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἕκαστον. 16ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ παρόντος τὰ τοσαῦτα ἔχω σοι πρὸς ὃ βούλει βοηθῆσαι. 17τὸ φιλόστοργον δοκεῖ σοι κατὰ φύσιν τʼ εἶναι καὶ καλόν; — πῶς γὰρ οὔ; — τί δέ; τὸ μὲν φιλόστοργον κατὰ φύσιν τʼ ἐστὶ καὶ καλόν, τὸ δʼ εὐλόγιστον οὐ καλόν; 18— οὐδαμῶς. — μὴ τοίνυν μάχην ἔχει τῷ φιλοστόργῳ τὸ εὐλόγιστον; — οὐ δοκεῖ μοι. — εἰ δὲ μή, τῶν μαχομένων ἀνάγκη θατέρου κατὰ φύσιν ὄντος θάτερον εἶναι παρὰ φύσιν; ἢ γὰρ οὔ; — οὕτως, ἔφη. 19— οὐκοῦν ὅ τι ἂν εὑρίσκωμεν ὁμοῦ μὲν φιλόστοργον ὁμοῦ δʼ εὐλόγιστον, τοῦτο θαρροῦντες ἀποφαινόμεθα ὀρθόν τε εἶναι καὶ καλόν; 20— ἔστω, ἔφη. — τί οὖν; ἀφεῖναι νοσοῦν τὸ παιδίον καὶ ἀφέντα ἀπελθεῖν ὅτι μὲν οὐκ εὐλόγιστον οὐκ οἶμαί σʼ ἀντερεῖν. ὑπολείπεται δʼ ἡμᾶς σκοπεῖν εἰ φιλόστοργον. — σκοπῶμεν δή. — 21ἆρʼ οὖν σὺ μὲν ἐπειδὴ φιλοστόργως διέκεισο πρὸς τὸ παιδίον, ὀρθῶς ἐποίεις φεύγων καὶ ἀπολείπων αὐτό; ἡ μήτηρ δʼ οὐ φιλοστοργεῖ τὸ παιδίον; — Φιλοστοργεῖ μὲν οὖν. 22— οὐκοῦν ἔδει καὶ τὴν μητέρα ἀφεῖναι αὐτὸ ἢ οὐκ ἔδει; — οὐκ ἔδει. — τί δʼ ἡ τιτθή; στέργει αὐτό; — στέργει, ἔφη. — ἔδει οὖν κἀκείνην ἀφεῖναι αὐτό; — οὐδαμῶς. — τί δʼ ὁ παιδαγωγός; οὐ στέργει αὐτό; 23— στέργει. — ἔδει οὖν κἀκεῖνον ἀφέντα ἀπελθεῖν, εἶθʼ οὕτως ἔρημον καὶ ἀβοήθητον ἀπολειφθῆναι τὸ παιδίον διὰ τὴν πολλὴν φιλοστοργίαν τῶν γονέων ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸ ἢ ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν τῶν οὔτε στεργόντων οὔτε κηδομένων ἀποθανεῖν; — μὴ γένοιτο. 24— καὶ μὴν ἐκεῖνό γε ἄνισον καὶ ἄγνωμον, ὅ τις αὑτῷ προσῆκον οἴεται διὰ τὸ φιλόστοργος εἶναι, τοῦτο τοῖς ὁμοίως φιλοστοργοῦσιν μὴ ἐφιέναι; 25— ἄτοπον. — ἄγε, σὺ δʼ ἂν νοσῶν ἠβούλου φιλοστόργους οὕτως ἔχειν τοὺς προσήκοντας τούς τʼ ἄλλους καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα, ὥστʼ ἀφεθῆναι μόνος ὑπʼ αὐτῶν καὶ ἔρημος; 26— οὐδαμῶς. — εὔξαιο δʼ ἂν οὕτως στερχθῆναι ὑπὸ τῶν σαυτοῦ, ὥστε διὰ τὴν ἄγαν αὐτῶν φιλοστοργίαν ἀεὶ μόνος ἀπολείπεσθαι ἐν ταῖς νόσοις, ἢ τούτου γʼ ἕνεκα μᾶλλον ἂν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, εἰ δυνατὸν ἦν, φιλοστοργεῖσθαι ηὔχου, ὥστʼ ἀπολείπεσθαι ὑπʼ αὐτῶν; εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, ὑπολείπεται μηδαμῶς ἔτι φιλόστοργον εἶναι τὸ πραχθέν. 27τί οὖν; οὐδὲν ἦν τὸ κινῆσάν σε καὶ ἐξορμῆσαν πρὸς τὸ ἀφεῖναι τὸ παιδίον; καὶ πῶς οἷόν τε; ἀλλὰ τοιοῦτόν τι ἄν, οἷον καὶ ἐν Ῥώμῃ τινὰ ἦν τὸ κινοῦν, ὥστʼ ἐγκαλύπτεσθαι τοῦ ἵππου τρέχοντος ᾧ ἐσπουδάκει, εἶτα νικήσαντός ποτε παραλόγως σπόγγων δεῆσαι αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸ ἀναληφθῆναι λιποψυχοῦντα. 