(ed.) · trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874)
But moreover, the things that are boldly asserted by him concerning fantasies or imaginations are very opposite to Fate. For desiring to show that fantasy is not of itself a perfect cause of consent, he says, that the Sages will prejudice us by imprinting false imaginations in our minds, if fantasies do of themselves absolutely cause consent; for wise men often make use of falsity against the wicked, representing a probable imagination,—which is yet not the cause of consent, for then it would be also a cause of false apprehension and error. Any one therefore, transferring these things from the wise man to Fate, may say, that consents are not caused by Fate; for if they were, false consents and opinions and deceptions would also be by Fate, and men would be endamaged by Fate. Thus the reason which exempts the wise man from doing hurt also demonstrates at the same time that Fate is not the cause of all things. For if men neither opine nor are prejudiced by Fate, it is manifest also that they neither act rightly nor are wise nor remain firm in their sentiments nor have utility by Fate, but that there is an end of Fate’s being the cause of all things. Now if any one shall say that Chrysippus makes not Fate the absolute cause of all things, but only a procatarctical (or antecedent) one, he will again show that he is contradictory to himself, since he excessively praises Homer for saying of Jupiter, Receive whatever ill or good
He sends to each of you;
as also Euripides for these words, O Jove, how can I say that wretched we,
Poor mortals, aught do understand? On thee
We all depend, and nothing can transact,
But as thy sacred wisdom shall enact.
And himself writes many things agreeable to these. In fine, he says that nothing, be it never so little, either rests or is moved otherwise than according to the reason of Jupiter, which is the same thing with Fate. Moreover, the antecedent cause is weaker than the absolute one, and attains not to its effect when it is subdued by others that rise up against it. But he himself, declaring Fate to be an invincible, unimpeachable, and inflexible cause, calls it Atropos, Adrasteia, Necessity, and Pepromene (as putting a limit to all things). Whether then shall we say, that neither consents nor virtues nor vices nor doing well nor doing ill is in our power? Or shall we affirm, that Fate is deficient, that terminating destiny is unable to determine, and that the motions and habits of Jupiter cannot accomplish? For the one of these two consequences will follow from Fate’s being an absolute, the other from its being only antecedent cause. For if it is an absolute cause, it takes away our free will and leaves nothing in our power; and if it is only antecedent, it loses its being unimpeachable and effectual. For not once or ten times, but everywhere, especially in his Physics, he has written, that there are many obstacles and impediments to particular natures and motions, but none to that of the universe. And how can the motion of the universe, extending as it does to particular ones, be undisturbed and unimpeached, if these are stopped and hindered? For neither can the nature of man be free from impediment, if that of the foot or hand is not so; nor can the motion of a ship but be hindered, if there are any obstacles about the sails or the operation of the oars.
Besides all this, if the fantasies are not according to Fate, neither are they causes of consents; but if, because it imprints fantasies leading to consent, the consents are said to be according to Fate, how is it not contrary to itself, imprinting in the greatest matters different imaginations and such as draw the understanding contrary ways? For (they say) those who adhere to one of them, and withhold not their consent, do amiss: if they yield to obscure things, they stumble; if to false, they are deceived; if to such as are not commonly comprehended, they opine. And yet one of these three is of necessity,—either that every fantasy is not the work of Fate, or that every receipt and consent of fantasy is faultless, or that Fate itself is not irreprehensible. For I do not know how it can be blameless, pro posing to us such fantasies that not the resisting or going against them, but the following and yielding to them, is blamable. Moreover, both Chrysippus and Antipater, in their disputes against the Academics, take not a little pains to prove that we neither act nor are incited without consent, saying, that they build on fictions and false suppositions who think that, a proper fantasy being presented, we are presently incited, without having either yielded or consented. Again, Chrysippus says, that God imprints in us false imaginations, as does also the wise man; not that they would have us consent or yield to them, but only that we should act and be incited with regard to that which appears; but we, being evil, do through infirmity consent to such fantasies. Now the perplexity and discrepancy of these discourses among themselves are not very difficult to be discerned. For he that would not have men consent but only act according to the fantasies which he presents unto them—whether he be God or a wise man knows that the fantasies are sufficient for acting, and that consents are superfluous. For if, knowing that the imagination gives us not an instinct to work without consent, he ministers to us false and probable fantasies, he is the voluntary cause of our falling and erring by assenting to incomprehensible things.
trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874) · CC BY-SA
(ed.)’s notes (4)
- Il. XV. 109. The words or good are not found in Homer. (G.)
- Eurip. Suppliants , 734.
- That is, Unchangeable.
- That is, Unavoidable.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1895
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν λεγόμενα νεανικῶς πρὸς τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἐναντιοῦται. τὴν γὰρ φαντασίαν βουλόμενος οὐκ οὖσαν αὐτοτελῆ τῆς συγκαταθέσεως αἰτίαν ἀποδεικνύειν, εἴρηκεν ὅτι βλάψουσιν οἱ σοφοὶ ψευδεῖς φαντασίας ἐμποιοῦντες, ἂν αἱ φαντασίαι ποιῶσιν αὐτοτελῶς τὰς συγκαταθέσεις· πολλάκις γὰρ οἱ σοφοὶ ψεύδει χρῶνται πρὸς τοὺς φαύλους καὶ φαντασίαν παριστᾶσι πιθανήν, οὐ μὴν αἰτίαν τῆς συγκαταθέσεως ἐπεὶ καὶ τῆς ὑπολήψεως αἰτία τῆς ψευδοῦς ἔσται καὶ τῆς ἀπάτης. ταῦτʼ οὖν ἄν τις ἀπὸ τοῦ σοφοῦ μεταφέρων ἐπὶ τὴν εἱμαρμένην λέγῃ μὴ διὰ τὴν εἱμαρμένην γίγνεσθαι τὰς συγκαταθέσεις, ἐπεὶ διὰ τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἔσονται καὶ ψευδεῖς ῖς συγκαταθέσεις καὶ ὑπολήψεις καὶ ἀπάται καὶ βλαβήσονται διὰ τὴν εἱμαρμένην, ὁ τοῦ βλάπτειν τὸν σοφὸν ἐξαιρούμενος λόγος ἅμα καὶ τὸ μὴ πάντων αἰτίαν εἶναι τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἀποδείκνυσιν. εἰ γὰρ μήτε δοξάζουσι μήτε βλάπτονται διὰ τὴν εἱμαρμένην, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ κατορθοῦσιν οὐδὲ φρονοῦσιν οὐδʼ ὑπολαμβάνουσι βεβαίως οὐδʼ ὠφελοῦνται διὰ τὴν εἱμαρμένην, ἀλλʼ οἴχεται τὸ πάντων αἰτίαν εἶναι τὴν εἱμαρμένην. ὁ δὲ λέγων, ὅτι Χρύσιππος οὐκ αὐτοτελῆ τούτων αἰτίαν ἀλλὰ προκαταρκτικὴν μόνον ἐποιεῖτο τὴν εἱμαρμένην, ἐκεῖ πάλιν αὐτὸν ἀποδείξει μαχόμενον πρὸς αὑτόν, ὅπου τὸν μὲν Ὅμηρον ὑπερφυῶς ἐπαινεῖ περὶ τοῦ Διὸς λέγοντα τῷ ἔχεθʼ, ὅττι κεν ὔμμι κακὸν πέμπῃσιν ἑκάστῳ ἢ ἀγαθόν· καὶ τὸν Εὐριπίδην ὦ Ζεῦ, τί δῆτα τοὺς ταλαιπώρους βροτοὺς
φρονεῖν λέγοιμʼ ἄν; σοῦ γὰρ ἐξηρτήμεθα,
δρῶμέν τε τοιάδʼ, ἃ σύ γε τυγχάνεις φρονῶν.
αὐτὸς δὲ πολλὰ τούτοις ὁμολογούμενα γράφει, τέλος δέ φησι μηδὲν ἴσχεσθαι μηδὲ κινεῖσθαι μηδὲ τοὐλάχιστον ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς λόγον, ὃν τῇ εἱμαρμένῃ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι. ἔτι τοίνυν τὸ μὲν προκαταρκτικὸν αἴτιον ἀσθενέστερόν ἐστι τοῦ αὐτοτελοῦς καὶ οὐκ ἐξικνεῖται κρατούμενον ὑπʼ ἄλλων ἐξανισταμένων· τὴν δʼ εἱμαρμένην αἰτίαν ἀνίκητον καὶ ἀκώλυτον καὶ ἄτρεπτον ἀποφαίνων αὐτὸς Ἄτροπον καλεῖ καὶ Ἀδράστειαν καὶ Ἀνάγκην καὶ Πεπρωμένην ὡς πέρας ἅπασιν ἐπιτιθεῖσαν. πότερον οὖν τὰς συγκαταθέσεις μὴ λέγωμεν ἐφʼ ἡμῖν εἶναι μηδὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς μηδὲ τὰς κακίας μηδὲ τὸ κατορθοῦν μηδὲ τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν, ἢ τὴν εἱμαρμένην λέγωμεν ἐλλείπουσαν εἶναι καὶ τὴν πεπρωμένην ἀπεράτωτον καὶ τὰς τοῦ Διὸς κινήσεις καὶ σχέσεις ἀσυντελέστους; τούτων γὰρ ἕπεται τὰ μὲν τῷ αὐτοτελῆ τὰ δὲ τῷ προκαταρκτικὴν μόνον αἰτίαν εἶναι τὴν εἱμαρμένην. αὐτοτελὴς μὲν γὰρ αἰτία πάντων οὖσα τὸ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ ἑκούσιον ἀναιρεῖ, προκαταρκτικὴ δὲ τὸ ἀκώλυτος εἶναι καὶ τελεσιουργὸς ἀπόλλυσιν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἅπαξ ἢ δὶς ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ μᾶλλον δʼ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς φυσικοῖς γέγραφε ταῖς μὲν κατὰ μέρος φύσεσι καὶ κινήσεσιν ἐνστήματα πολλὰ γίγνεσθαι καὶ κωλύματα, τῇ δὲ τῶν ὅλων μηδέν. καὶ πῶς εἰς τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἡ τῶν ὅλων διατείνουσα κίνησις, ἐμποδιζομένων καὶ κωλυομένων ἐκείνων, ἀνεμπόδιστος αὐτὴ καὶ ἀκώλυτός ἐστιν; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ τἀνθρώπου φύσις ἀνεμπόδιστος, εἰ μηδʼ ἡ τοῦ ποδὸς ἢ τῆς χειρός· οὐδʼ τῆς νεὼς κίνησις ἀκώλυτος ἂν εἴη, ἂν αἱ περὶ τὸ ἱστίον ἢ τὴν εἰρεσίαν ἐνέργειαι κωλύσεις τινὰς ἔχωσιν. ἄνευ δὲ τούτων, εἰ μὲν αἱ φαντασίαι μὴ γίγνονται καθʼ εἱμαρμένην … τῶν συγκαταθέσεων· εἰ δʼ ὅτι ποιεῖ φαντασίας ἀγωγοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν συγκατάθεσιν, καθʼ εἱμαρμένην αἱ συγκαταθέσεις γίγνεσθαι λέγονται, πῶς οὐ μάχεται πρὸς ἑαυτὴν πολλάκις ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις διαφόρους ποιοῦσα φαντασίας καὶ περισπώσας ἐπὶ τἀναντία τὴν διάνοιαν, ὅτε τοὺς προστιθεμένους τῇ ἑτέρᾳ καὶ μὴ ἐπέχοντας ἁμαρτάνειν λέγουσιν· ἂν μὲν ἀδήλοις εἴκωσι, προπίπτοντας· ἂν δὲ ψευδέσι, διαψευδομένους· ἂν δὲ κοινῶς ἀκαταλήπτοις, δοξάζοντας; καίτοι δεῖ, τριῶν ὄντων, ἢ μὴ πᾶσαν εἶναι φαντασίαν εἱμαρμένης ἔργον ἢ πᾶσαν παραδοχὴν φαντασίας καὶ συγκατάθεσιν ἀναμάρτητον ἢ μηδʼ αὐτὴν τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἀνεπίληπτον οὐκ οἶδα γὰρ ὅπως ἀνέγκλητός ἐστι τοιαύτας ποιοῦσα φαντασίας, αἷς τὸ μὴ μάχεσθαι μηδʼ ἀντιβαίνειν ἀλλʼ ἕπεσθαι καὶ εἴκειν ἐγκλητόν ἐστι. καὶ μὴν ἔν γε τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς Ἀκαδημαϊκοὺς ἀγῶσιν ὁ πλεῖστος λόγος αὐτῷ τε Χρυσίππῳ καὶ Ἀντιπάτρῳ περὶ τίνος γέγονε; περὶ τοῦ μήτε πράττειν μήθʼ ὁρμᾶν ἀσυγκαταθέτως, ἀλλὰ πλάσματα λέγειν καὶ κενὰς; ὑποθέσεις τοὺς ἀξιοῦντας, οἰκείας φαντασίας γενομένης, εὐθὺς ὁρμᾶν μὴ εἴξαντας μηδὲ συγκαταθεμένους. αὖθις δέ φησι Χρὺσιππος καὶ τὸν θεὸν ψευδεῖς ἐμποιεῖν φαντασίας καὶ τὸν σοφόν, οὐ συγκατατιθεμένων οὐδʼ εἰκόντων δεομένους ἡμῶν, ἀλλὰ πραττόντων μόνον καὶ ὁρμώντων ἐπὶ τὸ φαινόμενον· ἡμᾶς δὲ φαύλους ὄντας ὑπʼ ἀσθενείας συγκατατίθεσθαι ταῖς τοιαύταις φαντασίαις. ἡ δὲ τούτων τῶν λόγων ταραχὴ καὶ διαφορὰ πρὸς αὐτοὺς οὐ πάνυ δυσθεώρητός ἐστιν. ὁ γὰρ οὐ δεόμενος συγκατατιθεμένων ἀλλὰ πραττόντων μόνον, οἷς ἐνδίδωσι τὰς φαντασίας, εἴτε θεὸς εἴτε σοφός, οἶδεν ὅτι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν ἀρκοῦσιν αἱ φαντασίαι καὶ παρέλκουσιν αἱ συγκαταθέσεις· ὡς εἴ γε, γιγνώσκων ὅτι πρακτικὴν ὁρμὴν οὐ παρίστησι φαντασία δίχα συγκαταθέσεως, ψευδεῖς ἐνεργάζεται καὶ πιθανὰς φαντασίας, ἑκὼν αἴτιός ἐστι τοῦ προπίπτειν καὶ ἁμαρτάνειν ἀκαταλήπτοις συγκατατιθεμένους.
Greek text, ed. 1895 · CC BY-SA