Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER VI. · Of Providence.
1From every Event that happens in the World, it is easy to celebrate Providence, if a Person hath but these two Circumstances in himself; a Faculty of considering what happens to each Individual, and a grateful Temper. Without the first, he will not perceive the Usefulness of Things which happen: and without the other, he will not be thankful for them. If God had made Colours, and had not made the Faculty of seeing them, what would have been their Use? None. On the contrary, if he had made the Faculty, without such Objects as fall under its Observation, what would have been the Use of that? None. Again: If he had formed both the Faculty and the Objects, but had not made Light? Neither in that Case would they have been of any Use. 2Who is it then that hath fitted each of these to the other? Who is it that hath fitted the Sword to the Scabbard, and the Scabbard to the Sword? Is it no one? From the very Construction of a complete Work, we are used to declare positively, that it must be the Operation of some Artificer, and not the Effect of mere Chance. Doth every such Work, then, demonstrate an Artificer; and do not visible Objects, and the Sense of Seeing, and Light, demonstrate one? Doth not the Difference of the Sexes, and their Inclination to each other, and the Use of their several Powers; do not these Things, neither, demonstrate an Artificer? Most certainly they do. 3But farther: This Constitution of Understanding, by which we are not simply impressed by sensible Objects; but take and substract from them; and add and compose something out of them; and pass from some to others absolutely remote: Is not all this, neither, sufficient to prevail on some Men, and make them ashamed of leaving an Artificer out of their Scheme? If not, let them explain to us what it is that effects each of these; and how it is possible that Things so wonderful, and which carry such Marks of Contrivance, should come to pass spontaneously, and without Design. What, then, do these Things come to pass for our Service only? Many for ours only; such as are peculiarly necessary for a reasonable Creature: but you will find many, common to us with mere Animals, Then, do they too understand what is done? Not at all: For Use is one Affair, and Understanding another. But God had Need of Animals, to make use of the Appearances of Things; and of Us to understand that Use. It is sufficient, therefore, for them to eat, and drink, and sleep, and continue their Species, and perform other such Offices as belong to each of them: but to us, to whom he hath given likewise a Faculty of Understanding, these Offices are not sufficient. For if we do not act in a proper and orderly Manner, and suitably to the Nature and Conftitution of each Thing; we shall no longer attain our End. For where the Constitution of Beings is different, their Offices and Ends are different likewise. Thus where the Constitution is adapted only to Use, there Use is alone sufficient: But where understanding is added to Use, unless that too be duely exercised, the End of such a Being will never be attained. 4Well then: each of the Animals is constituted either for Food, or Husbandry, or to produce Milk; and the rest of them for some other like Use: and for these Purposes what need is there of understanding the Appearances of Things, and being able to make Distinctions concerning them? But God hath introduced Man, as a Spectator of Himself, and his Works; and not only as a Spectator, but an Interpreter of them. It is therefore shameful that Man should begin, and end, where irrational Creatures do. He is indeed rather to begin there, but to end where Nature itself hath fixt our End; and that is in Contemplation, and Understanding, and in a Scheme of Life conformable to Nature. 5Take care, then, not to die without Spectators of these Things. You take a Journey to Olympia to behold the Work of Phidias, and each of you thinks it a Misfortune to die without a Knowledge of such Things: and will you have no Inclination to understand, and be Spectators of those Works, for which there is no need to take a Journey; but which are ready and at hand, even to those who bestow no Pains! Will you never perceive, then, either what you are, or for what you were born; nor for what Purpose you are admitted Spectators of this Sight? But there are some Things unpleasant and difficult, in Life. And are there none at Olympia? Are not you heated? Are not you crouded? Are not you without good Conveniencies for bathing? Are not you wet through, when it happens to rain? Do not you bear Uproar, and Noise, and other disagreeable Circumstances? But I suppose, by comparing all these with the Advantage of seeing so valuable a Sight, you support and go through them. Well: and [in the present Case] have not you received Faculties by which you may support every Event? Have not you received Greatness of Soul? Have not you received a manly Spirit? Have not you received Patience? What signifies to me any thing that happens, while I have a Greatness of Soul? What shall disconcert or trouble or appear grievous to me? Shall I not make use of my Faculties, to that Purpose for which they were granted me; but lament and groan at what happens? 6Oh, but my Nose runs. And what have you Hands for, Beast, but to wipe it? But was there then any good Reason, that there should be such a dirty Thing in the World? And how much better is it that you should wipe your Nose, than complain? Pray, what Figure do you think Hercules would have made, if there had not been such a Lion, and a Hydra, and a Stag, and unjust and brutal Men; whom he expelled and cleared away? And what would he have done, if none of these had existed? Is it not plain, that he must have wrapt himself up and slept? In the first place, then, he would never have become a Hercules, by slumbering away his whole Life in such Delicacy and Ease: or if he had, what Good would it have done? What would have been the Use of his Arm, and the rest of his Strength; of his Patience, and Greatness of Mind; if such Circumstances and Subjects of Action had not roused and exercised him? What then, must we provide these Things for ourselves; and introduce a Boar, and a Lion, and a Hydra, into our Country? This would be Madness and Folly. But as they were in being, and to be met with, they were proper Subjects to set off and exercise Hercules. Do you therefore likewise, being sensible of this, inspect the Faculties you have: and after taking a View of them, say, "Bring on me now, O Jupiter, what Difficulty thou wilt, for I have Faculties granted me by Thee, and Abilities by which I may acquire Honour and Ornament to myself."——No: but you sit trembling, for fear this or that should happen: and lamenting, and mourning, and groaning at what doth happen; and then you accuse the Gods. For what is the Consequence of such a Meanspiritedness, but Impiety? And yet God hath not only granted us these Faculties, by which we may bear every Event, without being depressed or broken by it; but, like a good Prince, and a true Father, hath rendered them incapable of Restraint, Compulsion, or Hindrance, and intirely dependent on our own Pleasure: nor hath he reserved a Power, even to himself, of hindering or restraining them. Having these Things free, and your own, will you make no Use of them, nor consider what you have received, nor from whom? But sit groaning and lamenting, some of you, blind to him who gave them, and not acknowledging your Benefactor; and others, basely turning yourselves to Complaints and Accusations of God? Yet I undertake to show you, that you have Qualifications and Occasions for Greatness of Soul, and a manly Spirit: but what Occasions you have to find Fault, and complain, do you show me.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (6)
- The Translation follows ουδαμως in Mr. Upton's Addenda.
- See Introduction, §. 7.
- The famous Statue of Jupiter Olympius.
- The Translation follows a conjectural Emendation of Mr. Upton's on this Passage.
- It was one Part of the Elegance of those Times, to bathe every Day.
- Epictetus probably introduces this ridiculous Complaint, in order to intimate, that others commonly made are little less so. See M. Antoninus, 1. viii. §. 50. of Gataker's Edition and the Glasgow Translation.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Of providence.
For every event that happens in the world it is easy to give thanks to Providence, if a person has but these two qualities in himself: a habit of closely considering what happens to each individual, and a grateful temper. Without the first, he will not perceive the usefulness of things which happen; and without the other, he will not be thankful for them. If God had made colors, and had not made the faculty of seeing them, what would have been their use? None. On the other hand, if he had made the faculty of observation, without objects to observe, what would have been the use of that? None. Again, if he had formed both the faculty and the objects, but had not made the light of day? Neither in that case would they have been of any use.
Who is it, then, that has fitted each of these to the other? Who is it that has fitted the sword to the scabbard, and the scabbard to the sword? Is there no such Being? From the very construction of a complete work, we are used to declare positively that it must be the operation of some artificer, and not the effect of mere chance. Does every such work, then, demonstrate an artificer, and do not visible objects, and the sense of seeing, and light, demonstrate one? Do not the difference of the sexes, and their inclination to each other, and the use of their several powers,—do not these things demonstrate an artificer? Most certainly they do.
But further; this constitution of understanding, by which we are not simply impressed by sensible objects, but take and subtract and add and combine, and pass from point to point by inference,—is not all this sufficient to prevail on some men, and make them ashamed of leaving an artificer out of their scheme? If not, let them explain to us what the power is that effects each of these, and how it is possible that chance should produce things so wonderful, and which carry such marks of design.
What, then, do these things belong to us alone?
Many, indeed,—such as are peculiarly necessary for a reasonable creature; but you will find many which are common to us with mere animals.
Then, do they too understand what happens?
Not at all; for use is one affair, and understanding another. But God had need of animals to make use of things, and of us to understand that use. It is sufficient, therefore, for them to eat, and drink, and sleep, and continue their species, and perform other such offices as belong to each of them; but to us, to whom He has given likewise a faculty of understanding, these offices are not sufficient. For if we do not proceed in a wise and systematic manner, and suitably to the nature and constitution of each thing, we shall never attain our end. For where the constitution of beings is different, their offices and ends are different likewise. Thus where the constitution is adapted only to use, there use is alone sufficient; but where understanding is added to use, unless that too be duly exercised the end of such a being will never be attained.
Well, then, each of the animals is constituted either for food, or husbandry, to produce milk, or for some other like use; and for these purposes what need is there of understanding things, and being able to discriminate concerning them? But God has introduced man, as a spectator of Himself and of his works; and not only as a spectator, but an interpreter of them. It is therefore shameful that man should begin and end where irrational creatures do. He is indeed to begin there, but to end where nature itself has fixed our end; and that is, in contemplation and understanding, and in a scheme of life conformable to nature.
Take care, then, not to die without the contemplation of these things. You take a journey to Olympia to behold the work of Phidias, and each of you thinks it a misfortune to die without a knowledge of such things; and will you have no inclination to see and understand those works for which there is no need to take a journey, but which are ready and at hand even to those who bestow no pains! Will you never perceive what you are, or for what you were born, or for what purpose you are admitted to behold this spectacle?
But there are in life some things unpleasant and difficult.
And are there none at Olympia? Are you not heated? Are you not crowded? Are you not without good conveniences for bathing? Are you not wet through when it happens to rain? Do you not have uproar, and noise, and other disagreeable circumstances? But, I suppose, by comparing all these with the merit of the spectacle, you support and endure them. Well, and have you not received faculties by which you may support every event [of life]? Have you not received greatness of soul? Have you not received a manly spirit? Have you not received patience? What signifies to me anything that happens, while my soul is above it? What shall disconcert or trouble or appear grievous to me? Shall I neglect to use my powers to that purpose for which I received them; and shall I lament and groan at every casualty?
True, no doubt; but I have such a disagreeable catarrh! Attend to your diseases, then, as best you can. Do you say it is unreasonable that there should be such a discomfort in the world?
And how much better is it that you should have a catarrh than complain? Pray, what figure do you think Hercules would have made if there had not been a lion, and a hydra, and a stag, and unjust and brutal men, whom he expelled and cleared away? And what would he have done if none of these had existed? Is it not plain that he must have wrapped himself up and slept? In the first place, then, he would never have become a Hercules by slumbering away his whole life in such delicacy and ease; or if he had, what good would it have done? What would have been the use of his arm and his strength, of his patience and greatness of mind, if such circumstances and subjects of action had not roused and exercised him?
What, then, must we provide these things for ourselves; and introduce a boar and a lion and a hydra into our country?
This would be madness and folly. But as they were in being, and to be met with, they were proper subjects to call out and exercise Hercules. Do you therefore likewise, being sensible of this, consider the faculties you have, and after taking a view of them say, Bring on me now, O Zeus, what difficulty thou wilt, for I have faculties granted me by thee, and powers by which I may win honor from every event? No; but you sit trembling, for fear this or that should happen, and lamenting and mourning and groaning at what doth happen; and then you accuse the gods! In what does such baseness end but in impiety? And yet God has not only granted these faculties by which we may bear every event without being depressed or broken by it, but, like a good prince and a true father, has placed their exercise above restraint, compulsion, or hindrance, and wholly within our own control; nor has he reserved a power, even to himself, of hindering or restraining them. Having these things free, and your own, will you not use them, nor consider what you have received, nor from whom? But you sit groaning and lamenting, some of you, blind to him who gave them, and not acknowledging your benefactor; while others basely turn themselves to complaints and accusations against God! I undertake to show you that you have means and faculties to exhibit greatness of soul, and a manly spirit; but what occasion you have to find fault and complain, do you show me if you can.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
Of Providence.
From everything which is or happens in the world, it is easy to praise Providence, if a man possesses these two qualities, the faculty of seeing what belongs and happens to all persons and things, and a grateful disposition. If he does not possess these two qualities, one man will not see the use of things which are and which happen; another will not be thankful for them, even if he does know them. If God had made colours, but had not made the faculty of seeing them, what would have been their use? None at all. On the other hand, if He had made the faculty of vision, but had not made objects such as to fall under the faculty, what in that case also would have been the use of it? None at all. Well, suppose that He had made both, but had not made light? In that case, also, they would have been of no use. Who is it then who has fitted this to that and that to this? And who is it that has fitted the knife to the case and the case to the knife? Is it no one? And, indeed, from the very structure of things which have attained their completion, we are accustomed to show that the work is certainly the act of some artificer, and that it has not been constructed without a purpose. Does then each of these things demonstrate the workman, and do not visible things and the faculty of seeing and light demonstrate Him? And the existence of male and female, and the desire of each for conjunction, and the power of using the parts which are constructed, do not even these declare the workman? If they do not, let us consider the constitution of our understanding according to which, when we meet with sensible objects, we do not simply receive impressions from them, but we also select something from them, and subtract something, and add, and compound by means of them these things or those, and, in fact, pass from some to other things which, in a manner, resemble them: is not even this sufficient to move some men, and to induce them not to forget the workman? If not so, let them explain to us what it is that makes each several thing, or how it is possible that things so wonderful and like the contrivances of art should exist by chance and from their own proper motion?
What, then, are these things done in us only? Many, indeed, in us only, of which the rational animal had peculiarly need; but you will find many common to us with irrational animals. Do they then understand what is done? By no means. For use is one thing, and understanding is another: God had need of irrational animals to make use of appearances, but of us to understand the use of appearances. It is therefore enough for them to eat and to drink, and to sleep and to copulate, and to do all the other things which they severally do. But for us, to whom He has given also the intellectual faculty, these things are not sufficient; for unless we act in a proper and orderly manner, and conformably to the nature and constitution of each thing, we shall never attain our true end. For where the constitutions of living beings are different, there also the acts and the ends are different. In those animals then whose constitution is adapted only to use, use alone is enough: but in an animal (man), which has also the power of understanding the use, unless there be the due exercise of the understanding, he will never attain his proper end. Well then God constitutes every animal, one to be eaten, another to serve for agriculture, another to supply cheese, and another for some like use; for which purposes what need is there to understand appearances and to be able to distinguish them? But God has introduced man to be a spectator of God and of His works; and not only a spectator of them, but an interpreter. For this reason it is shameful for man to begin and to end where irrational animals do; but rather he ought to begin where they begin, and to end where nature ends in us; and nature ends in contemplation and understanding, and in a way of life conformable to nature. Take care then not to die without having been spectators of these things.
But you take a journey to Olympia to see the work of Phidias, and all of you think it a misfortune to die without having seen such things. But when there is no need to take a journey, and where a man is, there he has the works (of God) before him, will you not desire to see and understand them? Will you not perceive either what you are, or what you were born for, or what this is for which you have received the faculty of sight? But you may say, there are some things disagreeable and troublesome in life. And are there none at Olympia? Are you not scorched? Are you not pressed by a crowd? Are you not without comfortable means of bathing? Are you not wet when it rains? Have you not abundance of noise, clamour, and other disagreeable things? But I suppose that setting all these things off against the magnificence of the spectacle, you bear and endure. Well then and have you not received faculties by which you will be able to bear all that happens? Have you not received greatness of soul? Have you not received manliness? Have you not received endurance? And why do I trouble myself about anything that can happen if I possess greatness of soul? What shall distract my mind or disturb me, or appear painful? Shall I not use the power for the purposes for which I received it, and shall I grieve and lament over what happens?
Yes, but my nose runs. For what purpose then, slave, have you hands? Is it not that you may wipe your nose?— Is it then consistent with reason that there should be running of noses in the world?—Nay, how much better it is to wipe your nose than to find fault. What do you think that Hercules would have been if there had not been such a lion, and hydra, and stag, and boar, and certain unjust and bestial men, whom Hercules used to drive away and clear out? And what would he have been doing if there had been nothing of the kind? Is it not plain that he would have wrapped himself up and have slept? In the first place then he would not have been a Hercules, when he was dreaming away all his life in such luxury and ease; and even if he had been one, what would have been the use of him? and what the use of his arms, and of the strength of the other parts of his body, and his endurance and noble spirit, if such circumstances and occasions had not roused and exercised him? Well then must a man provide for himself such means of exercise, and seek to introduce a lion from some place into his country, and a boar, and a hydra? This would be folly and madness: but as they did exist, and were found, they were useful for showing what Hercules was and for exercising him. Come then do you also having observed these things look to the faculties which you have, and when you have looked at them, say: Bring now, O Zeus, any difficulty that thou pleasest, for I have means given to me by thee and powers for honouring myself through the things which happen. You do not so: but you sit still, trembling for fear that some things will happen, and weeping, and lamenting, and groaning for what does happen: and then you blame the gods. For what is the consequence of such meanness of spirit but impiety? And yet God has not only given us these faculties; by which we shall be able to bear everything thing happens without being depressed or broken by it; but, like a good king and a true father, He has given us these faculties free from hindrance, subject to no compulsion, unimpeded, and has put them entirely in our own power, without even having reserved to Himself any power of hindering or impeding. You, who have received these powers free and as your own, use them not: you do not even see what you have received, and from whom; some of you being blinded to the giver, and not even acknowledging your benefactor, and others, through meanness of spirit, betaking yourselves to fault-finding and making charges against God. Yet I will show to you that you have powers and means for greatness of soul and manliness: but what powers you have for finding fault and making accusations, do you show me.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (10)
- Goethe has a short poem, entitled Gleich und Gleich (Like and Like): Ein Blumenglöckchen Vom Boden hervor War früh gesprosset In lieblichem Flor; Da kam ein Bienchen Und naschte fein:— Die miissen wohl beyde Für einander seyn.
- See Schweig.’s note. I have given the sense of the passage, I think.
- Cicero, De Off. i. c. 4, on the difference between man and beast.
- See Schweig,’s note, tom. ii. p. 84.
- The original is αὐτοῦ , which I refer to God; but it may be ambiguous. Schweighaeuser refers it to man, and explains it to mean that man should be a spectator of himself, according to the maxim, Γνῶθι σεαυτόν . It is true that man can in a manner contemplate himself and his faculties as well as external objects; and as every man can be an object to every other man, so a man may be an object to himself when he examines his faculties and reflects on his own acts. Schweighaeuser asks how can a man be a spectator of God, except so far as he is a spectator of God’s works? It is not enough; he says, to reply that God and the universe, whom and which man contemplates, are the same thing to the Stoics; for Epictetus always distinguishes God the maker and governor of the universe from the universe itself. But here lies the difficulty. The universe is an all-comprehensive term: it is all that we can in any way perceive and conceive as existing; and it may therefore comprehend God, not as something distinct from the universe, but as being the universe himself. This form of expression is an acknowledgment of the weakness of the human faculties, and contains the implicit assertion of Locke that the notion of God is beyond man’s understanding (Essay, etc. ii. c. 17).
- This work was the colossal chryselephantine statue of Zeus (Jupiter) by Phidias, which was at Olympia . This wonderful work is described by Pausanias (Eliaca, A, 11).
- Compare Persius, Sat. iii, 66— Discite, io, miseri et causas cognoscite rerum, Quid sumus aut quidnam victuri gign mur.
- Compare Antoninus, viii. 50, and Epictetus, ii. 16, 13.
- ἀφορμὰς . This word in this passage has a different meaning from that which it has when it is opposed to ὁρμή . See Gataker, Antoninus, ix. 1 (Upton). Epictetus says that the powers which man has were given by God: Antoninus says, from nature. They mean the same thing. See Schweighaeuser’s note.
- Compare Antoninus, ix. 1.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1ἀφʼ ἑκάστου τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γινομένων ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν ἐγκωμιάσαι τὴν πρόνοιαν, ἂν δύο ἔχῃ τις ταῦτα ἐν ἑαυτῷ, δύναμίν τε συνορατικὴν τῶν γεγονότων ἑκάστῳ καὶ τὸ εὐχάριστον. 2εἰ δὲ μή, ὁ μὲν οὐκ ὄψεται τὴν εὐχρηστίαν τῶν γεγονότων, ὁ δʼ οὐκ εὐχαριστήσει ἐπʼ αὐτοῖς οὐδʼ ἂν ἴδῃ. 3χρώματα ὁ θεὸς εἰ πεποιήκει, δύναμιν δὲ θεατικὴν αὐτῶν μὴ πεποιήκει, τί ἂν ἦν ὄφελος; 4— οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν. — ἀλλʼ ἀνάπαλιν εἰ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν πεποιήκει, τὰ ὄντα δὲ μὴ τοιαῦτα οἷα ὑποπίπτειν τῇ δυνάμει τῇ ὁρατικῇ, καὶ οὕτως τί ὄφελος; 5— οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν. 6— τί δʼ, εἰ καὶ ἀμφότερα ταῦτα πεποιήκει, φῶς δὲ μὴ πεποιήκει; — οὐδʼ οὕτως τι ὄφελος. — τίς οὖν ὁ ἁρμόσας τοῦτο πρὸς ἐκεῖνο κἀκεῖνο πρὸς τοῦτο; τίς δʼ ὁ ἁρμόσας τὴν μάχαιραν πρὸς τὸ κολεὸν καὶ τὸ κολεὸν πρὸς τὴν μάχαιραν; 7οὐδείς; καὶ μὴν ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς κατασκευῆς τῶν ἐπιτετελεσμένων ἀποφαίνεσθαι εἰώθαμεν, ὅτι τεχνίτου τινὸς πάντως τὸ ἔργον, οὐχὶ δʼ εἰκῇ κατεσκευασμένον. 8ἆρʼ οὖν τούτων μὲν ἕκαστον ἐμφαίνει τὸν τεχνίτην, τὰ δʼ ὁρατὰ καὶ ὅρας[ε]ις καὶ φῶς οὐκ ἐμφαίνει; 9τὸ δʼ ἄρρεν καὶ τὸ θῆλυ καὶ ἡ προθυμία ἡ πρὸς τὴν συνουσίαν ἑκατέρου καὶ δύναμις ἡ χρηστικὴ τοῖς μορίοις τοῖς κατεσκευασμένοις οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἐμφαίνει τὸν τεχνίτην; 10ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν· ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη τῆς διανοίας κατασκευή, καθʼ ἣν οὐχ ἁπλῶς ὑποπίπτοντες τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τυπούμεθα ὑπʼ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκλαμβάνομέν τι καὶ ἀφαιροῦμεν καὶ προστίθεμεν καὶ συντίθεμεν τάδε τινὰ διʼ αὐτῶν καὶ νὴ Δία μεταβαίνομεν ἀπʼ ἄλλων ἐπʼ ἄλλα τινὰ οὕτω πως παρακείμενα, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἱκανὰ κινῆσαί τινας καὶ διατρέψαι πρὸς τὸ ἀπολιπεῖν τὸν τεχνίτην; 11ἢ ἐξηγησάσθωσαν ἡμῖν τί τὸ ποιοῦν ἐστιν ἕκαστον τούτων ἢ πῶς οἷόν τε τὰ οὕτω θαυμαστὰ καὶ τεχνικὰ εἰκῇ καὶ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου γίνεσθαι. 12τί οὖν; ἐφʼ ἡμῶν μόνων γίνεται ταῦτα; πολλὰ μὲν ἐπὶ μόνων, ὧν ἐξαιρέτως χρείαν εἶχεν τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον, πολλὰ δὲ κοινὰ εὑρήσεις ἡμῖν καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα. 13ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ παρακολουθεῖ τοῖς γινομένοις ἐκεῖνα; οὐδαμῶς. ἄλλο γάρ ἐστι χρῆσις καὶ ἄλλο παρακολούθησις. ἐκείνων χρείαν εἶχεν ὁ θεὸς χρωμένων ταῖς φαντασίαις, ἡμῶν δὲ παρακολουθούντων τῇ χρήσει. 14διὰ τοῦτο ἐκείνοις μὲν ἀρκεῖ τὸ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν καὶ τὸ ἀναπαύεσθαι καὶ ὀχεύειν καὶ τἆλλʼ ὅσα ἐπιτελεῖ τῶν αὑτῶν ἕκαστον, ἡμῖν δʼ, οἷς καὶ τὴν παρακολουθητικὴν δύναμιν ἔδωκεν, 15οὐκέτι ταῦτʼ ἀπαρκεῖ, ἀλλʼ ἂν μὴ κατὰ τρόπον καὶ τεταγμένως καὶ ἀκολούθως τῇ ἑκάστου φύσει καὶ κατασκευῇ πράττωμεν, οὐκέτι τοῦ τέλους τευξόμεθα τοῦ ἑαυτῶν. 16ὧν γὰρ αἱ κατασκευαὶ διάφοροι, τούτων καὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰ τέλη. 17οὗ τοίνυν ἡ κατασκευὴ μόνον χρηστική, τούτῳ χρῆσθαι ὁπωσοῦν ἀπαρκεῖ· οὗ δὲ καὶ παρακολουθητικὴ τῇ χρήσει, τούτῳ τὸ κατὰ τρόπον ἂν μὴ προσῇ οὐδέποτε τεύξεται τοῦ τέλους. 18τί οὖν; ἐκείνων ἕκαστον κατασκευάζει τὸ μὲν ὥστʼ ἐσθίεσθαι, τὸ δʼ ὥστε ὑπηρετεῖν εἰς γεωργίαν, τὸ δʼ ὥστε τυρὸν φέρειν, τὸ δʼ ἄλλο ἐπʼ ἄλλῃ χρείᾳ παραπλησίῳ, πρὸς ἃ τίς χρεία τοῦ παρακολουθεῖν ταῖς φαντασίαις καὶ ταύτας διακρίνειν δύνασθαι; 19τὸν δʼ ἄνθρωπον θεατὴν εἰσήγαγεν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἔργων τῶν αὐτοῦ, καὶ οὐ μόνον θεατήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξηγητὴν αὐτῶν. 20διὰ τοῦτο αἰσχρόν ἐστι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ καταλήγειν ὅπου καὶ τὰ ἄλογα, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἔνθεν μὲν ἄρχεσθαι, καταλήγειν δὲ ἐφʼ ὃ κατέληξεν ἐφʼ ἡμῶν καὶ ἡ φύσις. 21κατέληξεν δʼ ἐπὶ θεωρίαν καὶ παρακολούθησιν καὶ σύμφωνον διεξαγωγὴν τῇ φύσει. 22ὁρᾶτε οὖν, μὴ ἀθέατοι τούτων ἀποθάνητε. 23ἀλλʼ εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν μὲν ἀποδημεῖτε, ἵνʼ [ε]ἴδητε τὸ ἔργον τοῦ Φειδίου, καὶ ἀτύχημα ἕκαστος ὑμῶν οἴεται τὸ ἀνιστόρητος τούτων ἀποθανεῖν· 24ὅπου δʼ οὐδʼ ἀποδημῆσαι χρεία ἐστίν, ἀλλʼ ἐστὲ ἤδη καὶ πάρεστε τοῖς ἔργοις, ταῦτα δὲ θεάσασθαι καὶ κατανοῆσαι οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσετε; 25οὐκ αἰσθήσεσθε τοίνυν, οὔτε τίνες ἐστὲ οὔτʼ ἐπὶ τί γεγόνατε οὔτε [ἐπὶ] τί τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἐφʼ οὗ τὴν θέαν παρείληφθε; 26— ἀλλὰ γίνεταί τινα ἀηδῆ καὶ χαλεπὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ. — ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ δʼ οὐ γίνεται; οὐ καυματίζεσθε; οὐ στενοχωρεῖσθε; οὐ κακῶς λούεσθε; οὐ καταβρέχεσθε, ὅταν βρέχῃ; θορύβου δὲ καὶ βοῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων χαλεπῶν οὐκ ἀπολαύετε; 27ἀλλʼ οἶμαι ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα ἀντιτιθέντες πρὸς τὸ ἀξιόλογον τῆς θέας φέρετε καὶ ἀνέχεσθε. 28ἄγε δυνάμεις δʼ οὐκ εἰλήφατε, καθʼ ἃς οἴσετε πᾶν τὸ συμβαῖνον; μεγαλοψυχίαν οὐκ εἰλήφατε; ἀνδρείαν οὐκ εἰλήφατε; 29καρτερίαν οὐκ εἰλήφατε; καὶ τί ἔτι μοι μέλει μεγαλοψύχῳ ὄντι τῶν ἀποβῆναι δυναμένων; τί μʼ ἐκστήσει ἢ ταράξει ἢ τί ὀδυνηρὸν φανεῖται; οὐ χρήσομαι τῇ δυνάμει πρὸς ἃ εἴληφα αὐτήν, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀποβαίνουσιν πενθήσω καὶ στενάξω; 30ναί· ἀλλʼ αἱ μύξαι μου ῥέουσιν. τίνος οὖν ἕνεκα χεῖρας ἔχεις, ἀνδράποδον; οὐχ ἵνα καὶ ἀπομύσσῃς σεαυτόν; 31— τοῦτο οὖν εὔλογον μύξας γίνεσθαι ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ; 32— καὶ πόσῳ κρεῖττον ἀπομύξασθαί σε ἢ ἐγκαλεῖν; ἢ τί οἴει ὅτι ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἂν ἀπέβη, εἰ μὴ λέων τοιοῦτος ἐγένετο καὶ ὕδρα καὶ ἔλαφ[ρ]ος καὶ σῦς καὶ ἄδικοί τινες ἄνθρωποι καὶ θηριώδεις, οὓς ἐκεῖνος ἐξήλαυνεν καὶ ἐκάθαιρεν; 33καὶ τί ἂν ἐποίει μηδενὸς τοιούτου γεγονότος; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἐντετυλιγμένος ἂν ἐκάθευδεν; οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο Ἡρακλῆς ἐν τρυφῇ τοιαύτῃ καὶ ἡσυχίᾳ νυστάζων ὅλον τὸν βίον· εἰ δʼ ἄρα καὶ ἐγένετο, τί ὄφελος αὐτοῦ; 34τίς δὲ χρῆσις τῶν βραχιόνων τῶν ἐκείνου καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀλκῆς καὶ καρτερίας καὶ γενναιότητος, εἰ μὴ τοιαῦταί τινες αὐτὸν περιστάσεις καὶ ὗλαι διέσεισαν καὶ ἐγύμνασαν; 35τί οὖν; αὑτῷ ταύτας ἔδει κατασκευάζειν καὶ ζητεῖν ποθεν λέοντα εἰσαγαγεῖν εἰς τὴν χώραν τὴν αὑτοῦ καὶ σῦν καὶ ὕδραν; 36μωρία τοῦτο καὶ μανία. γενόμενα δὲ καὶ εὑρεθέντα εὔχρηστα ἦν πρὸς τὸ δεῖξαι καὶ γυμνάσαι τὸν Ἡρακλέα. 37ἄγε οὖν καὶ σὺ τούτων αἰσθόμενος ἀπόβλεψον εἰς τὰς δυνάμεις ἃς ἔχεις καὶ ἀπιδὼν εἰπὲ φέρε νῦν, ὦ Ζεῦ, ἣν θέλεις περίστασιν· ἔχω γὰρ παρασκευὴν ἐκ σοῦ μοι δεδομένην καὶ ἀφορμὰς πρὸς τὸ κοσμῆσαι διὰ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐμαυτόν 38οὔ· ἀλλὰ κάθησθε τὰ μὲν μὴ συμβῇ τρέμοντες, τῶν δὲ συμβαινόντων ὀδυρόμενοι καὶ πενθοῦντες καὶ στένοντες· εἶτα τοῖς θεοῖς ἐγκαλεῖτε. 39τί γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλο ἀκόλουθον τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀγεννείᾳ ἢ καὶ ἀσέβεια; 40καίτοι ὅ γε θεὸς οὐ μόνον ἔδωκεν ἡμῖν τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας, καθʼ ἃς οἴσομεν πᾶν τὸ ἀποβαῖνον μὴ ταπεινούμενοι μηδὲ συγκλώμενοι ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλʼ ὃ ἦν ἀγαθοῦ βασιλέως καὶ ταῖς ἀληθείαις πατρός, ἀκώλυτον τοῦτο ἔδωκεν, ἀνανάγκαστον, ἀπαραπόδιστον, ὅλον αὐτὸ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ἐποίησεν οὐδʼ αὑτῷ τινα πρὸς τοῦτο ἰσχὺν ἀπολιπών, ὥστε κωλῦσαι ἢ ἐμποδίσαι. 41ταῦτα ἔχοντες ἐλεύθερα καὶ ὑμέτερα μὴ χρῆσθε αὐτοῖς μηδʼ αἰσθάνεσθε τίνα εἰλήφατε καὶ παρὰ τίνος, 42ἀλλὰ κάθησθε πενθοῦντες καὶ στένοντες οἱ μὲν πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν δόντα ἀποτετυφλωμένοι μηδʼ ἐπιγινώσκοντες τὸν εὐεργέτην, οἱ δʼ ὑπʼ ἀγεννείας εἰς μέμψεις καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα τῷ θεῷ ἐκτρεπόμενοι. 43καίτοι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν μὲν καὶ ἀνδρείαν ἐγὼ σοὶ δείξω ὅτι ἀφορμὰς καὶ παρασκευὴν ἔχεις, πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέμφεσθαι καὶ ἐγκαλεῖν ποίας ἀφορμὰς ἔχεις σὺ δʼ ἐμοὶ δείκνυε.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA