(ed.) · trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874)
Moreover, in his books against the same Plato, concerning Justice, he immediately at the very beginning leaps into a discourse touching the Gods, and says, that Cephalus did not rightly avert men from injustice by the fear of the Gods, and that his doctrine is easily misrepresented, and that it affords to the contrary many arguments and probabilities impugning the discourse concerning divine punishments, as nothing differing from the tales of Acco and Alphito (or Raw-Head and Bloody-Bones), with which women are wont to frighten little children from their unlucky pranks. Having thus traduced Plato, he in other places again praises him, and often alleges this saying of Euripides: Howe’er you may deride it, there’s a Jove,
With other Gods, who sees men’s woes above.
And likewise, in his First Book of Justice citing these verses of Hesiod, Then Jove from heaven punishments did send,
And plague and famine brought them to their end,
he says, the Gods do these things, that the wicked being punished, others admonished by these examples may less dare to attempt the doing of such things.
Again, in his book of Justice, subjoining, that it is possible for those who make pleasure a good but not the end to preserve also justice, he said in express terms: For perhaps if we leave this to pleasure, that it is a good but not the end, and that honesty is one of those things which are eligible for themselves, we may preserve justice, making the honest and the just a greater good than pleasure. So much he says in this place concerning pleasure. But in his book against Plato, accusing him for seeming to make health a good, he says, that not only justice, but also magnanimity, temperance, and all the other virtues will be taken away, if we make pleasure, health, or any thing else which is not honest, to be a good. What therefore is to be said for Plato, we have elsewhere written against him. But here his contradicting himself is manifest, when he says in one place, that if a man supposes that with honesty pleasure also is a good, justice is preserved, and in another, accuses those who make any thing besides honesty to be a good of taking away all the virtues. But that he may not leave any means of making an apology for his contradictions, writing against Aristotle concerning justice, he affirms him not to have spoken rightly when he said, that pleasure being made the end, justice is taken away, and together with justice, every one also of the other virtues. For justice (he says) will indeed be taken away; but there is nothing to hinder the other virtues from remaining and being, though not eligible for themselves, yet good and virtues. Then he reckons up every one of them by name. But it will be better to set down his own words. For pleasure, says he, appearing according to this discourse to be made the end, yet all this seems not to me to be contained in it. Wherefore we must say, that neither any of the virtues is eligible nor any of the vices to be avoided for itself, but that all these things are to be referred to the proposed scope. Yet nothing, according to their opinion, will hinder but that fortitude, prudence, continence, and patience may be good, and their contraries to be avoided. Has there ever then been any man more peevish in his disputes than he, who has blamed two of the principal philosophers, the one for taking away all virtue, by not making that only to be good which is honest, and the other for not thinking all the virtues except justice to be preserved, though pleasure is made the end? For it is a wonderful licentiousness that, discoursing of the same matters, he should when accusing Plato take away again those very things which himself sets down when reprehending Aristotle. Moreover, in his demonstrations concerning justice, he says expressly, that every good deed is both a lawful action and a just operation; but that every thing which is done according to continence, patience, prudence, or fortitude is a good deed, and therefore also a just operation. Why then does he not also leave justice to them to whom he leaves prudence, fortitude, and continence; since whatever they do well according to the said virtue, they do also justly?
trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874) · CC BY-SA
(ed.)’s notes (1)
- Works and Days , 242.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1895
ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς αὐτὸν Πλάτωνα περὶ Δικαιοσύνης εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐνάλλεται τῷ περὶ θεῶν λόγῳ καί φησιν οὔτʼ ὀρθῶς ἀποτρέπειν τῷ ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν φόβῳ τῆς ἀδικίας τὸν Κέφαλον, εὐδιάβλητὸν τʼ εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τοὐναντίον ἐξάγοντα πολλοὺς περισπασμοὺς καὶ πιθανότητας ἀντιπιπτούσας τὸν περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κολάσεων λόγον, ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέροντα τῆς Ἀκκοῦς καὶ τῆς Ἀλφιτοῦς, διʼ ὧν τὰ παιδάρια τοῦ κακοσχολεῖν αἱ γυναῖκες ἀνείργουσιν οὕτω δὲ διασύρας τὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐπαινεῖ πάλιν ἐν ἄλλοις καὶ προφέρεται τὰ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου ταυτὶ πολλάκις ἀλλʼ ἔστι, κεἴ τις ἐγγελᾷ λόγῳ,
Ζεὺς καὶ θεοὶ βρότεια λεύσσοντες πάθη·
καὶ ὁμοίως ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ Δικαιοσύνης τὰ Ἡσιόδεια ταυτὶ προενεγκάμενος τοῖσιν δʼ οὐρανόθεν μέγʼ ἐπήλασε πῆμα Κρονίων,
λιμὸν ὁμοῦ καὶ λοιμόν· ἀποφθινύθουσι δὲ λαοί·
ταῦτά φησι τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖν, ὅπως κολαζομένων τῶν πονηρῶν οἱ λοιποὶ παραδείγμασι τούτοις χρώμενοι ἧττον ἐπιχειρῶσι τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν πάλιν ἐν μὲν τοῖς περὶ Δικαιοσύνης ὑπειπὼν, ὅτι τοὺς ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ τέλος τιθεμένους τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνδέχεται σῴζειν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην, θεὶς τοῦτο κατὰ λέξιν εἴρηκε τάχα γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ αὐτῆς ἀπολειπομένης τέλους δὲ μή, τῶν δὲ διʼ αὑτῶν αἱρετῶν ὄντος καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ, σῴζοιμεν ἂν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἀπολιπόντες τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἡδονῆς. ταῦτα μὲν ἐν τούτοις περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς. ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς Πλάτωνα κατηγορῶν αὐτοῦ δοκοῦντος ἀγαθὸν ἀπολιπεῖν τὴν ὑγίειαν, οὐ μόνον τὴν δικαιοσύνην φησὶν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ἀναιρεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς ἁπάσας, ἂν ἢ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν ὑγίειαν ἤ τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὃ μὴ καλόν ἐστιν, ἀγαθὸν ἀπολίπωμεν. ἃ μὲν οὖν ῥητέον ὑπὲρ Πλάτωνος, ἐν ἄλλοις γέγραπται πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐνταῦθα δ’ ἡ μάχη καταφανής ἐστιν, ὅπου μέν, ἂν μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ τις ὑποθῆται καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, σῴζεσθαι δικαιοσύνην λέγοντος ὅπου δὲ πάλιν τοὺς μὴ μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀπολιπόντας αἰτιωμένου τὰς ἀρετὰς ἁπάσας ἀναιρεῖν. ἳνα δὲ μηδʼ ἀπολογίαν ὑπολίπῃ τοῖς ἐναντιώμασιν, Ἀριστοτέλει περὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀντιγράφων οὔ φησιν αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς λέγειν, ὅτι τῆς ἡδονῆς τέλους οὔσης ἀναιρεῖται μὲν ἡ δικαιοσύνη, συναναιρεῖται δὲ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἑκάστη τὴν μὲν γὰρ δικαιοσύνην ὑπʼ αὐτῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀναιρεῖσθαι, τὰς δʼ ἄλλας ἀρετὰς οὐδὲν κωλύειν ὑπάρχειν, εἰ καὶ μὴ διʼ αὑτὰς αἱρετὰς ἀλλʼ ἀγαθὰς γοῦν καὶ ἀρετὰς ἐσομένας· εἶθʼ ἑκάστην ἐξ ὀνόματος προσαγορεύει. βέλτιον δὲ τὰς ἐκείνου λέξεις ἀναλαβεῖν τῆς γὰρ ἡδονῆς φησὶν ἐμφαινομένης τέλους κατὰ τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον, τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτο πᾶν μοι δοκεῖ οὐκ ἐμπεριλαμβάνεσθαι· διὸ ῥητέον μήτε τῶν ἀρετῶν τινα διʼ αὑτὴν αἱρετὴν εἶναι μήτε τῶν κακιῶν φευκτήν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ταῦτα δεῖν ἀναφέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸν ὑποκείμενον σκοπόν· οὐδὲν μέντοι κωλύσει κατʼ αὐτοὺς τὴν ἀνδρείαν μὲν καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἐγκράτειαν καὶ τὴν καρτερίαν καὶ τὰς ὁμοίας ταύταις ἀρετὰς εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τὰς δʼ ἐναντίας ὑπάρχειν φευκτάς. τίς οὖν τούτου πρὸς λόγους ἰταμώτερος γέγονεν, ὃς δυεῖν τῶν ἀρίστων φιλοσόφων ἐγκέκληκε τῷ μὲν ὅτι πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἀναιρεῖ, μὴ μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀπολιπών· τῷ δʼ ὅτι τῆς ἡδονῆς τέλους οὔσης οὐ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἄνευ τῆς δικαιοσύνης σῴζεσθαι νομίζει; θαυμαστὴ γὰρ ἡ ἐξουσία περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων διαλεγόμενον, ἃ τίθησιν αὐτὸς ἐγκαλῶν Ἀριστοτέλει, ταῦτʼ ἀναιρεῖν πάλιν Πλάτωνος κατηγοροῦντα. καὶ μὴν ἐν ταῖς περὶ Δικαιοσύνης Ἀποδείξεσι λέγει ῥητῶς ὅτι πᾶν κατόρθωμα καὶ εὐνόμημα καὶ δικαιοπράγημά ἐστι· τὸ δὲ γε κατʼ ἐγκράτειαν ἢ καρτερίαν ἢ φρόνησιν ἢ ἀνδρείαν πραττόμενον κατόρθωμά ἐστιν· ὥστε καὶ δικαιοπράγημα πῶς οὖν, οἷς ἀπολείπει φρόνησιν καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ ἐγκράτειαν, οὐκ ἀπολείπει δικαιοσύνην, εὐθὺς αὐτῶν ὅσοι κατορθοῦσιν ἐν ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἀρεταῖς καὶ δικαιοπραγούντων;
Greek text, ed. 1895 · CC BY-SA