(ed.) · trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874)
Moreover, Plato having said, that injustice, as being the corruption and sedition of the soul, loses not its power even in those who have it within them, but sets the wicked man against himself, and molests and disturbs him; Chrysippus, blaming this, affirms that it is absurdly said, A man injures himself; for that injustice is to another, and not to one’s self. But forgetting this, he again says, in his demonstrations concerning justice, that the unjust man is injured by himself and injures himself when he injures another, becoming to himself the cause of transgressing, and undeservedly hurting himself. In his books indeed against Plato, contending that we cannot speak of injustice against one’s self, but against another, he has these words: For men cannot be unjust by themselves; injustice requires several on opposite sides, speaking contrary one unto another. But no such thing extends to one alone, except inasmuch as he is affected towards his neighbor. But in his demonstrations he has such discourses as these, concerning the unjust man’s being injurious also to himself: The law forbids the being any way the author of transgression, and to act unjustly will be transgression. He therefore who is to himself the author of acting unjustly transgresses against himself. Now he that transgresses against any one also injures him; therefore he who is injurious to any one whomsoever is injurious also to himself. Again: Sin is a hurt, and every one who sins sins against himself; every one therefore who sins hurts himself undeservedly, and if so, is also unjust to himself. And farther thus: He who is hurt by another hurts himself, and that undeservedly. Now that is to be unjust. Every one therefore that is injured, by whomsoever it is, is unjust also to himself.
trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874) · CC BY-SA
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1895
τοῦ δὲ Πλάτωνος; εἰπόντος τὴν ἀδικίαν ὡς διαφθορὰ ψυχῆς; οὖσα καὶ στάσις οὐδʼ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἔχουσιν ἀποβάλλει τὴν δύναμιν ἀλλʼ αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ συμβάλλει καὶ συγκρούει καὶ ταράττει τὸν πονηρόν, ἐγκαλῶν Χρύσιππος ἀτόπως φησὶ λέγεσθαι τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἑαυτόν εἶναι γὰρ πρὸς ἕτερον οὐ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τὴν ἀδικίαν· ἐπιλαθόμενος γὰρ τούτων αὖθις ἐν ταῖς περὶ Δικαιοσύνης Ἀποδείξεσιν ἀδικεῖσθαί φησιν ὑφʼ ἑαυτοῦ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα καὶ αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν, ὅταν ἄλλον ἀδικῇ, γιγνόμενον ἑαυτῷ τοῦ παρανομεῖν αἴτιον καὶ βλάπτοντα παρʼ ἀξίαν ἑαυτόν. ἐν μὲν τοῖς πρὸς Πλάτωνα ταῦτʼ εἴρηκε περὶ τοῦ τὴν ἀδικίαν λέγεσθαι μὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον· οὐ γὰρ κατʼ ἰδίαν ἄδικοι συνεστήκασιν ἐκ πλειόνων δὲ τοιούτων τἀναντία λεγόντων, καὶ ἄλλως τῆς ἀδικίας λαμβανομένης ὡς ἂν ἐν πλείοσι πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς οὕτως ἔχουσιν, εἰς δὲ τὸν ἕνα μηδενὸς διατείνοντος τοιούτου, καθʼ ὅσον δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πλησίον ἔχει οὕτως· ἐν δὲ ταῖς Ἀποδείξεσι τοιούτους ἠρώτηκε λόγους περὶ τοῦ τὸν ἄδικον καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν· παραίτιον γενέσθαι παρανομήματος ἀπαγορεύει ὁ νόμος, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐστι παρανόμημα· ὁ τοίνυν παραίτιος γενόμενος ἑαυτῷ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν παρανομεῖ εἰς ἑαυτόν· ὁ δὲ παρανομῶν εἰς ἕνα καὶ ἀδικεῖ ἐκεῖνον· ὁ ἄρα καὶ ὁντινοῦν ἀδικῶν καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖ πάλιν τὸ ἁμάρτημα τῶν βλαμμάτων ἐστί, καὶ πᾶς ἁμαρτάνων παρʼ ἑαυτὸν ἁμαρτάνει· πᾶς ἄρʼ ὁ ἁμαρτάνων βλάπτει ἑαυτὸν παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ ἀδικεῖ ἑαυτόν ἔτι καὶ οὕτως ὁ βλαπτόμενος ὑφʼ ἑτέρου ἑαυτὸν βλάπτει καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἑαυτὸν βλάπτει; τοῦτο δʼ ἦν τὸ ἀδικεῖν· ὁ ἄρʼ ἀδικούμενος καὶ ὑφʼ ὁτουοῦν πᾶς ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖ.
Greek text, ed. 1895 · CC BY-SA