Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER XX. · In what manner Reason contemplates itself.
1Every Art, and every Faculty, contemplates some Things as its principal Objects. Whenever, therefore, it is of the same Nature with the Objects of its Contemplations, it necessarily contemplates itself too. But, where it is of a different Nature, it cannot contemplate itself. The Art of Shoemaking, for Instance, is exercised upon Leather; but is itself intirely distinct from the Materials it works upon: therefore it doth not contemplate itself. Again: Grammar is exercised on articulate Speech. Is the Art of Grammar itself, then, articulate Speech? By no means. Therefore it cannot contemplate itself. To what Purpose, then, is Reason appointed by Nature? To a proper Use of the Appearances of Things. And what is Reason? A Composition of certain Appearances to the Mind: and, thus, by its Nature, it becomes contemplative of itself too. Again: what Subjects of Contemplation belong to Prudence? Good and Evil, and Indifferent. What, then, is Prudence itself? Good. What, Imprudence? Evil. You see, then, that it necessarily contemplates both itself and its contrary. Therefore, the first and greatest Work of a Philosopher is, to try and distinguish the Appearances; and to admit none untried. Even in Money, where our Interest seems to be concerned, you see what an Art we have invented; and how many Ways an Assayer uses to try its Value. By the Sight; the Touch; the Smell; and, lastly, the Hearing. He throws the Piece down, and attends to the Jingle; and is not contented with its Jingling only once; but, by frequent Attention to it, becomes quite musical. In the same manner, whenever we think it of Consequence, whether we are deceived or not, we use the utmost Attention to distinguish thole Things which may possibly deceive us. But, yawning and slumbering over the poor miserable ruling Faculty, we admit every Appearance that offers. For here the Mischief does not strike us. When you would know, then, how very languidly you are affected by Good and Evil, and how vehemently by Things indifferent; consider how you are affected with regard to being blinded; and how with regard to being deceived; and you will find, that you are far from being moved, as you ought, in relation to Good and Evil. But much previous Qualification, and much Labour, and Learning, are wanted. What, then? Do you expect the greatest of Arts is to be acquired by slight Endeavours? And yet the principal Doctrine of the Philosophers, of itself, is short. If you have a mind to know it, read Zeno, and you will see. For what
Prolixity is there in saying, Our End is to follow the Gods? And, The Essence of Good consists in the proper Use of the Appearances of Things. Indeed, if you say, What, then, is God? What is an Appearance? What is particular, what universal Nature? Here the Affair becomes prolix. And so, if Epicurus should come and say, that Good must be placed in Body; here, too, it will be prolix: and it will be necessary to hear, what is the principal, the substantial and essential Part in us. It is unlikely, that the Good of a Snail should be placed in the Shell: and, is it likely, that the Good of a Man should? You yourself, Epicurus, have something superior to this. What is That in you, which deliberates, which examines, which forms the Judgment, concerning Body itself, that it is the principal Part? And why do you light your Lamp, and labour for us, and write so many Books? That we may not be ignorant of the Truth? What are We? What are we to You? Thus the Doctrine becomes prolix.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (1)
- Zeno, The Founder of the Stoic Sect, was born at Cittium, a Seaport Town, in the Island of Cyprus. He was originally a Merchant; and very rich. On a Voyage from Tyre, where he had been trading in Purple, he was shipwrecked, near the Piræus. During his Stay at Athens, he happened to meet, in a Bookseller's Shop, with the Second Book of Xenophon's Memoirs; with which he was extremely delighted; and asked the Bookseller, where such kind of Persons, as the Author mentioned, were to be found. The Bookseller answered, pointing to Crates, the Cynic, who was luckily passing by; Follow him: which Zeno did, and became his Disciple. But his Disposition was too modest to approve of the Cynic Indecency: and, forsaking Crates, he applied himself to the Academics; whom he attended for ten Years, and then formed a School of his own. There was a constant Severity, or, perhaps, Austerity, in his Manners, his Dress, and his Discourse; except at an Entertainment, when he used to appear with Chearfulness and Ease. His Morals were irreproachable: and he was presented by the Athenians with a golden Crown; because his Life was a public Example of Virtue, by its Conformity with his Words and Doctrines. He lived Ninety-eight Years, and then strangled himself; because, in going out of his School, he happened to fall down, and break his Finger. Diog. Laert. in Zeno.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
In what manner reason contemplates itself.
Every art, and every faculty, contemplates certain things as its principal objects. Whenever, therefore, it is of the same nature with the objects of its contemplation, it necessarily contemplates itself too; but where it is of a different nature, it cannot contemplate itself. The art of shoemaking, for instance, is exercised upon leather, but is itself entirely distinct from the materials it works upon; therefore it does not contemplate itself. Again, grammar is exercised on articulate speech. Is the art of grammar itself, then, articulate speech? By no means. Therefore, it cannot contemplate itself. To what purpose, then, is reason appointed by nature? To a proper use of the phenomena of existence. And what is reason? The art of systematizing these phenomena. Thus, by its nature, it becomes contemplative of itself too.
Again, what subjects of contemplation belong to prudence? Good and evil, and that which is indifferent. What, then, is prudence itself? Good. What imprudence? Evil.
You see, then, that it necessarily contemplates both itself and its contrary. Therefore, the first and greatest work of a philosopher is to try to distinguish the phenomena of existence, and to admit none untried. Even in money, where our interest seems to be concerned, you see what an art we have invented, and how many ways an assayer uses to try its value,—by the sight, the touch, the smell, and, lastly, the hearing. He throws the piece down, and attends to the jingle; and is not contented with its jingling only once, but, by frequent attention to it, trains his ear for sound. So, when we think it of consequence whether we are deceived or not, we use the utmost attention to discern those things which may deceive us. But, yawning and slumbering over our poor neglected reason, we are imposed upon by every appearance, nor know the mischief done. Would you know, then, how very languidly you are affected by good and evil, and how vehemently by things indifferent, consider how you feel with regard to bodily blindness, and how with regard to being deceived; and you will find that you are far from being moved, as you ought, in relation to good and evil.
But trained powers and much labor and learning are here needed.
What then? Do you expect the greatest of arts to be acquired by slight endeavors? And yet the principal doctrine of the philosophers is in itself short. If you have a mind to know it, read Zeno, and you will see. It is not a long story to say, Our end is to serve the gods, and The essence of good consists in the proper use of the phenomena of existence. If you say, what then is God; what are phenomena; what is particular, what universal nature,—here the long story comes in. And so, if Epicurus should come and say that good lies in the body, here, too, it will be a long story; and it will be necessary to hear what is the principal, and substantial, and essential part in us. It is unlikely that the good of a snail should be placed in the shell; and is it likely that the good of a man should? You yourself, Epicurus, have in you something superior to this. What is that in you which deliberates, which examines, which recognizes the body as the principal part? Why light your lamp, and labor for us, and write so many books? That we may not be ignorant of the truth? But what are we? What are we to you? Thus the doctrine becomes a long story.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
About reason, how it contemplates itself.
Every art and faculty contemplates certain things especially. When then it is itself of the same kind with the objects which it contemplates, it must of necessity contemplate itself also: but when it is of an unlike kind, it cannot contemplate itself. For instance, the shoemaker’s art is employed on skins, but itself is entirely distinct from the material of skins: for this reason it does not contemplate itself. Again, the grammarian’s art is employed about articulate speech; is then the art also articulate speech? By no means. For this reason it is not able to contemplate itself. Now reason, for what purpose has it been given by nature? For the right use of appearances. What is it then itself? A system (combination) of certain appearances. So by its nature it has the faculty of contemplating itself also. Again, sound sense, for the contemplation of what things does it belong to us? Good and evil, and things which are neither. What is it then itself? Good. And want of sense, what is it? Evil. Do you see then that good sense necessarily contemplates both itself and the opposite? For this reason it is the chief and the first work of a philosopher to examine appearances, and to distinguish them, and to admit none without examination. You see even in the matter of coin, in which our interest appears to be somewhat concerned, how we have invented an art, and how many means the assayer uses to try the value of coin, the sight, the touch, the smell, and lastly the hearing. He throws the coin (denarius) down, and observes the sound, and he is not content with its sounding once, but through his great attention he becomes a musician. In like manner, where we think that to be mistaken and not to be mistaken make a great difference, there we apply great attention to discovering the things which can deceive. But in the matter of our miserable ruling faculty, yawning and sleeping, we carelessly admit every appearance, for the harm is not noticed.
When then you would know how careless you are with respect to good and evil, and how active with respect to things which are indifferent (neither good nor evil), observe how you feel with respect to being deprived of the sight of the eyes, and how with respect to being deceived, and you will discover that you are far from feeling as you ought to do in relation to good and evil. But this is a matter which requires much preparation, and much labour and study. Well then do you expect to acquire the greatest of arts with small labour? And yet the chief doctrine of philosophers is very brief. If you would know, read Zeno’s writings and you will see For how few words it requires to say that man’s end (or object) is to follow the gods, and that the nature of good is a proper use of appearances. But if you say What is God, what is appearance, and what is particular and what is universal nature? then indeed many words are necessary. If then Epicurus should come and say, that the good must be in the body; in this case also many words become necessary, and we must be taught what is the leading principle in us, and the fundamental and the substantial; and as it is not probable that the good of a snail is in the shell, is it probable that the good of a man is in the body? But you yourself, Epicurus, possess something better than this. What is that in you which deliberates, what is that which examines every thing, what is that which forms a judgment about the body itself, that it is the principal part? and why do you light your lamp and labour for us, and write so many books? is it that we may not be ignorant of the truth, who we are, and what we are with respect to you? Thus the discussion requires many words.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (8)
- A comparison of lib. i. chap. 1, will help to explain this chapter. Compare also lib. i. chap. 17.
- Wolf suggests that we should read προηγουμένως instead of προηγουμένων .
- See Schweighaeuser’s note.
- We reckon death among the things which are indifferent ( indifferentia ), which the Greeks name ἀδιάφορα . But I name indifferent the things which are neither good nor bad, as disease, pain, poverty, exile, death. —Seneca, Ep. 82.
- Zeno, a native of Citium , in the island of Cyprus , is said to have come when he was young to Athens , where he spent the rest of a long life in the study and teaching of Philosophy. He was the founder of the Stoic sect, and a man respected for his ability and high character. He wrote many philosophical works. Zeno was succeeded in his school by Cleanthes.
- Follow. See i. 12, 5.
- I now have what the universal nature wills me to have, and I do what my nature now wills me to do. M. Antoninus, v. 25, and xi. 5. Epictetus never attempts to say what God is. He was too wise to attempt to do what man cannot do. But man does attempt to do it, and only shows the folly of his attempts, and, I think, his presumption also.
- Epicurus is said to have written more than any other person, as many as three hundred volumes ( κύλινδροι , rolls). Chrysippus was his rival in this respect. For if Epicurus wrote anything, Chrysippus vied with him in writing as much; and for this reason he often repeated himself, because he did not read over what he had written, and he left his writings uncorrected in consequence of his hurry. Diogenes Laertius, x.—Upton. See i. 4.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ δύναμις προηγουμένων τινῶν ἐστι θεωρητική. 2ὅταν μὲν οὖν ὁμοειδὴς τοῖς θεωρουμένοις καὶ αὐτή, ἀναγκαίως καὶ αὑτῆς γίνεται θεωρητική· ὅταν δʼ ἀνομογενής, οὐ δύναται θεωρεῖν ἑαυτήν. 3οἷον σκυτικὴ περὶ δέρματα ἀναστρέφεται, αὐτὴ δὲ παντελῶς ἀπήλλακται τῆς ὕλης τῶν δερμάτων· διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν αὑτῆς θεωρητική. 4γραμματικὴ πάλιν περὶ τὴν ἐγγράμματον φωνήν· μή τι οὖν ἐστι καὶ αὐτὴ ἐγγράμματος φωνή; οὐδαμῶς. διὰ τοῦτο οὐ δύναται θεωρεῖν ἑαυτήν. ὁ οὖν λόγος πρὸς τί ποτε ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως παρείληπται; 5πρὸς χρῆσιν φαντασιῶν οἵαν δεῖ. αὐτὸς οὖν τί ἐστιν; σύστημα ἐκ ποιῶν φαντασιῶν. οὕτως γίνεται φύσει καὶ αὑτοῦ θεωρητικός. 6πάλιν ἡ φρόνησις τίνα θεωρήσουσα παρελήλυθεν; ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ καὶ οὐδέτερα. αὐτὴ οὖν τί ἐστιν; ἀγαθόν. ἡ δʼ ἀφροσύνη τί ἐστιν; κακόν. ὁρᾷς οὖν ὅτι ἀναγκαίως καὶ αὑτῆς γίνεται καὶ τῆς ἐναντίας θεωρητική; 7διὰ τοῦτο ἔργον τοῦ φιλοσόφου τὸ μέγιστον καὶ πρῶτον δοκιμάζειν τὰς φαντασίας καὶ διακρίνειν καὶ μηδεμίαν ἀδοκίμαστον προσφέρεσθαι. 8ὁρᾶτε ἐπὶ τοῦ νομίσματος, ὅπου δοκεῖ τι εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, πῶς καὶ τέχνην ἐξευρήκαμεν καὶ ὅσοις ὁ ἀργυρογνώμων προσχρῆται πρὸς δοκιμασίαν τοῦ νομίσματος, τῇ ὄψει, τῇ ἁφῇ, τῇ ὀσφρασίᾳ, τὰ τελευταῖα τῇ ἀκοῇ· 9ῥήξας τὸ δηνάριον τῷ ψόφῳ προσέχει καὶ οὐχ ἅπαξ ἀρκεῖται ψοφήσαντος, ἀλλʼ ὑπὸ τῆς πολλῆς προσοχῆς μουσικὸς γίνεται. 10οὕτως ὅπου διαφέρειν οἰόμεθα τὸ πλανᾶσθαι τοῦ μὴ πλανᾶσθαι, ἐνταῦθα πολλὴν προσοχὴν εἰσφέρομεν εἰς διάκρισιν τῶν διαπλανᾶν δυναμένων, 11ἐπὶ δὲ ταλαιπώρου ἡγεμονικοῦ χάσκοντες καὶ καθεύδοντες, πᾶσαν φαντασίαν παραπροσδεχόμεθα· ἡ γὰρ ζημία οὐ προσπίπτει. 12ὅταν οὖν θέλῃς γνῶναι, πῶς ἔχεις περὶ μὲν τἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ ἀνειμένως, περὶ τἀδιάφορα δʼ ἐσπευσμένως, ἐπίστησον πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς τὸ ἐκτυφλωθῆναι καὶ πῶς πρὸς τὸ ἐξαπατηθῆναι καὶ γνώσῃ ὅτι μακρὰν εἶ τοῦ ὡς δεῖ πεπονθέναι περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. 13ἀλλὰ πολλῆς ἔχει χρείαν παρασκευῆς καὶ πόνου πολλοῦ καὶ μαθημάτων. τί οὖν; ἐλπίζεις ὅτι τὴν μεγίστην τέχνην ἀπὸ ὀλίγων ἔστιν ἀναλαβεῖν; 14καίτοι αὐτὸς μὲν ὁ προηγούμενος λόγος τῶν φιλοσόφων λίαν ἐστὶν ὀλίγος. εἰ θέλεις γνῶναι, ἀνάγνωθι τὰ Ζήνωνος καὶ ὄψει. 15τί γὰρ ἔχει μακρὸν εἰπεῖν ὅτι τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ ἕπεσθαι θεοῖς, οὐσία δʼ ἀγαθοῦ χρῆσις οἵα δεῖ φαντασιῶν; 16λέγε τί οὖν ἐστι θεὸς καὶ τί φαντασία; καὶ τί ἐστι φύσις ἡ ἐπὶ μέρους καὶ τί ἐστι φύσις ἡ τῶν ὅλων; 17ἤδη μακρόν. ἂν οὖν ἐλθὼν Ἐπίκουρος εἴπῃ, ὅτι ἐν σαρκὶ δεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν, πάλιν μακρὸν γίνεται καὶ ἀνάγκη ἀκοῦσαι τί τὸ προηγούμενόν ἐστιν ἐφʼ ἡμῶν, τί τὸ ὑποστατικὸν καὶ οὐσιῶδες. ὅτι τὸ κοχλίου ἀγαθὸν οὐκ εἰκὸς εἶναι ἐν τῷ κελύφει, τὸ οὖν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἰκός; 18σὺ δʼ αὐτὸς τί κυριώτερον ἔχεις, Ἐπίκουρε; τί ἐστιν ἐν σοὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον, τὸ ἐπισκεπτόμενον ἕκαστα, τὸ περὶ τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτῆς ὅτι τὸ προηγούμενόν ἐστιν [τὸ] ἐπικρῖνον; 19τί δὲ καὶ λύχνον ἅπτεις καὶ πονεῖς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν καὶ τηλικαῦτα βιβλία γράφεις; ἵνα μὴ ἀγνοήσωμεν ἡμεῖς τὴν ἀλήθειαν; τίνες ἡμεῖς; τί πρὸς σὲ ὄντες; οὕτω μακρὸς ὁ λόγος γίνεται.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA