Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER VII. · Of the Use of convertible and hypothetical Propositions, and the like.
1It is a Secret to the Vulgar, that the Practice of convertible, and hypothetical, and interrogatory Arguments, and, in general, of all other logical Forms, hath any Relation to the Duties of Life. For, in every Subject of Action, the Question is, how a wise and good Man may find a Way of extricating himself, and a Method of Behaviour conformable to his Duty upon the Occasion. Let them say, therefore, either that the Man of Virtue will not engage in Questions and Answers; or that, if he doth, he will not think it worth his Care whether he behaves rashly and at hazard in questioning and answering: or if they allow neither of these; it is necessary to confess, that some Examination ought to be made of those Topics, in which the Affair of Question and Answer is principally concerned. For what is the Profession of Reasoning? To lay down true Positions; to reject false ones; and to suspend the Judgment in doubtful ones. Is it enough, then, to have learned merely this?——It is enough, say you.——Is it enough, then, for him who would not commit Mistake in the Use of Money, merely to have heard, that we are to receive the good Pieces, and reject the bad?——This is not enough:——What must be added besides?——That Faculty which tries and distinguishes what Pieces are good, what bad.——Therefore, in Reasoning too, what hath been already said is not enough; but it is necessary that we should be able to prove and distinguish between the true, and the false, and the doubtful.——It is necessary. 2And what farther is professed in Reasoning?——To admit the Consequence of what you have properly granted.——Well: and here, too, is the mere Knowing this enough?——It is not; but we must learn how such a Thing is the Consequence of such another; and when one Thing follows from one Thing, and when from many Things in common. Is it not moreover necessary, that he, who would behave skilfully in Reasoning, should both himself demonstrate whatever he delivers, and be able to comprehend the Demonstrations of others; and not be deceived by such as sophisticate, as if they were demonstrating. Hence, then, the Employment and Exercise of concluding Arguments and Figures arises; and appears to be necessary. 3But it may possibly happen, that from the Premises which we have properly granted, there arises some Consequence, which, though false, is nevertheless a Consequence. What then ought I to do? To admit a Falsehood?——And how is that possible?——Well or to say that my Concessions were not properly made?——But neither is this allowed——Or that the Consequence doth not arise from the Premises?——Nor is even this allowed.——What then is to be done in the Case?——Is it not this? As the having once borrowed Money, is not enough to make a a Person a Debtor, unless he still continues to owe Money, and hath not paid it: so the having granted the Premises, is not enough to make it necessary to grant the Inference, unless we continue our Concessions. If the Premises continue to the End, such as they were when the Concessions were made, it is absolutely necessary to continue the Concessions, and to admit what follows from them. But if the Premises do not continue such as they were when the Concession was made, it is absolutely necessary to depart from the Concession, and admit [rather the contrary: I mean] what doth not follow from the Argument itself. For this Inference is no Consequence of ours, nor belongs to us, when we have departed from the Concession of the Premises. We ought then to examine these Kinds of Premises, and their Changes and Conversions, on which any one, by laying hold, either in the Question itself, or in the Answer, or in the syllogistical Conclusion, or in any other thing of that sort, gives an Occasion to the Unthinking of being disconcerted, not foreseeing the Consequence.——Why so?——That in this Topic we may not behave contrary to our Duty, nor with Confusion. 4The same Thing is to be observed in Hypotheses and hypothetical Arguments. For it is sometimes necessary to require some Hypothesis to be granted, as a kind of Step to the rest of the Argument. Is every given Hypothesis then to be granted, or not every one; and if not every one, which? And is he who has granted an Hypothesis, for ever to abide by it? Or is he sometimes to depart from it, and admit only Consequences, but not to admit Contradictions?——Ay: but a Person may say, on your admitting the Hypothesis of a Possibility, I will drive you upon an Impossibility. With such a one as this, shall the Man of Prudence not engage; but avoid all Examination and Conversation with him?——And yet who, besides the Man of Prudence, is capable of treating an Argument, or who besides is sagacious in Questions and Answers, and incapable of being deceived and imposed on by Sophistry?——Or will he indeed engage, but without regarding whether he behaves rashly and at hazard in the Argument?——Yet how then can he be such a one as we are supposing him? But, without some such Exercise and Preparation, is it possible for him to preserve himself consistent? Let them shew this: and all these Theorems will be superfluous and absurd, and unconnected with our Idea of the virtuous Man. Why then are we still indolent, and slothful, and sluggish, seeking Pretences of avoiding Labour? Shall we not be watchful to render Reason itself accurate?——"But suppose, after all, I should make a Mistake in these Points: have I killed a Father?——Wretch! why, in this Case, where had you a Father to kill? What is it then that you have done? The only Fault that you could commit, in this Instance, you have committed. This very Thing I myself said to Rufus, when he reproved me, for not finding something that was omitted in some Syllogism. Why, said I, have I burnt the Capitol then? Wretch! answered he, was the Thing here omitted the Capitol? Or are there no other Faults, but burning the Capitol, or killing a Father? and is it no Fault to treat the Appearances presented to our Minds rashly, and vainly, and at hazard; not to comprehend a Reason, nor a Demonstration, nor a Sophism; nor, in short, to see what is for, or against one's self in a Question or Answer? Is nothing of all this any Fault?
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (2)
- It is but fair to warn the Reader, that little Entertainment is to be expected from this Chapter, which is wholly logical.
- The Passage seems to require that ανακολουθον should be ακολουθον; We are to depart from the Concession, and admit what follows from the Argument itself. The Meaning I apprehend to be, that if, in the Course of an Argument, our Opponent sophistically alters the State of the Question on which our Concessions were founded, it is lawful to revoke those Concessions; and admit no Consequence but what is fairly drawn from the Argument itself.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Of the use of the forms of right reasoning.
It is not understood by most persons that the proper use of inferences and hypotheses and interrogations, and logical forms generally, has any relation to the duties of life. In every matter of action the question is, how a wise and good man may come honestly and consistently out of it. We must admit, therefore, either that the wise man will not engage in difficult problems or that, if he does, he will not think it worth his care to deal with them thoroughly; or if we allow neither of these alternatives, it is necessary to confess that some examination ought to be made of those points on which the solution of these problems chiefly depends. For what is reasoning? To lay down true positions, to reject false ones, and to suspend the judgment in doubtful ones. Is it enough, then, to have learned merely this? It is enough, say you. Is it enough, then, for him who would not commit any mistake in the use of money, merely to have heard that we are to receive the good pieces, and to reject the bad? This is not enough. What must be added besides? That skill which tries and distinguishes what pieces are good, what bad. Therefore, in reasoning too, the definition just given is not enough; but it is necessary that we should be able to prove and distinguish between the true and the false and the doubtful. This is clear.
And what further is attempted in reasoning? To admit the logical consequence of whatever you have properly granted. Well, and is it enough merely to know this necessity? It is not; but we must learn how it happens that such a thing is the consequence of such another, and when one thing follows from one premise, and when from many premises. Is it not moreover necessary that he who would acquit himself skilfully in reasoning should both himself demonstrate whatever he asserts and be able to comprehend the demonstrations of others, and not be deceived by such as use sophistry as if they were reasoning fairly? Hence arises the use and practice of logical forms; and it appears to be indispensable.
But it may possibly happen that from the premises which we have honestly granted there arises some consequence which, though false in itself, is nevertheless a fair inference. What then ought I to do? To admit a falsehood? Impossible. To take back my concessions? But this will not be allowed. Or assert that the consequence does not fairly follow from the premises? Nor is even this practicable. What then, is to be done in the case? Is it not this? As the having once borrowed money is not enough to make a person a debtor, unless he still continues to owe money and has not paid it, so the having granted the premises is not enough to make it necessary to grant the inference, unless we continue our concessions. If the premises continue to the end such as they were when the concessions were made, it is absolutely necessary to continue the concessions, and to admit what follows from them. But if the premises do not continue such as they were when the concession was made, it is absolutely necessary to revoke the concession, and refuse to accept the inference. For this inference is no consequence of ours, nor belongs to us, when we have revoked the concession of the premises. We ought then thoroughly to consider our premises and their different aspects, on which any one, by laying hold,—either on the question itself or on the answer, or on the inference, or elsewhere,—may embarrass the unthinking who did not foresee the result. So that in this way we may not be led into any unbecoming or confused position.
The same thing is to be observed in hypotheses and hypothetical arguments. For it is sometimes necessary to require some hypothesis to be granted, as a kind of step to the rest of the argument. Is every given hypothesis, then, to be granted, or not every one? and if not every one, which? And is he who has granted an hypothesis forever to abide by it! Or is he sometimes to revoke it, and admit only consequences, but not to admit contradictions? Ay, but a person may say, on your admitting a possible hypothesis, will drive you upon an impossibility. With such a one as this, shall the wise man never engage, but avoid all argument and conversation with him? And yet who beside the wise man is capable of treating an argument, or who beside is sagacious in reasoning, and incapable of being deceived and imposed on by sophistry? Or will he indeed engage, but without regarding whether he behaves rashly and heedlessly in the argument? Yet how, then, can he be wise, as we are supposing him? and without some such exercise and preparation, how can he hold his own? If this could be shown, then indeed all these forms of reasoning would be superfluous and absurd, and unconnected with our idea of the virtuous man.
Why, then, are we still indolent, and slothful, and sluggish, seeking pretences of avoiding labor? Shall we not be watchful to render reason itself accurate? But suppose, after all, I should make a mistake in these points,—it is not as if I had killed my father. O slavish man, in this case you had no father to kill. but the only fault that you could commit in this instance, you have committed. This very thing I myself said to Rufus when he reproved me for not finding the weak point in some syllogism. Why, said I, have I burnt the capitol then? Slave! answered he, was the thing here involved the capitol? Or are there no other faults but burning the capitol, or killing a father? And is it no fault to treat rashly, and vainly, and heedlessly, the things which pass before our eyes,—not to comprehend a reason, nor a demonstration, nor a sophism; nor, in short, to see what is strong in reasoning and what is weak? Is there nothing wrong in this?
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
Of the use of sophistical arguments and hypothetical and the like.
The handling of sophistical and hypothetical arguments, and of those which derive their conclusions from questioning, and in a word the handling of all such arguments, relates to the duties of life, though the many do not know this truth. For in every matter we inquire how the wise and good man shall discover the proper path and the proper method of dealing with the matter. Let then people either say that the grave man will not descend into the contest of question and answer, or, that if he does descend into the contest, he will take no care about not conducting himself rashly or carelessly in questioning and answering. But if they do not allow either the one or the other of these things, they must admit that some inquiry ought to be made into those topics (τόπων) on which particularly questioning and answering are employed. For what is the end proposed in reasoning? To establish true propositions, to remove the false, to withhold assent from those which are not plain. Is it enough then to have learned only this? It is enough, a man may reply. Is it then also enough for a man, who would not make a mistake in the use of coined money, to have heard this precept, that he should receive the genuine drachmae and reject the spurious? It is not enough. What then ought to be added to this precept? What else than the faculty which proves and distinguishes the genuine and the spurious drachmae? Consequently also in reasoning what has been said is not enough; but it is necessary that a man should acquire the faculty of examining and distinguishing the true and the false, and that which is not plain? It is necessary. Besides this, what is proposed in reasoning? That you should accept what follows from that which you have properly granted. Well, is it then enough in this case also to know this? It is not enough; but a man must learn how one thing is a consequence of other things, and when one thing follows from one thing, and when it follows from several collectively. Consider then if it be not necessary that this power should also be acquired by him, who purposes to conduct himself skilfully in reasoning, the power of demonstrating himself the several things which he has proposed, and the power of understanding the demonstrations of others, and of not being deceived by sophists, as if they were demonstrating. Therefore there has arisen among us the practice and exercise of conclusive arguments and figures, and it has been shown to be necessary.
But in fact in some cases we have properly granted the premises or assumptions, and there results from them something; and though it is not true, yet none the less it does result. What then ought I to do? Ought I to admit the falsehood? And how is that possible? Well, should I say that I did not properly grant that which we agreed upon? But you are not allowed to do even this. Shall I then say that the consequence does not arise through what has been conceded? But neither is this allowed. What then must be done in this case? Consider if it is not this: as to have borrowed is not enough to make a man still a debtor, but to this must be added the fact that he continues to owe the money and that the debt is not paid, so it is not enough to compel you to admit the inferencethat you have granted the premises (τὰ λήμματα), but you must abide by what you have granted. Indeed, if the premises continue to the end such as they were when they were granted, it is absolutely necessary for us to abide by what we have granted, and we must accept their consequences: but if the premises do not remain such as they were when they were granted, it is absolutely necessary for us also to withdraw from what we granted, and from accepting what does not follow from the words in which our concessions were made. For the inference is now not our inference, nor does it result with our assent, since we have withdrawn from the premises which we granted. We ought then both to examine such kinds of premises, and such change and variation of them (from one meaning to another), by which in the course of questioning or answering, or in making the syllogistic conclusion, or in any other such way, the premises undergo variations, and give occasion to the foolish to be confounded, if they do not see what conclusions (consequences) are. For what reason ought we to examine? In order that we may not in this matter be employed in an improper manner nor in a confused way.
And the same in hypotheses and hypothetical arguments; for it is necessary sometimes to demand the granting of some hypothesis as a kind of passage to the argument which follows. Must we then allow every hypothesis that is proposed, or not allow every one? And if not every one, which should we allow? And if a man has allowed an hypothesis, must he in every case abide by allowing it? or must he sometimes withdraw from it, but admit the consequences and not admit contradictions? Yes; but suppose that a man says, If you admit the hypothesis of a possibility, I will draw you to an impossibility. With such a person shall a man of sense refuse to enter into a contest, and avoid discussion and conversation with him? But what other man than the man of sense can use argumentation and is skilful in questioning and answering, and incapable of being cheated and deceived by false reasoning? And shall he enter into the contest, and yet not take care whether he shall engage in argument not rashly and not carelessly? And if he does not take care, how can he be such a man as we conceive him to be? But without some such exercise and preparation, can he maintain a continuous and consistent argument? Let them show this; and all these speculations (θεωρήματα) become superfluous, and are absurd and inconsistent with our notion of a good and serious man.
Why are we still indolent and negligent and sluggish, and why do we seek pretences for not labouring and not being watchful in cultivating our reason? If then I shall make a mistake in these matters may I not have killed my father? Slave, where was there a father in this matter that you could kill him? What then have you done? The only fault that was possible here is the fault which you have committed. This is the very remark which I made to Rufus when he blamed me for not having discovered the one thing omitted in a certain syllogism: I suppose, I said, that I have burnt the Capitol. Slave, he replied, was the thing omitted here the Capitol? Or are these the only crimes, to burn the Capitol and to kill your father? But for a man to use the appearances presented to him rashly and foolishly and carelessly, and not to understand argument, nor demonstration, nor sophism, nor, in a word, to see in questioning and answering what is consistent with that which we have granted or is not consistent; is there no error in this?
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (7)
- The title is περὶ τῆς χρείας τῶν μεταπιπτόντων καὶ ὑποθετικῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμοιων . Schweighaeuser has a big note on μεταπίπτοντες λόγοι , which he has collected from various critics. Mrs. Carter translated the title Of the Use of Convertible and Hypothetical Propositions and the like. But convertible might be understood in the common logical sense, which is not the meaning of Epictetus. Schweighaeuser explains μεταπίπτοντες λόγοι to be sophistical arguments in which the meaning of propositions or of terms, which ought to remain the same, is dexterously changed and perverted to another meaning.
- See Schweig.’s note on ἀποδείξειν ἕκαστα ἀποδόντα .
- These are syllogisms and figures, modes ( τρόποι ) by which the syllogism has its proper conclusion.
- Compare Aristotle, Topic. viii. 1, 22 (ed. J. Pac. 758). Afterwards Epictetus uses τὰ ὡμολογημένα as equivalent to λήμματα (premises or assumptions).
- The inference, τὸ ἐπιφερόμενον. Ἐπιφορά est illatio quae assumptionem sequitur (Upton).
- This, then, is a case of μεταπίπτοντες λόγοι (chap. vii. 1), where there has been a sophistical or dishonest change in the premises or in some term, by virtue of which change there appears to be a just conclusion, which, however, is false; and it is not a conclusion derived from the premises to which we assented. A ridiculous example is given by Seneca, Ep. 48: Mus syllaba est: mus autem caseum rodit: syllaba ergo caseum rodit. Seneca laughs at this absurdity, and says perhaps the following syllogism ( collectio ) may be a better example of acuteness: Mus syllaba est: syllaba autem caseum non rodit: mus ergo caseum non rodit. One is as good as the other. We know that neither conclusion is true, and we see where the error is. Ménage says that though the Stoics particularly cultivated logic, some of them despised it, and he mentions Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Antoninus. Upton, however, observes that Epictetus and Marcus Antoninus did not despise logic (he says nothing about Seneca), but employed it for their own purposes. It has been observed that if a man is asked whether, if every A is B, every B is also A, he might answer that it is. But if you put the conversion in this material form: Every goose is an animal, he immediately perceives that he cannot say, Every animal is a goose. What does this show? It shows that the man’s comprehension of the proposition, every A is B, was not true, and that he took it to mean Something different from what the person intended who put the question. He understood that A and B were coextensive. Whether we call this reasoning or something else, makes no matter. A man whose understanding is sound cannot in the nature of things reason wrong; but his understanding of the matter on which he reasons may be wrong somewhere, and he may not be able to discover where. A man who has been trained in the logical art may show him that his conclusion is just according to his understanding of the terms and the propositions employed, but yet it is not true.
- Rufus is Musonius Rufus (i. 1). To kill a father and to burn the Roman Capitol are mentioned as instances of the greatest crimes. Comp. Horace, Epode, iii. ; Cicero, De Amicit. c. 11; Plutarch, Tib. Gracchus, c. 20.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1ἡ περὶ τοὺς μεταπίπτοντας καὶ ὑποθετικούς, ἔτι δὲ ἠρωτῆσθαι περαίνοντας καὶ πάντας ἁπλῶς τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους πραγματεία λανθάνει τοὺς πολλοὺς περὶ καθήκοντος οὖσα. 2ζητοῦμεν γὰρ ἐπὶ πάσης ὕλης πῶς ἂν εὕρ[ο]οι ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τὴν διέξοδον καὶ ἀναστροφὴν τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ καθήκουσαν. 3οὐκοῦν ἢ τοῦτο λεγέτωσαν, ὅτι οὐ συγκαθήσει εἰς ἐρώτησιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν ὁ σπουδαῖος ἢ ὅτι συγκαθεὶς οὐκ ἐπιμελήσεται τοῦ μὴ εἰκῇ μηδʼ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἐν ἐρωτήσει καὶ ἀποκρίσει ἀναστρέφεσθαι, 4[μ]ἢ τούτων μηδέτερον προσδεχομένοις ἀναγκαῖον ὁμολογεῖν, ὅτι ἐπίσκεψίν τινα ποιητέον τῶν τόπων τούτων, περὶ οὓς μάλιστα στρέφεται ἐρώτησις καὶ ἀπόκρισις. 5τί γὰρ ἐπαγγέλλεται ἐν λόγῳ; τἀληθῆ τιθέναι, τὰ ψευδῆ αἴρειν, πρὸς τὰ ἄδηλα ἐπέχειν. 6ἆρʼ οὖν ἀρκεῖ τοῦτο μόνον μαθεῖν; — ἀρκεῖ, φησίν. — οὐκοῦν καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ ἐν χρήσει νομίσματος μὴ διαπίπτειν ἀρκεῖ τοῦτο ἀκοῦσαι, διὰ τί τὰς μὲν δοκίμους δραχμὰς παραδέχῃ, τὰς δʼ ἀδοκίμους ἀποδοκιμάζεις; 7— οὐκ ἀρκεῖ. — τί οὖν δεῖ τούτῳ προσλαβεῖν; τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ δύναμιν δοκιμαστικήν τε καὶ διακριτικὴν τῶν δοκίμων τε καὶ ἀδοκίμων δραχμῶν; 8οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐπὶ λόγου οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τὸ λεχθέν, ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκη δοκιμαστικὸν γενέσθαι καὶ διακριτικὸν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ τοῦ ψεύδους καὶ τοῦ ἀδήλου; 9— ἀνάγκη. — ἐπὶ τούτοις τί παραγγέλλεται ἐν λόγῳ; τὸ ἀκόλουθον τοῖς δοθεῖσιν ὑπὸ σοῦ καλῶς παραδέχου. 10ἄγε ἀρκεῖ οὖν κἀνταῦθα γνῶναι τοῦτο; οὐκ ἀρκεῖ, δεῖ δὲ μαθεῖν πῶς τί τισιν ἀκόλουθον γίνεται καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἓν ἑνὶ ἀκολουθεῖ, ποτὲ δὲ πλείοσιν κοινῇ. 11μή ποτε οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη προσλαβεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα ἐν λόγῳ συνετῶς ἀναστραφήσεσθαι καὶ αὐτόν τʼ ἀποδείξειν ἕκαστα ἀποδόντα καὶ τοῖς ἀποδεικνύουσι παρακολουθήσειν μηδʼ ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιζομένων διαπλανηθήσεσθαι ὡς ἀποδεικνυόντων; 12οὐκοῦν ἐλήλυθεν ἡμῖν περὶ τῶν συναγόντων λόγων καὶ τρόπων πραγματεία καὶ γυμνασία καὶ ἀναγκαία πέφηνεν. 13ἀλλὰ δὴ ἔστιν ἐφʼ ὧν δεδώκαμεν ὑγιῶς τὰ λήμματα καὶ συμβαίνει τουτὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν· ψεῦδος δὲ ὂν οὐδὲν ἧττον συμβαίνει. 14τί οὖν μοι καθήκει ποιεῖν; προσδέχεσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος; 15καὶ πῶς οἷόν τʼ; ἀλλὰ λέγειν ὅτι οὐχ ὑγιῶς παρεχώρησα τὰ ὡμολογημένα; καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦτο δίδοται. ἀλλʼ ὅτι οὐ συμβαίνει διὰ τῶν παρακεχωρημένων; ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ τοῦτο δίδοται. 16τί οὖν ἐπὶ τούτων ποιητέον; ἢ μή ποτε ὡς οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τὸ δανείσασθαι πρὸς τὸ ἔτι ὀφείλειν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ προσεῖναι καὶ τὸ ἐπιμένειν ἐπὶ τοῦ δανείου καὶ μὴ διαλελύσθαι αὐτό, οὕτως οὐκ ἀρκεῖ πρὸς τὸ δεῖν παραχωρεῖν τὸ ἐπιφερόμενον τὸ δεδωκέναι τὰ λήμματα, δεῖ δʼ ἐπιμένειν ἐπὶ τῆς παραχωρήσεως αὐτῶν. 17καὶ δὴ μενόντων μὲν αὐτῶν εἰς τέλος ὁποῖα παρεχωρήθη πᾶσα ἀνάγκη ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τῆς παραχωρήσεως ἐπιμένειν καὶ τὸ ἀκόλουθον αὐτοῖς προσδέχεσθαι … 19οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἔτι οὐδὲ καθʼ ἡμᾶς συμβαίνει τοῦτο τὸ ἐπιφερόμενον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς συγχωρήσεως τῶν λημμάτων ἀπέστημεν. 20δεῖ οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν λημμάτων ἱστορῆσαι καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην μεταβολήν τε καὶ μετάπτωσιν αὐτῶν, καθʼ ἣν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἐρωτήσει ἢ τῇ ἀποκρίσει ἢ τῷ συλλελογίσθαι ἤ τινι ἄλλῳ τοιούτῳ λαμβάνοντα τὰς μεταπτώσεις ἀφορμὴν παρέχει τοῖς ἀνοήτοις τοῦ ταράσσεσθαι μὴ βλέπουσι τὸ ἀκόλουθον. τίνος ἕνεκα; 21ἵνʼ ἐν τῷ τόπῳ τούτῳ μὴ παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον μηδʼ εἰκῇ μηδὲ συγκεχυμένως ἀναστρεφώμεθα. 22καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπί τε τῶν ὑποθέσεων καὶ τῶν ὑποθετικῶν λόγων. ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτʼ αἰτῆσαί τινα ὑπόθεσιν ὥσπερ ἐπιβάθραν τῷ ἑξῆς λόγῳ. 23πᾶσαν οὖν τὴν δοθεῖσαν παραχωρητέον ἢ οὐ πᾶσαν; καὶ εἰ οὐ πᾶσαν, τίνα; 24[περὶ τίνος ἡ σκέψις; περὶ καθήκοντος.] παραχωρήσαντι δὲ μενετέον εἰς ἅπαν ἐπὶ τῆς τηρήσεως ἢ ἔστιν ὅτε ἀποστατέον, τὰ δʼ ἀκόλουθα προσδεκτέον καὶ τὰ μαχόμενα οὐ προσδεκτέον; 25— ναί. — ἀλλὰ λέγει τις ὅτι ποιήσω σε δυνατοῦ δεξάμενον ὑπόθεσιν ἐπʼ ἀδύνατον ἀπαχθῆναι. πρὸς τοῦτον οὐ συγκαθήσει ὁ φρόνιμος, ἀλλὰ φεύξεται ἐξέτασιν καὶ κοινολογίαν; 26καὶ τίς ἔτι ἄλλος ἐστὶ λόγῳ χρηστικὸς καὶ δεινὸς ἐρωτήσει καὶ ἀποκρίσει καὶ νὴ Δία ἀνεξαπάτητός τε καὶ ἀσόφιστος; 27ἀλλὰ συγκαθήσει μέν, οὐκ ἐπιστραφήσεται δὲ τοῦ μὴ εἰκῇ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἀναστρέφεσθαι ἐν λόγῳ; καὶ πῶς ἔτι ἔσται τοιοῦτος οἷον αὐτὸν ἐπινοοῦμεν; 28ἀλλʼ ἄνευ τινὸς τοιαύτης γυμνασίας καὶ παρασκευῆς φυλάττειν οἷός τʼ ἐστὶ τὸ ἑξῆς; 29τοῦτο δεικνύτωσαν καὶ παρέλκει τὰ θεωρήματα ταῦτα πάντα, ἄτοπα ἦν καὶ ἀνακόλουθα τῇ προλήψει τοῦ σπουδαίου. 30τί ἔτι ἀργοὶ καὶ ῥᾴθυμοι καὶ νωθροί ἐσμεν καὶ προφάσεις ζητοῦμεν, καθʼ ἃς οὐ πονήσομεν οὐδʼ ἀγρυπνήσομεν ἐξεργαζόμενοι τὸν αὑτῶν λόγον; 31— ἂν οὖν ἐν τούτοις πλανηθῶ, μή τι τὸν πατέρα ἀπέκτεινα; — ἀνδράποδον, ποῦ γὰρ ἐνθάδε πατὴρ ἦν, ἵνʼ αὐτὸν ἀποκτείνῃς; τί οὖν ἐποίησας; ὃ μόνον ἦν κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἁμάρτημα, τοῦτο ἡμάρτηκας. 32ἐπεί τοι τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐγὼ Ῥούφῳ εἶπον ἐπιτιμῶντί μοι ὅτι τὸ παραλειπόμενον ἓν ἐν συλλογισμῷ τινι οὐχ εὕρισκον. οὐχ οἷον μέν, φημί, εἰ τὸ Καπιτώλιον κατέκαυσα, ὁ δʼ ἀνδράποδον, ἔφη, ἐνθάδε τὸ παραλειπόμενον Καπιτώλιόν ἐστιν. 33ἢ ταῦτα μόνα ἁμαρτήματά ἐστι τὸ Καπιτώλιον ἐμπρῆσαι καὶ τὸν πατέρα ἀποκτεῖναι, τὸ δʼ εἰκῇ καὶ μάτην καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν χρῆσθαι ταῖς φαντασίαις ταῖς αὑτοῦ καὶ μὴ παρακολουθεῖν λόγῳ μηδʼ ἀποδείξει μηδὲ σοφίσματι μηδʼ ἁπλῶς βλέπειν τὸ καθʼ αὑτὸν καὶ οὐ καθʼ αὑτὸν ἐν ἐρωτήσει καὶ ἀποκρίσει, τούτων δʼ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἁμάρτημα;
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA