(ed.) · trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874)
And these things indeed contain great contradictions to natural reason; but this is also repugnant to the doctrine concerning God and Providence, that assigning to them the least causes, he takes from them the most principal and greatest. For what is more principal than the permanency of the world, or that its essence, united in its parts, is contained in itself? But this, as Chrysippus says, fell out casually. For if the possession of place is the cause of incorruptibility, and this was the production of chance, it is manifest that the preservation of the universe is a work of chance, and not of Fate and Providence.
trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874) · CC BY-SA
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1895
καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἔχει μεγάλας ὑπεναντιώσεις πρὸς τὸν φυσικὸν λόγον· ἐκεῖνο δʼ ἤδη καὶ πρὸς τὸν περὶ θεοῦ καὶ προνοίας, τὸ τὰ μικρότατα τῶν αἰτίων τούτοις ἀνατιθέντα τὸ κυριώτατον ἀφαιρεῖσθαι καὶ μέγιστον. τί γάρ ἐστι κυριώτερον τῆς τοῦ κόσμου διαμονῆς καὶ τοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν ἡνωμένην τοῖς μέρεσι συνέχεσθαι πρὸς αὑτήν; ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε συμπέπτωκεν αὐτομάτως κατὰ Χρύσιππον. εἰ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ τόπου κατάληψις αἰτία τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ἐστὶν αὕτη δὲ συντυχίᾳ γέγονε, δῆλον ὅτι συντυχίας ἔργον ἡ σωτηρία τῶν ὅλων ἐστίν, οὐχ εἱμαρμένης καὶ προνοίας.
Greek text, ed. 1895 · CC BY-SA