28τί οὖν τοῦτό ἐστιν; τὸ μὲν ἀκριβὲς οὐ τοῦ παρόντος καιροῦ τυχόν· ἐκεῖνο δʼ ἀπαρκεῖ πεισθῆναι, εἴπερ ὑγιές ἐστι τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσόφων λεγόμενον, ὅτι οὐκ ἔξω που δεῖ ζητεῖν αὐτό, ἀλλʼ ἓν καὶ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ πάντων τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ποιεῖν τι ἡμᾶς ἢ μὴ ποιεῖν, τοῦ λέγειν τινὰ ἢ μὴ λέγειν, τοῦ ἐπαίρεσθαι ἢ συστέλλεσθαι ἢ φεύγειν τινὰ ἢ διώκειν, 29τοῦθʼ ὅπερ καὶ νῦν ἐμοί τε καὶ σοὶ γέγονεν αἴτιον, σοὶ μὲν τοῦ ἐλθεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ καὶ καθῆσθαι νῦν ἀκούοντα, ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦ λέγειν ταῦτα. 30τί δʼ ἐστὶ τοῦτο; ἆρά γε ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν; — οὐδέν. — εἰ δʼ ἄλλως ἡμῖν ἐφάνη, τί ἂν ἄλλο ἢ τὸ δόξαν ἐπράττομεν; 31οὐκ οὖν καὶ τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ τοῦτο αἴτιον τοῦ πενθεῖν, οὐχ ὁ τοῦ Πατρόκλου θάνατος (ἄλλος γάρ τις οὐ πάσχει ταῦτα τοῦ ἑταίρου ἀποθανόντος) 32, ἀλλʼ ὅτι ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ. καὶ σοὶ τότε φεύγειν τοῦτο αὐτὸ ὅτι ἔδοξέν σοι· καὶ πάλιν, ἐὰν μείνῃς, ὅτι ἔδοξέν σοι. καὶ νῦν ἐν Ῥώμῃ ἀνέρχῃ, ὅτι δοκεῖ σοι· κἂν μεταδόξῃ, οὐκ ἂν ἀπελεύσῃ. 33καὶ ἁπλῶς οὔτε θάνατος οὔτε φυγὴ οὔτε πόνος οὔτε ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ πράττειν τι ἢ μὴ πράττειν ἡμᾶς, ἀλλʼ ὑπολήψεις καὶ δόγματα. 34τοῦτό σε πείθω ἢ οὐχί; — Πεί[σ]θεις, ἔφη. — οἷα δὴ τὰ αἴτια ἐφʼ ἑκάστου, τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ ἀποτελούμενα. 35οὐκοῦν ὅταν μὴ ὀρθῶς τι πράττωμεν, ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἡμέρας οὐδὲν ἄλλο αἰτιασόμεθα ἢ τὸ δόγμα, ἀφʼ οὗ αὐτὸ ἐπράξαμεν, κἀκεῖνο ἐξαίρειν καὶ ἐκτέμνειν πειρασόμεθα μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ φύματα καὶ τὰ ἀποστήματα ἐκ τοῦ σώματος. 36ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν ὀρθῶς πραττομένων ταὐτὸν τοῦτο αἴτιον ἀποφανοῦμεν. 37καὶ οὔτʼ οἰκέτην ἔτι αἰτιασόμεθα οὔτε γείτονα οὔτε γυναῖκα οὔτε τέκνα ὡς αἴτιά τινων κακῶν ἡμῖν γινόμενα πεπεισμένοι ὅτι, ἂν μὴ ἡμῖν δόξῃ τοιαῦτά τινα εἶναι, οὐ πράττομεν τὰ ἀκόλουθα· τοῦ δόξαι δὲ ἢ μὴ δόξαι, ἡμεῖς κύριοι καὶ οὐ τὰ ἐκτός. 38— οὕτως, ἔφη. — ἀπὸ τῆς σήμερον τοίνυν ἡμέρας οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐπισκοπήσομεν οὐδʼ ἐξετάσομεν, ποῖόν τι ἐστὶν ἢ πῶς ἔχει, οὔτε τὸν ἀγρὸν οὔτε τὰ ἀνδράποδα οὔτε τοὺς ἵππους ἢ κύνας, ἀλλὰ τὰ δόγματα. — εὔχομαι, ἔφη. 39— ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὅτι σχολαστικόν σε δεῖ γενέσθαι, τοῦτο τὸ ζῷον οὗ πάντες καταγελῶσιν, εἴπερ ἄρα θέλεις ἐπίσκεψιν τῶν σαυτοῦ δογμάτων ποιεῖσθαι. 40τοῦτο δʼ ὅτι μιᾶς ὥρας ἢ ἡμέρας οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπινοεῖς καὶ αὐτός.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA