Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER XXV. · On the same Subject.
1If these Things are true; and we are not stupid, or acting a Part, when we say, that the Good or Ill of Man consists in Choice, and that all besides is nothing to us; why are we still troubled? Why do we still fear? What hath been our Concern, is in no one's Power: what is in the Power of others, we do not regard. What Embarassment have we left? But direct me. Why should I direct you? Hath not Jupiter directed you? Hath he not given you what is your own, Incapable of Restraint, or Hindrance; and what is not your own, liable to both? What Directions, then, what Orders, have you brought from him? "By all Methods keep what is your own: what belongs to others, do not covet. Honesty, is your own: a Sense of virtuous Shame is your own. Who, then, can deprive you of there? Who can restrain you from making use of them, but yourself? And how do you do it? When you make that your Concern which is not your own, you lose what is." Having such Precepts and Directions from Jupiter, what sort do you still want from me? Am I better than He? More worthy of Credit? If you observe these, what others do you need? Or are not these Directions his? Produce your natural Preconceptions: produce the Demonstrations of Philosophers: produce what you have often heard, and what you have said yourself; what you have read, and what you have studied. How long is it right to observe these Things, and not break up the Game? As long as it goes on agreeably. A King is chosen at the Saturnalian Festival (for it was agreed to play at that Game): he orders; "Do you drink: you mix the Wine: you sing: you go: you come." I obey; that the Game may not be broken up by my Fault.——"Well: but I bid you think yourself to be unhappy." I do not think so: and who shall compel me to think so? Again: we agreed to play Agamemnon and Achilles. He who is appointed for Agamemnon, says to me; "Go to Achilles, and force away Briseis." I go. "Come." I come. 2We should converse in Life as we do in hypothetical Arguments. "Suppose it to be Night."——Well: suppose it.——"Is it Day, then?" No: for I admitted the Hypothesis, that it is Night.——"Suppose, that you think it to be Night."——Well: suppose it.——But think also, in reality, that it is Night."——That doth not follow from the Hypothesis. Thus, too, in the other Case. Suppose you have ill Luck.——Suppose it,——"Are you, then, unlucky?"——Yes.——"Have you some cross Demon."——Yes.——"Well: but think too [in earnest], that you are unhappy."——This doth not follow from the Hypothesis: and there is one who forbids me [to think so]. How long, then, are we to obey such Orders? As long as it is worth while: that is, as long as I preserve what is becoming and fit. 3Further: some are peevish and fastidious; and say, I cannot dine with such a Fellow, to be obliged to hear him all Day recounting, how he fought in Mysia. "I told you, my Friend, how I gained the Eminence. There I am besieged again." But another says, "I had rather get a Dinner, and hear him prate as much as he pleases." Do you compare the Value of these Things, and judge for yourself: but do not let it be with Depression, and Anxiety; and with a Supposition, that you are unhappy: for no one compels you to that. Is the House in a Smoke? If it be a moderate one, I will stay: If a very great one, I will go out. For you must always remember, and hold to this, that the Door is open, "Well: do not live at Nicopolis."——I will not live there.——"Nor at Athens."——Well: nor at Athens.——"Nor at Rome."——Nor at Rome neither.——"But you shall live at Gyaros."——I will live there. But living at Gyaros seems to me like living in a great Smoke, I will retire where no one can forbid me to live; (for that Abode is open to all) and put off my last Garment, this paultry Body of mine: beyond this, no one hath any Power over me. Thus Demetrius said to Nero; "You sentence me to Death; and Nature, you;" If I place my Admiration on Body, I give myself up for a Slave: if on an Estate, the same: for I immediately betray myself, how I may be taken. Just as when a Snake pulls in his Head, I say strike that Part of him which he guards: and be you assured, that whatever you shew a Desire to guard, there your Master will attack you. Remember but this, whom will you any longer flatter, or fear? But I want to sit where the Senators do. Do not you see, that by this you straiten yourself? You squeeze yourself? Why, how else shall I see the Show, in the Amphitheatre cleverly? Do not see it [at all], Man; and you will not be squeezed. Why do you give yourself Trouble? Or wait a little while; and when the Show is over, go sit in the Senators Places, and sun yourself. For remember, that this holds universally; we squeeze ourselves; we straiten ourselves: that is; our own Principles squeeze and straiten us. What is it to be reviled, for Instance? Stand by a Stone, and revile it; and what will you get? If you, therefore, would hear like a Stone, what would your Reviler be the better? But, if the Reviler hath the Weakness of the Reviled for an Advantage-ground, then he carries his Point.——"Strip him." "What do you mean by him?" "Take my Clothes; strip off them [if you will]."——"I have put an Affront upon you."——"Much Good may it do you." $. 4. These Things were the Study of Socrates; and, by this means, he always preserved the same Countenance. But we had rather exercise and study any thing, than how to become unrestrained and free. The Philosophers talk Paradoxes. And are there not Paradoxes in other Arts? What is more paradoxical, than the pricking any one's Eye, to make him see? If a Person was to tell this to one ignorant of Surgery, would not he laugh at him? Where is the Wonder then, if, in Philosophy too, many Truths appear Paradoxes to the Ignorant?
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (3)
- An Island in the Ægean Sea, to which the Romans used to banish Criminals.
- The Body, which Epictetus here compares to a Garment, is, by the sacred Writers, represented under the Figure of a House, or Tabernacle, Job iv. 19. 2 Pet. i. 13, 14. St. Paul with a sublime Rapidity of Expression, joins the two Metaphors together, 2 Cor. v. 2—4. as, indeed, the one is but a looser, the other a closer Covering. The same Apostle hath made use of the Figure of Clothing, in another Place, in a strikingly beautiful Manner, 1 Cor. xv. 53, 54.
- Anaxagoras is said, by some, and Socrates, by others, to have made the same Speech, on receiving the News of his being condemned to Death by the judges of Athens: and from one of them, probably, Demetrius borrowed it. Demetrius was Cynic Philosopher; and is mentioned with high Approbation by Seneca.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
On the same subject.
If these things are true; and if we are not stupid or insincere when we say that the good or ill of man lies within his own will, and that all beside is nothing to us, why are we still troubled? Why do we still fear? What truly concerns us is in no one’s power; what is in the power of others concerns not us. What embarrassment have we left?
But you must direct me.
Why should I direct you? Has not Zeus directed you? Has he not given you what is your own. incapable of restraint or hindrance; and what is not your own, liable to both? What directions, then, what orders, have you brought from him? By all means guard what is your own; what belongs to others do not covet. Honesty is your own; a sense of virtuous shame is your own. Who, then, can deprive you of these? Who can restrain you from making use of them, but yourself? And how do you do it? When you make that your concern which is not truly your own, you lose that which is. Having such precepts and directions from Zeus, what sort do you still want from me? Am I better than He, or more worthy of credit? If you observe these precepts, what others do you need? Are not these His? Apply the. recognized principles; apply the demonstrations of philosophers; apply what you have often heard, and what you have said yourself; what you have read, and what you have carefully studied.
How long is it right to devote one’s self to these things and not break up the game?
As long as it goes on well. A king is chosen at the Saturnalian Festival, supposing it to be agreed to play at that game; he orders: Do you drink; you mix the wine; you sing: you go; you come. I obey, that the game may not be broken up by my fault.
[Then he orders] bid you think yourself to be unhappy. I do not think so; and who shall compel me to think so?
Again, suppose we agree to play Agamemnon and Achilles. He who is appointed for Agamemnon says to me, Go to Achilles, and force away Briseis. I go. Come. I come. We should deal with life as with these imaginary orders.
Suppose it to be night. Well, suppose it. Is it day then? No; for I admitted the hypothesis, that it was night. Suppose that you think it to be night. Well, suppose it. But you must really think that it is night. That by no means follows from the hypothesis. Thus it is in the case illustrated. Suppose you have ill luck? Suppose it. Are you then unlucky? Yes. Are you thoroughly unfortunate? Yes. Well; but you must really regard yourself as miserable. But this is no part of the assumption, and there is a power who forbids me [to admit that].
How far, then, are we to carry such analogies? As far as is useful; that is, till we go farther than is reasonable and fit.
Moreover, some are peevish and fastidious, and say, I cannot dine with such a fellow, to be obliged to hear him all day recounting how he fought in Mysia. I told you, my friend, how I gained the eminence. There I begin to suffer another siege. But another says, had rather get a dinner, and hear him prate as much as he pleases.
Do you decide between these opinions; but do not let it be with depression and anxiety, and the assumption that you are miserable, for no one compels you to that. Is there smoke in my house? If it be moderate, I will stay; if very great, I will go out. For you must always remember, and hold to this, that the door is open. You are forbidden to live at Nicopolis. Then I will not live there. Nor at Athens. Well, nor at Athens. Nor at Rome. Nor at Rome. But you shall live at Gyaros. I will live there. But suppose that living at Gyaros seems to me like living in a great smoke. I can then retire where no one can forbid me to live, for it is an abode open to all, and put off my last garment, this poor body of mine; beyond this, no one has any power over me.
Thus Demetrius said to Nero: You sentence me to death; and Nature you. If I prize my body first, I have surrendered myself as a slave; if my estate, the same; for I at once betray where I am vulnerable. Just as when a reptile pulls in his head, I bid you strike that part of him which he guards; and be you assured, that wherever you show a desire to guard yourself. there your master will attack you. Remember but this, and whom will you any longer flatter or fear?
But I want to sit where the senators do.
Do not you see, that by this you incommode and torment yourself?
Why, how else shall I see the show in the Amphitheatre advantageously?
Do not insist on seeing it, O man! and you will not be incommoded. Why do you vex yourself? Or wait a little while; and when the show is over, go sit in the senators’ places and sun yourself. For remember, that this holds universally,—we incommode and torment ourselves; that is, our own preconceived notions do it for us. What is it to be reviled, for instance? Stand by a stone and revile it, and what will you get by it? If you, therefore, would listen only as a stone, what would your reviler gain? But if the reviler has the weakness of the reviled for a vantage-ground, then he carries his point.
Strip him [bids the tyrant]. What mean you by him? Take my clothes, strip them, at your pleasure. I meant only to insult you. Much good may it do you.
These things were the study of Socrates; and by these means he always preserved the same countenance. Yet we had rather exercise and study anything, than how to become unrestrained and free. But the philosophers talk paradoxes. And are there not paradoxes in other arts? What is more paradoxical than to prick any one’s eye, that he may see? Should one tell this to one ignorant of surgery, would not he laugh at him? What wonder then, if in philosophy also many truths appear paradoxes to the ignorant?
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Higginson’s notes (1)
- An island in the Aegean Sea , to which the Romans used to banish criminals.—C.
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
On the same.
If these things are true, and if we are not silly, and are not acting hypocritically when we say that the good of man is in the will, and the evil too, and that every thing else does not concern us, why are we still disturbed, why are we still afraid? The things about which we have been busied are in no man’s power: and the things which are in the power of others, we care not for. What kind of trouble have we still?
But give me directions. Why should I give you directions? has not Zeus given you directions? Has he not given to you what is your own free from hindrance and free from impediment, and what is not your own subject to hindrance and impediment? What directions then, what kind of orders did you bring when you came from him? Keep by every means what is your own; do not desire what belongs to others. Fidelity (integrity) is your own, virtuous shame is your own; who then can take these things from you? who else than yourself will hinder you from using them? But how do you act? when you seek what is not your own, you lose that which is your own. Having such promptings and commands from Zeus, what kind do you still ask from me? Am I more powerful than he, am I more worthy of confidence? But if you observe these, do you want any others besides? Well, but he has not given these orders, you will say. Produce your praecognitions (προλήψεις), produce the proofs of philosophers, produce what you have often heard, and produce what you have said yourself, produce what you have read, produce what you have meditated on; and you will then see that all these things are from God. How long then is it fit to observe these precepts from God, and not to break up the play? As long as the play is continued with propriety. In the Saturnalia a king is chosen by lot, for it has been the custom to play at this game. The king commands: Do you drink, Do you mix the wine, Do you sing, Do you go, Do you come. I obey that the game may not be broken up through me.—But if he says, think that you are in evil plight: I answer, I do not think so; and who will compel me to think so? Further, we agreed to play Agamemnon and Achilles. He who is appointed to play Agamemnon says to me, Go to Achilles and tear from him Briseis. I go. He says, Come, and I come.
For as we behave in the matter of hypothetical arguments, so ought we to do in life. Suppose it to be night. I suppose that it is night. Well then; is it day? No, for I admitted the hypothesis that it was night. Suppose that you think that it is night? Suppose that I do. But also think that it is night. That is not consistent with the hypothesis. So in this case also: Suppose that you are unfortunate. Well, suppose so. Are you then unhappy? Yes. Well then are you troubled with an unfavorable daemon (fortune)? Yes. But think also that you are in misery. This is not consistent with the hypothesis; and another (Zeus) forbids me to think so.
How long then must we obey such orders? As long as it is profitable; and this means as long as I maintain that which is becoming and consistent. Further, some men are sour and of bad temper, and they say, I cannot sup with this man to be obliged to hear him telling daily how he fought in Mysia : I told you, brother, how I ascended the hill: then I began to be besieged again. But another says, I prefer to get my supper and to hear him talk as much as he likes. And do you compare these estimates (judgments): only do nothing in a depressed mood, nor as one afflicted, nor as thinking that you are in misery, for no man compels you to that.—Has it smoked in the chamber? If the smoke is moderate, I will stay; if it is excessive, I go out: for you must always remember this and hold it fast, that the door is open.—Well, but you say to me, Do not live in Nicopolis. I will not live there.—Nor in Athens.— I will not live in Athens.—Nor in Rome.—I will not live in Rome.—Live in Gyarus.—I will live in Gyarus, but it seems like a great smoke to live in Gyarus; and I depart to the place where no man will hinder me from living, for that dwelling place is open to all; and as to the last garment, that is the poor body, no one has any power over me beyond this. This was the reason why Demetrius said to Nero, You threaten me with death, but nature threatens you. If I set my admiration on the poor body, I have given myself up to be a slave: if on my little possessions, I also make myself a slave: for I immediately make it plain with what I may be caught; as if the snake draws in his head, I tell you to strike that part of him which be guards; and do you be assured that whatever part you choose to guard, that part your master will attack. Remembering this whom will you still flatter or fear?
But I should like to sit where the Senators sit.—Do you see that you are putting yourself in straits, you are squeezing yourself.—How then shall I see well in any other way in the amphitheatre? Man, do not be a spectator at all; and you will not be squeezed. Why do you give yourself trouble? Or wait a little, and when the spectacle is over, seat yourself in the place reserved for the Senators and sun yourself. For remember this general truth, that it is we who squeeze ourselves, who put ourselves in straits; that is our opinions squeeze us and put us in straits. For what is it to be reviled? Stand by a stone and revile it; and what will you gain? If then a man listens like a stone, what profit is there to the reviler? But if the reviler has as a stepping-stone (or ladder) the weakness of him who is reviled, then he accomplishes something.—Strip him.—What do you mean by him?— Lay hold of his garment, strip it off. I have insulted you. Much good may it do you.
This was the practice of Socrates: this was the reason why he always had one face. But we choose to practise and study any thing rather than the means by which we shall be unimpeded and free. You say, Philosophers talk paradoxes. But are there no paradoxes in the other arts? and what is more paradoxical than to puncture a man’s eye in order that he may see? If any one said this to a man ignorant of the surgical art, would he not ridicule the speaker? Where is the wonder then if in philosophy also many things which are true appear paradoxical to the inexperienced?
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (9)
- The conclusion and you will then see, is not in the text, but it is what Epictetus means. The argument is complete. If we admit the existence of God, and that he is our father, as Epictetus teaches, we have from him the intellectual powers which we possess; and those men in whom these powers have been roused to activity, and are exercised, require no other instructor. It is true that in a large part of mankind these powers are inactive and are not exercised, or if they are exercised, it is in a very imperfect way. But those who contemplate the improvement of the human race, hope that all men, or if not all men, a great number will be roused to the exercise of the powers which they have, and that human life will be made more conformable to Nature, that is, that man will use the powers which he has, and will not need advice and direction from other men, who professing that they are wise and that they can teach, prove by their teaching and often by their example that they are not wise, and are incapable of teaching. This is equally true for those who may deny or doubt about the existence of God. They cannot deny that man has the intellectual powers which he does possess; and they are certainly not the persons who will proclaim their own want of these powers. If man has them and can exercise them, the fact is sufficient; and we need not dispute about the source of these powers which are in man Naturally, that is, according to the constitution of his Nature.
- See the end of the preceding chapter. Upton compares Horace’s Incidere ludum (Epp. i. 14, 36) . Compare also Epictetus, ii. 16, 37.
- A festival at Rome in December, a season of jollity and license (Livy, xxii. 1). Compare the passage in Tacitus, Ann. xiii. 15 , in which Nero is chosen by lot to be king: and Seneca, De Constant. Sapient. c. 12, Illi (pueri) inter ipsos magistratus gerunt, et praetextam fascesque ac tribunal imitantur.
- Gyarus or Gyara a wretched island in the Aegean sea, to which criminals were sent under the empire at Rome . Juvenal, Sat. i. 73.
- See Schweighaeuser’s note.
- Demetrius was a Cynic philosopher, of whom Seneca (De Benef. vii. 1) says: He was in my opinion a great man, even if he is compared with the greatest. One of his sayings was; You gain more by possessing a few precepts of philosophy, if you have them ready and use them, than by learning many if you have them not at hand. Seneca often mentions Demetrius. The saying in the text is also attributed to Anaxagoras (Life by Diogenes Laertius) and to Socrates by Xeuophon (Apologia, 27).
- At Rome , and probably in other towns, there were seats reserved for the different classes of men at the public spectacles.
- See Schweighaeuser’s note.
- Paradoxes ( παράδοξα ), things contrary to opinion, are contrasted with paralogies ( παράλογα ), things contrary to reason (iv. 1. 173). Cicero says (Prooemium to his Paradoxes), that paradoxes are something which cause surprise and contradict common opinion; and in another place he says that the Romans gave the name of admirabilia to the Stoic paradoxes.—The puncture of the eye is the operation for cataract.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ἐστι καὶ μὴ βλακεύομεν μηδʼ ὑποκρινόμεθα ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐν προαιρέσει καὶ τὸ κακόν, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα πάντα οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τί ἔτι ταρασσόμεθα, τί ἔτι φοβούμεθα; περὶ ἃ ἐσπουδάκαμεν, τούτων ἐξουσίαν οὐδεὶς ἔχει· 2ὧν ἐξουσίαν οἱ ἄλλοι ἔχουσιν, τούτων οὐκ ἐπιστρεφόμεθα. ποῖον ἔτι πρᾶγμα ἔχομεν; 3— ἀλλὰ ἔντειλαί μοι. — τί σοι ἐντείλωμαι; ὁ Ζεύς σοι οὐκ ἐντέταλται; οὐ δέδωκέν σοι τὰ μὲν σὰ ἀκώλυ[σ]τα καὶ ἀπαραπόδιστα, τὰ δὲ μὴ σὰ κωλυτὰ καὶ παραποδιστά; 4τίνα οὖν ἐντολὴν ἔχων ἐκεῖθεν ἐλήλυθας, ποῖον διάταγμα; τὰ σὰ τήρει ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου, τῶν ἀλλοτρίων μὴ ἐφίεσο. τὸ πιστὸν σόν … · τίς οὖν ἀφελέσθαι δύναταί σου ταῦτα; τίς κωλύσει χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς ἄλλος εἰ μὴ σύ; σὺ δὲ πῶς; ὅταν περὶ τὰ μὴ σαυτοῦ σπουδάσῃς, τὰ σαυτοῦ ἀπώλεσας. 5τοιαύτας ἔχων ὑποθήκας καὶ ἐντολὰς παρὰ τοῦ Διὸς ποίας ἔτι παρʼ ἐμοῦ θέλεις; κρείσσων εἰμὶ ἐκείνου, ἀξιοπιστότερος; 6ἀλλὰ ταύτας τηρῶν ἄλλων τινῶν προσδέῃ; ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνος οὐκ ἐντέταλται ταῦτα; φέρε τὰς προλήψεις, φέρε τὰς ἀποδείξεις τὰς τῶν φιλοσόφων, φέρε ἃ πολλάκις ἤκουσας, φέρε δʼ ἃ εἶπας αὐτός, φέρε ἃ ἀνέγνως, φέρε ἃ ἐμελέτησας. 7μέχρις οὖ ν τίνος ταῦτα τηρεῖν καλῶς ἔχει[ς] καὶ τὴν παιδιὰν μὴ λύειν; 8μέχρις ἂν κομψῶς διεξάγηται. ἐν Σατορναλίοις λέλογχεν βασιλεύς· ἔδοξε γὰρ παῖξαι ταύτην τὴν παιδιάν. προστάσσει σὺ πίε, σὺ κέρασον, σὺ ᾆσον, σὺ ἄπελθε, σὺ ἐλθέ. ὑπακούω, ἵνα μὴ παρʼ ἐμὲ λύηται ἡ παιδιά. 9ἀλλὰ σὺ ὑπολάμβανε ὅτι ἐν κακοῖς εἶ. οὐχ ὑπολαμβάνω· καὶ τίς μʼ ἀναγκάσει ὑπολαμβάνειν; 10πάλιν συνεθέμεθα παῖξαι τὰ περὶ Ἀγαμέμνονα καὶ Ἀχιλλέα. καταταγεὶς Ἀγαμέμνων λέγει μοι πορεύου πρὸς τὸν Ἀχιλλέα καὶ ἀπόσπασον τὴν Βρισηίδα. πορεύομαι. 11ἔρχου. ἔρχομαι. ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποθετικῶν λόγων ἀναστρεφόμεθα, οὕτως δεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ βίου. ἔστω νύξ. ἔστω. τί οὖν; ἡμέρα ἐστίν; οὔ· ἔλαβον γὰρ ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ νύκτα εἶναι. 12ἔστω σε ὑπολαμβάνειν ὅτι νύξ ἐστιν. ἔστω. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπόλαβε ὅτι νύξ ἐστιν. οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ ὑποθέσει. 13οὕτως καὶ ἐνταῦθα. ἔστω σε εἶναι δυστυχῆ. ἔστω. ἆρʼ οὖν ἀτυχὴς εἶ; ναί. τί οὖν; κακοδαιμονεῖς; ναί. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπόλαβε ὅτι ἐν κακοῖς εἶ. οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ ὑποθέσει· καὶ ἄλλος με κωλύει. 14μέχρι πόσου οὖν ὑπακουστέον τοῖς τοιούτοις; μέχρις ἂν οὗ λυσιτελῇ, τοῦτο δʼ ἔστιν μέχρις ἂν οὗ σῴζω τὸ πρέπον καὶ κατάλληλον. 15λοιπὸν οἱ μέν εἰσι κακαύστηροι καὶ κακοστόμαχοι καὶ λέγουσιν ἐγὼ οὐ δύναμαι παρὰ τούτῳ δειπνεῖν, ἵνʼ αὐτοῦ ἀνέχομαι καθʼ ἡμέραν διηγουμένου, πῶς ἐν Μυσίᾳ ἐπολέμησεν· διηγησάμην σοι, ἀδελφέ, πῶς ἐπὶ τὸν λόφον ἀνέβην· πάλιν ἄρχομαι πολιορκεῖσθαι. 16ἄλλος λέγει ἐγὼ δειπνῆσαι θέλω μᾶλλον καὶ ἀκούειν αὐτοῦ ὅσα θέλει ἀδολεσχοῦντος. 17καὶ σὺ σύγκρινε ταύτας τὰς ἀξίας· μόνον μηδὲν βαρούμενος ποίει, μὴ θλιβόμενος μηδʼ ὑπολαμβάνων ἐν κακοῖς εἶναι· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδείς σε ἀναγκάζει. 18καπνὸν πεποίηκεν ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι; ἂν μέτριον, μενῶ· ἂν λίαν πολύν, ἐξέρχομαι. τούτου γὰρ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ κρατεῖν, ὅτι ἡ θύρα ἤνοικται. 19ἀλλὰ μὴ οἴκει ἐν Νικοπόλει. οὐκ οἰκῶ. μηδʼ ἐν Ἀθήναις. οὐδʼ ἐν Ἀθήναις. μηδʼ ἐν Ῥώμῃ. οὐδʼ ἐν Ῥώμῃ. ἐν Γυάροις οἴκει. οἰκῶ. ἀλλὰ πολύς μοι καπνὸς φαίνεται τὸ ἐν Γυάροις οἰκεῖν. 20ἀποχωρῶ, ὅπου μʼ οὐδεὶς κωλύσει οἰκεῖν· ἐκείνη γὰρ ἡ οἴκησις παντὶ ἤνοικται. 21καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον χιτωνάριον, τοῦτʼ ἔστι τὸ σωμάτιον, τούτου ἀνωτέρω οὐδενὶ οὐδὲν εἰς ἐμὲ ἔξεστιν. 22διὰ τοῦτο ὁ Δημήτριος εἶπεν τῷ Νέρωνι ἀπειλεῖς μοι θάνατον, σοὶ δʼ ἡ φύσις. 23ἂν δὲ τὸ σωμάτιον θαυμάσω, δοῦλον ἐμαυτὸν παραδέδωκα· ἂν τὸ κτησείδιον, δοῦλον. 24εὐθὺς γὰρ [ἐμ]αὐτὸς κατʼ ἐμαυτοῦ δηλῶ, τίνι ἁλωτός εἰμι. ὡς ὁ ὄφις ἐὰν συσπᾷ τὴν κεφαλήν, λέγω ἐκεῖνο αὐτοῦ τύπτε ὃ φυλάσσει. καὶ σὺ γίγνωσκε, ὅτι ὃ ἂν φυλάσσειν ἐθέλῃς, κατʼ ἐκεῖνο ἐπιβήσεταί σοι ὁ κύριος. 25τούτων μεμνημένος τίνα ἔτι κολακεύσεις ἢ φοβήσῃ; 26ἀλλὰ θέλω καθῆσθαι ὅπου οἱ συγκλητικοί.— ὁρᾷς ὅτι σὺ σαυτῷ στενοχωρίαν παρέχεις, σὺ σαυτὸν θλίβεις; 27— πῶς οὖν ἄλλως θεωρήσω καλῶς ἐν τῷ ἀμφιθεάτρῳ; — ἄνθρωπε, καὶ μὴ θεώρει καὶ οὐ μὴ θλιβῇς. τί πράγματα ἔχεις; ἢ μικρὸν ἔκδεξαι καὶ ἀχθείσης τῆς θεωρίας κάθισον εἰς τοὺς τῶν συγκλητικῶν τόπους καὶ ἡλιάζου. 28καθόλου γὰρ ἐκείνου μέμνησο, ὅτι ἑαυτοὺς θλίβομεν, ἑαυτοὺς στενοχωροῦμεν, τοῦτʼ ἔστιν τὰ δόγματα ἡμᾶς θλίβει καὶ στενοχωρεῖ. 29ἐπεὶ τί ἐστιν αὐτὸ τὸ λοιδορεῖσθαι; παραστὰς λίθον λοιδόρει· καὶ τί ποιήσεις; ἂν οὖν τις ὡς λίθος ἀκούῃ, τί ὄφελος τῷ λοιδοροῦντι; ἂν δʼ ἔχῃ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τοῦ λοιδορουμένου ὁ λοιδορῶν ἐπιβάθραν, τότε ἀνύει τι. 30περίσχισον αὐτόν. τί λέγεις αὐτόν; τὸ ἱμάτιον λάβε, περίσχισον. 31ὕβριν σοι πεποίηκα. καλῶς σοι γένοιτο. ταῦτα ἐμελέτα Σωκράτης, διὰ τοῦτο ἓν ἔχων πρόσωπον ἀεὶ διετέλει. ἡμεῖς δὲ θέλομεν πάντα μᾶλλον ἀσκεῖν καὶ μελετᾶν ἢ ὅπως ἀπαραπόδιστοι καὶ ἐλεύθεροι ἐσόμεθα. 32παράδοξα λέγουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις οὐκ ἔστι παράδοξα; καὶ τί παραδοξότερόν ἐστιν ἢ κεντεῖν τινος τὸν ὀφθαλμόν, ἵνα ἴδῃ; εἴ τις ἀπείρῳ τῶν ἰατρικῶν τοῦτο εἶπεν, οὐκ ἂν κατεγέλα τοῦ λέγοντος; 33τί οὖν θαυμαστὸν εἰ καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ πολλὰ τῶν ἀληθῶν παράδοξα φαίνεται τοῖς ἀπείροις;
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA