Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER XXVII. · Of the several Appearances of Things to the Mind: and what Remedies are to be provided for them.
1Appearances to the Mind are of Four Kinds. Things are either what they appear to be: or they neither are, nor appear to be: or they are, and do not appear to be: or they are not, and yet appear to be. To form a right Judgment in all these Cases, belongs only to the completely Instructed. But whatever presses, to that a Remedy must be applied. If the Sophistries of Pyrrhonism, or the Academy, press us, the Remedy must be applied there: if specious Appearances, by which Things seem to be good which are not so, let us seek for a Comedy there. If it be Custom which presses us, we must endeavour to find a Remedy against that. What Remedy is to be found against Custom? A contrary Custom. You hear the Vulgar say, "Such a one, poor Soul! is dead."——Why, his Father died: his Mother died.——"Ay: but he was cut off in the Flower of his Age, and in a foreign Land."——Hear the contrary Ways of Speaking: withdraw yourself from these Expressions. Oppose to one Custom, a contrary Custom; to Sophistry, the Art of Reasoning, and the frequent Use and Exercise of it. Against specious Appearances, we must have clear Pre-conceptions, brightened up, and ready. When Death appears as an Evil, we ought immediately to remember, that Evils may be avoided, but Death is Necessity. For what can I do, or where can I fly from it? Let me suppose myself to be Sarpedon, the Son of Jove, that I may speak in the same gallant Way. Brave tho' we die, and honour'd if we live;
Or let us Glory gain, or Glory give.Pope. If I can atchieve nothing myself, I will not envy another the Honour of doing some gallant Action. But suppose this to be a Strain too high for us; are not we capable [at least] of arguing thus?——Where shall I fly from Death? Shew me the Place; shew me the People, to whom I may have Recourse, whom Death doth not overtake. Shew me the Charm to avoid it. If there be none, what would you have me do? I cannot escape Death: but cannot I escape the Dread of it? Must I die trembling, and lamenting? For the Origin of the Disease is, wishing for something that is not obtained. In consequence of this, if I can bring over Externals to my own Inclination, I do it: if not, I want to tear out the Eyes of whoever hinders me. For it is the Nature of Man, not to bear the being deprived of Good; not to bear the falling into Evil. And so, at last, when I can neither bring over Things [to my own Inclination], nor tear out the Eyes of him who hinders me, I sit down, and groan, and revile him whom I can; Jupiter, and the rest of the Gods. For what are they to me, if they take no care of me? Oh! but you will be guilty of Impiety. What then? Can I be in a worse Condition than I am now? In general, remember this, That, unless Piety and Interest be placed in the same Thing, Piety cannot be preserved in any mortal Breast. 2Do not these Things seem to have Force? Let a Pyrrhonist, or an Academic, come and oppose them. For my part, I am not at Leisure; nor able to stand up as an Advocate for general Consent. Even if Business were concerning an Estate, I should call in another Advocate. With what Advocate, then, am I contented [in the present Case] With any that may be upon the Spot. I may be at a Loss, perhaps, to give a Reason, how Sensation is performed: whether it be diffused universally, or reside in a particular Part: for I find Difficulties that shock me, in each Case: but, that you and I are not the same Person, I very exactly know. How so? Why, I never, when I have a mind to swallow any thing, carry it to your Mouth; but my own. I never, when I wanted to take a Loaf, took a Brush: but went directly to the Loaf, as fit to answer my Purpose. And do you yourselves, who deny all Evidence of the Senses, act any otherwise? Who of you, when he intended to go into a Bath, ever went into a Mill? What, then, must not we, to the utmost, defend these Points? support the general Consent [of Mankind]? be fortified against every thing that opposes it? Who denies that? But it must be done by him who hath Abilities; who hath Leisure: but he, who is full of Trembling and Perturbation, and inward Disorders of Heart, must employ his Time about something else.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (5)
- Pyrrho, the Founder of the Sect of the Pyrrhonists, was born at Elis, and flourished about the Time of Alexander. He held, That there is no Difference between Just and Unjust, Good and Evil: that all Things are equally indifferent, uncertain, and undistinguishable: that neither our Senses or Understanding give us either a true or a false Information: therefore, that we ought to give them no Credit; but to remain without Opinion; without Motion; without Inclination; and to say of every thing, that it no more is, than it is not; that it is no more one thing than another; and that against one Reason, there is always an equal Reason to be opposed. His Life is said to have been conformable to his Principles; for that he never avoided any thing: and his Friends were obliged to follow him, to prevent his running under the Wheels of a Coach, or walking down a Precipice. But these Stories, perhaps, are nothing but mere Invention; formed to expose the Absurdities of his System. Once, when he saw his Master Anaxarchus fallen into a Ditch, he passed by him, without offering him any Assistance. Anaxarchus was consistent enough with his Principles, not to suffer Pyrrho to be blamed for this Tranquil Behaviour: which he justified, as a laudable Instance of Indifference, and Want of Affection. A fine Picture this, of sceptical Friendship!For a more complete Account of the System of Pyrrho, see Diog. Laert. in his Life. And Lipsius Manuduct. ad Stoic. Philosoph. B. ii. Dif. 3.
- The Translation follows Mr. Upton's Reading, το φοβεισθαι.
- The blasphemous Impatience, here introduced, resembles that which is strongly described, in a few Words, Is. viii. 21.—When they shall be hungry, they shall fret themselves; and curse their King, and their God, and look upward.
- This is spoken in Opposition to the Sceptics, who are alluded to in the Beginning of the Chapter; and who say, that no Argument hath any Force.
- This seems to be said by one of the Hearers, who wanted to have the Absurdities of the Sceptics confuted, and guarded against, by regular Argument. Epictetus allows this to be right, for such as have Abilities and Leisure: but recommends to others, the more necessary Talk, of curing their own moral Disorders: and insinuates, that the mere common Occurrences of Life are sufficient to overthrow the Notions of the Pyrrhonists.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Of the varied appearances of things to the mind, and what means are at hand by which to regulate them.
Appearances to the mind are of four kinds.
Things either are what they appear to be; or they neither are, nor appear to be; or they are, and do not appear to be; or they are not, and yet appear to be. Rightly to aim, in all these cases, is the wise man’s task. Whatever unduly constrains us, to that a remedy must be applied. If the sophistries of Pyrrhonism, or the Academy, constrain us, the remedy must be applied there; if specious appearances, by which things seem to be good which are not so, let us seek for a remedy there. If it be custom which constrains us, we must endeavor to find a remedy against that.
What remedy is to be found against custom?
Establish a contrary custom. You hear the vulgar say, Such a one, poor soul! is dead. Well, his father died; his mother died. Ay, but he was cut off in the flower of his age, and in a foreign land. Observe these contrary ways of speaking; and abandon such expressions. Oppose to one custom a contrary custom; to sophistry the art of reasoning, and the frequent use and exercise of it. Against specious appearances we must set clear convictions, bright and ready for use. When death appears as an evil, we ought immediately to remember that evils are things to be avoided, but death is inevitable. For what can I do, or where can I fly from it? Let me suppose myself to be Sarpedon, the son of Jove, that I may speak as nobly. I go either to excel, or to give another the occasion to excel. If I can achieve nothing myself, I will not grudge another his achievement.
But suppose this to be a strain too high for us; do not these following thoughts befit us? Whither shall I fly from death? Show me the place, show me the people, to whom I may have recourse, whom death does not overtake. Show me the charm to avoid it. If there be none, what would you have me do? I cannot escape death; but cannot I escape the dread of it? Must I die trembling and lamenting? For the very origin of the disease lies in wishing for something that is not obtained. Under the influence of this, if I can make outward things conform to my own inclination, I do it; if not, I feel inclined to tear out the eyes of whoever hinders me. For it is the nature of man not to endure the being deprived of good; not to endure the falling into evil. And so, at last, when I can neither control events, nor tear out the eyes of him who hinders me, I sit down, and groan, and revile him whom I can,—Zeus, and the rest of the gods; for what are they to me, if they take no care of me?
Oh! but then you will be impious.
What then? Can I be in a worse condition than I am now? In general, remember this, that unless we make our religion and our treasure to consist in the same thing, religion will always be sacrificed.
Have these things no weight? Let a Pyrrhonist, or an Academic, come and oppose them. For my part, I have neither leisure nor ability to stand up as an advocate for common-sense. Even if the business were concerning an estate, I should call in another advocate. To what advocate, then, shall I now appeal? I will leave it to any one who may be upon the spot. Thus, I may not be able to explain how sensation takes place, whether it be diffused universally, or reside in a particular part; for I find perplexities in either case; but that you and I are not the same person, I very exactly know.
How so?
Why, I never, when I have a mind to swallow anything, carry it to your mouth, but my own. I never, when I wanted bread, seized a broom instead, but went directly to the bread as I needed it. You who deny all evidence of the senses, do you act otherwise? Which of you, when he wished to go into a bath, ever went into a mill?
Why, then, must not we, to the utmost, defend these points; stand by common-sense; be fortified against everything that opposes it?
Who denies that? But it must be done by him who has ability and leisure to spare; but he who is full of trembling and perturbation and inward disorders of heart must first employ his time about something else.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Higginson’s notes (1)
- Imitated from Iliad, 12. 328 .—H.
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
In how many ways appearances exist, and what aids we should provide against them.
Appearances are to us in four ways: for either things appear as they are; or they are not, and do not even appear to be; or they are, and do not appear to be; or they are not, and yet appear to be. Further, in all these cases to form a right judgment (to hit the mark) is the office of an educated man. But whatever it is that annoys (troubles) us, to that we ought to apply a remedy. If the sophisms of Pyrrho and of the Academics are what annoys (troubles), we must apply the remedy to them. If it is the persuasion of appearances, by which some things appear to be good, when they are not good, let us seek a remedy for this. If it is habit which annoys us, we must try to seek aid against habit. What aid then can we find against habit? The contrary habit. You hear the ignorant say: That unfortunate person is dead: his father and mother are overpowered with sorrow; he was cut off by an untimely death and in a foreign land. Hear the contrary way of speaking: Tear yourself from these expressions: oppose to one habit the contrary habit; to sophistry oppose reason, and the exercise and discipline of reason; against persuasive (deceitful) appearances we ought to have manifest praecognitions (προλήψεις) cleared of all impurities and ready to hand.
When death appears an evil, we ought to have this rule in readiness, that it is fit to avoid evil things, and that death is a necessary thing. For what shall I do, and where shall I escape it? Suppose that I am not Sarpedon, the son of Zeus, nor able to speak in this noble way: I will go and I am resolved either to behave bravely myself or to give to another the opportunity of doing so; if I cannot succeed in doing any thing myself, I will not grudge another the doing of something noble.—Suppose that it is above our power to act thus; is it not in our power to reason thus? Tell me where I can escape death: discover for me the country, show me the men to whom I must go, whom death does not visit. Discover to me a charm against death. If I have not one, what do you wish me to do? I cannot escape from death. Shall I not escape from the fear of death, but shall I die lamenting and trembling? For the origin of perturbation is this, to wish for something, and that this should not happen. Therefore if I am able to change externals according to my wish, I change them; but if I can not, I am ready to tear out the eyes of him who hinders me. For the nature of man is not to endure to be deprived of the good, and not to endure the falling into the evil. Then at last, when I am neither able to change circumstances nor to tear out the eyes of him who hinders me, I sit down and groan, and abuse whom I can, Zeus and the rest of the gods. For if they do not care for me, what are they to me?—Yes, but you will be an impious man.—In what respect then will it be worse for me than it is now?—To sum up, remember this that unless piety and your interest be in the same thing, piety cannot be maintained in any man. Do not these things seem necessary (true)?
Let the followers of Pyrrho and the Academics come and make their objections. For I, as to my part, have no leisure for these disputes, nor am I able to undertake the defence of common consent (opinion). If I had a suit even about a bit of land, I would call in another to defend my interests. With what evidence then am I satisfied? With that which belongs to the matter in hand. How indeed perception is effected, whether through the whole body or any part, perhaps I cannot explain: for both opinions perplex me. But that you and I are not the same, I know with perfect certainty. How do you know it? When I intend to swallow any thing, I never carry it to your mouth, but to my own. When I intend to take bread, I never lay hold of a broom, but I always go to the bread as to a mark. And you yourselves (the Pyrrhonists), who take away the evidence of the senses, do you act otherwise? Who among you, when he intended to enter a bath, ever went into a mill?
What then? Ought we not with all our power to hold to this also, the maintaining of general opinion, and fortifying ourselves against the arguments which are directed against it? Who denies that we ought to do this? Well, he should do it who is able, who has leisure for it; but as to him who trembles and is perturbed and is inwardly broken in heart (spirit), he must employ his time better on something else.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (7)
- Pyrrho was a native of Elis , in the Peloponnesus Iliad. He is said to have accompanied Alexander the Great in his Asiatic expedition (Diogenes Laertius, ix. 61). The time of his birth is not stated, but it is said that he lived to the age of ninety. See Levin’s Six Lectures, 1871 . Lecture II., On the Pyrrhonian Ethic; Lecture III., On the grounds of Scepticism.
- ἀπώλετο does not mean that the father is dead, and that the mother is dead. They survive and lament. Compare Euripides, Alcestis, v. 825: ἀπωλόμεσθα πάντες, οὐ κείνη μόν
- Homer, xii. v. 328: ἴομεν, ἠὲ τῳ εὐχος ὀρέξομεν ἦέ τις ἡμῖν .
- This means, the received opinion about the knowledge and certainty of things, which knowledge and certainty the Sceptic philosophers attack by taking away general assent or consent (Wolf). Lord Shaftesbury accepts this explanation. See also Schweig.’s note.
- The chief question which was debated between the Pyrrhonists and the Academics on one side, and the Stoics on the other, was this, whether there is a criterion of truth; and in the first place, the question is about the evidence of the senses, or the certainty of truth in those things which are perceived by the senses. —Schweighaeuser. The strength of the Stoic system was that it furnishes a groundwork of common sense, and the universal belief of mankind, on which to found sufficient certitude for the requirements of life: on the other hand, the real question of knowledge, in the philosophical sense of the word, was abandoned. Levin’s Six Lectures, p. 70.
- ὡς πρὸς σκοπόν , Schweighaeuser’s emendation in place of ὡς προκόπτων .
- For the word συνήθειαν , which occurs in s. 20, Schweighaeuser suggests ἀλήθειαν here, and translates it by veritas. See his notes on this chapter, s. 15 and s. 20.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1τετραχῶς αἱ φαντασίαι γίνονται ἡμῖν· ἢ γὰρ ἔστι τινὰ καὶ οὕτως φαίνεται ἢ οὐκ ὄντα οὐδὲ φαίνεται ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ ἔστι καὶ οὐ φαίνεται ἢ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται. 2λοιπὸν ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις εὐστοχεῖν ἔργον ἐστὶ τοῦ πεπαιδευμένου. ὅ τι δʼ ἂν ᾖ τὸ θλῖβον, ἐκείνῳ δεῖ προσάγειν τὴν βοήθειαν. εἰ σοφίσματα ἡμᾶς Πυρρώνεια καὶ Ἀκαδημαικὰ τὰ θλίβοντά ἐστιν, ἐκείνοις προσάγωμεν τὴν βοήθειαν· 3εἰ αἱ τῶν πραγμάτων πιθανότητες, καθʼ ἃς φαίνεταί τινα ἀγαθὰ οὐκ ὄντα, ἐκεῖ τὴν βοήθειαν ζητῶμεν· εἰ ἔθος ἐστὶ τὸ θλῖβον, πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τὴν βοήθειαν ἀνευρίσκειν πειρατέον. 4τί οὖν πρὸς ἔθος ἔστιν εὑρίσκειν βοήθημα; 5τὸ ἐναντίον ἔθος. ἀκούεις τῶν ἰδιωτῶν λεγόντων τάλας ἐκεῖνος, ἀπέθανεν· ἀπώλετο ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ, ἡ μήτηρ· ἐξεκόπη, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄωρος καὶ ἐπὶ ξένης. 6ἄκουσον τῶν ἐναντίων λόγων, ἀπόσπασον σεαυτὸν τούτων τῶν φωνῶν, ἀντίθες τῷ ἔθει τὸ ἐναντίον ἔθος. πρὸς τοὺς σοφιστικοὺς λόγους τὰ λογικὰ καὶ τὴν ἐν τούτοις γυμνασίαν καὶ τριβήν, πρὸς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων πιθανότητας τὰς προλήψεις ἐναργεῖς ἐσμηγμένας καὶ προχείρους ἔχειν δεῖ. 7ὅταν θάνατος φαίνηται κακόν, πρόχειρον ἔχειν ὅτι τὰ κακὰ ἐκκλίνειν καθήκει καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ὁ θάνατος. τί γὰρ ποιήσω; 8ποῦ γὰρ αὐτὸν φύγω; ἔστω ἐμὲ εἶναι Σαρπηδόνα τὸν τοῦ Διός, ἵνʼ οὕτως γενναίως εἴπω ἀπελθὼν ἢ αὐτὸς ἀριστεῦσαι θέλω ἢ ἄλλῳ παρασχεῖν ἀφορμὴν τοῦ ἀριστεῦσαι· εἰ μὴ δύναμαι κατορθῶσαί τι αὐτός, οὐ φθονήσω ἄλλῳ τοῦ ποιῆσαί τι γενναῖον· ἔστω ταῦτα ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς, ἐκεῖνο οὐ πίπτει εἰς ἡμᾶς; 9καὶ ποῦ φύγω τὸν θάνατον; μηνύσατέ μοι τὴν χώραν, μηνύσατε ἀνθρώπους, εἰς οὓς ἀπέλθω, εἰς οὓς οὐ παραβάλλει, μηνύσατε ἐπαοιδήν· εἰ μὴ ἔχω, τί με θέλετε ποιεῖν; 10οὐ δύναμαι τὸν θάνατον ἀποφυγεῖν· τὸ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτὸν μὴ ἀποφύγω, ἀλλʼ ἀποθάνω πενθῶν καὶ τρέμων; αὕτη γὰρ γένεσις πάθους θέλειν τι καὶ μὴ γίνεσθαι. 11ἔνθεν ἂν μὲν δύνωμαι τὰ ἐκτὸς μετατιθέναι πρὸς τὴν βούλησιν τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ, μετατίθημι· εἰ δὲ μή, τὸν ἐμποδίζοντα ἐκτυφλῶσαι θέλω. 12πέφυκε γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος μὴ ὑπομένειν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, μὴ ὑπομένειν περιπίπτειν τῷ κακῷ. 13εἶτα τὸ τελευταῖον, ὅταν μήτε τὰ πράγματα μεταθεῖναι δυνηθῶ μήτε τὸν ἐμποδίζοντα ἐκτυφλῶσαι, κάθημαι καὶ στένω καὶ ὃν δύναμαι λοιδορῶ, τὸν Δία καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς τοὺς ἄλλους· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐπιστρέφονταί μου, τί ἐμοὶ καὶ αὐτοῖς; 14ναί· ἀλλʼ ἀσεβὴς ἔσῃ. τί οὖν μοι χεῖρον ἔσται, ὧν ἔστι μοι νῦν; τὸ σύνολον ἐκείνου μεμνῆσθαι, ὅτι, ἐὰν μὴ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ᾖ τὸ εὐσεβὲς καὶ συμφέρον, οὐ δύναται σωθῆναι τὸ εὐσεβὲς ἔν τινι. ταῦτα οὐ δοκεῖ ἐπείγοντα; 15ἐρχέσθω καὶ ἀπαντάτω Πυρρώνειος καὶ Ἀκαδημαικός. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐμὸν μέρος οὐκ ἄγω σχολὴν πρὸς ταῦτα οὐδὲ δύναμαι συνηγορῆσαι τῇ συνηθείᾳ. 16εἰ καὶ περὶ ἀγριδίου πραγμάτιον εἶχον, ἄλλον ἂν παρεκάλεσα τὸν συνηγορήσοντα· τίνι οὖν ἀρκοῦμαι κατὰ τὸν τόπον; 17πῶς μὲν αἴσθησις γίνεται, π[ρ]ότερον διʼ ὅλων ἢ ἀπὸ μέρους, ἴσως οὐκ οἶδα ἀπολογίσασθαι, ταράσσει δέ με ἀμφότερα. ὅτι δʼ ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ οὐκ ἐσμὲν οἱ αὐτοί, λίαν ἀκριβῶς οἶδα. 18πόθεν τοῦτο; οὐδέποτε καταπίνειν τι θέλων ἐκεῖ φέρω τὸν ψωμόν, ἀλλʼ ὧδε· οὐδέποτʼ ἄρτον θέλων λαβεῖν τὸ σάρον ἔλαβον, ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τὸν ἄρτον ἔρχομαι ὡς πρὸς σκοπόν. 19ὑμεῖς δʼ αὐτοὶ οἱ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀναιροῦντες ἄλλο τι ποιεῖτε; τίς ὑμῶν εἰς βαλανεῖον ἀπελθεῖν θέλων εἰς μυλῶνα ἀπῆλθεν; 20— τί οὖν; οὐ δεῖ κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ τούτων ἀντέχεσθαι, τοῦ τηρῆσαι τὴν συνήθειαν, τοῦ πεφράχθαι πρὸς τὰ κατʼ αὐτῆς; 21— καὶ τίς ἀντιλέγει; ἀλλὰ τὸν δυνάμενον, τὸν σχολάζοντα· τὸν δὲ τρέμοντα καὶ ταρασσόμενον καὶ ῥηγνύμενον ἔσωθεν τὴν καρδίαν ἄλλῳ τινὶ δεῖ προσευκαιρεῖν.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA